@timber-js/app 0.2.0-alpha.21 → 0.2.0-alpha.211

package/src/shared/rsc-cache-key.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+/**
+ * The `_rsc` payload cache key — derived identically on both sides.
+ *
+ * The client puts this in the payload URL so the document and its Flight
+ * payload occupy different cache keys (TIM-1268). The server recomputes it
+ * from the received headers so a request cannot claim one client's key while
+ * sending another client's headers — see `server/rsc-cache-key-guard.ts`.
+ * Both sides must agree exactly, which is why the derivation lives here and
+ * not in either one.
+ *
+ * Isomorphic: no server or client imports. The browser bundle audit
+ * (`tests/client-bundle-audit.test.ts`) enforces the client half of that.
+ *
+ * See design/19-client-navigation.md §"The `_rsc` cache key".
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Digest length in hex characters. 128 bits: the origin guard compares a
+ * caller-supplied key against a recomputed one, so the relevant bound is a
+ * birthday attack (an attacker who can influence a victim's `X-Timber-URL`
+ * gets to search both sides), not second preimage. 64 bits would fall to
+ * ~2^32 work; 128 puts it at 2^64.
+ */
+const KEY_HEX_LENGTH = 32;
+
+/**
+ * Marks a value as a framework-issued key, and versions the derivation.
+ *
+ * Without it, an application value that happened to be 32 lowercase hex — an
+ * MD5, a token — is indistinguishable from a forged claim: both are "the
+ * right shape, the wrong digest", and no information in the value separates
+ * them. So the exemption cannot key on shape alone.
+ *
+ * The prefix resolves that because it is anchored to the address the
+ * victim's own client uses. A payload lives at `?_rsc=1.<digest>`, so
+ * anything aimed at that cache entry must carry the prefix and therefore
+ * gets validated; anything without it cannot be addressing a payload URL at
+ * all, and is exempt as application data. An attacker cannot both hit the
+ * victim's cache key and dodge the check.
+ *
+ * The version component also gives the derivation a migration path: the
+ * client and the origin must agree byte for byte, so a future change to the
+ * canonical form can be rolled out by bumping this instead of a flag day.
+ */
+const KEY_PREFIX = '1.';
+
+/**
+ * The request headers that vary an RSC payload response, in canonical
+ * casing — this list is also emitted verbatim as the response's `Vary`
+ * tokens (`server/pipeline.ts`), since "what varies the response" is one
+ * question with one answer, not two lists that happen to agree.
+ *
+ * This list is the contract, and it is enforced rather than trusted:
+ * `tests/rsc-cache-key.test.ts` asserts that the header names
+ * `buildRscHeaders()` can emit are exactly this set. A header added to the
+ * request without being added here fails that test, because a varying input
+ * outside the key is precisely the cache-poisoning hazard the key exists to
+ * close.
+ *
+ * **No credentials, session identifiers, or user-supplied content may be
+ * added.** Every value here is hashed into a URL, and URLs are logged by
+ * proxies, CDNs, and origin access logs. `fnv1aHash` is a cache-key hash,
+ * not a KDF — a low-entropy secret would be recoverable by brute force.
+ * Authentication travels on cookies, which never enter the key.
+ */
+export const RSC_KEY_HEADERS = [
+  'Accept',
+  'X-Timber-State-Tree',
+  'X-Timber-URL',
+  'X-Timber-Deployment-Id',
+] as const;
+
+/**
+ * Whether a value could be a key this module produced.
+ *
+ * `_rsc` is not a reserved parameter name — an application may already use
+ * it for its own search state, including for a value that happens to look
+ * like a digest. Anything without the `KEY_PREFIX` is therefore application
+ * data, not a claim on a payload cache key, and the origin guard leaves it
+ * alone rather than penalizing the response.
+ *
+ * Derived from `KEY_PREFIX` and `KEY_HEX_LENGTH` rather than spelled again,
+ * so the shape cannot drift from the digest that has to satisfy it.
+ *
+ * Ignoring a malformed value costs no protection: clients only ever send
+ * well-formed keys, so a URL bearing a malformed one is an address no
+ * legitimate request will ever ask for, and nothing can be poisoned at an
+ * address nobody reads.
+ */
+export function isRscCacheKeyShape(value: string): boolean {
+  if (!value.startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)) return false;
+  const digest = value.slice(KEY_PREFIX.length);
+  return digest.length === KEY_HEX_LENGTH && /^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(digest);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The query parameter carrying the payload cache key.
+ *
+ * Spelled here rather than at each of the four places that read or write it
+ * — the client that appends it, the origin guard that validates it, and the
+ * strip below — because it is a wire contract between two independent
+ * implementations, exactly like the digest itself.
+ */
+export const RSC_KEY_PARAM = '_rsc';
+
+// ─── Keeping the key out of application state ────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Decode one raw `name` or `value` the way `URLSearchParams` does:
+ * `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, so `+` is a space.
+ *
+ * Malformed percent-escapes throw in `decodeURIComponent`. `URLSearchParams`
+ * leaves those bytes as-is rather than throwing, and so do we — a pair we
+ * cannot decode is by definition not the framework's, so it is kept.
+ */
+function formDecode(raw: string): string {
+  try {
+    return decodeURIComponent(raw.replace(/\+/g, ' '));
+  } catch {
+    return raw;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove framework-issued `_rsc` values from a raw query string.
+ *
+ * Only values matching `isRscCacheKeyShape` are removed. `_rsc` is not a
+ * reserved name (see that function), so `/search?_rsc=foo` is application
+ * state and survives — the same exemption the origin guard applies, derived
+ * from the same predicate so the two cannot disagree about what "ours"
+ * means.
+ *
+ * Operates on the raw string rather than round-tripping through
+ * `URLSearchParams`, so every surviving pair keeps its original bytes.
+ * Re-serializing would rewrite `?b` as `?b=` and `?a=%7E` as `?a=~` on RSC
+ * navigations only, which is the same class of inconsistency this function
+ * exists to remove.
+ *
+ * Matching decodes the name, because `?%5Frsc=<key>` is a `_rsc` parameter
+ * as far as `URLSearchParams` is concerned — the same reasoning as the
+ * guard's fast path.
+ *
+ * @param search - `url.search`, with or without the leading `?`.
+ * @returns The query string including a leading `?`, or `''` if empty.
+ */
+export function stripRscCacheKey(search: string): string {
+  const query = search.startsWith('?') ? search.slice(1) : search;
+  if (query === '') return '';
+  const kept = query.split('&').filter((pair) => {
+    const eq = pair.indexOf('=');
+    if (formDecode(eq === -1 ? pair : pair.slice(0, eq)) !== RSC_KEY_PARAM) return true;
+    return !isRscCacheKeyShape(eq === -1 ? '' : formDecode(pair.slice(eq + 1)));
+  });
+  const result = kept.join('&');
+  return result === '' ? '' : `?${result}`;
+}
+
+/** A request's search state as application code should see it. */
+export interface AppVisibleSearch {
+  /** Parsed params, with the framework's cache key removed. */
+  params: URLSearchParams;
+  /** The matching raw query string — `''` or `?…`. */
+  search: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The search state application code sees, for any request URL.
+ *
+ * The `_rsc` key rides on the payload URL of every RSC navigation and on no
+ * other request, so reading search params straight off `req.url` makes the
+ * same page observe different search state depending on whether it was
+ * reached by a full load or a client navigation — and lets the cache key
+ * leak into whatever the page builds from it: a canonical URL, a pagination
+ * link, an analytics payload (TIM-1272).
+ *
+ * Every application-facing derivation of search state goes through here.
+ * `params` and `search` are returned together, from one strip, because they
+ * are two views of one answer and were previously two expressions that had
+ * to agree.
+ *
+ * The raw request URL is deliberately untouched: `server/rsc-cache-key-guard.ts`
+ * still reads the parameter from `req.url` to bind the key to the request.
+ */
+export function appVisibleSearch(url: URL): AppVisibleSearch {
+  const search = stripRscCacheKey(url.search);
+  return { params: new URLSearchParams(search), search };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads a header value by name. Must be case-insensitive — `Headers.get()`
+ * already is, and `recordLookup` below makes a plain record so.
+ */
+export type HeaderLookup = (name: string) => string | null | undefined;
+
+/**
+ * Compute the `_rsc` cache key for a request.
+ *
+ * Absent headers are omitted rather than sent as empty, so "header missing"
+ * and "header present but empty" produce different keys.
+ *
+ * Values are length-prefixed rather than delimiter-separated. Any delimiter
+ * can be forged by a value that contains it: with a `\0` separator, an
+ * `accept` of `a\nx-timber-url\0b` serializes identically to an `accept` of
+ * `a` alongside an `x-timber-url` of `b`, which would let one header claim
+ * another's key. HTTP forbids control characters in header values and both
+ * `fetch()` and the server runtime reject them, so this is defense in depth
+ * — but a length prefix is unambiguous for *any* content, which is a
+ * property worth having in a function whose whole job is to be agreed on by
+ * two independent implementations.
+ *
+ * SHA-256, truncated to 128 bits. A fast non-cryptographic hash is the
+ * obvious choice for a cache key and is the wrong one here: the origin
+ * *compares* this value against a recomputed one, which makes it a check.
+ * FNV-1a — used for timber's other cache keys — is a multiply-xor over a
+ * fixed field, so an attacker controlling a few bytes of any input (their
+ * own `X-Timber-URL`, say) can solve for a chosen digest rather than search
+ * for one, and forge a key belonging to somebody else.
+ *
+ * Returns `null` when no digest is available — `crypto.subtle` is absent in
+ * non-secure browsing contexts (plain `http://` on a LAN address). Callers
+ * must treat that as "no key", never as "key matches": the client omits the
+ * parameter and the server refuses to share-cache. That returns those
+ * clients to the pre-TIM-1268 posture, where `Vary` alone separates HTML
+ * from Flight — acceptable, because a non-secure origin has no shared-CDN
+ * caching story to protect in the first place.
+ */
+export async function rscCacheKey(lookup: HeaderLookup): Promise<string | null> {
+  const subtle = globalThis.crypto?.subtle;
+  if (!subtle) return null;
+  let canonical = '';
+  for (const name of RSC_KEY_HEADERS) {
+    const value = lookup(name);
+    if (value == null) continue;
+    // Lowercased in the canonical form so the two implementations cannot
+    // disagree over the casing of the constant they share.
+    canonical += `${name.toLowerCase()}:${value.length}:${value}`;
+  }
+  const digest = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(canonical));
+  let hex = '';
+  for (const byte of new Uint8Array(digest, 0, KEY_HEX_LENGTH / 2)) {
+    hex += byte.toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
+  }
+  return KEY_PREFIX + hex;
+}
+
+/**
+ * An unverifiable stand-in key, for the one case where the digest cannot be
+ * computed: `crypto.subtle` is absent in non-secure browsing contexts.
+ * `crypto.getRandomValues` is not gated that way, so it is available exactly
+ * where the digest is not.
+ *
+ * Carries `KEY_PREFIX` like any other key, so the origin reads it as a claim
+ * it cannot verify — and refuses to share-cache the response — rather than
+ * exempting it as application data. Lives here so the prefix has one home.
+ */
+export function randomRscCacheKey(): string {
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(KEY_HEX_LENGTH / 2);
+  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
+  return KEY_PREFIX + [...bytes].map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+}
+
+/** Build a case-insensitive lookup over a plain header record. */
+export function recordLookup(headers: Record<string, string>): HeaderLookup {
+  const lowered: Record<string, string> = {};
+  for (const name of Object.keys(headers)) {
+    lowered[name.toLowerCase()] = headers[name];
+  }
+  return (name) => lowered[name.toLowerCase()];
+}

package/src/shared/rsc-error-envelope.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * The hard-navigate error envelope shared by the server and the client router.
+ *
+ * A client-navigation (RSC) request cannot carry an error *page* — the response
+ * body must be Flight data or the decoder crashes. Instead the server answers
+ * with this envelope: an `X-Timber-Error: 1` header and a minimal JSON body.
+ * The client treats it as "give up on SPA navigation and hard-navigate", and
+ * the resulting document request renders the real error page as HTML.
+ *
+ * The header name lives here so the four server producers and the single
+ * client consumer cannot drift apart. See design/10-error-handling.md
+ * §"Error Page Rendering for Client Navigation".
+ */
+
+/** Header the client checks to decide whether to hard-navigate. */
+export const TIMBER_ERROR_HEADER = 'X-Timber-Error';

package/src/shared/rsc-manifest.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/**
+ * The RSC manifest — the shape the static build writes and the client reads.
+ *
+ * In `output: 'static'` there is no server at navigation time and a generated
+ * `.rsc` file carries no response headers, so anything a navigation would
+ * normally learn from headers has to be inlined here at build time.
+ *
+ * Route params used to be such a thing (TIM-1255, TIM-1285). They are not any
+ * more: they ride inside the payload, on its root row, so the
+ * `.rsc` file carries them the same way it carries the tree, and the static
+ * path stopped needing a special case (TIM-1294). What is left is the content
+ * hash, which genuinely cannot live inside the file it names.
+ *
+ * Declared once rather than in each half. The producer
+ * (`plugins/static-build.ts`) and the consumer (`client/rsc-fetch.ts`) each
+ * had their own copy, and the copies drifted the moment a field was added to
+ * one — a static SPA navigation then committed `null` for the field the
+ * producer was faithfully writing.
+ *
+ * Isomorphic: no server, client, or build-time imports.
+ */
+
+export interface RscManifestEntry {
+  /** The content-hashed URL the payload actually lives at, in route space. */
+  url: string;
+}
+
+/** Keyed by the unhashed `/_rsc/*.rsc` path. */
+export type RscManifest = Record<string, RscManifestEntry>;

package/src/shared/rsc-media-type.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/**
+ * The RSC Flight media type, and the request predicate over it.
+ *
+ * One module owns the string because two independently-written spellings of
+ * "is this an RSC request?" must agree, and the consequence of them
+ * disagreeing is cache poisoning rather than a visible bug. The Cloudflare
+ * adapter's `isRsc` decides what may enter the edge cache; the origin's
+ * pipeline decides which headers may vary the response. TIM-1269 made the
+ * adapter's `VARY_HONORED` allowlist exempt `Accept` *because* `isRsc`
+ * excludes Flight responses from the cache, and exempt the `X-Timber-*`
+ * headers *because* the origin reads them only behind its own RSC check. If
+ * one predicate is ever tightened (a real media-type parse, a
+ * parameter-aware match) and the other is not, the adapter can classify a
+ * request as a document while the origin treats it as RSC, and store a
+ * Flight payload under the document's key — the class
+ * `design/48-payload-addressing.md` exists to prevent.
+ *
+ * `tests/rsc-media-type-single-source.test.ts` fails if the literal reappears
+ * in executable source outside this file.
+ *
+ * Isomorphic: zero imports, so `adapters/cloudflare.ts` — which Node's native
+ * ESM loader evaluates before Vite's resolver exists — can load it and
+ * interpolate the value into the generated worker. Same precedent as
+ * `shared/rsc-cache-key.ts`.
+ *
+ * See design/19-client-navigation.md, design/25-production-deployments.md
+ * §"`Vary` and the Workers Cache API".
+ */
+
+/** Media type of a React Flight payload. */
+export const RSC_CONTENT_TYPE = 'text/x-component';
+
+/**
+ * Is this request asking for an RSC payload rather than a full document?
+ *
+ * Substring containment, deliberately: `Accept` is a list, and a client may
+ * send `text/x-component;charset=utf-8` or list it alongside other types.
+ * Tightening this to a real media-type parse is a behaviour change that has
+ * to move the adapter's generated `isRsc` in the same commit — see above.
+ */
+export function isRscRequest(req: Request): boolean {
+  return (req.headers.get('Accept') ?? '').includes(RSC_CONTENT_TYPE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Does this Content-Type header value designate an RSC Flight payload?
+ *
+ * Case-insensitive exact media-type match per RFC 9110 §8.3.1 — media types
+ * are case-insensitive. Parameters (`;charset=utf-8`) are stripped before
+ * comparison.
+ *
+ * Contrast with `isRscRequest`, which uses substring containment because
+ * `Accept` is a list of types. A `Content-Type` header names exactly one
+ * type, so substring would over-match (e.g. `text/x-component-v2`).
+ */
+export function isRscContentType(contentType: string | null): boolean {
+  if (!contentType) return false;
+  return contentType.split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase() === RSC_CONTENT_TYPE;
+}

package/src/shared/rsc-payload-path.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * Where a route's Flight payload lives in `output: 'static'`.
+ *
+ * The static build writes these files and the client fetches them, so the two
+ * halves must agree byte for byte. They used to state the naming rule
+ * separately — `plugins/static-build.ts` for the write and
+ * `client/rsc-fetch.ts` for the read — which is a duplicate representation with
+ * nothing checking it. One function now, called by both.
+ *
+ * ## The shape
+ *
+ * The payload path mirrors the HTML path: every route gets a directory and the
+ * artifact is the `index` inside it.
+ *
+ *   /           → /_rsc/index.rsc          (cf. index.html)
+ *   /about      → /_rsc/about/index.rsc    (cf. about/index.html)
+ *   /blog/hello → /_rsc/blog/hello/index.rsc
+ *
+ * That shape is **injective**, which the previous one (`/about` →
+ * `/_rsc/about.rsc`, root → `/_rsc/index.rsc`) was not: a site with both `/`
+ * and `/index` produced two payloads at `_rsc/index.rsc`, and the second write
+ * won silently — a client navigation to one route was served the other route's
+ * payload, same content type and same shape, undetectable downstream
+ * (TIM-1266).
+ *
+ * Injectivity holds because two distinct non-root routes give distinct
+ * directories, and the root's `/_rsc/index.rsc` has no directory component for
+ * a non-root route to occupy — reaching it would need an empty route path,
+ * which is not a route.
+ *
+ * Isomorphic: no server, client, or build-time imports.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The route-space path of a route's static Flight payload.
+ *
+ * @param routePath A route-space pathname: leading slash, no deployment base,
+ *   no query or fragment, no trailing slash (except the root `/`). Callers
+ *   normalize; this function does not, because the two callers normalize from
+ *   different sources (a browser URL, a build-time route entry).
+ */
+/**
+ * The directory, relative to the site root, that holds every static RSC
+ * payload. The one spelling: the build writes, hashes, and reports it as
+ * content-hashed from here.
+ */
+export const RSC_PAYLOAD_DIR = '_rsc';
+
+export function rscPayloadPath(routePath: string): string {
+  const prefix = routePath === '/' ? '' : routePath;
+  return `/${RSC_PAYLOAD_DIR}${prefix}/index.rsc`;
+}

package/src/shared/segment-info.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * The segment metadata wire contract between server and client.
+ *
+ * One declaration, imported by both ends. The producer
+ * (`server/rsc-entry/helpers.ts` → `X-Timber-Segments` and the
+ * `self.__timber_segments` bootstrap script) and the consumers
+ * (`client/segment-cache.ts`, the history stack, the prefetch cache) used to
+ * declare this shape separately, which is how a field gets added to one side
+ * only.
+ *
+ * See design/19-client-navigation.md §"X-Timber-State-Tree Header"
+ * See design/07-routing.md §"Intercepting Routes"
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Metadata for one rendered segment or slot, sent via `X-Timber-Segments`.
+ */
+export interface SegmentInfo {
+  /** The segment's URL path (e.g. `/`, `/feed`), or the slot key for slots. */
+  path: string;
+  /** Outlet key — includes route group name when applicable (e.g. `/(marketing)`). */
+  segmentId?: string;
+  /**
+   * The segment's directory path in `app/`, groups included and slots elided
+   * (e.g. `app/(browse)/feed` → `/(browse)/feed`). Absent on slot entries.
+   *
+   * This is the identity interception scoping compares against, and it is the
+   * reason it travels: `path`/`segmentId` are URL-addressed and collapse
+   * `(browse)/feed` and `(landing)/feed` to the same key, while a scope has to
+   * tell those two directories apart. See `computeSegmentTreePaths`.
+   */
+  treePath?: string;
+  isRequestDependent: boolean;
+  /** True for parallel route slot entries, keyed by slot path (e.g. `/@sidebar`). */
+  slot?: boolean;
+  /** Parent segment path for slot entries — attaches the slot to its SegmentNode. */
+  parentSegment?: string;
+  /** True when the slot's access.ts denied on this render. Denied slots are excluded from the state tree. */
+  denied?: boolean;
+  /** True when the slot was skipped (cached content reused). Payloads with skipped slots are not replayable. */
+  skipped?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Content key for slot entries — encodes owner parts, slot name, matched
+   * entry file, and slot params. The client stores and advertises this key;
+   * the server computes the destination key and checks membership.
+   * Replaces URL-based departing/destination diffing (TIM-1370).
+   */
+  contentKey?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The client's `X-Timber-State-Tree` request header.
+ *
+ * `segments` and `slots` are a caching optimization — they tell the server what
+ * the client can reuse. `treePaths` is not: it describes the *shape* of the
+ * tree currently on screen, so the server can answer "does the rendered route
+ * pass through the segment that owns this intercepting slot?" without
+ * re-deriving it from the address bar, which stops being the source route the
+ * moment a modal is open (TIM-1282).
+ *
+ * None of the three is a security input. Every `access.ts` runs regardless.
+ */
+export interface StateTree {
+  segments: string[];
+  slots?: string[];
+  treePaths?: string[];
+}

package/src/shared/slot-params.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/**
+ * Per-slot segment params — the one definition both halves of the API read.
+ *
+ * A parallel slot matches the URL through its *own* sub-tree, so it can derive
+ * a param the main route never had, or derive the same name with a different
+ * type (`[...year]` → `string[]` where the main route's `[year]` gave
+ * `string`). The server answers `getSegmentParams(slotPath)` from a per-slot
+ * map; the client answers `useSegmentParams(slotPath)` from the same map,
+ * published on the RSC payload (TIM-1285).
+ *
+ * The merge lives here rather than in either half because the two must agree
+ * about what "the slot's params" are — a divergence is invisible until
+ * somebody reads a param of the wrong type, which is exactly the class of bug
+ * this module closes.
+ *
+ * Isomorphic: no server or client imports.
+ *
+ * See design/41-global-params.md §"Params in a parallel slot".
+ */
+
+import type { CoercedParams } from './param-value.ts';
+
+/** Slot tree path → that slot's own coerced params. */
+export type SlotParamsRecord = Record<string, CoercedParams>;
+
+/**
+ * The params a slot sees: the main route's as a base, the slot's own on top.
+ *
+ * Params from segments *above* the slot are not re-derived by the slot's own
+ * chain, so they have to come from the main route; params the slot does
+ * re-derive may have a different type than the main route gave them, so the
+ * slot's win.
+ *
+ * Null-prototype, like every other param record the framework hands out
+ * (`coerceSegmentParams` installs one unconditionally). A spread literal would
+ * inherit `Object.prototype`, so a lookup for a param the route does not
+ * define would resolve to an inherited member — `params.constructor` returning
+ * a function instead of `undefined` — in the one param record that was built
+ * by merging. See design/13-security.md #36c.
+ */
+export function mergeSlotParams(
+  mainParams: CoercedParams,
+  slotParams: CoercedParams
+): CoercedParams {
+  return Object.assign(Object.create(null), mainParams, slotParams);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the params for a segment path against a published slot map.
+ *
+ * Returns the merge when `segmentPath` names a slot that published params,
+ * and the main route's record otherwise — an ordinary (non-slot) segment
+ * path, an unknown path, or a request with no slots at all. Mirrors the
+ * server's `getSegmentParams(segmentPath)` branch exactly.
+ *
+ * `Object.hasOwn` rather than `in` or a truthiness test: the map arrives from
+ * JSON, so a segment path of `constructor` or `toString` would otherwise
+ * resolve to an inherited member of `Object.prototype`.
+ */
+export function resolveSegmentParams(
+  mainParams: CoercedParams,
+  slotParams: SlotParamsRecord | null | undefined,
+  segmentPath: string | undefined
+): CoercedParams {
+  if (!segmentPath || !slotParams || !Object.hasOwn(slotParams, segmentPath)) return mainParams;
+  return cachedMerge(mainParams, slotParams, segmentPath);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The merged record for one (main record, slot map, path) triple, reused until
+ * one of the three changes.
+ *
+ * `useSegmentParams(slotPath)` calls this on every render. Returning a fresh
+ * object each time makes the hook's result change by reference on renders where
+ * nothing navigated, so a component using it as a `useEffect` dependency
+ * re-runs the effect — and re-renders in a loop if that effect sets state —
+ * while memoized children below it lose their memoization.
+ *
+ * Keyed on the *identities* of the two records, not their contents: both are
+ * replaced rather than mutated on every navigation (`ParamsProvider`'s memoized
+ * value and the server's per-request store), so identity is the correct
+ * equality here and a deep comparison would be slower and no more accurate.
+ *
+ * A `WeakMap` chain rather than a `Map`, so a superseded navigation's records
+ * and their merges become collectable as soon as nothing else holds them.
+ */
+const mergeCache = new WeakMap<object, WeakMap<object, Map<string, CoercedParams>>>();
+
+function cachedMerge(
+  mainParams: CoercedParams,
+  slotParams: SlotParamsRecord,
+  segmentPath: string
+): CoercedParams {
+  let bySlotMap = mergeCache.get(mainParams);
+  if (!bySlotMap) {
+    bySlotMap = new WeakMap();
+    mergeCache.set(mainParams, bySlotMap);
+  }
+  let byPath = bySlotMap.get(slotParams);
+  if (!byPath) {
+    byPath = new Map();
+    bySlotMap.set(slotParams, byPath);
+  }
+  const cached = byPath.get(segmentPath);
+  if (cached) return cached;
+  const merged = mergeSlotParams(mainParams, slotParams[segmentPath]);
+  byPath.set(segmentPath, merged);
+  return merged;
+}

package/src/shared/static-platform-files.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/**
+ * Platform files the static build is allowed to overwrite in the output.
+ *
+ * The build merges two trees into the deployed directory — the client bundle
+ * (which carries everything the user put in `public/`) and the pre-rendered
+ * site. That merge otherwise refuses overlaps, because a silent overwrite
+ * leaves one of two artifacts deployed with nothing recording which
+ * (TIM-1266).
+ *
+ * These names are the exception, and only because the pre-rendered copy is
+ * *derived from* the one it replaces rather than competing with it:
+ * `plugins/static-build.ts` reads `public/_redirects` and writes the
+ * generated rules plus the user's, so the winner is a superset of the loser.
+ *
+ * That holds only for a file the current pass produced, which is why
+ * `cleanConditionalArtifacts` deletes a previous build's `_redirects` before
+ * generation: written only when a pass finds redirects, it would otherwise
+ * survive into a pass that produced nothing and claim an exemption it no
+ * longer earns.
+ *
+ * `_headers` is NOT here. It is not written into the pre-rendered tree at
+ * all — adapters generate it directly into the output, folding in the
+ * user's copy as they go (TIM-1326).
+ *
+ * Declared once so the code that performs the merge and the code that
+ * produces the merged file cannot disagree about which names are exempt.
+ *
+ * Isomorphic: no server, client, or build-time imports.
+ */
+
+/** Platform redirect rules (Cloudflare Pages, Netlify). See TIM-1245/TIM-1249. */
+export const REDIRECTS_FILE = '_redirects';
+
+/** Platform header rules (Cloudflare Pages, Netlify). See TIM-1241/TIM-1326. */
+export const HEADERS_FILE = '_headers';
+
+/**
+ * Where a user authors platform files. Stated once because two modules read
+ * from here — `plugins/static-build.ts` for `_redirects`, adapters for
+ * `_headers` — and they must look in the same place.
+ *
+ * Both read the **project source**, never the build output. The generated
+ * file lands under the same name in the output directory, so a reader aimed
+ * there would fold the previous build's generated rules back in and compound
+ * them on every rebuild.
+ */
+export const USER_PLATFORM_DIR = 'public';
+
+/** Output-relative paths whose pre-rendered copy subsumes the `public/` one. */
+export const USER_MERGED_PLATFORM_FILES: readonly string[] = [REDIRECTS_FILE];
+
+/**
+ * Output paths the framework writes itself, which no route may claim.
+ *
+ * These are written outside the per-entry writer — `_redirects` after
+ * generation, `_headers` by the adapter after the copy — so the collision
+ * tracker never sees them and a route rendering to one of these paths is
+ * overwritten with nothing recording it.
+ *
+ * Reserved rather than tracked, because there is no version of "serve a route
+ * at `/_headers`" that works: Cloudflare Pages and Netlify read these two
+ * files themselves and never serve them, so the route is unservable however
+ * the conflict is resolved.
+ *
+ * That justification is per-file, not per-mechanism. `.nojekyll` is written
+ * the same way and is deliberately NOT here: only the `github-pages` target
+ * writes it, and everywhere else `/.nojekyll` is an ordinary servable path,
+ * so reserving it globally would refuse a valid Cloudflare site. Its write
+ * site skips the write when a file is already there instead — GitHub Pages
+ * only cares that the file exists.
+ *
+ * Same reasoning as the synthetic 404 entry using an internal urlPath so a
+ * real `/404` route cannot collide with `404.html`.
+ */
+export const RESERVED_OUTPUT_PATHS: readonly string[] = [REDIRECTS_FILE, HEADERS_FILE];