@timber-js/app 0.2.0-alpha.21 → 0.2.0-alpha.211

package/src/server/cookie-context.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+/**
+ * Cookie Context — per-request cookie API and on-the-wire helpers.
+ *
+ * Split out of `request-context.ts` (TIM-853) so the cookie subsystem
+ * — encoding contract, options grammar, parser, serializer, and RYW map
+ * — lives in one file. The headers/scope/params APIs
+ * stay in `request-context.ts` and call into this module via the
+ * exported helpers.
+ *
+ * See design/29-cookies.md for the encoding contract and read-your-own-
+ * writes semantics. See ONGOING_SECURITY.md H-3 (TIM-868) for the
+ * smuggling primitive that the encoding contract closes.
+ */
+
+import { requestContextAls, type RequestContextStore } from './als-registry.ts';
+import { isDebug } from './debug.ts';
+import {
+  ANY_COOKIE,
+  noteCookieReadForReactCache,
+  warnIfCachedCookieIsWritten,
+} from './react-cache-scope.ts';
+import {
+  assertValidCookieName,
+  assertValidCookieValue,
+  assertValidCookieOptions,
+} from '../cookies/validation.ts';
+import {
+  parseCookieHeader,
+  parseSetCookie,
+  safeDecodeCookieValue,
+  serializeCookieEntry,
+} from './cookie-parsing.ts';
+
+// Re-export the validators so framework-internal consumers and tests can
+// import the canonical implementation from the same module that hosts
+// `getCookies()`. The pure shared module lives in `cookies/validation.ts`
+// so the client `useCookie` hook can use the same checks without pulling
+// in the server ALS code.
+export { assertValidCookieName, assertValidCookieValue, assertValidCookieOptions };
+
+// ─── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Returns a cookie accessor for the current request.
+ *
+ * Available in middleware, access checks, server components, and server actions.
+ * Throws if called outside a request context (security principle #2: no global fallback).
+ *
+ * Read methods (.get, .has, .getAll) are always available and reflect
+ * read-your-own-writes from .set() calls in the same request.
+ *
+ * Mutation methods (.set, .delete, .clear) are only available in mutable
+ * contexts (middleware.ts, server actions, route.ts handlers). Calling them
+ * in read-only contexts (access.ts, server components) throws.
+ *
+ * This is the escape hatch for direct cookie jar operations. For typed
+ * cookie access, use `defineCookie()` instead.
+ *
+ * See design/29-cookies.md
+ */
+export function getCookieJar(): RequestCookies {
+  const store = requestContextAls.getStore();
+  if (!store) {
+    throw new Error(
+      '[timber] getCookieJar() called outside of a request context. ' +
+        'It can only be used in middleware, access checks, server components, and server actions.'
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Parse cookies lazily on first access
+  if (!store.parsedCookies) {
+    store.parsedCookies = parseCookieHeader(store.cookieHeader);
+  }
+
+  const map = store.parsedCookies;
+  return {
+    // Reads are noted (dev only) so a later write of the same cookie can
+    // warn if React.cache may have memoized the old value (TIM-1529 D3).
+    get(name: string): string | undefined {
+      noteCookieReadForReactCache(name);
+      return map.get(name);
+    },
+    has(name: string): boolean {
+      noteCookieReadForReactCache(name);
+      return map.has(name);
+    },
+    getAll(): Array<{ name: string; value: string }> {
+      noteCookieReadForReactCache(ANY_COOKIE);
+      return Array.from(map.entries()).map(([name, value]) => ({ name, value }));
+    },
+    get size(): number {
+      noteCookieReadForReactCache(ANY_COOKIE);
+      return map.size;
+    },
+
+    set(name: string, value: string, options?: SetCookieOptions): void {
+      assertMutable(store, 'set');
+      // Validate the name first — names cannot be URL-encoded (RFC 7230
+      // token grammar is strict), so a bad name is always a bug.
+      assertValidCookieName(name);
+      // Type guard with a guiding error. The single most common mistake
+      // is passing a non-string (object, number, Date) and expecting the
+      // framework to JSON-encode. Point developers at jsonCookieCodec.
+      if (typeof value !== 'string') {
+        throw new Error(
+          `[timber] getCookieJar().set(${JSON.stringify(name)}, …): value must be a string, got ${typeof value}.\n` +
+            `  To store a JSON-serializable value, use defineCookie + jsonCookieCodec:\n` +
+            `\n` +
+            `    import { defineCookie, jsonCookieCodec } from '@timber-js/app/cookies';\n` +
+            `\n` +
+            `    export const ${name}Cookie = defineCookie(${JSON.stringify(name)}, {\n` +
+            `      codec: jsonCookieCodec(),\n` +
+            `    });\n` +
+            `\n` +
+            `    ${name}Cookie.set(value);\n` +
+            `\n` +
+            `  See design/29-cookies.md §"Typed Cookies with Schema Validation".`
+        );
+      }
+      // Encode the value so the on-the-wire bytes always satisfy
+      // RFC 6265 §4.1.1 cookie-octet. encodeURIComponent's output is a
+      // strict subset of cookie-octet (only `A-Z a-z 0-9 ! ' ( ) * - . _
+      // ~ %`), so the encoded form can never carry the H-3 smuggling
+      // primitive — `;` becomes `%3B`, CR/LF become `%0D`/`%0A`, etc.
+      // The round-trip is lossless: parseCookieHeader auto-decodes on
+      // read, so `cookies().get(name)` returns exactly `value`. See
+      // ONGOING_SECURITY.md H-3 (TIM-868) and design/29-cookies.md
+      // §"Encoding Contract".
+      //
+      // The `{ raw: true }` opt-out skips the encoder for callers who
+      // need exact byte control (e.g. forwarding pre-encoded cookies
+      // from an upstream service). The opt-out goes through the strict
+      // cookie-octet validator instead — the smuggling primitive cannot
+      // sneak in via the escape hatch.
+      const raw = options?.raw === true;
+      const wireValue = raw ? value : encodeURIComponent(value);
+      if (raw) {
+        assertValidCookieValue(name, wireValue);
+      }
+      if (store.flushed) {
+        if (isDebug()) {
+          console.warn(
+            `[timber] warn: getCookieJar().set('${name}') called after response headers were committed.\n` +
+              `  The cookie will NOT be sent. Move cookie mutations to middleware.ts, a server action,\n` +
+              `  or a route.ts handler.`
+          );
+        }
+        return;
+      }
+      // Strip the framework-only `raw` flag before persisting — it is
+      // not an HTTP cookie attribute and must not leak into the jar.
+      const { raw: _raw, ...attributeOptions } = options ?? {};
+      void _raw;
+      const opts = { ...DEFAULT_COOKIE_OPTIONS, ...attributeOptions };
+      assertValidCookieOptions(opts);
+      store.cookieJar.set(name, { name, value: wireValue, options: opts });
+      // Read-your-own-writes: store the DECODED logical value so that
+      // subsequent `cookies().get(name)` in the same request returns
+      // exactly what the developer wrote — never the encoded form.
+      // For `{ raw: true }`, the wire form IS the logical form.
+      map.set(name, raw ? wireValue : value);
+      warnIfCachedCookieIsWritten(name);
+    },
+
+    setFromHeaders(headers: Headers): void {
+      assertMutable(store, 'setFromHeaders');
+      if (store.flushed) {
+        console.warn(
+          `[timber] warn: getCookieJar().setFromHeaders() called after response headers were committed.\n` +
+            `  The cookies will NOT be sent. Move cookie mutations to middleware.ts, a server action,\n` +
+            `  or a route.ts handler.`
+        );
+        return;
+      }
+      // Headers.getSetCookie() returns individual Set-Cookie strings,
+      // avoiding the fragile comma-splitting that raw .get() requires.
+      for (const raw of headers.getSetCookie()) {
+        const parsed = parseSetCookie(raw);
+        if (parsed) {
+          // Use setRaw to preserve the original header's attributes without
+          // merging DEFAULT_COOKIE_OPTIONS (parseSetCookie intentionally
+          // does not apply defaults — see its doc comment).
+          setRaw(store, map, parsed.name, parsed.value, parsed.options);
+        }
+      }
+    },
+
+    delete(name: string, options?: Pick<CookieOptions, 'path' | 'domain'>): void {
+      assertMutable(store, 'delete');
+      // Validate the name even though delete writes an empty value — a
+      // smuggled name (`;` or CR/LF) would corrupt the Set-Cookie header
+      // we emit. See ONGOING_SECURITY.md H-3 (TIM-868).
+      assertValidCookieName(name);
+      if (store.flushed) {
+        if (isDebug()) {
+          console.warn(
+            `[timber] warn: getCookieJar().delete('${name}') called after response headers were committed.\n` +
+              `  The cookie will NOT be deleted. Move cookie mutations to middleware.ts, a server action,\n` +
+              `  or a route.ts handler.`
+          );
+        }
+        return;
+      }
+      const opts: CookieOptions = {
+        ...DEFAULT_COOKIE_OPTIONS,
+        ...options,
+        maxAge: 0,
+        expires: new Date(0),
+      };
+      // delete() is a jar entry point like set() — caller-supplied
+      // path/domain are serialized verbatim into the Set-Cookie header,
+      // so they must pass the same attribute-injection guard. See
+      // design/29-cookies.md §"Cookie Attribute Validation" (TIM-1026).
+      assertValidCookieOptions(opts);
+      store.cookieJar.set(name, { name, value: '', options: opts });
+      // Remove from read view
+      map.delete(name);
+      warnIfCachedCookieIsWritten(name);
+    },
+
+    clear(): void {
+      assertMutable(store, 'clear');
+      if (store.flushed) return;
+      // Delete every incoming cookie
+      for (const name of Array.from(map.keys())) {
+        store.cookieJar.set(name, {
+          name,
+          value: '',
+          options: { ...DEFAULT_COOKIE_OPTIONS, maxAge: 0, expires: new Date(0) },
+        });
+      }
+      map.clear();
+      warnIfCachedCookieIsWritten(ANY_COOKIE);
+    },
+
+    toString(): string {
+      noteCookieReadForReactCache(ANY_COOKIE);
+      // Re-encode values when serializing as a Cookie header — the
+      // RYW map holds decoded logical values, but a Cookie header has
+      // to satisfy `cookie-octet`. Mirror the auto-encode contract on
+      // `set()` so toString() round-trips losslessly with parseCookieHeader.
+      return Array.from(map.entries())
+        .map(([name, value]) => `${name}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`)
+        .join('; ');
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns the value of a single cookie, or undefined if absent.
+ *
+ * @internal — not part of the public API. Use `defineCookie().get()` or `getCookieJar().get()` instead.
+ */
+export function getCookie(name: string): string | undefined {
+  const jar = getCookieJar();
+  return jar.get(name);
+}
+
+// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Per-call options for `getCookies().set()`. Extends the persistent
+ * `CookieOptions` (HTTP cookie attributes) with framework-only flags
+ * that are NOT serialized into the Set-Cookie header.
+ *
+ * The `raw` flag is the escape hatch for the auto-encoding contract.
+ * See design/29-cookies.md §"Encoding Contract".
+ */
+export interface SetCookieOptions extends CookieOptions {
+  /**
+   * Skip the framework's `encodeURIComponent` pass and store the value
+   * verbatim. The value is then validated against the strict RFC 6265
+   * §4.1.1 `cookie-octet` grammar — the H-3 smuggling primitive cannot
+   * sneak in via this opt-out.
+   *
+   * Use this when forwarding a cookie value that is already in its
+   * intended on-the-wire form (e.g. mirroring an upstream service's
+   * Set-Cookie). Default: `false` (auto-encode).
+   */
+  raw?: boolean;
+}
+
+/** Options for setting a cookie. See design/29-cookies.md. */
+export interface CookieOptions {
+  /** Domain scope. Default: omitted (current domain only). */
+  domain?: string;
+  /** URL path scope. Default: '/'. */
+  path?: string;
+  /** Expiration date. Mutually exclusive with maxAge. */
+  expires?: Date;
+  /** Max age in seconds. Mutually exclusive with expires. */
+  maxAge?: number;
+  /** Prevent client-side JS access. Default: true. */
+  httpOnly?: boolean;
+  /** Only send over HTTPS. Default: true. */
+  secure?: boolean;
+  /** Cross-site request policy. Default: 'lax'. */
+  sameSite?: 'strict' | 'lax' | 'none';
+  /** Partitioned (CHIPS) — isolate cookie per top-level site. Default: false. */
+  partitioned?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Cookie accessor returned by `getCookies()`.
+ *
+ * Read methods are always available. Mutation methods throw in read-only
+ * contexts (access.ts, server components).
+ */
+export interface RequestCookies {
+  /** Get a cookie value by name. Returns undefined if not present. */
+  get(name: string): string | undefined;
+  /** Check if a cookie exists. */
+  has(name: string): boolean;
+  /** Get all cookies as an array of { name, value } pairs. */
+  getAll(): Array<{ name: string; value: string }>;
+  /** Number of cookies. */
+  readonly size: number;
+  /**
+   * Set a cookie. Only available in mutable contexts (middleware, actions,
+   * route handlers).
+   *
+   * The value is auto-encoded with `encodeURIComponent` so the on-the-wire
+   * bytes always satisfy RFC 6265 §4.1.1 cookie-octet — `cookies().get()`
+   * returns the same logical value the developer wrote. Pass `{ raw: true }`
+   * to skip the encoder; the raw path validates against the strict
+   * cookie-octet grammar instead. See design/29-cookies.md §"Encoding
+   * Contract" and ONGOING_SECURITY.md H-3 (TIM-868).
+   */
+  set(name: string, value: string, options?: SetCookieOptions): void;
+  /**
+   * Copy all `Set-Cookie` headers from a `Headers` object.
+   * Parses each header and forwards name, value, and all attributes
+   * (path, domain, max-age, expires, sameSite, secure, httpOnly, partitioned).
+   *
+   * Useful when forwarding cookies from an internal `fetch()` or auth handler:
+   * ```ts
+   * const response = await auth.handler(req);
+   * getCookies().then(c => c.setFromHeaders(response.headers));
+   * ```
+   */
+  setFromHeaders(headers: Headers): void;
+  /** Delete a cookie. Only available in mutable contexts. */
+  delete(name: string, options?: Pick<CookieOptions, 'path' | 'domain'>): void;
+  /** Delete all cookies. Only available in mutable contexts. */
+  clear(): void;
+  /** Serialize cookies as a Cookie header string. */
+  toString(): string;
+}
+
+const DEFAULT_COOKIE_OPTIONS: CookieOptions = {
+  path: '/',
+  httpOnly: true,
+  secure: true,
+  sameSite: 'lax',
+};
+
+// ─── Framework-Internal Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Build a Map of cookie name → value reflecting the current request's
+ * read-your-own-writes state. Includes incoming cookies plus any
+ * mutations from getCookies().set() / getCookies().delete() in the same request.
+ *
+ * Used by SSR renderers to populate NavContext.cookies so that
+ * useCookie()'s server snapshot matches the actual response state.
+ *
+ * See design/29-cookies.md §"Read-Your-Own-Writes"
+ * See design/triage/TIM-441-cookie-api-triage.md §4
+ */
+export function getCookiesForSsr(): Map<string, string> {
+  const store = requestContextAls.getStore();
+  if (!store) {
+    throw new Error('[timber] getCookiesForSsr() called outside of a request context.');
+  }
+
+  // Trigger lazy parsing if not yet done
+  if (!store.parsedCookies) {
+    store.parsedCookies = parseCookieHeader(store.cookieHeader);
+  }
+
+  // The parsedCookies map already reflects read-your-own-writes:
+  // - getCookies().set() updates the map via map.set(name, value)
+  // - getCookies().delete() removes from the map via map.delete(name)
+  // Return a copy so callers can't mutate the internal map.
+  return new Map(store.parsedCookies);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Collect all Set-Cookie headers from the cookie jar.
+ * Called by the framework at flush time to apply cookies to the response.
+ *
+ * Returns an array of serialized Set-Cookie header values.
+ */
+export function getSetCookieHeaders(): string[] {
+  const store = requestContextAls.getStore();
+  if (!store) return [];
+  return Array.from(store.cookieJar.values()).map(serializeCookieEntry);
+}
+
+// ─── Cookie Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/** Throw if cookie mutation is attempted in a read-only context. */
+function assertMutable(store: RequestContextStore, method: string): void {
+  if (!store.mutableContext) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `[timber] getCookieJar().${method}() cannot be called in this context.\n` +
+        `  Set cookies in middleware.ts, server actions, or route.ts handlers.`
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write a cookie to the jar WITHOUT merging DEFAULT_COOKIE_OPTIONS.
+ * Used by setFromHeaders to preserve the original header's attributes exactly.
+ *
+ * For deletion cookies (maxAge=0), the jar entry is still created so the
+ * Set-Cookie header is emitted, but the cookie is NOT added to the read map
+ * (it would be misleading — the cookie is being deleted).
+ */
+function setRaw(
+  store: RequestContextStore,
+  readMap: Map<string, string>,
+  name: string,
+  value: string,
+  options: CookieOptions
+): void {
+  // setRaw is the forwarding path for upstream Set-Cookie headers
+  // (`getCookies().setFromHeaders(response.headers)`). The value comes
+  // out of `parseSetCookie` in its on-the-wire form — already encoded
+  // by whoever produced it — so we re-emit it verbatim into our jar.
+  // We DO validate against the strict cookie-octet grammar, both as
+  // defense-in-depth against a malicious upstream and to keep the
+  // ONGOING_SECURITY.md H-3 invariant intact at every entry point into
+  // the cookie jar / RYW map.
+  assertValidCookieName(name);
+  assertValidCookieValue(name, value);
+  // Options get the same entry-point guard as set()/delete(). For the
+  // setFromHeaders path this can only fire on attributes parseSetCookie
+  // cannot produce (it splits on `;` and normalizes Max-Age/SameSite),
+  // but setRaw is the jar entry point — the invariant lives here, not in
+  // the caller. See design/29-cookies.md §"Cookie Attribute Validation".
+  assertValidCookieOptions(options);
+  store.cookieJar.set(name, { name, value, options });
+  warnIfCachedCookieIsWritten(name);
+  // Deletion cookies (Max-Age=0) should not appear in the read map.
+  if (options.maxAge === 0) {
+    readMap.delete(name);
+  } else {
+    // Decode for the RYW map so consumers see the same logical bytes
+    // they would see if the upstream cookie had arrived on the next
+    // request. Mirrors `parseCookieHeader`'s auto-decode.
+    readMap.set(name, safeDecodeCookieValue(value));
+  }
+}

package/src/server/cookie-parsing.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/**
+ * Cookie parsing and serialization helpers — pure string ↔ structure
+ * functions with no ALS dependency. Split out of `cookie-context.ts`
+ * (TIM-853) so the API surface and the wire-format codecs can each be
+ * read on their own.
+ *
+ * The functions in this module are total over arbitrary input. They
+ * never throw and never call `assertValid*` (the security validators
+ * live in the API surface — `cookie-context.ts` invokes them at every
+ * jar entry point so the smuggling-primitive invariant from TIM-868
+ * is enforced regardless of which path produced the bytes).
+ *
+ * Delegates to the `cookie` package (RFC 6265, dependency-free,
+ * browser-safe) for wire codecs. Adapts at the boundary to preserve
+ * timber's Map-based API and never-throw contract.
+ */
+
+import { parseCookie, parseSetCookie as upstreamParseSetCookie, stringifySetCookie } from 'cookie';
+
+import type { CookieEntry } from './als-registry.ts';
+import type { CookieOptions } from './cookie-context.ts';
+
+/**
+ * Parse a Cookie header string into a Map of name → value pairs.
+ * Follows RFC 6265 §4.2.1: cookies are semicolon-separated key=value pairs.
+ *
+ * Values are auto-decoded with `decodeURIComponent` so they round-trip
+ * losslessly with `getCookies().set()` (which auto-encodes). Malformed
+ * `%`-escapes from third-party cookies fall back to the raw byte sequence
+ * — the parser must be total over arbitrary inbound headers, including
+ * non-conforming values from other servers, browser extensions, etc.
+ */
+export function parseCookieHeader(header: string): Map<string, string> {
+  const map = new Map<string, string>();
+  if (!header) return map;
+
+  // cookie.parseCookie returns a plain object with first-wins semantics
+  // and uses safeDecodeURIComponent by default (try/catch around
+  // decodeURIComponent, falls back to raw). This matches our contract.
+  const parsed = parseCookie(header);
+  for (const name in parsed) {
+    const value = parsed[name];
+    if (value !== undefined) map.set(name, value);
+  }
+
+  return map;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decode a single cookie value with `decodeURIComponent`, falling back to
+ * the raw byte sequence if the input contains a malformed `%`-escape.
+ *
+ * Used by both `parseCookieHeader` (incoming Cookie: header) and the
+ * `setRaw` forwarding path (outgoing Set-Cookie from upstream services).
+ * Total — never throws.
+ *
+ * cookie's internal decode has identical semantics but is not exported,
+ * so we keep this standalone helper.
+ */
+export function safeDecodeCookieValue(raw: string): string {
+  try {
+    return decodeURIComponent(raw);
+  } catch {
+    return raw;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serialize a CookieEntry into a Set-Cookie header value.
+ *
+ * Total — never throws. If the cookie package's serializer rejects
+ * the input (e.g. non-integer maxAge, forbidden chars in name/value),
+ * falls back to a minimal hand-rolled serialization so the response
+ * path is never interrupted by a codec error.
+ */
+export function serializeCookieEntry(entry: CookieEntry): string {
+  try {
+    return stringifySetCookie(
+      {
+        name: entry.name,
+        value: entry.value,
+        domain: entry.options.domain,
+        path: entry.options.path,
+        expires: entry.options.expires,
+        maxAge: entry.options.maxAge,
+        httpOnly: entry.options.httpOnly,
+        secure: entry.options.secure,
+        sameSite: entry.options.sameSite,
+        partitioned: entry.options.partitioned,
+      },
+      // timber pre-encodes values at the API surface (set() calls
+      // encodeURIComponent), so pass identity to avoid double-encoding.
+      { encode: (v: string) => v }
+    );
+  } catch {
+    // Fallback: hand-roll a minimal Set-Cookie so we never drop the
+    // header entirely. The entry-point validators in cookie-context.ts
+    // already reject truly dangerous input — this path only fires for
+    // edge-case formatting the upstream serializer is strict about.
+    return serializeCookieEntryFallback(entry);
+  }
+}
+
+function serializeCookieEntryFallback(entry: CookieEntry): string {
+  const parts = [`${entry.name}=${entry.value}`];
+  const opts = entry.options;
+
+  if (opts.domain) parts.push(`Domain=${opts.domain}`);
+  if (opts.path) parts.push(`Path=${opts.path}`);
+  if (opts.expires) parts.push(`Expires=${opts.expires.toUTCString()}`);
+  if (opts.maxAge !== undefined) parts.push(`Max-Age=${opts.maxAge}`);
+  if (opts.httpOnly) parts.push('HttpOnly');
+  if (opts.secure) parts.push('Secure');
+  if (opts.sameSite) {
+    parts.push(`SameSite=${opts.sameSite.charAt(0).toUpperCase()}${opts.sameSite.slice(1)}`);
+  }
+  if (opts.partitioned) parts.push('Partitioned');
+
+  return parts.join('; ');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse a raw `Set-Cookie` header string into name, value, and options.
+ * Handles all standard attributes: Path, Domain, Max-Age, Expires,
+ * SameSite, Secure, HttpOnly, Partitioned.
+ *
+ * Does NOT apply DEFAULT_COOKIE_OPTIONS — the caller decides whether
+ * to merge defaults (e.g. `set()` does, but `setRaw()` should preserve
+ * the original header's intent).
+ */
+export function parseSetCookie(
+  header: string
+): { name: string; value: string; options: CookieOptions } | null {
+  const parsed = upstreamParseSetCookie(header, {
+    // Don't decode — setRaw expects the wire-form value so it can
+    // re-emit verbatim and validate against cookie-octet.
+    decode: (v: string) => v,
+  });
+
+  // cookie.parseSetCookie always returns a SetCookie object, but
+  // with name/value as empty strings when the header has no `=`.
+  if (!parsed.name) return null;
+
+  const options: CookieOptions = {};
+
+  if (parsed.path !== undefined) options.path = parsed.path || '/';
+  if (parsed.domain !== undefined) options.domain = parsed.domain;
+  if (parsed.maxAge !== undefined && Number.isFinite(parsed.maxAge)) {
+    options.maxAge = parsed.maxAge;
+  }
+  if (parsed.expires !== undefined) options.expires = parsed.expires;
+  if (parsed.sameSite !== undefined && parsed.sameSite !== true) {
+    const sameSite = (parsed.sameSite as string).toLowerCase();
+    if (sameSite === 'strict' || sameSite === 'lax' || sameSite === 'none') {
+      options.sameSite = sameSite;
+    }
+  }
+  if (parsed.secure) options.secure = true;
+  if (parsed.httpOnly) options.httpOnly = true;
+  if (parsed.partitioned) options.partitioned = true;
+
+  return { name: parsed.name, value: parsed.value ?? '', options };
+}

package/src/server/csp-nonce.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/**
+ * CSP nonce — per-request, generated on demand.
+ *
+ * timber emits several inline `<script>` tags per HTML response — React's
+ * bootstrap script and Fizz runtime, the Flight init/chunk scripts, the
+ * segment-tree script, and the post-flush noindex script. Under a strict
+ * `Content-Security-Policy` (`script-src 'nonce-…' 'strict-dynamic'`) every
+ * one of them needs the request's nonce or the browser refuses to run it.
+ *
+ * The app opts in by reading `ctx.nonce` in `middleware.ts` and putting it
+ * in the CSP header it sets through `ctx.headers`. The first read generates
+ * the value and stores it on the request context; the render pipeline reads
+ * it back with `getCspNonce()` and stamps it on every inline script. A
+ * request whose middleware never reads `ctx.nonce` has no nonce, and its
+ * markup is byte-identical to a render without this feature. timber does
+ * not parse the CSP header — the app owns the policy, timber owns the
+ * markup, and `ctx.nonce` is the one value both are built from.
+ *
+ * `proxy.ts` cannot participate: it only sees the finished response from
+ * `next()`, after the markup exists.
+ *
+ * See design/13-security.md §"Content Security Policy" (TIM-1414).
+ */
+
+import { requestContextAls } from './als-registry.ts';
+
+/**
+ * Generate a CSP nonce: 128 random bits, base64. Matches CSP's
+ * `base64-value` grammar, so it is valid in the header verbatim and safe
+ * inside a double-quoted HTML attribute without escaping.
+ */
+function generateNonce(): string {
+  const bytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));
+  let binary = '';
+  for (const b of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(b);
+  return btoa(binary);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The request's CSP nonce, creating it on first call. Backs the
+ * `ctx.nonce` getter on `MiddlewareContext`. Outside a request context
+ * (tests, build-time rendering) a fresh value is returned but not
+ * retained, since there is no request for it to belong to.
+ */
+export function requestCspNonce(): string {
+  const store = requestContextAls.getStore();
+  if (!store) return generateNonce();
+  store.cspNonce ??= generateNonce();
+  return store.cspNonce;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The request's CSP nonce if middleware asked for one, else `undefined` —
+ * in which case the pipeline emits bare `<script>` tags.
+ */
+export function getCspNonce(): string | undefined {
+  return requestContextAls.getStore()?.cspNonce;
+}