@skrr-ai/cli 0.1.49 → 0.1.50

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/daemonToolApproval.js

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.ATTESTED_TOOL_APPROVAL_TTL_MS = exports.DAEMON_TOOL_CATEGORIES = exports.DAEMON_TOOL_READ_ONLY_CAPABILITY = exports.DAEMON_TOOL_ATTESTED_APPROVAL_CAPABILITY = void 0;
+exports.categoryForDaemonTool = categoryForDaemonTool;
+exports.canonicalToolInputDigest = canonicalToolInputDigest;
+exports.mintAttestedToolApproval = mintAttestedToolApproval;
+exports.verifyAttestedToolApproval = verifyAttestedToolApproval;
+const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto");
+/**
+ * Server-attested tool approval (OSK-11975 follow-up to the `manual` mode
+ * refusal on `daemon:tool:request`).
+ *
+ * A daemon category in `manual` mode means "a PERSON approves each call". On
+ * the harness-session path the daemon asks through the permission bridge; on
+ * the daemon-tool path a cloud agent's call used to be refused outright,
+ * because the request carried no approval and there was no channel back to a
+ * person. The attested-approval protocol closes that gap without weakening
+ * the guarantee:
+ *
+ *   1. The daemon announces `daemon_tool_attested_approval_v1` and its
+ *      resolved per-category posture (`toolPermissionModes`) at register time.
+ *   2. Before proxying a call, the server reads the announced posture for the
+ *      tool's category. `manual` means it must ask first — through the same
+ *      permission surface (`canUseTool` → `permission:request`) an in-process
+ *      SDK turn would have used — and only then dispatch, carrying an
+ *      `attestedApproval` object on the request.
+ *   3. The daemon verifies the attestation's SHAPE and BINDING — it is bound
+ *      to this exact (toolUseId, toolName, toolInput digest) and expires
+ *      quickly — and allows the call. A missing or malformed attestation gets
+ *      the same named refusal as before.
+ *
+ * What the daemon verifies is the binding, not the server's honesty: the
+ * request already arrives over the daemon's authenticated server channel, so
+ * the field IS the attestation. What the binding buys is that the model —
+ * which authors `toolInput` — cannot mint an approval, and an approval for
+ * one call cannot be replayed onto another.
+ */
+/** Announced by a daemon that honours `attestedApproval` on daemon:tool:request. */
+exports.DAEMON_TOOL_ATTESTED_APPROVAL_CAPABILITY = 'daemon_tool_attested_approval_v1';
+/**
+ * Announced by a daemon that honours `toolPosture: 'read_only'` on
+ * daemon:tool:request — the daemon-tool-path expression of the wire `plan`
+ * session mode: reads run, every mutating category is refused with a named
+ * reason. Carries INTENT like `browserPolicy: 'read_only'` — the daemon owns
+ * what read-only means, so the server cannot widen the fence by shipping a
+ * wider value.
+ */
+exports.DAEMON_TOOL_READ_ONLY_CAPABILITY = 'daemon_tool_read_only_v1';
+exports.DAEMON_TOOL_CATEGORIES = [
+    'read',
+    'write',
+    'bash',
+    'browser',
+    'claude_session',
+    'native_ui',
+];
+/** Map a tool name to its category. Unknown tools take the restrictive answer. */
+function categoryForDaemonTool(toolName) {
+    switch (String(toolName || '').toLowerCase()) {
+        case 'read':
+        case 'glob':
+        case 'grep':
+        case 'filetransferread':
+            return 'read';
+        case 'write':
+        case 'edit':
+        case 'multiedit':
+        case 'apply_patch':
+        case 'filetransferwrite':
+            return 'write';
+        // Reading or stopping a background command is part of running it.
+        case 'bash':
+        case 'taskoutput':
+        case 'taskstop':
+            return 'bash';
+        case 'browser':
+            return 'browser';
+        case 'native':
+            return 'native_ui';
+        case 'claude_session':
+        case 'claude-session':
+            return 'claude_session';
+        default:
+            return 'write';
+    }
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Attested approval
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * How long an attestation stays valid. Short: it answers ONE person, about
+ * THIS call, moments ago — it is not a standing grant. The server asks and
+ * dispatches back-to-back, so the window only has to outlive publish latency.
+ */
+exports.ATTESTED_TOOL_APPROVAL_TTL_MS = 60 * 1000;
+/**
+ * Deterministic serialization for the input digest: objects sort keys
+ * recursively, arrays keep order, non-JSON values normalize the way
+ * `JSON.stringify` would emit them (undefined/functions in objects drop, in
+ * arrays become null). Both runtimes must digest the SAME bytes — the server
+ * mints and the daemon verifies — so this lives here, once.
+ */
+function canonicalJson(value) {
+    if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') {
+        if (value === undefined || typeof value === 'function' || typeof value === 'symbol') {
+            return 'null';
+        }
+        return JSON.stringify(value);
+    }
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        return `[${value.map((entry) => canonicalJson(entry)).join(',')}]`;
+    }
+    const record = value;
+    const keys = Object.keys(record).filter((key) => record[key] !== undefined &&
+        typeof record[key] !== 'function' &&
+        typeof record[key] !== 'symbol');
+    keys.sort();
+    return `{${keys.map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJson(record[key])}`).join(',')}}`;
+}
+/** The digest both sides compute over `toolInput`. */
+function canonicalToolInputDigest(toolInput) {
+    return (0, node_crypto_1.createHash)('sha256')
+        .update(canonicalJson(toolInput ?? {}))
+        .digest('hex');
+}
+/** Server side: mint the attestation after a person approved THIS call. */
+function mintAttestedToolApproval(args) {
+    const now = args.now ?? Date.now();
+    return {
+        v: 1,
+        toolUseId: args.toolUseId,
+        toolName: args.toolName,
+        inputSha256: canonicalToolInputDigest(args.toolInput),
+        decidedBy: 'user',
+        issuedAt: now,
+        expiresAt: now + (args.ttlMs ?? exports.ATTESTED_TOOL_APPROVAL_TTL_MS),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Daemon side: verify an attestation against the call it claims to approve.
+ * Untrusted wire input — every field is checked, and any mismatch is a plain
+ * "no approval", never a partial credit. `reason` is for daemon logs; the
+ * refusal text stays generic so a probing caller learns nothing new.
+ */
+function verifyAttestedToolApproval(approval, call) {
+    if (approval === undefined || approval === null)
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'absent' };
+    if (typeof approval !== 'object' || Array.isArray(approval)) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed' };
+    }
+    const a = approval;
+    if (a.v !== 1 ||
+        typeof a.toolUseId !== 'string' ||
+        typeof a.toolName !== 'string' ||
+        typeof a.inputSha256 !== 'string' ||
+        a.decidedBy !== 'user' ||
+        typeof a.issuedAt !== 'number' ||
+        typeof a.expiresAt !== 'number') {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed' };
+    }
+    const now = call.now ?? Date.now();
+    if (a.expiresAt <= now || a.issuedAt > now + 30_000) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'expired' };
+    }
+    if (a.toolUseId !== call.toolUseId ||
+        a.toolName.toLowerCase() !== String(call.toolName).toLowerCase() ||
+        a.inputSha256 !== canonicalToolInputDigest(call.toolInput)) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'binding' };
+    }
+    return { ok: true };
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/messages.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export type AuthFailureReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'UNKNOWN_401' | 'UNKNOWN';
+export type AuthFailureReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'UNKNOWN_401' | 'UNKNOWN';
 /**
  * The command that recovers this process from a re-auth latch.
  *
@@ -11,8 +11,13 @@ export type AuthFailureReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_
  * something the other did not describe (OSK-10224).
  *
  * The binary is whatever the consumer registered with
- * `configureAuthCore({ binaryName })` — the binary the user actually typed —
- * and `--device` is added only when there is no TTY to open a browser from.
+ * `configureAuthCore({ binaryName })` — the binary the user actually typed.
+ *
+ * No flag. This used to append `--device` whenever stdout was not a TTY, which
+ * is always true for a daemon under launchd/systemd — and neither `skrrd login`
+ * nor `skrr login` has a `--device` option, so the one command the latch line
+ * named failed with `unknown option '--device'` (OSK-12056). Both logins already
+ * fall back to a paste-a-code arm when no browser can be opened.
  */
 export declare function reauthCommand(): string;
 export declare function formatReauthMessage(reason: AuthFailureReason | string): string;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/messages.js

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ const REASON_HUMAN = {
     REFRESH_REUSED: 'Your session was ended for security reasons (token replay detected).',
     REFRESH_EXPIRED: 'Your session has expired.',
     SESSION_REVOKED: 'Your session was ended (you signed out elsewhere or your password changed).',
+    DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH: "This computer's device key no longer matches the one skrr registered for it, so its session cannot be renewed.",
     TOKEN_EXPIRED: 'Your access token has expired.',
     TOKEN_INVALID: 'Your saved credentials are no longer valid.',
     UNKNOWN_401: 'skrr needs you to sign in again.',
@@ -34,12 +35,16 @@ const REASON_HUMAN = {
  * something the other did not describe (OSK-10224).
  *
  * The binary is whatever the consumer registered with
- * `configureAuthCore({ binaryName })` — the binary the user actually typed —
- * and `--device` is added only when there is no TTY to open a browser from.
+ * `configureAuthCore({ binaryName })` — the binary the user actually typed.
+ *
+ * No flag. This used to append `--device` whenever stdout was not a TTY, which
+ * is always true for a daemon under launchd/systemd — and neither `skrrd login`
+ * nor `skrr login` has a `--device` option, so the one command the latch line
+ * named failed with `unknown option '--device'` (OSK-12056). Both logins already
+ * fall back to a paste-a-code arm when no browser can be opened.
  */
 function reauthCommand() {
-    const bin = (0, runtime_js_1.getAuthBinaryName)();
-    return process.stdout.isTTY ? `${bin} login` : `${bin} login --device`;
+    return `${(0, runtime_js_1.getAuthBinaryName)()} login`;
 }
 function formatReauthMessage(reason) {
     const norm = REASON_HUMAN[reason] || REASON_HUMAN.UNKNOWN;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/refresh.js

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ const node_fs_1 = __importDefault(require("node:fs"));
 const node_path_1 = __importDefault(require("node:path"));
 const proper_lockfile_1 = __importDefault(require("proper-lockfile"));
 const runtime_js_1 = require("./runtime.js");
+const refreshClassification_js_1 = require("./refreshClassification.js");
 const types_js_1 = require("./types.js");
 /**
  * P1-6: Reduced from 30 s to 5 s.
@@ -820,14 +821,12 @@ async function doRefresh(serverUrl, currentRefreshToken, daemonId, options = {})
         catch {
             /* ignore */
         }
-        const code = parsedBody.code;
-        const permanent = [
-            'REFRESH_INVALID',
-            'REFRESH_REUSED',
-            'REFRESH_EXPIRED',
-            'SESSION_REVOKED',
-        ];
-        if (code && permanent.includes(code)) {
+        // The server's code, mapped through the one table the stateless classifier
+        // reads too — so a permanent refusal that is not spelled as a reason name
+        // (DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH) latches instead of riding the
+        // unknown-401 budget forever (OSK-12056).
+        const code = (0, refreshClassification_js_1.permanentReasonForRefreshCode)(parsedBody.code);
+        if (code) {
             // A KNOWN credential-death code is genuinely permanent — latch
             // immediately, exactly as before. It is NOT routed through the
             // unknown-401 budget.
@@ -857,7 +856,7 @@ async function doRefresh(serverUrl, currentRefreshToken, daemonId, options = {})
         }
         // Unknown-shape 401 — unknown code, missing code, or unparseable body.
         // By construction this is NOT a daemon's actual refresh-family burn
-        // (those arrive as one of the four KNOWN codes above); it most likely
+        // (those arrive as one of the KNOWN codes above); it most likely
         // came from infra OverSky does not fully control — a proxy/middleware
         // regression, a clock-skew replay rejection (DEVICE_PROOF_REPLAYED),
         // or a half-rolled-out server route.

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/refreshClassification.d.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ export interface ClassifiedRefreshFailure {
     failure: PermanentAuthFailure | TransientAuthFailure;
 }
 export type ClassifiedRefreshResult = ClassifiedRefreshSuccess | ClassifiedRefreshFailure;
+/**
+ * The permanent reason a 401 refresh refusal's `code` names, or `null` when the
+ * code is missing or unrecognised (an unknown-shape 401). The ONE mapping both
+ * this classifier and the daemon's `refresh.ts` read.
+ */
+export declare function permanentReasonForRefreshCode(code: string | undefined | null): PermanentAuthReason | null;
 /**
  * Classify an HTTP response from /api/auth/refresh (or /api/daemons/token/refresh)
  * into a discriminated union of success or failure.

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/refreshClassification.js

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
  */
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.TransientAuthFailure = exports.PermanentAuthFailure = void 0;
+exports.permanentReasonForRefreshCode = permanentReasonForRefreshCode;
 exports.classifyRefreshResponse = classifyRefreshResponse;
 const types_js_1 = require("./types.js");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "PermanentAuthFailure", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return types_js_1.PermanentAuthFailure; } });
@@ -32,6 +33,33 @@ const PERMANENT_CODE_SET = new Set([
     'REFRESH_EXPIRED',
     'SESSION_REVOKED',
 ]);
+/**
+ * Server refusal codes that are permanent but are not themselves reason names.
+ *
+ * `DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH` (`daemonRefreshTokens.verifyDeviceProofPinForRow`)
+ * means the proof was signed by a key other than the one enrolled on the daemon's
+ * row. Every retry is signed by the same key, so it can never succeed — but
+ * because it was not in the set above it fell through to the unknown-401 path,
+ * where a daemon retrying on a five-minute cadence never exhausted its budget:
+ * one laptop logged 741 "transient, retrying" refusals over four days, and the
+ * reason it eventually surfaced was `UNKNOWN_401` (OSK-12056).
+ */
+const PERMANENT_CODE_ALIASES = {
+    REFRESH_MISSING: 'REFRESH_INVALID',
+    DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH: 'DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH',
+};
+/**
+ * The permanent reason a 401 refresh refusal's `code` names, or `null` when the
+ * code is missing or unrecognised (an unknown-shape 401). The ONE mapping both
+ * this classifier and the daemon's `refresh.ts` read.
+ */
+function permanentReasonForRefreshCode(code) {
+    if (!code)
+        return null;
+    if (PERMANENT_CODE_SET.has(code))
+        return code;
+    return PERMANENT_CODE_ALIASES[code] ?? null;
+}
 /**
  * Classify an HTTP response from /api/auth/refresh (or /api/daemons/token/refresh)
  * into a discriminated union of success or failure.
@@ -64,17 +92,12 @@ function classifyRefreshResponse(status, body) {
     }
     // 401 — auth failure; check for known permanent code
     if (status === 401) {
-        if (body?.code === 'REFRESH_MISSING') {
-            return {
-                kind: 'failure',
-                failure: new types_js_1.PermanentAuthFailure('REFRESH_INVALID', body.message ?? 'Refresh token missing'),
-            };
-        }
-        const code = body?.code;
-        if (code && PERMANENT_CODE_SET.has(code)) {
+        const reason = permanentReasonForRefreshCode(body?.code);
+        if (reason) {
+            const fallback = body?.code === 'REFRESH_MISSING' ? 'Refresh token missing' : reason;
             return {
                 kind: 'failure',
-                failure: new types_js_1.PermanentAuthFailure(code, body?.message ?? code),
+                failure: new types_js_1.PermanentAuthFailure(reason, body?.message ?? fallback),
             };
         }
         // Unknown-shape 401 (no code, or a code we don't recognise). This is NOT a

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/sessionPermissionAuthority.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/**
+ * Session permission authority — the ONE rule that decides whether a session's
+ * execution contract governs the run's permissions, shared by the server and
+ * the daemon (OSK-11975 introduced it; it was implemented twice — the server
+ * read `kind !== 'commitment'`, the daemon read the `permissionSource` marker —
+ * which is exactly how a new contract kind or a new source value would drift
+ * them apart).
+ *
+ * The wire model:
+ *
+ *   - The contract is closed (`hasOnlyKeys` on the daemon), so "whose
+ *     permissions govern" can never ride INSIDE it. It is a top-level session
+ *     field: `permissionSource`.
+ *   - `'agent'` means the Agent's own configured permission mode, tool policy,
+ *     Grants, session env, MCP servers and machine consent govern the run,
+ *     exactly as for an unattended Task of the same Agent. Today only a
+ *     `commitment` contract may carry it.
+ *   - A `commitment` contract WITHOUT the marker (an older server mid-deploy)
+ *     still governs permissions — the marker is the version signal, so its
+ *     absence must keep the legacy fence, not silently lift it.
+ *   - `task_delivery` contracts always govern, marker or not.
+ *
+ * Server vs daemon asymmetry, on purpose: the server STAMPS the marker
+ * (`permissionSourceForContract`), so on its own side the predicate reduces to
+ * "a commitment never governs" — `contractGovernsPermissions(c,
+ * permissionSourceForContract(c))` is exactly `kind !== 'commitment'`. The
+ * daemon reads the marker it received, because it cannot distinguish "new
+ * server, agent permissions" from "old server, contract fence" any other way.
+ * Both call the same function; only the input differs.
+ */
+/** The wire vocabulary for `permissionSource`. Top-level session field. */
+export declare const SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES: readonly ["agent"];
+export type SessionPermissionSource = (typeof SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES)[number];
+/**
+ * The daemon capability that proves a build honours `permissionSource`. The
+ * server announces it in preflight and refuses to dispatch a Commitment Run to
+ * a daemon without it (`COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED`), so
+ * the marker never reaches a daemon that would ignore it.
+ */
+export declare const COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_CAPABILITY = "commitment_execution_contract_v2_agent_permissions";
+/**
+ * The minimal contract shape this rule reads. The predicate only ever needs
+ * `kind` — keeping the input structural means this module never imports the
+ * full `CommitmentExecutionContract` type, which lives daemon-side
+ * (`daemon/src/commitment-execution-contract.ts`) and server-side in the
+ * commitment services.
+ */
+export type PermissionContractKind = {
+    kind?: unknown;
+} | null | undefined;
+/**
+ * Untrusted wire input: anything but an exact vocabulary literal reads as
+ * absent. Never widen by coercion — an unrecognized future value must degrade
+ * to "contract governs", the conservative answer.
+ */
+export declare function normalizeSessionPermissionSource(value: unknown): SessionPermissionSource | undefined;
+/**
+ * What the server stamps on the wire for this contract. A `commitment`
+ * contract no longer carries permissions (OSK-11975); every other contract
+ * kind keeps its own authority and stamps nothing.
+ */
+export declare function permissionSourceForContract(contract: PermissionContractKind): SessionPermissionSource | undefined;
+/**
+ * Whether the contract is the run's PERMISSION authority — the single place
+ * this rule lives.
+ *
+ * True for a non-commitment contract regardless of marker, and for a
+ * commitment whose server did not declare agent permissions. False for no
+ * contract at all, and for a commitment carrying `permissionSource: 'agent'`,
+ * which then follows the Agent's own permissions exactly as a Task does while
+ * the contract keeps its non-permission roles (normalized shape, ephemeral
+ * worktree, result validation, `GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS`, provider restriction).
+ */
+export declare function contractGovernsPermissions(contract: PermissionContractKind, permissionSource: unknown): boolean;
+/**
+ * The contract when it governs permissions, else `undefined` — for the sites
+ * that used `executionContract` as "is this run permission-fenced".
+ */
+export declare function permissionGoverningContract<T extends {
+    kind?: unknown;
+}>(contract: T | null | undefined, permissionSource: unknown): T | undefined;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/sessionPermissionAuthority.js

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Session permission authority — the ONE rule that decides whether a session's
+ * execution contract governs the run's permissions, shared by the server and
+ * the daemon (OSK-11975 introduced it; it was implemented twice — the server
+ * read `kind !== 'commitment'`, the daemon read the `permissionSource` marker —
+ * which is exactly how a new contract kind or a new source value would drift
+ * them apart).
+ *
+ * The wire model:
+ *
+ *   - The contract is closed (`hasOnlyKeys` on the daemon), so "whose
+ *     permissions govern" can never ride INSIDE it. It is a top-level session
+ *     field: `permissionSource`.
+ *   - `'agent'` means the Agent's own configured permission mode, tool policy,
+ *     Grants, session env, MCP servers and machine consent govern the run,
+ *     exactly as for an unattended Task of the same Agent. Today only a
+ *     `commitment` contract may carry it.
+ *   - A `commitment` contract WITHOUT the marker (an older server mid-deploy)
+ *     still governs permissions — the marker is the version signal, so its
+ *     absence must keep the legacy fence, not silently lift it.
+ *   - `task_delivery` contracts always govern, marker or not.
+ *
+ * Server vs daemon asymmetry, on purpose: the server STAMPS the marker
+ * (`permissionSourceForContract`), so on its own side the predicate reduces to
+ * "a commitment never governs" — `contractGovernsPermissions(c,
+ * permissionSourceForContract(c))` is exactly `kind !== 'commitment'`. The
+ * daemon reads the marker it received, because it cannot distinguish "new
+ * server, agent permissions" from "old server, contract fence" any other way.
+ * Both call the same function; only the input differs.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_CAPABILITY = exports.SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES = void 0;
+exports.normalizeSessionPermissionSource = normalizeSessionPermissionSource;
+exports.permissionSourceForContract = permissionSourceForContract;
+exports.contractGovernsPermissions = contractGovernsPermissions;
+exports.permissionGoverningContract = permissionGoverningContract;
+/** The wire vocabulary for `permissionSource`. Top-level session field. */
+exports.SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES = ['agent'];
+/**
+ * The daemon capability that proves a build honours `permissionSource`. The
+ * server announces it in preflight and refuses to dispatch a Commitment Run to
+ * a daemon without it (`COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED`), so
+ * the marker never reaches a daemon that would ignore it.
+ */
+exports.COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_CAPABILITY = 'commitment_execution_contract_v2_agent_permissions';
+/**
+ * Untrusted wire input: anything but an exact vocabulary literal reads as
+ * absent. Never widen by coercion — an unrecognized future value must degrade
+ * to "contract governs", the conservative answer.
+ */
+function normalizeSessionPermissionSource(value) {
+    return exports.SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES.includes(value)
+        ? value
+        : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * What the server stamps on the wire for this contract. A `commitment`
+ * contract no longer carries permissions (OSK-11975); every other contract
+ * kind keeps its own authority and stamps nothing.
+ */
+function permissionSourceForContract(contract) {
+    return contract?.kind === 'commitment' ? 'agent' : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Whether the contract is the run's PERMISSION authority — the single place
+ * this rule lives.
+ *
+ * True for a non-commitment contract regardless of marker, and for a
+ * commitment whose server did not declare agent permissions. False for no
+ * contract at all, and for a commitment carrying `permissionSource: 'agent'`,
+ * which then follows the Agent's own permissions exactly as a Task does while
+ * the contract keeps its non-permission roles (normalized shape, ephemeral
+ * worktree, result validation, `GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS`, provider restriction).
+ */
+function contractGovernsPermissions(contract, permissionSource) {
+    if (!contract)
+        return false;
+    return !(contract.kind === 'commitment' && normalizeSessionPermissionSource(permissionSource) === 'agent');
+}
+/**
+ * The contract when it governs permissions, else `undefined` — for the sites
+ * that used `executionContract` as "is this run permission-fenced".
+ */
+function permissionGoverningContract(contract, permissionSource) {
+    return contract && contractGovernsPermissions(contract, permissionSource) ? contract : undefined;
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/types.d.ts

@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ export interface TokenPair {
  *   - TOKEN_*         — access-token specific (server pushes 4402 close;
  *                       daemon classifies as TOKEN_INVALID/TOKEN_EXPIRED).
  *   - SESSION_REVOKED — admin/forensic revoke; whole family burned.
+ *   - DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH — the refresh carried a device proof signed by a key
+ *                       other than the one enrolled on this daemon's row
+ *                       (server code `DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH`).
+ *                       The daemon signs every retry with the same key, so
+ *                       retrying can never succeed.
  *   - UNKNOWN_401     — server returned 401 with a code we don't
  *                       recognize. Treated as permanent (better to prompt
  *                       re-auth than to loop forever) but tagged
@@ -74,7 +79,7 @@ export interface TokenPair {
  * Without this, the client `describeAuthFailure` exhaustiveness check
  * was silently broken for the non-REFRESH branches.
  */
-export type PermanentAuthReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'UNKNOWN_401';
+export type PermanentAuthReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'UNKNOWN_401';
 export declare class PermanentAuthFailure extends Error {
     readonly code: PermanentAuthReason;
     constructor(code: PermanentAuthReason, message: string);

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/cliHandoffWire.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/**
+ * cliHandoffWire.ts — the ONE declaration of the CLI↔daemon hand-off wire
+ * contracts, shared by the daemon (writer/server) and the CLI (reader).
+ *
+ * Two contracts live here:
+ *
+ *   1. The hand-off descriptor file (`descriptor.json` on Dedicated guests,
+ *      `daemon-island.<profile>.json` on laptops). Until now the shape was
+ *      declared twice — `DedicatedCliHandoffDescriptor` daemon-side and
+ *      `LocalBootstrap` CLI-side — two type declarations for one file format,
+ *      the same drift disease `sessionPermissionAuthority` fixed.
+ *   2. The broker-mode redeem exchange: `POST /v1/auth/cli-handoff-token`
+ *      request/response plus its error codes.
+ *
+ * Readers stay loose (unknown fields ignored, absent `handoffModes` reads as
+ * refresh-family-only) so a new field never breaks an older peer; writers
+ * must produce the full shape.
+ */
+/**
+ * What a caller may redeem the descriptor secret for.
+ *  - `refresh_family`: the legacy durable mint (90-day cli-scope family).
+ *  - `access_token`:   broker mode — a short-lived access token from a
+ *                      daemon-owned family; nothing durable leaves the daemon.
+ */
+export declare const CLI_HANDOFF_MODES: readonly ["refresh_family", "access_token"];
+export type CliHandoffMode = (typeof CLI_HANDOFF_MODES)[number];
+/** Broker-mode redeem route on the daemon's loopback server. */
+export declare const CLI_HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATH = "/v1/auth/cli-handoff-token";
+/** Error codes this contract emits. String literals so both ends compare
+ *  without importing a symbol they may not have. */
+export declare const CLI_HANDOFF_TOKEN_ERROR_UNAVAILABLE = "HANDOFF_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE";
+/** Emitted by the LEGACY /v1/auth/cli-handoff route when a hand-off-secret
+ *  caller asks for a refresh family the daemon no longer mints for it. */
+export declare const CLI_HANDOFF_ERROR_BROKER_ONLY = "HANDOFF_BROKER_ONLY";
+/**
+ * The descriptor file format. `version` is absent on the oldest island files
+ * and `1` on the first dedicated-guest descriptors; `handoffModes` first
+ * appears at version 2. Every field the CLI needs to dial is validated; the
+ * rest ride along untyped.
+ */
+export interface CliHandoffDescriptor {
+    version?: number;
+    pid?: number;
+    daemonId?: string;
+    host?: string;
+    port?: number;
+    /** Base64 handshake secret — hand-off-only on guests, island on laptops. */
+    secret?: string;
+    /** Server URL the daemon is authenticated against. Older daemons omit it;
+     *  readers refuse to broker without it (never mint against an unknown
+     *  server). */
+    serverUrl?: string;
+    /** Daemon-authored epoch counter; bumped when the descriptor is republished. */
+    epoch?: number;
+    handoffModes?: CliHandoffMode[];
+}
+/**
+ * Parse an untrusted descriptor JSON value. Returns null when the fields the
+ * caller cannot proceed without — host, port, secret — are absent or
+ * mistyped. Unknown fields and future `version` values are tolerated: the
+ * reader ignores them, which is what makes additive evolution safe.
+ */
+export declare function parseCliHandoffDescriptor(value: unknown): CliHandoffDescriptor | null;
+/**
+ * Untrusted `handoffModes` input → known literals only, deduped. An
+ * unrecognized future mode is dropped rather than widening by coercion.
+ */
+export declare function normalizeHandoffModes(value: unknown): CliHandoffMode[];
+/**
+ * The versioned-default rule: a descriptor that never declares modes offers
+ * only the durable mint it has always offered. Mode negotiation is purely
+ * additive — a daemon advertises the new mode, it never un-advertises the
+ * old one by accident.
+ */
+export declare function advertisedHandoffModes(d: CliHandoffDescriptor): CliHandoffMode[];
+export declare function descriptorOffersAccessToken(d: CliHandoffDescriptor): boolean;
+export interface CliHandoffTokenRequest {
+    /** Bypass the daemon broker's cached token (the 401-recovery path). */
+    forceRefresh?: boolean;
+}
+export interface CliHandoffTokenResponse {
+    accessToken: string;
+    /** Absolute expiry in ms since epoch, when the daemon knows it. */
+    accessExpiresAt?: number;
+    /** Server the minted credential belongs to — lets the caller verify it is
+     *  about to use a token for the API it thinks it is talking to. */
+    serverUrl?: string;
+}
+/** Parse the redeem response; null when the token itself is absent. */
+export declare function parseCliHandoffTokenResponse(value: unknown): CliHandoffTokenResponse | null;