@tellescope/sdk 1.251.0 → 1.252.0

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0001-data-sync-redaction-bypass.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+"use strict";
+var __assign = (this && this.__assign) || function () {
+    __assign = Object.assign || function(t) {
+        for (var s, i = 1, n = arguments.length; i < n; i++) {
+            s = arguments[i];
+            for (var p in s) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(s, p))
+                t[p] = s[p];
+        }
+        return t;
+    };
+    return __assign.apply(this, arguments);
+};
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.data_sync_redaction_bypass_tests = void 0;
+require('source-map-support').install();
+var sdk_1 = require("../../../sdk");
+var testing_1 = require("@tellescope/testing");
+var setup_1 = require("../../setup");
+var constants_1 = require("@tellescope/constants");
+var host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080';
+var _a = [process.env.NON_ADMIN_EMAIL, process.env.NON_ADMIN_PASSWORD], nonAdminEmail = _a[0], nonAdminPassword = _a[1];
+var FULL_ACCESS = { create: 'All', read: 'All', update: 'All', delete: 'All' };
+// Schema fields tagged `redactions: ['all']` that must never appear in
+// `/v1/data-sync` results. See packages/public/schema/src/schema.ts.
+var REDACTABLE_FIELDS_BY_MODEL = {
+    users: ['hashedPass', 'hashedInviteCode'],
+    endusers: ['hashedPassword'],
+};
+var collectViolations = function (results) {
+    var violations = [];
+    for (var _i = 0, results_1 = results; _i < results_1.length; _i++) {
+        var record = results_1[_i];
+        if (!record.data || record.data === 'deleted')
+            continue;
+        var fields = REDACTABLE_FIELDS_BY_MODEL[record.modelName];
+        if (!fields)
+            continue;
+        var parsed = void 0;
+        try {
+            parsed = JSON.parse(record.data);
+        }
+        catch (_a) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        for (var _b = 0, fields_1 = fields; _b < fields_1.length; _b++) {
+            var f = fields_1[_b];
+            if (f in parsed && parsed[f] !== undefined && parsed[f] !== null && parsed[f] !== '') {
+                violations.push({ modelName: record.modelName, recordId: record.recordId, leakedField: f });
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return violations;
+};
+/**
+ * Regression test for F-0001 (security-audit/findings/F-0001-data-sync-bypasses-applyRedactions.md).
+ *
+ * The /v1/data-sync handler must apply the central applyRedactions() pipeline to
+ * every non-deleted record. The original bug: redactions were gated behind
+ *   `if (session.fieldRedactions && session.fieldRedactions[record.modelName])`
+ * which meant any session without role-based field redactions (including all
+ * admins) received raw records — leaking schema-level `redactions: ['all']`
+ * fields (hashedPass, hashedPassword, hashedInviteCode).
+ *
+ * This test:
+ *   1. Configures a non-admin user with broad read access on users + endusers
+ *      and NO fieldRedactions — the realistic "regular user with read access"
+ *      condition that triggers the bypass.
+ *   2. Creates an enduser with a password to populate the sync stream.
+ *   3. Calls /v1/data-sync as the non-admin.
+ *   4. Asserts no returned record contains hashedPass / hashedPassword /
+ *      hashedInviteCode.
+ *
+ * Pre-fix: assertion fails with leaked records.
+ * Post-fix: assertion passes.
+ */
+var data_sync_redaction_bypass_tests = function (_a) {
+    var sdk = _a.sdk, sdkNonAdmin = _a.sdkNonAdmin;
+    return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        var roleName, testEnduserId, rbapId, originalRoles, rbap, testEnduser, sync_1, violations_1, userRecordsInStream_1, adminSync, adminViolations_1, otherUsersInStream_2, linkedAccountLeaks_1, _i, otherUsersInStream_1, record, parsed, _b, _c, _d, _e;
+        return __generator(this, function (_f) {
+            switch (_f.label) {
+                case 0:
+                    (0, testing_1.log_header)("F-0001: /v1/data-sync field-redaction bypass regression");
+                    roleName = "f0001-data-sync-bypass-".concat(Date.now());
+                    originalRoles = sdkNonAdmin.userInfo.roles;
+                    _f.label = 1;
+                case 1:
+                    _f.trys.push([1, , 15, 32]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.createOne({
+                            role: roleName,
+                            permissions: __assign(__assign({}, constants_1.PROVIDER_PERMISSIONS), { users: FULL_ACCESS, endusers: FULL_ACCESS }),
+                            // intentionally NO fieldRedactions — this is the exploit condition.
+                        })];
+                case 2:
+                    rbap = _f.sent();
+                    rbapId = rbap.id;
+                    // 2. Assign role to the non-admin user and re-authenticate so the new
+                    //    session reflects the role's permissions.
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.updateOne(sdkNonAdmin.userInfo.id, { roles: [roleName] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })];
+                case 3:
+                    // 2. Assign role to the non-admin user and re-authenticate so the new
+                    //    session reflects the role's permissions.
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.wait)(undefined, 1500)];
+                case 4:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkNonAdmin.authenticate(nonAdminEmail, nonAdminPassword)
+                        // 3. Create a test enduser and set a password — this populates
+                        //    `hashedPassword` on the enduser record and writes a data_sync_records
+                        //    row for it.
+                    ];
+                case 5:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.createOne({
+                            fname: 'F0001Target',
+                            lname: 'Patient',
+                            email: "f0001-target-".concat(Date.now(), "@example.com"),
+                        })];
+                case 6:
+                    testEnduser = _f.sent();
+                    testEnduserId = testEnduser.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.set_password({ id: testEnduser.id, password: 'F0001TestPassword!123' })
+                        // The non-admin user's own `hashedPass` is set from login and refreshed
+                        // on every write to their user record (e.g., the role-assignment update
+                        // above). No extra setup needed for users.hashedPass to be in the stream.
+                    ];
+                case 7:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    // The non-admin user's own `hashedPass` is set from login and refreshed
+                    // on every write to their user record (e.g., the role-assignment update
+                    // above). No extra setup needed for users.hashedPass to be in the stream.
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.wait)(undefined, 500)
+                        // 4. As the non-admin, call /v1/data-sync from epoch zero to capture all
+                        //    sync records the role can see.
+                    ];
+                case 8:
+                    // The non-admin user's own `hashedPass` is set from login and refreshed
+                    // on every write to their user record (e.g., the role-assignment update
+                    // above). No extra setup needed for users.hashedPass to be in the stream.
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkNonAdmin.sync({ from: new Date(0) })
+                        // 5. Walk every record. Fail if any contains a `redactions: ['all']` field.
+                    ];
+                case 9:
+                    sync_1 = _f.sent();
+                    violations_1 = collectViolations(sync_1.results);
+                    userRecordsInStream_1 = sync_1.results.filter(function (r) { return r.modelName === 'users'; }).length;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.async_test)("F-0001 guard: /v1/data-sync sync stream contains at least one user record", function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () { return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+                            return [2 /*return*/, ({ userRecords: userRecordsInStream_1, totalRecords: sync_1.results.length })];
+                        }); }); }, { onResult: function (r) { return r.userRecords >= 1; } })];
+                case 10:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.async_test)("F-0001: /v1/data-sync must NOT return hashedPass / hashedPassword / hashedInviteCode (see security-audit/findings/F-0001)", function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+                            return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+                                return [2 /*return*/, ({
+                                        violationCount: violations_1.length,
+                                        violations: violations_1.slice(0, 10),
+                                        affectedModels: Array.from(new Set(violations_1.map(function (v) { return v.modelName; }))),
+                                        affectedFields: Array.from(new Set(violations_1.map(function (v) { return v.leakedField; }))),
+                                    })];
+                            });
+                        }); }, { onResult: function (r) { return r.violationCount === 0; } })
+                        // ========================================================================
+                        // Additional coverage for applyRedactions code paths reachable via /v1/data-sync.
+                        // Each of these is a distinct branch in applyRedactions (routing.ts:1165-1238)
+                        // and could regress independently of the F-0001 fix.
+                        // ========================================================================
+                        // Case A: schema-level `redactions: ['all']` must apply to ADMIN sessions too.
+                        // Admins have no session.fieldRedactions, but `redactions: ['all']` is universal.
+                        // Pre-fix: admin saw hashedPass via data-sync because applyRedactions was skipped entirely.
+                        // Post-fix: applyRedactions always runs and `redactions: ['all']` strips for everyone.
+                    ];
+                case 11:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.sync({ from: new Date(0) })];
+                case 12:
+                    adminSync = _f.sent();
+                    adminViolations_1 = collectViolations(adminSync.results);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.async_test)("F-0001 coverage A: admin /v1/data-sync also strips redactions:['all'] fields (hashedPass etc.)", function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+                            return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+                                return [2 /*return*/, ({
+                                        violationCount: adminViolations_1.length,
+                                        violations: adminViolations_1.slice(0, 10),
+                                    })];
+                            });
+                        }); }, { onResult: function (r) { return r.violationCount === 0; } })
+                        // Case B: `linkedAccountAccess` on users must be stripped when the caller is NOT
+                        // the record's owner. This is a separate branch in applyRedactions (routing.ts:1220-1225)
+                        // and protects against cross-user enumeration of who-requested-access-to-whom.
+                        // The non-admin user reads other user records via data-sync; if any of those
+                        // records have linkedAccountAccess set, it must be stripped on read.
+                    ];
+                case 13:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    otherUsersInStream_2 = sync_1.results.filter(function (r) { return r.modelName === 'users' && r.recordId !== sdkNonAdmin.userInfo.id; });
+                    linkedAccountLeaks_1 = [];
+                    for (_i = 0, otherUsersInStream_1 = otherUsersInStream_2; _i < otherUsersInStream_1.length; _i++) {
+                        record = otherUsersInStream_1[_i];
+                        if (!record.data || record.data === 'deleted')
+                            continue;
+                        try {
+                            parsed = JSON.parse(record.data);
+                            if ('linkedAccountAccess' in parsed && parsed.linkedAccountAccess !== undefined) {
+                                linkedAccountLeaks_1.push({ recordId: record.recordId });
+                            }
+                        }
+                        catch (_g) { }
+                    }
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.async_test)("F-0001 coverage B: /v1/data-sync strips linkedAccountAccess from other users' records", function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+                            return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+                                return [2 /*return*/, ({
+                                        otherUserRecords: otherUsersInStream_2.length,
+                                        leakCount: linkedAccountLeaks_1.length,
+                                        leaks: linkedAccountLeaks_1.slice(0, 5),
+                                    })];
+                            });
+                        }); }, { onResult: function (r) { return r.leakCount === 0; } })];
+                case 14:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 32];
+                case 15:
+                    _f.trys.push([15, 17, , 18]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.updateOne(sdkNonAdmin.userInfo.id, { roles: originalRoles !== null && originalRoles !== void 0 ? originalRoles : [] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })];
+                case 16:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 18];
+                case 17:
+                    _b = _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 18];
+                case 18:
+                    if (!rbapId) return [3 /*break*/, 22];
+                    _f.label = 19;
+                case 19:
+                    _f.trys.push([19, 21, , 22]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.deleteOne(rbapId)];
+                case 20:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 22];
+                case 21:
+                    _c = _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 22];
+                case 22:
+                    if (!testEnduserId) return [3 /*break*/, 26];
+                    _f.label = 23;
+                case 23:
+                    _f.trys.push([23, 25, , 26]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.deleteOne(testEnduserId)];
+                case 24:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 26];
+                case 25:
+                    _d = _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 26];
+                case 26: 
+                // Re-authenticate the non-admin to drop the exploit role from their JWT
+                // before subsequent tests run.
+                // Role restore above re-triggers deauthenticate_user; wait > 1s so the freshly minted
+                // token's (second-floored) iat lands after the deauth timestamp and isn't permanently
+                // rejected by is_logged_in's iat-slack check. Matches the in-test re-auth above.
+                return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.wait)(undefined, 1500)];
+                case 27:
+                    // Re-authenticate the non-admin to drop the exploit role from their JWT
+                    // before subsequent tests run.
+                    // Role restore above re-triggers deauthenticate_user; wait > 1s so the freshly minted
+                    // token's (second-floored) iat lands after the deauth timestamp and isn't permanently
+                    // rejected by is_logged_in's iat-slack check. Matches the in-test re-auth above.
+                    _f.sent();
+                    _f.label = 28;
+                case 28:
+                    _f.trys.push([28, 30, , 31]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkNonAdmin.authenticate(nonAdminEmail, nonAdminPassword)];
+                case 29:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 31];
+                case 30:
+                    _e = _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 31];
+                case 31: return [7 /*endfinally*/];
+                case 32: return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    });
+};
+exports.data_sync_redaction_bypass_tests = data_sync_redaction_bypass_tests;
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+    console.log("\uD83C\uDF10 Using API URL: ".concat(host));
+    var sdk_2 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var sdkNonAdmin_1 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var runTests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+            switch (_a.label) {
+                case 0: return [4 /*yield*/, (0, setup_1.setup_tests)(sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin_1)];
+                case 1:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, exports.data_sync_redaction_bypass_tests)({ sdk: sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin: sdkNonAdmin_1 })];
+                case 2:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    }); };
+    runTests()
+        .then(function () {
+        console.log("✅ F-0001 data-sync redaction-bypass test suite completed successfully");
+        process.exit(0);
+    })
+        .catch(function (error) {
+        console.error("❌ F-0001 data-sync redaction-bypass test suite failed:", error);
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0001-data-sync-redaction-bypass.test.js.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0001-data-sync-redaction-bypass.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0005-ai-conversations-rbac.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk";
+/**
+ * Regression test for F-0005 (security-audit/findings/F-0005-ai-conversations-bypass-rbac.md).
+ *
+ * Both `ai_conversations.send_message` and `ai_conversations.generate_ai_decision` are
+ * registered with `noAccessPermissions: true` ([api.ts:22699, 22721](packages/private/api/api/v1/api.ts)).
+ * Their only access gate is `if (req.session.type === 'enduser') throw 403`. They must ALSO
+ * check `session.access?.ai_conversations?.<action>` (and `session.access?.endusers?.read`
+ * for generate_ai_decision) — the standard pattern used 16 lines earlier in the same file
+ * at api.ts:22680 for the background_errors handler.
+ *
+ * This test:
+ *   1. Creates a role with explicit NO_ACCESS for ai_conversations (and endusers).
+ *   2. Assigns the role to the non-admin user.
+ *   3. Calls each endpoint as the non-admin.
+ *   4. Asserts each endpoint returns a 403-equivalent error (not 200).
+ *
+ * Pre-fix:
+ *   - send_message: 200 (or some downstream error from Bedrock) — NOT 403. Test fails.
+ *   - generate_ai_decision: 200 with `{}` (handler responds early before access check). Test fails.
+ *
+ * Post-fix: both endpoints throw 403 before any work happens. Test passes.
+ */
+export declare const ai_conversations_rbac_tests: ({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin }: {
+    sdk: Session;
+    sdkNonAdmin: Session;
+}) => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0005-ai-conversations-rbac.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0005-ai-conversations-rbac.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"F-0005-ai-conversations-rbac.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0005-ai-conversations-rbac.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAGA,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AAYtC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B;SAAwC,OAAO;iBAAe,OAAO;mBA8F5G,CAAA"}

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0005-ai-conversations-rbac.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+"use strict";
+var __assign = (this && this.__assign) || function () {
+    __assign = Object.assign || function(t) {
+        for (var s, i = 1, n = arguments.length; i < n; i++) {
+            s = arguments[i];
+            for (var p in s) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(s, p))
+                t[p] = s[p];
+        }
+        return t;
+    };
+    return __assign.apply(this, arguments);
+};
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.ai_conversations_rbac_tests = void 0;
+require('source-map-support').install();
+var bson_1 = require("bson");
+var sdk_1 = require("../../../sdk");
+var testing_1 = require("@tellescope/testing");
+var setup_1 = require("../../setup");
+var constants_1 = require("@tellescope/constants");
+var host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080';
+var _a = [process.env.NON_ADMIN_EMAIL, process.env.NON_ADMIN_PASSWORD], nonAdminEmail = _a[0], nonAdminPassword = _a[1];
+/**
+ * Regression test for F-0005 (security-audit/findings/F-0005-ai-conversations-bypass-rbac.md).
+ *
+ * Both `ai_conversations.send_message` and `ai_conversations.generate_ai_decision` are
+ * registered with `noAccessPermissions: true` ([api.ts:22699, 22721](packages/private/api/api/v1/api.ts)).
+ * Their only access gate is `if (req.session.type === 'enduser') throw 403`. They must ALSO
+ * check `session.access?.ai_conversations?.<action>` (and `session.access?.endusers?.read`
+ * for generate_ai_decision) — the standard pattern used 16 lines earlier in the same file
+ * at api.ts:22680 for the background_errors handler.
+ *
+ * This test:
+ *   1. Creates a role with explicit NO_ACCESS for ai_conversations (and endusers).
+ *   2. Assigns the role to the non-admin user.
+ *   3. Calls each endpoint as the non-admin.
+ *   4. Asserts each endpoint returns a 403-equivalent error (not 200).
+ *
+ * Pre-fix:
+ *   - send_message: 200 (or some downstream error from Bedrock) — NOT 403. Test fails.
+ *   - generate_ai_decision: 200 with `{}` (handler responds early before access check). Test fails.
+ *
+ * Post-fix: both endpoints throw 403 before any work happens. Test passes.
+ */
+var ai_conversations_rbac_tests = function (_a) {
+    var sdk = _a.sdk, sdkNonAdmin = _a.sdkNonAdmin;
+    return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        var roleName, rbapId, originalRoles, rbap, _b, _c, _d;
+        return __generator(this, function (_e) {
+            switch (_e.label) {
+                case 0:
+                    (0, testing_1.log_header)("F-0005: ai_conversations RBAC bypass regression");
+                    roleName = "f0005-ai-conversations-no-access-".concat(Date.now());
+                    originalRoles = sdkNonAdmin.userInfo.roles;
+                    _e.label = 1;
+                case 1:
+                    _e.trys.push([1, , 8, 21]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.createOne({
+                            role: roleName,
+                            permissions: __assign(__assign({}, constants_1.PROVIDER_PERMISSIONS), { ai_conversations: { create: null, read: null, update: null, delete: null }, endusers: { create: null, read: null, update: null, delete: null } }),
+                        })];
+                case 2:
+                    rbap = _e.sent();
+                    rbapId = rbap.id;
+                    // 2. Assign the role to the non-admin user and re-authenticate so the new
+                    //    session reflects the role's denied permissions.
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.updateOne(sdkNonAdmin.userInfo.id, { roles: [roleName] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })];
+                case 3:
+                    // 2. Assign the role to the non-admin user and re-authenticate so the new
+                    //    session reflects the role's denied permissions.
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.wait)(undefined, 1500)];
+                case 4:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkNonAdmin.authenticate(nonAdminEmail, nonAdminPassword)
+                        // 3a. send_message must throw 403 (or equivalent access error). Pre-fix: succeeds (or
+                        //     fails downstream in Bedrock without 403). Post-fix: throws before any work.
+                    ];
+                case 5:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    // 3a. send_message must throw 403 (or equivalent access error). Pre-fix: succeeds (or
+                    //     fails downstream in Bedrock without 403). Post-fix: throws before any work.
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.async_test)("F-0005: ai_conversations.send_message must throw 403 when role denies ai_conversations", function () { return sdkNonAdmin.api.ai_conversations.send_message({
+                            message: 'F-0005 regression test',
+                            type: 'Test',
+                        }); }, {
+                            shouldError: true,
+                            onError: function (e) {
+                                var _a, _b;
+                                // Accept any 4xx access-denial response — handler may use 403 (recommended)
+                                // or 400 with "access" / "permission" in the message.
+                                var msg = ((_a = e === null || e === void 0 ? void 0 : e.message) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : '').toLowerCase();
+                                var status = (_b = e === null || e === void 0 ? void 0 : e.status) !== null && _b !== void 0 ? _b : e === null || e === void 0 ? void 0 : e.code;
+                                return status === 403 || status === 401
+                                    || msg.includes('access') || msg.includes('permission') || msg.includes('forbidden');
+                            },
+                        })
+                        // 3b. generate_ai_decision must throw 403 BEFORE the early res.json({}) response.
+                        //     Pre-fix: handler responds 200 with {} immediately and processes in background.
+                        //     Post-fix: handler throws 403 before res.json({}).
+                    ];
+                case 6:
+                    // 3a. send_message must throw 403 (or equivalent access error). Pre-fix: succeeds (or
+                    //     fails downstream in Bedrock without 403). Post-fix: throws before any work.
+                    _e.sent();
+                    // 3b. generate_ai_decision must throw 403 BEFORE the early res.json({}) response.
+                    //     Pre-fix: handler responds 200 with {} immediately and processes in background.
+                    //     Post-fix: handler throws 403 before res.json({}).
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.async_test)("F-0005: ai_conversations.generate_ai_decision must throw 403 when role denies endusers/ai_conversations", function () { return sdkNonAdmin.api.ai_conversations.generate_ai_decision({
+                            enduserId: new bson_1.ObjectId().toHexString(),
+                            automationStepId: new bson_1.ObjectId().toHexString(),
+                            outcomes: ['yes', 'no'],
+                            prompt: 'F-0005 regression test',
+                            sources: [{ type: 'SMS', limit: 1 }], // non-empty so the validator passes; access check then fires
+                        }); }, {
+                            shouldError: true,
+                            onError: function (e) {
+                                var _a, _b;
+                                var msg = ((_a = e === null || e === void 0 ? void 0 : e.message) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : '').toLowerCase();
+                                var status = (_b = e === null || e === void 0 ? void 0 : e.status) !== null && _b !== void 0 ? _b : e === null || e === void 0 ? void 0 : e.code;
+                                return status === 403 || status === 401
+                                    || msg.includes('access') || msg.includes('permission') || msg.includes('forbidden');
+                            },
+                        })];
+                case 7:
+                    // 3b. generate_ai_decision must throw 403 BEFORE the early res.json({}) response.
+                    //     Pre-fix: handler responds 200 with {} immediately and processes in background.
+                    //     Post-fix: handler throws 403 before res.json({}).
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 21];
+                case 8:
+                    _e.trys.push([8, 10, , 11]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.updateOne(sdkNonAdmin.userInfo.id, { roles: originalRoles !== null && originalRoles !== void 0 ? originalRoles : [] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })];
+                case 9:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 11];
+                case 10:
+                    _b = _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 11];
+                case 11:
+                    if (!rbapId) return [3 /*break*/, 15];
+                    _e.label = 12;
+                case 12:
+                    _e.trys.push([12, 14, , 15]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.deleteOne(rbapId)];
+                case 13:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 15];
+                case 14:
+                    _c = _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 15];
+                case 15: 
+                // Re-authenticate the non-admin to drop the no-access role from their JWT
+                // before subsequent tests run.
+                // Role restore above re-triggers deauthenticate_user; wait > 1s so the freshly minted
+                // token's (second-floored) iat lands after the deauth timestamp and isn't permanently
+                // rejected by is_logged_in's iat-slack check. Matches the in-test re-auth above.
+                return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.wait)(undefined, 1500)];
+                case 16:
+                    // Re-authenticate the non-admin to drop the no-access role from their JWT
+                    // before subsequent tests run.
+                    // Role restore above re-triggers deauthenticate_user; wait > 1s so the freshly minted
+                    // token's (second-floored) iat lands after the deauth timestamp and isn't permanently
+                    // rejected by is_logged_in's iat-slack check. Matches the in-test re-auth above.
+                    _e.sent();
+                    _e.label = 17;
+                case 17:
+                    _e.trys.push([17, 19, , 20]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkNonAdmin.authenticate(nonAdminEmail, nonAdminPassword)];
+                case 18:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 20];
+                case 19:
+                    _d = _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 20];
+                case 20: return [7 /*endfinally*/];
+                case 21: return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    });
+};
+exports.ai_conversations_rbac_tests = ai_conversations_rbac_tests;
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+    console.log("\uD83C\uDF10 Using API URL: ".concat(host));
+    var sdk_2 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var sdkNonAdmin_1 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var runTests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+            switch (_a.label) {
+                case 0: return [4 /*yield*/, (0, setup_1.setup_tests)(sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin_1)];
+                case 1:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, exports.ai_conversations_rbac_tests)({ sdk: sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin: sdkNonAdmin_1 })];
+                case 2:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    }); };
+    runTests()
+        .then(function () {
+        console.log("✅ F-0005 ai_conversations RBAC test suite completed successfully");
+        process.exit(0);
+    })
+        .catch(function (error) {
+        console.error("❌ F-0005 ai_conversations RBAC test suite failed:", error);
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0005-ai-conversations-rbac.test.js.map