@tellescope/sdk 1.251.0 → 1.252.0

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0008-handle-incoming-communication-cross-tenant.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+require('source-map-support').install();
+
+import axios from "axios"
+import { ObjectId } from 'bson'
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk"
+import {
+  async_test,
+  log_header,
+} from "@tellescope/testing"
+import { setup_tests } from "../../setup"
+
+const host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080' as const
+
+const CROSS_ORG_API_KEY = process.env.CROSS_ORG_API_KEY
+const CROSS_ORG_TARGET_BUSINESS_ID = process.env.CROSS_ORG_TARGET_BUSINESS_ID
+
+const post = async (path: string, body: any, headers: Record<string, string> = {}) => {
+  try {
+    const res = await axios.post(`${host}${path}`, body, {
+      validateStatus: () => true,
+      headers,
+    })
+    return { status: res.status, data: res.data }
+  } catch (err: any) {
+    return { status: err?.response?.status, data: err?.response?.data }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Regression test for F-0008 (security-audit/findings/F-0008-handle-incoming-communication-cross-tenant-enduser-lookup.md).
+ *
+ * `journeys.handle_incoming_communication` previously used `buildAllQueries({ unrestricted: true, organizationIds: [] }).endusers.findById(enduserId)`,
+ * permitting cross-tenant lookup of any enduser by id. The handler then called `handleIncomingCommunication(...)`
+ * against the matched enduser, triggering journey progression and automated actions on someone else's tenant.
+ *
+ * The fix switches to the standard tenant-scoped `DB.endusers.findById(enduserId)` wrapper, which automatically
+ * filters by `req.session.businessId`. Cross-tenant lookups now return null → handler returns 404 → no side effect.
+ *
+ * Note: the same-tenant happy path is already covered by the existing test at
+ * `packages/public/sdk/src/tests/tests.ts:7588` ("handle_incoming_communication test for other enduser") — that
+ * test creates endusers in the test tenant, sets up journeys, calls handle_incoming_communication, and asserts
+ * journey-step cancellation. This file covers the negative cases only.
+ *
+ * **Negative-only by design**: the test never drives `handleIncomingCommunication` against a cross-tenant
+ * enduser — the post-fix code returns 404 before any side effects fire, and the assertion confirms that.
+ */
+export const handle_incoming_communication_cross_tenant_tests = async ({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdmin: Session }) => {
+  log_header("F-0008: handle_incoming_communication cross-tenant rejection")
+
+  // ====================================================================
+  // Assertion 1: nonexistent enduserId returns 404 (baseline; regression
+  // guard for the not-found path that any cross-tenant call now lands in).
+  // ====================================================================
+  const nonexistentId = new ObjectId().toHexString()
+  const nonexistentRes = await post(
+    '/v1/journeys/handle-incoming-communication',
+    { enduserId: nonexistentId },
+    { Authorization: `Bearer ${sdk.authToken}` },
+  )
+  await async_test(
+    "F-0008: handle_incoming_communication with nonexistent enduserId returns 404",
+    async () => ({ status: nonexistentRes.status }),
+    { onResult: r => r.status === 404 },
+  )
+
+  // ====================================================================
+  // Assertion 2: cross-tenant enduserId returns 404 (the actual F-0008 fix).
+  // Env-gated; skipped when cross-org infra isn't configured.
+  // Safe to run post-fix because the tenant-scoped DB returns null for
+  // cross-tenant lookups — no handleIncomingCommunication side effect fires.
+  // ====================================================================
+  if (!(CROSS_ORG_API_KEY && CROSS_ORG_TARGET_BUSINESS_ID)) {
+    console.log("  [F-0008] Skipping cross-tenant rejection assertion — CROSS_ORG_* env vars not set")
+    return
+  }
+
+  const sdkCrossOrg = new Session({
+    host,
+    apiKey: CROSS_ORG_API_KEY,
+    headers: { 'x-tellescope-organization': CROSS_ORG_TARGET_BUSINESS_ID },
+  })
+
+  // Create a sentinel enduser in the cross-org tenant. Use a clearly-test email
+  // so any accidental side-effect routing is obvious in logs.
+  const ts = Date.now()
+  const crossEnduser = await sdkCrossOrg.api.endusers.createOne({
+    fname: 'F0008CrossTenant', lname: 'Sentinel',
+    email: `f0008-cross-${ts}@tellescope.com`,
+  } as any)
+
+  try {
+    const crossRes = await post(
+      '/v1/journeys/handle-incoming-communication',
+      { enduserId: crossEnduser.id },
+      { Authorization: `Bearer ${sdk.authToken}` },
+    )
+
+    await async_test(
+      "F-0008: handle_incoming_communication with cross-tenant enduserId returns 404 (no side effect)",
+      async () => ({
+        status: crossRes.status,
+        message: crossRes.data?.message ?? null,
+      }),
+      { onResult: r => r.status === 404 },
+    )
+  } finally {
+    try { await sdkCrossOrg.api.endusers.deleteOne(crossEnduser.id) } catch {}
+  }
+}
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+  console.log(`🌐 Using API URL: ${host}`)
+  const sdk = new Session({ host })
+  const sdkNonAdmin = new Session({ host })
+
+  const runTests = async () => {
+    await setup_tests(sdk, sdkNonAdmin)
+    await handle_incoming_communication_cross_tenant_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+  }
+
+  runTests()
+    .then(() => {
+      console.log("✅ F-0008 handle_incoming_communication cross-tenant test suite completed successfully")
+      process.exit(0)
+    })
+    .catch((error) => {
+      console.error("❌ F-0008 handle_incoming_communication cross-tenant test suite failed:", error)
+      process.exit(1)
+    })
+}

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+import { sanitize_user_html } from "@tellescope/utilities"
+
+// Regression test for F-0013 / F-0014 (pattern 06 — XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML).
+// sanitize_user_html is the canonical render-time sanitizer that replaced remove_script_tags
+// at every dangerouslySetInnerHTML sink. This asserts it neutralizes XSS vectors (incl. encoded /
+// whitespace / mixed-case / iframe-srcdoc bypass variants) while preserving legitimate
+// customization HTML (tables, headings, lists, links, images, inline styles).
+//
+// Pure-function test — no Session needed. Runs as part of the main suite and standalone:
+//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.js
+
+const fail = (msg: string) => { throw new Error(msg) }
+
+const has_no_executable_vector = (out: string) => {
+  const o = out.toLowerCase()
+  // A handler smuggled into an attribute VALUE (e.g. title="<img onerror=...>") is inert
+  // text — strip quoted values before checking for *live* on*= attributes to avoid false positives.
+  const withoutValues = o.replace(/"[^"]*"/g, '""').replace(/'[^']*'/g, "''")
+  return !/\son[a-z]+\s*=/.test(withoutValues)   // no live on*= event-handler attribute
+      && !o.includes('javascript:')              // dropped schemes never appear in safe output
+      && !o.includes('vbscript:')
+      && !o.includes('<script')                  // literal dangerous tags (encoded &lt;script is fine)
+      && !o.includes('<iframe')
+      && !o.includes('<svg')
+      && !o.includes('<math')
+      && !o.includes('<object')
+      && !o.includes('<embed')
+      && !o.includes('<form')
+      && !o.includes('<noscript')
+      && !o.includes('<template')
+}
+
+export const sanitize_user_html_xss_tests = async () => {
+  console.log("Running F-0013/F-0014 sanitize_user_html XSS regression tests")
+
+  const xssPayloads: [string, string][] = [
+    ['img onerror', `<img src=x onerror="alert(document.domain)">`],
+    ['svg onload', `<svg onload="alert(1)"></svg>`],
+    ['svg animate onbegin', `<svg><animate onbegin="alert(1)" attributeName="x" dur="1s"></svg>`],
+    ['details ontoggle', `<details open ontoggle="alert(1)"></details>`],
+    ['input onfocus autofocus', `<input autofocus onfocus="alert(1)">`],
+    ['body onpageshow', `<body onpageshow="alert(1)">`],
+    ['a javascript scheme', `<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>`],
+    ['a javascript entity-encoded', `<a href="jav&#x09;ascript:alert(1)">x</a>`],
+    ['iframe javascript src', `<iframe src="javascript:alert(1)"></iframe>`],
+    ['iframe srcdoc nested', `<iframe srcdoc="<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"></iframe>`],
+    ['script tag', `<script>alert(1)</script>`],
+    ['onerror newline before =', `<img src=x onerror\n="alert(1)">`],
+    ['onerror mixed case', `<IMG SRC=x OnErRoR="alert(1)">`],
+    ['marquee onstart', `<marquee onstart="alert(1)">x</marquee>`],
+    // mutation / namespace confusion — svg/math/noscript/template must be stripped
+    ['mathml mglyph style mxss', `<math><mtext><table><mglyph><style><!--</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`],
+    ['svg foreignObject', `<svg><foreignObject><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></foreignObject></svg>`],
+    ['noscript context confusion', `<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>">`],
+    ['template content', `<template><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></template>`],
+    // comment / CDATA confusion
+    ['comment confusion', `<!--><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>-->`],
+    ['cdata confusion', `<![CDATA[<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>]]>`],
+    // markup smuggled inside an attribute value must stay inert
+    ['markup inside attr value', `<img src="x" alt="<script>alert(1)</script>">`],
+    // protocol obfuscation
+    ['vbscript scheme', `<a href="vbscript:msgbox(1)">x</a>`],
+    ['data text/html href', `<a href="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">x</a>`],
+    ['javascript decimal entity', `<a href="&#74;avascript:alert(1)">x</a>`],
+    ['javascript newline entity', `<a href="jav&#x0A;ascript:alert(1)">x</a>`],
+  ]
+  for (const [name, payload] of xssPayloads) {
+    const out = sanitize_user_html(payload)
+    if (!has_no_executable_vector(out)) fail(`XSS not neutralized [${name}] -> ${out}`)
+  }
+
+  // DOM clobbering: caller-controlled id/name must be stripped
+  const clobber = sanitize_user_html(`<a id="x" name="getElementById">link</a><img name="y">`)
+  if (/\b(id|name)\s*=/.test(clobber)) fail(`id/name not stripped (DOM clobbering): ${clobber}`)
+
+  // legitimate customization HTML must survive
+  const heading = sanitize_user_html(`<h1>Welcome</h1><h3 style="color:#333">Sub</h3>`)
+  if (!(heading.includes('<h1>') && heading.includes('<h3') && heading.toLowerCase().includes('color'))) fail(`headings/style stripped: ${heading}`)
+
+  const table = sanitize_user_html(`<table><thead><tr><th>H</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td style="padding:4px" colspan="2">cell</td></tr></tbody></table>`)
+  if (!(table.includes('<table') && table.includes('<td') && table.includes('colspan'))) fail(`table stripped: ${table}`)
+
+  const list = sanitize_user_html(`<ul><li>a</li></ul><ol start="3"><li>c</li></ol>`)
+  if (!(list.includes('<ul') && list.includes('<li') && list.includes('<ol'))) fail(`list stripped: ${list}`)
+
+  const link = sanitize_user_html(`<a href="https://example.com">link</a>`)
+  if (!link.includes('href="https://example.com"')) fail(`safe link stripped: ${link}`)
+  if (!link.toLowerCase().includes('noopener')) fail(`external link not hardened: ${link}`)
+
+  const img = sanitize_user_html(`<img src="https://cdn.example.com/a.png" alt="pic" width="200">`)
+  if (!(img.includes('src="https://cdn.example.com/a.png"') && img.includes('alt="pic"'))) fail(`http image stripped: ${img}`)
+
+  const dataimg = sanitize_user_html(`<img src="">`)
+  if (!dataimg.includes('data:image/png')) fail(`data: image stripped: ${dataimg}`)
+
+  const fmt = sanitize_user_html(`<p><strong>b</strong> <em>i</em> <span style="font-size:14px">s</span></p><blockquote>q</blockquote>`)
+  if (!(fmt.includes('<strong>') && fmt.includes('<span') && fmt.toLowerCase().includes('font-size'))) fail(`formatting stripped: ${fmt}`)
+
+  const mixed = sanitize_user_html(`<p>Hello <b>name</b></p><img src=x onerror="steal()">`)
+  if (!(mixed.includes('<b>name</b>') && !/\son[a-z]+\s*=/.test(mixed.toLowerCase()))) fail(`mixed content not handled: ${mixed}`)
+
+  console.log("✅ F-0013/F-0014 sanitize_user_html XSS regression tests passed")
+}
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+  sanitize_user_html_xss_tests()
+    .then(() => { console.log("✅ suite completed"); process.exit(0) })
+    .catch((err) => { console.error("❌ suite failed:", err); process.exit(1) })
+}

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+import { add_value_for_dotted_key } from "@tellescope/utilities"
+
+// Regression test for F-0016 (pattern 17 — prototype pollution).
+// add_value_for_dotted_key must NOT write through __proto__/constructor/prototype path segments
+// (which would pollute Object.prototype process-wide), while still performing legitimate dotted assignment.
+//
+// Pure-function test — no Session needed. Runs in the main suite and standalone:
+//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.js
+
+const fail = (msg: string) => { throw new Error(msg) }
+
+export const prototype_pollution_tests = async () => {
+  console.log("Running F-0016 prototype-pollution regression tests")
+
+  // 1. __proto__ path must not pollute Object.prototype
+  add_value_for_dotted_key({ insurance: {} } as any, 'insurance.__proto__.__pp_a__', 'polluted')
+  const leakedA = ({} as any).__pp_a__
+  delete (Object.prototype as any).__pp_a__ // clean up regardless, so a failure here can't contaminate the rest of the suite
+  if (leakedA !== undefined) fail('Object.prototype polluted via __proto__ path')
+
+  // 2. constructor.prototype path must not pollute
+  add_value_for_dotted_key({ insurance: {} } as any, 'insurance.constructor.prototype.__pp_b__', 'polluted')
+  const leakedB = ({} as any).__pp_b__
+  delete (Object.prototype as any).__pp_b__
+  if (leakedB !== undefined) fail('Object.prototype polluted via constructor.prototype path')
+
+  // 3. a leading __proto__ segment must not pollute either
+  add_value_for_dotted_key({} as any, '__proto__.__pp_c__', 'polluted')
+  const leakedC = ({} as any).__pp_c__
+  delete (Object.prototype as any).__pp_c__
+  if (leakedC !== undefined) fail('Object.prototype polluted via leading __proto__ segment')
+
+  // 4. legitimate dotted assignment still works (existing intermediate objects)
+  const obj = { a: { b: {} } } as any
+  add_value_for_dotted_key(obj, 'a.b.c', 42)
+  if (obj.a.b.c !== 42) fail('legitimate dotted assignment broke')
+
+  // 5. single-key assignment still works
+  const flat = {} as any
+  add_value_for_dotted_key(flat, 'name', 'ok')
+  if (flat.name !== 'ok') fail('single-key assignment broke')
+
+  console.log("✅ F-0016 prototype-pollution regression tests passed")
+}
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+  prototype_pollution_tests()
+    .then(() => { console.log("✅ suite completed"); process.exit(0) })
+    .catch((err) => { console.error("❌ suite failed:", err); process.exit(1) })
+}

package/src/tests/tests.ts

@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ import {
 import fs from "fs"
 import { load_inbox_data_tests } from "./api_tests/load_inbox_data.test";
 import { enduser_login_tests } from "./api_tests/enduser_login.test";
+import { enduser_login_rate_limits_tests } from "./api_tests/enduser_login_rate_limits.test";
 import { eom_procedure_codes_tests } from "./api_tests/eom_procedure_codes.test";
 import { cross_org_api_key_tests } from "./api_tests/cross_org_api_key.test";
 import { custom_dashboards_tests } from "./api_tests/custom_dashboards.test";
@@ -88,6 +89,12 @@ import { custom_aggregation_tests } from "./api_tests/custom_aggregation.test";
 import { chats_analytics_tests } from "./api_tests/chats_analytics.test";
 import { no_access_permission_checks_tests } from "./api_tests/no_access_permission_checks.test";
 import { field_redaction_tests } from "./api_tests/field_redaction.test";
+import { data_sync_redaction_bypass_tests } from "./api_tests/security/F-0001-data-sync-redaction-bypass.test";
+import { ai_conversations_rbac_tests } from "./api_tests/security/F-0005-ai-conversations-rbac.test";
+import { invite_user_enumeration_tests } from "./api_tests/security/F-0007-invite-user-enumeration.test";
+import { handle_incoming_communication_cross_tenant_tests } from "./api_tests/security/F-0008-handle-incoming-communication-cross-tenant.test";
+import { sanitize_user_html_xss_tests } from "./api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test";
+import { prototype_pollution_tests } from "./api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test";
 import { bulk_assignment_tests } from "./api_tests/bulk_assignment.test";
 import { managed_content_enduser_access_tests } from "./api_tests/managed_content_enduser_access.test";
 import { managed_content_file_access_tests } from "./api_tests/managed_content_file_access.test";
@@ -109,6 +116,7 @@ import { set_fields_order_templates_tests } from "./api_tests/set_fields_order_t
 import { date_string_validation_tests } from "./api_tests/date_string_validation.test";
 import { enduser_session_invalidation_tests } from "./api_tests/enduser_session_invalidation.test";
 import { enduser_cross_access_isolation_tests } from "./api_tests/enduser_cross_access_isolation.test";
+import { calendar_event_webhook_template_tests } from "./api_tests/calendar_event_webhook_template.test";
 
 const UniquenessViolationMessage = 'Uniqueness Violation'
 
@@ -5092,6 +5100,7 @@ const trigger_events_api_tests = async () => {
 const automation_trigger_tests = async () => {
   log_header("Automation Trigger Tests")
 
+  await push_forms_to_portal_group_completion_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
   await order_status_equals_tests()
   await set_fields_order_templates_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
   await medication_added_trigger_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
@@ -5102,7 +5111,6 @@ const automation_trigger_tests = async () => {
   await form_response_set_fields_trigger_tests()
   await form_response_set_fields_journey_tests()
   await appointment_completed_trigger_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
-  await push_forms_to_portal_group_completion_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
   await trigger_events_api_tests()
   await fields_changed_tests()
   await field_equals_trigger_tests()
@@ -14321,10 +14329,19 @@ const ip_address_form_tests = async () => {
     await replace_form_field_template_values_tests()
     await mfa_tests()
     await setup_tests(sdk, sdkNonAdmin)
+    await invite_user_enumeration_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+    await handle_incoming_communication_cross_tenant_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+    await calendar_event_webhook_template_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+    await outbound_chat_sent_trigger_tests({ sdk })
+    await enduser_login_rate_limits_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+    await data_sync_redaction_bypass_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+    await ai_conversations_rbac_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+    await sanitize_user_html_xss_tests()
+    await prototype_pollution_tests()
+    await automation_trigger_tests()
     await account_switcher_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
     await enduser_login_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
     await outbound_chat_sent_trigger_tests({ sdk })
-    await automation_trigger_tests()
     await enduser_cross_access_isolation_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
     await eom_procedure_codes_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
     await cross_org_api_key_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })