@simplelayer/graniteer-core 0.0.2 → 0.2.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (175) hide show
  1. package/package.json +169 -15
  2. package/src/adminBookingCredit.test.ts +451 -0
  3. package/src/adminBookingCredit.ts +239 -0
  4. package/src/agreementCheckout.ts +250 -0
  5. package/src/agreementPortalEmail.ts +128 -0
  6. package/src/availability.test.ts +25 -0
  7. package/src/availability.ts +201 -0
  8. package/src/billingPortalLinkEmail.ts +117 -0
  9. package/src/bookingAgreementEmail.ts +149 -0
  10. package/src/bookingEffects.ts +388 -0
  11. package/src/bookingHoldReclaim.ts +94 -0
  12. package/src/busClient.ts +268 -0
  13. package/src/busSignature.ts +71 -0
  14. package/src/checkoutCoupon.test.ts +675 -0
  15. package/src/checkoutCoupon.ts +455 -0
  16. package/src/checkoutSessionParams.ts +56 -0
  17. package/src/commonsContract.ts +175 -0
  18. package/src/commonsDeposit.ts +298 -0
  19. package/src/commonsDepositWebhook.ts +237 -0
  20. package/src/conductorAdmin.ts +141 -0
  21. package/src/dayPassConfirmation.ts +230 -0
  22. package/src/dunningEmails.test.ts +263 -0
  23. package/src/dunningEmails.ts +203 -0
  24. package/src/email-templates/brand.ts +93 -0
  25. package/src/email-templates/email-change.tsx +92 -0
  26. package/src/email-templates/invite.tsx +79 -0
  27. package/src/email-templates/magic-link.tsx +59 -0
  28. package/src/email-templates/reauthentication.tsx +60 -0
  29. package/src/email-templates/recovery.tsx +59 -0
  30. package/src/email-templates/signup.tsx +67 -0
  31. package/src/functions/admin-cancel-membership.ts +311 -0
  32. package/src/functions/admin-change-membership-plan.ts +312 -0
  33. package/src/functions/admin-charge-guest-print.ts +229 -0
  34. package/src/functions/admin-correct-booking.ts +333 -0
  35. package/src/functions/admin-create-booking.ts +460 -0
  36. package/src/functions/admin-create-commons-event.ts +244 -0
  37. package/src/functions/admin-debug-boldsign-doc.ts +93 -0
  38. package/src/functions/admin-door-write.ts +272 -0
  39. package/src/functions/admin-issue-day-pass.ts +231 -0
  40. package/src/functions/admin-mark-booking-paid.ts +203 -0
  41. package/src/functions/admin-mint-billing-portal-link.ts +168 -0
  42. package/src/functions/admin-mint-portal-link.ts +62 -0
  43. package/src/functions/admin-photo-upload.ts +128 -0
  44. package/src/functions/admin-remove-team-member.ts +150 -0
  45. package/src/functions/admin-request-trial.ts +366 -0
  46. package/src/functions/admin-resend-commons-deposit-link.ts +323 -0
  47. package/src/functions/admin-reset-mfa.ts +138 -0
  48. package/src/functions/admin-retry-invoice-payment.test.ts +567 -0
  49. package/src/functions/admin-retry-invoice-payment.ts +333 -0
  50. package/src/functions/admin-reverse-coupon-redemption.ts +98 -0
  51. package/src/functions/admin-revoke-agreement.ts +467 -0
  52. package/src/functions/admin-send-commons-agreement.ts +214 -0
  53. package/src/functions/admin-set-credit-amount.ts +123 -0
  54. package/src/functions/admin-skip-commons-contract.ts +165 -0
  55. package/src/functions/admin-undo-membership-cancel.ts +144 -0
  56. package/src/functions/admin-wall-photo-write.ts +141 -0
  57. package/src/functions/auth-email-hook.ts +259 -0
  58. package/src/functions/boldsign-sender-identity.ts +114 -0
  59. package/src/functions/booking-availability.ts +419 -0
  60. package/src/functions/booking-member-preview.ts +136 -0
  61. package/src/functions/booking-status.ts +149 -0
  62. package/src/functions/conductor.ts +505 -0
  63. package/src/functions/create-agreement.ts +537 -0
  64. package/src/functions/create-booking.ts +648 -0
  65. package/src/functions/create-day-pass-checkout.ts +218 -0
  66. package/src/functions/create-portal-session.ts +142 -0
  67. package/src/functions/create-subscription-checkout.test.ts +222 -0
  68. package/src/functions/create-subscription-checkout.ts +440 -0
  69. package/src/functions/day-pass-status.ts +89 -0
  70. package/src/functions/dayStatus.ts +71 -0
  71. package/src/functions/diag-webpush-test.ts +45 -0
  72. package/src/functions/event-access-admin.ts +277 -0
  73. package/src/functions/event-access-store.ts +309 -0
  74. package/src/functions/ezeep-print-webhook.ts +213 -0
  75. package/src/functions/ezeep-usage-reconcile.ts +299 -0
  76. package/src/functions/fetch-avatar-original.ts +457 -0
  77. package/src/functions/get-provider-sign-link.ts +155 -0
  78. package/src/functions/get-signing-link.ts +211 -0
  79. package/src/functions/guest-print-setup-confirm.ts +128 -0
  80. package/src/functions/guest-print-submit.ts +149 -0
  81. package/src/functions/luma-webhook.ts +165 -0
  82. package/src/functions/manage-booking.ts +472 -0
  83. package/src/functions/mcp.ts +67 -0
  84. package/src/functions/member-door-action.test.ts +1248 -0
  85. package/src/functions/member-door-action.ts +863 -0
  86. package/src/functions/member-unifi-mapping.test.ts +516 -0
  87. package/src/functions/member-unifi-mapping.ts +206 -0
  88. package/src/functions/membership-door-sync.ts +956 -0
  89. package/src/functions/migration-collision-alert.copy.ts +232 -0
  90. package/src/functions/migration-collision-alert.test.ts +349 -0
  91. package/src/functions/migration-collision-alert.ts +232 -0
  92. package/src/functions/office-assignment-end.ts +146 -0
  93. package/src/functions/portal-booking-access.ts +95 -0
  94. package/src/functions/portal-list-invoices.ts +99 -0
  95. package/src/functions/portal-request-login.ts +192 -0
  96. package/src/functions/portal-resend-invite.ts +248 -0
  97. package/src/functions/portal-submit-event.ts +168 -0
  98. package/src/functions/print-billing-recover.ts +97 -0
  99. package/src/functions/print-billing-run.ts +183 -0
  100. package/src/functions/public-facts.ts +168 -0
  101. package/src/functions/push-send.ts +348 -0
  102. package/src/functions/push-test.ts +234 -0
  103. package/src/functions/request-portal-link.ts +211 -0
  104. package/src/functions/reschedule-booking.ts +649 -0
  105. package/src/functions/review-ratings.ts +113 -0
  106. package/src/functions/space-availability-range.acceptance.test.ts +161 -0
  107. package/src/functions/space-availability-range.ts +142 -0
  108. package/src/functions/stripe-db-reconcile.ts +319 -0
  109. package/src/functions/stripe-webhook.moved-regression.test.ts +78 -0
  110. package/src/functions/stripe-webhook.ts +2595 -0
  111. package/src/functions/sync-gcal-blackouts.ts +298 -0
  112. package/src/functions/timetable-event-register.ts +162 -0
  113. package/src/functions/timetable-event-status.ts +90 -0
  114. package/src/functions/timetable-spaces.ts +219 -0
  115. package/src/functions/touch-pass-reconciler.ts +689 -0
  116. package/src/functions/touch-pass-signup.ts +478 -0
  117. package/src/functions/upload-booking-display-image.ts +179 -0
  118. package/src/functions/virtual-onboarding-purge.ts +134 -0
  119. package/src/functions/virtual-onboarding-submit.ts +315 -0
  120. package/src/functions/voice-booking.ts +453 -0
  121. package/src/functions/voice-day-pass.ts +346 -0
  122. package/src/functions/voice-inquiry.test.ts +301 -0
  123. package/src/functions/voice-inquiry.ts +198 -0
  124. package/src/functions/voice-membership-signup.ts +355 -0
  125. package/src/functions/voice-tour-availability.ts +204 -0
  126. package/src/functions/voice-tour-booking.ts +429 -0
  127. package/src/gcalSync.ts +142 -0
  128. package/src/ghlEventInquiry.ts +143 -0
  129. package/src/ghlNote.ts +34 -0
  130. package/src/ghlTask.ts +48 -0
  131. package/src/ghlVoiceInquiry.ts +90 -0
  132. package/src/guestPrintCapture.test.ts +722 -0
  133. package/src/guestPrintCapture.ts +538 -0
  134. package/src/lumaGhl.ts +195 -0
  135. package/src/mailArrivalEmail.ts +121 -0
  136. package/src/manageToken.ts +363 -0
  137. package/src/membership.ts +109 -0
  138. package/src/membershipBusClient.ts +537 -0
  139. package/src/membershipWelcome.ts +683 -0
  140. package/src/migrationCheckout.ts +366 -0
  141. package/src/money.ts +36 -0
  142. package/src/ops.ts +97 -0
  143. package/src/pacificDate.ts +88 -0
  144. package/src/paymentLinkEmail.ts +123 -0
  145. package/src/policyAcknowledgment.test.ts +50 -0
  146. package/src/policyAcknowledgment.ts +96 -0
  147. package/src/portalSession.ts +46 -0
  148. package/src/pricing.test.ts +660 -0
  149. package/src/pricing.ts +1025 -0
  150. package/src/printBilling.test.ts +750 -0
  151. package/src/printBilling.ts +891 -0
  152. package/src/printBillingAdapters.ts +169 -0
  153. package/src/printCorrections.test.ts +348 -0
  154. package/src/printCorrections.ts +496 -0
  155. package/src/rateLimit.ts +82 -0
  156. package/src/referralCredits.test.ts +31 -0
  157. package/src/referralCredits.ts +34 -0
  158. package/src/referralGrant.ts +321 -0
  159. package/src/rescheduleCredit.test.ts +521 -0
  160. package/src/rescheduleCredit.ts +337 -0
  161. package/src/reservationWifiCode.test.ts +69 -0
  162. package/src/reservationWifiCode.ts +81 -0
  163. package/src/retellCallAnalyzed.test.ts +167 -0
  164. package/src/retellCallAnalyzed.ts +113 -0
  165. package/src/retellSignature.test.ts +137 -0
  166. package/src/retellSignature.ts +82 -0
  167. package/src/signedUnpaidReminderEmail.test.ts +246 -0
  168. package/src/signedUnpaidReminderEmail.ts +132 -0
  169. package/src/slackAlert.ts +38 -0
  170. package/src/stripeCoworkingPortal.ts +91 -0
  171. package/src/supabaseTestFakes.ts +131 -0
  172. package/src/supportTicketEmail.ts +119 -0
  173. package/src/tier1Agreement.ts +125 -0
  174. package/src/unifiAccessPolicies.ts +228 -0
  175. package/src/unifiGroups.ts +129 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
1
+ // supabase/functions/touch-pass-signup/index.ts
2
+ //
3
+ // Member-initiated signup for the Touch Pass add-on (Apple/Google Wallet tap
4
+ // credential, $5/mo, Commons front + Midtown doors only). Implements
5
+ // touch-pass-addon-plan-v1.md v7 §2 steps 1, 2, 4, 5 exactly.
6
+ //
7
+ // STANDING REQUIREMENT (Kyle): this add-on is opt-in ONLY. This function is the
8
+ // ONLY code path anywhere that may set touch_pass_addon_status = 'pending'.
9
+ // membership_enforce.py / membership_revoke.py on ftw-middleware are forbidden
10
+ // from calling unifi.assign_touch_pass -- see the plan's "why this is riskier
11
+ // than it looks" section. Nothing about this function's existence changes that;
12
+ // it is itself gated behind TOUCH_PASS_ENABLED + an allowlist below, matching
13
+ // the staged-rollout discipline (flag off -> dry run -> one real subject ->
14
+ // leave on) used elsewhere in this codebase (see member-door-action/index.ts).
15
+ //
16
+ // Money-path logic (steps 1/2/4/5) was dry-run-tested against a pure-mock
17
+ // harness first (touch-pass-dryrun/, 16/16 passing, vacuity-proofed) using
18
+ // abstract Stripe/Supabase client interfaces. This file is the real
19
+ // implementation against real Deno/Stripe/Supabase-js -- the differences from
20
+ // the mock (documented inline below) are the parts that could NOT be dry-run
21
+ // tested without a live Stripe call, and are flagged for extra scrutiny in
22
+ // review:
23
+ // - supabase-js does NOT throw on a Postgres constraint violation from
24
+ // .update()/.insert() -- it returns { data, error } with error.code set.
25
+ // The mock's claimPendingRow assumed a thrown exception (matching a raw
26
+ // pg client); this real version checks the returned error object instead.
27
+ // - stripe.invoiceItems.create requires `currency` alongside `amount` --
28
+ // omitted in the design doc's pseudocode and the mock; added here.
29
+ // - There is no combined "finalizeAndPay" call in the real Stripe Node/Deno
30
+ // SDK -- finalizeInvoice(id) and pay(id) are two separate calls. The SCA
31
+ // branch is detected primarily by the documented Stripe error `code`
32
+ // (`invoice_payment_intent_requires_action`), with the less-certain
33
+ // `err.payment_intent?.status === 'requires_action'` shape kept only as a
34
+ // secondary/fallback clause, not the primary discriminator (round 6 fix:
35
+ // the `code` field is Stripe's own documented contract for this error;
36
+ // `payment_intent` presence on a thrown error is comparatively
37
+ // under-verified). Neither clause has been exercised against a real live
38
+ // Stripe SCA-required card in this session (Technique 1's pure-mock dry
39
+ // run cannot do that) -- flag this specific branch for extra scrutiny in
40
+ // review and treat it as the single least-verified piece of this file.
41
+
42
+ import { createClient } from 'npm:@supabase/supabase-js@2';
43
+ import Stripe from 'npm:stripe@17.5.0';
44
+ import { z } from 'npm:zod@3.23.8';
45
+ import { clientIp, checkRateLimit } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/rateLimit';
46
+ import { resolvePortalSession } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/portalSession';
47
+ import { logOps } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/ops';
48
+
49
+ const corsHeaders = {
50
+ 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
51
+ 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'authorization, x-client-info, apikey, content-type',
52
+ 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, OPTIONS',
53
+ };
54
+
55
+ function json(status: number, body: unknown) {
56
+ return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
57
+ status, headers: { ...corsHeaders, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
58
+ });
59
+ }
60
+
61
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
62
+ // Constant, defined once in this module (§2 step 8 / B1 guard). Never a price
63
+ // string looked up dynamically -- the whole point of the B1 assertion (see
64
+ // the standalone deploy-time check, touch-pass-b1-assert.ts) is that this
65
+ // literal can be grepped and diffed against membership_plans.
66
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
67
+ const TOUCH_PASS_PRICE_ID = Deno.env.get('TOUCH_PASS_STRIPE_PRICE_ID') ?? '';
68
+ const TOUCH_PASS_AMOUNT_CENTS = 500; // $5.00 flat -- see plan v7 §2 step 4
69
+
70
+ const Body = z.object({
71
+ membership_id: z.string().uuid(),
72
+ });
73
+
74
+ interface MembershipRow {
75
+ id: string;
76
+ email: string;
77
+ auth_user_id: string | null;
78
+ touch_pass_addon_status: string | null;
79
+ touch_pass_pending_at: string | null;
80
+ touch_pass_stripe_item_id: string | null;
81
+ stripe_customer_id: string | null;
82
+ stripe_subscription_id: string | null;
83
+ }
84
+
85
+ export async function handle(req: Request): Promise<Response> {
86
+ if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') return new Response('ok', { headers: corsHeaders });
87
+ if (req.method !== 'POST') return json(405, { ok: false, error: 'method_not_allowed' });
88
+
89
+ const SUPABASE_URL = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL') ?? '';
90
+ const SERVICE_ROLE_KEY = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY') ?? '';
91
+ const stripeKey = Deno.env.get('STRIPE_SECRET_KEY') ?? '';
92
+ if (!SUPABASE_URL || !SERVICE_ROLE_KEY || !stripeKey) {
93
+ return json(503, { ok: false, error: 'not_configured' });
94
+ }
95
+
96
+ const admin = createClient(SUPABASE_URL, SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, {
97
+ auth: { persistSession: false, autoRefreshToken: false },
98
+ });
99
+ // S-12: this pinned API version is LOAD-BEARING, not a routine pin --
100
+ // `Invoice.payment_intent` (read in chargeActivationFee's SCA branch, and
101
+ // in touch-pass-reconciler-index.ts's sweep) does not exist on Invoice in
102
+ // current/later Stripe API versions at all (Stripe moved 3DS confirmation
103
+ // off Invoice.payment_intent in later versions). Bumping this version
104
+ // string without re-verifying that field's presence would silently break
105
+ // SCA detection everywhere it's read in this codebase.
106
+ const stripe = new Stripe(stripeKey, { apiVersion: '2024-11-20.acacia' as Stripe.LatestApiVersion });
107
+
108
+ // ---- Staged-rollout gate (NEW vs. the design doc -- added to match this
109
+ // codebase's own established rollout discipline: flag off -> dry run ->
110
+ // one real subject -> leave on. member-door-action/index.ts is the pattern
111
+ // this mirrors. Flag this addition explicitly in review: it is a safety
112
+ // property added during implementation, not present in the reviewed plan
113
+ // text, and should be checked for correctness on its own merits.) --------
114
+ const enabledRaw = (Deno.env.get('TOUCH_PASS_ENABLED') ?? '').trim().toLowerCase();
115
+ const enabled = ['1', 'true', 't', 'yes', 'y', 'on'].includes(enabledRaw);
116
+ if (!enabled) return json(503, { ok: false, error: 'not_configured' });
117
+ if (!TOUCH_PASS_PRICE_ID) return json(503, { ok: false, error: 'not_configured' });
118
+
119
+ const allowlist = new Set(
120
+ (Deno.env.get('TOUCH_PASS_ALLOWLIST') ?? '').split(/[\s,;]+/).map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean),
121
+ );
122
+
123
+ // ---- Identity: from Supabase's own verified session, never the body ----
124
+ const session = await resolvePortalSession(req, admin);
125
+ if (!session) return json(401, { ok: false, error: 'unauthorized' });
126
+
127
+ if (!allowlist.has(session.id)) {
128
+ return json(503, { ok: false, error: 'not_configured' });
129
+ }
130
+
131
+ // ---- Body ----------------------------------------------------------------
132
+ const raw = await req.json().catch(() => ({}));
133
+ const parsed = Body.safeParse(raw);
134
+ if (!parsed.success) return json(400, { ok: false, error: 'invalid_payload' });
135
+ const { membership_id } = parsed.data;
136
+
137
+ // ---- Rate limit, keyed on the verified sub (never email) ----------------
138
+ const buckets = await Promise.all([
139
+ checkRateLimit(admin, 'touch-pass-signup-ip', clientIp(req), 30, 300),
140
+ checkRateLimit(admin, 'touch-pass-signup', session.id, 5, 300),
141
+ ]);
142
+ if (buckets.some((ok) => !ok)) return json(429, { ok: false, error: 'rate_limited' });
143
+
144
+ // ===========================================================================
145
+ // §2 step 1 -- claim-lock the row, keyed on gc-io's own RLS resolution order.
146
+ // ===========================================================================
147
+ // Uses the touch_pass_claim_pending() SQL function (SECURITY DEFINER,
148
+ // EXECUTE revoked from anon/authenticated, granted only to service_role --
149
+ // confirmed via has_function_privilege before this shipped) rather than a
150
+ // PostgREST .or() filter string built from session.email: interpolating a
151
+ // JWT-derived email into a hand-built filter expression is a real, if
152
+ // narrow, injection surface (RFC 5321 technically allows a comma or
153
+ // parenthesis inside a quoted-string local part), and a parameterized SQL
154
+ // function closes it outright instead of relying on escaping discipline.
155
+ async function claimPending(id: string): Promise<
156
+ { ok: true } | { ok: false; reason: 'no_match' | 'unique_violation' }
157
+ > {
158
+ const { data, error } = await admin.rpc('touch_pass_claim_pending', {
159
+ p_membership_id: id,
160
+ p_auth_user_id: session!.id,
161
+ p_email: session!.email,
162
+ });
163
+ if (error) throw error; // genuine DB/RPC failure -> outer catch, 500
164
+ const row = Array.isArray(data) ? data[0] : data;
165
+ if (row?.unique_violation) return { ok: false, reason: 'unique_violation' };
166
+ if (row?.claimed) return { ok: true };
167
+ return { ok: false, reason: 'no_match' };
168
+ }
169
+
170
+ // ===========================================================================
171
+ // §2 step 2 -- resolve a stale cross-subscription blocking row via a LIVE
172
+ // Stripe read, CAS-guarded DB write BEFORE the Stripe cancellation, 404
173
+ // folded into "resolvable". Guard (found by the dry run, see plan v7
174
+ // changelog): a blocking row with NO Stripe item yet is a live in-flight
175
+ // claim, never resolved here.
176
+ // ===========================================================================
177
+ async function findBlockingRow(): Promise<MembershipRow | null> {
178
+ const { data, error } = await admin.rpc('touch_pass_find_blocking_row', {
179
+ p_exclude_id: membership_id,
180
+ p_auth_user_id: session!.id,
181
+ p_email: session!.email,
182
+ });
183
+ if (error) throw error;
184
+ const rows = (data as MembershipRow[] | null) ?? [];
185
+ return rows[0] ?? null;
186
+ }
187
+
188
+ async function resolveStaleBlockingRow(
189
+ blocking: MembershipRow,
190
+ ): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; reason: 'still_active' | 'cas_lost_race' }> {
191
+ // Dry-run-found guard: nothing to check on Stripe if this row never got a
192
+ // SubscriptionItem -- that's a live in-flight claim, not staleness.
193
+ if (!blocking.touch_pass_stripe_item_id) return { ok: false, reason: 'still_active' };
194
+
195
+ let resolvable = false;
196
+ try {
197
+ const item = await stripe.subscriptionItems.retrieve(blocking.touch_pass_stripe_item_id);
198
+ // stripe-node types SubscriptionItem.subscription as `string` (expanded
199
+ // form only appears when `expand` is requested, which it never is here).
200
+ const subId = typeof item.subscription === 'string' ? item.subscription : undefined;
201
+ if (!subId) {
202
+ resolvable = true; // no parent to check -- treat like gone
203
+ } else {
204
+ try {
205
+ const sub = await stripe.subscriptions.retrieve(subId);
206
+ resolvable = sub.status === 'canceled';
207
+ } catch (e) {
208
+ if ((e as { statusCode?: number }).statusCode === 404) resolvable = true;
209
+ else throw e;
210
+ }
211
+ }
212
+ } catch (e) {
213
+ if ((e as { statusCode?: number }).statusCode === 404) {
214
+ resolvable = true; // 404 on the item itself folds into "resolvable"
215
+ } else {
216
+ throw e;
217
+ }
218
+ }
219
+
220
+ if (!resolvable) return { ok: false, reason: 'still_active' };
221
+
222
+ // CAS BEFORE cancel (round 5's ordering fix) -- exact-status-match WHERE
223
+ // clause is the optimistic lock against §4's reconciler touching the same
224
+ // row concurrently.
225
+ const { data: casRows, error: casErr } = await admin
226
+ .from('memberships')
227
+ .update({ touch_pass_addon_status: 'canceled', touch_pass_canceled_at: new Date().toISOString() })
228
+ .eq('id', blocking.id)
229
+ .eq('touch_pass_addon_status', blocking.touch_pass_addon_status)
230
+ .select('id');
231
+ if (casErr) throw casErr;
232
+ if (!casRows || casRows.length === 0) return { ok: false, reason: 'cas_lost_race' };
233
+
234
+ // Only now touch Stripe. If this fails, the DB row already reads
235
+ // 'canceled' -- the reconciler's Job C (forward-reconciliation pass,
236
+ // touch-pass-reconciler-index.ts) finishes the Stripe-side cancel on its
237
+ // next pass. Never the reverse (live row, Stripe item already gone).
238
+ try {
239
+ await stripe.subscriptionItems.del(blocking.touch_pass_stripe_item_id, { proration_behavior: 'none' });
240
+ } catch (e) {
241
+ if ((e as { statusCode?: number }).statusCode !== 404) {
242
+ await logOps(admin, 'touch_pass_stale_resolution_cancel_failed', {
243
+ membership_id: blocking.id, stripe_item_id: blocking.touch_pass_stripe_item_id,
244
+ message: String(e).slice(0, 300),
245
+ }, { severity: 'warning' });
246
+ }
247
+ }
248
+ return { ok: true };
249
+ }
250
+
251
+ // ===========================================================================
252
+ // §2 step 4 -- one-off $5 charge: invoice-first + InvoiceItem.invoice,
253
+ // sidestepping pending_invoice_items_behavior entirely. Explicit branch on
254
+ // the pay() outcome.
255
+ // ===========================================================================
256
+ async function chargeActivationFee(
257
+ row: MembershipRow,
258
+ ): Promise<
259
+ | { outcome: 'paid'; stripeItemId: string; invoiceId: string; hostedInvoiceUrl?: string | null }
260
+ | { outcome: 'requires_action'; stripeItemId: string; invoiceId: string; hostedInvoiceUrl?: string | null }
261
+ | { outcome: 'declined'; stripeItemId: string; invoiceId: string; hostedInvoiceUrl?: string | null }
262
+ > {
263
+ // S-2: idempotency keys on every Stripe-mutating call in this function.
264
+ // Keyed on membership_id AND touch_pass_pending_at (the timestamp step 1's
265
+ // claim just set) rather than membership_id alone -- a key must be unique
266
+ // PER PENDING EPISODE, not per membership, or a later signup attempt on
267
+ // the same row (after a prior cancel) would replay Stripe's cached
268
+ // response from the FIRST attempt (Stripe caches an idempotency key's
269
+ // response for 24h) instead of creating fresh resources.
270
+ const idemBase = `touch_pass:${row.id}:${row.touch_pass_pending_at ?? 'unknown'}`;
271
+
272
+ const item = await stripe.subscriptionItems.create({
273
+ subscription: row.stripe_subscription_id!,
274
+ price: TOUCH_PASS_PRICE_ID,
275
+ proration_behavior: 'none',
276
+ // S-3: metadata on the SubscriptionItem itself (in addition to the
277
+ // Invoice's own metadata set below) so any Stripe-side view of just the
278
+ // item -- e.g. Job B's orphan scan -- can identify it without a DB join.
279
+ metadata: { membership_id: row.id, feature: 'touch_pass' },
280
+ }, { idempotencyKey: `${idemBase}:item` });
281
+
282
+ let invoice = await stripe.invoices.create({
283
+ customer: row.stripe_customer_id!,
284
+ auto_advance: false,
285
+ // touch_pass_stripe_item_id is stamped on the INVOICE's own metadata too
286
+ // (not just the InvoiceItem's below) so the stripe-webhook diff's
287
+ // invoice.payment_failed branch can cancel the right SubscriptionItem
288
+ // by reading event.data.object.metadata directly, with no extra DB
289
+ // round-trip and no dependency on memberships.touch_pass_stripe_item_id
290
+ // having been written yet (step 5 below writes it, but a payment_failed
291
+ // event racing ahead of that write must still be able to cancel).
292
+ metadata: { membership_id: row.id, feature: 'touch_pass', touch_pass_stripe_item_id: item.id },
293
+ }, { idempotencyKey: `${idemBase}:invoice` });
294
+
295
+ // `currency` is required alongside `amount` -- absent from the design
296
+ // doc's pseudocode and the mock; added here (see file header).
297
+ await stripe.invoiceItems.create({
298
+ customer: row.stripe_customer_id!,
299
+ invoice: invoice.id,
300
+ amount: TOUCH_PASS_AMOUNT_CENTS,
301
+ currency: 'usd',
302
+ metadata: { membership_id: row.id, touch_pass_stripe_item_id: item.id },
303
+ }, { idempotencyKey: `${idemBase}:invoiceitem` });
304
+
305
+ // Capture finalizeInvoice's return value (not just await it) -- it's the
306
+ // finalized invoice with hosted_invoice_url populated, needed below for
307
+ // S-6's requires_action/declined responses.
308
+ invoice = await stripe.invoices.finalizeInvoice(invoice.id, undefined, { idempotencyKey: `${idemBase}:finalize` });
309
+
310
+ try {
311
+ const paid = await stripe.invoices.pay(invoice.id, undefined, { idempotencyKey: `${idemBase}:pay` });
312
+ return { outcome: 'paid', stripeItemId: item.id, invoiceId: invoice.id, hostedInvoiceUrl: paid.hosted_invoice_url };
313
+ } catch (e) {
314
+ // Least-verified branch in this file -- see file header. Round 6 fix
315
+ // (BL-3): check the documented Stripe error `code` FIRST -- Stripe's own
316
+ // documented contract for this condition -- with the payment_intent
317
+ // status check kept only as a secondary/fallback clause, not the
318
+ // primary discriminator. Confirm this shape against a real Stripe test
319
+ // card during review/staging before trusting it in prod.
320
+ const stripeErr = e as { type?: string; code?: string; payment_intent?: { status?: string } };
321
+ if (stripeErr?.code === 'invoice_payment_intent_requires_action'
322
+ || stripeErr?.payment_intent?.status === 'requires_action') {
323
+ // S-6 (partial): surface hosted_invoice_url so the client can send
324
+ // the member to complete 3DS. `invoice` here is the pre-pay() object
325
+ // (finalizeInvoice's return value, not re-fetched) -- its
326
+ // hosted_invoice_url is populated once finalized, before pay() is
327
+ // ever called, so this is available even though pay() threw.
328
+ return { outcome: 'requires_action', stripeItemId: item.id, invoiceId: invoice.id, hostedInvoiceUrl: invoice.hosted_invoice_url };
329
+ }
330
+ if (stripeErr?.type === 'StripeCardError') {
331
+ return { outcome: 'declined', stripeItemId: item.id, invoiceId: invoice.id, hostedInvoiceUrl: invoice.hosted_invoice_url };
332
+ }
333
+ throw e; // anything else (network, Stripe 5xx) -> outer catch, 500, no silent miscategorization
334
+ }
335
+ }
336
+
337
+ // ===========================================================================
338
+ // Orchestration
339
+ // ===========================================================================
340
+ try {
341
+ let step1 = await claimPending(membership_id);
342
+
343
+ if (!step1.ok) {
344
+ // Both failure modes (plain no-match, and a caught unique-violation) fall
345
+ // through to the SAME blocking-row lookup + resolution attempt -- fixed
346
+ // during the dry run, see plan v7 changelog. Only resolution actually
347
+ // failing results in a refusal.
348
+ const blocking = await findBlockingRow();
349
+ if (!blocking) {
350
+ return json(409, { ok: false, error: 'not_found_or_not_eligible' });
351
+ }
352
+ const step2 = await resolveStaleBlockingRow(blocking);
353
+ if (!step2.ok) {
354
+ return json(409, {
355
+ ok: false,
356
+ error: step2.reason === 'still_active' ? 'already_has_touch_pass' : 'try_again',
357
+ });
358
+ }
359
+ step1 = await claimPending(membership_id);
360
+ if (!step1.ok) {
361
+ return json(409, { ok: false, error: 'try_again' });
362
+ }
363
+ }
364
+
365
+ const { data: row, error: rowErr } = await admin
366
+ .from('memberships')
367
+ .select('id,email,auth_user_id,touch_pass_addon_status,touch_pass_pending_at,touch_pass_stripe_item_id,stripe_customer_id,stripe_subscription_id,unifi_access_user_id')
368
+ .eq('id', membership_id)
369
+ .maybeSingle();
370
+ if (rowErr) throw rowErr;
371
+ if (!row) throw new Error('membership row vanished after successful claim');
372
+ const membership = row as unknown as MembershipRow & { unifi_access_user_id: string | null };
373
+
374
+ if (!membership.stripe_customer_id || !membership.stripe_subscription_id) {
375
+ await admin.from('memberships').update({ touch_pass_addon_status: 'canceled' })
376
+ .eq('id', membership_id).eq('touch_pass_addon_status', 'pending');
377
+ return json(409, { ok: false, error: 'no_active_subscription' });
378
+ }
379
+
380
+ // Identity-not-verified: no auth_user_id AND no unifi_access_user_id means
381
+ // this member's building profile isn't linked yet -- surface it as a
382
+ // staff-visible warning (deduped once per membership via ops_events'
383
+ // dedupe_key, not a separate task-queue table -- membership_admin_actions
384
+ // is a billing/plan-change audit log with no open/resolved concept and no
385
+ // fit for this; ops_events + logOps's dedupeKey is this codebase's actual
386
+ // mechanism for "alert staff once"), then refuse the charge.
387
+ if (!membership.auth_user_id && !membership.unifi_access_user_id) {
388
+ await admin.from('memberships').update({ touch_pass_addon_status: 'canceled' })
389
+ .eq('id', membership_id).eq('touch_pass_addon_status', 'pending');
390
+ await logOps(admin, 'touch_pass_identity_not_verified', {
391
+ membership_id,
392
+ }, { severity: 'warning', dedupeKey: `touch_pass_identity_not_verified:${membership_id}` });
393
+ return json(409, { ok: false, error: 'identity_not_verified' });
394
+ }
395
+
396
+ const charge = await chargeActivationFee(membership);
397
+
398
+ // BL-9: CAS-guard this write -- exact-status-match plus "not already
399
+ // written" -- rather than an unconditional update with no row-count
400
+ // check. An unconditional update can silently no-op (0 rows) if the row
401
+ // moved underfoot (e.g. the reconciler's Job A canceled it for timing out
402
+ // while this Stripe round-trip was in flight) and the code would sail on
403
+ // as if the ids were safely recorded when they were not.
404
+ const { data: writtenRows, error: writeErr } = await admin
405
+ .from('memberships')
406
+ .update({ touch_pass_stripe_item_id: charge.stripeItemId, touch_pass_activation_invoice_id: charge.invoiceId })
407
+ .eq('id', membership_id)
408
+ .eq('touch_pass_addon_status', 'pending')
409
+ .is('touch_pass_stripe_item_id', null)
410
+ .select('id');
411
+ if (writeErr) {
412
+ // Unreachable in the ordinary case (both ids are freshly minted by
413
+ // Stripe) -- a unique-constraint hit here means a retry/replay bug
414
+ // cross-wired two members' rows. Fatal, alert a human, never overwrite.
415
+ await logOps(admin, 'touch_pass_activation_id_write_failed', {
416
+ membership_id, stripe_item_id: charge.stripeItemId, invoice_id: charge.invoiceId,
417
+ message: writeErr.message,
418
+ }, { severity: 'error' });
419
+ return json(500, { ok: false, error: 'write_failed' });
420
+ }
421
+ if (!writtenRows || writtenRows.length === 0) {
422
+ await logOps(admin, 'touch_pass_activation_id_write_no_match', {
423
+ membership_id, stripe_item_id: charge.stripeItemId, invoice_id: charge.invoiceId,
424
+ }, { severity: 'error' });
425
+ return json(500, { ok: false, error: 'write_failed' });
426
+ }
427
+
428
+ if (charge.outcome === 'paid') {
429
+ // System of record is the invoice.paid webhook (see the stripe-webhook
430
+ // diff) -- this response just reflects the synchronous pay() result.
431
+ return json(200, { ok: true, status: 'activating' });
432
+ }
433
+ if (charge.outcome === 'requires_action') {
434
+ // S-6 (partial): give the client the hosted_invoice_url so the member
435
+ // can be sent to complete 3DS. (The other half of S-6 -- the hard-bound
436
+ // SCA escalation having no terminal disposition, i.e. what eventually
437
+ // happens to a row stuck past SCA_HARD_BOUND_MS in the reconciler --
438
+ // is deliberately deferred; see final report.)
439
+ return json(200, { ok: true, status: 'requires_action', hosted_invoice_url: charge.hostedInvoiceUrl ?? null });
440
+ }
441
+ // BL-5: a synchronous decline must also cancel the Stripe item -- the
442
+ // charge already created a live SubscriptionItem (see chargeActivationFee)
443
+ // and the earlier version of this branch only flipped the DB row,
444
+ // leaving a canceled-in-our-eyes row with a still-live Stripe item that
445
+ // nothing else was guaranteed to clean up promptly. `del` failures are
446
+ // non-fatal (a 404 is fine; anything else is logged, not thrown -- the
447
+ // reconciler's Job C forward-reconciliation pass retries it, which is
448
+ // why this UPDATE also stamps touch_pass_canceled_at -- NEW-1: Job C's
449
+ // own retry filter requires that column to be non-null, and this branch
450
+ // was previously leaving it NULL, making the row invisible to Job C).
451
+ if (charge.outcome === 'declined') {
452
+ try {
453
+ await stripe.subscriptionItems.del(charge.stripeItemId, { proration_behavior: 'none' });
454
+ } catch (e) {
455
+ if ((e as { statusCode?: number }).statusCode !== 404) {
456
+ await logOps(admin, 'touch_pass_decline_cancel_failed', {
457
+ membership_id, stripe_item_id: charge.stripeItemId, message: String(e).slice(0, 300),
458
+ }, { severity: 'error' });
459
+ }
460
+ }
461
+ await admin.from('memberships').update({
462
+ touch_pass_addon_status: 'canceled',
463
+ touch_pass_canceled_at: new Date().toISOString(),
464
+ })
465
+ .eq('id', membership_id).eq('touch_pass_addon_status', 'pending');
466
+ return json(200, { ok: false, status: 'declined' }); // S-14: ok:false on a failed charge
467
+ }
468
+ // Unreachable: chargeActivationFee's return type is exhaustively
469
+ // 'paid' | 'requires_action' | 'declined', and 'paid' returned above.
470
+ throw new Error(`unreachable charge outcome: ${(charge as { outcome: string }).outcome}`);
471
+ } catch (e) {
472
+ console.error('[touch-pass-signup] error', e);
473
+ await logOps(admin, 'touch_pass_signup_error', {
474
+ membership_id, actor_uid: session.id, message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
475
+ }, { severity: 'error' });
476
+ return json(500, { ok: false, error: 'signup_failed' });
477
+ }
478
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
1
+ // Member-facing "booking display image" upload.
2
+ //
3
+ // This is the ONLY write path for public.room_display_booking_overrides and for
4
+ // the room-display-overrides bucket -- both are service-role-only, exactly like
5
+ // bookings itself (members hold SELECT only there, writes go through
6
+ // manage-booking / reschedule-booking).
7
+ //
8
+ // Identity model: caller resolved from their portal session JWT only. The
9
+ // booking id in the body is authorized against the SAME ownership predicate the
10
+ // "Members can view their own bookings" RLS policy uses:
11
+ // lower(bookings.contact_email) = lower(auth.jwt()->>'email')
12
+ //
13
+ // The row this writes is NOT what the tablet reads: the display client polls
14
+ // the public.room_display_current_overrides VIEW, which re-derives room/time
15
+ // from live bookings and gates on status='paid', active, NOT blocked and the
16
+ // live display window. This function never writes `active` or `blocked`, so
17
+ // an admin takedown survives a re-upload.
18
+ import { createClient } from 'npm:@supabase/supabase-js@2';
19
+ import { resolvePortalSessionEmail } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/portalSession';
20
+ import { checkRateLimit } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/rateLimit';
21
+
22
+ // The bucket is private (workspace blocks public buckets) and therefore carries
23
+ // no file_size_limit / allowed_mime_types of its own -- these are the enforcement.
24
+ const MAX_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
25
+ const MAX_BODY_BYTES = Math.ceil((MAX_BYTES * 4) / 3) + 4096; // base64 overhead
26
+
27
+ export interface UploadBookingDisplayImageConfig {
28
+ allowedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string> | readonly string[];
29
+ }
30
+
31
+ function cors(origin: string | null, allowedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string> | readonly string[]): Record<string, string> {
32
+ const h: Record<string, string> = {
33
+ 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'authorization, x-client-info, apikey, content-type',
34
+ 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, OPTIONS',
35
+ Vary: 'Origin',
36
+ };
37
+ const allowed = allowedOrigins instanceof Set ? allowedOrigins : new Set(allowedOrigins);
38
+ if (origin && (allowed.has(origin) || /^https:\/\/[a-z0-9-]+\.lovable\.app$/.test(origin))) {
39
+ h['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = origin;
40
+ }
41
+ return h;
42
+ }
43
+
44
+ /** Magic-number sniff. GIF deliberately excluded (animation + polyglot risk). */
45
+ function sniff(b: Uint8Array): { mime: string; ext: string } | null {
46
+ if (b.length > 3 && b[0] === 0xff && b[1] === 0xd8 && b[2] === 0xff) return { mime: 'image/jpeg', ext: 'jpg' };
47
+ if (b.length > 8 && b[0] === 0x89 && b[1] === 0x50 && b[2] === 0x4e && b[3] === 0x47) return { mime: 'image/png', ext: 'png' };
48
+ if (
49
+ b.length > 12 &&
50
+ String.fromCharCode(...b.slice(0, 4)) === 'RIFF' &&
51
+ String.fromCharCode(...b.slice(8, 12)) === 'WEBP'
52
+ ) return { mime: 'image/webp', ext: 'webp' };
53
+ return null;
54
+ }
55
+
56
+ const UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
57
+
58
+ export async function handle(req: Request, config: UploadBookingDisplayImageConfig): Promise<Response> {
59
+ const ch = cors(req.headers.get('origin'), config.allowedOrigins);
60
+ const json = (status: number, body: unknown) =>
61
+ new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status, headers: { ...ch, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } });
62
+
63
+ let email = 'unknown';
64
+ let bookingId = '';
65
+ let path = '';
66
+
67
+ try {
68
+ if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') return new Response('ok', { headers: ch });
69
+ if (req.method !== 'POST') return json(405, { error: 'method_not_allowed' });
70
+ if (!(req.headers.get('content-type') ?? '').toLowerCase().startsWith('application/json')) {
71
+ return json(415, { error: 'unsupported_media_type' });
72
+ }
73
+
74
+ // Reject oversized payloads BEFORE buffering the body.
75
+ const len = Number(req.headers.get('content-length') ?? '0');
76
+ if (!len || Number.isNaN(len)) return json(411, { error: 'length_required' });
77
+ if (len > MAX_BODY_BYTES) return json(413, { error: 'payload_too_large', max_bytes: MAX_BYTES });
78
+
79
+ const admin = createClient(
80
+ Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')!,
81
+ Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')!,
82
+ { auth: { persistSession: false, autoRefreshToken: false } },
83
+ );
84
+
85
+ const who = await resolvePortalSessionEmail(req, admin);
86
+ if (!who) return json(401, { error: 'unauthorized' });
87
+ email = who;
88
+
89
+ const allowed = await checkRateLimit(admin, 'upload-booking-display-image', email, 10, 300);
90
+ if (!allowed) return json(429, { error: 'rate_limited' });
91
+
92
+ let body: { booking_id?: unknown; image_base64?: unknown; mime_type?: unknown };
93
+ try {
94
+ body = await req.json();
95
+ } catch {
96
+ return json(400, { error: 'invalid_json' });
97
+ }
98
+
99
+ bookingId = typeof body.booking_id === 'string' ? body.booking_id.trim() : '';
100
+ const declared = typeof body.mime_type === 'string' ? body.mime_type.trim().toLowerCase() : '';
101
+ const b64raw = typeof body.image_base64 === 'string' ? body.image_base64 : '';
102
+
103
+ if (!UUID_RE.test(bookingId)) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_booking_id' });
104
+ if (!b64raw) return json(400, { error: 'missing_image' });
105
+
106
+ const b64 = b64raw.startsWith('data:') ? b64raw.slice(b64raw.indexOf(',') + 1) : b64raw;
107
+ let bytes: Uint8Array;
108
+ try {
109
+ bytes = Uint8Array.from(atob(b64.replace(/\s/g, '')), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
110
+ } catch {
111
+ return json(400, { error: 'invalid_image_encoding' });
112
+ }
113
+ if (bytes.byteLength === 0) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_image_encoding' });
114
+ if (bytes.byteLength > MAX_BYTES) return json(413, { error: 'image_too_large', max_bytes: MAX_BYTES });
115
+
116
+ const sniffed = sniff(bytes);
117
+ if (!sniffed) {
118
+ return json(400, { error: 'unsupported_image_type', allowed: ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'] });
119
+ }
120
+ if (declared && declared !== sniffed.mime) return json(400, { error: 'mime_mismatch' });
121
+
122
+ // Ownership. Booking-not-found and not-owned intentionally share one 404 so
123
+ // the response cannot be used to probe which booking UUIDs are real.
124
+ const { data: booking, error: bErr } = await admin
125
+ .from('bookings')
126
+ .select('id,contact_email')
127
+ .eq('id', bookingId)
128
+ .maybeSingle();
129
+
130
+ if (bErr) {
131
+ console.error('[bdi] lookup_failed', { email, bookingId, code: bErr.code });
132
+ return json(500, { error: 'lookup_failed' });
133
+ }
134
+ const owner = String((booking as { contact_email?: string } | null)?.contact_email ?? '').toLowerCase();
135
+ if (!booking || owner !== email) return json(404, { error: 'booking_not_found' });
136
+
137
+ // Deterministic path: one object per booking, replaced in place.
138
+ path = `${bookingId}/welcome.${sniffed.ext}`;
139
+ const { error: upErr } = await admin.storage
140
+ .from('room-display-overrides')
141
+ .upload(path, bytes, { contentType: sniffed.mime, upsert: true });
142
+
143
+ if (upErr) {
144
+ console.error('[bdi] upload_failed', { email, bookingId, path, msg: upErr.message });
145
+ return json(500, { error: 'upload_failed' });
146
+ }
147
+
148
+ // Private bucket: the object is read over the storage REST endpoint with the
149
+ // anon apikey (policy "Public can read room display override images").
150
+ const base = `${Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')}/storage/v1/object/room-display-overrides/${path}`;
151
+
152
+ const { data: row, error: rowErr } = await admin
153
+ .from('room_display_booking_overrides')
154
+ .upsert(
155
+ {
156
+ booking_id: bookingId,
157
+ storage_path: path,
158
+ image_url: base,
159
+ uploaded_by_email: email,
160
+ updated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
161
+ } as never,
162
+ { onConflict: 'booking_id' },
163
+ )
164
+ .select('updated_at')
165
+ .single();
166
+
167
+ if (rowErr) {
168
+ console.error('[bdi] save_failed', { email, bookingId, path, code: rowErr.code });
169
+ return json(500, { error: 'save_failed' });
170
+ }
171
+
172
+ const version = Math.floor(new Date((row as { updated_at: string }).updated_at).getTime() / 1000);
173
+ console.log('[bdi] ok', { email, bookingId, path, version });
174
+ return json(200, { ok: true, image_url: `${base}?v=${version}` });
175
+ } catch (e) {
176
+ console.error('[bdi] unhandled', { email, bookingId, path, msg: String(e) });
177
+ return json(500, { error: 'internal_error' });
178
+ }
179
+ }