@tera-system/core 0.2.13 → 0.2.16
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/MANIFEST.json +5 -5
- package/README.md +3 -3
- package/RELEASES.md +318 -272
- package/agents/application-blueprint.md +4 -4
- package/agents/domain-expert-agent.md +3 -3
- package/agents/domain-research-agent.md +4 -4
- package/agents/engineering-agent-typescript.md +1 -1
- package/agents/production-erp-expert.md +2 -2
- package/agents/red-team-agent.md +287 -28
- package/agents/security-auditor.md +112 -17
- package/agents/security-observer.md +94 -0
- package/agents/tera-client-engagement.md +1 -1
- package/agents/tera-system-evolution.md +2 -1
- package/agents/tera.md +1 -0
- package/core/tera-system/AGENT_ACTIVATION_MATRIX.md +275 -277
- package/core/tera-system/AGENT_DEPENDENCY_MAP.md +2 -2
- package/core/tera-system/AGENT_PERMISSION_MODEL.md +39 -26
- package/core/tera-system/SECURITY_TEAM_CHARTER.md +60 -20
- package/core/tera-system/TERA_DISTRIBUTION_POLICY.md +2 -2
- package/core/tera-system/TERA_PROJECT_DECISION.md +14 -12
- package/core/tera-system/TOOLING_AND_MCP_POLICY.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/TeraCapabilityMap.md +327 -0
- package/core/tera-system/TeraHelperAgents.md +13 -10
- package/core/tera-system/TeraPolicyMap.md +2 -1
- package/core/tera-system/TeraPreExecutionGate.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/TeraPreparationDocumentationGovernance.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/TeraSubAgents.md +312 -868
- package/core/tera-system/TeraTokenPolicy.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_EVIDENCE_MANIFEST.md +59 -0
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_MATRIX_API_TOP10.md +112 -0
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_MATRIX_ASVS_L2.md +261 -0
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_MATRIX_WSTG.md +209 -0
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_SECURITY_TARGET_SNAPSHOT.md +50 -0
- package/core/tera-system/design-system/DESIGN_SOURCE_PROTOCOL.md +2 -2
- package/core/tera-system/design-system/FIGMA_INTEGRATION.md +3 -3
- package/core/tera-system/design-system/UI_ACCEPTANCE_GATE.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/engineering-governance/ENGINEERING_AGENT_RESPONSIBILITIES.md +4 -2
- package/core/tera-system/engineering-governance/ENGINEERING_REVIEW_CHECKLIST.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/engineering-governance/QUALITY_GATE_THRESHOLDS.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/profiles/PROFILES_INDEX.md +2 -0
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_RUNTIME_CHECKLISTS.md +3 -3
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_RUNTIME_PROTOCOLS_CLIENT.md +2 -2
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_RUNTIME_PROTOCOLS_CORE.md +5 -5
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_SOLUTION_PREPARATION_PROTOCOL.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_SOLUTION_PREPARATION_TEMPLATES.md +4 -4
- package/package.json +2 -2
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@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ TERA_ACTIVE_CONTEXT.md (if exists) + Task Context + الملفات المحدد
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| **Light** | مهام بسيطة، قراءة ملف واحد، كتابة محدودة | تنسيق، توثيق، مهام روتينية |
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| **Medium** | تحليل وتصميم، قراءة 2-4 ملفات | معظم مهام التحضير والتحليل |
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| **Strong** | مراجعة شاملة، أمان، قرارات معمارية | SecurityAgent، مراجعات الجودة، مراجعة الامتثال |
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| **Strong** | مراجعة شاملة، أمان، قرارات معمارية | SecurityAgent (الدرع)، مراجعات الجودة، مراجعة الامتثال |
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**قاعدة:** لا يُسمح لأي عميل فرعي باستخدام Strong Token Budget إلا بتفويض صريح من Tera.
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<!-- © 2026 Majed Khaireddin (Alabasi1980). Tera System — Proprietary. All rights reserved. -->
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# EVIDENCE_MANIFEST.md — قالب بيان الأدلة (حماية النزاهة)
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> **الغرض (P3):** تجميد الأدلة وضمان عدم تعديلها بعد انتهاء الجولة. ينشئه الشبح **عند إغلاق الجولة** (قبل تسليمها للقاضي).
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> **الموقع:** `security-reports/[ROUND-ID]/EVIDENCE_MANIFEST.md`
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> **القاعدة:** بعد `Evidence Freeze Timestamp` ممنوع تعديل/حذف أي ملف أدلة أصلي — أي إضافة لاحقة في `evidence-addendum/`.
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## البيان
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```text
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EVIDENCE_MANIFEST.md
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Round ID: <SEC-ROUND-...>
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Evidence Freeze Timestamp: <UTC — لحظة إغلاق الجولة>
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Target Build ID: <من SECURITY_TARGET_SNAPSHOT>
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Commit SHA: <من SECURITY_TARGET_SNAPSHOT>
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Generated By: الشبح (Red Team)
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```
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## قائمة التجزئة (يُحسب كل ملف SHA256)
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```text
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evidence/T-01-01/request.txt SHA256: <hash>
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evidence/T-01-01/response.txt SHA256: <hash>
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evidence/T-01-01/metadata.md SHA256: <hash>
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evidence/T-02-03/request.txt SHA256: <hash>
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evidence/T-03-02/response.txt SHA256: <hash>
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evidence/T-06-01/screenshot.png SHA256: <hash>
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evidence/T-07-02/tool-output.txt SHA256: <hash>
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... (كل ملف تحت evidence/)
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```
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## الإضافات بعد التجميد (addendum)
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```text
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evidence-addendum/T-99-01/request.txt SHA256: <hash>
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evidence-addendum/T-99-01/response.txt SHA256: <hash>
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(سبب الإضافة: <...>)
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```
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## تحقق القاضي (Auditor Verification)
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```text
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Manifest present: YES / NO
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Files recomputed vs manifest: N / N (match)
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Mismatches found: [list → الأدلة المتأثرة تُبطل]
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Files modified after freeze: [list → تُرفض]
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Addendum files verified: [list]
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```
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---
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## ملاحظات
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- الشبح يمنع نفسه من تعديل أي ملف أدلة بعد الـ Freeze — يكتب فقط في `evidence-addendum/`.
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- القاضي يعيد حساب كل SHA256 وقت التدقيق ويقارنها بالبيان — أي اختلاف يُبطل الدليل المتأثر.
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- هذا البيان جزء من سجل التدقيق (Audit Record) ويُحفظ مع قرار القاضي.
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*الشبح (Red Team) — [ROUND-ID] — [تاريخ]*
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<!-- © 2026 Majed Khaireddin (Alabasi1980). Tera System — Proprietary. All rights reserved. -->
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# MATRIX_API_TOP10.md — قالب مصفوفة تغطية OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)
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> **الاستخدام:** ينسخ الشبح هذا القالب إلى `security-reports/[ROUND-ID]/MATRIX_API_TOP10.md` في كل جولة، ويملأ كل بند بنتيجة.
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> **قيم النتائج (حرفياً):** `PASS` · `FAIL` (يربط Finding ID) · `N/A` (يجب سبب خاص بالتطبيق) · `NOT TESTED` (يجب سبب).
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> **المصدر:** OWASP API Security Top 10 — 2023.
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## الملف الشخصي للتطبيق
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| البند | القيمة |
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|---|---|
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| Round ID | |
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| التطبيق / الإصدار | |
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| تاريخ التنفيذ | |
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| المنفذ | الشبح (Red Team) |
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## API1 — Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA)
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| # | Check | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
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| API1-01 | Object IDs from client input tested across all endpoints (GET/PUT/DELETE) | | | |
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| API1-02 | User A cannot access User B objects by ID | | | |
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| API1-03 | Mass assignment of object properties prevented | | | |
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| API1-04 | Authorization checked server-side for every object read/write | | | |
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## API2 — Broken Authentication
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| API2-01 | Authentication not bypassable via API manipulation | | | |
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| API2-02 | Credential stuffing / brute force rate-limited | | | |
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| API2-03 | Password reset / recovery not abusable | | | |
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| API2-04 | Session/token invalidation on logout & password change | | | |
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## API3 — Broken Object Property Level Authorization (BOPLA)
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| # | Check | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
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| API3-01 | Sensitive properties (role, balance, password, admin) not exposed in responses | | | |
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| API3-02 | Extra properties in request body rejected (mass assignment) | | | |
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| API3-03 | Property-level read/write authorization enforced | | | |
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## API4 — Unrestricted Resource Consumption
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| API4-01 | Rate limiting on API endpoints | | | |
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| API4-02 | Payload size limits enforced | | | |
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| API4-03 | Pagination / query limits prevent resource exhaustion | | | |
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| API4-04 | No unbounded loops, expensive queries, or queue abuse | | | |
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## API5 — Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA)
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| API5-01 | Admin functions not callable by regular users (server-side RBAC) | | | |
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| API5-02 | Function-level access control per HTTP method and endpoint | | | |
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| API5-03 | No hidden/undocumented admin endpoints accessible | | | |
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## API6 — Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows
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| API6-01 | Critical business flows (payments, orders, transfers) not abusable | | | |
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| API6-02 | Anti-automation / rate limits on high-value flows | | | |
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| API6-03 | Business flow integrity (no double-spend, replay, race) | | | |
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## API7 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
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| API7-01 | URL inputs (import, webhooks, preview, images) validated | | | |
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| API7-02 | Private network / metadata ranges blocked (169.254.169.254, localhost) | | | |
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| API7-03 | DNS rebinding protection | | | |
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## API8 — Security Misconfiguration
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| API8-01 | No debug/verbose error responses in production | | | |
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| API8-02 | CORS configured correctly (no wildcard with credentials) | | | |
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| API8-03 | Security headers present (CSP, XFO, XCTO, HSTS) | | | |
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| API8-04 | No default/weak credentials; least privilege on API keys | | | |
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## API9 — Improper Inventory Management
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| API9-01 | No old/unversioned API endpoints exposed | | | |
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| API9-02 | Deprecated versions removed or documented | | | |
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| API9-03 | Environment-specific endpoints (debug, staging) not exposed | | | |
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## API10 — Unsafe Consumption of APIs
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| API10-01 | Third-party API responses validated/sanitized before use | | | |
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| API10-02 | No data leakage via third-party integrations | | | |
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| API10-03 | TLS + auth to third-party APIs | | | |
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---
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## ملخص التغطية (يملأه الشبح)
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```text
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Total applicable: ___
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PASS: ___ FAIL: ___ N/A: ___ NOT TESTED: ___
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Coverage % (tested / applicable): ___%
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```
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*الشبح (Red Team) — [Round ID] — [تاريخ]*
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<!-- © 2026 Majed Khaireddin (Alabasi1980). Tera System — Proprietary. All rights reserved. -->
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# MATRIX_ASVS_L2.md — قالب مصفوفة تغطية OWASP ASVS 5.0 Level 2
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> **الاستخدام:** ينسخ الشبح هذا القالب إلى `security-reports/[ROUND-ID]/MATRIX_ASVS_L2.md` في كل جولة، ويملأ كل Control بنتيجة.
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> **قيم النتائج (حرفياً):** `PASS` · `FAIL` (يربط Finding ID) · `N/A` (يجب سبب خاص بالتطبيق) · `NOT TESTED` (يجب سبب).
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> **المصدر:** OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 5.0 — Level 2.
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## الملف الشخصي للتطبيق
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| التطبيق / الإصدار | |
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| تاريخ التنفيذ | |
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| المنفذ | الشبح (Red Team) |
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## V1 — Architecture, Design and Threat Modeling (L2: 13 Controls)
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| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
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| V1.1.1 | Components are integrated with the organization's change and/or configuration management processes | | | |
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| V1.2.1 | Uniqueness and integrity are verified cryptographically in a production environment | | | |
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| V1.2.2 | Software is built using a supported, secure framework | | | |
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| V1.2.3 | All third-party components are reviewed to determine unneeded features and security defaults | | | |
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| V1.2.4 | Threat modeling performed for all significant changes | | | |
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| V1.3.1 | Trust boundaries defined and documented | | | |
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| V1.5.1 | Separate storage or controlled access for sensitive data | | | |
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| V1.6.1 | All components of the trusted network are managed and configured | | | |
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| V1.7.1 | Cryptographic modules fail securely | | | |
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| V1.7.2 | Sanitization of data handling on failed/errored code paths | | | |
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| V1.8.1 | Trust boundaries between client and server | | | |
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| V1.8.2 | Server-side validation of client data | | | |
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| V1.11.1 | Data required for business is not exposed in URLs/query strings | | | |
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## V2 — Authentication (L2: 21 Controls)
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| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
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| V2.1.1 | Use of unique, random, unpredictable secrets for credentials | | | |
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| V2.1.2 | Password strength policy (at least 12 chars; no top-10000 passwords) | | | |
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| V2.1.3 | No default, weak, well-known passwords (e.g. admin/admin) | | | |
|
|
43
|
+
| V2.1.4 | Weak password change: anti-reuse + state change | | | |
|
|
44
|
+
| V2.1.5 | Shared or default accounts disabled | | | |
|
|
45
|
+
| V2.1.6 | Rate limiting or equivalent for authentication | | | |
|
|
46
|
+
| V2.1.7 | Back-off/alerting on prolonged brute-force attempts | | | |
|
|
47
|
+
| V2.1.8 | Non-generic error messages during authentication | | | |
|
|
48
|
+
| V2.2.1 | Anti-automation for credential stuffing | | | |
|
|
49
|
+
| V2.2.2 | (L3) MFA enrollment policy | | | |
|
|
50
|
+
| V2.3.1 | No bypass through alternative authentication paths | | | |
|
|
51
|
+
| V2.3.2 | Test user/session termination on password change | | | |
|
|
52
|
+
| V2.3.3 | (L3) WebAuthn/adaptive auth hardening | | | |
|
|
53
|
+
| V2.4.1 | Out-of-band verification channels (email/SMS) hardened | | | |
|
|
54
|
+
| V2.4.2 | Out-of-band verification requests are rate-limited | | | |
|
|
55
|
+
| V2.5.1 | Password reset links single-use, expiring, only to registered user | | | |
|
|
56
|
+
| V2.5.2 | Password reset token/hash protected against leakage | | | |
|
|
57
|
+
| V2.5.3 | (L3) Account lockout after brute force with recovery path | | | |
|
|
58
|
+
| V2.5.4 | No password reset that reveals account existence | | | |
|
|
59
|
+
| V2.6.1 | (L3) Protection against "verify your account" abuse | | | |
|
|
60
|
+
| V2.8.1 | (L3) Risk-based authentication | | | |
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
## V3 — Session Management (L2: 16 Controls)
|
|
63
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+
|
|
64
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
65
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
66
|
+
| V3.1.1 | Framework-generated, random, unpredictable session tokens | | | |
|
|
67
|
+
| V3.1.2 | Session tokens never in URLs | | | |
|
|
68
|
+
| V3.1.3 | Session token properties: correct domain/path/expiry/Secure/HttpOnly | | | |
|
|
69
|
+
| V3.1.4 | SameSite restrictions where possible | | | |
|
|
70
|
+
| V3.1.5 | Cookies set with the `__Host-` prefix where applicable | | | |
|
|
71
|
+
| V3.1.6 | No session leakage via Referer/other side channels | | | |
|
|
72
|
+
| V3.2.1 | No session fixation (new session on login) | | | |
|
|
73
|
+
| V3.2.2 | Session invalidation on logout | | | |
|
|
74
|
+
| V3.2.3 | Session invalidated on inactivity (absolute expiry) | | | |
|
|
75
|
+
| V3.2.4 | Session invalidated on password change | | | |
|
|
76
|
+
| V3.3.1 | Single active session allowed (or clearly documented multiple) | | | |
|
|
77
|
+
| V3.3.2 | (L3) Full session termination on all browser apps | | | |
|
|
78
|
+
| V3.4.1 | Cookie-based sessions use secure channel | | | |
|
|
79
|
+
| V3.4.2 | (L3) Session data integrity verified server-side | | | |
|
|
80
|
+
| V3.5.1 | Session tokens signed/verified server-side (JWT/opaque) | | | |
|
|
81
|
+
| V3.5.2 | Stateless tokens signed with verified algorithm (no alg=none) | | | |
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
## V4 — Access Control (L2: 20 Controls)
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
86
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
87
|
+
| V4.1.1 | Access control enforced server-side | | | |
|
|
88
|
+
| V4.1.2 | Deny-by-default for new features | | | |
|
|
89
|
+
| V4.1.3 | Principle of least privilege applied | | | |
|
|
90
|
+
| V4.1.4 | Insecure direct object references (IDOR/BOLA) prevented | | | |
|
|
91
|
+
| V4.1.5 | File downloads/access gated by authorization (BOPLA) | | | |
|
|
92
|
+
| V4.2.1 | Horizontal access control (user A cannot read user B) | | | |
|
|
93
|
+
| V4.2.2 | Vertical access control (user cannot act as admin) | | | |
|
|
94
|
+
| V4.3.1 | Mass assignment prevented on sensitive fields | | | |
|
|
95
|
+
| V4.3.2 | Role changes require authorization + re-authentication | | | |
|
|
96
|
+
| V4.3.3 | (L3) Business limits enforced server-side | | | |
|
|
97
|
+
| V4.4.1 | Authorization checked for each server-side object/record | | | |
|
|
98
|
+
| V4.4.2 | (L3) Server-side authorization on all write operations | | | |
|
|
99
|
+
| V4.4.3 | (L3) Server-side authorization on all read operations | | | |
|
|
100
|
+
| V4.5.1 | (L3) Intent-based authorization for state-changing operations | | | |
|
|
101
|
+
| V4.5.2 | (L3) Sensitive functions use specific access control | | | |
|
|
102
|
+
| V4.5.3 | (L3) Idempotency keys for critical state changes | | | |
|
|
103
|
+
| V4.6.1 | (L3) Sealed/authenticated non-HTTP services (e.g. GraphQL) | | | |
|
|
104
|
+
| V4.7.1 | (L3) Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) allowlist | | | |
|
|
105
|
+
| V4.7.2 | (L3) Non-HTTP connectors protected | | | |
|
|
106
|
+
| V4.8.1 | (L3) Business logic limits for abuse | | | |
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
## V5 — Validation, Sanitization and Encoding (L2: 20 Controls)
|
|
109
|
+
|
|
110
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
111
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
112
|
+
| V5.1.1 | Input validation on all untrusted data (positive allowlist) | | | |
|
|
113
|
+
| V5.1.2 | No mass assignment of sensitive fields (see V4.3.1) | | | |
|
|
114
|
+
| V5.1.3 | Structured data validated strictly per schema | | | |
|
|
115
|
+
| V5.1.4 | No undocumented client-side trust of server data | | | |
|
|
116
|
+
| V5.1.5 | (L3) Server-side default values where appropriate | | | |
|
|
117
|
+
| V5.2.1 | SQL injection prevented (parameterized queries) | | | |
|
|
118
|
+
| V5.2.2 | NoSQL injection prevented | | | |
|
|
119
|
+
| V5.2.3 | OS command injection prevented | | | |
|
|
120
|
+
| V5.2.4 | LDAP/XPath injection prevented | | | |
|
|
121
|
+
| V5.2.5 | Server-side template injection prevented | | | |
|
|
122
|
+
| V5.2.6 | (L3) Client-side template injection prevented | | | |
|
|
123
|
+
| V5.3.1 | Output encoding/escaping for HTML context (XSS) | | | |
|
|
124
|
+
| V5.3.2 | Output encoding for attribute contexts | | | |
|
|
125
|
+
| V5.3.3 | Output encoding for JavaScript context | | | |
|
|
126
|
+
| V5.3.4 | Output encoding for URL context | | | |
|
|
127
|
+
| V5.3.5 | Output encoding for CSS context | | | |
|
|
128
|
+
| V5.3.6 | (L3) Context-sensitive encoding / auto-escaping | | | |
|
|
129
|
+
| V5.4.1 | SSRF prevented (URL validation, deny-list, DNS rebinding) | | | |
|
|
130
|
+
| V5.4.2 | (L3) SSRF protection against private network ranges | | | |
|
|
131
|
+
| V5.5.1 | Deserialization of untrusted data prevented | | | |
|
|
132
|
+
|
|
133
|
+
## V6 — Stored Cryptography (L2: 8 Controls)
|
|
134
|
+
|
|
135
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
136
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
137
|
+
| V6.1.1 | No deprecated/weak cryptographic algorithms | | | |
|
|
138
|
+
| V6.1.2 | (L3) Homomorphic crypto only where proven | | | |
|
|
139
|
+
| V6.2.1 | Data encrypted at rest where sensitive | | | |
|
|
140
|
+
| V6.2.2 | (L3) HSM/secure element usage where required | | | |
|
|
141
|
+
| V6.3.1 | Random numbers generated by CSPRNG | | | |
|
|
142
|
+
| V6.3.2 | No predictable seeds | | | |
|
|
143
|
+
| V6.4.1 | Passwords stored with strong, salted, slow hashes (bcrypt/scrypt/argon2) | | | |
|
|
144
|
+
| V6.4.2 | Password hashing includes per-user salt | | | |
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
## V7 — Error Handling and Logging (L2: 12 Controls)
|
|
147
|
+
|
|
148
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
149
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
150
|
+
| V7.1.1 | No stack traces/internal errors in responses | | | |
|
|
151
|
+
| V7.1.2 | Error messages reveal no internals (SQL, paths, secrets) | | | |
|
|
152
|
+
| V7.1.3 | (L3) Custom error pages / standardized errors | | | |
|
|
153
|
+
| V7.2.1 | Security-relevant events logged (auth, access, changes) | | | |
|
|
154
|
+
| V7.2.2 | Logs include sufficient context (actor, source, result) | | | |
|
|
155
|
+
| V7.2.3 | Logs are tamper-resistant / protected | | | |
|
|
156
|
+
| V7.2.4 | (L3) Audit logs for privileged operations | | | |
|
|
157
|
+
| V7.2.5 | (L3) Logging of failed login and access attempts | | | |
|
|
158
|
+
| V7.3.1 | Sensitive data (secrets, tokens, hashes) not logged | | | |
|
|
159
|
+
| V7.3.2 | (L3) Logs are encrypted or access-restricted | | | |
|
|
160
|
+
| V7.4.1 | No sensitive data in URLs/query strings | | | |
|
|
161
|
+
| V7.5.1 | (L3) Log integrity verification | | | |
|
|
162
|
+
|
|
163
|
+
## V8 — Data Protection (L2: 12 Controls)
|
|
164
|
+
|
|
165
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
166
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
167
|
+
| V8.1.1 | Sensitive data identified and classified | | | |
|
|
168
|
+
| V8.1.2 | Sensitive data processed only on trusted infrastructure | | | |
|
|
169
|
+
| V8.2.1 | Sensitive data sent only over TLS (no cleartext) | | | |
|
|
170
|
+
| V8.2.2 | Strict TLS configuration (cert, version, ciphers) | | | |
|
|
171
|
+
| V8.3.1 | Sensitive data protected in memory | | | |
|
|
172
|
+
| V8.3.2 | (L3) Memory sanitization | | | |
|
|
173
|
+
| V8.3.3 | Sensitive data not cached insecurely (browser/CDN) | | | |
|
|
174
|
+
| V8.3.4 | (L3) Minimized data in cookies/localStorage | | | |
|
|
175
|
+
| V8.3.5 | (L3) Data minimization in analytics | | | |
|
|
176
|
+
| V8.4.1 | Data at rest encrypted per sensitivity | | | |
|
|
177
|
+
| V8.4.2 | Backups encrypted and access-controlled | | | |
|
|
178
|
+
| V8.4.3 | (L3) Database encryption with key separation | | | |
|
|
179
|
+
|
|
180
|
+
## V9 — Communication (L2: 5 Controls)
|
|
181
|
+
|
|
182
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
183
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
184
|
+
| V9.1.1 | TLS used for all client-server communication | | | |
|
|
185
|
+
| V9.1.2 | (L3) Pinning or certificate transparency | | | |
|
|
186
|
+
| V9.2.1 | (L3) Outbound connections use TLS | | | |
|
|
187
|
+
| V9.3.1 | (L3) TLS for non-HTTP services | | | |
|
|
188
|
+
| V9.4.1 | (L3) Perfect forward secrecy | | | |
|
|
189
|
+
|
|
190
|
+
## V10 — Malicious Code (L2: 3 Controls)
|
|
191
|
+
|
|
192
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
193
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
194
|
+
| V10.1.1 | No unauthorized code/backdoors in source | | | |
|
|
195
|
+
| V10.2.1 | (L3) Compiled code checked / source of truth | | | |
|
|
196
|
+
| V10.3.1 | (L3) No malicious code in build artifacts | | | |
|
|
197
|
+
|
|
198
|
+
## V11 — Business Logic (L2: 5 Controls)
|
|
199
|
+
|
|
200
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
201
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
202
|
+
| V11.1.1 | Business logic flows validated for abuse | | | |
|
|
203
|
+
| V11.1.2 | No bypass of workflow (race, replay, double-spend) | | | |
|
|
204
|
+
| V11.1.3 | Business rules enforced server-side (limits, quotas) | | | |
|
|
205
|
+
| V11.1.4 | (L3) Anti-automation on critical business functions | | | |
|
|
206
|
+
| V11.1.5 | (L3) Business limits configurable and monitored | | | |
|
|
207
|
+
|
|
208
|
+
## V12 — Files and Resources (L2: 7 Controls)
|
|
209
|
+
|
|
210
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
211
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
212
|
+
| V12.1.1 | Files served from separate domain/container where feasible | | | |
|
|
213
|
+
| V12.1.2 | File uploads validated by type, size, content | | | |
|
|
214
|
+
| V12.1.3 | File content validated (magic bytes) | | | |
|
|
215
|
+
| V12.1.4 | No dangerous filenames (traversal, double extension) | | | |
|
|
216
|
+
| V12.2.1 | Uploaded files not executable in web root | | | |
|
|
217
|
+
| V12.2.2 | (L3) Files stored outside web root | | | |
|
|
218
|
+
| V12.3.1 | No untrusted file inclusion (LFI/RFI) | | | |
|
|
219
|
+
|
|
220
|
+
## V13 — API and Web Service (L2: 12 Controls)
|
|
221
|
+
|
|
222
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
223
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
224
|
+
| V13.1.1 | No data leakage in API responses beyond required fields | | | |
|
|
225
|
+
| V13.1.2 | (L3) Response size / pagination limits | | | |
|
|
226
|
+
| V13.1.3 | (L3) API versioning and deprecation | | | |
|
|
227
|
+
| V13.2.1 | REST endpoints enforce authn/authz per method | | | |
|
|
228
|
+
| V13.2.2 | GraphQL/other API languages hardened (depth, complexity) | | | |
|
|
229
|
+
| V13.2.3 | (L3) WebSocket authentication | | | |
|
|
230
|
+
| V13.2.4 | (L3) WebSocket message authorization | | | |
|
|
231
|
+
| V13.3.1 | (L3) SOAP/web service policy enforcement | | | |
|
|
232
|
+
| V13.3.2 | (L3) Webhook signature validation | | | |
|
|
233
|
+
| V13.4.1 | (L3) No SQL injection in ORM/API layers | | | |
|
|
234
|
+
| V13.4.2 | (L3) No logic errors in API input handling | | | |
|
|
235
|
+
| V13.5.1 | (L3) No SSRF in API URL inputs (import/preview/webhooks) | | | |
|
|
236
|
+
|
|
237
|
+
## V14 — Configuration (L2: 9 Controls)
|
|
238
|
+
|
|
239
|
+
| ASVS ID | Control | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
240
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
241
|
+
| V14.1.1 | No debug/development features in production | | | |
|
|
242
|
+
| V14.1.2 | (L3) Debug features disabled in staging too | | | |
|
|
243
|
+
| V14.1.3 | HTTP security headers set correctly (CSP, XFO, XCTO, HSTS, Referrer-Policy) | | | |
|
|
244
|
+
| V14.1.4 | (L3) Subresource integrity for static resources | | | |
|
|
245
|
+
| V14.2.1 | CSP used to mitigate XSS | | | |
|
|
246
|
+
| V14.2.2 | (L3) CSP nonces/hashes | | | |
|
|
247
|
+
| V14.2.3 | (L3) No unsafe-inline/unsafe-eval in CSP | | | |
|
|
248
|
+
| V14.3.1 | (L3) All HTTP responses include X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff | | | |
|
|
249
|
+
| V14.5.1 | (L3) HTTP request smuggling mitigated | | | |
|
|
250
|
+
|
|
251
|
+
---
|
|
252
|
+
|
|
253
|
+
## ملخص التغطية (يملأه الشبح)
|
|
254
|
+
|
|
255
|
+
```text
|
|
256
|
+
Total controls applicable: ___
|
|
257
|
+
PASS: ___ FAIL: ___ N/A: ___ NOT TESTED: ___
|
|
258
|
+
Coverage % (tested / applicable): ___%
|
|
259
|
+
```
|
|
260
|
+
|
|
261
|
+
*الشبح (Red Team) — [Round ID] — [تاريخ]*
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
<!-- © 2026 Majed Khaireddin (Alabasi1980). Tera System — Proprietary. All rights reserved. -->
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
# MATRIX_WSTG.md — قالب مصفوفة تغطية OWASP WSTG
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
> **الاستخدام:** ينسخ الشبح هذا القالب إلى `security-reports/[ROUND-ID]/MATRIX_WSTG.md` في كل جولة، ويملأ كل Test Case بنتيجة.
|
|
6
|
+
> **قيم النتائج (حرفياً):** `PASS` · `FAIL` (يربط Finding ID) · `N/A` (يجب سبب خاص بالتطبيق) · `NOT TESTED` (يجب سبب).
|
|
7
|
+
> **المصدر:** OWASP Web Security Testing Guide — الإصدار المثبت (WSTG v4.2).
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
## الملف الشخصي للتطبيق
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
| البند | القيمة |
|
|
12
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
13
|
+
| Round ID | |
|
|
14
|
+
| التطبيق / الإصدار | |
|
|
15
|
+
| تاريخ التنفيذ | |
|
|
16
|
+
| المنفذ | الشبح (Red Team) |
|
|
17
|
+
|
|
18
|
+
## WSTG-INFO — Information Gathering (10 Tests)
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
21
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
22
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-01 | Conduct Search Engine Discovery Reconnaissance | | | |
|
|
23
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-02 | Fingerprint Web Server | | | |
|
|
24
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-03 | Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage | | | |
|
|
25
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-04 | Enumerate Applications on Webserver | | | |
|
|
26
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-05 | Review Webpage Content for Information Leakage | | | |
|
|
27
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-06 | Identify Application Entry Points | | | |
|
|
28
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-07 | Map Execution Paths Through Application | | | |
|
|
29
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-08 | Fingerprint Web Application Framework | | | |
|
|
30
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-09 | Fingerprint Web Application | | | |
|
|
31
|
+
| WSTG-INFO-10 | Map Application Architecture | | | |
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
## WSTG-CONF — Configuration and Deployment Management (10 Tests)
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
36
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
37
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-01 | Test Network Infrastructure Configuration | | | |
|
|
38
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-02 | Test Application Platform Configuration | | | |
|
|
39
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-03 | Test File Extensions Handling | | | |
|
|
40
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-04 | Review Old, Backup and Unreferenced Files | | | |
|
|
41
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-05 | Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces | | | |
|
|
42
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-06 | Test HTTP Methods | | | |
|
|
43
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-07 | Test HTTP Strict Transport Security | | | |
|
|
44
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-08 | Test RIA Cross Domain Policy | | | |
|
|
45
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-09 | Test File Permission | | | |
|
|
46
|
+
| WSTG-CONF-10 | Test for Subdomain Takeover | | | |
|
|
47
|
+
|
|
48
|
+
## WSTG-IDNT — Identity Management (5 Tests)
|
|
49
|
+
|
|
50
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
51
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
52
|
+
| WSTG-IDNT-01 | Test Role Definitions | | | |
|
|
53
|
+
| WSTG-IDNT-02 | Test User Registration Process | | | |
|
|
54
|
+
| WSTG-IDNT-03 | Test Account Provisioning Process | | | |
|
|
55
|
+
| WSTG-IDNT-04 | Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account | | | |
|
|
56
|
+
| WSTG-IDNT-05 | Testing for Weak or Unenforced Username Policy | | | |
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
## WSTG-ATHN — Authentication (10 Tests)
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
61
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
62
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-01 | Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel | | | |
|
|
63
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-02 | Testing for Default Credentials | | | |
|
|
64
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-03 | Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism | | | |
|
|
65
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-04 | Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema | | | |
|
|
66
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-05 | Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password and Psw Reset | | | |
|
|
67
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-06 | Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses | | | |
|
|
68
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-07 | Testing for Weak Password Policy | | | |
|
|
69
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-08 | Testing for Weak Security Question Answer | | | |
|
|
70
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-09 | Testing for Weak Password Change or Reset Functionalities | | | |
|
|
71
|
+
| WSTG-ATHN-10 | Testing for Weaker Authentication in Alternative Channel | | | |
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
## WSTG-SESS — Session Management (9 Tests)
|
|
74
|
+
|
|
75
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
76
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
77
|
+
| WSTG-SESS-01 | Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema | | | |
|
|
78
|
+
| WSTG-SESS-02 | Testing for Cookies Attributes | | | |
|
|
79
|
+
| WSTG-SESS-03 | Testing for Session Fixation | | | |
|
|
80
|
+
| WSTG-SESS-04 | Testing for Session Variables Overexposure | | | |
|
|
81
|
+
| WSTG-SESS-05 | Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery | | | |
|
|
82
|
+
| WSTG-SESS-06 | Testing for Logout Functionality | | | |
|
|
83
|
+
| WSTG-SESS-07 | Testing Session Timeout | | | |
|
|
84
|
+
| WSTG-SESS-08 | Testing for Session Puzzling | | | |
|
|
85
|
+
| WSTG-SESS-09 | Testing for Session Hijacking | | | |
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
## WSTG-AUTHZ — Authorization (8 Tests)
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
90
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
91
|
+
| WSTG-AUTHZ-01 | Testing Directory Traversal File Include | | | |
|
|
92
|
+
| WSTG-AUTHZ-02 | Testing for Bypassing Authorization Schema | | | |
|
|
93
|
+
| WSTG-AUTHZ-03 | Testing for Privilege Escalation | | | |
|
|
94
|
+
| WSTG-AUTHZ-04 | Testing for Insecure Direct Object References | | | |
|
|
95
|
+
| WSTG-AUTHZ-05 | Testing for OAuth Authorization Server Issues | | | |
|
|
96
|
+
| WSTG-AUTHZ-06 | (L3) Testing for JWT Issues | | | |
|
|
97
|
+
| WSTG-AUTHZ-07 | (L3) Testing for File Upload | | | |
|
|
98
|
+
| WSTG-AUTHZ-08 | (L3) Testing for HTTP Parameter Pollution | | | |
|
|
99
|
+
|
|
100
|
+
## WSTG-CRYP — Cryptography (2 Tests)
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
103
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
104
|
+
| WSTG-CRYP-01 | Testing for Weak Transport Layer Security | | | |
|
|
105
|
+
| WSTG-CRYP-02 | Testing for Padding Oracle | | | |
|
|
106
|
+
|
|
107
|
+
## WSTG-INPV — Input Validation (19 Tests)
|
|
108
|
+
|
|
109
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
110
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
111
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-01 | Reflected Cross Site Scripting | | | |
|
|
112
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-02 | Stored Cross Site Scripting | | | |
|
|
113
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-03 | HTTP Verb Tampering | | | |
|
|
114
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-04 | HTTP Parameter Pollution | | | |
|
|
115
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-05 | SQL Injection | | | |
|
|
116
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-06 | LDAP Injection | | | |
|
|
117
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-07 | XML Injection | | | |
|
|
118
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-08 | SSI Injection | | | |
|
|
119
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-09 | XPath Injection | | | |
|
|
120
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-10 | IMAP/SMTP Injection | | | |
|
|
121
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-11 | Code Injection | | | |
|
|
122
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-12 | Command Injection | | | |
|
|
123
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-13 | Buffer Overflow | | | |
|
|
124
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-14 | Incubated Vulnerability | | | |
|
|
125
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-15 | HTTP Splitting / Request Smuggling | | | |
|
|
126
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-16 | HTTP Incoming Requests | | | |
|
|
127
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-17 | Host Header Injection | | | |
|
|
128
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-18 | Server-Side Template Injection | | | |
|
|
129
|
+
| WSTG-INPV-19 | Server-Side Request Forgery | | | |
|
|
130
|
+
|
|
131
|
+
## WSTG-ERRH — Error Handling (2 Tests)
|
|
132
|
+
|
|
133
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
134
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
135
|
+
| WSTG-ERRH-01 | Analysis of Error Codes | | | |
|
|
136
|
+
| WSTG-ERRH-02 | Analysis of Stack Traces | | | |
|
|
137
|
+
|
|
138
|
+
## WSTG-WEAK — Weak Cryptography (2 Tests)
|
|
139
|
+
|
|
140
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
141
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
142
|
+
| WSTG-WEAK-01 | Weak Cryptography (insecure algorithms) | | | |
|
|
143
|
+
| WSTG-WEAK-02 | Padding Oracle (re-check) | | | |
|
|
144
|
+
|
|
145
|
+
## WSTG-BUSL — Business Logic (7 Tests)
|
|
146
|
+
|
|
147
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
148
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
149
|
+
| WSTG-BUSL-01 | Test Business Logic Data Validation | | | |
|
|
150
|
+
| WSTG-BUSL-02 | Test Ability to Forge Requests | | | |
|
|
151
|
+
| WSTG-BUSL-03 | Test Integrity Checks | | | |
|
|
152
|
+
| WSTG-BUSL-04 | Test Process Timing | | | |
|
|
153
|
+
| WSTG-BUSL-05 | Test Number of Times a Function Can Be Used Limits | | | |
|
|
154
|
+
| WSTG-BUSL-06 | Testing for Circumvention of Work Flows | | | |
|
|
155
|
+
| WSTG-BUSL-07 | Test Defenses Against Application Misuse | | | |
|
|
156
|
+
|
|
157
|
+
## WSTG-CLNT — Client-side (17 Tests)
|
|
158
|
+
|
|
159
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
160
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
161
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-01 | Testing for DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting | | | |
|
|
162
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-02 | Testing for JavaScript Execution | | | |
|
|
163
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-03 | Testing for HTML Injection | | | |
|
|
164
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-04 | Testing for Client-side URL Redirect | | | |
|
|
165
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-05 | Testing for CSS Injection | | | |
|
|
166
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-06 | Testing for Client-side Resource Manipulation | | | |
|
|
167
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-07 | Testing Cross Origin Resource Sharing | | | |
|
|
168
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-08 | Testing for Cross Site Flashing | | | |
|
|
169
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-09 | Testing for Clickjacking | | | |
|
|
170
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-10 | Testing WebSockets | | | |
|
|
171
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-11 | Testing Web Messaging | | | |
|
|
172
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-12 | Testing Browser Storage | | | |
|
|
173
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-13 | Testing for Cross Site Script Inclusion | | | |
|
|
174
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-14 | Testing for Reverse Tabnabbing | | | |
|
|
175
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-15 | Testing for Cross-Site Request Forgery (re-check) | | | |
|
|
176
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-16 | (L3) Testing for Insecure Postmessage | | | |
|
|
177
|
+
| WSTG-CLNT-17 | (L3) Testing for Local File Inclusion via JS | | | |
|
|
178
|
+
|
|
179
|
+
## WSTG-APIT — API Testing (1 Test)
|
|
180
|
+
|
|
181
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
182
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
183
|
+
| WSTG-APIT-01 | Testing GraphQL | | | |
|
|
184
|
+
|
|
185
|
+
## WSTG-DESS — Denial of Service (3 Tests)
|
|
186
|
+
|
|
187
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
188
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
189
|
+
| WSTG-DESS-01 | Test for Anti-Resource Loop | | | |
|
|
190
|
+
| WSTG-DESS-02 | Test for Application DoS | | | |
|
|
191
|
+
| WSTG-DESS-03 | (L3) Test for API abuse / mass assignment | | | |
|
|
192
|
+
|
|
193
|
+
## WSTG-MISC — Miscellaneous (1 Test)
|
|
194
|
+
|
|
195
|
+
| WSTG ID | Test | Result | Evidence/Test ID | Notes |
|
|
196
|
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
197
|
+
| WSTG-MISC-01 | (L3) Test for OAuth Authorization Server Issues | | | |
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
---
|
|
200
|
+
|
|
201
|
+
## ملخص التغطية (يملأه الشبح)
|
|
202
|
+
|
|
203
|
+
```text
|
|
204
|
+
Total tests applicable: ___
|
|
205
|
+
PASS: ___ FAIL: ___ N/A: ___ NOT TESTED: ___
|
|
206
|
+
Coverage % (tested / applicable): ___%
|
|
207
|
+
```
|
|
208
|
+
|
|
209
|
+
*الشبح (Red Team) — [Round ID] — [تاريخ]*
|