@tera-system/core 0.2.13 → 0.2.16
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/MANIFEST.json +5 -5
- package/README.md +3 -3
- package/RELEASES.md +318 -272
- package/agents/application-blueprint.md +4 -4
- package/agents/domain-expert-agent.md +3 -3
- package/agents/domain-research-agent.md +4 -4
- package/agents/engineering-agent-typescript.md +1 -1
- package/agents/production-erp-expert.md +2 -2
- package/agents/red-team-agent.md +287 -28
- package/agents/security-auditor.md +112 -17
- package/agents/security-observer.md +94 -0
- package/agents/tera-client-engagement.md +1 -1
- package/agents/tera-system-evolution.md +2 -1
- package/agents/tera.md +1 -0
- package/core/tera-system/AGENT_ACTIVATION_MATRIX.md +275 -277
- package/core/tera-system/AGENT_DEPENDENCY_MAP.md +2 -2
- package/core/tera-system/AGENT_PERMISSION_MODEL.md +39 -26
- package/core/tera-system/SECURITY_TEAM_CHARTER.md +60 -20
- package/core/tera-system/TERA_DISTRIBUTION_POLICY.md +2 -2
- package/core/tera-system/TERA_PROJECT_DECISION.md +14 -12
- package/core/tera-system/TOOLING_AND_MCP_POLICY.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/TeraCapabilityMap.md +327 -0
- package/core/tera-system/TeraHelperAgents.md +13 -10
- package/core/tera-system/TeraPolicyMap.md +2 -1
- package/core/tera-system/TeraPreExecutionGate.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/TeraPreparationDocumentationGovernance.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/TeraSubAgents.md +312 -868
- package/core/tera-system/TeraTokenPolicy.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_EVIDENCE_MANIFEST.md +59 -0
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_MATRIX_API_TOP10.md +112 -0
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_MATRIX_ASVS_L2.md +261 -0
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_MATRIX_WSTG.md +209 -0
- package/core/tera-system/_TEMPLATE_SECURITY_TARGET_SNAPSHOT.md +50 -0
- package/core/tera-system/design-system/DESIGN_SOURCE_PROTOCOL.md +2 -2
- package/core/tera-system/design-system/FIGMA_INTEGRATION.md +3 -3
- package/core/tera-system/design-system/UI_ACCEPTANCE_GATE.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/engineering-governance/ENGINEERING_AGENT_RESPONSIBILITIES.md +4 -2
- package/core/tera-system/engineering-governance/ENGINEERING_REVIEW_CHECKLIST.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/engineering-governance/QUALITY_GATE_THRESHOLDS.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/profiles/PROFILES_INDEX.md +2 -0
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_RUNTIME_CHECKLISTS.md +3 -3
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_RUNTIME_PROTOCOLS_CLIENT.md +2 -2
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_RUNTIME_PROTOCOLS_CORE.md +5 -5
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_SOLUTION_PREPARATION_PROTOCOL.md +1 -1
- package/core/tera-system/runtime/TERA_SOLUTION_PREPARATION_TEMPLATES.md +4 -4
- package/package.json +2 -2
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@@ -154,22 +154,86 @@ If evidence is missing or insufficient — record it as `NOT TESTED` or `INCOMPL
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Before any judgment:
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1. Read the authorization file — confirm the version, environment, and scope match the test records.
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4. Verify
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2. **Verify `SECURITY_TARGET_SNAPSHOT.md`** — start vs end commit SHA, working-tree cleanliness, runtime restart. If the target changed during the round → **round INVALID / INCOMPLETE**.
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3. Inventory the actual evidence folders — do not trust the Red Team's summary.
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4. **Verify `EVIDENCE_MANIFEST.md`** — independently recompute SHA256 for every evidence file and compare. Any mismatch voids the affected evidence.
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5. Check the attack surface map — is every critical endpoint covered?
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6. **Build the Surface Reconciliation** (see §6.2.3) — do not trust the Red Team's surface alone.
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7. Verify Test IDs exist with Request/Response evidence.
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8. Verify the ASVS 5.0 Level 2 and WSTG matrices are complete.
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### 6.2 Evidence Review
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| Check | Rule |
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|---|---|
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| PASS without evidence | Change to `NOT TESTED` |
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| Successful exploit without Evidence Pack (request+response) | REJECT the finding — require the pack or mark claim unverified |
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| Evidence not reconstructible (cannot rebuild conclusion from files alone) | REJECT / mark insufficient |
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| Evidence hash mismatch vs EVIDENCE_MANIFEST.md | VOID the affected evidence — flag integrity breach |
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| Evidence added after freeze (not in addendum) | REJECT as non-compliant |
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| N/A without app-specific justification | REJECT the N/A |
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| Scanner-only result (no manual verification) | Not accepted as proof |
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| Severity classification |
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| Severity classification | Three-axis review (see §6.2.1) — by production impact |
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| Finding closure | Requires retest evidence |
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### 6.2.1 Three-Axis Severity Review
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For every finding, verify the red team classified on **three axes** (per red-team §9.1):
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```text
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Technical Severity — inherent defect severity in isolation (not inflated by chains)
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Business Impact — impact on business/data/reputation
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Exploit Chain Severity — full severity when chained (this is the gate basis)
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```
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Your review:
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- **Reject inflated Technical Severity** — if a finding is Critical solely because of a chain, the Technical axis is wrong (chain goes on the Chain axis).
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- **Reject hidden chains** — if a finding is Medium but clearly chains into admin takeover, the Chain axis is wrong and the gate must block.
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- **Reject lumped findings** — unrelated weaknesses (e.g. missing headers + CORS wildcard) must be separate findings unless the exploit requires both.
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- **Gate decision basis is Exploit Chain Severity** — Critical/High chain open = no delivery. Never average axes into a single number.
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### 6.2.2 Coverage Matrix Verification
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- Verify all three matrices exist: `MATRIX_ASVS_L2.md`, `MATRIX_WSTG.md`, `MATRIX_API_TOP10.md`.
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- Every control row must have exactly one result: `PASS` / `FAIL`→Finding ID / `N/A`+reason / `NOT TESTED`+reason.
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- **Reject any N/A without an app-specific justification.**
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- Compute coverage: `tested controls / total controls`, and `PASS / FAIL / N/A / NOT TESTED` totals.
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- Coverage below 100% of applicable controls (or unjustified NOT TESTED) → `INCOMPLETE` gate, never PASS.
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- For Discovery rounds (§10.1 red-team), verify the Discovery Scorecard is present and validate the false-positive claims against evidence.
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### 6.2.3 Independent Surface Reconciliation (P4 — the key integrity check)
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**You do NOT trust the Red Team's attack surface alone.** You build the reconciliation from three independent sources:
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```text
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A. Red Team discovered surface ← 01_ATTACK_SURFACE.md (they provide)
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B. Runtime/router surface ← what the running app actually exposes
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(from العين runtime observation + your own read-only route checks)
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C. Source-declared surface ← routes from code/schema/router (they provide from Phase B;
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you can cross-check against source yourself)
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```
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Steps:
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1. Collect A, B, C.
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2. Compute the union: `Surface = A ∪ B ∪ C`.
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3. Compute **Missing from Red Team** = endpoints in B∪C but NOT in A.
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4. Compute **Unexplained routes** = endpoints in B but NOT in C (runtime-only — investigate).
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5. Emit the reconciliation block in your report:
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```text
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Surface Reconciliation
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Runtime endpoints: 47
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Source-declared endpoints: 51
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Red Team discovered: 44
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Missing from Red Team:
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- /api/internal/export
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- /api/v1/report
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Unexplained routes: 2
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```
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6. For every endpoint missing from the Red Team surface: test it yourself (read-only) or mark it `NOT TESTED`. "Critical endpoints tested: 100%" is only meaningful **after** reconciliation.
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7. If missing endpoints are critical and untested → gate cannot PASS.
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### 6.3 Gate Decision
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| Condition | Decision |
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Zero-threshold conditions:
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```text
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Critical open: 0
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High open: 0
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Critical open (Exploit Chain): 0
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High open (Exploit Chain): 0
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Auth/permission bypass: 0
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Cross-user/tenant access: 0
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Unauthorized admin operation: 0
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Real secrets exposed: 0
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Target unchanged during round (SECURITY_TARGET_SNAPSHOT start=end): required
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Evidence Manifest verified (all hashes match): required
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Surface Reconciliation complete (no critical untested endpoints missing from Red Team surface): required
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Critical endpoints tested: 100% (post-reconciliation)
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Roles × Operations Matrix: 100%
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Approved ASVS: 100% PASS or justified approved N/A
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Approved ASVS: 100% PASS or justified approved N/A (verified via matrices)
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Coverage Matrices present & complete (ASVS L2 / WSTG / API Top 10): required
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Evidence Packs complete for every claimed exploit: required
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Retested findings: 100%
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Critical NOT TESTED/BLOCKED: 0
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Evidence & data integrity: complete and approved
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Overall Security Gate: PASS / CONDITIONAL PASS / FAIL / INCOMPLETE
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Target Integrity Assessment:
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- SECURITY_TARGET_SNAPSHOT start commit: [SHA]
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- End commit / tree changed during round: YES/NO → [VALID / INVALID / INCOMPLETE]
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- Runtime restarted during round: YES/NO
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Coverage Assessment:
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- Surface Reconciliation (A ∪ B ∪ C):
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- Runtime endpoints: N
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- Source-declared endpoints: N
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- Red Team discovered: N
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- Missing from Red Team: [list]
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- Unexplained routes: N
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- Attack surface map complete (post-reconciliation): Yes / No
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- Critical endpoints tested: N / total (100% required, post-reconciliation)
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- Roles × Operations Matrix: N / total (100% required)
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- ASVS 5.0 Level 2: X PASS / Y N/A (justified) / Z NOT TESTED
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- WSTG
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- API coverage (OWASP API Top 10): [status]
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- ASVS 5.0 Level 2 matrix: X PASS / Y N/A (justified) / Z NOT TESTED — of Total
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- WSTG matrix: [status + totals]
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- API coverage (OWASP API Top 10) matrix: [status + totals]
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Findings Assessment:
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- Findings reported: N (Critical X / High Y / Medium Z / Low W)
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- Open Critical/High: N → [blocks delivery]
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- Findings reported: N (Critical X / High Y / Medium Z / Low W) — by Exploit Chain Severity
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- Open Critical/High (chain): N → [blocks delivery]
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- Technical Severity inflated (chain on wrong axis): [count — rejected]
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- Hidden chain not reflected in Chain Severity: [count — corrected]
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- Retested findings: N / total (100% required)
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- Severity classification correct: Yes / [issues]
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Evidence Assessment:
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- EVIDENCE_MANIFEST.md present: Yes / No
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- Manifest hashes verified (independent recompute): [N verified / M mismatched → voided]
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- Evidence modified after freeze (not in addendum): [count → rejected]
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- PASS without evidence → changed to NOT TESTED: [count]
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- Exploits without Evidence Pack → rejected/held: [count]
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- N/A rejected without justification: [count]
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- Scanner-only claims rejected: [count]
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- Reconstructibility verified (rebuild from files alone): Yes / [issues]
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- Evidence redaction correct: Yes / [issues]
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Observer Assessment:
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- Detection gaps identified: [list]
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- Logging/alerting findings: [list]
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- Blue Team Assessment present (§7.2): Yes / No
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- Secrets-in-logs amplification noted: [SEC refs]
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Gate Decision:
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- Decision: PASS / CONDITIONAL PASS / FAIL / INCOMPLETE
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- **You never call INCOMPLETE a success.**
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- **You classify severity by production impact** — fake data does not reduce severity.
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- **You do not lower severity because "it's just a demo".**
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- **You judge severity on three axes** (Technical / Business / Exploit Chain) — never a single inflated number.
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- **You reject findings whose Evidence Pack cannot be reconstructed from files alone.**
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- **You reject N/A in coverage matrices without an app-specific justification.**
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- **You do not trust the Red Team's attack surface** — you build the Surface Reconciliation (A ∪ B ∪ C) independently.
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- **You verify the Evidence Manifest** — recompute every hash; a mismatch voids evidence.
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- **You verify the Target Snapshot** — a changed target invalidates the round.
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- **You can reach a FAIL the Red Team did not expect** — that is your job.
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- **Never invent evidence.** `[Unknown]` is a valid entry.
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A blocked attack is NOT a success if the system did not log it. Detection, logging, and alerting are part of security. If the red team's attempts are invisible in the logs, that is an independent finding.
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You operate at the intersection of **Red Team observation** and **Blue Team / Detection Engineering / Security Observability**:
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### 3.1 Observation role (during the engagement)
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You monitor:
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1. **Application, auth, reverse proxy, and database logs** — did the attacks appear?
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2. **CPU, memory, connections, errors, timeouts** — any resource impact or instability?
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4. **Canary data integrity** — before vs after each attack wave.
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5. **Alerts and detection time** — how fast did the system notice?
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### 3.2 Blue Team / Detection Engineering role (assessment output)
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You evaluate the target's **detection and observability posture** — this is a distinct deliverable, not just "did it crash":
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1. **Logging adequacy** — are security-relevant events (auth failures, admin calls, uploads, privilege changes, export/download) captured at all? With enough context (actor, source, result)?
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2. **Alerting** — is there ANY alerting/triggering? What is the detection latency (time from attack to system noticing)?
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3. **Timestamps & correlation** — are log lines timestamped (UTC, consistent format)? Can a forensic analyst reconstruct the timeline of an attack?
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4. **Attack visibility** — do malicious 200s (JWT forgery, BFLA, IDOR) look identical to legitimate requests, or is there an indicator? Are attacks distinguishable from normal traffic?
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5. **Secrets in logs** — do logs capture secrets, hashes, env dumps, raw SQL, payloads? (This amplifies findings like env leak.)
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6. **Blind spots** — which attack classes produced NO log trace at all?
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Each finding gets: what the system SHOULD have captured, what it ACTUALLY captured, and the gap.
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### 3.3 Runtime Surface + Target Integrity support (for the auditor)
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You provide two inputs that the auditor (القاضي) needs for independent verification:
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1. **Runtime surface (source B for reconciliation)** — during the engagement, record the actual endpoints/routes you observe being exercised (from logs, network, and your read-only checks):
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```text
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RUNTIME_SURFACE.md
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Observed endpoints: [list every path observed during the engagement]
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Observation method: [logs / network / requests]
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```
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This becomes source B in the auditor's Surface Reconciliation (§6.2.3).
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2. **Target change detection** — record whether the running application changed during the round:
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```text
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Target PID: [stable across rounds? YES/NO]
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Runtime restarted: YES/NO + timestamps
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Process start time: [baseline vs end]
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HTTP behavior drift: [unusual changes in responses mid-round]
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```
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This feeds `SECURITY_TARGET_SNAPSHOT.md` closing block (P2). If the runtime restarted or changed mid-round, flag it immediately — the round may be INVALID.
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---
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## 4. Reference Hierarchy
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## 7. Observer Report Format
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The observer produces **two outputs** per round:
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### 7.0 Outputs overview
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```text
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1. Observer Report (executive — §7.1) ← operational monitoring
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2. Blue Team Assessment (technical — §7.2) ← detection engineering
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3. RUNTIME_SURFACE.md (source B — §3.3) ← for the auditor's reconciliation
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4. Target integrity notes (P2 — §3.3) ← runtime restarted / process changed
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```
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### 7.1 Observer Report (executive — operational)
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```text
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Observer Report
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Round ID:
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- Status: Normal / Anomalies Found / STOP_EVENT
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- Key Detection Gaps: [list]
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- Recommended Next Action:
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Target Integrity (P2):
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- Target PID stable: YES / NO
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- Runtime restarted during round: YES / NO [timestamps]
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- Process start time: baseline [t] → end [t]
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- HTTP behavior drift mid-round: None / [describe]
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- Runtime surface recorded: RUNTIME_SURFACE.md (source B)
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```
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### 7.2 Blue Team Assessment (technical — Detection Engineering)
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```text
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Blue Team / Detection Engineering Assessment
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Round ID:
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Target:
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Detection Posture by Layer:
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| Layer (logs/WAF/IDS/alerting/rate-limit/lockout) | Present? | Detected attacks? | Latency | Notes |
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Logging Adequacy:
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- Security-relevant events captured: [list which attack classes left traces]
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- Context captured per event (actor/source/result): Yes / Partial / No
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- Timestamps: Present / Absent / Inconsistent — format & timezone
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Alerting:
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- Alerting system present: Yes / No
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- Detection latency measured: [time]
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- Malicious 200s distinguishable: Yes / No — [explanation]
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Observability Gaps (independent findings):
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| # | Gap | Attack class affected | Impact | Recommendation |
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+
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Secrets-in-Logs Assessment:
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- Secrets/hashes/raw SQL/env dumps in logs: Yes / No — [list]
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- Amplifies which findings: [SEC refs]
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Blind Spots (attacks with NO log trace):
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- [list]
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Handback:
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- Overall Detection Posture: Weak / Moderate / Strong
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- Top 3 Recommendations: [1. 2. 3.]
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```
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---
|
|
@@ -221,6 +314,7 @@ Handback to Orchestrator:
|
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- **Correlate with Test IDs.** Your report is only useful when tied to specific red team actions.
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- **Never invent observations.** If you did not see it, say so. `[Unknown]` is a valid entry.
|
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- **Stop conditions apply to you too.** If you observe real data exposure, service failure, or a stop indicator — report immediately.
|
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|
+
- **Blue Team is your second deliverable.** The Blue Team Assessment (§7.2) is mandatory — measuring whether the system *detected* the attack is as valuable as the attacks themselves.
|
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|
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---
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|
|
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ Majed يؤكد: "نحتاج مخزون ومبيعات فقط"
|
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554
|
|
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|
**ممنوع:**
|
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|
```text
|
|
557
|
-
❌ لا تستدعي أي عميل فرعي آخر (EngineeringAgent, SecurityAgent, إلخ)
|
|
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|
+
❌ لا تستدعي أي عميل فرعي آخر (EngineeringAgent, SecurityAgent (الدرع), إلخ)
|
|
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558
|
❌ لا تدير DomainResearchAgent أو DomainExpertAgent أو ProductionERPExpert أو تعدل تعريفاتهم
|
|
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|
❌ لا تستخدم البحث لتوسيع النطاق دون موافقة Majed
|
|
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|
```
|
|
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ Its role is to detect, analyze, propose, govern, and narrowly execute approved s
|
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رفض أو تقليل أي إضافة غير مبررة: ملفات، عملاء، طبقات، MCPs، أو قواعد مكررة.
|
|
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212
|
|
|
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213
|
7. **Core Agent Governance**
|
|
214
|
-
مراجعة وتحسين تعريفات جميع العملاء في `.opencode/agents/` — البالغ عددهم
|
|
214
|
+
مراجعة وتحسين تعريفات جميع العملاء في `.opencode/agents/` — البالغ عددهم 23 حالياً — للتأكد من أنها تعكس الواقع التشغيلي بدقة، ولا تحتوي تكراراً أو تضارباً.
|
|
215
215
|
|
|
216
216
|
**قائمة العملاء الكاملة (مصدر الحقيقة: `.opencode/agents/`):**
|
|
217
217
|
- **Coding Agents:** `engineering-agent`, `engineering-agent-dotnet`, `engineering-agent-typescript`, `engineering-agent-phaser`, `ui-designer`, `tera-software-designer`
|
|
@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ Its role is to detect, analyze, propose, govern, and narrowly execute approved s
|
|
|
221
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|
- **Research:** `domain-research-agent`, `domain-expert-agent`
|
|
222
222
|
- **Knowledge:** `project-knowledge-agent`
|
|
223
223
|
- **Specialist:** `production-erp-expert`
|
|
224
|
+
- **Security Team (فريق الحماية — SCP-2026-09-02-001):** `red-team-agent` (الشبح), `security-observer` (العين), `security-auditor` (القاضي) — + الدرع (SecurityAgent) معرف في `TeraHelperAgents.md` §6.1
|
|
224
225
|
- **System:** `tera-system-evolution` (نفسي)
|
|
225
226
|
|
|
226
227
|
> **تنبيه:** لا تهمل أي عميل في التحليل فقط لأنه غير مذكور في قائمة قديمة. المرجع هو الملفات الموجودة فعلياً في `.opencode/agents/`.
|
package/agents/tera.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ Phase 7 rules:
|
|
|
247
247
|
- Phase 7 does not execute code or add scope.
|
|
248
248
|
- No closure without Delivery Readiness validation.
|
|
249
249
|
- Blocking issues found in Phase 7 → `TASK-COD-FIX-*`.
|
|
250
|
+
- **Security Gate (Phase 7 — فريق الحماية):** لا تسليم بلا قرار القاضي (security-auditor) بعد جولة اختبار هجومي كاملة. Tera يقرر `SECURITY_TEST_REQUIRED` / `SECURITY_TEST_WAIVED` — وعند المطلوب: الشبح يهاجم + العين يراقب + القاضي يحكم. المرجع: `tera-system/SECURITY_TEAM_CHARTER.md` + `TERA_RUNTIME_CHECKLISTS.md` §Phase 7. للمشاريع الداخلية الصغيرة يجوز لـ Majed التنازل عن الجولة الكاملة.
|
|
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251
|
|
|
251
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|
---
|
|
252
253
|
|