@termix-it/cryptoclaw 1.0.0

package/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md

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+---
+summary: "Exec approvals, allowlists, and sandbox escape prompts"
+read_when:
+  - Configuring exec approvals or allowlists
+  - Implementing exec approval UX in the macOS app
+  - Reviewing sandbox escape prompts and implications
+title: "Exec Approvals"
+---
+
+# Exec approvals
+
+Exec approvals are the **companion app / node host guardrail** for letting a sandboxed agent run
+commands on a real host (`gateway` or `node`). Think of it like a safety interlock:
+commands are allowed only when policy + allowlist + (optional) user approval all agree.
+Exec approvals are **in addition** to tool policy and elevated gating (unless elevated is set to `full`, which skips approvals).
+Effective policy is the **stricter** of `tools.exec.*` and approvals defaults; if an approvals field is omitted, the `tools.exec` value is used.
+
+If the companion app UI is **not available**, any request that requires a prompt is
+resolved by the **ask fallback** (default: deny).
+
+## Where it applies
+
+Exec approvals are enforced locally on the execution host:
+
+- **gateway host** → `openclaw` process on the gateway machine
+- **node host** → node runner (macOS companion app or headless node host)
+
+macOS split:
+
+- **node host service** forwards `system.run` to the **macOS app** over local IPC.
+- **macOS app** enforces approvals + executes the command in UI context.
+
+## Settings and storage
+
+Approvals live in a local JSON file on the execution host:
+
+`~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json`
+
+Example schema:
+
+```json
+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "socket": {
+    "path": "~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.sock",
+    "token": "base64url-token"
+  },
+  "defaults": {
+    "security": "deny",
+    "ask": "on-miss",
+    "askFallback": "deny",
+    "autoAllowSkills": false
+  },
+  "agents": {
+    "main": {
+      "security": "allowlist",
+      "ask": "on-miss",
+      "askFallback": "deny",
+      "autoAllowSkills": true,
+      "allowlist": [
+        {
+          "id": "B0C8C0B3-2C2D-4F8A-9A3C-5A4B3C2D1E0F",
+          "pattern": "~/Projects/**/bin/rg",
+          "lastUsedAt": 1737150000000,
+          "lastUsedCommand": "rg -n TODO",
+          "lastResolvedPath": "/Users/user/Projects/.../bin/rg"
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## Policy knobs
+
+### Security (`exec.security`)
+
+- **deny**: block all host exec requests.
+- **allowlist**: allow only allowlisted commands.
+- **full**: allow everything (equivalent to elevated).
+
+### Ask (`exec.ask`)
+
+- **off**: never prompt.
+- **on-miss**: prompt only when allowlist does not match.
+- **always**: prompt on every command.
+
+### Ask fallback (`askFallback`)
+
+If a prompt is required but no UI is reachable, fallback decides:
+
+- **deny**: block.
+- **allowlist**: allow only if allowlist matches.
+- **full**: allow.
+
+## Allowlist (per agent)
+
+Allowlists are **per agent**. If multiple agents exist, switch which agent you’re
+editing in the macOS app. Patterns are **case-insensitive glob matches**.
+Patterns should resolve to **binary paths** (basename-only entries are ignored).
+Legacy `agents.default` entries are migrated to `agents.main` on load.
+
+Examples:
+
+- `~/Projects/**/bin/bird`
+- `~/.local/bin/*`
+- `/opt/homebrew/bin/rg`
+
+Each allowlist entry tracks:
+
+- **id** stable UUID used for UI identity (optional)
+- **last used** timestamp
+- **last used command**
+- **last resolved path**
+
+## Auto-allow skill CLIs
+
+When **Auto-allow skill CLIs** is enabled, executables referenced by known skills
+are treated as allowlisted on nodes (macOS node or headless node host). This uses
+`skills.bins` over the Gateway RPC to fetch the skill bin list. Disable this if you want strict manual allowlists.
+
+## Safe bins (stdin-only)
+
+`tools.exec.safeBins` defines a small list of **stdin-only** binaries (for example `jq`)
+that can run in allowlist mode **without** explicit allowlist entries. Safe bins reject
+positional file args and path-like tokens, so they can only operate on the incoming stream.
+Shell chaining and redirections are not auto-allowed in allowlist mode.
+
+Shell chaining (`&&`, `||`, `;`) is allowed when every top-level segment satisfies the allowlist
+(including safe bins or skill auto-allow). Redirections remain unsupported in allowlist mode.
+Command substitution (`$()` / backticks) is rejected during allowlist parsing, including inside
+double quotes; use single quotes if you need literal `$()` text.
+
+Default safe bins: `jq`, `grep`, `cut`, `sort`, `uniq`, `head`, `tail`, `tr`, `wc`.
+
+## Control UI editing
+
+Use the **Control UI → Nodes → Exec approvals** card to edit defaults, per‑agent
+overrides, and allowlists. Pick a scope (Defaults or an agent), tweak the policy,
+add/remove allowlist patterns, then **Save**. The UI shows **last used** metadata
+per pattern so you can keep the list tidy.
+
+The target selector chooses **Gateway** (local approvals) or a **Node**. Nodes
+must advertise `system.execApprovals.get/set` (macOS app or headless node host).
+If a node does not advertise exec approvals yet, edit its local
+`~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json` directly.
+
+CLI: `openclaw approvals` supports gateway or node editing (see [Approvals CLI](/cli/approvals)).
+
+## Approval flow
+
+When a prompt is required, the gateway broadcasts `exec.approval.requested` to operator clients.
+The Control UI and macOS app resolve it via `exec.approval.resolve`, then the gateway forwards the
+approved request to the node host.
+
+When approvals are required, the exec tool returns immediately with an approval id. Use that id to
+correlate later system events (`Exec finished` / `Exec denied`). If no decision arrives before the
+timeout, the request is treated as an approval timeout and surfaced as a denial reason.
+
+The confirmation dialog includes:
+
+- command + args
+- cwd
+- agent id
+- resolved executable path
+- host + policy metadata
+
+Actions:
+
+- **Allow once** → run now
+- **Always allow** → add to allowlist + run
+- **Deny** → block
+
+## Approval forwarding to chat channels
+
+You can forward exec approval prompts to any chat channel (including plugin channels) and approve
+them with `/approve`. This uses the normal outbound delivery pipeline.
+
+Config:
+
+```json5
+{
+  approvals: {
+    exec: {
+      enabled: true,
+      mode: "session", // "session" | "targets" | "both"
+      agentFilter: ["main"],
+      sessionFilter: ["discord"], // substring or regex
+      targets: [
+        { channel: "slack", to: "U12345678" },
+        { channel: "telegram", to: "123456789" },
+      ],
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+Reply in chat:
+
+```
+/approve <id> allow-once
+/approve <id> allow-always
+/approve <id> deny
+```
+
+### macOS IPC flow
+
+```
+Gateway -> Node Service (WS)
+                 |  IPC (UDS + token + HMAC + TTL)
+                 v
+             Mac App (UI + approvals + system.run)
+```
+
+Security notes:
+
+- Unix socket mode `0600`, token stored in `exec-approvals.json`.
+- Same-UID peer check.
+- Challenge/response (nonce + HMAC token + request hash) + short TTL.
+
+## System events
+
+Exec lifecycle is surfaced as system messages:
+
+- `Exec running` (only if the command exceeds the running notice threshold)
+- `Exec finished`
+- `Exec denied`
+
+These are posted to the agent’s session after the node reports the event.
+Gateway-host exec approvals emit the same lifecycle events when the command finishes (and optionally when running longer than the threshold).
+Approval-gated execs reuse the approval id as the `runId` in these messages for easy correlation.
+
+## Implications
+
+- **full** is powerful; prefer allowlists when possible.
+- **ask** keeps you in the loop while still allowing fast approvals.
+- Per-agent allowlists prevent one agent’s approvals from leaking into others.
+- Approvals only apply to host exec requests from **authorized senders**. Unauthorized senders cannot issue `/exec`.
+- `/exec security=full` is a session-level convenience for authorized operators and skips approvals by design.
+  To hard-block host exec, set approvals security to `deny` or deny the `exec` tool via tool policy.
+
+Related:
+
+- [Exec tool](/tools/exec)
+- [Elevated mode](/tools/elevated)
+- [Skills](/tools/skills)

package/docs/tools/exec.md

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+---
+summary: "Exec tool usage, stdin modes, and TTY support"
+read_when:
+  - Using or modifying the exec tool
+  - Debugging stdin or TTY behavior
+title: "Exec Tool"
+---
+
+# Exec tool
+
+Run shell commands in the workspace. Supports foreground + background execution via `process`.
+If `process` is disallowed, `exec` runs synchronously and ignores `yieldMs`/`background`.
+Background sessions are scoped per agent; `process` only sees sessions from the same agent.
+
+## Parameters
+
+- `command` (required)
+- `workdir` (defaults to cwd)
+- `env` (key/value overrides)
+- `yieldMs` (default 10000): auto-background after delay
+- `background` (bool): background immediately
+- `timeout` (seconds, default 1800): kill on expiry
+- `pty` (bool): run in a pseudo-terminal when available (TTY-only CLIs, coding agents, terminal UIs)
+- `host` (`sandbox | gateway | node`): where to execute
+- `security` (`deny | allowlist | full`): enforcement mode for `gateway`/`node`
+- `ask` (`off | on-miss | always`): approval prompts for `gateway`/`node`
+- `node` (string): node id/name for `host=node`
+- `elevated` (bool): request elevated mode (gateway host); `security=full` is only forced when elevated resolves to `full`
+
+Notes:
+
+- `host` defaults to `sandbox`.
+- `elevated` is ignored when sandboxing is off (exec already runs on the host).
+- `gateway`/`node` approvals are controlled by `~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json`.
+- `node` requires a paired node (companion app or headless node host).
+- If multiple nodes are available, set `exec.node` or `tools.exec.node` to select one.
+- On non-Windows hosts, exec uses `SHELL` when set; if `SHELL` is `fish`, it prefers `bash` (or `sh`)
+  from `PATH` to avoid fish-incompatible scripts, then falls back to `SHELL` if neither exists.
+- Host execution (`gateway`/`node`) rejects `env.PATH` and loader overrides (`LD_*`/`DYLD_*`) to
+  prevent binary hijacking or injected code.
+- Important: sandboxing is **off by default**. If sandboxing is off, `host=sandbox` runs directly on
+  the gateway host (no container) and **does not require approvals**. To require approvals, run with
+  `host=gateway` and configure exec approvals (or enable sandboxing).
+
+## Config
+
+- `tools.exec.notifyOnExit` (default: true): when true, backgrounded exec sessions enqueue a system event and request a heartbeat on exit.
+- `tools.exec.approvalRunningNoticeMs` (default: 10000): emit a single “running” notice when an approval-gated exec runs longer than this (0 disables).
+- `tools.exec.host` (default: `sandbox`)
+- `tools.exec.security` (default: `deny` for sandbox, `allowlist` for gateway + node when unset)
+- `tools.exec.ask` (default: `on-miss`)
+- `tools.exec.node` (default: unset)
+- `tools.exec.pathPrepend`: list of directories to prepend to `PATH` for exec runs.
+- `tools.exec.safeBins`: stdin-only safe binaries that can run without explicit allowlist entries.
+
+Example:
+
+```json5
+{
+  tools: {
+    exec: {
+      pathPrepend: ["~/bin", "/opt/oss/bin"],
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+### PATH handling
+
+- `host=gateway`: merges your login-shell `PATH` into the exec environment. `env.PATH` overrides are
+  rejected for host execution. The daemon itself still runs with a minimal `PATH`:
+  - macOS: `/opt/homebrew/bin`, `/usr/local/bin`, `/usr/bin`, `/bin`
+  - Linux: `/usr/local/bin`, `/usr/bin`, `/bin`
+- `host=sandbox`: runs `sh -lc` (login shell) inside the container, so `/etc/profile` may reset `PATH`.
+  OpenClaw prepends `env.PATH` after profile sourcing via an internal env var (no shell interpolation);
+  `tools.exec.pathPrepend` applies here too.
+- `host=node`: only non-blocked env overrides you pass are sent to the node. `env.PATH` overrides are
+  rejected for host execution. Headless node hosts accept `PATH` only when it prepends the node host
+  PATH (no replacement). macOS nodes drop `PATH` overrides entirely.
+
+Per-agent node binding (use the agent list index in config):
+
+```bash
+openclaw config get agents.list
+openclaw config set agents.list[0].tools.exec.node "node-id-or-name"
+```
+
+Control UI: the Nodes tab includes a small “Exec node binding” panel for the same settings.
+
+## Session overrides (`/exec`)
+
+Use `/exec` to set **per-session** defaults for `host`, `security`, `ask`, and `node`.
+Send `/exec` with no arguments to show the current values.
+
+Example:
+
+```
+/exec host=gateway security=allowlist ask=on-miss node=mac-1
+```
+
+## Authorization model
+
+`/exec` is only honored for **authorized senders** (channel allowlists/pairing plus `commands.useAccessGroups`).
+It updates **session state only** and does not write config. To hard-disable exec, deny it via tool
+policy (`tools.deny: ["exec"]` or per-agent). Host approvals still apply unless you explicitly set
+`security=full` and `ask=off`.
+
+## Exec approvals (companion app / node host)
+
+Sandboxed agents can require per-request approval before `exec` runs on the gateway or node host.
+See [Exec approvals](/tools/exec-approvals) for the policy, allowlist, and UI flow.
+
+When approvals are required, the exec tool returns immediately with
+`status: "approval-pending"` and an approval id. Once approved (or denied / timed out),
+the Gateway emits system events (`Exec finished` / `Exec denied`). If the command is still
+running after `tools.exec.approvalRunningNoticeMs`, a single `Exec running` notice is emitted.
+
+## Allowlist + safe bins
+
+Allowlist enforcement matches **resolved binary paths only** (no basename matches). When
+`security=allowlist`, shell commands are auto-allowed only if every pipeline segment is
+allowlisted or a safe bin. Chaining (`;`, `&&`, `||`) and redirections are rejected in
+allowlist mode.
+
+## Examples
+
+Foreground:
+
+```json
+{ "tool": "exec", "command": "ls -la" }
+```
+
+Background + poll:
+
+```json
+{"tool":"exec","command":"npm run build","yieldMs":1000}
+{"tool":"process","action":"poll","sessionId":"<id>"}
+```
+
+Send keys (tmux-style):
+
+```json
+{"tool":"process","action":"send-keys","sessionId":"<id>","keys":["Enter"]}
+{"tool":"process","action":"send-keys","sessionId":"<id>","keys":["C-c"]}
+{"tool":"process","action":"send-keys","sessionId":"<id>","keys":["Up","Up","Enter"]}
+```
+
+Submit (send CR only):
+
+```json
+{ "tool": "process", "action": "submit", "sessionId": "<id>" }
+```
+
+Paste (bracketed by default):
+
+```json
+{ "tool": "process", "action": "paste", "sessionId": "<id>", "text": "line1\nline2\n" }
+```
+
+## apply_patch (experimental)
+
+`apply_patch` is a subtool of `exec` for structured multi-file edits.
+Enable it explicitly:
+
+```json5
+{
+  tools: {
+    exec: {
+      applyPatch: { enabled: true, allowModels: ["gpt-5.2"] },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- Only available for OpenAI/OpenAI Codex models.
+- Tool policy still applies; `allow: ["exec"]` implicitly allows `apply_patch`.
+- Config lives under `tools.exec.applyPatch`.

package/docs/tools/firecrawl.md

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+---
+summary: "Firecrawl fallback for web_fetch (anti-bot + cached extraction)"
+read_when:
+  - You want Firecrawl-backed web extraction
+  - You need a Firecrawl API key
+  - You want anti-bot extraction for web_fetch
+title: "Firecrawl"
+---
+
+# Firecrawl
+
+OpenClaw can use **Firecrawl** as a fallback extractor for `web_fetch`. It is a hosted
+content extraction service that supports bot circumvention and caching, which helps
+with JS-heavy sites or pages that block plain HTTP fetches.
+
+## Get an API key
+
+1. Create a Firecrawl account and generate an API key.
+2. Store it in config or set `FIRECRAWL_API_KEY` in the gateway environment.
+
+## Configure Firecrawl
+
+```json5
+{
+  tools: {
+    web: {
+      fetch: {
+        firecrawl: {
+          apiKey: "FIRECRAWL_API_KEY_HERE",
+          baseUrl: "https://api.firecrawl.dev",
+          onlyMainContent: true,
+          maxAgeMs: 172800000,
+          timeoutSeconds: 60,
+        },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- `firecrawl.enabled` defaults to true when an API key is present.
+- `maxAgeMs` controls how old cached results can be (ms). Default is 2 days.
+
+## Stealth / bot circumvention
+
+Firecrawl exposes a **proxy mode** parameter for bot circumvention (`basic`, `stealth`, or `auto`).
+OpenClaw always uses `proxy: "auto"` plus `storeInCache: true` for Firecrawl requests.
+If proxy is omitted, Firecrawl defaults to `auto`. `auto` retries with stealth proxies if a basic attempt fails, which may use more credits
+than basic-only scraping.
+
+## How `web_fetch` uses Firecrawl
+
+`web_fetch` extraction order:
+
+1. Readability (local)
+2. Firecrawl (if configured)
+3. Basic HTML cleanup (last fallback)
+
+See [Web tools](/tools/web) for the full web tool setup.