@simple-auth-kit/cli 1.0.0

package/registry/combos/express-drizzle/variants/workspaces/src/auth.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,545 @@
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { and, desc, eq, gt, or } from "drizzle-orm";
+import { hashPassword, verifyPassword } from "@/lib/auth/core/crypto.js";
+import {
+  buildAuthorizationUrl,
+  APPLE_OIDC_PROVIDER,
+  completeOAuthLogin,
+  exchangeCodeForTokens,
+  GOOGLE_OIDC_PROVIDER,
+  OAuthProviderDescriptor,
+  signAppleClientSecret,
+  verifyIdTokenAndExtractProfile,
+} from "@/lib/auth/core/oauth.js";
+import { requestPasswordReset as coreRequestPasswordReset, resetPassword as coreResetPassword } from "@/lib/auth/core/password-reset.js";
+import { checkRateLimit, type RateLimitDeps } from "@/lib/auth/core/rate-limit.js";
+import {
+  blockUser,
+  createSession,
+  deactivateUser,
+  revokeAccessToken,
+  revokeAllSessionsForUser,
+  revokeOtherSessionsForUser,
+  revokeSession,
+  rotateRefreshToken,
+} from "@/lib/auth/core/session-policy.js";
+import { signAccessToken, signRefreshToken, signTwoFactorChallengeToken, verifyRefreshToken, verifyTwoFactorChallengeToken } from "@/lib/auth/core/token-service.js";
+import { buildTotpProvisioningUri, generateBackupCodes, generateTotpSecret, verifyTotpCode } from "@/lib/auth/core/two-factor.js";
+import type { AuthConfig } from "./auth.config.js";
+import { HttpError } from "./http-error.js";
+import { AuditLogEntry, AuditLogListFilter, AuditLogRepository, toAuditLogEntry } from "./audit-log.repository.js";
+import type { Paginated } from "./pagination.js";
+import type { Database } from "./db.js";
+import { KeyProviderService } from "./key-provider.js";
+import { OAuthRepository } from "./oauth.repository.js";
+import { PasswordResetRepository } from "./password-reset.repository.js";
+import type { Revoker } from "@/lib/auth/core/types.js";
+import type { AuthzContext } from "./authz.middleware.js";
+import { MemberListFilter, MemberListResult, MemberSummary, PermissionInput, PermissionSummary, RbacRepository, RoleSummary, toMemberSummary } from "./rbac.repository.js";
+import { sessions, users } from "./schema.js";
+import { SessionRepository } from "./session.repository.js";
+import { TwoFactorRepository } from "./two-factor.repository.js";
+import { toId, toIdOrNull } from "./id.helper.js";
+
+export interface AuthTokens {
+  accessToken: string;
+  refreshToken: string;
+  sessionId: string;
+}
+
+export interface TwoFactorChallenge {
+  twoFactorRequired: true;
+  challengeToken: string;
+}
+
+/** `PATCH /auth/me`'s return shape — the same across every combo, workspace-scoped or not, since a profile isn't a workspace concept. */
+export interface SelfProfile {
+  id: string;
+  email: string;
+  firstName: string | null;
+  lastName: string | null;
+  displayName: string | null;
+  phone: string | null;
+  username: string | null;
+  photo: string | null;
+  createdAt: string;
+}
+
+// Plain class, manually constructed with its dependencies (see create-auth-app.ts) —
+// no Nest DI container, no decorators. Wires registry/core functions to the
+// Drizzle-backed repositories/key-provider/rate-limit exactly like the reference combo.
+export class AuthService {
+  constructor(
+    private readonly db: Database,
+    private readonly sessions: SessionRepository,
+    private readonly keys: KeyProviderService,
+    private readonly rateLimit: RateLimitDeps,
+    private readonly auditLog: AuditLogRepository,
+    private readonly rbac: RbacRepository,
+    private readonly twoFactor: TwoFactorRepository,
+    private readonly oauth: OAuthRepository,
+    private readonly passwordReset: PasswordResetRepository,
+    private readonly config: AuthConfig,
+  ) {}
+
+  /** Creates the user and nothing else. Joining or creating a workspace is a separate, explicit call — see WorkspaceController. */
+  async signup(input: {
+    email: string;
+    password: string;
+    firstName?: string;
+    lastName?: string;
+    displayName?: string;
+    phone?: string;
+    username?: string;
+    userAgent?: string;
+    ip?: string;
+  }): Promise<AuthTokens> {
+    const [existing] = await this.db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.email, input.email)).limit(1);
+    if (existing) throw new HttpError(409, "email already registered");
+
+    const passwordHash = await hashPassword(input.password);
+    const [user] = await this.db
+      .insert(users)
+      .values({
+        email: input.email,
+        passwordHash,
+        firstName: input.firstName,
+        lastName: input.lastName,
+        displayName: input.displayName,
+        phone: input.phone,
+        username: input.username,
+      })
+      .returning();
+    return this.issueSessionTokens(user, { userAgent: input.userAgent, ip: input.ip });
+  }
+
+  /** Returns full tokens directly, or a short-lived challenge if the account has 2FA enabled — see `loginTwoFactor`. */
+  async login(input: { identifier: string; password: string; userAgent?: string; ip?: string }): Promise<AuthTokens | TwoFactorChallenge> {
+    const { allowed } = await checkRateLimit(this.rateLimit, "login", input.identifier);
+    if (!allowed) throw new HttpError(429, "too many login attempts");
+
+    const [user] = await this.db
+      .select()
+      .from(users)
+      .where(or(eq(users.email, input.identifier), eq(users.username, input.identifier), eq(users.phone, input.identifier)))
+      .limit(1);
+    if (!user || user.blocked || !user.isActive || user.isDeleted || !user.passwordHash) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid credentials");
+
+    const valid = await verifyPassword(user.passwordHash, input.password);
+    if (!valid) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid credentials");
+
+    if (user.twoFactorEnabled) {
+      const key = await this.keys.getActiveKey();
+      const { token } = await signTwoFactorChallengeToken({ activeKey: key }, user.id.toString()); // core-facing: sub must be string
+      return { twoFactorRequired: true, challengeToken: token };
+    }
+
+    return this.issueSessionTokens(user, { userAgent: input.userAgent, ip: input.ip });
+  }
+
+  /** Completes the challenge `login()` returned when 2FA is enabled — a TOTP code or an unused backup code. */
+  async loginTwoFactor(input: { challengeToken: string; code: string; userAgent?: string; ip?: string }): Promise<AuthTokens> {
+    const { sub } = await verifyTwoFactorChallengeToken({ secret: this.keys.secret }, input.challengeToken);
+
+    const [user] = await this.db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.id, toId(sub))).limit(1);
+    if (!user || user.blocked || !user.isActive || user.isDeleted || !user.twoFactorEnabled || !user.twoFactorSecret) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid credentials");
+
+    const validTotp = verifyTotpCode(user.twoFactorSecret, input.code);
+    const validBackup = !validTotp && (await this.twoFactor.consumeBackupCode(user.id, input.code));
+    if (!validTotp && !validBackup) {
+      await this.sessions.appendAuditEvent({ type: "two_factor_challenge_failed", userId: user.id.toString() }); // core-facing: string
+      throw new HttpError(401, "invalid two-factor code");
+    }
+
+    return this.issueSessionTokens(user, { userAgent: input.userAgent, ip: input.ip });
+  }
+
+  async enrollTwoFactor(userId: string): Promise<{ secret: string; provisioningUri: string }> {
+    const idBig = toId(userId);
+    const user = await this.getUserOrThrow(userId);
+    const secret = generateTotpSecret();
+    // Not enabled yet — confirmTwoFactor() flips that, so an abandoned enrollment never locks the account out.
+    await this.db.update(users).set({ twoFactorSecret: secret, twoFactorEnabled: false }).where(eq(users.id, idBig));
+    return { secret, provisioningUri: buildTotpProvisioningUri({ secret, accountName: user.email, issuer: this.config.twoFactorIssuer }) };
+  }
+
+  async confirmTwoFactor(userId: string, code: string): Promise<{ backupCodes: string[] }> {
+    const idBig = toId(userId);
+    const user = await this.getUserOrThrow(userId);
+    if (!user.twoFactorSecret) throw new HttpError(400, "call enrollTwoFactor first");
+    if (!verifyTotpCode(user.twoFactorSecret, code)) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid two-factor code");
+
+    const backupCodes = generateBackupCodes();
+    await this.twoFactor.saveBackupCodes(idBig, backupCodes.map((c) => c.hash));
+    await this.db.update(users).set({ twoFactorEnabled: true }).where(eq(users.id, idBig));
+    await this.sessions.appendAuditEvent({ type: "two_factor_enabled", userId });
+    return { backupCodes: backupCodes.map((c) => c.code) };
+  }
+
+  async disableTwoFactor(userId: string, code: string): Promise<void> {
+    const idBig = toId(userId);
+    const user = await this.getUserOrThrow(userId);
+    if (!user.twoFactorEnabled || !user.twoFactorSecret) throw new HttpError(400, "two-factor is not enabled");
+
+    const validTotp = verifyTotpCode(user.twoFactorSecret, code);
+    const validBackup = !validTotp && (await this.twoFactor.consumeBackupCode(idBig, code));
+    if (!validTotp && !validBackup) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid two-factor code");
+
+    await this.db.update(users).set({ twoFactorEnabled: false, twoFactorSecret: null }).where(eq(users.id, idBig));
+    await this.twoFactor.clearBackupCodes(idBig);
+    await this.sessions.appendAuditEvent({ type: "two_factor_disabled", userId });
+  }
+
+  /** Always succeeds from the caller's point of view — an unknown email or a throttled request looks identical, to avoid enumeration. */
+  async requestPasswordReset(email: string): Promise<void> {
+    const [user] = await this.db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.email, email)).limit(1);
+    if (!user || user.isDeleted) return;
+
+    const { allowed } = await checkRateLimit(this.rateLimit, "password-reset", email);
+    if (!allowed) return;
+
+    const { token } = await coreRequestPasswordReset(this.passwordReset, user.id.toString());
+    if (this.config.sendPasswordResetEmail) await this.config.sendPasswordResetEmail(email, token);
+  }
+
+  async resetPassword(token: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void> {
+    const { userId } = await coreResetPassword(this.passwordReset, token, newPassword);
+    // The old password is no longer trusted, so neither are its sessions. The revoker is the user
+    // themselves — they proved control of the account by consuming the reset token.
+    await revokeAllSessionsForUser(this.sessions, userId, { userId });
+  }
+
+  /** Builds the redirect URL for `provider`. `state` is an opaque anti-CSRF nonce the provider echoes back verbatim. */
+  async startOAuth(provider: string): Promise<{ url: string }> {
+    const state = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ nonce: randomUUID() })).toString("base64url");
+
+    if (provider === "google") {
+      const creds = this.config.oauthProviders.google;
+      if (!creds) throw new HttpError(400, "google OAuth is not configured");
+      return { url: buildAuthorizationUrl(GOOGLE_OIDC_PROVIDER, { clientId: creds.clientId, redirectUri: creds.redirectUri, state }) };
+    }
+    if (provider === "apple") {
+      const creds = this.config.oauthProviders.apple;
+      if (!creds) throw new HttpError(400, "apple OAuth is not configured");
+      return { url: buildAuthorizationUrl(APPLE_OIDC_PROVIDER, { clientId: creds.clientId, redirectUri: creds.redirectUri, state }) };
+    }
+    throw new HttpError(400, `unknown OAuth provider "${provider}"`);
+  }
+
+  async completeOAuthCallback(provider: string, code: string, _state: string): Promise<AuthTokens> {
+    let providerDescriptor: OAuthProviderDescriptor;
+    let clientId: string;
+    let idToken: string;
+
+    if (provider === "google") {
+      const creds = this.config.oauthProviders.google;
+      if (!creds) throw new HttpError(400, "google OAuth is not configured");
+      providerDescriptor = GOOGLE_OIDC_PROVIDER;
+      clientId = creds.clientId;
+      idToken = (
+        await exchangeCodeForTokens(GOOGLE_OIDC_PROVIDER, { clientId: creds.clientId, clientSecret: creds.clientSecret, redirectUri: creds.redirectUri, code })
+      ).idToken;
+    } else if (provider === "apple") {
+      const creds = this.config.oauthProviders.apple;
+      if (!creds) throw new HttpError(400, "apple OAuth is not configured");
+      providerDescriptor = APPLE_OIDC_PROVIDER;
+      clientId = creds.clientId;
+      const clientSecret = await signAppleClientSecret({ teamId: creds.teamId, clientId: creds.clientId, keyId: creds.keyId, privateKeyPem: creds.privateKey });
+      idToken = (await exchangeCodeForTokens(APPLE_OIDC_PROVIDER, { clientId: creds.clientId, clientSecret, redirectUri: creds.redirectUri, code })).idToken;
+    } else {
+      throw new HttpError(400, `unknown OAuth provider "${provider}"`);
+    }
+
+    const profile = await verifyIdTokenAndExtractProfile(providerDescriptor, { clientId, idToken });
+    const { userId } = await completeOAuthLogin(this.oauth, { provider, profile });
+
+    const user = await this.getUserOrThrow(userId);
+    if (user.blocked || !user.isActive || user.isDeleted) throw new HttpError(401, "account is blocked");
+    return this.issueSessionTokens(user, { provider });
+  }
+
+  /** Pinned to the caller's workspace — the filter argument cannot widen it. */
+  async listAuditLog(ctx: AuthzContext, filter: AuditLogListFilter): Promise<Paginated<AuditLogEntry>> {
+    const { items, meta } = await this.auditLog.list({ ...filter, workspaceId: ctx.workspaceId });
+    return { items: items.map(toAuditLogEntry), meta };
+  }
+
+  /** `req.auth` (the JWT claims) never carries 2FA status, so `/auth/me` fetches it fresh — the one bit of the response that isn't just echoing the token. */
+  async getTwoFactorStatus(userId: string): Promise<{ twoFactorEnabled: boolean }> {
+    const [user] = await this.db.select({ twoFactorEnabled: users.twoFactorEnabled }).from(users).where(eq(users.id, toId(userId))).limit(1);
+    if (!user) throw new HttpError(404, `user "${userId}" not found`);
+    return { twoFactorEnabled: user.twoFactorEnabled };
+  }
+
+  async listActiveSessions(userId: string): Promise<Array<{ id: string; createdAt: string; expiresAt: string; provider?: string; userAgent?: string; ip?: string }>> {
+    // "Active" is now two conditions, not one: not revoked, and not past its own absolute expiry.
+    // `sessions_user_active_idx` is (user_id, is_revoked, expires_at) for exactly this read.
+    const rows = await this.db
+      .select()
+      .from(sessions)
+      .where(and(eq(sessions.userId, toId(userId)), eq(sessions.isRevoked, false), gt(sessions.expiresAt, new Date())))
+      .orderBy(desc(sessions.createdAt));
+    return rows.map((row) => ({
+      id: row.id.toString(),
+      createdAt: row.createdAt.toISOString(),
+      expiresAt: row.expiresAt.toISOString(),
+      provider: row.provider ?? undefined,
+      userAgent: row.userAgent ?? undefined,
+      ip: row.ip ?? undefined,
+    }));
+  }
+
+  // ---- workspace-scoped administration ----
+  //
+  // Every method below takes the caller's AuthzContext, and every one of them reaches the
+  // database through a workspace-scoped query. That is the security property this model rests on:
+  // an admin of one workspace has no expressible way to name a row in another.
+
+  async listUsers(ctx: AuthzContext, filter: MemberListFilter): Promise<MemberListResult> {
+    const { items, meta } = await this.rbac.listMembers(ctx.workspaceId, filter);
+    return { items: items.map(toMemberSummary), meta };
+  }
+
+  async getUser(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string): Promise<MemberSummary> {
+    return this.rbac.getMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId);
+  }
+
+  async updateUser(
+    ctx: AuthzContext,
+    userId: string,
+    input: { firstName?: string | null; lastName?: string | null; displayName?: string | null; phone?: string | null; username?: string | null; photo?: string | null },
+    actorUserId: string | null,
+  ): Promise<MemberSummary> {
+    return this.rbac.updateMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId, input, actorUserId);
+  }
+
+  async deleteUser(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string, actorUserId: string | null, reason?: string): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.deleteMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId, actorUserId, reason);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The whole authorization vocabulary of the deployment, for a console's permission matrix. The
+   * catalog is global; what is workspace-scoped is which of this workspace's roles point at it.
+   */
+  async listPermissions(): Promise<{ permissions: PermissionSummary[] }> {
+    return { permissions: await this.rbac.listPermissions() };
+  }
+
+  /** Defines a permission, or edits one — including deactivating it. The write path for "the catalog is editable in the database". */
+  async definePermission(input: PermissionInput, actorUserId: string | null): Promise<PermissionSummary> {
+    return this.rbac.upsertPermission(input, actorUserId);
+  }
+
+  async listRoles(ctx: AuthzContext): Promise<{ roles: RoleSummary[] }> {
+    return { roles: await this.rbac.listRoles(ctx.workspaceId) };
+  }
+
+  async createRole(
+    ctx: AuthzContext,
+    input: { slug: string; name?: string; displayName?: string; description?: string | null },
+    actorUserId: string | null,
+  ): Promise<RoleSummary> {
+    return this.rbac.createRole(ctx.workspaceId, input, actorUserId);
+  }
+
+  async updateRole(
+    ctx: AuthzContext,
+    roleId: string,
+    input: { name?: string; displayName?: string; description?: string | null; isActive?: boolean },
+    actorUserId: string | null,
+  ): Promise<RoleSummary> {
+    return this.rbac.updateRole(ctx.workspaceId, roleId, input, actorUserId);
+  }
+
+  async deleteRole(ctx: AuthzContext, roleId: string, actorUserId: string | null, reason?: string): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.deleteRole(ctx.workspaceId, roleId, actorUserId, reason);
+  }
+
+  async attachPermissionToRole(ctx: AuthzContext, roleId: string, permissionSlug: string, actorUserId: string | null): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.attachPermissionToRole(ctx.workspaceId, roleId, permissionSlug, actorUserId);
+  }
+
+  async assignRole(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string, roleSlug: string): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.assignRoleToMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId, roleSlug);
+    await this.auditLog.append({ type: "role_assigned", userId, role: roleSlug }, { workspaceId: ctx.workspaceId });
+  }
+
+  async revokeRole(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string, roleSlug: string): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.revokeRoleFromMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId, roleSlug);
+    await this.auditLog.append({ type: "role_revoked", userId, role: roleSlug }, { workspaceId: ctx.workspaceId });
+  }
+
+  async grantPermission(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string, permissionSlug: string, actorUserId: string | null): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.grantPermissionToMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId, permissionSlug, actorUserId);
+    await this.auditLog.append({ type: "permission_granted", userId, permission: permissionSlug }, { workspaceId: ctx.workspaceId });
+  }
+
+  async revokePermission(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string, permissionSlug: string): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.revokePermissionFromMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId, permissionSlug);
+    await this.auditLog.append({ type: "permission_revoked", userId, permission: permissionSlug }, { workspaceId: ctx.workspaceId });
+  }
+
+  async refresh(refreshToken: string): Promise<Omit<AuthTokens, "sessionId">> {
+    const key = await this.keys.getActiveKey();
+    const presented = await verifyRefreshToken({ secret: this.keys.secret }, refreshToken);
+    const { session, nextJti } = await rotateRefreshToken(this.sessions, presented);
+
+    const [user] = await this.db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.id, toId(session.userId))).limit(1);
+    if (!user || user.blocked || !user.isActive || user.isDeleted) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid credentials");
+
+    // Identity only. Authorization is resolved from the database on every request (the authz middleware),
+    // so a token issued before a grant is as authoritative as one issued after it.
+    const access = await signAccessToken(
+      { activeKey: key },
+      { sub: user.id.toString(), sessionId: session.id },
+      { ttlSeconds: this.config.accessTokenTtlSeconds },
+    );
+    const refresh = await signRefreshToken(
+      { activeKey: key },
+      { sub: user.id.toString(), sessionId: session.id, sv: session.sessionVersion },
+      { jti: nextJti, ttlSeconds: this.config.refreshTokenTtlSeconds },
+    );
+    return { accessToken: access.token, refreshToken: refresh.token };
+  }
+
+  async logout(sessionId: string, accessJti: string, accessRemainingTtlSeconds: number, revoker?: Revoker): Promise<void> {
+    await revokeSession(this.sessions, sessionId, revoker);
+    await revokeAccessToken(this.sessions, accessJti, accessRemainingTtlSeconds);
+  }
+
+  async logoutAll(userId: string, revoker?: Revoker): Promise<void> {
+    await revokeAllSessionsForUser(this.sessions, userId, revoker);
+  }
+
+  async logoutOthers(userId: string, keepSessionId: string, revoker?: Revoker): Promise<void> {
+    await revokeOtherSessionsForUser(this.sessions, userId, keepSessionId, revoker);
+  }
+
+  async changePassword(userId: string, currentSessionId: string, input: { currentPassword: string; newPassword: string }): Promise<void> {
+    const idBig = toId(userId);
+    const [user] = await this.db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.id, idBig)).limit(1);
+    if (!user || user.blocked || !user.isActive || user.isDeleted || !user.passwordHash) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid credentials");
+
+    const valid = await verifyPassword(user.passwordHash, input.currentPassword);
+    if (!valid) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid credentials");
+
+    const passwordHash = await hashPassword(input.newPassword);
+    await this.db.update(users).set({ passwordHash, updatedBy: idBig }).where(eq(users.id, idBig));
+    // The old password is no longer trusted everywhere else it's signed in — but leave the
+    // session making this very call alone, the same courtesy `logoutOthers` extends.
+    await revokeOtherSessionsForUser(this.sessions, userId, currentSessionId, { userId });
+  }
+
+  /** Backs both `GET`- and `PATCH /auth/me` — deliberately not workspace-scoped, see `updateProfile`. */
+  private toSelfProfile(user: typeof users.$inferSelect): SelfProfile {
+    return {
+      id: user.id.toString(),
+      email: user.email,
+      firstName: user.firstName,
+      lastName: user.lastName,
+      displayName: user.displayName,
+      phone: user.phone,
+      username: user.username,
+      photo: user.photo,
+      createdAt: user.createdAt.toISOString(),
+    };
+  }
+
+  /** Self-service — no `users:manage` permission required, callable by anyone on their own row, and deliberately not workspace-scoped, see `updateProfile`. */
+  async getProfile(userId: string): Promise<SelfProfile> {
+    const idBig = toId(userId);
+    const [user] = await this.db.select().from(users).where(and(eq(users.id, idBig), eq(users.isDeleted, false))).limit(1);
+    if (!user) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid credentials");
+    return this.toSelfProfile(user);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Self-service — no `users:manage` permission required, the caller's own row only, and
+   * deliberately not workspace-scoped: a profile belongs to the account, not to any one
+   * membership, so this updates the same `users` row `updateMember` would, without requiring an
+   * `X-Workspace-Id` or a membership in it — the same direct-update-on-`users` shape
+   * `changePassword` already uses.
+   */
+  async updateProfile(
+    userId: string,
+    input: { firstName?: string | null; lastName?: string | null; displayName?: string | null; phone?: string | null; username?: string | null; photo?: string | null },
+  ): Promise<SelfProfile> {
+    const idBig = toId(userId);
+    const [existing] = await this.db.select({ id: users.id }).from(users).where(and(eq(users.id, idBig), eq(users.isDeleted, false))).limit(1);
+    if (!existing) throw new HttpError(401, "invalid credentials");
+    const [user] = await this.db
+      .update(users)
+      .set({ ...input, updatedBy: idBig })
+      .where(eq(users.id, idBig))
+      .returning();
+    return this.toSelfProfile(user);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Blocking is an account-level action, so it is gated on the target being a member of the
+   * caller's workspace — otherwise an admin of one workspace could disable an account they
+   * have no relationship with.
+   */
+  async block(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string, revoker?: Revoker): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.requireMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId);
+    await this.db.update(users).set({ blocked: true, updatedBy: toIdOrNull(revoker?.userId) }).where(eq(users.id, toId(userId)));
+    // The administrator, not the blocked user, is what lands in `sessions.revoked_by`.
+    await blockUser(this.sessions, userId, revoker);
+    // Belt and braces. The block is enforced on the authentication path — login and refresh both
+    // refuse a blocked user, and AuthGuard never consults the permission cache — so a warm entry
+    // cannot defeat it. Dropping the entry anyway means nothing about a blocked account is being
+    // served from memory.
+    await this.rbac.invalidateMember(userId, ctx.workspaceId);
+  }
+
+  async unblock(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string, revoker?: Revoker): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.requireMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId);
+    await this.db.update(users).set({ blocked: false, updatedBy: toIdOrNull(revoker?.userId) }).where(eq(users.id, toId(userId)));
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A routine administrative on/off toggle — distinct from `block`/`unblock`, which is a
+   * security/moderation action. Both independently deny login; see the note on the `users` table.
+   */
+  async deactivate(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string, revoker?: Revoker): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.requireMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId);
+    await this.db.update(users).set({ isActive: false, updatedBy: toIdOrNull(revoker?.userId) }).where(eq(users.id, toId(userId)));
+    await deactivateUser(this.sessions, userId, revoker);
+    await this.rbac.invalidateMember(userId, ctx.workspaceId);
+  }
+
+  async activate(ctx: AuthzContext, userId: string, revoker?: Revoker): Promise<void> {
+    await this.rbac.requireMember(ctx.workspaceId, userId);
+    await this.db.update(users).set({ isActive: true, updatedBy: toIdOrNull(revoker?.userId) }).where(eq(users.id, toId(userId)));
+  }
+
+  private async getUserOrThrow(userId: string): Promise<typeof users.$inferSelect> {
+    const [user] = await this.db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.id, toId(userId))).limit(1);
+    if (!user) throw new HttpError(404, `user "${userId}" not found`);
+    return user;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The access token identifies the user and the session, and carries no authorization: roles
+   * and permissions belong to a workspace membership, and this token is valid in all of them.
+   * Each request resolves its own — see AuthzGuard. Takes the raw database user row (bigint id)
+   * — every call site already has one in hand.
+   */
+  private async issueSessionTokens(user: { id: bigint }, meta: { userAgent?: string; ip?: string; provider?: string }): Promise<AuthTokens> {
+    const session = await createSession(this.sessions, { userId: user.id.toString(), ...meta });
+    const key = await this.keys.getActiveKey();
+
+    const access = await signAccessToken(
+      { activeKey: key },
+      { sub: user.id.toString(), sessionId: session.id },
+      { ttlSeconds: this.config.accessTokenTtlSeconds },
+    );
+    const refresh = await signRefreshToken(
+      { activeKey: key },
+      { sub: user.id.toString(), sessionId: session.id, sv: session.sessionVersion },
+      { jti: session.currentRefreshJti, ttlSeconds: this.config.refreshTokenTtlSeconds },
+    );
+
+    return { accessToken: access.token, refreshToken: refresh.token, sessionId: session.id };
+  }
+}

package/registry/combos/express-drizzle/variants/workspaces/src/authz.middleware.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+import type { NextFunction, Request, RequestHandler, Response } from "express";
+import { defineAbilitiesFor } from "./ability.js";
+import { HttpError } from "./http-error.js";
+import type { PermissionCache } from "./permission-cache.js";
+import { memberCacheKey, type RbacRepository } from "./rbac.repository.js";
+import "./request-context.js";
+
+export const WORKSPACE_HEADER = "x-workspace-id";
+
+/**
+ * Roles and permissions belong to a *membership*, not a user, so they could not be baked into the
+ * access token even in principle — the token is workspace-agnostic and one login serves every
+ * workspace. A request names the workspace it is acting in via the `X-Workspace-Id` header, and
+ * everything below is resolved from the database on that request.
+ */
+export interface AuthzContext {
+  workspaceId: string;
+  memberId: string;
+  roles: string[];
+  permissions: string[];
+}
+
+export interface AuthzMiddlewareDeps {
+  rbac: RbacRepository;
+  cache: PermissionCache;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extracted so both middlewares below resolve identically; only their behaviour on "no workspace
+ * named" differs.
+ *
+ * The one lookup is `resolveAuthzContext`'s — anchored on the `[userId, workspaceId]` unique
+ * index — and it goes through `PermissionCache`, keyed on that same pair, so the steady-state cost
+ * is a cache read. The *semantics* stay "read from the database": every write that could change
+ * the answer bumps a version counter and the cached entry becomes unreachable. A non-member is
+ * never cached, so being added to a workspace is effective immediately.
+ *
+ * The CASL ability is derived from what came back, in memory, so gating routes on abilities costs
+ * exactly what gating them on permission slugs did.
+ *
+ * Idempotent: a route may legitimately sit behind both middlewares, and resolving twice would
+ * double the hot path's query count for no gain.
+ */
+async function resolve(deps: AuthzMiddlewareDeps, req: Request): Promise<void> {
+  if (req.authz) return;
+
+  const workspaceId = req.headers[WORKSPACE_HEADER];
+  if (!req.auth || typeof workspaceId !== "string" || workspaceId.length === 0) return;
+
+  const userId = req.auth.sub;
+  const authz = await deps.cache.resolve<AuthzContext>(memberCacheKey(userId, workspaceId), () => deps.rbac.resolveAuthzContext(userId, workspaceId));
+  // Deliberately the same answer for "no such workspace" and "not your workspace": a caller
+  // outside a workspace must not be able to probe whether it exists.
+  if (!authz) throw new HttpError(403, "not a member of this workspace");
+  req.authz = authz;
+  // Scoped to this workspace by construction: the permissions it is built from are the ones that
+  // membership carries *here*, so the ability /auth/me describes grants nothing anywhere else.
+  req.ability = defineAbilitiesFor(authz.permissions);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolves the authorization context when the request names a workspace, and does nothing when it
+ * does not. Used on routes that work either way — `GET /auth/me` answers with no roles when no
+ * workspace is named. Must run after the auth middleware.
+ *
+ * Replaces the reference combo's `AuthzGuard`.
+ */
+export function createAuthzMiddleware(deps: AuthzMiddlewareDeps): RequestHandler {
+  return async function authzMiddleware(req: Request, _res: Response, next: NextFunction): Promise<void> {
+    try {
+      await resolve(deps, req);
+      next();
+    } catch (err) {
+      next(err);
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The same resolution, but the workspace is mandatory — every workspace-scoped route uses this.
+ *
+ * Replaces the reference combo's `WorkspaceGuard`.
+ */
+export function createWorkspaceMiddleware(deps: AuthzMiddlewareDeps): RequestHandler {
+  return async function workspaceMiddleware(req: Request, _res: Response, next: NextFunction): Promise<void> {
+    try {
+      await resolve(deps, req);
+      if (!req.authz) throw new HttpError(403, `${WORKSPACE_HEADER} header is required`);
+      next();
+    } catch (err) {
+      next(err);
+    }
+  };
+}