@termix-it/cryptoclaw 1.0.0

package/docs/multi-agent-sandbox-tools.md

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+---
+summary: "Per-agent sandbox + tool restrictions, precedence, and examples"
+title: Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools
+read_when: "You want per-agent sandboxing or per-agent tool allow/deny policies in a multi-agent gateway."
+status: active
+---
+
+# Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools Configuration
+
+## Overview
+
+Each agent in a multi-agent setup can now have its own:
+
+- **Sandbox configuration** (`agents.list[].sandbox` overrides `agents.defaults.sandbox`)
+- **Tool restrictions** (`tools.allow` / `tools.deny`, plus `agents.list[].tools`)
+
+This allows you to run multiple agents with different security profiles:
+
+- Personal assistant with full access
+- Family/work agents with restricted tools
+- Public-facing agents in sandboxes
+
+`setupCommand` belongs under `sandbox.docker` (global or per-agent) and runs once
+when the container is created.
+
+Auth is per-agent: each agent reads from its own `agentDir` auth store at:
+
+```
+~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/agent/auth-profiles.json
+```
+
+Credentials are **not** shared between agents. Never reuse `agentDir` across agents.
+If you want to share creds, copy `auth-profiles.json` into the other agent's `agentDir`.
+
+For how sandboxing behaves at runtime, see [Sandboxing](/gateway/sandboxing).
+For debugging “why is this blocked?”, see [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated](/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated) and `openclaw sandbox explain`.
+
+---
+
+## Configuration Examples
+
+### Example 1: Personal + Restricted Family Agent
+
+```json
+{
+  "agents": {
+    "list": [
+      {
+        "id": "main",
+        "default": true,
+        "name": "Personal Assistant",
+        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
+        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "family",
+        "name": "Family Bot",
+        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-family",
+        "sandbox": {
+          "mode": "all",
+          "scope": "agent"
+        },
+        "tools": {
+          "allow": ["read"],
+          "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process", "browser"]
+        }
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "bindings": [
+    {
+      "agentId": "family",
+      "match": {
+        "provider": "whatsapp",
+        "accountId": "*",
+        "peer": {
+          "kind": "group",
+          "id": "120363424282127706@g.us"
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+**Result:**
+
+- `main` agent: Runs on host, full tool access
+- `family` agent: Runs in Docker (one container per agent), only `read` tool
+
+---
+
+### Example 2: Work Agent with Shared Sandbox
+
+```json
+{
+  "agents": {
+    "list": [
+      {
+        "id": "personal",
+        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-personal",
+        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "work",
+        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-work",
+        "sandbox": {
+          "mode": "all",
+          "scope": "shared",
+          "workspaceRoot": "/tmp/work-sandboxes"
+        },
+        "tools": {
+          "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
+          "deny": ["browser", "gateway", "discord"]
+        }
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### Example 2b: Global coding profile + messaging-only agent
+
+```json
+{
+  "tools": { "profile": "coding" },
+  "agents": {
+    "list": [
+      {
+        "id": "support",
+        "tools": { "profile": "messaging", "allow": ["slack"] }
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Result:**
+
+- default agents get coding tools
+- `support` agent is messaging-only (+ Slack tool)
+
+---
+
+### Example 3: Different Sandbox Modes per Agent
+
+```json
+{
+  "agents": {
+    "defaults": {
+      "sandbox": {
+        "mode": "non-main", // Global default
+        "scope": "session"
+      }
+    },
+    "list": [
+      {
+        "id": "main",
+        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
+        "sandbox": {
+          "mode": "off" // Override: main never sandboxed
+        }
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "public",
+        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-public",
+        "sandbox": {
+          "mode": "all", // Override: public always sandboxed
+          "scope": "agent"
+        },
+        "tools": {
+          "allow": ["read"],
+          "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"]
+        }
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Configuration Precedence
+
+When both global (`agents.defaults.*`) and agent-specific (`agents.list[].*`) configs exist:
+
+### Sandbox Config
+
+Agent-specific settings override global:
+
+```
+agents.list[].sandbox.mode > agents.defaults.sandbox.mode
+agents.list[].sandbox.scope > agents.defaults.sandbox.scope
+agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceRoot > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceRoot
+agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceAccess > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess
+agents.list[].sandbox.docker.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.*
+agents.list[].sandbox.browser.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.*
+agents.list[].sandbox.prune.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.prune.*
+```
+
+**Notes:**
+
+- `agents.list[].sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.*` overrides `agents.defaults.sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.*` for that agent (ignored when sandbox scope resolves to `"shared"`).
+
+### Tool Restrictions
+
+The filtering order is:
+
+1. **Tool profile** (`tools.profile` or `agents.list[].tools.profile`)
+2. **Provider tool profile** (`tools.byProvider[provider].profile` or `agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].profile`)
+3. **Global tool policy** (`tools.allow` / `tools.deny`)
+4. **Provider tool policy** (`tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`)
+5. **Agent-specific tool policy** (`agents.list[].tools.allow/deny`)
+6. **Agent provider policy** (`agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`)
+7. **Sandbox tool policy** (`tools.sandbox.tools` or `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools`)
+8. **Subagent tool policy** (`tools.subagents.tools`, if applicable)
+
+Each level can further restrict tools, but cannot grant back denied tools from earlier levels.
+If `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools` is set, it replaces `tools.sandbox.tools` for that agent.
+If `agents.list[].tools.profile` is set, it overrides `tools.profile` for that agent.
+Provider tool keys accept either `provider` (e.g. `google-antigravity`) or `provider/model` (e.g. `openai/gpt-5.2`).
+
+### Tool groups (shorthands)
+
+Tool policies (global, agent, sandbox) support `group:*` entries that expand to multiple concrete tools:
+
+- `group:runtime`: `exec`, `bash`, `process`
+- `group:fs`: `read`, `write`, `edit`, `apply_patch`
+- `group:sessions`: `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `session_status`
+- `group:memory`: `memory_search`, `memory_get`
+- `group:ui`: `browser`, `canvas`
+- `group:automation`: `cron`, `gateway`
+- `group:messaging`: `message`
+- `group:nodes`: `nodes`
+- `group:openclaw`: all built-in OpenClaw tools (excludes provider plugins)
+
+### Elevated Mode
+
+`tools.elevated` is the global baseline (sender-based allowlist). `agents.list[].tools.elevated` can further restrict elevated for specific agents (both must allow).
+
+Mitigation patterns:
+
+- Deny `exec` for untrusted agents (`agents.list[].tools.deny: ["exec"]`)
+- Avoid allowlisting senders that route to restricted agents
+- Disable elevated globally (`tools.elevated.enabled: false`) if you only want sandboxed execution
+- Disable elevated per agent (`agents.list[].tools.elevated.enabled: false`) for sensitive profiles
+
+---
+
+## Migration from Single Agent
+
+**Before (single agent):**
+
+```json
+{
+  "agents": {
+    "defaults": {
+      "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
+      "sandbox": {
+        "mode": "non-main"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "tools": {
+    "sandbox": {
+      "tools": {
+        "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
+        "deny": []
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**After (multi-agent with different profiles):**
+
+```json
+{
+  "agents": {
+    "list": [
+      {
+        "id": "main",
+        "default": true,
+        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
+        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Legacy `agent.*` configs are migrated by `openclaw doctor`; prefer `agents.defaults` + `agents.list` going forward.
+
+---
+
+## Tool Restriction Examples
+
+### Read-only Agent
+
+```json
+{
+  "tools": {
+    "allow": ["read"],
+    "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process"]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Safe Execution Agent (no file modifications)
+
+```json
+{
+  "tools": {
+    "allow": ["read", "exec", "process"],
+    "deny": ["write", "edit", "apply_patch", "browser", "gateway"]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Communication-only Agent
+
+```json
+{
+  "tools": {
+    "allow": ["sessions_list", "sessions_send", "sessions_history", "session_status"],
+    "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "read", "browser"]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Common Pitfall: "non-main"
+
+`agents.defaults.sandbox.mode: "non-main"` is based on `session.mainKey` (default `"main"`),
+not the agent id. Group/channel sessions always get their own keys, so they
+are treated as non-main and will be sandboxed. If you want an agent to never
+sandbox, set `agents.list[].sandbox.mode: "off"`.
+
+---
+
+## Testing
+
+After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:
+
+1. **Check agent resolution:**
+
+   ```exec
+   openclaw agents list --bindings
+   ```
+
+2. **Verify sandbox containers:**
+
+   ```exec
+   docker ps --filter "name=openclaw-sbx-"
+   ```
+
+3. **Test tool restrictions:**
+   - Send a message requiring restricted tools
+   - Verify the agent cannot use denied tools
+
+4. **Monitor logs:**
+   ```exec
+   tail -f "${OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR:-$HOME/.openclaw}/logs/gateway.log" | grep -E "routing|sandbox|tools"
+   ```
+
+---
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+### Agent not sandboxed despite `mode: "all"`
+
+- Check if there's a global `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode` that overrides it
+- Agent-specific config takes precedence, so set `agents.list[].sandbox.mode: "all"`
+
+### Tools still available despite deny list
+
+- Check tool filtering order: global → agent → sandbox → subagent
+- Each level can only further restrict, not grant back
+- Verify with logs: `[tools] filtering tools for agent:${agentId}`
+
+### Container not isolated per agent
+
+- Set `scope: "agent"` in agent-specific sandbox config
+- Default is `"session"` which creates one container per session
+
+---
+
+## See Also
+
+- [Multi-Agent Routing](/concepts/multi-agent)
+- [Sandbox Configuration](/gateway/configuration#agentsdefaults-sandbox)
+- [Session Management](/concepts/session)

package/docs/network.md

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+---
+summary: "Network hub: gateway surfaces, pairing, discovery, and security"
+read_when:
+  - You need the network architecture + security overview
+  - You are debugging local vs tailnet access or pairing
+  - You want the canonical list of networking docs
+title: "Network"
+---
+
+# Network hub
+
+This hub links the core docs for how OpenClaw connects, pairs, and secures
+devices across localhost, LAN, and tailnet.
+
+## Core model
+
+- [Gateway architecture](/concepts/architecture)
+- [Gateway protocol](/gateway/protocol)
+- [Gateway runbook](/gateway)
+- [Web surfaces + bind modes](/web)
+
+## Pairing + identity
+
+- [Pairing overview (DM + nodes)](/start/pairing)
+- [Gateway-owned node pairing](/gateway/pairing)
+- [Devices CLI (pairing + token rotation)](/cli/devices)
+- [Pairing CLI (DM approvals)](/cli/pairing)
+
+Local trust:
+
+- Local connections (loopback or the gateway host’s own tailnet address) can be
+  auto‑approved for pairing to keep same‑host UX smooth.
+- Non‑local tailnet/LAN clients still require explicit pairing approval.
+
+## Discovery + transports
+
+- [Discovery & transports](/gateway/discovery)
+- [Bonjour / mDNS](/gateway/bonjour)
+- [Remote access (SSH)](/gateway/remote)
+- [Tailscale](/gateway/tailscale)
+
+## Nodes + transports
+
+- [Nodes overview](/nodes)
+- [Bridge protocol (legacy nodes)](/gateway/bridge-protocol)
+- [Node runbook: iOS](/platforms/ios)
+- [Node runbook: Android](/platforms/android)
+
+## Security
+
+- [Security overview](/gateway/security)
+- [Gateway config reference](/gateway/configuration)
+- [Troubleshooting](/gateway/troubleshooting)
+- [Doctor](/gateway/doctor)

package/docs/nodes/audio.md

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+---
+summary: "How inbound audio/voice notes are downloaded, transcribed, and injected into replies"
+read_when:
+  - Changing audio transcription or media handling
+title: "Audio and Voice Notes"
+---
+
+# Audio / Voice Notes — 2026-01-17
+
+## What works
+
+- **Media understanding (audio)**: If audio understanding is enabled (or auto‑detected), OpenClaw:
+  1. Locates the first audio attachment (local path or URL) and downloads it if needed.
+  2. Enforces `maxBytes` before sending to each model entry.
+  3. Runs the first eligible model entry in order (provider or CLI).
+  4. If it fails or skips (size/timeout), it tries the next entry.
+  5. On success, it replaces `Body` with an `[Audio]` block and sets `{{Transcript}}`.
+- **Command parsing**: When transcription succeeds, `CommandBody`/`RawBody` are set to the transcript so slash commands still work.
+- **Verbose logging**: In `--verbose`, we log when transcription runs and when it replaces the body.
+
+## Auto-detection (default)
+
+If you **don’t configure models** and `tools.media.audio.enabled` is **not** set to `false`,
+OpenClaw auto-detects in this order and stops at the first working option:
+
+1. **Local CLIs** (if installed)
+   - `sherpa-onnx-offline` (requires `SHERPA_ONNX_MODEL_DIR` with encoder/decoder/joiner/tokens)
+   - `whisper-cli` (from `whisper-cpp`; uses `WHISPER_CPP_MODEL` or the bundled tiny model)
+   - `whisper` (Python CLI; downloads models automatically)
+2. **Gemini CLI** (`gemini`) using `read_many_files`
+3. **Provider keys** (OpenAI → Groq → Deepgram → Google)
+
+To disable auto-detection, set `tools.media.audio.enabled: false`.
+To customize, set `tools.media.audio.models`.
+Note: Binary detection is best-effort across macOS/Linux/Windows; ensure the CLI is on `PATH` (we expand `~`), or set an explicit CLI model with a full command path.
+
+## Config examples
+
+### Provider + CLI fallback (OpenAI + Whisper CLI)
+
+```json5
+{
+  tools: {
+    media: {
+      audio: {
+        enabled: true,
+        maxBytes: 20971520,
+        models: [
+          { provider: "openai", model: "gpt-4o-mini-transcribe" },
+          {
+            type: "cli",
+            command: "whisper",
+            args: ["--model", "base", "{{MediaPath}}"],
+            timeoutSeconds: 45,
+          },
+        ],
+      },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+### Provider-only with scope gating
+
+```json5
+{
+  tools: {
+    media: {
+      audio: {
+        enabled: true,
+        scope: {
+          default: "allow",
+          rules: [{ action: "deny", match: { chatType: "group" } }],
+        },
+        models: [{ provider: "openai", model: "gpt-4o-mini-transcribe" }],
+      },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+### Provider-only (Deepgram)
+
+```json5
+{
+  tools: {
+    media: {
+      audio: {
+        enabled: true,
+        models: [{ provider: "deepgram", model: "nova-3" }],
+      },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+## Notes & limits
+
+- Provider auth follows the standard model auth order (auth profiles, env vars, `models.providers.*.apiKey`).
+- Deepgram picks up `DEEPGRAM_API_KEY` when `provider: "deepgram"` is used.
+- Deepgram setup details: [Deepgram (audio transcription)](/providers/deepgram).
+- Audio providers can override `baseUrl`, `headers`, and `providerOptions` via `tools.media.audio`.
+- Default size cap is 20MB (`tools.media.audio.maxBytes`). Oversize audio is skipped for that model and the next entry is tried.
+- Default `maxChars` for audio is **unset** (full transcript). Set `tools.media.audio.maxChars` or per-entry `maxChars` to trim output.
+- OpenAI auto default is `gpt-4o-mini-transcribe`; set `model: "gpt-4o-transcribe"` for higher accuracy.
+- Use `tools.media.audio.attachments` to process multiple voice notes (`mode: "all"` + `maxAttachments`).
+- Transcript is available to templates as `{{Transcript}}`.
+- CLI stdout is capped (5MB); keep CLI output concise.
+
+## Gotchas
+
+- Scope rules use first-match wins. `chatType` is normalized to `direct`, `group`, or `room`.
+- Ensure your CLI exits 0 and prints plain text; JSON needs to be massaged via `jq -r .text`.
+- Keep timeouts reasonable (`timeoutSeconds`, default 60s) to avoid blocking the reply queue.