@tellescope/sdk 1.256.13 → 1.256.15

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/load-inbox-redaction.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+require('source-map-support').install();
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk";
+import { async_test, log_header, } from "@tellescope/testing";
+import { setup_tests } from "../../setup";
+var host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080';
+var ENDUSER_PASSWORD = 'F0151TestPassword!123';
+/**
+ * Regression test: `load_inbox_data` must apply enduser field redactions.
+ *
+ * load_inbox_data serialized $lookup'ed endusers via convert_id_name only (NOT applyRedactions),
+ * so endusers.hashedPassword (redactions:['all']) leaked to staff sessions — while the sibling
+ * phone_calls in the same response correctly went through applyRedactions.
+ *
+ * Repro: create an enduser, set their portal password (→ hashedPassword), seed an inbound
+ * (logOnly) email so the enduser appears in the inbox join, then load_inbox_data as staff and
+ * assert the returned enduser entry has NO hashedPassword.
+ */
+export var load_inbox_redaction_tests = function (_a) {
+    var sdk = _a.sdk;
+    return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        var enduserId, emailId, email, enduser_1, seeded, _b, _c;
+        return __generator(this, function (_d) {
+            switch (_d.label) {
+                case 0:
+                    log_header("load_inbox_data enduser redaction");
+                    _d.label = 1;
+                case 1:
+                    _d.trys.push([1, , 6, 15]);
+                    email = "f0151-enduser-".concat(Date.now(), "@example.com");
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.createOne({ email: email, fname: 'F0151', lname: 'Inbox' })];
+                case 2:
+                    enduser_1 = _d.sent();
+                    enduserId = enduser_1.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.set_password({ id: enduser_1.id, password: ENDUSER_PASSWORD })
+                        // Seed an inbound logOnly email so the enduser is joined into the inbox payload
+                    ];
+                case 3:
+                    _d.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.emails.createOne({
+                            enduserId: enduser_1.id, subject: 'F0151 seed', textContent: 'seed',
+                            logOnly: true, inbound: true,
+                        })];
+                case 4:
+                    seeded = _d.sent();
+                    emailId = seeded.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, async_test('load_inbox_data does not leak enduser.hashedPassword to staff', function () { return sdk.api.endusers.load_inbox_data({ enduserIds: [enduser_1.id] }); }, {
+                            onResult: function (r) {
+                                var _a;
+                                var returned = ((_a = r === null || r === void 0 ? void 0 : r.endusers) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : []).find(function (e) { var _a; return ((_a = (e.id || e._id)) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.toString()) === enduserId; });
+                                // require that the enduser actually came back (so the assertion is meaningful),
+                                // and that hashedPassword is absent
+                                return !!returned && !('hashedPassword' in returned);
+                            },
+                        })];
+                case 5:
+                    _d.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 15];
+                case 6:
+                    if (!emailId) return [3 /*break*/, 10];
+                    _d.label = 7;
+                case 7:
+                    _d.trys.push([7, 9, , 10]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.emails.deleteOne(emailId)];
+                case 8:
+                    _d.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 10];
+                case 9:
+                    _b = _d.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 10];
+                case 10:
+                    if (!enduserId) return [3 /*break*/, 14];
+                    _d.label = 11;
+                case 11:
+                    _d.trys.push([11, 13, , 14]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.deleteOne(enduserId)];
+                case 12:
+                    _d.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 14];
+                case 13:
+                    _c = _d.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 14];
+                case 14: return [7 /*endfinally*/];
+                case 15: return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    });
+};
+if (require.main === module) {
+    console.log("\uD83C\uDF10 Using API URL: ".concat(host));
+    var sdk_1 = new Session({ host: host });
+    var sdkNonAdmin_1 = new Session({ host: host });
+    var runTests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+            switch (_a.label) {
+                case 0: return [4 /*yield*/, setup_tests(sdk_1, sdkNonAdmin_1)];
+                case 1:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, load_inbox_redaction_tests({ sdk: sdk_1, sdkNonAdmin: sdkNonAdmin_1 })];
+                case 2:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    }); };
+    runTests()
+        .then(function () {
+        console.log("✅ load_inbox_data redaction test suite completed successfully");
+        process.exit(0);
+    })
+        .catch(function (error) {
+        console.error("❌ load_inbox_data redaction test suite failed:", error);
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=load-inbox-redaction.test.js.map

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/load-inbox-redaction.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"load-inbox-redaction.test.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/load-inbox-redaction.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;AAExC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AACtC,OAAO,EACL,UAAU,EACV,UAAU,GACX,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAA;AAC5B,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA;AAEzC,IAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,uBAAgC,CAAA;AAEpE,IAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,uBAAuB,CAAA;AAEhD;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,IAAM,0BAA0B,GAAG,UAAO,EAAgD;QAA9C,GAAG,SAAA;;;;;;oBACpD,UAAU,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC,CAAA;;;;oBAKvC,KAAK,GAAG,wBAAiB,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,iBAAc,CAAA;oBACvC,qBAAM,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,OAAA,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAA;;oBAArF,YAAU,SAA2E;oBAC3F,SAAS,GAAG,SAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAA;oBACtB,qBAAM,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,SAAO,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;wBAEnF,gFAAgF;sBAFG;;oBAAnF,SAAmF,CAAA;oBAGpE,qBAAM,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;4BAC5C,SAAS,EAAE,SAAO,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM;4BACjE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI;yBACtB,CAAC,EAAA;;oBAHH,MAAM,GAAG,SAGN;oBACT,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAA;oBAEnB,qBAAM,UAAU,CACd,+DAA+D,EAC/D,cAAM,OAAA,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,SAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,EAAS,CAAC,EAArE,CAAqE,EAC3E;4BACE,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAC,CAAM;;gCACf,IAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,CAAC,MAAA,CAAC,aAAD,CAAC,uBAAD,CAAC,CAAE,QAAQ,mCAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAC,CAAM,YAAK,OAAA,CAAA,MAAA,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,0CAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAK,SAAS,CAAA,EAAA,CAAC,CAAA;gCAChG,gFAAgF;gCAChF,oCAAoC;gCACpC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,gBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAA;4BACtD,CAAC;yBACF,CACF,EAAA;;oBAXD,SAWC,CAAA;;;yBAEG,OAAO,EAAP,yBAAO;;;;oBAAU,qBAAM,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAA;;oBAAvC,SAAuC,CAAA;;;;;;yBACxD,SAAS,EAAT,yBAAS;;;;oBAAU,qBAAM,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAA;;oBAA3C,SAA2C,CAAA;;;;;;;;;;CAErE,CAAA;AAED,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE;IAC3B,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,sCAAqB,IAAI,CAAE,CAAC,CAAA;IACxC,IAAM,KAAG,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,MAAA,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;IACjC,IAAM,aAAW,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,MAAA,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;IAEzC,IAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;;;wBACf,qBAAM,WAAW,CAAC,KAAG,EAAE,aAAW,CAAC,EAAA;;oBAAnC,SAAmC,CAAA;oBACnC,qBAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,OAAA,EAAE,WAAW,eAAA,EAAE,CAAC,EAAA;;oBAAtD,SAAsD,CAAA;;;;SACvD,CAAA;IAED,QAAQ,EAAE;SACP,IAAI,CAAC;QACJ,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,+DAA+D,CAAC,CAAA;QAC5E,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;IACjB,CAAC,CAAC;SACD,KAAK,CAAC,UAAC,KAAK;QACX,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,gDAAgD,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAA;QACtE,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;IACjB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;CACL"}

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/prototype-pollution.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export declare const prototype_pollution_tests: () => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=prototype-pollution.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/prototype-pollution.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"prototype-pollution.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/prototype-pollution.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAWA,eAAO,MAAM,yBAAyB,qBAgCrC,CAAA"}

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/prototype-pollution.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+import { add_value_for_dotted_key } from "@tellescope/utilities";
+// Regression test: prototype pollution via dotted-key assignment.
+// add_value_for_dotted_key must NOT write through __proto__/constructor/prototype path segments
+// (which would pollute Object.prototype process-wide), while still performing legitimate dotted assignment.
+//
+// Pure-function test — no Session needed. Runs in the main suite and standalone:
+//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/prototype-pollution.test.js
+var fail = function (msg) { throw new Error(msg); };
+export var prototype_pollution_tests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+    var leakedA, leakedB, leakedC, obj, flat;
+    return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+        console.log("Running prototype-pollution regression tests");
+        // 1. __proto__ path must not pollute Object.prototype
+        add_value_for_dotted_key({ insurance: {} }, 'insurance.__proto__.__pp_a__', 'polluted');
+        leakedA = {}.__pp_a__;
+        delete Object.prototype.__pp_a__; // clean up regardless, so a failure here can't contaminate the rest of the suite
+        if (leakedA !== undefined)
+            fail('Object.prototype polluted via __proto__ path');
+        // 2. constructor.prototype path must not pollute
+        add_value_for_dotted_key({ insurance: {} }, 'insurance.constructor.prototype.__pp_b__', 'polluted');
+        leakedB = {}.__pp_b__;
+        delete Object.prototype.__pp_b__;
+        if (leakedB !== undefined)
+            fail('Object.prototype polluted via constructor.prototype path');
+        // 3. a leading __proto__ segment must not pollute either
+        add_value_for_dotted_key({}, '__proto__.__pp_c__', 'polluted');
+        leakedC = {}.__pp_c__;
+        delete Object.prototype.__pp_c__;
+        if (leakedC !== undefined)
+            fail('Object.prototype polluted via leading __proto__ segment');
+        obj = { a: { b: {} } };
+        add_value_for_dotted_key(obj, 'a.b.c', 42);
+        if (obj.a.b.c !== 42)
+            fail('legitimate dotted assignment broke');
+        flat = {};
+        add_value_for_dotted_key(flat, 'name', 'ok');
+        if (flat.name !== 'ok')
+            fail('single-key assignment broke');
+        console.log("✅ prototype-pollution regression tests passed");
+        return [2 /*return*/];
+    });
+}); };
+if (require.main === module) {
+    prototype_pollution_tests()
+        .then(function () { console.log("✅ suite completed"); process.exit(0); })
+        .catch(function (err) { console.error("❌ suite failed:", err); process.exit(1); });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=prototype-pollution.test.js.map

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/prototype-pollution.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"prototype-pollution.test.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/prototype-pollution.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAA;AAEhE,kEAAkE;AAClE,gGAAgG;AAChG,4GAA4G;AAC5G,EAAE;AACF,iFAAiF;AACjF,mIAAmI;AAEnI,IAAM,IAAI,GAAG,UAAC,GAAW,IAAO,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;AAEtD,MAAM,CAAC,IAAM,yBAAyB,GAAG;;;QACvC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC,CAAA;QAE3D,sDAAsD;QACtD,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,EAAS,EAAE,8BAA8B,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAA;QACxF,OAAO,GAAI,EAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAA;QACpC,OAAQ,MAAM,CAAC,SAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAA,CAAC,iFAAiF;QAC3H,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS;YAAE,IAAI,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC,CAAA;QAE/E,iDAAiD;QACjD,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,EAAS,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAA;QACpG,OAAO,GAAI,EAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAA;QACpC,OAAQ,MAAM,CAAC,SAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAA;QACzC,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS;YAAE,IAAI,CAAC,0DAA0D,CAAC,CAAA;QAE3F,yDAAyD;QACzD,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAS,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAA;QAC/D,OAAO,GAAI,EAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAA;QACpC,OAAQ,MAAM,CAAC,SAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAA;QACzC,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS;YAAE,IAAI,CAAC,yDAAyD,CAAC,CAAA;QAGpF,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,EAAS,CAAA;QACnC,wBAAwB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;QAC1C,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE;YAAE,IAAI,CAAC,oCAAoC,CAAC,CAAA;QAG1D,IAAI,GAAG,EAAS,CAAA;QACtB,wBAAwB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA;QAC5C,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;YAAE,IAAI,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAA;QAE3D,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,+CAA+C,CAAC,CAAA;;;KAC7D,CAAA;AAED,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE;IAC3B,yBAAyB,EAAE;SACxB,IAAI,CAAC,cAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;SACjE,KAAK,CAAC,UAAC,GAAG,IAAO,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;CAC9E"}

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk";
+/**
+ * Regression tests: `/v1/proxy-image` must refuse internal and non-image destinations.
+ *
+ * GET /v1/proxy-image accepted an arbitrary ?url= and streamed the upstream response body straight
+ * back with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, with no authentication, no destination validation and no
+ * content-type restriction. That reaches http://169.254.169.254/ (EC2 instance credentials under
+ * IMDSv1), 127.0.0.1, and anything else inside the VPC.
+ *
+ * The endpoint's only legitimate job is to re-serve an image that ALREADY renders in the staff
+ * browser, with permissive CORS headers, so html2canvas can rasterize a form-response PDF without
+ * tainting the canvas (canvas.toDataURL() throws on a tainted canvas, and the form-response view sets
+ * crossOrigin="anonymous"). Anything reachable only from inside our network was therefore never a
+ * legitimate input — which is why refusing non-public destinations cannot regress the feature.
+ *
+ * Repro: stand up a local HTTP server that serves a JSON secret, point proxy-image at it with no
+ * credentials, and assert the secret does not come back.
+ *   - red  (unfixed): the sentinel body is streamed back to an unauthenticated caller
+ *   - green (fixed):  the request is refused and the sentinel server is never contacted
+ *
+ * Assertions are deliberately written as "4xx and nothing leaked" rather than pinning an exact status,
+ * because the fix both authenticates the endpoint and moves it to POST (the url moves into the body so
+ * presigned S3 URLs for patient attachments stop landing in access logs). Either 401 or 404/405 on the
+ * old GET shape is an acceptable outcome; streaming the body is not.
+ *
+ * The authenticated happy-path test lives with the Phase 2 endpoint change — it cannot exist here
+ * because the POST route does not yet exist, and a test that fails for "not implemented" would muddy
+ * the vulnerability proof.
+ */
+export declare const proxy_image_ssrf_tests: ({ sdk }: {
+    sdk: Session;
+    sdkNonAdmin: Session;
+}) => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAIA,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AA0BtC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2BG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB;SAA2B,OAAO;iBAAe,OAAO;mBAkG1F,CAAA"}

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+require('source-map-support').install();
+import http from "http";
+import axios from "axios";
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk";
+import { async_test, log_header, } from "@tellescope/testing";
+import { setup_tests } from "../../setup";
+var host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080';
+var LOCAL_HOSTNAMES = ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1'];
+/**
+ * 127.0.0.1 only means "the machine running this test" when the API is also local. Against staging or
+ * prod it is the API server itself — the sentinel below would never be contacted, every assertion
+ * here would pass for the wrong reason, and we would be probing a live environment. Fail loudly.
+ */
+var assert_local_api = function () {
+    var hostname = new URL(host).hostname;
+    if (!LOCAL_HOSTNAMES.includes(hostname)) {
+        throw new Error("SSRF tests must run against a local API (got ".concat(host, "). ")
+            + "127.0.0.1 would resolve to the API server rather than this machine, so the tests would be meaningless.");
+    }
+};
+/**
+ * Regression tests: `/v1/proxy-image` must refuse internal and non-image destinations.
+ *
+ * GET /v1/proxy-image accepted an arbitrary ?url= and streamed the upstream response body straight
+ * back with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, with no authentication, no destination validation and no
+ * content-type restriction. That reaches http://169.254.169.254/ (EC2 instance credentials under
+ * IMDSv1), 127.0.0.1, and anything else inside the VPC.
+ *
+ * The endpoint's only legitimate job is to re-serve an image that ALREADY renders in the staff
+ * browser, with permissive CORS headers, so html2canvas can rasterize a form-response PDF without
+ * tainting the canvas (canvas.toDataURL() throws on a tainted canvas, and the form-response view sets
+ * crossOrigin="anonymous"). Anything reachable only from inside our network was therefore never a
+ * legitimate input — which is why refusing non-public destinations cannot regress the feature.
+ *
+ * Repro: stand up a local HTTP server that serves a JSON secret, point proxy-image at it with no
+ * credentials, and assert the secret does not come back.
+ *   - red  (unfixed): the sentinel body is streamed back to an unauthenticated caller
+ *   - green (fixed):  the request is refused and the sentinel server is never contacted
+ *
+ * Assertions are deliberately written as "4xx and nothing leaked" rather than pinning an exact status,
+ * because the fix both authenticates the endpoint and moves it to POST (the url moves into the body so
+ * presigned S3 URLs for patient attachments stop landing in access logs). Either 401 or 404/405 on the
+ * old GET shape is an acceptable outcome; streaming the body is not.
+ *
+ * The authenticated happy-path test lives with the Phase 2 endpoint change — it cannot exist here
+ * because the POST route does not yet exist, and a test that fails for "not implemented" would muddy
+ * the vulnerability proof.
+ */
+export var proxy_image_ssrf_tests = function (_a) {
+    var sdk = _a.sdk;
+    return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        var SENTINEL, sentinelHits, sentinel, sentinelPort, sentinelURL_1, call_unauthenticated, call_authenticated_1;
+        return __generator(this, function (_b) {
+            switch (_b.label) {
+                case 0:
+                    log_header("proxy-image unauthenticated SSRF");
+                    assert_local_api();
+                    SENTINEL = "f0025-sentinel-".concat(Date.now(), "-").concat(Math.random().toString(36).slice(2));
+                    sentinelHits = 0;
+                    sentinel = http.createServer(function (_, res) {
+                        sentinelHits++;
+                        res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+                        res.end(JSON.stringify({ sentinel: SENTINEL, credentials: 'internal-only' }));
+                    });
+                    _b.label = 1;
+                case 1:
+                    _b.trys.push([1, , 9, 10]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, new Promise(function (resolve) { return sentinel.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', function () { return resolve(); }); })];
+                case 2:
+                    _b.sent();
+                    sentinelPort = sentinel.address().port;
+                    sentinelURL_1 = "http://127.0.0.1:".concat(sentinelPort, "/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/");
+                    call_unauthenticated = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+                        var res, body;
+                        var _a;
+                        return __generator(this, function (_b) {
+                            switch (_b.label) {
+                                case 0:
+                                    sentinelHits = 0;
+                                    return [4 /*yield*/, axios.get("".concat(host, "/v1/proxy-image"), {
+                                            params: { url: sentinelURL_1 },
+                                            validateStatus: function () { return true; },
+                                            responseType: 'text',
+                                            transformResponse: [function (d) { return d; }],
+                                            timeout: 10000,
+                                        })];
+                                case 1:
+                                    res = _b.sent();
+                                    body = typeof res.data === 'string' ? res.data : JSON.stringify((_a = res.data) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : '');
+                                    return [2 /*return*/, { status: res.status, leaked: body.includes(SENTINEL), sentinelHits: sentinelHits }];
+                            }
+                        });
+                    }); };
+                    // T1 — the core SSRF: an unauthenticated caller must not be able to read an internal resource.
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, async_test('proxy-image does not stream an internal non-image resource to an unauthenticated caller', call_unauthenticated, {
+                            // Positive control: a numeric status proves we actually reached our API rather than failing to
+                            // connect (a connection error would make "nothing leaked" true for the wrong reason).
+                            onResult: function (r) { return (typeof r.status === 'number'
+                                && r.leaked === false
+                                && r.sentinelHits === 0); },
+                        })
+                        // T2 — the unauthenticated surface itself: the request must be refused outright, and the
+                        // destination must never be contacted (no SSRF-as-a-side-effect even when the body is withheld).
+                    ];
+                case 3:
+                    // T1 — the core SSRF: an unauthenticated caller must not be able to read an internal resource.
+                    _b.sent();
+                    // T2 — the unauthenticated surface itself: the request must be refused outright, and the
+                    // destination must never be contacted (no SSRF-as-a-side-effect even when the body is withheld).
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, async_test('proxy-image refuses an unauthenticated request without contacting the destination', call_unauthenticated, { onResult: function (r) { return r.status >= 400 && r.status < 500 && r.sentinelHits === 0; } })
+                        // Authenticating is not enough on its own — a staff session must not be able to reach an internal
+                        // address either. These use the real session, and are deterministic (no external network).
+                    ];
+                case 4:
+                    // T2 — the unauthenticated surface itself: the request must be refused outright, and the
+                    // destination must never be contacted (no SSRF-as-a-side-effect even when the body is withheld).
+                    _b.sent();
+                    call_authenticated_1 = function (url) { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+                        var res;
+                        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+                            switch (_a.label) {
+                                case 0:
+                                    sentinelHits = 0;
+                                    return [4 /*yield*/, axios.post("".concat(host, "/v1/proxy-image"), { url: url }, {
+                                            headers: { Authorization: "Bearer ".concat(sdk.authToken) },
+                                            validateStatus: function () { return true; },
+                                            timeout: 10000,
+                                        })];
+                                case 1:
+                                    res = _a.sent();
+                                    return [2 /*return*/, { status: res.status, sentinelHits: sentinelHits }];
+                            }
+                        });
+                    }); };
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, async_test('proxy-image refuses a private destination even for an authenticated staff session', function () { return call_authenticated_1(sentinelURL_1); }, { onResult: function (r) { return r.status === 400 && r.sentinelHits === 0; } })];
+                case 5:
+                    _b.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, async_test('proxy-image refuses cloud metadata for an authenticated staff session', function () { return call_authenticated_1('https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/'); }, { onResult: function (r) { return r.status === 400; } })
+                        // Scheme and port are pinned: only https on 443, which is all the PDF export ever needs.
+                    ];
+                case 6:
+                    _b.sent();
+                    // Scheme and port are pinned: only https on 443, which is all the PDF export ever needs.
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, async_test('proxy-image refuses a plain http destination', function () { return call_authenticated_1('http://example.com/logo.png'); }, { onResult: function (r) { return r.status === 400; } })];
+                case 7:
+                    // Scheme and port are pinned: only https on 443, which is all the PDF export ever needs.
+                    _b.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, async_test('proxy-image refuses a non-443 port', function () { return call_authenticated_1('https://example.com:8443/logo.png'); }, { onResult: function (r) { return r.status === 400; } })];
+                case 8:
+                    _b.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 10];
+                case 9:
+                    sentinel.close();
+                    return [7 /*endfinally*/];
+                case 10: return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    });
+};
+if (require.main === module) {
+    console.log("\uD83C\uDF10 Using API URL: ".concat(host));
+    var sdk_1 = new Session({ host: host });
+    var sdkNonAdmin_1 = new Session({ host: host });
+    var runTests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+            switch (_a.label) {
+                case 0: return [4 /*yield*/, setup_tests(sdk_1, sdkNonAdmin_1)];
+                case 1:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, proxy_image_ssrf_tests({ sdk: sdk_1, sdkNonAdmin: sdkNonAdmin_1 })];
+                case 2:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    }); };
+    runTests()
+        .then(function () {
+        console.log("✅ proxy-image SSRF test suite completed successfully");
+        process.exit(0);
+    })
+        .catch(function (error) {
+        console.error("❌ proxy-image SSRF test suite failed:", error);
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.js.map

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/proxy-image-unauth-ssrf.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;AAExC,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,MAAM,CAAA;AACvB,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,CAAA;AACzB,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AACtC,OAAO,EACL,UAAU,EACV,UAAU,GACX,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAA;AAC5B,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA;AAEzC,IAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,uBAAgC,CAAA;AAEpE,IAAM,eAAe,GAAG,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAA;AAEzD;;;;GAIG;AACH,IAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG;IACvB,IAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAA;IACvC,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE;QACvC,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,uDAAgD,IAAI,QAAK;cACvD,wGAAwG,CAC3G,CAAA;KACF;AACH,CAAC,CAAA;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2BG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,IAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,UAAO,EAAgD;QAA9C,GAAG,SAAA;;;;;;oBAChD,UAAU,CAAC,kCAAkC,CAAC,CAAA;oBAC9C,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAA;oBAEZ,QAAQ,GAAG,yBAAkB,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,cAAI,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAE,CAAA;oBAClF,YAAY,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA;oBAId,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,UAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG;wBACxC,YAAY,EAAE,CAAA;wBACd,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;wBAC1D,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;oBAC/E,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;;;;oBAGA,qBAAM,IAAI,OAAO,CAAO,UAAA,OAAO,IAAI,OAAA,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,cAAM,OAAA,OAAO,EAAE,EAAT,CAAS,CAAC,EAAhD,CAAgD,CAAC,EAAA;;oBAApF,SAAoF,CAAA;oBAC9E,YAAY,GAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,EAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAA;oBAC/C,gBAAc,2BAAoB,YAAY,gDAA6C,CAAA;oBAI3F,oBAAoB,GAAG;;;;;;oCAC3B,YAAY,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA;oCACJ,qBAAM,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,UAAG,IAAI,oBAAiB,EAAE;4CACpD,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,aAAW,EAAE;4CAC5B,cAAc,EAAE,cAAM,OAAA,IAAI,EAAJ,CAAI;4CAC1B,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM;4CACpB,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,UAAC,CAAM,IAAK,OAAA,CAAC,EAAD,CAAC,CAAC;4CAClC,OAAO,EAAE,KAAM;yCACT,CAAC,EAAA;;oCANH,GAAG,GAAG,SAMH;oCAEH,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAA,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,mCAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;oCACrF,sBAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,cAAA,EAAE,EAAA;;;yBAC7E,CAAA;oBAED,+FAA+F;oBAC/F,qBAAM,UAAU,CACd,yFAAyF,EACzF,oBAAoB,EACpB;4BACE,+FAA+F;4BAC/F,sFAAsF;4BACtF,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAC,CAAM,IAAK,OAAA,CACpB,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ;mCACzB,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK;mCAClB,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,CACxB,EAJqB,CAIrB;yBACF,CACF;wBAED,yFAAyF;wBACzF,iGAAiG;sBAHhG;;oBAbD,+FAA+F;oBAC/F,SAYC,CAAA;oBAED,yFAAyF;oBACzF,iGAAiG;oBACjG,qBAAM,UAAU,CACd,mFAAmF,EACnF,oBAAoB,EACpB,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAC,CAAM,IAAK,OAAA,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,EAAzD,CAAyD,EAAE,CACpF;wBAED,kGAAkG;wBAClG,2FAA2F;sBAH1F;;oBAND,yFAAyF;oBACzF,iGAAiG;oBACjG,SAIC,CAAA;oBAIK,uBAAqB,UAAO,GAAW;;;;;oCAC3C,YAAY,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA;oCACJ,qBAAM,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAG,IAAI,oBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,KAAA,EAAE,EAAE;4CAC9D,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,iBAAU,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAE,EAAE;4CACrD,cAAc,EAAE,cAAM,OAAA,IAAI,EAAJ,CAAI;4CAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,KAAM;yCACT,CAAC,EAAA;;oCAJH,GAAG,GAAG,SAIH;oCACT,sBAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,cAAA,EAAE,EAAA;;;yBAC5C,CAAA;oBAED,qBAAM,UAAU,CACd,mFAAmF,EACnF,cAAM,OAAA,oBAAkB,CAAC,aAAW,CAAC,EAA/B,CAA+B,EACrC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAC,CAAM,IAAK,OAAA,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,EAAxC,CAAwC,EAAE,CACnE,EAAA;;oBAJD,SAIC,CAAA;oBAED,qBAAM,UAAU,CACd,uEAAuE,EACvE,cAAM,OAAA,oBAAkB,CAAC,2CAA2C,CAAC,EAA/D,CAA+D,EACrE,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAC,CAAM,IAAK,OAAA,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,EAAhB,CAAgB,EAAE,CAC3C;wBAED,yFAAyF;sBAFxF;;oBAJD,SAIC,CAAA;oBAED,yFAAyF;oBACzF,qBAAM,UAAU,CACd,8CAA8C,EAC9C,cAAM,OAAA,oBAAkB,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,EAAjD,CAAiD,EACvD,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAC,CAAM,IAAK,OAAA,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,EAAhB,CAAgB,EAAE,CAC3C,EAAA;;oBALD,yFAAyF;oBACzF,SAIC,CAAA;oBAED,qBAAM,UAAU,CACd,oCAAoC,EACpC,cAAM,OAAA,oBAAkB,CAAC,mCAAmC,CAAC,EAAvD,CAAuD,EAC7D,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAC,CAAM,IAAK,OAAA,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,EAAhB,CAAgB,EAAE,CAC3C,EAAA;;oBAJD,SAIC,CAAA;;;oBAED,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAA;;;;;;CAEnB,CAAA;AAED,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE;IAC3B,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,sCAAqB,IAAI,CAAE,CAAC,CAAA;IACxC,IAAM,KAAG,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,MAAA,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;IACjC,IAAM,aAAW,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,MAAA,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;IAEzC,IAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;;;wBACf,qBAAM,WAAW,CAAC,KAAG,EAAE,aAAW,CAAC,EAAA;;oBAAnC,SAAmC,CAAA;oBACnC,qBAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,OAAA,EAAE,WAAW,eAAA,EAAE,CAAC,EAAA;;oBAAlD,SAAkD,CAAA;;;;SACnD,CAAA;IAED,QAAQ,EAAE;SACP,IAAI,CAAC;QACJ,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC,CAAA;QACnE,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;IACjB,CAAC,CAAC;SACD,KAAK,CAAC,UAAC,KAAK;QACX,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,uCAAuC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAA;QAC7D,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;IACjB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;CACL"}

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export declare const sanitize_user_html_with_iframes_tests: () => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AA+CA,eAAO,MAAM,qCAAqC,qBAiKjD,CAAA"}