@simple-auth-kit/cli 1.0.0

package/registry/combos/express-drizzle/test/prove-cycle.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,789 @@
+// Black-box proof of the full auth cycle, run against a materialized variant of this combo by
+// `npm run prove-cycle`. Everything below is variant-agnostic and speaks HTTP only; the three
+// places where variants genuinely differ come from ./variant-hooks.js, which each variant
+// supplies. Do not branch on the variant name in this file — add a hook instead.
+//
+// The two exceptions to "HTTP only" are deliberate and both are about *startup*: the tier section
+// below registers a route the way a developer would, and the front/back equivalence section
+// imports the same `defineAbilitiesFor` a client would use. Neither reads the database.
+import "dotenv/config";
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { generateTotpCode } from "@/lib/auth/core/two-factor.js";
+import { ABILITY_SUBJECT, defineAbilitiesFor } from "../src/ability.js";
+import { ability, createTieredRouter } from "../src/route-tiers.js";
+import { bootstrap, capturedResetTokens } from "./bootstrap.js";
+import { adminRouteProbes, AuthTokens, BASE_PORT, CallOptions, decodeJwtPayload, ProofContext, RouteProbe } from "./harness.js";
+import { hooks } from "./variant-hooks.js";
+
+const BASE = `http://localhost:${BASE_PORT}`;
+
+let failures = 0;
+function assert(condition: boolean, message: string) {
+  if (condition) {
+    console.log(`  ok   ${message}`);
+  } else {
+    failures += 1;
+    console.error(`  FAIL ${message}`);
+  }
+}
+
+async function call(method: string, path: string, opts: CallOptions = {}): Promise<{ status: number; body: any }> {
+  const res = await fetch(`${BASE}${path}`, {
+    method,
+    headers: {
+      "content-type": "application/json",
+      ...(opts.token ? { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.token}` } : {}),
+      ...(opts.workspaceId ? { "x-workspace-id": opts.workspaceId } : {}),
+      ...(opts.headers ?? {}),
+    },
+    body: opts.body ? JSON.stringify(opts.body) : undefined,
+  });
+  const envelope = await res.json().catch(() => undefined);
+  const body = envelope && typeof envelope === "object" && "data" in envelope ? envelope.data : envelope;
+  return { status: res.status, body: body as any };
+}
+
+const RUN_ID = randomUUID().slice(0, 8);
+const uniqueEmail = (prefix: string) => `${prefix}-${randomUUID()}@example.com`;
+/** Role slugs are unique within their scope, so each run needs its own — the proof runs against a database it does not reset. */
+const ROLE_SLUG = `billing-manager-${RUN_ID}`;
+
+async function signup(email: string, password: string): Promise<AuthTokens> {
+  const res = await call("POST", "/auth/signup", { body: { email, password } });
+  if (res.status !== 200 && res.status !== 201) throw new Error(`signup failed (${res.status}): ${JSON.stringify(res.body)}`);
+  return res.body as AuthTokens;
+}
+
+const ctx: ProofContext = { call, assert, signup, uniqueEmail };
+
+/**
+ * Registers a route on a tiered router exactly as a developer would, but naming a permission the
+ * catalog does not define.
+ *
+ * This is the Express shape of the reference combo's "a route that declares no tier fails at
+ * startup". There, a handler with no marker is caught by walking the route table at boot. Here the
+ * tier is a required argument of `route()`, so a route with *no* tier is not something a running
+ * program can express — it is a compile error, which is the stronger guarantee and cannot be
+ * asserted at runtime. What remains runtime-checkable is the other half of the same property: a
+ * route gated on a slug nothing can ever grant. `ability()` refuses it at registration, i.e. at
+ * startup, so even an untyped (plain-JS) caller fails loudly at boot rather than serving a route
+ * no one can reach.
+ */
+function registerRouteGatedOnAnUndefinedSlug(): unknown {
+  const passthrough = (_req: unknown, _res: unknown, next: () => void) => next();
+  const router = createTieredRouter({ authentication: passthrough as never, authorization: passthrough as never });
+  try {
+    // Cast because the whole point is that TypeScript rejects this; the check being proved is the
+    // runtime one, which catches a caller who is not type-checked at all.
+    router.route("get", "/__tier-proof", ability("no:such-permission" as never), ((_req: unknown, res: { json: (b: unknown) => void }) =>
+      res.json({ ok: true })) as never);
+    return undefined;
+  } catch (err) {
+    return err;
+  }
+}
+
+async function main() {
+  console.log("0. fail-closed at startup: a route gated on a permission nothing can grant stops the app from booting");
+  const bootError = registerRouteGatedOnAnUndefinedSlug();
+  const bootMessage = bootError instanceof Error ? bootError.message : String(bootError);
+  assert(bootError !== undefined, "registering a route gated on a slug outside PERMISSION_CATALOG throws at registration, not at request time");
+  assert(
+    bootMessage.includes("no:such-permission") && bootMessage.includes("PERMISSION_CATALOG"),
+    `…and the error names the offending permission (got: ${bootMessage.split("\n")[0]})`,
+  );
+
+  const app = await bootstrap(BASE_PORT);
+  assert(true, "…and a router whose routes all name catalog slugs builds fine — the check is about the slug, not the boot path");
+  console.log(`variant: ${hooks.variant}\n`);
+
+  try {
+    console.log("1. signup (session A)");
+    const emailA = uniqueEmail("a");
+    const signupA = await call("POST", "/auth/signup", { body: { email: emailA, password: "correct-horse-battery" } });
+    assert(signupA.status === 201 || signupA.status === 200, `signup succeeds with only email + password in the body (got ${signupA.status})`);
+    const tokensA = signupA.body as AuthTokens;
+    assert(!!tokensA.accessToken && !!tokensA.refreshToken, "signup returns access + refresh tokens");
+
+    // Asserted as an exact set rather than a list of absences, and kept exact on purpose: this is
+    // the assertion that stops authorization data creeping back into the token later. There is no
+    // `roles` claim and no `permissions` claim — not empty ones, none. A token that carries
+    // permissions is a snapshot that keeps working after the grant behind it is gone, for as long
+    // as the token lives; everything here is resolved server-side on the request that uses it.
+    const claimsA = decodeJwtPayload(tokensA.accessToken);
+    assert(
+      Object.keys(claimsA).sort().join(",") === "exp,iat,jti,sessionId,sub",
+      `the access token carries exactly the expected claims — identity and session only (got ${Object.keys(claimsA).sort().join(",")})`,
+    );
+    assert(claimsA.sub === (await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: tokensA.accessToken })).body.sub, "the token's subject is the user");
+
+    const meSignup = await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: tokensA.accessToken });
+    assert(
+      hooks.variant === "workspaces" ? meSignup.body.roles.length === 0 : meSignup.body.roles.length > 0,
+      `a new signup's roles come from the database, not the token (got ${JSON.stringify(meSignup.body.roles)})`,
+    );
+
+    console.log("2. login (session B, a second device for the same user)");
+    const loginB = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: emailA, password: "correct-horse-battery" } });
+    const tokensB = loginB.body as AuthTokens;
+    assert(loginB.status === 201 || loginB.status === 200, `login succeeds (got ${loginB.status})`);
+    assert(tokensB.sessionId !== tokensA.sessionId, "login creates a distinct session from signup's");
+
+    console.log("2b. login with wrong password is rejected");
+    const badLogin = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: emailA, password: "wrong" } });
+    assert(badLogin.status === 401, `wrong password rejected (got ${badLogin.status})`);
+
+    console.log("2c. a second signup with the same email is rejected — email is globally unique");
+    const duplicate = await call("POST", "/auth/signup", { body: { email: emailA, password: "another-password-1" } });
+    assert(duplicate.status === 409, `duplicate email rejected (got ${duplicate.status})`);
+
+    console.log("3. protected route: GET /auth/me with session A's access token");
+    const meA = await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: tokensA.accessToken });
+    assert(meA.status === 200, `me succeeds with a valid token (got ${meA.status})`);
+    assert(meA.body?.sessionId === tokensA.sessionId, "me reflects session A's identity");
+
+    console.log("3b. protected route rejects a missing token");
+    const meNoAuth = await call("GET", "/auth/me");
+    assert(meNoAuth.status === 401, `me rejects no token (got ${meNoAuth.status})`);
+
+    console.log("3c. the three route tiers, from the outside");
+    // Tier 1: no token at all. Each of these is marked @Public() in the source; the assertion is
+    // that the marker and the behaviour agree. "Reached" is asserted as "not refused for want of
+    // a bearer token" — several of them answer 401 for a bad *credential*, which is the handler
+    // running, not the guard refusing.
+    const MISSING_TOKEN = "missing bearer token";
+    const publicProbes: Array<[string, string, unknown]> = [
+      ["POST", "/auth/login", { identifier: emailA, password: "wrong-on-purpose" }],
+      ["POST", "/auth/refresh", { refreshToken: "not-a-real-token" }],
+      ["POST", "/auth/password/forgot", { email: uniqueEmail("nobody") }],
+      ["POST", "/auth/login/2fa", { challengeToken: "nope", code: "000000" }],
+      ["POST", "/auth/password/reset", { token: "nope", newPassword: "irrelevant-1" }],
+      ["GET", "/auth/oauth/google/start", undefined],
+    ];
+    for (const [method, path, body] of publicProbes) {
+      const res = await call(method, path, { body });
+      assert(res.body?.message !== MISSING_TOKEN, `${method} ${path} is reachable with no token (got ${res.status} ${res.body?.message ?? ""})`);
+    }
+
+    // Tier 2: any authenticated caller, no permission. `tokensA` holds no administrative
+    // permission whatsoever, and these must still answer.
+    for (const path of ["/auth/me", "/auth/sessions"]) {
+      const authed = await call("GET", path, { token: tokensA.accessToken });
+      assert(authed.status === 200, `GET ${path} is open to any authenticated user (got ${authed.status})`);
+      const anon = await call("GET", path);
+      assert(anon.status === 401, `…and refuses an anonymous caller (got ${anon.status})`);
+    }
+
+    console.log("4. refresh session A's token");
+    const refreshed = await call("POST", "/auth/refresh", { body: { refreshToken: tokensA.refreshToken } });
+    assert(refreshed.status === 200 || refreshed.status === 201, `refresh succeeds (got ${refreshed.status})`);
+    const rotatedA = refreshed.body as { accessToken: string; refreshToken: string };
+    assert(rotatedA.refreshToken !== tokensA.refreshToken, "refresh issues a new refresh token (rotation)");
+
+    console.log("4b. reuse of the now-dead original refresh token is detected and kills the whole session family");
+    const reuse = await call("POST", "/auth/refresh", { body: { refreshToken: tokensA.refreshToken } });
+    assert(reuse.status === 401, `stale/reused refresh token rejected (got ${reuse.status})`);
+
+    const reuseFalloutB = await call("POST", "/auth/refresh", { body: { refreshToken: tokensB.refreshToken } });
+    assert(reuseFalloutB.status === 401, `reuse detection also killed session B's refresh (got ${reuseFalloutB.status})`);
+
+    // Self-contained on purpose: the reuse detection just above kills every session belonging to
+    // user A, so anything asserting on a *live* session has to bring its own.
+    console.log("4c. a session's lifetime: an absolute expiry that refreshing does not extend");
+    type LiveSession = { id: string; createdAt: string; expiresAt: string; provider?: string };
+    const lifetimeEmail = uniqueEmail("lifetime");
+    const lifetimeFirst = await signup(lifetimeEmail, "lifetime-pw-123");
+    const lifetimeSessionId = decodeJwtPayload(lifetimeFirst.accessToken).sessionId as string;
+
+    const listSessions = async (token: string) => (await call("GET", "/auth/sessions", { token })).body as LiveSession[];
+    const live = (await listSessions(lifetimeFirst.accessToken)).find((s) => s.id === lifetimeSessionId);
+    assert(!!live, "the caller's own session is listed");
+    assert(
+      !!live && new Date(live.expiresAt).getTime() > new Date(live.createdAt).getTime(),
+      `a session expires strictly after it was created (got ${live?.createdAt} → ${live?.expiresAt})`,
+    );
+    assert(!live?.provider, "a password login records no OAuth provider on the session");
+
+    // The point of `expires_at` being written once and never rewritten: rotation issues a fresh
+    // refresh token every time, so without an absolute cap a continuously active client would hold
+    // one session open forever.
+    const lifetimeRotated = (await call("POST", "/auth/refresh", { body: { refreshToken: lifetimeFirst.refreshToken } })).body as AuthTokens;
+    const afterRefresh = (await listSessions(lifetimeRotated.accessToken)).find((s) => s.id === lifetimeSessionId);
+    assert(afterRefresh?.expiresAt === live?.expiresAt, `refreshing does not push the session's expiry out (got ${afterRefresh?.expiresAt})`);
+
+    // A second device for the same user, so the list can be read after the first one is revoked.
+    const lifetimeSecond = (await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: lifetimeEmail, password: "lifetime-pw-123" } })).body as AuthTokens;
+    assert((await listSessions(lifetimeSecond.accessToken)).some((s) => s.id === lifetimeSessionId), "a second device sees the first device's session");
+
+    await call("POST", "/auth/logout", { token: lifetimeRotated.accessToken });
+    // Revocation is never a delete: the row survives with `is_revoked` set, and what changes is
+    // that it stops counting as active.
+    assert(
+      !(await listSessions(lifetimeSecond.accessToken)).some((s) => s.id === lifetimeSessionId),
+      "a revoked session stops being listed as active",
+    );
+
+    console.log("5. logout-one-device: revoke session A specifically using its (rotated) access token");
+    const logoutA = await call("POST", "/auth/logout", { token: rotatedA.accessToken });
+    assert(logoutA.status === 200 || logoutA.status === 201, `logout succeeds (got ${logoutA.status})`);
+
+    const meAAfterLogout = await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: rotatedA.accessToken });
+    assert(meAAfterLogout.status === 401, `session A's access token is denylisted after logout (got ${meAAfterLogout.status})`);
+
+    console.log("6. block/unblock (admin-scoped)");
+    const adminEmail = uniqueEmail("admin");
+    const adminSignup = await signup(adminEmail, "admin-pw-123");
+    const adminUserId = (await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: adminSignup.accessToken })).body.sub as string;
+    const admin = await hooks.makeAdmin(ctx, { userId: adminUserId, email: adminEmail, password: "admin-pw-123", tokens: adminSignup });
+
+    const victimEmail = uniqueEmail("victim");
+    const victimTokens = await signup(victimEmail, "victim-pw-123");
+    const victimId = (await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: victimTokens.accessToken })).body.sub as string;
+    await hooks.admitUser(ctx, admin, { userId: victimId, email: victimEmail });
+
+    console.log("6a. a non-admin cannot block anyone");
+    const forbiddenBlock = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${victimId}/block`, { token: victimTokens.accessToken, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(forbiddenBlock.status === 403, `non-admin block attempt rejected (got ${forbiddenBlock.status})`);
+
+    console.log("6b. an admin cannot block themselves");
+    const selfBlock = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${adminUserId}/block`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(selfBlock.status === 403, `admin self-block rejected (got ${selfBlock.status})`);
+
+    console.log("6b-ii. an admin cannot revoke their own role");
+    // Self-revoking `admin` strips the permission that authorised the call. In a workspace
+    // there is no way back in afterwards, so the route refuses it the same way self-block does.
+    const selfRevoke = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${adminUserId}/roles/admin/revoke`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(selfRevoke.status === 403, `admin self-role-revoke rejected (got ${selfRevoke.status})`);
+    const stillAdmin = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/users", { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(stillAdmin.status === 200, `admin still authorised after the refused self-revoke (got ${stillAdmin.status})`);
+
+    console.log("6c. admin blocks the victim");
+    const block = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${victimId}/block`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(block.status === 200 || block.status === 201, `block succeeds (got ${block.status})`);
+
+    console.log("7. get-rejected-after-block: victim cannot log in or refresh anymore");
+    const victimLoginAfterBlock = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: victimEmail, password: "victim-pw-123" } });
+    assert(victimLoginAfterBlock.status === 401, `blocked user cannot log in (got ${victimLoginAfterBlock.status})`);
+
+    const victimRefreshAfterBlock = await call("POST", "/auth/refresh", { body: { refreshToken: victimTokens.refreshToken } });
+    assert(victimRefreshAfterBlock.status === 401, `blocked user's refresh token rejected (got ${victimRefreshAfterBlock.status})`);
+
+    console.log("7b. unblock restores access");
+    const unblock = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${victimId}/unblock`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(unblock.status === 200 || unblock.status === 201, `unblock succeeds (got ${unblock.status})`);
+    const victimLoginAfterUnblock = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: victimEmail, password: "victim-pw-123" } });
+    assert(
+      victimLoginAfterUnblock.status === 200 || victimLoginAfterUnblock.status === 201,
+      `unblocked user can log in again (got ${victimLoginAfterUnblock.status})`,
+    );
+
+    console.log("7c. deactivate is a distinct toggle from block — both independently deny login, neither implies the other");
+    const deactivate = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${victimId}/deactivate`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(deactivate.status === 200 || deactivate.status === 201, `deactivate succeeds (got ${deactivate.status})`);
+
+    const victimLoginAfterDeactivate = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: victimEmail, password: "victim-pw-123" } });
+    assert(victimLoginAfterDeactivate.status === 401, `deactivated (but not blocked) user cannot log in either (got ${victimLoginAfterDeactivate.status})`);
+
+    const usersAfterDeactivate = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/users", { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    const victimAfterDeactivate = (usersAfterDeactivate.body as { items: Array<{ id?: string; userId?: string; blocked: boolean; isActive: boolean }> }).items.find(
+      (u) => (u.id ?? u.userId) === victimId,
+    );
+    assert(victimAfterDeactivate?.isActive === false, "…and the user list reflects isActive=false");
+    assert(victimAfterDeactivate?.blocked === false, "…while blocked stays false — deactivating never sets it, they are independent flags");
+
+    const reactivate = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${victimId}/activate`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(reactivate.status === 200 || reactivate.status === 201, `activate succeeds (got ${reactivate.status})`);
+    const victimLoginAfterReactivate = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: victimEmail, password: "victim-pw-123" } });
+    assert(
+      victimLoginAfterReactivate.status === 200 || victimLoginAfterReactivate.status === 201,
+      `reactivated user can log in again (got ${victimLoginAfterReactivate.status})`,
+    );
+
+    console.log("8. two-factor: enroll -> confirm -> login now requires 2FA -> complete challenge -> logout");
+    const tfaEmail = uniqueEmail("tfa");
+    const tfaTokens = await signup(tfaEmail, "tfa-pw-12345");
+
+    const enroll = await call("POST", "/auth/2fa/enroll", { token: tfaTokens.accessToken });
+    assert(enroll.status === 200 || enroll.status === 201, `2fa enroll succeeds (got ${enroll.status})`);
+    const { secret } = enroll.body as { secret: string; provisioningUri: string };
+
+    const confirm = await call("POST", "/auth/2fa/confirm", { token: tfaTokens.accessToken, body: { code: generateTotpCode(secret) } });
+    assert(confirm.status === 200 || confirm.status === 201, `2fa confirm succeeds (got ${confirm.status})`);
+    const { backupCodes } = confirm.body as { backupCodes: string[] };
+    assert(backupCodes.length === 10, `2fa confirm returns backup codes (got ${backupCodes.length})`);
+
+    const tfaLogin = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: tfaEmail, password: "tfa-pw-12345" } });
+    const tfaChallenge = tfaLogin.body as { twoFactorRequired: true; challengeToken: string };
+    assert(tfaChallenge.twoFactorRequired === true, `login now returns a 2fa challenge instead of tokens (got status ${tfaLogin.status})`);
+
+    const tfaComplete = await call("POST", "/auth/login/2fa", { body: { challengeToken: tfaChallenge.challengeToken, code: generateTotpCode(secret) } });
+    assert(tfaComplete.status === 200 || tfaComplete.status === 201, `2fa challenge completes login (got ${tfaComplete.status})`);
+    const tfaSessionTokens = tfaComplete.body as { accessToken: string };
+
+    const tfaBadChallenge = await call("POST", "/auth/login/2fa", { body: { challengeToken: tfaChallenge.challengeToken, code: "000000" } });
+    assert(tfaBadChallenge.status === 401, `wrong 2fa code rejected (got ${tfaBadChallenge.status})`);
+
+    const tfaLogout = await call("POST", "/auth/logout", { token: tfaSessionTokens.accessToken });
+    assert(tfaLogout.status === 200 || tfaLogout.status === 201, `logout after 2fa login succeeds (got ${tfaLogout.status})`);
+
+    console.log("9. forgot/reset password -> old password stops working -> old sessions revoked");
+    const resetEmail = uniqueEmail("reset");
+    const resetTokens = await signup(resetEmail, "original-password-1");
+
+    const forgot = await call("POST", "/auth/password/forgot", { body: { email: resetEmail } });
+    assert(forgot.status === 200 || forgot.status === 201, `forgot-password always reports success (got ${forgot.status})`);
+    const rawResetToken = capturedResetTokens.get(resetEmail);
+    assert(!!rawResetToken, "the reset token reached the sendPasswordResetEmail hook");
+
+    const badReset = await call("POST", "/auth/password/reset", { body: { token: "not-a-real-token", newPassword: "irrelevant-1" } });
+    assert(badReset.status === 401, `reset with an invalid token is rejected (got ${badReset.status})`);
+
+    const reset = await call("POST", "/auth/password/reset", { body: { token: rawResetToken, newPassword: "new-password-2" } });
+    assert(reset.status === 200 || reset.status === 201, `reset with a valid token succeeds (got ${reset.status})`);
+
+    // Session revocation bumps sessionVersion/revokedAt, which invalidates future *refreshes*
+    // immediately; it does not retroactively invalidate an already-issued, still-unexpired
+    // access token (same "denylist is for instant per-token kill, sessionVersion is for
+    // refresh-time revocation" split that /auth/logout relies on elsewhere in this file).
+    const refreshAfterReset = await call("POST", "/auth/refresh", { body: { refreshToken: resetTokens.refreshToken } });
+    assert(refreshAfterReset.status === 401, `pre-reset session's refresh token is invalid after password reset (got ${refreshAfterReset.status})`);
+
+    const loginWithOldPassword = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: resetEmail, password: "original-password-1" } });
+    assert(loginWithOldPassword.status === 401, `old password no longer works (got ${loginWithOldPassword.status})`);
+
+    const loginWithNewPassword = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: resetEmail, password: "new-password-2" } });
+    assert(loginWithNewPassword.status === 200 || loginWithNewPassword.status === 201, `new password works (got ${loginWithNewPassword.status})`);
+
+    console.log("10. RBAC: create role, attach permission, assign to user, permission takes effect");
+    const rbacEmail = uniqueEmail("rbac");
+    const rbacTokens = await signup(rbacEmail, "rbac-pw-12345");
+    const rbacUserId = (await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: rbacTokens.accessToken })).body.sub as string;
+    await hooks.admitUser(ctx, admin, { userId: rbacUserId, email: rbacEmail });
+
+    const createRole = await call("POST", "/auth/admin/roles", {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { slug: ROLE_SLUG, displayName: "Billing manager" },
+    });
+    assert(createRole.status === 200 || createRole.status === 201, `admin can create a role (got ${createRole.status})`);
+    const role = createRole.body as { id: string; slug: string; displayName: string };
+    assert(role.slug === ROLE_SLUG && role.displayName === "Billing manager", "a role carries a stable slug and a separate human label");
+
+    const attachPermission = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/roles/${role.id}/permissions`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { permission: "billing:manage" },
+    });
+    assert(attachPermission.status === 200 || attachPermission.status === 201, `admin can attach a permission to a role (got ${attachPermission.status})`);
+
+    const assignRole = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${rbacUserId}/roles`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { role: ROLE_SLUG },
+    });
+    assert(assignRole.status === 200 || assignRole.status === 201, `admin can assign a role to a user (got ${assignRole.status})`);
+
+    const rbacDirect = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${rbacUserId}/permissions`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { permission: "reports:export" },
+    });
+    assert(rbacDirect.status === 200 || rbacDirect.status === 201, `admin can grant a permission directly (got ${rbacDirect.status})`);
+
+    // No re-login. Nothing about authorization lives in the token in either variant, so both
+    // grants are in effect on the caller's very next request, on the token they already hold.
+    const rbacMe = await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: rbacTokens.accessToken, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert((rbacMe.body?.permissions ?? []).includes("billing:manage"), "the assigned role's permission is in effect on the user's existing token");
+    assert((rbacMe.body?.permissions ?? []).includes("reports:export"), "a direct grant is unioned with the role-derived permissions");
+    assert((rbacMe.body?.roles ?? []).includes(ROLE_SLUG), "…and /auth/me reports the role by slug");
+
+    console.log("11. admin audit log: the role_assigned event from step 10 is readable back");
+    const auditList = await call("GET", `/auth/admin/audit-log?userId=${rbacUserId}&action=role_assigned`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+    });
+    assert(auditList.status === 200, `admin can list the audit log (got ${auditList.status})`);
+    const auditEntries = (auditList.body as { items: Array<{ action: string; name: string; userId: string | null }> }).items;
+    assert(
+      auditEntries.some((e) => e.action === "role_assigned" && e.userId === rbacUserId),
+      "the role_assigned event for this user shows up in the audit log",
+    );
+    assert(auditEntries.every((e) => e.name === "Role assigned"), "audit entries carry a human-readable name alongside the action");
+
+    const auditForbidden = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/audit-log", { token: rbacTokens.accessToken, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(auditForbidden.status === 403, `non-admin cannot list the audit log (got ${auditForbidden.status})`);
+
+    console.log("11b. user/role CRUD: fetch, edit, and soft-delete both — on disposable rows, so the shared probe target/role are untouched");
+    const crudUserEmail = uniqueEmail("crud-user");
+    const crudUserTokens = await signup(crudUserEmail, "crud-user-pw-12345");
+    const crudUserId = (await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: crudUserTokens.accessToken })).body.sub as string;
+    await hooks.admitUser(ctx, admin, { userId: crudUserId, email: crudUserEmail });
+
+    const getUser = await call("GET", `/auth/admin/users/${crudUserId}`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(getUser.status === 200, `admin can fetch a single user (got ${getUser.status})`);
+    assert((getUser.body as { email: string }).email === crudUserEmail, "…and it's the right one");
+
+    const updateUser = await call("PATCH", `/auth/admin/users/${crudUserId}`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { displayName: "CRUD Test User" },
+    });
+    assert(updateUser.status === 200, `admin can edit a user's profile (got ${updateUser.status})`);
+    assert((updateUser.body as { displayName: string | null }).displayName === "CRUD Test User", "…and the edit is reflected in the response");
+
+    const crudRoleSlug = `crud-role-${RUN_ID}`;
+    const createCrudRole = await call("POST", "/auth/admin/roles", { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId, body: { slug: crudRoleSlug } });
+    assert(createCrudRole.status === 201, `admin can create a disposable role for the delete test (got ${createCrudRole.status})`);
+    const crudRoleId = (createCrudRole.body as { id: string }).id;
+
+    const updateRole = await call("PATCH", `/auth/admin/roles/${crudRoleId}`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { displayName: "CRUD Test Role" },
+    });
+    assert(updateRole.status === 200, `admin can edit a role (got ${updateRole.status})`);
+    assert((updateRole.body as { displayName: string }).displayName === "CRUD Test Role", "…and the edit is reflected in the response");
+
+    const assignCrudRole = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${crudUserId}/roles`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { role: crudRoleSlug },
+    });
+    assert(assignCrudRole.status === 201, `the disposable role can be assigned before it's deleted (got ${assignCrudRole.status})`);
+
+    const deleteRole = await call("DELETE", `/auth/admin/roles/${crudRoleId}`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { reason: "prove-cycle cleanup" },
+    });
+    assert(deleteRole.status === 200, `admin can delete a role (got ${deleteRole.status})`);
+
+    const rolesAfterDelete = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/roles", { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(
+      !(rolesAfterDelete.body as { roles: Array<{ id: string }> }).roles.some((r) => r.id === crudRoleId),
+      "a deleted role no longer appears in the role list",
+    );
+
+    const meAfterRoleDelete = await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: crudUserTokens.accessToken, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(!(meAfterRoleDelete.body?.roles ?? []).includes(crudRoleSlug), "…and a member who held it no longer resolves it, with no re-login");
+
+    const deleteUser = await call("DELETE", `/auth/admin/users/${crudUserId}`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(deleteUser.status === 200, `admin can delete a user (got ${deleteUser.status})`);
+
+    const usersAfterDelete = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/users", { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(
+      !(usersAfterDelete.body as { items: Array<{ id: string }> }).items.some((u) => u.id === crudUserId),
+      "a deleted user no longer appears in the user list",
+    );
+
+    const getDeletedUser = await call("GET", `/auth/admin/users/${crudUserId}`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(getDeletedUser.status === 404, `…and fetching them directly by id now 404s (got ${getDeletedUser.status})`);
+
+    const loginAsDeletedUser = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: crudUserEmail, password: "crud-user-pw-12345" } });
+    assert(loginAsDeletedUser.status === 401, `…and they can no longer log in (got ${loginAsDeletedUser.status})`);
+
+    const selfDeleteAttempt = await call("DELETE", `/auth/admin/users/${(await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: await admin.freshToken() })).body.sub}`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+    });
+    assert(selfDeleteAttempt.status === 403, `an admin cannot delete their own account (got ${selfDeleteAttempt.status})`);
+
+    console.log("11c. login accepts a username or a phone number in place of the email, same password");
+    const identEmail = uniqueEmail("ident");
+    const identTokens = await signup(identEmail, "ident-user-pw-12345");
+    const identUserId = (await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: identTokens.accessToken })).body.sub as string;
+    await hooks.admitUser(ctx, admin, { userId: identUserId, email: identEmail });
+
+    const identUsername = `ident-user-${RUN_ID}`;
+    const identPhone = `+1-555-${RUN_ID}`;
+    const setIdentFields = await call("PATCH", `/auth/admin/users/${identUserId}`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { username: identUsername, phone: identPhone },
+    });
+    assert(setIdentFields.status === 200, `admin can set a user's username and phone (got ${setIdentFields.status})`);
+
+    const loginByUsername = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: identUsername, password: "ident-user-pw-12345" } });
+    assert(loginByUsername.status === 201 || loginByUsername.status === 200, `login by username succeeds (got ${loginByUsername.status})`);
+    assert((loginByUsername.body as AuthTokens).accessToken !== undefined, "…and returns a real access token");
+
+    const loginByPhone = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: identPhone, password: "ident-user-pw-12345" } });
+    assert(loginByPhone.status === 201 || loginByPhone.status === 200, `login by phone succeeds (got ${loginByPhone.status})`);
+
+    const loginByEmailStill = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: identEmail, password: "ident-user-pw-12345" } });
+    assert(loginByEmailStill.status === 201 || loginByEmailStill.status === 200, `login by email still works once username/phone are also set (got ${loginByEmailStill.status})`);
+
+    const loginByUsernameWrongPassword = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: identUsername, password: "wrong" } });
+    assert(loginByUsernameWrongPassword.status === 401, `login by username with the wrong password is still rejected (got ${loginByUsernameWrongPassword.status})`);
+
+    const loginByUnknownIdentifier = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: `nobody-${RUN_ID}`, password: "whatever" } });
+    assert(loginByUnknownIdentifier.status === 401, `an identifier matching no email/username/phone is rejected the same way (got ${loginByUnknownIdentifier.status})`);
+
+    console.log("11d. change password: wrong current password rejected, right one rotates it and revokes every other session but this one");
+    const otherDeviceLogin = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: identEmail, password: "ident-user-pw-12345" } });
+    const otherDeviceTokens = otherDeviceLogin.body as AuthTokens;
+    assert(otherDeviceTokens.sessionId !== identTokens.sessionId, "a second session for the identifier-test user exists, distinct from the signup session");
+
+    const wrongCurrentPassword = await call("POST", "/auth/password/change", {
+      token: identTokens.accessToken,
+      body: { currentPassword: "not-the-real-password", newPassword: "ident-new-pw-67890" },
+    });
+    assert(wrongCurrentPassword.status === 401, `changing the password with the wrong current password is rejected (got ${wrongCurrentPassword.status})`);
+
+    const changePassword = await call("POST", "/auth/password/change", {
+      token: identTokens.accessToken,
+      body: { currentPassword: "ident-user-pw-12345", newPassword: "ident-new-pw-67890" },
+    });
+    assert(changePassword.status === 201 || changePassword.status === 200, `change-password succeeds with the right current password (got ${changePassword.status})`);
+
+    const oldPasswordNowFails = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: identEmail, password: "ident-user-pw-12345" } });
+    assert(oldPasswordNowFails.status === 401, `the old password no longer works (got ${oldPasswordNowFails.status})`);
+
+    const newPasswordWorks = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: identEmail, password: "ident-new-pw-67890" } });
+    assert(newPasswordWorks.status === 201 || newPasswordWorks.status === 200, `the new password works (got ${newPasswordWorks.status})`);
+
+    const callingSessionSurvives = await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: identTokens.accessToken });
+    assert(callingSessionSurvives.status === 200, `the session that called change-password is left alone, not logged out by its own request (got ${callingSessionSurvives.status})`);
+
+    // Revocation lands on the session row (checked at refresh time), not an instant denylist of
+    // the still-live access token — same split `logout()` vs. `logoutOthers()` relies on elsewhere.
+    const otherSessionRefreshRevoked = await call("POST", "/auth/refresh", { body: { refreshToken: otherDeviceTokens.refreshToken } });
+    assert(
+      otherSessionRefreshRevoked.status === 401,
+      `…while the other, unrelated session for the same user can no longer refresh (got ${otherSessionRefreshRevoked.status})`,
+    );
+
+    console.log("11d-2. self-service profile update: no admin permission required, own row only");
+    const selfProfileUpdate = await call("PATCH", "/auth/me", {
+      token: identTokens.accessToken,
+      body: { displayName: "Self Updated", photo: "" },
+    });
+    assert(selfProfileUpdate.status === 200, `a user can update their own profile with no admin permission (got ${selfProfileUpdate.status})`);
+    const selfProfile = selfProfileUpdate.body as { id: string; displayName: string | null; photo: string | null };
+    assert(selfProfile.displayName === "Self Updated", "…and the response reflects the new value");
+    assert(selfProfile.photo === "", "…including the photo field");
+
+    const selfProfileRejectsNoToken = await call("PATCH", "/auth/me", { body: { displayName: "No Auth" } });
+    assert(selfProfileRejectsNoToken.status === 401, `updating a profile without a token is rejected (got ${selfProfileRejectsNoToken.status})`);
+
+    const meAfterProfileUpdate = await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: identTokens.accessToken });
+    assert(
+      (meAfterProfileUpdate.body as { displayName: string | null }).displayName === "Self Updated",
+      `…and GET /auth/me reflects the same update, no separate refetch path (got ${JSON.stringify(meAfterProfileUpdate.body)})`,
+    );
+
+    console.log("11e. admin creates a user directly — no signup, usable immediately");
+    const createdEmail = uniqueEmail("admin-created");
+    const createUser = await call("POST", "/auth/admin/users", {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { email: createdEmail, password: "admin-created-pw-12345", displayName: "Admin Created" },
+    });
+    assert(createUser.status === 201 || createUser.status === 200, `admin can create a user directly (got ${createUser.status})`);
+    const createdUser = createUser.body as { id: string; email: string; displayName: string | null; roles: string[] };
+    assert(createdUser.email === createdEmail, "…and the response is the new user, not something stale");
+    assert(createdUser.displayName === "Admin Created", "…with the profile fields given at creation time");
+
+    const createdUserCanLogin = await call("POST", "/auth/login", { body: { identifier: createdEmail, password: "admin-created-pw-12345" } });
+    assert(
+      createdUserCanLogin.status === 201 || createdUserCanLogin.status === 200,
+      `the account is usable immediately, no separate activation step (got ${createdUserCanLogin.status})`,
+    );
+
+    const duplicateCreate = await call("POST", "/auth/admin/users", {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { email: createdEmail, password: "another-pw-12345" },
+    });
+    assert(duplicateCreate.status === 409, `creating a second account with the same email is rejected (got ${duplicateCreate.status})`);
+
+    const createWithRole = await call("POST", "/auth/admin/users", {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { email: uniqueEmail("admin-created-role"), password: "admin-created-pw-67890", roles: [ROLE_SLUG] },
+    });
+    assert(createWithRole.status === 201 || createWithRole.status === 200, `admin can name specific roles at creation time (got ${createWithRole.status})`);
+    assert(
+      (createWithRole.body as { roles: string[] }).roles.includes(ROLE_SLUG),
+      `…and the named role — not the default — is what the new account actually holds (got ${JSON.stringify((createWithRole.body as { roles: string[] }).roles)})`,
+    );
+
+    console.log("12. permission enforcement: each admin route is opened by its own permission and by nothing else");
+    // The point of this section is that permissions — not roles — are the boundary. Every probe
+    // user below holds a real role that carries nothing, so "has a role" can never be mistaken
+    // for "has authority", and the only thing that ever changes between them is which single
+    // permission was granted directly.
+    const NO_PERMS_ROLE = `probe-no-perms-${RUN_ID}`;
+    const ASSIGNABLE_ROLE = `probe-assignable-${RUN_ID}`;
+
+    const noPermsRole = await call("POST", "/auth/admin/roles", { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId, body: { slug: NO_PERMS_ROLE } });
+    const assignableRole = await call("POST", "/auth/admin/roles", {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { slug: ASSIGNABLE_ROLE },
+    });
+    assert(noPermsRole.status === 201 && assignableRole.status === 201, "the probe roles are created (neither carries any permission)");
+
+    const probeTargetEmail = uniqueEmail("probe-target");
+    const probeTargetTokens = await signup(probeTargetEmail, "probe-target-pw-1");
+    const probeTargetId = (await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: probeTargetTokens.accessToken })).body.sub as string;
+    await hooks.admitUser(ctx, admin, { userId: probeTargetId, email: probeTargetEmail });
+
+    const probesFor = (seq: number) =>
+      adminRouteProbes({
+        targetUserId: probeTargetId,
+        roleId: (assignableRole.body as { id: string }).id,
+        roleSlug: ASSIGNABLE_ROLE,
+        newRoleSlug: `${ASSIGNABLE_ROLE}-new-${seq}`,
+        newPermissionSlug: `probe:defined-${RUN_ID}-${seq}`,
+      });
+
+    /** Runs every admin route as one caller and reports what each answered. Leaves the target user as it found it. */
+    async function runProbes(token: string, seq: number) {
+      const results: Array<{ probe: RouteProbe; status: number }> = [];
+      for (const probe of probesFor(seq)) {
+        const res = await call(probe.method, probe.path, { token, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId, body: probe.body });
+        results.push({ probe, status: res.status });
+      }
+      return results;
+    }
+
+    const succeeded = (status: number) => status === 200 || status === 201;
+    const refused = (rs: Array<{ probe: { label: string }; status: number }>) =>
+      rs
+        .filter((r) => r.status !== 403)
+        .map((r) => `${r.probe.label} -> ${r.status}`)
+        .join(", ");
+
+    /** A user with the empty role, plus exactly the permissions named — granted directly, never through a role. */
+    async function probeUser(label: string, grants: string[]) {
+      const email = uniqueEmail(label);
+      const password = `${label}-pw-12345`;
+      const tokens = await signup(email, password);
+      const userId = (await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: tokens.accessToken })).body.sub as string;
+      await hooks.admitUser(ctx, admin, { userId, email });
+      await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${userId}/roles`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId, body: { role: NO_PERMS_ROLE } });
+      for (const permission of grants) {
+        await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${userId}/permissions`, { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId, body: { permission } });
+      }
+      // No re-login: authorization is read from the database on every request in both variants,
+      // so the token this user already holds sees the grants immediately.
+      return { email, password, userId, token: tokens.accessToken };
+    }
+
+    console.log("12a. holding a role that carries no permissions opens nothing");
+    const bare = await probeUser("probe-bare", []);
+    const bareMe = await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token: bare.token, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(bareMe.body?.roles?.includes(NO_PERMS_ROLE), "the probe user really does hold a role — it just carries no permissions");
+    const bareResults = await runProbes(bare.token, 0);
+    assert(bareResults.every((r) => r.status === 403), `all ${bareResults.length} admin routes refuse them (offenders: ${refused(bareResults) || "none"})`);
+
+    console.log("12b. one directly-granted permission opens exactly the routes it names, and no others");
+    const permissions = [...new Set(probesFor(0).map((p) => p.permission))];
+    let probeSeq = 1;
+    /** Kept for 12d: one caller holding exactly one permission is the sharpest case for the equivalence check. */
+    let singleGrantUser: { token: string; permission: string } | undefined;
+    for (const permission of permissions) {
+      const holder = await probeUser(`probe-${permission.replace(/[^a-z]/g, "")}`, [permission]);
+      if (permission === "users:read") singleGrantUser = { token: holder.token, permission };
+      const results = await runProbes(holder.token, probeSeq++);
+      for (const r of results.filter((r) => r.probe.permission === permission)) {
+        assert(succeeded(r.status), `"${permission}" opens ${r.probe.label} (got ${r.status})`);
+      }
+      const others = results.filter((r) => r.probe.permission !== permission);
+      assert(others.every((r) => r.status === 403), `…and "${permission}" opens nothing else (offenders: ${refused(others) || "none"})`);
+    }
+
+    console.log("12c. revoking a permission takes it away again — on the same token, with no re-login");
+    const revokee = await probeUser("probe-revokee", ["users:read"]);
+    const beforeRevoke = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/users", { token: revokee.token, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(beforeRevoke.status === 200, `the grant is in effect to begin with (got ${beforeRevoke.status})`);
+
+    const revoked = await call("POST", `/auth/admin/users/${revokee.userId}/permissions/${encodeURIComponent("users:read")}/revoke`, {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+    });
+    assert(succeeded(revoked.status), `admin can revoke a direct grant (got ${revoked.status})`);
+
+    const afterRevokeCall = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/users", { token: revokee.token, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(afterRevokeCall.status === 403, `and the route closes again on the very next request (got ${afterRevokeCall.status})`);
+
+    console.log("12d. front/back equivalence: an ability rebuilt from /auth/me answers exactly as the server enforces");
+    // This is the property the whole flat-slug model exists for. The client is given permission
+    // slugs and builds its ability with the *same* `defineAbilitiesFor` the server's guard used.
+    // Comparing predicted allow/deny against the real HTTP status for every gated route is what
+    // makes "the console cannot offer a button the API refuses" a fact rather than a hope.
+    async function proveEquivalence(label: string, token: string) {
+      const me = await call("GET", "/auth/me", { token, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+      const ability = defineAbilitiesFor((me.body?.permissions ?? []) as string[]);
+      const results = await runProbes(token, probeSeq++);
+
+      const disagreements = results
+        .map((r) => ({ label: r.probe.label, predicted: ability.can(r.probe.permission, ABILITY_SUBJECT), served: r.status !== 403 }))
+        .filter((r) => r.predicted !== r.served);
+      assert(
+        disagreements.length === 0,
+        `${label}: all ${results.length} gated routes answer exactly as the client-side ability predicts` +
+          (disagreements.length ? ` (disagreements: ${disagreements.map((d) => `${d.label} predicted=${d.predicted}`).join(", ")})` : ""),
+      );
+      return new Set(results.filter((r) => r.status !== 403).map((r) => r.probe.label));
+    }
+
+    const adminAllows = await proveEquivalence("admin", await admin.freshToken());
+    const bareAllows = await proveEquivalence("a member holding a role with no permissions", bare.token);
+    const grantAllows = await proveEquivalence(`a user holding only "${singleGrantUser!.permission}"`, singleGrantUser!.token);
+    assert(
+      adminAllows.size > grantAllows.size && grantAllows.size > bareAllows.size && bareAllows.size === 0,
+      `…and the three callers genuinely differ, so the comparison is not vacuous (admin=${adminAllows.size}, single-grant=${grantAllows.size}, bare=${bareAllows.size})`,
+    );
+
+    console.log("12e. a permission edited in the database changes enforcement, with no code change and no redeploy");
+    // `isActive: false` is the deny: the row stops appearing in any ability that would have
+    // carried it, without unpicking a single grant. Written here through the admin API — each
+    // variant's hooks prove the same thing again with a raw database write, to rule out the API
+    // doing anything in memory.
+    const deactivated = await call("POST", "/auth/admin/permissions", {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { slug: "users:read", isActive: false },
+    });
+    assert(succeeded(deactivated.status), `an admin can deactivate a permission (got ${deactivated.status})`);
+
+    const listAfterDeactivate = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/permissions", { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(
+      (listAfterDeactivate.body?.permissions ?? []).some((p: { slug: string; isActive: boolean }) => p.slug === "users:read" && p.isActive === false),
+      "the catalog reports it as inactive",
+    );
+
+    const deniedByEdit = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/users", { token: singleGrantUser!.token, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(deniedByEdit.status === 403, `the route it opened is now refused for a user whose grant is untouched (got ${deniedByEdit.status})`);
+
+    const adminDeniedToo = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/users", { token: await admin.freshToken(), workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(adminDeniedToo.status === 403, `…including for the administrator, whose role still carries it (got ${adminDeniedToo.status})`);
+
+    const reactivated = await call("POST", "/auth/admin/permissions", {
+      token: await admin.freshToken(),
+      workspaceId: admin.workspaceId,
+      body: { slug: "users:read", isActive: true },
+    });
+    assert(succeeded(reactivated.status), `an admin can reactivate it (got ${reactivated.status})`);
+    const restored = await call("GET", "/auth/admin/users", { token: singleGrantUser!.token, workspaceId: admin.workspaceId });
+    assert(restored.status === 200, `and every grant that pointed at it works again immediately (got ${restored.status})`);
+
+    console.log(`13. ${hooks.variant}-specific properties`);
+    await hooks.proveVariantProperties(ctx, admin);
+  } finally {
+    await app.close();
+  }
+
+  if (failures > 0) {
+    console.error(`\n${failures} assertion(s) failed`);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  console.log("\nAll assertions passed.");
+}
+
+main().catch((err) => {
+  console.error(err);
+  process.exit(1);
+});