@simplelayer/graniteer-core 0.0.2 → 0.2.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +169 -15
- package/src/adminBookingCredit.test.ts +451 -0
- package/src/adminBookingCredit.ts +239 -0
- package/src/agreementCheckout.ts +250 -0
- package/src/agreementPortalEmail.ts +128 -0
- package/src/availability.test.ts +25 -0
- package/src/availability.ts +201 -0
- package/src/billingPortalLinkEmail.ts +117 -0
- package/src/bookingAgreementEmail.ts +149 -0
- package/src/bookingEffects.ts +388 -0
- package/src/bookingHoldReclaim.ts +94 -0
- package/src/busClient.ts +268 -0
- package/src/busSignature.ts +71 -0
- package/src/checkoutCoupon.test.ts +675 -0
- package/src/checkoutCoupon.ts +455 -0
- package/src/checkoutSessionParams.ts +56 -0
- package/src/commonsContract.ts +175 -0
- package/src/commonsDeposit.ts +298 -0
- package/src/commonsDepositWebhook.ts +237 -0
- package/src/conductorAdmin.ts +141 -0
- package/src/dayPassConfirmation.ts +230 -0
- package/src/dunningEmails.test.ts +263 -0
- package/src/dunningEmails.ts +203 -0
- package/src/email-templates/brand.ts +93 -0
- package/src/email-templates/email-change.tsx +92 -0
- package/src/email-templates/invite.tsx +79 -0
- package/src/email-templates/magic-link.tsx +59 -0
- package/src/email-templates/reauthentication.tsx +60 -0
- package/src/email-templates/recovery.tsx +59 -0
- package/src/email-templates/signup.tsx +67 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-cancel-membership.ts +311 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-change-membership-plan.ts +312 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-charge-guest-print.ts +229 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-correct-booking.ts +333 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-create-booking.ts +460 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-create-commons-event.ts +244 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-debug-boldsign-doc.ts +93 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-door-write.ts +272 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-issue-day-pass.ts +231 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-mark-booking-paid.ts +203 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-mint-billing-portal-link.ts +168 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-mint-portal-link.ts +62 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-photo-upload.ts +128 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-remove-team-member.ts +150 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-request-trial.ts +366 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-resend-commons-deposit-link.ts +323 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-reset-mfa.ts +138 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-retry-invoice-payment.test.ts +567 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-retry-invoice-payment.ts +333 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-reverse-coupon-redemption.ts +98 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-revoke-agreement.ts +467 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-send-commons-agreement.ts +214 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-set-credit-amount.ts +123 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-skip-commons-contract.ts +165 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-undo-membership-cancel.ts +144 -0
- package/src/functions/admin-wall-photo-write.ts +141 -0
- package/src/functions/auth-email-hook.ts +259 -0
- package/src/functions/boldsign-sender-identity.ts +114 -0
- package/src/functions/booking-availability.ts +419 -0
- package/src/functions/booking-member-preview.ts +136 -0
- package/src/functions/booking-status.ts +149 -0
- package/src/functions/conductor.ts +505 -0
- package/src/functions/create-agreement.ts +537 -0
- package/src/functions/create-booking.ts +648 -0
- package/src/functions/create-day-pass-checkout.ts +218 -0
- package/src/functions/create-portal-session.ts +142 -0
- package/src/functions/create-subscription-checkout.test.ts +222 -0
- package/src/functions/create-subscription-checkout.ts +440 -0
- package/src/functions/day-pass-status.ts +89 -0
- package/src/functions/dayStatus.ts +71 -0
- package/src/functions/diag-webpush-test.ts +45 -0
- package/src/functions/event-access-admin.ts +277 -0
- package/src/functions/event-access-store.ts +309 -0
- package/src/functions/ezeep-print-webhook.ts +213 -0
- package/src/functions/ezeep-usage-reconcile.ts +299 -0
- package/src/functions/fetch-avatar-original.ts +457 -0
- package/src/functions/get-provider-sign-link.ts +155 -0
- package/src/functions/get-signing-link.ts +211 -0
- package/src/functions/guest-print-setup-confirm.ts +128 -0
- package/src/functions/guest-print-submit.ts +149 -0
- package/src/functions/luma-webhook.ts +165 -0
- package/src/functions/manage-booking.ts +472 -0
- package/src/functions/mcp.ts +67 -0
- package/src/functions/member-door-action.test.ts +1248 -0
- package/src/functions/member-door-action.ts +863 -0
- package/src/functions/member-unifi-mapping.test.ts +516 -0
- package/src/functions/member-unifi-mapping.ts +206 -0
- package/src/functions/membership-door-sync.ts +956 -0
- package/src/functions/migration-collision-alert.copy.ts +232 -0
- package/src/functions/migration-collision-alert.test.ts +349 -0
- package/src/functions/migration-collision-alert.ts +232 -0
- package/src/functions/office-assignment-end.ts +146 -0
- package/src/functions/portal-booking-access.ts +95 -0
- package/src/functions/portal-list-invoices.ts +99 -0
- package/src/functions/portal-request-login.ts +192 -0
- package/src/functions/portal-resend-invite.ts +248 -0
- package/src/functions/portal-submit-event.ts +168 -0
- package/src/functions/print-billing-recover.ts +97 -0
- package/src/functions/print-billing-run.ts +183 -0
- package/src/functions/public-facts.ts +168 -0
- package/src/functions/push-send.ts +348 -0
- package/src/functions/push-test.ts +234 -0
- package/src/functions/request-portal-link.ts +211 -0
- package/src/functions/reschedule-booking.ts +649 -0
- package/src/functions/review-ratings.ts +113 -0
- package/src/functions/space-availability-range.acceptance.test.ts +161 -0
- package/src/functions/space-availability-range.ts +142 -0
- package/src/functions/stripe-db-reconcile.ts +319 -0
- package/src/functions/stripe-webhook.moved-regression.test.ts +78 -0
- package/src/functions/stripe-webhook.ts +2595 -0
- package/src/functions/sync-gcal-blackouts.ts +298 -0
- package/src/functions/timetable-event-register.ts +162 -0
- package/src/functions/timetable-event-status.ts +90 -0
- package/src/functions/timetable-spaces.ts +219 -0
- package/src/functions/touch-pass-reconciler.ts +689 -0
- package/src/functions/touch-pass-signup.ts +478 -0
- package/src/functions/upload-booking-display-image.ts +179 -0
- package/src/functions/virtual-onboarding-purge.ts +134 -0
- package/src/functions/virtual-onboarding-submit.ts +315 -0
- package/src/functions/voice-booking.ts +453 -0
- package/src/functions/voice-day-pass.ts +346 -0
- package/src/functions/voice-inquiry.test.ts +301 -0
- package/src/functions/voice-inquiry.ts +198 -0
- package/src/functions/voice-membership-signup.ts +355 -0
- package/src/functions/voice-tour-availability.ts +204 -0
- package/src/functions/voice-tour-booking.ts +429 -0
- package/src/gcalSync.ts +142 -0
- package/src/ghlEventInquiry.ts +143 -0
- package/src/ghlNote.ts +34 -0
- package/src/ghlTask.ts +48 -0
- package/src/ghlVoiceInquiry.ts +90 -0
- package/src/guestPrintCapture.test.ts +722 -0
- package/src/guestPrintCapture.ts +538 -0
- package/src/lumaGhl.ts +195 -0
- package/src/mailArrivalEmail.ts +121 -0
- package/src/manageToken.ts +363 -0
- package/src/membership.ts +109 -0
- package/src/membershipBusClient.ts +537 -0
- package/src/membershipWelcome.ts +683 -0
- package/src/migrationCheckout.ts +366 -0
- package/src/money.ts +36 -0
- package/src/ops.ts +97 -0
- package/src/pacificDate.ts +88 -0
- package/src/paymentLinkEmail.ts +123 -0
- package/src/policyAcknowledgment.test.ts +50 -0
- package/src/policyAcknowledgment.ts +96 -0
- package/src/portalSession.ts +46 -0
- package/src/pricing.test.ts +660 -0
- package/src/pricing.ts +1025 -0
- package/src/printBilling.test.ts +750 -0
- package/src/printBilling.ts +891 -0
- package/src/printBillingAdapters.ts +169 -0
- package/src/printCorrections.test.ts +348 -0
- package/src/printCorrections.ts +496 -0
- package/src/rateLimit.ts +82 -0
- package/src/referralCredits.test.ts +31 -0
- package/src/referralCredits.ts +34 -0
- package/src/referralGrant.ts +321 -0
- package/src/rescheduleCredit.test.ts +521 -0
- package/src/rescheduleCredit.ts +337 -0
- package/src/reservationWifiCode.test.ts +69 -0
- package/src/reservationWifiCode.ts +81 -0
- package/src/retellCallAnalyzed.test.ts +167 -0
- package/src/retellCallAnalyzed.ts +113 -0
- package/src/retellSignature.test.ts +137 -0
- package/src/retellSignature.ts +82 -0
- package/src/signedUnpaidReminderEmail.test.ts +246 -0
- package/src/signedUnpaidReminderEmail.ts +132 -0
- package/src/slackAlert.ts +38 -0
- package/src/stripeCoworkingPortal.ts +91 -0
- package/src/supabaseTestFakes.ts +131 -0
- package/src/supportTicketEmail.ts +119 -0
- package/src/tier1Agreement.ts +125 -0
- package/src/unifiAccessPolicies.ts +228 -0
- package/src/unifiGroups.ts +129 -0
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// Member wall photo -- best-effort link-fetch of a pasted external avatar
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// URL, so it can be captured at full quality for the physical member wall.
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// See member-wall-photo-plan-v1.md §3.4 for the full design and the Opus
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// adversarial review (§8) that hardened this from a v1 IP-deny-list draft
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// into the design below. This function is the direct, reviewed result of
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// that process -- do not weaken any of the guards below without re-running
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// that review, in particular:
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// - the bucket path (`fetched/{sub}/original`) is NOT the member's own
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// RLS-readable prefix -- writing here instead of `{sub}/original` is
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// what keeps this blind SSRF rather than full-read SSRF (review finding
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// B1). Never change this path to something the member can read back.
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// - the guard is a HOSTNAME ALLOW-LIST, not an IP deny-list. An IP
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// deny-list cannot be made sound in this runtime: Deno's fetch() has no
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// way to pin a DNS resolution, so DNS rebinding defeats any pre-connect
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// IP check unconditionally (review finding B2). The IP-literal checks
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// below are defense-in-depth on redirect targets only, not the primary
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// control.
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// - the URL fetched is ALWAYS read fresh from member_profiles.avatar_url
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// server-side, never a client-supplied body parameter (review finding
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// S3) -- this keeps every probe attributable to a real, rate-limited
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// profile write instead of making this an open URL-fetch primitive.
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// - the HTTP response is ALWAYS a constant `{ ok: true }` regardless of
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// outcome (review finding S4) -- the real reason lives only in
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// ops_events / last_fetch_error, never in the response body, because
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// that is the only oracle a direct caller has.
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import { createClient } from 'npm:@supabase/supabase-js@2';
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import { jwtVerify, createRemoteJWKSet } from 'npm:jose@5.9.6';
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import { clientIp, checkRateLimit } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/rateLimit';
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import { logOps } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/ops';
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const corsHeaders = {
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'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
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'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'authorization, x-client-info, apikey, content-type',
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'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, OPTIONS',
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};
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function json(status: number, body: unknown) {
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return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
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status,
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headers: { ...corsHeaders, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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}
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// Always this, regardless of what actually happened -- see file header, S4.
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const OK_RESPONSE = () => json(200, { ok: true });
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Auth -- deliberately NOT the admin-door-write pattern (no aal2, no
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// admin_users check). Any authenticated member may trigger this, scoped
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// strictly to their own claims.sub -- the function does nothing the caller
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// isn't entitled to do on their own behalf. What IS required, per review
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// finding B4: issuer/audience-bound JWT verification, role==='authenticated'
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// explicitly, is_anonymous rejected, and a real member_profiles row.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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interface CallerClaims {
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sub: string;
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email?: string;
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role?: string;
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is_anonymous?: boolean;
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}
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const JWKS_URL_SUFFIX = '/auth/v1/.well-known/jwks.json';
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let jwksCache: ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet> | null = null;
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function getJwks(supabaseUrl: string) {
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if (!jwksCache) jwksCache = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(`${supabaseUrl}${JWKS_URL_SUFFIX}`));
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return jwksCache;
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}
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async function verifyCaller(authHeader: string | null, supabaseUrl: string): Promise<CallerClaims | null> {
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if (!authHeader?.toLowerCase().startsWith('bearer ')) return null;
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try {
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(authHeader.slice(7).trim(), getJwks(supabaseUrl), {
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issuer: `${supabaseUrl}/auth/v1`,
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audience: 'authenticated',
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});
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const claims = payload as unknown as CallerClaims;
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if (!claims.sub) return null;
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if (claims.role !== 'authenticated') return null;
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if (claims.is_anonymous === true) return null;
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return claims;
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// URL guard -- hostname allow-list (review finding B2). Parse once, validate
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// only the parsed fields, fetch the parsed .href -- never the raw string
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// (review finding B2c). This alone disposes of the userinfo trick
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// (https://trusted.com@169.254.169.254/ puts the real host in .hostname) and
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// unicode/punycode confusion (.hostname is already IDNA-normalized).
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const ALLOWED_HOST_SUFFIXES = [
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'licdn.com', // LinkedIn CDN (media.licdn.com, etc.)
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'googleusercontent.com', // Google account photos (lh3.googleusercontent.com, etc.)
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'gravatar.com', // secure.gravatar.com, www.gravatar.com
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'githubusercontent.com', // avatars.githubusercontent.com
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];
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class GuardError extends Error {
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constructor(public code: string) {
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super(code);
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}
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}
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function hostAllowed(hostname: string): boolean {
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const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, '');
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return ALLOWED_HOST_SUFFIXES.some((s) => h === s || h.endsWith('.' + s));
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}
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// Defense-in-depth only (review finding B3) -- applied to IP literals at
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// every hop, including the initial URL. Not the primary control; the host
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// allow-list above is. v4-mapped/compatible v6 forms are normalized to their
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// embedded v4 address before the v4 list is applied, since Linux dual-stack
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// sockets connect those straight through.
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const V4_DENY_RANGES: Array<[number, number]> = (() => {
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const toInt = (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number) => ((a << 24) | (b << 16) | (c << 8) | d) >>> 0;
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const cidr = (base: [number, number, number, number], bits: number): [number, number] => {
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const start = toInt(...base);
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const size = 2 ** (32 - bits);
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return [start >>> 0, (start + size - 1) >>> 0];
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};
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return [
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cidr([0, 0, 0, 0], 8), // 0.0.0.0/8 -- reaches loopback on Linux
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cidr([10, 0, 0, 0], 8),
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cidr([100, 64, 0, 0], 10), // CGNAT -- includes Alibaba metadata 100.100.100.200
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cidr([127, 0, 0, 0], 8),
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cidr([169, 254, 0, 0], 16), // link-local -- cloud metadata endpoints
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cidr([172, 16, 0, 0], 12),
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cidr([192, 0, 0, 0], 24),
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cidr([192, 168, 0, 0], 16),
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cidr([198, 18, 0, 0], 15),
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cidr([224, 0, 0, 0], 4), // multicast
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cidr([240, 0, 0, 0], 4), // reserved
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[toInt(255, 255, 255, 255), toInt(255, 255, 255, 255)],
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];
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})();
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function v4ToInt(v4: string): number | null {
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const parts = v4.split('.').map(Number);
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if (parts.length !== 4 || parts.some((p) => !Number.isInteger(p) || p < 0 || p > 255)) return null;
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return ((parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8) | parts[3]) >>> 0;
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}
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function v4Denied(v4: string): boolean {
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const n = v4ToInt(v4);
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if (n === null) return true; // unparseable literal -- fail closed
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return V4_DENY_RANGES.some(([lo, hi]) => n >= lo && n <= hi);
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}
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// Extract an embedded v4 address from common IPv4-in-IPv6 forms
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// (::ffff:a.b.c.d, ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX, ::a.b.c.d, 64:ff9b::a.b.c.d NAT64,
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// 2002:XXXX:XXXX::/16 6to4). Returns null if none found.
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function embeddedV4(v6: string): string | null {
|
|
158
|
+
const lower = v6.toLowerCase();
|
|
159
|
+
const dotted = lower.match(/(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})$/);
|
|
160
|
+
if (dotted && (lower.startsWith('::ffff:') || lower.startsWith('::') || lower.startsWith('64:ff9b::'))) {
|
|
161
|
+
return dotted[1];
|
|
162
|
+
}
|
|
163
|
+
// ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX (hex form) or 6to4 2002:XXXX:XXXX::
|
|
164
|
+
const hexMatch = lower.match(/^(?:::ffff:|2002:)([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})/);
|
|
165
|
+
if (hexMatch) {
|
|
166
|
+
const hi = parseInt(hexMatch[1], 16);
|
|
167
|
+
const lo = parseInt(hexMatch[2], 16);
|
|
168
|
+
return `${(hi >> 8) & 0xff}.${hi & 0xff}.${(lo >> 8) & 0xff}.${lo & 0xff}`;
|
|
169
|
+
}
|
|
170
|
+
return null;
|
|
171
|
+
}
|
|
172
|
+
|
|
173
|
+
function ipLiteralDenied(hostname: string): boolean {
|
|
174
|
+
// v6 literal comes bracketed in a URL's .hostname per WHATWG (e.g. "::1")
|
|
175
|
+
const isV6 = hostname.includes(':');
|
|
176
|
+
if (!isV6) {
|
|
177
|
+
return /^[0-9.]+$/.test(hostname) ? v4Denied(hostname) : false; // not an IP literal at all -> not this check's job
|
|
178
|
+
}
|
|
179
|
+
const bare = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
|
|
180
|
+
if (['::', '::1'].includes(bare)) return true;
|
|
181
|
+
if (/^fc[0-9a-f]{2}:/i.test(bare) || /^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/i.test(bare)) return true; // fc00::/7, fe80::/10
|
|
182
|
+
if (/^ff/i.test(bare)) return true; // ff00::/8 multicast
|
|
183
|
+
if (bare.toLowerCase().startsWith('2001:0:') || bare.toLowerCase().startsWith('2001::')) return true; // Teredo 2001::/32
|
|
184
|
+
const embedded = embeddedV4(bare);
|
|
185
|
+
if (embedded) return v4Denied(embedded);
|
|
186
|
+
return false;
|
|
187
|
+
}
|
|
188
|
+
|
|
189
|
+
function validate(raw: string): URL {
|
|
190
|
+
if (raw.length > 2048) throw new GuardError('url_too_long');
|
|
191
|
+
let u: URL;
|
|
192
|
+
try {
|
|
193
|
+
u = new URL(raw);
|
|
194
|
+
} catch {
|
|
195
|
+
throw new GuardError('bad_url');
|
|
196
|
+
}
|
|
197
|
+
if (u.protocol !== 'https:') throw new GuardError('scheme_not_allowed');
|
|
198
|
+
if (u.port !== '') throw new GuardError('port_not_allowed'); // WHATWG strips :443; '' is the only legal value
|
|
199
|
+
if (u.username || u.password) throw new GuardError('userinfo_not_allowed');
|
|
200
|
+
if (ipLiteralDenied(u.hostname)) throw new GuardError('ip_range_blocked');
|
|
201
|
+
if (!hostAllowed(u.hostname)) throw new GuardError('host_not_allowed');
|
|
202
|
+
return u; // fetch u.href -- the parsed/normalized form -- never `raw`
|
|
203
|
+
}
|
|
204
|
+
|
|
205
|
+
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
206
|
+
// Fetch, with redirect handling, one shared deadline, streamed size cap, and
|
|
207
|
+
// magic-byte content sniffing.
|
|
208
|
+
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
209
|
+
|
|
210
|
+
const MAX_BYTES = 15 * 1024 * 1024;
|
|
211
|
+
const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 8000;
|
|
212
|
+
const MAX_REDIRECTS = 3;
|
|
213
|
+
|
|
214
|
+
const MAGIC: Array<{ type: string; bytes: number[]; mask?: (b: Uint8Array) => boolean }> = [
|
|
215
|
+
{ type: 'image/jpeg', bytes: [0xff, 0xd8, 0xff] },
|
|
216
|
+
{ type: 'image/png', bytes: [0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a] },
|
|
217
|
+
{ type: 'image/gif', bytes: [0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38] },
|
|
218
|
+
{
|
|
219
|
+
type: 'image/webp',
|
|
220
|
+
bytes: [0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46],
|
|
221
|
+
mask: (b) => b.length >= 12 && b[8] === 0x57 && b[9] === 0x45 && b[10] === 0x42 && b[11] === 0x50,
|
|
222
|
+
},
|
|
223
|
+
];
|
|
224
|
+
|
|
225
|
+
function sniffType(head: Uint8Array): string | null {
|
|
226
|
+
for (const m of MAGIC) {
|
|
227
|
+
if (head.length < m.bytes.length) continue;
|
|
228
|
+
if (m.bytes.every((byte, i) => head[i] === byte) && (!m.mask || m.mask(head))) return m.type;
|
|
229
|
+
}
|
|
230
|
+
return null;
|
|
231
|
+
}
|
|
232
|
+
|
|
233
|
+
interface FetchResult {
|
|
234
|
+
bytes: Uint8Array;
|
|
235
|
+
contentType: string;
|
|
236
|
+
finalHost: string;
|
|
237
|
+
}
|
|
238
|
+
|
|
239
|
+
async function guardedFetch(startUrl: URL, deadline: number, userAgent: string): Promise<FetchResult> {
|
|
240
|
+
let current = startUrl;
|
|
241
|
+
for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
|
|
242
|
+
const remaining = deadline - Date.now();
|
|
243
|
+
if (remaining <= 0) throw new GuardError('fetch_timeout');
|
|
244
|
+
const controller = new AbortController();
|
|
245
|
+
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), remaining);
|
|
246
|
+
let res: Response;
|
|
247
|
+
try {
|
|
248
|
+
res = await fetch(current.href, {
|
|
249
|
+
redirect: 'manual',
|
|
250
|
+
signal: controller.signal,
|
|
251
|
+
headers: { 'User-Agent': userAgent, Accept: 'image/*' },
|
|
252
|
+
});
|
|
253
|
+
} catch (e) {
|
|
254
|
+
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
255
|
+
if ((e as Error)?.name === 'AbortError') throw new GuardError('fetch_timeout');
|
|
256
|
+
throw new GuardError('fetch_failed');
|
|
257
|
+
}
|
|
258
|
+
|
|
259
|
+
if (res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
|
|
260
|
+
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
261
|
+
const loc = res.headers.get('location');
|
|
262
|
+
if (!loc) throw new GuardError('redirect_missing_location');
|
|
263
|
+
if (hop === MAX_REDIRECTS) throw new GuardError('too_many_redirects');
|
|
264
|
+
let next: URL;
|
|
265
|
+
try {
|
|
266
|
+
next = new URL(loc, current.href); // resolve against the CURRENT hop, not the origin
|
|
267
|
+
} catch {
|
|
268
|
+
throw new GuardError('redirect_unparseable');
|
|
269
|
+
}
|
|
270
|
+
current = validate(next.href); // re-run the FULL guard, not just the IP check
|
|
271
|
+
continue;
|
|
272
|
+
}
|
|
273
|
+
|
|
274
|
+
if (!res.ok) {
|
|
275
|
+
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
276
|
+
throw new GuardError(`fetch_status_${res.status}`);
|
|
277
|
+
}
|
|
278
|
+
|
|
279
|
+
const rawType = (res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '').split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
|
|
280
|
+
if (!['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp', 'image/gif'].includes(rawType)) {
|
|
281
|
+
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
282
|
+
throw new GuardError('not_an_image');
|
|
283
|
+
}
|
|
284
|
+
|
|
285
|
+
if (!res.body) {
|
|
286
|
+
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
287
|
+
throw new GuardError('empty_body');
|
|
288
|
+
}
|
|
289
|
+
|
|
290
|
+
const reader = res.body.getReader();
|
|
291
|
+
const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
|
|
292
|
+
let total = 0;
|
|
293
|
+
try {
|
|
294
|
+
for (;;) {
|
|
295
|
+
if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new GuardError('fetch_timeout');
|
|
296
|
+
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
|
|
297
|
+
if (done) break;
|
|
298
|
+
total += value.byteLength;
|
|
299
|
+
if (total > MAX_BYTES) throw new GuardError('too_large');
|
|
300
|
+
chunks.push(value);
|
|
301
|
+
}
|
|
302
|
+
} finally {
|
|
303
|
+
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
304
|
+
try {
|
|
305
|
+
reader.releaseLock();
|
|
306
|
+
} catch {
|
|
307
|
+
/* already released */
|
|
308
|
+
}
|
|
309
|
+
}
|
|
310
|
+
|
|
311
|
+
const bytes = new Uint8Array(total);
|
|
312
|
+
let offset = 0;
|
|
313
|
+
for (const c of chunks) {
|
|
314
|
+
bytes.set(c, offset);
|
|
315
|
+
offset += c.byteLength;
|
|
316
|
+
}
|
|
317
|
+
|
|
318
|
+
const sniffed = sniffType(bytes.subarray(0, 12));
|
|
319
|
+
if (!sniffed) throw new GuardError('not_an_image'); // header claimed image/*, bytes say otherwise
|
|
320
|
+
|
|
321
|
+
return { bytes, contentType: sniffed, finalHost: current.hostname };
|
|
322
|
+
}
|
|
323
|
+
throw new GuardError('too_many_redirects');
|
|
324
|
+
}
|
|
325
|
+
|
|
326
|
+
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
327
|
+
// Handler
|
|
328
|
+
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
329
|
+
|
|
330
|
+
export async function handle(req: Request, operator: { userAgent: string }): Promise<Response> {
|
|
331
|
+
if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') return new Response('ok', { headers: corsHeaders });
|
|
332
|
+
if (req.method !== 'POST') return OK_RESPONSE(); // S4: constant response even for a malformed call shape
|
|
333
|
+
|
|
334
|
+
const SUPABASE_URL = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')!;
|
|
335
|
+
const SERVICE_ROLE_KEY = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')!;
|
|
336
|
+
|
|
337
|
+
const caller = await verifyCaller(req.headers.get('Authorization') ?? req.headers.get('authorization'), SUPABASE_URL);
|
|
338
|
+
if (!caller) return OK_RESPONSE(); // never reveal auth failure via response shape
|
|
339
|
+
|
|
340
|
+
const admin = createClient(SUPABASE_URL, SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, {
|
|
341
|
+
auth: { persistSession: false, autoRefreshToken: false },
|
|
342
|
+
});
|
|
343
|
+
|
|
344
|
+
const ip = clientIp(req);
|
|
345
|
+
|
|
346
|
+
// Charged BEFORE any URL validation (review finding B4b) -- otherwise
|
|
347
|
+
// rejected probes against the guard itself are free.
|
|
348
|
+
const [subHourOk, subDayOk, ipHourOk] = await Promise.all([
|
|
349
|
+
checkRateLimit(admin, 'fetch-avatar-original-sub-hour', caller.sub, 5, 3600),
|
|
350
|
+
checkRateLimit(admin, 'fetch-avatar-original-sub-day', caller.sub, 20, 86400),
|
|
351
|
+
checkRateLimit(admin, 'fetch-avatar-original-ip-hour', ip, 20, 3600),
|
|
352
|
+
]);
|
|
353
|
+
if (!subHourOk || !subDayOk || !ipHourOk) {
|
|
354
|
+
await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_rejected', { sub: caller.sub, reason: 'rate_limited' }, { severity: 'warning' });
|
|
355
|
+
return OK_RESPONSE();
|
|
356
|
+
}
|
|
357
|
+
|
|
358
|
+
// "Authenticated" needs a floor beyond the JWT alone (review finding B4c):
|
|
359
|
+
// require a real member_profiles row for this caller.
|
|
360
|
+
const { data: profile, error: profileErr } = await admin
|
|
361
|
+
.from('member_profiles')
|
|
362
|
+
.select('avatar_url')
|
|
363
|
+
.eq('auth_user_id', caller.sub)
|
|
364
|
+
.maybeSingle();
|
|
365
|
+
if (profileErr || !profile) {
|
|
366
|
+
await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_rejected', { sub: caller.sub, reason: 'no_member_profile' }, { severity: 'warning' });
|
|
367
|
+
return OK_RESPONSE();
|
|
368
|
+
}
|
|
369
|
+
|
|
370
|
+
// The URL fetched is ALWAYS read fresh from the DB, never a client-supplied
|
|
371
|
+
// body parameter (review finding S3) -- keeps this from being a generic
|
|
372
|
+
// authenticated URL-fetch primitive.
|
|
373
|
+
const target = profile.avatar_url as string | null;
|
|
374
|
+
|
|
375
|
+
const writeFailure = async (reason: string, host: string | null) => {
|
|
376
|
+
await admin
|
|
377
|
+
.from('member_wall_photo_queue')
|
|
378
|
+
.upsert(
|
|
379
|
+
{
|
|
380
|
+
auth_user_id: caller.sub,
|
|
381
|
+
last_fetch_error: reason,
|
|
382
|
+
last_fetch_at: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
383
|
+
last_fetch_host: host,
|
|
384
|
+
},
|
|
385
|
+
{ onConflict: 'auth_user_id' },
|
|
386
|
+
);
|
|
387
|
+
await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_failed', { sub: caller.sub, reason, host }, { severity: 'info' });
|
|
388
|
+
};
|
|
389
|
+
|
|
390
|
+
if (!target) {
|
|
391
|
+
await writeFailure('no_avatar_url', null);
|
|
392
|
+
return OK_RESPONSE();
|
|
393
|
+
}
|
|
394
|
+
|
|
395
|
+
let validated: URL;
|
|
396
|
+
try {
|
|
397
|
+
validated = validate(target);
|
|
398
|
+
} catch (e) {
|
|
399
|
+
const code = e instanceof GuardError ? e.code : 'bad_url';
|
|
400
|
+
let host: string | null = null;
|
|
401
|
+
try {
|
|
402
|
+
host = new URL(target).hostname;
|
|
403
|
+
} catch {
|
|
404
|
+
/* not even parseable -- host stays null */
|
|
405
|
+
}
|
|
406
|
+
await writeFailure(code, host);
|
|
407
|
+
return OK_RESPONSE();
|
|
408
|
+
}
|
|
409
|
+
|
|
410
|
+
const deadline = Date.now() + FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
411
|
+
let result: FetchResult;
|
|
412
|
+
try {
|
|
413
|
+
result = await guardedFetch(validated, deadline, operator.userAgent);
|
|
414
|
+
} catch (e) {
|
|
415
|
+
const code = e instanceof GuardError ? e.code : 'fetch_failed';
|
|
416
|
+
await writeFailure(code, validated.hostname);
|
|
417
|
+
return OK_RESPONSE();
|
|
418
|
+
}
|
|
419
|
+
|
|
420
|
+
// Success path: write under fetched/{sub}/original -- NOT {sub}/original.
|
|
421
|
+
// This is the RLS-inaccessible-to-members prefix (plan §3.1, review B1).
|
|
422
|
+
// Never change this without re-running the review.
|
|
423
|
+
const objectPath = `fetched/${caller.sub}/original`;
|
|
424
|
+
const { error: uploadErr } = await admin.storage
|
|
425
|
+
.from('member-photo-originals')
|
|
426
|
+
.upload(objectPath, result.bytes, { contentType: result.contentType, upsert: true });
|
|
427
|
+
if (uploadErr) {
|
|
428
|
+
await writeFailure('storage_write_failed', result.finalHost);
|
|
429
|
+
return OK_RESPONSE();
|
|
430
|
+
}
|
|
431
|
+
|
|
432
|
+
const { error: rpcErr } = await admin.rpc('upsert_wall_photo_queue_entry_for', {
|
|
433
|
+
p_auth_user_id: caller.sub,
|
|
434
|
+
p_object_path: objectPath,
|
|
435
|
+
p_content_type: result.contentType,
|
|
436
|
+
p_byte_size: result.bytes.byteLength,
|
|
437
|
+
p_source_url: validated.href, // normalized, post-validation form only -- never the raw pasted string (review S1)
|
|
438
|
+
});
|
|
439
|
+
if (rpcErr) {
|
|
440
|
+
await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_failed', { sub: caller.sub, reason: 'queue_upsert_failed', detail: rpcErr.message }, { severity: 'error' });
|
|
441
|
+
return OK_RESPONSE();
|
|
442
|
+
}
|
|
443
|
+
|
|
444
|
+
await logOps(
|
|
445
|
+
admin,
|
|
446
|
+
'wall_photo_fetch_succeeded',
|
|
447
|
+
{
|
|
448
|
+
sub: caller.sub,
|
|
449
|
+
host: result.finalHost,
|
|
450
|
+
content_type: result.contentType,
|
|
451
|
+
byte_size: result.bytes.byteLength,
|
|
452
|
+
},
|
|
453
|
+
{ severity: 'info' }, // logOps defaults to 'error' (which pages Slack) -- a
|
|
454
|
+
// successful fetch is the routine case, not an alert.
|
|
455
|
+
);
|
|
456
|
+
return OK_RESPONSE();
|
|
457
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { createClient } from 'npm:@supabase/supabase-js@2';
|
|
2
|
+
import { jwtVerify, createRemoteJWKSet } from 'npm:jose@5.9.6';
|
|
3
|
+
import { clientIp, checkRateLimit } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/rateLimit';
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
const corsHeaders = {
|
|
6
|
+
'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
|
|
7
|
+
'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'authorization, x-client-info, apikey, content-type',
|
|
8
|
+
'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, OPTIONS',
|
|
9
|
+
};
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
interface CallerClaims {
|
|
12
|
+
sub: string;
|
|
13
|
+
email?: string;
|
|
14
|
+
aal?: string;
|
|
15
|
+
}
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
const JWKS_URL_SUFFIX = '/auth/v1/.well-known/jwks.json';
|
|
18
|
+
let jwksCache: ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet> | null = null;
|
|
19
|
+
function getJwks(supabaseUrl: string) {
|
|
20
|
+
if (!jwksCache) jwksCache = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(`${supabaseUrl}${JWKS_URL_SUFFIX}`));
|
|
21
|
+
return jwksCache;
|
|
22
|
+
}
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
async function verifyCaller(authHeader: string | null, supabaseUrl: string): Promise<CallerClaims | null> {
|
|
25
|
+
if (!authHeader?.toLowerCase().startsWith('bearer ')) return null;
|
|
26
|
+
const token = authHeader.slice(7).trim();
|
|
27
|
+
try {
|
|
28
|
+
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, getJwks(supabaseUrl));
|
|
29
|
+
const claims = payload as unknown as CallerClaims;
|
|
30
|
+
if (!claims.sub) return null;
|
|
31
|
+
return claims;
|
|
32
|
+
} catch {
|
|
33
|
+
return null;
|
|
34
|
+
}
|
|
35
|
+
}
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
function json(status: number, body: unknown) {
|
|
38
|
+
return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
|
|
39
|
+
status,
|
|
40
|
+
headers: { ...corsHeaders, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
|
41
|
+
});
|
|
42
|
+
}
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
// Statuses where the document is live in BoldSign and still awaiting signatures.
|
|
45
|
+
const SIGNABLE_STATUSES = new Set(['sent', 'viewed', 'signed']);
|
|
46
|
+
|
|
47
|
+
export async function handle(req: Request, operator: { providerSignerEmail: string }): Promise<Response> {
|
|
48
|
+
if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') return new Response('ok', { headers: corsHeaders });
|
|
49
|
+
if (req.method !== 'POST') return json(405, { ok: false, error: 'method_not_allowed' });
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
const SUPABASE_URL = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')!;
|
|
52
|
+
const SERVICE_ROLE_KEY = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')!;
|
|
53
|
+
|
|
54
|
+
const authHeader = req.headers.get('Authorization') || req.headers.get('authorization');
|
|
55
|
+
const caller = await verifyCaller(authHeader, SUPABASE_URL);
|
|
56
|
+
if (!caller) return json(401, { ok: false, error: 'unauthenticated' });
|
|
57
|
+
if (caller.aal !== 'aal2') return json(403, { ok: false, error: 'mfa_required' });
|
|
58
|
+
const callerEmail = (caller.email ?? '').toLowerCase();
|
|
59
|
+
if (!callerEmail) return json(403, { ok: false, error: 'no_email' });
|
|
60
|
+
|
|
61
|
+
const admin = createClient(SUPABASE_URL, SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, {
|
|
62
|
+
auth: { persistSession: false, autoRefreshToken: false },
|
|
63
|
+
});
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
const [ipOk, emailOk] = await Promise.all([
|
|
66
|
+
checkRateLimit(admin, 'provider-sign-link-ip', clientIp(req), 30, 300),
|
|
67
|
+
checkRateLimit(admin, 'provider-sign-link-email', callerEmail, 20, 300),
|
|
68
|
+
]);
|
|
69
|
+
if (!ipOk || !emailOk) return json(429, { ok: false, error: 'rate_limited' });
|
|
70
|
+
|
|
71
|
+
// Exact match on the citext email column — never pass a caller-controlled value
|
|
72
|
+
// as a LIKE pattern (`%`/`_` are legal in an email local-part).
|
|
73
|
+
const { data: allow, error: allowErr } = await admin
|
|
74
|
+
.from('admin_users').select('email').eq('email', callerEmail).maybeSingle();
|
|
75
|
+
if (allowErr) return json(500, { ok: false, error: 'allowlist_lookup_failed' });
|
|
76
|
+
if (!allow) return json(403, { ok: false, error: 'not_authorized' });
|
|
77
|
+
|
|
78
|
+
let body: { signature_document_id?: string };
|
|
79
|
+
try {
|
|
80
|
+
body = await req.json();
|
|
81
|
+
} catch {
|
|
82
|
+
return json(400, { ok: false, error: 'invalid_json' });
|
|
83
|
+
}
|
|
84
|
+
const docId = (body.signature_document_id ?? '').trim();
|
|
85
|
+
if (!/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i.test(docId)) {
|
|
86
|
+
return json(400, { ok: false, error: 'invalid_signature_document_id' });
|
|
87
|
+
}
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
try {
|
|
90
|
+
const { data: row, error: rowErr } = await admin
|
|
91
|
+
.from('signature_documents')
|
|
92
|
+
.select('id,status,boldsign_document_id')
|
|
93
|
+
.eq('id', docId)
|
|
94
|
+
.maybeSingle();
|
|
95
|
+
if (rowErr) return json(500, { ok: false, error: 'row_lookup_failed', detail: rowErr.message });
|
|
96
|
+
if (!row) return json(404, { ok: false, error: 'not_found' });
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
if (!row.boldsign_document_id) {
|
|
99
|
+
return json(409, {
|
|
100
|
+
ok: false,
|
|
101
|
+
error: 'not_sent',
|
|
102
|
+
detail: 'This agreement has not been sent to BoldSign yet, so there is nothing to sign.',
|
|
103
|
+
});
|
|
104
|
+
}
|
|
105
|
+
if (!SIGNABLE_STATUSES.has(String(row.status).toLowerCase())) {
|
|
106
|
+
return json(409, {
|
|
107
|
+
ok: false,
|
|
108
|
+
error: 'not_signable',
|
|
109
|
+
detail: `Document status is "${row.status}"; a signing link is only available while the document is out for signature.`,
|
|
110
|
+
});
|
|
111
|
+
}
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
const apiKey = Deno.env.get('BOLDSIGN_API_KEY');
|
|
114
|
+
if (!apiKey) return json(500, { ok: false, error: 'boldsign_not_configured' });
|
|
115
|
+
|
|
116
|
+
// Always our own internal signer — never taken from the request body.
|
|
117
|
+
const signerEmail = operator.providerSignerEmail;
|
|
118
|
+
|
|
119
|
+
const url =
|
|
120
|
+
'https://api.boldsign.com/v1/document/getEmbeddedSignLink' +
|
|
121
|
+
`?documentId=${encodeURIComponent(row.boldsign_document_id)}` +
|
|
122
|
+
`&signerEmail=${encodeURIComponent(signerEmail)}`;
|
|
123
|
+
|
|
124
|
+
const res = await fetch(url, {
|
|
125
|
+
method: 'GET',
|
|
126
|
+
headers: { 'X-API-KEY': apiKey, accept: 'application/json' },
|
|
127
|
+
});
|
|
128
|
+
const text = await res.text();
|
|
129
|
+
if (!res.ok) {
|
|
130
|
+
return json(500, {
|
|
131
|
+
ok: false,
|
|
132
|
+
error: 'boldsign_failed',
|
|
133
|
+
detail: `BoldSign ${res.status}: ${text}`.slice(0, 500),
|
|
134
|
+
});
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
|
|
137
|
+
let signLink: string | null = null;
|
|
138
|
+
try {
|
|
139
|
+
signLink = (JSON.parse(text) as { signLink?: string }).signLink ?? null;
|
|
140
|
+
} catch {
|
|
141
|
+
signLink = null;
|
|
142
|
+
}
|
|
143
|
+
if (!signLink) {
|
|
144
|
+
return json(500, {
|
|
145
|
+
ok: false,
|
|
146
|
+
error: 'no_sign_link',
|
|
147
|
+
detail: `BoldSign returned no signLink: ${text}`.slice(0, 500),
|
|
148
|
+
});
|
|
149
|
+
}
|
|
150
|
+
|
|
151
|
+
return json(200, { ok: true, signLink });
|
|
152
|
+
} catch (e) {
|
|
153
|
+
return json(500, { ok: false, error: 'unhandled', detail: String(e).slice(0, 500) });
|
|
154
|
+
}
|
|
155
|
+
}
|