@tellescope/sdk 1.256.13 → 1.256.15

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/{F-0007-invite-user-enumeration.test.ts → invite-user-enumeration.test.ts}

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ const post = async (path: string, body: any, headers: Record<string, string> = {
 }
 
 /**
- * Regression test for F-0007 (security-audit/findings/F-0007-invite-user-cross-tenant-email-enumeration.md).
+ * Regression test: `invite_user` cross-tenant enumeration.
  *
  * `users.invite_user` previously used `buildAllQueries({ unrestricted: true, organizationIds: [] }).users.findOne({ email })`
  * to enforce platform-wide email uniqueness and threw the distinctive `"A user with this email already exists"`
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ const post = async (path: string, body: any, headers: Record<string, string> = {
  *      env vars are not set, mirroring cross_org_api_key.test.ts convention.
  */
 export const invite_user_enumeration_tests = async ({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdmin: Session }) => {
-  log_header("F-0007: users.invite_user cross-tenant enumeration regression")
+  log_header("users.invite_user cross-tenant enumeration regression")
 
   // Reset state so prior tests' rate-limit accounting doesn't leak in.
   await sdk.reset_db()
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ export const invite_user_enumeration_tests = async ({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin } : { sdk
   }
 
   await async_test(
-    "F-0007: invite_user rate-limits within ~12 rapid requests (defense-in-depth; no invites sent)",
+    "invite_user rate-limits within ~12 rapid requests (defense-in-depth; no invites sent)",
     async () => ({ rateLimitedAt }),
     { onResult: r => r.rateLimitedAt >= 0 && r.rateLimitedAt <= 12 },
   )
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ export const invite_user_enumeration_tests = async ({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin } : { sdk
   )
 
   await async_test(
-    "F-0007: invite_user same-tenant duplicate returns 400 'already exists' (unchanged)",
+    "invite_user same-tenant duplicate returns 400 'already exists' (unchanged)",
     async () => ({
       status: sameTenantRes.status,
       message: sameTenantRes.data?.message ?? '',
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ export const invite_user_enumeration_tests = async ({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin } : { sdk
   // Env-gated; skipped when cross-org infra not configured.
   // ====================================================================
   if (!(CROSS_ORG_API_KEY && CROSS_ORG_TARGET_BUSINESS_ID)) {
-    console.log("  [F-0007] Skipping cross-tenant silent no-op assertion — CROSS_ORG_* env vars not set")
+    console.log("  Skipping cross-tenant silent no-op assertion — CROSS_ORG_* env vars not set")
     return
   }
 
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ export const invite_user_enumeration_tests = async ({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin } : { sdk
   )
 
   await async_test(
-    "F-0007: cross-tenant invite of existing email must NOT return 'already exists' (no enumeration)",
+    "cross-tenant invite of existing email must NOT return 'already exists' (no enumeration)",
     async () => ({
       status: crossRes.status,
       message: crossRes.data?.message ?? '',
@@ -188,11 +188,11 @@ if (require.main === module) {
 
   runTests()
     .then(() => {
-      console.log("✅ F-0007 invite_user enumeration test suite completed successfully")
+      console.log("✅ invite_user enumeration test suite completed successfully")
       process.exit(0)
     })
     .catch((error) => {
-      console.error("❌ F-0007 invite_user enumeration test suite failed:", error)
+      console.error("❌ invite_user enumeration test suite failed:", error)
       process.exit(1)
     })
 }

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/{F-0151-load-inbox-redaction.test.ts → load-inbox-redaction.test.ts}

@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ const host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080' as const
 const ENDUSER_PASSWORD = 'F0151TestPassword!123'
 
 /**
- * Regression test for F-0151
- * (security-audit/findings/F-0151-load-inbox-data-endusers-unredacted.md).
+ * Regression test: `load_inbox_data` must apply enduser field redactions.
  *
  * load_inbox_data serialized $lookup'ed endusers via convert_id_name only (NOT applyRedactions),
  * so endusers.hashedPassword (redactions:['all']) leaked to staff sessions — while the sibling
@@ -24,7 +23,7 @@ const ENDUSER_PASSWORD = 'F0151TestPassword!123'
  * assert the returned enduser entry has NO hashedPassword.
  */
 export const load_inbox_redaction_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdmin: Session }) => {
-  log_header("F-0151: load_inbox_data enduser redaction")
+  log_header("load_inbox_data enduser redaction")
 
   let enduserId: string | undefined
   let emailId: string | undefined
@@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ export const load_inbox_redaction_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session, sdkNo
     emailId = seeded.id
 
     await async_test(
-      'F-0151: load_inbox_data does not leak enduser.hashedPassword to staff',
+      'load_inbox_data does not leak enduser.hashedPassword to staff',
       () => sdk.api.endusers.load_inbox_data({ enduserIds: [enduser.id] } as any),
       {
         onResult: (r: any) => {
@@ -71,11 +70,11 @@ if (require.main === module) {
 
   runTests()
     .then(() => {
-      console.log("✅ F-0151 load_inbox_data redaction test suite completed successfully")
+      console.log("✅ load_inbox_data redaction test suite completed successfully")
       process.exit(0)
     })
     .catch((error) => {
-      console.error("❌ F-0151 load_inbox_data redaction test suite failed:", error)
+      console.error("❌ load_inbox_data redaction test suite failed:", error)
       process.exit(1)
     })
 }

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/{F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.ts → prototype-pollution.test.ts}

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
 import { add_value_for_dotted_key } from "@tellescope/utilities"
 
-// Regression test for F-0016 (pattern 17 — prototype pollution).
+// Regression test: prototype pollution via dotted-key assignment.
 // add_value_for_dotted_key must NOT write through __proto__/constructor/prototype path segments
 // (which would pollute Object.prototype process-wide), while still performing legitimate dotted assignment.
 //
 // Pure-function test — no Session needed. Runs in the main suite and standalone:
-//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.js
+//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/prototype-pollution.test.js
 
 const fail = (msg: string) => { throw new Error(msg) }
 
 export const prototype_pollution_tests = async () => {
-  console.log("Running F-0016 prototype-pollution regression tests")
+  console.log("Running prototype-pollution regression tests")
 
   // 1. __proto__ path must not pollute Object.prototype
   add_value_for_dotted_key({ insurance: {} } as any, 'insurance.__proto__.__pp_a__', 'polluted')
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ export const prototype_pollution_tests = async () => {
   add_value_for_dotted_key(flat, 'name', 'ok')
   if (flat.name !== 'ok') fail('single-key assignment broke')
 
-  console.log("✅ F-0016 prototype-pollution regression tests passed")
+  console.log("✅ prototype-pollution regression tests passed")
 }
 
 if (require.main === module) {

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/{F-0025-proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.ts → proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.ts}

@@ -22,15 +22,14 @@ const assert_local_api = () => {
   const hostname = new URL(host).hostname
   if (!LOCAL_HOSTNAMES.includes(hostname)) {
     throw new Error(
-      `F-0025 SSRF tests must run against a local API (got ${host}). `
+      `SSRF tests must run against a local API (got ${host}). `
       + `127.0.0.1 would resolve to the API server rather than this machine, so the tests would be meaningless.`
     )
   }
 }
 
 /**
- * Regression tests for F-0025
- * (security-audit/findings/F-0025-proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.md).
+ * Regression tests: `/v1/proxy-image` must refuse internal and non-image destinations.
  *
  * GET /v1/proxy-image accepted an arbitrary ?url= and streamed the upstream response body straight
  * back with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, with no authentication, no destination validation and no
@@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ const assert_local_api = () => {
  * the vulnerability proof.
  */
 export const proxy_image_ssrf_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdmin: Session }) => {
-  log_header("F-0025: proxy-image unauthenticated SSRF")
+  log_header("proxy-image unauthenticated SSRF")
   assert_local_api()
 
   const SENTINEL = `f0025-sentinel-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)}`
@@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ export const proxy_image_ssrf_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdm
 
     // T1 — the core SSRF: an unauthenticated caller must not be able to read an internal resource.
     await async_test(
-      'F-0025: proxy-image does not stream an internal non-image resource to an unauthenticated caller',
+      'proxy-image does not stream an internal non-image resource to an unauthenticated caller',
       call_unauthenticated,
       {
         // Positive control: a numeric status proves we actually reached our API rather than failing to
@@ -111,7 +110,7 @@ export const proxy_image_ssrf_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdm
     // T2 — the unauthenticated surface itself: the request must be refused outright, and the
     // destination must never be contacted (no SSRF-as-a-side-effect even when the body is withheld).
     await async_test(
-      'F-0025: proxy-image refuses an unauthenticated request without contacting the destination',
+      'proxy-image refuses an unauthenticated request without contacting the destination',
       call_unauthenticated,
       { onResult: (r: any) => r.status >= 400 && r.status < 500 && r.sentinelHits === 0 },
     )
@@ -129,26 +128,26 @@ export const proxy_image_ssrf_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdm
     }
 
     await async_test(
-      'F-0025: proxy-image refuses a private destination even for an authenticated staff session',
+      'proxy-image refuses a private destination even for an authenticated staff session',
       () => call_authenticated(sentinelURL),
       { onResult: (r: any) => r.status === 400 && r.sentinelHits === 0 },
     )
 
     await async_test(
-      'F-0025: proxy-image refuses cloud metadata for an authenticated staff session',
+      'proxy-image refuses cloud metadata for an authenticated staff session',
       () => call_authenticated('https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/'),
       { onResult: (r: any) => r.status === 400 },
     )
 
     // Scheme and port are pinned: only https on 443, which is all the PDF export ever needs.
     await async_test(
-      'F-0025: proxy-image refuses a plain http destination',
+      'proxy-image refuses a plain http destination',
       () => call_authenticated('http://example.com/logo.png'),
       { onResult: (r: any) => r.status === 400 },
     )
 
     await async_test(
-      'F-0025: proxy-image refuses a non-443 port',
+      'proxy-image refuses a non-443 port',
       () => call_authenticated('https://example.com:8443/logo.png'),
       { onResult: (r: any) => r.status === 400 },
     )
@@ -169,11 +168,11 @@ if (require.main === module) {
 
   runTests()
     .then(() => {
-      console.log("✅ F-0025 proxy-image SSRF test suite completed successfully")
+      console.log("✅ proxy-image SSRF test suite completed successfully")
       process.exit(0)
     })
     .catch((error) => {
-      console.error("❌ F-0025 proxy-image SSRF test suite failed:", error)
+      console.error("❌ proxy-image SSRF test suite failed:", error)
       process.exit(1)
     })
 }

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/{F-0013-sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.ts → sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.ts}

@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 import { DEFAULT_IFRAME_SANDBOX, replace_form_field_template_values, sanitize_user_html, sanitize_user_html_with_iframes } from "@tellescope/utilities"
 
-// Companion to F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.ts (pattern 06 — XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML).
+// Companion to sanitize-user-html.test.ts (pattern 06 — XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML).
 //
 // sanitize_user_html_with_iframes is the variant used by the live form's field description, so
 // admins can embed video / scheduling widgets. It permits <iframe> and NOTHING else beyond what
 // sanitize_user_html allows. This asserts:
-//   1. permitting iframe did not reopen any of the F-0013 vectors (the full payload list is re-run)
+//   1. permitting iframe did not reopen any of the base vectors (the full payload list is re-run)
 //   2. only absolute https iframes survive — relative, protocol-relative, http, javascript:, data:
 //      and srcdoc frames are dropped, along with their fallback content
 //   3. the restrictive sandbox is forced, but an author-supplied sandbox is honored
 //   4. sanitize_user_html itself still strips iframes (the boundary between the two functions)
 //
 // Pure-function test — no Session needed. Runs as part of the main suite and standalone:
-//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.js
+//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.js
 
 const fail = (msg: string) => { throw new Error(msg) }
 
-// Same as has_no_executable_vector in the F-0013 test, minus the '<iframe' clause (iframes are
+// Same as has_no_executable_vector in the base sanitizer test, minus the '<iframe' clause (iframes are
 // expected in this function's output). Everything else must still be neutralized.
 const has_no_executable_vector_allowing_iframe = (out: string) => {
   const o = out.toLowerCase()
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export const sanitize_user_html_with_iframes_tests = async () => {
   console.log("Running sanitize_user_html_with_iframes XSS regression tests")
 
   // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-  // 1. Re-run the full F-0013 payload set — permitting iframe must not be a general regression
+  // 1. Re-run the full base payload set — permitting iframe must not be a general regression
   // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   const xssPayloads: [string, string][] = [
     ['img onerror', `<img src=x onerror="alert(document.domain)">`],

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/{F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.ts → sanitize-user-html.test.ts}

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 import { sanitize_user_html } from "@tellescope/utilities"
 
-// Regression test for F-0013 / F-0014 (pattern 06 — XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML).
+// Regression test: XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML.
 // sanitize_user_html is the canonical render-time sanitizer that replaced remove_script_tags
 // at every dangerouslySetInnerHTML sink. This asserts it neutralizes XSS vectors (incl. encoded /
 // whitespace / mixed-case / iframe-srcdoc bypass variants) while preserving legitimate
 // customization HTML (tables, headings, lists, links, images, inline styles).
 //
 // Pure-function test — no Session needed. Runs as part of the main suite and standalone:
-//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.js
+//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/sanitize-user-html.test.js
 
 const fail = (msg: string) => { throw new Error(msg) }
 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ const has_no_executable_vector = (out: string) => {
 }
 
 export const sanitize_user_html_xss_tests = async () => {
-  console.log("Running F-0013/F-0014 sanitize_user_html XSS regression tests")
+  console.log("Running sanitize_user_html XSS regression tests")
 
   const xssPayloads: [string, string][] = [
     ['img onerror', `<img src=x onerror="alert(document.domain)">`],
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ export const sanitize_user_html_xss_tests = async () => {
   const mixed = sanitize_user_html(`<p>Hello <b>name</b></p><img src=x onerror="steal()">`)
   if (!(mixed.includes('<b>name</b>') && !/\son[a-z]+\s*=/.test(mixed.toLowerCase()))) fail(`mixed content not handled: ${mixed}`)
 
-  console.log("✅ F-0013/F-0014 sanitize_user_html XSS regression tests passed")
+  console.log("✅ sanitize_user_html XSS regression tests passed")
 }
 
 if (require.main === module) {

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/schema-adminonly-enforcement.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+require('source-map-support').install();
+
+import axios from "axios"
+
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk"
+import {
+  assert,
+  log_header,
+} from "@tellescope/testing"
+import { PROVIDER_PERMISSIONS } from "@tellescope/constants"
+import { setup_tests } from "../../setup"
+
+const host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080' as const
+
+const RAND = () => Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)
+
+const ALL = 'All' as const
+const FULL_ACCESS = { create: ALL, read: ALL, update: ALL, delete: ALL }
+
+type Check = {
+  label: string,
+  pass: boolean,
+  detail: string,
+}
+
+/**
+ * Regression test: `adminOnly` custom actions must be enforced at runtime, not merely declared.
+ *
+ * `adminOnly: true` on a CUSTOM action in schema.ts was documentation-only. The runtime gate
+ * (routing.ts:944) reads the flag off the options object built by getCustomEndpointFields, and
+ * api.ts:609 set `adminOnly: o.adminOnly` without ever consulting `action.adminOnly`. So every
+ * admin-only custom action had to declare the flag twice, and the copies desynced: 11 of 20
+ * declared custom actions were unenforced at runtime while both public doc artifacts
+ * (openapi.json and the unauthenticated GET /documentation feed, which read the SCHEMA flag)
+ * advertised "**Admin only.**".
+ *
+ * DEFAULT CRUD actions never had this bug — routing.ts:2434 etc. read
+ * model.defaultActions.<op>.adminOnly straight off the schema. The fix
+ * (`adminOnly: o.adminOnly ?? action.adminOnly`) makes custom actions behave the same way.
+ *
+ * Five of the 11 were de-flagged in the schema instead, because the flag itself was wrong and
+ * enforcing it would revert a deliberate decision: users.invite_user carries an explicit
+ * "no longer admin only, but controlled by users.create" and send_invitation_to_existing is its
+ * sibling; organizations.create_and_join is the self-service signup path and would 401 every new
+ * org (a fresh user has no roles — the handler is what grants Admin); sync_note_to_canvas is
+ * designed around `access: 'read'` for non-admin callers; background_errors.mark_read substitutes
+ * its own RBAC check that intentionally admits non-admins holding the verb.
+ *
+ * SAFETY: every probe fails EARLY inside its handler — after the adminOnly gate but before any
+ * vendor call. Pre-fix these requests really do reach the handler, and these handlers talk to
+ * Twilio, Athena and Canvas:
+ *   - trigger_events     : no `action` key + an absent triggerId => the loop `continue`s (inert)
+ *   - athena-subscription: frequency 1 trips the `frequency < 5` guard on the handler's first line
+ *   - sync-athena        : 404s on the missing Athena integration (skipped if one exists)
+ *   - link-twilio        : takes NO parameters and can CREATE A REAL TWILIO SUBACCOUNT, so it is
+ *                          probed only when the org already has a twilioSID (handler short-circuits)
+ *   - twilio-embed       : no phoneNumberSid => 404 no-config or 400, both before any Twilio call
+ *   - handle-autoreply   : absent enduserId => `if (!enduser) return` (communications.ts:42)
+ * Input validation runs BEFORE the adminOnly gate (routing.ts:921 orders access, then validate),
+ * so every probe body must be schema-VALID or the test would prove nothing.
+ *
+ * RED (pre-fix): the six group-B rows fail — each reaches its handler and returns a non-401.
+ * GREEN (post-fix): all six return 401 "Admin access only"; the group-A controls are unchanged.
+ */
+export const schema_adminonly_enforcement_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdmin: Session }) => {
+  log_header("schema-declared adminOnly must be enforced on custom actions")
+
+  const checks: Check[] = []
+  const record = (label: string, pass: boolean, detail: string) => checks.push({ label, pass, detail })
+
+  // Raw axios: the SDK's parseError discards the HTTP status, and the status is the whole point.
+  const request = async (
+    authToken: string, method: 'get' | 'post', path: string, data?: any,
+  ) => {
+    const r = await axios.request({
+      method,
+      url: `${host}/v1${path}`,
+      ...method === 'get' ? { params: data } : { data },
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${authToken}` },
+      validateStatus: () => true,
+    })
+    return { status: r.status, body: r.data }
+  }
+
+  const isAdminDenial = (r: { status: number, body: any }) => (
+    r.status === 401 && r.body?.message === 'Admin access only'
+  )
+  const summarize = (r: { status: number, body: any }) => (
+    `${r.status} ${(JSON.stringify(r.body) ?? '').slice(0, 120)}`
+  )
+
+  let roleId = ''
+  let attackerId = ''
+  let enduserId = ''
+
+  try {
+    /* ================= fixtures ================= */
+
+    const role = `f0191-staff-${RAND()}`
+    const rbap = await sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.createOne({
+      role,
+      permissions: {
+        ...PROVIDER_PERMISSIONS,
+        // grant exactly the verbs the actions under test declare, so a rejection proves the ADMIN
+        // gate fired rather than ordinary RBAC
+        automation_triggers: FULL_ACCESS,
+        organizations: FULL_ACCESS,
+        availability_blocks: FULL_ACCESS,
+        background_errors: FULL_ACCESS,
+        users: FULL_ACCESS,
+      },
+    } as any)
+    roleId = rbap.id
+
+    const attacker = await sdk.api.users.createOne({
+      email: `f0191-attacker-${RAND()}@tellescope.example`,
+      fname: 'F0191', lname: 'Staff',
+      verifiedEmail: true,
+      notificationEmailsDisabled: true,
+      roles: [role],
+    } as any)
+    attackerId = attacker.id
+
+    const attackerToken = (await sdk.api.users.generate_auth_token({ id: attackerId })).authToken
+    const adminToken = (await sdk.api.users.generate_auth_token({ id: sdk.userInfo.id })).authToken
+
+    const attackerSDK = new Session({ host, authToken: attackerToken })
+    await attackerSDK.refresh_session()
+    record(
+      'setup: attacker is a non-admin holding every verb under test',
+      attackerSDK.userInfo.id === attackerId && !(attackerSDK.userInfo.roles ?? []).includes('Admin'),
+      `id=${attackerSDK.userInfo.id} roles=${JSON.stringify(attackerSDK.userInfo.roles)}`,
+    )
+
+    const enduser = await sdk.api.endusers.createOne({ fname: 'F0191', lname: 'Patient' })
+    enduserId = enduser.id
+
+    // A guaranteed-valid, guaranteed-absent id: create then delete, so probes hit the handler's
+    // "not found" branch rather than tripping input validation (which runs BEFORE the admin gate).
+    const doomed = await sdk.api.endusers.createOne({ fname: 'F0191', lname: 'Absent' })
+    const ABSENT_ID = doomed.id
+    await sdk.api.endusers.deleteOne(ABSENT_ID)
+
+    /* ===== environment guards for the two probes input alone cannot make safe ===== */
+
+    let athenaIntegrationExists = false
+    try {
+      const existing = await sdk.api.integrations.load_redacted({})
+      athenaIntegrationExists = !!existing.integrations.find((i: any) => /athena/i.test(i.title ?? ''))
+    } catch { /* load not permitted — assume absent */ }
+
+    let orgHasTwilioSID = false
+    try {
+      const org = await sdk.api.organizations.getOne(sdk.userInfo.businessId)
+      orgHasTwilioSID = !!(org as any)?.twilioSID
+    } catch { /* ignore */ }
+
+    /* ===== GROUP B: the six genuine gaps — each must become 401 ===== */
+
+    const groupB: {
+      label: string, method: 'get' | 'post', path: string, data?: any, skip?: string,
+    }[] = [
+      {
+        label: 'automation_triggers.trigger_events',
+        method: 'post', path: '/automation-triggers/trigger-events',
+        // no `action` key: stays off the arbitrary-action-execution branch entirely
+        data: { triggers: [{ enduserId, automationTriggerId: ABSENT_ID }] },
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'organizations.add_athena_subscription',
+        method: 'post', path: '/organizations/athena-subscription',
+        data: { type: 'patients', frequency: 1 }, // trips `frequency < 5` on the handler's first line
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'organizations.sync_athena_subscription',
+        method: 'post', path: '/organizations/sync-athena-subscription',
+        data: { type: 'patients' },
+        skip: athenaIntegrationExists
+          ? 'org HAS an Athena integration — probing would call Athena.process_subscription for real'
+          : undefined,
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'organizations.link_twilio',
+        method: 'post', path: '/organizations/link-twilio',
+        data: {},
+        skip: orgHasTwilioSID
+          ? undefined
+          : 'org has no twilioSID — probing would CREATE A REAL TWILIO SUBACCOUNT',
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'organizations.load_twilio_embed',
+        method: 'get', path: '/organizations/twilio-embed',
+        data: { type: 'tfn-verification' }, // no phoneNumberSid => rejected before any Twilio call
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'availability_blocks.handle_autoreply',
+        method: 'post', path: '/handle-out-of-office-autoreply',
+        data: { channel: 'Email', enduserId: ABSENT_ID }, // communications.ts:42 `if (!enduser) return`
+      },
+    ]
+
+    for (const probe of groupB) {
+      if (probe.skip) {
+        record(`B: ${probe.label} rejects a non-admin`, true, `SKIPPED (safety) — ${probe.skip}`)
+        continue
+      }
+
+      const attackerResult = await request(attackerToken, probe.method, probe.path, probe.data)
+      // baseline: an admin must NOT be admin-denied on the same path, so a blanket 401 can't pass
+      const baseline = await request(adminToken, probe.method, probe.path, probe.data)
+      const badProbe = isAdminDenial(baseline)
+
+      record(
+        `B: ${probe.label} rejects a non-admin`,
+        !badProbe && isAdminDenial(attackerResult),
+        `attacker=${summarize(attackerResult)} | admin baseline=${baseline.status}`
+          + (badProbe ? ' BAD PROBE: admin was also admin-denied' : ''),
+      )
+    }
+
+    /* ===== GROUP A: de-flagged actions must NOT become admin-only ===== */
+
+    const groupA: { label: string, method: 'get' | 'post', path: string, data?: any }[] = [
+      {
+        label: 'organizations.sync_note_to_canvas',
+        method: 'post', path: '/organizations/sync-note-to-canvas',
+        data: { enduserId: ABSENT_ID, note: 'control' }, // 404 Enduser not found
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'background_errors.mark_read',
+        method: 'post', path: '/background-errors/mark-read', data: {},
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'users.send_invitation_to_existing',
+        method: 'post', path: '/invite-existing-user-to-organization',
+        // takes userId (not email); an absent id hits RecordNotFoundError, well short of any invite
+        data: { userId: ABSENT_ID },
+      },
+    ]
+
+    for (const probe of groupA) {
+      const r = await request(attackerToken, probe.method, probe.path, probe.data)
+      record(
+        `A: ${probe.label} stays reachable by a non-admin (flag intentionally dropped)`,
+        !isAdminDenial(r),
+        `${summarize(r)} (expected a handler response, not 401 Admin access only)`,
+      )
+    }
+
+    /* ===== report: print full table first, then assert (harness exits on first failure) ===== */
+    console.log('\n  check summary:')
+    for (const c of checks) {
+      console.log(`    ${c.pass ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL'}  ${c.label}  —  ${c.detail}`)
+    }
+    console.log('')
+
+    for (const c of checks) {
+      assert(c.pass, `${c.label} — ${c.detail}`, c.label)
+    }
+  } finally {
+    if (enduserId) { try { await sdk.api.endusers.deleteOne(enduserId) } catch {} }
+    if (attackerId) { try { await sdk.api.users.deleteOne(attackerId) } catch {} }
+    if (roleId) { try { await sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.deleteOne(roleId) } catch {} }
+  }
+}
+
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+  console.log(`🌐 Using API URL: ${host}`)
+  const sdk = new Session({ host })
+  const sdkNonAdmin = new Session({ host })
+
+  const runTests = async () => {
+    await setup_tests(sdk, sdkNonAdmin)
+    await schema_adminonly_enforcement_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+  }
+
+  runTests()
+    .then(() => {
+      console.log("✅ schema adminOnly enforcement test suite completed successfully")
+      process.exit(0)
+    })
+    .catch((error) => {
+      console.error("❌ schema adminOnly enforcement test suite failed:", error)
+      process.exit(1)
+    })
+}