@skrr-ai/cli 0.1.49 → 0.1.50

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/cliHandoffWire.js

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/**
+ * cliHandoffWire.ts — the ONE declaration of the CLI↔daemon hand-off wire
+ * contracts, shared by the daemon (writer/server) and the CLI (reader).
+ *
+ * Two contracts live here:
+ *
+ *   1. The hand-off descriptor file (`descriptor.json` on Dedicated guests,
+ *      `daemon-island.<profile>.json` on laptops). Until now the shape was
+ *      declared twice — `DedicatedCliHandoffDescriptor` daemon-side and
+ *      `LocalBootstrap` CLI-side — two type declarations for one file format,
+ *      the same drift disease `sessionPermissionAuthority` fixed.
+ *   2. The broker-mode redeem exchange: `POST /v1/auth/cli-handoff-token`
+ *      request/response plus its error codes.
+ *
+ * Readers stay loose (unknown fields ignored, absent `handoffModes` reads as
+ * refresh-family-only) so a new field never breaks an older peer; writers
+ * must produce the full shape.
+ */
+/**
+ * What a caller may redeem the descriptor secret for.
+ *  - `refresh_family`: the legacy durable mint (90-day cli-scope family).
+ *  - `access_token`:   broker mode — a short-lived access token from a
+ *                      daemon-owned family; nothing durable leaves the daemon.
+ */
+export const CLI_HANDOFF_MODES = ['refresh_family', 'access_token'];
+/** Broker-mode redeem route on the daemon's loopback server. */
+export const CLI_HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATH = '/v1/auth/cli-handoff-token';
+/** Error codes this contract emits. String literals so both ends compare
+ *  without importing a symbol they may not have. */
+export const CLI_HANDOFF_TOKEN_ERROR_UNAVAILABLE = 'HANDOFF_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE';
+/** Emitted by the LEGACY /v1/auth/cli-handoff route when a hand-off-secret
+ *  caller asks for a refresh family the daemon no longer mints for it. */
+export const CLI_HANDOFF_ERROR_BROKER_ONLY = 'HANDOFF_BROKER_ONLY';
+/**
+ * Parse an untrusted descriptor JSON value. Returns null when the fields the
+ * caller cannot proceed without — host, port, secret — are absent or
+ * mistyped. Unknown fields and future `version` values are tolerated: the
+ * reader ignores them, which is what makes additive evolution safe.
+ */
+export function parseCliHandoffDescriptor(value) {
+    if (value == null || typeof value !== 'object')
+        return null;
+    const v = value;
+    if (typeof v.host !== 'string' || v.host.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    if (typeof v.port !== 'number' || !Number.isInteger(v.port) || v.port <= 0)
+        return null;
+    if (typeof v.secret !== 'string' || v.secret.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    return {
+        ...(typeof v.version === 'number' ? { version: v.version } : {}),
+        ...(typeof v.pid === 'number' ? { pid: v.pid } : {}),
+        ...(typeof v.daemonId === 'string' ? { daemonId: v.daemonId } : {}),
+        host: v.host,
+        port: v.port,
+        secret: v.secret,
+        ...(typeof v.serverUrl === 'string' ? { serverUrl: v.serverUrl } : {}),
+        ...(typeof v.epoch === 'number' ? { epoch: v.epoch } : {}),
+        ...(Array.isArray(v.handoffModes)
+            ? { handoffModes: normalizeHandoffModes(v.handoffModes) }
+            : {}),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Untrusted `handoffModes` input → known literals only, deduped. An
+ * unrecognized future mode is dropped rather than widening by coercion.
+ */
+export function normalizeHandoffModes(value) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(value))
+        return [];
+    const out = [];
+    for (const m of value) {
+        if (CLI_HANDOFF_MODES.includes(m) &&
+            !out.includes(m)) {
+            out.push(m);
+        }
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * The versioned-default rule: a descriptor that never declares modes offers
+ * only the durable mint it has always offered. Mode negotiation is purely
+ * additive — a daemon advertises the new mode, it never un-advertises the
+ * old one by accident.
+ */
+export function advertisedHandoffModes(d) {
+    const declared = normalizeHandoffModes(d.handoffModes);
+    return declared.length > 0 ? declared : ['refresh_family'];
+}
+export function descriptorOffersAccessToken(d) {
+    return advertisedHandoffModes(d).includes('access_token');
+}
+/** Parse the redeem response; null when the token itself is absent. */
+export function parseCliHandoffTokenResponse(value) {
+    if (value == null || typeof value !== 'object')
+        return null;
+    const v = value;
+    if (typeof v.accessToken !== 'string' || v.accessToken.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    return {
+        accessToken: v.accessToken,
+        ...(typeof v.accessExpiresAt === 'number' ? { accessExpiresAt: v.accessExpiresAt } : {}),
+        ...(typeof v.serverUrl === 'string' ? { serverUrl: v.serverUrl } : {}),
+    };
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/credentialSession.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/**
+ * credentialSession.ts — the shared credential-lifecycle kernel (policy half).
+ *
+ * A credential lifecycle is policy × mechanism. The policy — serve a cached
+ * token until its expiry-skew window, collapse concurrent acquires onto one
+ * in-flight operation, invalidate on a resource-side 401 — is identical for
+ * every surface and was being re-implemented per consumer (task token-broker,
+ * delegated-cli redemption, the human CLI refresh path). The mechanism —
+ * WHERE the durable secret lives and HOW a token is acquired — legitimately
+ * differs (in-memory daemon family vs file+envelope+lock vs loopback redeem)
+ * and stays behind the `acquire` seam.
+ *
+ * Deliberately thin: no persistence, no retry policy, no logging. Callers
+ * own their store and their error surfaces; this owns the cache/single-
+ * flight/invalidate invariants so they cannot drift between surfaces.
+ */
+/** What an acquire returns. `expiresAtMs` absent means "no known expiry" —
+ *  the token is served until `invalidate()` or an acquire replaces it. */
+export interface AcquiredCredential {
+    accessToken: string;
+    /** Absolute expiry in ms since epoch, when the issuer tells us. */
+    expiresAtMs?: number;
+}
+export interface CredentialSessionOptions {
+    /**
+     * The mechanism. Called with `forceRefresh: true` when the caller asked to
+     * bypass the cache (the 401-recovery path) — implementations should renew
+     * rather than serve their own cache. A rejected promise propagates to every
+     * waiter and is never cached.
+     */
+    acquire: (forceRefresh: boolean) => Promise<AcquiredCredential>;
+    /** Serve the cached token until this many ms before expiry. Default 30s. */
+    skewMs?: number;
+    /** Injectable clock for tests. */
+    now?: () => number;
+}
+export interface CredentialSession {
+    /**
+     * Resolves a usable access token: the cached one while it is inside its
+     * freshness window, otherwise a single shared acquire. `forceRefresh`
+     * discards the cache first (use after a resource 401).
+     */
+    getToken(forceRefresh?: boolean): Promise<string>;
+    /** Drop the cached token; the next getToken() acquires. */
+    invalidate(): void;
+}
+export declare function createCredentialSession(opts: CredentialSessionOptions): CredentialSession;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/credentialSession.js

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/**
+ * credentialSession.ts — the shared credential-lifecycle kernel (policy half).
+ *
+ * A credential lifecycle is policy × mechanism. The policy — serve a cached
+ * token until its expiry-skew window, collapse concurrent acquires onto one
+ * in-flight operation, invalidate on a resource-side 401 — is identical for
+ * every surface and was being re-implemented per consumer (task token-broker,
+ * delegated-cli redemption, the human CLI refresh path). The mechanism —
+ * WHERE the durable secret lives and HOW a token is acquired — legitimately
+ * differs (in-memory daemon family vs file+envelope+lock vs loopback redeem)
+ * and stays behind the `acquire` seam.
+ *
+ * Deliberately thin: no persistence, no retry policy, no logging. Callers
+ * own their store and their error surfaces; this owns the cache/single-
+ * flight/invalidate invariants so they cannot drift between surfaces.
+ */
+const DEFAULT_SKEW_MS = 30_000;
+export function createCredentialSession(opts) {
+    const skewMs = opts.skewMs ?? DEFAULT_SKEW_MS;
+    const now = opts.now ?? Date.now;
+    let cached = null;
+    let inFlight = null;
+    let inFlightForced = false;
+    // Monotonic generation so a superseded in-flight acquire (a forceRefresh
+    // launched while a plain acquire was still running) cannot write its stale
+    // result back over the newer one.
+    let generation = 0;
+    const fresh = (t) => t.expiresAtMs == null || now() < t.expiresAtMs - skewMs;
+    const acquireShared = (force) => {
+        // A forced acquire must not join a non-forced in-flight one — that would
+        // serve the very credential a 401 just invalidated. A forced in-flight
+        // DOES satisfy non-forced waiters: it is already renewing.
+        if (inFlight && (inFlightForced || !force))
+            return inFlight;
+        const gen = ++generation;
+        const p = opts.acquire(force).then((t) => {
+            if (gen === generation)
+                cached = t;
+            return t;
+        });
+        inFlight = p;
+        inFlightForced = force;
+        // `then(cleanup, cleanup)` not `.finally(cleanup)`: finally propagates the
+        // rejection into a derived promise nobody awaits — an unhandledRejection.
+        const cleanup = () => {
+            if (inFlight === p) {
+                inFlight = null;
+                inFlightForced = false;
+            }
+        };
+        p.then(cleanup, cleanup);
+        return p;
+    };
+    return {
+        async getToken(forceRefresh = false) {
+            if (forceRefresh)
+                cached = null;
+            if (cached && fresh(cached))
+                return cached.accessToken;
+            return (await acquireShared(forceRefresh)).accessToken;
+        },
+        invalidate() {
+            cached = null;
+        },
+    };
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/daemonToolApproval.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/**
+ * Server-attested tool approval (OSK-11975 follow-up to the `manual` mode
+ * refusal on `daemon:tool:request`).
+ *
+ * A daemon category in `manual` mode means "a PERSON approves each call". On
+ * the harness-session path the daemon asks through the permission bridge; on
+ * the daemon-tool path a cloud agent's call used to be refused outright,
+ * because the request carried no approval and there was no channel back to a
+ * person. The attested-approval protocol closes that gap without weakening
+ * the guarantee:
+ *
+ *   1. The daemon announces `daemon_tool_attested_approval_v1` and its
+ *      resolved per-category posture (`toolPermissionModes`) at register time.
+ *   2. Before proxying a call, the server reads the announced posture for the
+ *      tool's category. `manual` means it must ask first — through the same
+ *      permission surface (`canUseTool` → `permission:request`) an in-process
+ *      SDK turn would have used — and only then dispatch, carrying an
+ *      `attestedApproval` object on the request.
+ *   3. The daemon verifies the attestation's SHAPE and BINDING — it is bound
+ *      to this exact (toolUseId, toolName, toolInput digest) and expires
+ *      quickly — and allows the call. A missing or malformed attestation gets
+ *      the same named refusal as before.
+ *
+ * What the daemon verifies is the binding, not the server's honesty: the
+ * request already arrives over the daemon's authenticated server channel, so
+ * the field IS the attestation. What the binding buys is that the model —
+ * which authors `toolInput` — cannot mint an approval, and an approval for
+ * one call cannot be replayed onto another.
+ */
+/** Announced by a daemon that honours `attestedApproval` on daemon:tool:request. */
+export declare const DAEMON_TOOL_ATTESTED_APPROVAL_CAPABILITY = "daemon_tool_attested_approval_v1";
+/**
+ * Announced by a daemon that honours `toolPosture: 'read_only'` on
+ * daemon:tool:request — the daemon-tool-path expression of the wire `plan`
+ * session mode: reads run, every mutating category is refused with a named
+ * reason. Carries INTENT like `browserPolicy: 'read_only'` — the daemon owns
+ * what read-only means, so the server cannot widen the fence by shipping a
+ * wider value.
+ */
+export declare const DAEMON_TOOL_READ_ONLY_CAPABILITY = "daemon_tool_read_only_v1";
+/**
+ * Tool categories the daemon recognizes for permission purposes. This is the
+ * wire vocabulary the daemon's announced `toolPermissionModes` is keyed on —
+ * shared so the server's pre-dispatch check and the daemon's own enforcement
+ * classify a tool name identically (a third map was exactly the drift this
+ * package exists to prevent).
+ */
+export type DaemonToolCategory = 'read' | 'write' | 'bash' | 'browser' | 'claude_session' | 'native_ui';
+export declare const DAEMON_TOOL_CATEGORIES: readonly DaemonToolCategory[];
+/** Map a tool name to its category. Unknown tools take the restrictive answer. */
+export declare function categoryForDaemonTool(toolName: string): DaemonToolCategory;
+/**
+ * The posture a daemon announces per category for the daemon-tool path:
+ *  - `auto`      — the call runs once guardrails pass; no attestation needed
+ *  - `manual`    — the call needs a person; the server must attach a fresh
+ *                  `attestedApproval` or the daemon refuses it
+ *  - `delegated` — the category's own policy decides per action (browser,
+ *                  native UI); asking up front would ask the wrong question
+ */
+export type DaemonToolPathPosture = 'auto' | 'manual' | 'delegated';
+export type DaemonToolPermissionModes = Readonly<Partial<Record<DaemonToolCategory, DaemonToolPathPosture>>>;
+/** The wire field values `toolPosture` accepts. Unknown values must be ignored. */
+export type DaemonToolPosture = 'read_only';
+/**
+ * How long an attestation stays valid. Short: it answers ONE person, about
+ * THIS call, moments ago — it is not a standing grant. The server asks and
+ * dispatches back-to-back, so the window only has to outlive publish latency.
+ */
+export declare const ATTESTED_TOOL_APPROVAL_TTL_MS: number;
+export interface AttestedToolApproval {
+    v: 1;
+    /** Binds the approval to this exact call — a different call gets nothing. */
+    toolUseId: string;
+    toolName: string;
+    /** SHA-256 of the canonical tool input (see `canonicalToolInputDigest`). */
+    inputSha256: string;
+    /** Who answered on the server's permission surface. */
+    decidedBy: 'user';
+    issuedAt: number;
+    expiresAt: number;
+}
+/** The digest both sides compute over `toolInput`. */
+export declare function canonicalToolInputDigest(toolInput: unknown): string;
+/** Server side: mint the attestation after a person approved THIS call. */
+export declare function mintAttestedToolApproval(args: {
+    toolUseId: string;
+    toolName: string;
+    toolInput: unknown;
+    now?: number;
+    ttlMs?: number;
+}): AttestedToolApproval;
+export type AttestedToolApprovalVerdict = {
+    ok: true;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    reason: 'absent' | 'malformed' | 'binding' | 'expired';
+};
+/**
+ * Daemon side: verify an attestation against the call it claims to approve.
+ * Untrusted wire input — every field is checked, and any mismatch is a plain
+ * "no approval", never a partial credit. `reason` is for daemon logs; the
+ * refusal text stays generic so a probing caller learns nothing new.
+ */
+export declare function verifyAttestedToolApproval(approval: unknown, call: {
+    toolUseId: string;
+    toolName: string;
+    toolInput: unknown;
+    now?: number;
+}): AttestedToolApprovalVerdict;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/daemonToolApproval.js

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+/**
+ * Server-attested tool approval (OSK-11975 follow-up to the `manual` mode
+ * refusal on `daemon:tool:request`).
+ *
+ * A daemon category in `manual` mode means "a PERSON approves each call". On
+ * the harness-session path the daemon asks through the permission bridge; on
+ * the daemon-tool path a cloud agent's call used to be refused outright,
+ * because the request carried no approval and there was no channel back to a
+ * person. The attested-approval protocol closes that gap without weakening
+ * the guarantee:
+ *
+ *   1. The daemon announces `daemon_tool_attested_approval_v1` and its
+ *      resolved per-category posture (`toolPermissionModes`) at register time.
+ *   2. Before proxying a call, the server reads the announced posture for the
+ *      tool's category. `manual` means it must ask first — through the same
+ *      permission surface (`canUseTool` → `permission:request`) an in-process
+ *      SDK turn would have used — and only then dispatch, carrying an
+ *      `attestedApproval` object on the request.
+ *   3. The daemon verifies the attestation's SHAPE and BINDING — it is bound
+ *      to this exact (toolUseId, toolName, toolInput digest) and expires
+ *      quickly — and allows the call. A missing or malformed attestation gets
+ *      the same named refusal as before.
+ *
+ * What the daemon verifies is the binding, not the server's honesty: the
+ * request already arrives over the daemon's authenticated server channel, so
+ * the field IS the attestation. What the binding buys is that the model —
+ * which authors `toolInput` — cannot mint an approval, and an approval for
+ * one call cannot be replayed onto another.
+ */
+/** Announced by a daemon that honours `attestedApproval` on daemon:tool:request. */
+export const DAEMON_TOOL_ATTESTED_APPROVAL_CAPABILITY = 'daemon_tool_attested_approval_v1';
+/**
+ * Announced by a daemon that honours `toolPosture: 'read_only'` on
+ * daemon:tool:request — the daemon-tool-path expression of the wire `plan`
+ * session mode: reads run, every mutating category is refused with a named
+ * reason. Carries INTENT like `browserPolicy: 'read_only'` — the daemon owns
+ * what read-only means, so the server cannot widen the fence by shipping a
+ * wider value.
+ */
+export const DAEMON_TOOL_READ_ONLY_CAPABILITY = 'daemon_tool_read_only_v1';
+export const DAEMON_TOOL_CATEGORIES = [
+    'read',
+    'write',
+    'bash',
+    'browser',
+    'claude_session',
+    'native_ui',
+];
+/** Map a tool name to its category. Unknown tools take the restrictive answer. */
+export function categoryForDaemonTool(toolName) {
+    switch (String(toolName || '').toLowerCase()) {
+        case 'read':
+        case 'glob':
+        case 'grep':
+        case 'filetransferread':
+            return 'read';
+        case 'write':
+        case 'edit':
+        case 'multiedit':
+        case 'apply_patch':
+        case 'filetransferwrite':
+            return 'write';
+        // Reading or stopping a background command is part of running it.
+        case 'bash':
+        case 'taskoutput':
+        case 'taskstop':
+            return 'bash';
+        case 'browser':
+            return 'browser';
+        case 'native':
+            return 'native_ui';
+        case 'claude_session':
+        case 'claude-session':
+            return 'claude_session';
+        default:
+            return 'write';
+    }
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Attested approval
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * How long an attestation stays valid. Short: it answers ONE person, about
+ * THIS call, moments ago — it is not a standing grant. The server asks and
+ * dispatches back-to-back, so the window only has to outlive publish latency.
+ */
+export const ATTESTED_TOOL_APPROVAL_TTL_MS = 60 * 1000;
+/**
+ * Deterministic serialization for the input digest: objects sort keys
+ * recursively, arrays keep order, non-JSON values normalize the way
+ * `JSON.stringify` would emit them (undefined/functions in objects drop, in
+ * arrays become null). Both runtimes must digest the SAME bytes — the server
+ * mints and the daemon verifies — so this lives here, once.
+ */
+function canonicalJson(value) {
+    if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') {
+        if (value === undefined || typeof value === 'function' || typeof value === 'symbol') {
+            return 'null';
+        }
+        return JSON.stringify(value);
+    }
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        return `[${value.map((entry) => canonicalJson(entry)).join(',')}]`;
+    }
+    const record = value;
+    const keys = Object.keys(record).filter((key) => record[key] !== undefined &&
+        typeof record[key] !== 'function' &&
+        typeof record[key] !== 'symbol');
+    keys.sort();
+    return `{${keys.map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJson(record[key])}`).join(',')}}`;
+}
+/** The digest both sides compute over `toolInput`. */
+export function canonicalToolInputDigest(toolInput) {
+    return createHash('sha256')
+        .update(canonicalJson(toolInput ?? {}))
+        .digest('hex');
+}
+/** Server side: mint the attestation after a person approved THIS call. */
+export function mintAttestedToolApproval(args) {
+    const now = args.now ?? Date.now();
+    return {
+        v: 1,
+        toolUseId: args.toolUseId,
+        toolName: args.toolName,
+        inputSha256: canonicalToolInputDigest(args.toolInput),
+        decidedBy: 'user',
+        issuedAt: now,
+        expiresAt: now + (args.ttlMs ?? ATTESTED_TOOL_APPROVAL_TTL_MS),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Daemon side: verify an attestation against the call it claims to approve.
+ * Untrusted wire input — every field is checked, and any mismatch is a plain
+ * "no approval", never a partial credit. `reason` is for daemon logs; the
+ * refusal text stays generic so a probing caller learns nothing new.
+ */
+export function verifyAttestedToolApproval(approval, call) {
+    if (approval === undefined || approval === null)
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'absent' };
+    if (typeof approval !== 'object' || Array.isArray(approval)) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed' };
+    }
+    const a = approval;
+    if (a.v !== 1 ||
+        typeof a.toolUseId !== 'string' ||
+        typeof a.toolName !== 'string' ||
+        typeof a.inputSha256 !== 'string' ||
+        a.decidedBy !== 'user' ||
+        typeof a.issuedAt !== 'number' ||
+        typeof a.expiresAt !== 'number') {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed' };
+    }
+    const now = call.now ?? Date.now();
+    if (a.expiresAt <= now || a.issuedAt > now + 30_000) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'expired' };
+    }
+    if (a.toolUseId !== call.toolUseId ||
+        a.toolName.toLowerCase() !== String(call.toolName).toLowerCase() ||
+        a.inputSha256 !== canonicalToolInputDigest(call.toolInput)) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'binding' };
+    }
+    return { ok: true };
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/messages.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export type AuthFailureReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'UNKNOWN_401' | 'UNKNOWN';
+export type AuthFailureReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'UNKNOWN_401' | 'UNKNOWN';
 /**
  * The command that recovers this process from a re-auth latch.
  *
@@ -11,8 +11,13 @@ export type AuthFailureReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_
  * something the other did not describe (OSK-10224).
  *
  * The binary is whatever the consumer registered with
- * `configureAuthCore({ binaryName })` — the binary the user actually typed —
- * and `--device` is added only when there is no TTY to open a browser from.
+ * `configureAuthCore({ binaryName })` — the binary the user actually typed.
+ *
+ * No flag. This used to append `--device` whenever stdout was not a TTY, which
+ * is always true for a daemon under launchd/systemd — and neither `skrrd login`
+ * nor `skrr login` has a `--device` option, so the one command the latch line
+ * named failed with `unknown option '--device'` (OSK-12056). Both logins already
+ * fall back to a paste-a-code arm when no browser can be opened.
  */
 export declare function reauthCommand(): string;
 export declare function formatReauthMessage(reason: AuthFailureReason | string): string;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/messages.js

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ const REASON_HUMAN = {
     REFRESH_REUSED: 'Your session was ended for security reasons (token replay detected).',
     REFRESH_EXPIRED: 'Your session has expired.',
     SESSION_REVOKED: 'Your session was ended (you signed out elsewhere or your password changed).',
+    DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH: "This computer's device key no longer matches the one skrr registered for it, so its session cannot be renewed.",
     TOKEN_EXPIRED: 'Your access token has expired.',
     TOKEN_INVALID: 'Your saved credentials are no longer valid.',
     UNKNOWN_401: 'skrr needs you to sign in again.',
@@ -29,12 +30,16 @@ const REASON_HUMAN = {
  * something the other did not describe (OSK-10224).
  *
  * The binary is whatever the consumer registered with
- * `configureAuthCore({ binaryName })` — the binary the user actually typed —
- * and `--device` is added only when there is no TTY to open a browser from.
+ * `configureAuthCore({ binaryName })` — the binary the user actually typed.
+ *
+ * No flag. This used to append `--device` whenever stdout was not a TTY, which
+ * is always true for a daemon under launchd/systemd — and neither `skrrd login`
+ * nor `skrr login` has a `--device` option, so the one command the latch line
+ * named failed with `unknown option '--device'` (OSK-12056). Both logins already
+ * fall back to a paste-a-code arm when no browser can be opened.
  */
 export function reauthCommand() {
-    const bin = getAuthBinaryName();
-    return process.stdout.isTTY ? `${bin} login` : `${bin} login --device`;
+    return `${getAuthBinaryName()} login`;
 }
 export function formatReauthMessage(reason) {
     const norm = REASON_HUMAN[reason] || REASON_HUMAN.UNKNOWN;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/refresh.js

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import fs from 'node:fs';
 import path from 'node:path';
 import lockfile from 'proper-lockfile';
 import { getAuthLogger, getAuthConfigDir, emitAuthTelemetry, notifyResponseObserver, } from './runtime.js';
+import { permanentReasonForRefreshCode } from './refreshClassification.js';
 import { PermanentAuthFailure, TransientAuthFailure, } from './types.js';
 /**
  * P1-6: Reduced from 30 s to 5 s.
@@ -804,14 +805,12 @@ async function doRefresh(serverUrl, currentRefreshToken, daemonId, options = {})
         catch {
             /* ignore */
         }
-        const code = parsedBody.code;
-        const permanent = [
-            'REFRESH_INVALID',
-            'REFRESH_REUSED',
-            'REFRESH_EXPIRED',
-            'SESSION_REVOKED',
-        ];
-        if (code && permanent.includes(code)) {
+        // The server's code, mapped through the one table the stateless classifier
+        // reads too — so a permanent refusal that is not spelled as a reason name
+        // (DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH) latches instead of riding the
+        // unknown-401 budget forever (OSK-12056).
+        const code = permanentReasonForRefreshCode(parsedBody.code);
+        if (code) {
             // A KNOWN credential-death code is genuinely permanent — latch
             // immediately, exactly as before. It is NOT routed through the
             // unknown-401 budget.
@@ -841,7 +840,7 @@ async function doRefresh(serverUrl, currentRefreshToken, daemonId, options = {})
         }
         // Unknown-shape 401 — unknown code, missing code, or unparseable body.
         // By construction this is NOT a daemon's actual refresh-family burn
-        // (those arrive as one of the four KNOWN codes above); it most likely
+        // (those arrive as one of the KNOWN codes above); it most likely
         // came from infra OverSky does not fully control — a proxy/middleware
         // regression, a clock-skew replay rejection (DEVICE_PROOF_REPLAYED),
         // or a half-rolled-out server route.

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/refreshClassification.d.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ export interface ClassifiedRefreshFailure {
     failure: PermanentAuthFailure | TransientAuthFailure;
 }
 export type ClassifiedRefreshResult = ClassifiedRefreshSuccess | ClassifiedRefreshFailure;
+/**
+ * The permanent reason a 401 refresh refusal's `code` names, or `null` when the
+ * code is missing or unrecognised (an unknown-shape 401). The ONE mapping both
+ * this classifier and the daemon's `refresh.ts` read.
+ */
+export declare function permanentReasonForRefreshCode(code: string | undefined | null): PermanentAuthReason | null;
 /**
  * Classify an HTTP response from /api/auth/refresh (or /api/daemons/token/refresh)
  * into a discriminated union of success or failure.

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/refreshClassification.js

@@ -33,6 +33,33 @@ const PERMANENT_CODE_SET = new Set([
     'REFRESH_EXPIRED',
     'SESSION_REVOKED',
 ]);
+/**
+ * Server refusal codes that are permanent but are not themselves reason names.
+ *
+ * `DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH` (`daemonRefreshTokens.verifyDeviceProofPinForRow`)
+ * means the proof was signed by a key other than the one enrolled on the daemon's
+ * row. Every retry is signed by the same key, so it can never succeed — but
+ * because it was not in the set above it fell through to the unknown-401 path,
+ * where a daemon retrying on a five-minute cadence never exhausted its budget:
+ * one laptop logged 741 "transient, retrying" refusals over four days, and the
+ * reason it eventually surfaced was `UNKNOWN_401` (OSK-12056).
+ */
+const PERMANENT_CODE_ALIASES = {
+    REFRESH_MISSING: 'REFRESH_INVALID',
+    DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH: 'DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH',
+};
+/**
+ * The permanent reason a 401 refresh refusal's `code` names, or `null` when the
+ * code is missing or unrecognised (an unknown-shape 401). The ONE mapping both
+ * this classifier and the daemon's `refresh.ts` read.
+ */
+export function permanentReasonForRefreshCode(code) {
+    if (!code)
+        return null;
+    if (PERMANENT_CODE_SET.has(code))
+        return code;
+    return PERMANENT_CODE_ALIASES[code] ?? null;
+}
 /**
  * Classify an HTTP response from /api/auth/refresh (or /api/daemons/token/refresh)
  * into a discriminated union of success or failure.
@@ -65,17 +92,12 @@ export function classifyRefreshResponse(status, body) {
     }
     // 401 — auth failure; check for known permanent code
     if (status === 401) {
-        if (body?.code === 'REFRESH_MISSING') {
-            return {
-                kind: 'failure',
-                failure: new PermanentAuthFailure('REFRESH_INVALID', body.message ?? 'Refresh token missing'),
-            };
-        }
-        const code = body?.code;
-        if (code && PERMANENT_CODE_SET.has(code)) {
+        const reason = permanentReasonForRefreshCode(body?.code);
+        if (reason) {
+            const fallback = body?.code === 'REFRESH_MISSING' ? 'Refresh token missing' : reason;
             return {
                 kind: 'failure',
-                failure: new PermanentAuthFailure(code, body?.message ?? code),
+                failure: new PermanentAuthFailure(reason, body?.message ?? fallback),
             };
         }
         // Unknown-shape 401 (no code, or a code we don't recognise). This is NOT a