@stevenvo780/st-lang 4.8.0 → 4.10.0

package/dist/reasoning/ban-logic/protocols.d.ts

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+import { key, principal } from './terms';
+import type { BANFormula, Protocol } from './types';
+/**
+ * Needham-Schroeder shared-key (simplificado para BAN).
+ *
+ * 1. A → S : A, B, N_a
+ * 2. S → A : {N_a, K_ab, B, {K_ab, A}_{K_bs}}_{K_as}
+ * 3. A → B : {K_ab, A}_{K_bs}
+ * 4. B → A : {N_b}_{K_ab}
+ * 5. A → B : {N_b - 1}_{K_ab}   (representamos como nonce(N_b'))
+ */
+export declare function needhamSchroederSymmetric(): Protocol;
+/**
+ * Needham-Schroeder public-key (Lowe attack territory).
+ *
+ * Original:
+ *   1. A → B : {N_a, A}_{K_b}
+ *   2. B → A : {N_a, N_b}_{K_a}
+ *   3. A → B : {N_b}_{K_b}
+ *
+ * El "Lowe attack" (1995) muestra que un atacante M puede intercalar
+ * y hacer creer a B que está hablando con A cuando en realidad A
+ * habla con M. Modelamos el protocolo TAL CUAL, sin la corrección
+ * de Lowe; el resultado: el goal "B|≡A|≡(sesión con B)" NO se
+ * deriva.
+ */
+export declare function needhamSchroederPublicKey(): Protocol;
+/**
+ * Kerberos (simplificación BAN).
+ *
+ * 1. C → S : C, T, N_c
+ * 2. S → C : {N_c, T_C, K_ct}_{K_cs}, {C, T_C, K_ct}_{K_ts}
+ * 3. C → T : {C, T_C, K_ct}_{K_ts}, {C, t}_{K_ct}
+ * 4. T → C : {t + 1}_{K_ct}
+ *
+ * Goal: C cree que T comparte K_ct con C; T cree lo mismo.
+ */
+export declare function kerberos(): Protocol;
+export declare const protocolUtils: {
+    believes: (p: import("./types").BANTerm, f: BANFormula) => BANFormula;
+    sharedKey: (a: import("./types").BANTerm, b: import("./types").BANTerm, k: import("./types").BANTerm) => BANFormula;
+    publicKey: (p: ReturnType<typeof principal>, k: ReturnType<typeof key>) => BANFormula;
+    jurisdiction: (p: import("./types").BANTerm, f: BANFormula) => BANFormula;
+    saidMessage: (p: import("./types").BANTerm, w: import("./types").BANTerm) => BANFormula;
+    fresh: (w: import("./types").BANTerm) => BANFormula;
+    encrypted: (msg: import("./types").BANTerm, k: import("./types").BANTerm) => import("./types").BANTerm;
+    sees: (p: import("./types").BANTerm, w: import("./types").BANTerm) => BANFormula;
+    message: (...content: import("./types").BANTerm[]) => import("./types").BANTerm;
+    nonce: (name: string) => import("./types").BANTerm;
+    key: (name: string, shared?: [string, string]) => import("./types").BANTerm;
+    principal: (name: string) => import("./types").BANTerm;
+    controls: (p: import("./types").BANTerm, f: BANFormula) => BANFormula;
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=protocols.d.ts.map

package/dist/reasoning/ban-logic/protocols.d.ts.map

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package/dist/reasoning/ban-logic/protocols.js

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+"use strict";
+// ============================================================
+// BAN Logic — Catálogo de protocolos
+// ============================================================
+//
+// Protocolos clásicos modelados en estilo BAN para validar el motor.
+//
+// - Needham-Schroeder symmetric (1978): autenticación basada en
+//   servidor de confianza. BAN-correcto bajo assumptions estándar
+//   (frescura de los nonces).
+//
+// - Needham-Schroeder public-key (1978): el famoso protocolo con
+//   el "Lowe attack" (1995). Sin las correcciones de Lowe, NO logra
+//   autenticar B con A (deja un goal sin probar). Lo modelamos así
+//   para que `analyzeProtocol` lo refleje.
+//
+// - Kerberos (variant clásica simplificada): cliente C, servidor S
+//   con la KDC, autenticación mutua.
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.protocolUtils = void 0;
+exports.needhamSchroederSymmetric = needhamSchroederSymmetric;
+exports.needhamSchroederPublicKey = needhamSchroederPublicKey;
+exports.kerberos = kerberos;
+const terms_1 = require("./terms");
+/**
+ * Needham-Schroeder shared-key (simplificado para BAN).
+ *
+ * 1. A → S : A, B, N_a
+ * 2. S → A : {N_a, K_ab, B, {K_ab, A}_{K_bs}}_{K_as}
+ * 3. A → B : {K_ab, A}_{K_bs}
+ * 4. B → A : {N_b}_{K_ab}
+ * 5. A → B : {N_b - 1}_{K_ab}   (representamos como nonce(N_b'))
+ */
+function needhamSchroederSymmetric() {
+    const A = (0, terms_1.principal)('A');
+    const B = (0, terms_1.principal)('B');
+    const S = (0, terms_1.principal)('S');
+    const N_a = (0, terms_1.nonce)('N_a');
+    const N_b = (0, terms_1.nonce)('N_b');
+    const N_b_prime = (0, terms_1.nonce)("N_b'");
+    const K_ab = (0, terms_1.key)('K_ab', ['A', 'B']);
+    const K_as = (0, terms_1.key)('K_as', ['A', 'S']);
+    const K_bs = (0, terms_1.key)('K_bs', ['B', 'S']);
+    // Goal final: A cree que B cree K_ab (autenticación mutua de la clave).
+    const goal1 = (0, terms_1.believes)(A, (0, terms_1.believes)(B, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(A, B, K_ab)));
+    const goal2 = (0, terms_1.believes)(B, (0, terms_1.believes)(A, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(A, B, K_ab)));
+    return {
+        name: 'Needham-Schroeder-symmetric',
+        participants: ['A', 'B', 'S'],
+        initialAssumptions: [
+            // Claves compartidas con S.
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(A, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(A, S, K_as)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(B, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(B, S, K_bs)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(A, S, K_as)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(B, S, K_bs)),
+            // S decide la clave (jurisdicción).
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(A, (0, terms_1.controls)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(A, B, K_ab))),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(B, (0, terms_1.controls)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(A, B, K_ab))),
+            // S cree la clave que él mismo emite.
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(A, B, K_ab)),
+            // Frescuras.
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(A, (0, terms_1.fresh)(N_a)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(B, (0, terms_1.fresh)(N_b)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(S, (0, terms_1.fresh)(K_ab)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(A, (0, terms_1.fresh)(K_ab)),
+            // En el handshake nonce N_b, A confirma que sigue vivo. Para que
+            // B termine creyendo K_ab cree A, B asume frescura de la sesión
+            // como sigue:
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(B, (0, terms_1.fresh)(N_b_prime)),
+        ],
+        steps: [
+            // Idealización paso 2: S → A : { N_a, K_ab, A↔K_ab B }_{K_as}
+            {
+                from: 'S',
+                to: 'A',
+                message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)((0, terms_1.message)(N_a, K_ab), K_as),
+            },
+            // Idealización paso 3: A → B : { K_ab, A↔K_ab B }_{K_bs}
+            {
+                from: 'A',
+                to: 'B',
+                message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)(K_ab, K_bs),
+            },
+            // Idealización paso 4: B → A : { N_b, A↔K_ab B }_{K_ab}
+            {
+                from: 'B',
+                to: 'A',
+                message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)((0, terms_1.message)(N_b), K_ab),
+            },
+            // Idealización paso 5: A → B : { N_b', A↔K_ab B }_{K_ab}
+            {
+                from: 'A',
+                to: 'B',
+                message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)((0, terms_1.message)(N_b_prime), K_ab),
+            },
+        ],
+        goals: [goal1, goal2],
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Needham-Schroeder public-key (Lowe attack territory).
+ *
+ * Original:
+ *   1. A → B : {N_a, A}_{K_b}
+ *   2. B → A : {N_a, N_b}_{K_a}
+ *   3. A → B : {N_b}_{K_b}
+ *
+ * El "Lowe attack" (1995) muestra que un atacante M puede intercalar
+ * y hacer creer a B que está hablando con A cuando en realidad A
+ * habla con M. Modelamos el protocolo TAL CUAL, sin la corrección
+ * de Lowe; el resultado: el goal "B|≡A|≡(sesión con B)" NO se
+ * deriva.
+ */
+function needhamSchroederPublicKey() {
+    const A = (0, terms_1.principal)('A');
+    const B = (0, terms_1.principal)('B');
+    const N_a = (0, terms_1.nonce)('N_a');
+    const N_b = (0, terms_1.nonce)('N_b');
+    // Claves públicas modeladas como `key` con shared = [owner, owner]
+    // como hack mnemotécnico; el motor usa `publicKey` para R2.
+    const K_a = (0, terms_1.key)('K_a');
+    const K_b = (0, terms_1.key)('K_b');
+    // En BAN original con Lowe: el goal de B "A cree que está hablando
+    // con B" no se cumple sin Lowe-fix. Lo dejamos como goal para que el
+    // análisis lo reporte como UNSATISFIED.
+    const goalA = (0, terms_1.believes)(A, (0, terms_1.believes)(B, (0, terms_1.sees)(B, N_a)));
+    const goalB = (0, terms_1.believes)(B, (0, terms_1.believes)(A, (0, terms_1.sees)(A, N_b)));
+    return {
+        name: 'Needham-Schroeder-public-key',
+        participants: ['A', 'B'],
+        initialAssumptions: [
+            // Nadie comparte secret state inicial real con el otro; solo PKs.
+            // Modelamos como sharedKey "público" para R1 (BAN no distingue
+            // semánticamente shared vs public para el análisis de pares).
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(A, { kind: 'publicKey', principal: B, key: K_b }),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(B, { kind: 'publicKey', principal: A, key: K_a }),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(A, (0, terms_1.fresh)(N_a)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(B, (0, terms_1.fresh)(N_b)),
+        ],
+        steps: [
+            // 1. A → B : {N_a, A}_{K_b}
+            { from: 'A', to: 'B', message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)((0, terms_1.message)(N_a, A), K_b) },
+            // 2. B → A : {N_a, N_b}_{K_a}   ← OJO: NO incluye B (origen del Lowe attack)
+            { from: 'B', to: 'A', message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)((0, terms_1.message)(N_a, N_b), K_a) },
+            // 3. A → B : {N_b}_{K_b}
+            { from: 'A', to: 'B', message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)(N_b, K_b) },
+        ],
+        goals: [goalA, goalB],
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Kerberos (simplificación BAN).
+ *
+ * 1. C → S : C, T, N_c
+ * 2. S → C : {N_c, T_C, K_ct}_{K_cs}, {C, T_C, K_ct}_{K_ts}
+ * 3. C → T : {C, T_C, K_ct}_{K_ts}, {C, t}_{K_ct}
+ * 4. T → C : {t + 1}_{K_ct}
+ *
+ * Goal: C cree que T comparte K_ct con C; T cree lo mismo.
+ */
+function kerberos() {
+    const C = (0, terms_1.principal)('C');
+    const T = (0, terms_1.principal)('T');
+    const S = (0, terms_1.principal)('S');
+    const N_c = (0, terms_1.nonce)('N_c');
+    const t = (0, terms_1.nonce)('t');
+    const K_cs = (0, terms_1.key)('K_cs', ['C', 'S']);
+    const K_ts = (0, terms_1.key)('K_ts', ['T', 'S']);
+    const K_ct = (0, terms_1.key)('K_ct', ['C', 'T']);
+    const goalC = (0, terms_1.believes)(C, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(C, T, K_ct));
+    const goalT = (0, terms_1.believes)(T, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(C, T, K_ct));
+    return {
+        name: 'Kerberos',
+        participants: ['C', 'T', 'S'],
+        initialAssumptions: [
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(C, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(C, S, K_cs)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(T, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(T, S, K_ts)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(C, S, K_cs)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(T, S, K_ts)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(C, (0, terms_1.controls)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(C, T, K_ct))),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(T, (0, terms_1.controls)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(C, T, K_ct))),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(S, (0, terms_1.sharedKey)(C, T, K_ct)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(C, (0, terms_1.fresh)(N_c)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(T, (0, terms_1.fresh)(t)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(C, (0, terms_1.fresh)(K_ct)),
+            (0, terms_1.believes)(T, (0, terms_1.fresh)(K_ct)),
+        ],
+        steps: [
+            // 2. S → C : { N_c, K_ct }_{K_cs}
+            { from: 'S', to: 'C', message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)((0, terms_1.message)(N_c, K_ct), K_cs) },
+            // 3. C → T : { C, K_ct }_{K_ts}
+            { from: 'C', to: 'T', message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)((0, terms_1.message)(C, K_ct), K_ts) },
+            // 3b. C → T : { t }_{K_ct}
+            { from: 'C', to: 'T', message: (0, terms_1.encrypted)(t, K_ct) },
+        ],
+        goals: [goalC, goalT],
+    };
+}
+// Exports de utilidades para referencia rápida en tests:
+exports.protocolUtils = {
+    believes: terms_1.believes,
+    sharedKey: terms_1.sharedKey,
+    publicKey: (p, k) => ({
+        kind: 'publicKey',
+        principal: p,
+        key: k,
+    }),
+    jurisdiction: terms_1.jurisdiction,
+    saidMessage: terms_1.saidMessage,
+    fresh: terms_1.fresh,
+    encrypted: terms_1.encrypted,
+    sees: terms_1.sees,
+    message: terms_1.message,
+    nonce: terms_1.nonce,
+    key: terms_1.key,
+    principal: terms_1.principal,
+    controls: terms_1.controls,
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=protocols.js.map

package/dist/reasoning/ban-logic/protocols.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/reasoning/ban-logic/rules.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+import type { BANFormula } from './types';
+/**
+ * R1 — Message-meaning (shared key).
+ *
+ * Si P cree A↔K B y P ve {X}_K, entonces P cree que A dijo X
+ * (asumiendo P ≠ originador, y la clave es genuinamente compartida
+ * solo entre A y B + posibles autoridades).
+ *
+ * Devuelve la primera derivación posible o null. La variante que enumera
+ * TODAS está en `saturate()`.
+ */
+export declare function applyMessageMeaningShared(state: ReadonlyArray<BANFormula>, beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+/**
+ * R2 — Message-meaning (public key).
+ *
+ * Si P cree |→K Q y P ve {X}_{K^-1} (cifrado con la clave privada de Q),
+ * entonces P cree que Q dijo X.
+ *
+ * Modelo: tratamos `encrypted(X, privateKey_Q)` como "Q firmó X".
+ * Convención de naming: si la clave pública se llama K, la privada
+ * compartirá el nombre con sufijo "_inv" o es identificable porque
+ * el atributo `shared` corresponde a Q.
+ *
+ * Para simplificar el motor, modelamos firma como `encrypted(X, K)` donde
+ * K es la clave pública y publicKey(Q, K). El "sentido directo" en
+ * la verdad: solo Q pudo haber producido ese ciphertext porque solo
+ * Q tiene la inversa. Así que la regla R2 dice: si P|≡|→K Q y P◁{X}_K
+ * entonces P|≡ Q|~ X. Esto es la versión "firma con clave pública".
+ */
+export declare function applyMessageMeaningPublic(state: ReadonlyArray<BANFormula>, beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+/**
+ * R3 — Message-meaning (shared secret).
+ *
+ * Si P cree A⇌Y B y P ve un mensaje compound que combina X con Y
+ * (modelo `compound([X, Y])`), entonces P cree que A dijo X.
+ */
+export declare function applyMessageMeaningSecret(state: ReadonlyArray<BANFormula>, beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+/**
+ * R4 — Nonce-verification.
+ *
+ * Si P cree que X es fresco y P cree que Q dijo X, entonces P cree
+ * que Q realmente cree X (porque sólo lo pudo haber dicho recientemente).
+ */
+export declare function applyNonceVerification(state: ReadonlyArray<BANFormula>, beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+/**
+ * R5 — Jurisdiction.
+ *
+ * Si P cree que Q tiene jurisdicción sobre X (P|≡ Q|⇒ X) y P cree
+ * que Q cree X (P|≡ Q|≡ X), entonces P cree X.
+ */
+export declare function applyJurisdiction(state: ReadonlyArray<BANFormula>, beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+/**
+ * R10 — Seeing encrypted: si P tiene la clave, ver {X}_K implica ver X.
+ */
+export declare function applySeeingEncrypted(state: ReadonlyArray<BANFormula>, beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+/**
+ * Decomposición de "ver compound": P ◁ <X1,...,Xn>  ⇒  P ◁ Xi  (todos).
+ * Devuelve la primera Xi que NO esté ya en state (para evitar duplicados).
+ */
+export declare function applySeesCompound(state: ReadonlyArray<BANFormula>, beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+/**
+ * Belief-conjunction descomposición.
+ */
+export declare function applyBeliefConjunction(beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+export declare function applyBeliefConjunctionRight(beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+/**
+ * Said-conjunction descomposición.
+ */
+export declare function applySaidConjunction(beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+/**
+ * Propagación de frescura: si P|≡#X y X aparece dentro de un compound C
+ * que está en state, entonces P|≡#C.
+ */
+export declare function applyFreshnessPropagation(state: ReadonlyArray<BANFormula>, beliefP: BANFormula): BANFormula | null;
+export declare const RULES_REGISTRY: {
+    readonly R1_messageMeaningShared: typeof applyMessageMeaningShared;
+    readonly R2_messageMeaningPublic: typeof applyMessageMeaningPublic;
+    readonly R3_messageMeaningSecret: typeof applyMessageMeaningSecret;
+    readonly R4_nonceVerification: typeof applyNonceVerification;
+    readonly R5_jurisdiction: typeof applyJurisdiction;
+    readonly R10_seeingEncrypted: typeof applySeeingEncrypted;
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=rules.d.ts.map

package/dist/reasoning/ban-logic/rules.d.ts.map

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