@serfab/cadre-core 1.17.0 → 1.19.0

package/src/control-database.ts

@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ import optimysticPlugin from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-optimystic/plugin';
 import { digest, randomBytes } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
 import type { Libp2p } from '@libp2p/interface';
 import type { IRepo } from '@optimystic/db-core';
-import type { StrandRow, JoinRequestRow, JoinOutcome, PendingJoin, NodeProfile, PeerAddressRecord, CadrePeerRow, OwnerKeyRow, RevocationRow, RevocationLedgerOpenResult, DeviceTokenRecord, DeviceTokenRow, PushPlatform, CadreInviteRow, CadreInviteUsageRow, CadreInviteRedemptionResult, CadreInviteStatus, OwnerGrantRow, OwnerGrantUsageRow, OwnerGrantRedemptionResult, OwnerGrantStatus, SeedPeer, MachineRemovalResult } from './types.js';
-import { APPLY_CONTROL_SCHEMA, CONTROL_SCHEMA_DECLARATION, controlSchemaFileDeclaration } from './control-schema.js';
+import { createEmptyCollections } from '@serfab/quereus-plugin-sereus';
+import type { CollectionRegistrySource } from '@serfab/quereus-plugin-sereus';
+import type { StrandRow, JoinRequestRow, JoinOutcome, PendingJoin, NodeProfile, PeerAddressRecord, CadrePeerRow, OwnerKeyRow, RevocationRow, DeviceTokenRecord, DeviceTokenRow, PushPlatform, CadreInviteRow, CadreInviteUsageRow, CadreInviteRedemptionResult, CadreInviteStatus, OwnerGrantRow, OwnerGrantUsageRow, OwnerGrantRedemptionResult, OwnerGrantStatus, SeedPeer, MachineRemovalResult } from './types.js';
+import { APPLY_CONTROL_SCHEMA, CONTROL_SCHEMA_DECLARATION, CONTROL_SCHEMA_NAME, controlSchemaFileDeclaration } from './control-schema.js';
 import { refuseIncompatibleControlStore } from './control-schema-version.js';
 import { canonicalDatetime } from './canonical-datetime.js';
 import { controlAuthorizationFields, unboundAuthorizationFields, cadreInviteRowFields, ownerGrantRowFields, CONTROL_TABLES } from './control-authorization.js';
@@ -16,12 +18,16 @@ import type { ControlTable, RevocableTable, BoundControlDomain, UnboundControlDo
 import { requireEd25519PublicKeyB64 } from './ed25519-key.js';
 import { verifyCadreInviteRow, verifyOwnerGrantRow } from './peer-authorization.js';
 import { OWNER_KEY_MAX_LABEL } from './owner-key-export.js';
-import { retryControlWrite, SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY } from './control-write-retry.js';
+import { retryControlWrite, LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY, SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY } from './control-write-retry.js';
 import type { ControlWriteRetryOptions } from './control-write-retry.js';
 import { isCohortUnreachableRead, retryControlRead } from './control-read-retry.js';
 import type { ControlReadRetryOptions } from './control-read-retry.js';
 import { chainMessages } from './control-retry.js';
 import type { ControlRetryAbandonment } from './control-retry.js';
+import { TableWatchRegistry } from './table-change-watch.js';
+import type { TableChangeWatch, TableChangeWatchOptions } from './table-change-watch.js';
+import { MembershipView } from './membership-view.js';
+import type { FormationInviteFacts } from './formation-token.js';
 
 export type { ControlTable, RevocableTable, ControlDomain, ControlAction } from './control-authorization.js';
 
@@ -58,12 +64,11 @@ export function generateStampId(peerId: string): string {
  * present locally.
  *
  * Consent is bound to the strand's one-off `StampId` (see the consent branch of
- * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`), so the writer must read the live row before inserting.
- * The ordinary "host strand has not converged on this responder yet" case is caught
- * earlier and reported as `missing` by `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand`;
- * reaching here means the row vanished between that check and the write, which is a
- * genuine race and is surfaced rather than left to fail the deferred `StrandExists`
- * CHECK at commit (which would drop the write with a far less legible error).
+ * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`), so a writer not handed the stamp reads the live row before
+ * inserting, and throws this when the row is absent rather than leaving it to fail the
+ * deferred `StrandExists` CHECK at commit (a far less legible error). The formation
+ * responder hands the stamp over from `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand`, which
+ * reports an absent row as `missing`; a row removed after that read fails the CHECK instead.
  */
 export class MissingHostStrandError extends Error {
   constructor(readonly strandId: string, readonly token: string) {
@@ -106,16 +111,16 @@ export class FormationAbortedError extends Error {
  * the write, inside {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation} /
  * {@link ControlDatabase.recordFormationUsage}, off the same check for a cadre invitation
  * ({@link ControlDatabase.redeemCadreInvite}) and an owner grant
- * ({@link ControlDatabase.redeemOwnerGrant}), and off the unlocked pre-check
- * `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.authorizeUsage` runs before the manager issues a membership
- * pass — and off nothing else. It exists because
+ * ({@link ControlDatabase.redeemOwnerGrant}), and off the unlocked re-check
+ * `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.authorizeUsage` runs after an outside approval, before the
+ * manager issues a membership pass — and off nothing else. It exists because
  * without it the refusal surfaces as a generic `CHECK constraint failed: Authorized` from the
  * schema's own count-based cap clause, which the manager reports as a retryable
  * `Formation conflict, retry` — telling the joiner to retry something that can never succeed.
  * Two redemptions of one token racing on the SAME node serialize behind the local write
- * queue, so the loser reads the winner's committed row and is refused here by name —
- * `StrandFormationManager.validateToken`'s `isTokenUsed` check cannot catch that, since it
- * ran before either redemption wrote anything.
+ * queue, so the loser reads the winner's committed row and is refused here by name — the
+ * use count `StrandFormationManager.validateToken` reads cannot catch that, since it was
+ * read before either redemption wrote anything.
  */
 export class InvitationExhaustedError extends Error {
   constructor(
@@ -484,6 +489,8 @@ interface OptimysticPluginResult {
    * compose-strand.ts).
    */
   hydrate: (db: Database) => Promise<{ tables: number; indexes: number }>;
+  /** The transaction bridge, whose registry holds every collection a control table opened; see {@link ControlDatabase.ensureOwnerKey}. */
+  txnBridge: CollectionRegistrySource;
   [key: string]: unknown;
 }
 
@@ -542,10 +549,9 @@ interface GuardedRemoval {
 
 /**
  * The exact bytes an owner signs to append one `Revocation` tombstone — `Revocation.Authorized`
- * binds the whole (TableName, RowKey, StampId) row under its own domain tag. Shared by every
- * tombstone writer (a guarded removal, an issued row's withdrawal, the ledger marker) so the
- * field order lives in one place; the base64url verifier is `peer-authorization.ts`'s
- * `revocationDigest`.
+ * binds the whole (TableName, RowKey, StampId) row under its own domain tag. Shared by both
+ * tombstone writers (a guarded removal, an issued row's withdrawal) so the field order lives
+ * in one place; the base64url verifier is `peer-authorization.ts`'s `revocationDigest`.
  */
 function revocationTombstoneMessage(partyId: string, ref: { tableName: string; rowKey: string; stampId: string }): Uint8Array {
   return buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', partyId, [ref.tableName, ref.rowKey, ref.stampId]);
@@ -587,6 +593,63 @@ export function ownerKeyLabel(label: string | null | undefined): string | null {
  */
 export type ControlSign = (message: Uint8Array) => string | Promise<string>;
 
+/**
+ * Signs this node's own address record over its `CadrePeer` row as it stands —
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.updateSelfPeerRecord}'s callback, run inside the locked write body on
+ * every attempt, so the record written is always stamped past the row that was actually read.
+ */
+export type SelfRecordSigner = (current: PeerAddressRecord) => PeerAddressRecord;
+
+/**
+ * Which owner re-touch {@link ControlDatabase.reauthorizeCadrePeer} makes over a `CadrePeer` row:
+ *
+ * - `'rebroadcast'` — the write-while-alone drain re-emitting a row that committed local-only. It
+ *   bumps `UpdatedAt` so the row goes out as a fresh transaction, and writes only while the row's
+ *   `Sig` is null: once the machine has self-published, the row is its to refresh, and a bump
+ *   without a re-sign would leave its signature unverifiable.
+ * - `'revouch'` — an owner rebinding the row's voucher to its own key before the vouching key is
+ *   removed (`CadreNode.removeOwner`). Written whether or not the machine has self-published, and
+ *   leaves `UpdatedAt` untouched, so a self-signed record stays verifiable.
+ */
+export type CadrePeerRetouchMode = 'rebroadcast' | 'revouch';
+
+/**
+ * What {@link ControlDatabase.reauthorizeCadrePeer} found and did: the row was re-touched; no
+ * readable row exists (absent, or its stamp retired); or — `'rebroadcast'` only — the machine has
+ * self-published since, so the row is no longer the owner's to re-emit. The two no-write outcomes
+ * are decided over the row as read inside the locked body, so a caller can act on them.
+ */
+export type CadrePeerRetouchOutcome = 'retouched' | 'absent' | 'self-published';
+
+/** A formation invitation written with a founding ({@link FoundingRows}), bound to the strand founded. */
+export interface FoundingInvite {
+  /** The invitation token, the `FormationInvite` primary key. */
+  token: string;
+  /** The sApp a redeemed strand will use. */
+  sAppId: string;
+  /** Epoch ms after which it cannot be redeemed; omit for never. */
+  expiresAtMs?: number;
+  /** How many redemptions it allows; omit for unlimited. */
+  totalUses?: number;
+  /** Web hook sent the disclosure; a `ValidationKey` then signs off each redemption. */
+  validationUrl?: string;
+}
+
+/** The control rows one founding writes together; see {@link ControlDatabase.insertFoundingRows}. */
+export interface FoundingRows {
+  strand: { id: string; type: 'o' | 'c'; memberPrivateKey?: string };
+  /** This party's membership identity key for a closed strand; absent for an open strand, or when a stored key is adopted. */
+  partyKey?: string;
+  /** A formation invitation bound to this strand (its `StrandId` is `strand.id`). */
+  formationInvite?: FoundingInvite;
+}
+
+/** One owner-signed insert, stamped and signed: the statement and parameters to run under the write lock. */
+interface SignedInsert {
+  sql: string;
+  params: SqlParameters;
+}
+
 /** What an owner asks {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadreInvite} (or {@link ControlDatabase.signCadreInvite}) to sign. */
 export interface CadreInviteFields {
   /** The invitation public key (base64url ed25519), the row's primary key. */
@@ -615,7 +678,7 @@ async function signGuardedRemoval(
 }
 
 /** The control tables keyed by a strand id whose repeat insert a caller may treat as idempotent. */
-type StrandIdTable = Extract<RevocableTable, 'Strand' | 'JoinedStrand'>;
+type StrandIdTable = Extract<RevocableTable, 'Strand' | 'StrandPartyKey' | 'JoinedStrand'>;
 
 /** The control tables whose repeat insert of a held key a caller may classify. */
 type KeyConflictTable = StrandIdTable | IssuedTable | Extract<RevocableTable, 'JoinRequest'>;
@@ -642,7 +705,8 @@ function keyConflictPattern(table: KeyConflictTable): RegExp {
  * {@link CadreNode.publishStrand} uses this to tell "my own earlier publish already
  * landed" (re-read, and no-op when the row matches) apart from every other rejection —
  * an unauthorized signer, a retired stamp — which must keep surfacing. For `JoinedStrand`
- * the same test tells "another machine of this party already published this join" apart.
+ * the same test tells "another machine of this party already published this join" apart, and
+ * for `StrandPartyKey` it tells a founding that this party's key for the id is already seated.
  *
  * Matched by TEXT, not by type: the typed engine error does not survive the trip out of
  * optimystic (same constraint the retry classifiers in `control-write-retry.ts` document).
@@ -709,31 +773,17 @@ export class PendingJoinChangedError extends Error {
 }
 
 /**
- * The one `CadreControl.Revocation` row that retires nothing, filed once by an owner
- * ({@link ControlDatabase.openRevocationLedger}) so the table is never a never-written
- * block. The schema's table comment says why that matters and why the row can never read
- * as a retirement; `RowIsGone` pins this exact triple.
+ * A `CadreControl.Revocation` row that retires nothing, which parties founded before
+ * `control-collections-created-at-cadre-founding` may hold: an owner filed it so the table
+ * had a collection, which genesis now creates. Nothing files it now. `RowIsGone` still admits
+ * this exact triple, and {@link ControlDatabase.queryRevocations} skips it.
  */
-export const REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER = {
+const REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER = {
   tableName: 'Revocation',
   rowKey: 'ledger',
   stampId: 'opened',
 } as const;
 
-/**
- * The rejection a second insert of the ledger marker produces: the optimystic vtab's
- * primary-key wording (see {@link keyConflictPattern}), naming both columns of
- * `Revocation`'s composite key. Applied only to the marker's own insert, whose key
- * ('Revocation', 'opened') no row but the marker can hold (`RowIsGone`), and `Revocation`
- * has no other unique constraint.
- */
-const REVOCATION_LEDGER_CONFLICT = /UNIQUE constraint failed: Revocation\.TableName, Revocation\.StampId\b/i;
-
-/** Did the ledger marker's insert fail because the marker is already filed? Text-matched, failing closed, like {@link isStrandIdConflict}. */
-function isRevocationLedgerConflict(error: unknown): boolean {
-  return errorChainMatches(error, REVOCATION_LEDGER_CONFLICT);
-}
-
 /** Whether any message in `error`'s cause chain matches `pattern`; false for a non-`Error`. */
 function errorChainMatches(error: unknown, pattern: RegExp): boolean {
   return error instanceof Error && chainMessages(error).some(message => pattern.test(message));
@@ -807,7 +857,91 @@ export type ReapableTable = (typeof REAPABLE_TABLES)[number];
 const REAPABLE_TABLE_SET: ReadonlySet<RevocableTable> = new Set<RevocableTable>(REAPABLE_TABLES);
 const isReapableTable = (table: RevocableTable): table is ReapableTable => REAPABLE_TABLE_SET.has(table);
 
-/** Every `CadreInvite` column, in the order {@link cadreInviteRowOf} reads them; callers append their `where`. */
+/** One control read's rows, and whether it took the committed-read path ({@link ControlDatabase.readRowsOnce}). */
+interface RoutedRead {
+  rows: Record<string, SqlValue>[];
+  committed: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The full-table scans the `Revocation`, `CadrePeer` and `OwnerKey` membership views load
+ * ({@link ControlDatabase.readMembershipRows}); the four chain tables' scans sit beside their
+ * row mappers below. Specs rig these reads by their text: `from CadreControl.Revocation`, and
+ * the `CadrePeer` scan by its `select PeerId, Multiaddr, StampId` prefix, which no other
+ * `CadrePeer` statement shares.
+ */
+const REVOCATION_SELECT_SQL = 'select TableName, RowKey, StampId, ReissuedAt, SignerKey, SignerSig from CadreControl.Revocation';
+const CADRE_PEER_SELECT_SQL = 'select PeerId, Multiaddr, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage, PublicKey, UpdatedAt, Profile, Sig from CadreControl.CadrePeer';
+const OWNER_KEY_SELECT_SQL = 'select Key, Label, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage from CadreControl.OwnerKey';
+
+/** A stored `CadrePeer` row as a {@link CadrePeerRow}. */
+function cadrePeerRowOf(row: Record<string, SqlValue>): CadrePeerRow {
+  return {
+    peerId: row.PeerId as string,
+    publicKey: (row.PublicKey as string | null) ?? null,
+    multiaddr: (row.Multiaddr as string | null) ?? null,
+    updatedAt: (row.UpdatedAt as number | null) ?? 0,
+    profile: (row.Profile as NodeProfile | null) ?? null,
+    sig: (row.Sig as string | null) ?? null,
+    stampId: (row.StampId as string | null) ?? null,
+    vouchOwner: (row.VouchOwner as string | null) ?? null,
+    vouchSig: (row.VouchSig as string | null) ?? null,
+    vouchUsage: (row.VouchUsage as string | null) ?? null,
+  };
+}
+
+/** A {@link CadrePeerRow} as the address record its machine signed ({@link PeerAddressRecord}); see {@link ControlDatabase.queryPeerRecord} for the coalescing. */
+function peerAddressRecordOf(row: CadrePeerRow): PeerAddressRecord {
+  const multiaddr = row.multiaddr ?? '';
+  return {
+    peerId: row.peerId,
+    publicKey: row.publicKey ?? '',
+    addrs: multiaddr.length > 0 ? multiaddr.split(',') : [],
+    updatedAt: row.updatedAt,
+    profile: row.profile,
+    sig: row.sig ?? '',
+  };
+}
+
+/** The columns {@link ControlDatabase.reauthorizeCadrePeer} signs over and bumps: a row it may write. */
+interface RetouchTarget {
+  stampId: string;
+  updatedAt: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.reauthorizeCadrePeer}'s decision over the row as read: the row to write,
+ * or the {@link CadrePeerRetouchOutcome} that says why nothing is written — no readable row (a
+ * stampless row counts, since the voucher digest binds the stamp), or a self-published row in
+ * `'rebroadcast'` mode. One function so the pre-check outside the lock and the re-check inside it
+ * cannot disagree.
+ */
+function retouchTarget(row: CadrePeerRow | null, mode: CadrePeerRetouchMode): RetouchTarget | 'absent' | 'self-published' {
+  if (row === null || row.stampId === null) {
+    return 'absent';
+  }
+  if (mode === 'rebroadcast' && row.sig !== null) {
+    return 'self-published';
+  }
+  return { stampId: row.stampId, updatedAt: row.updatedAt };
+}
+
+/** A stored `Revocation` row as a {@link RevocationRow}; the caller has already skipped {@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}. */
+function revocationRowOf(row: Record<string, SqlValue>): RevocationRow {
+  return {
+    tableName: row.TableName as RevocableTable,
+    rowKey: row.RowKey as string,
+    stampId: row.StampId as string,
+    reissuedAt: (row.ReissuedAt as number | null) ?? 0,
+    signerKey: row.SignerKey as string,
+    signerSig: row.SignerSig as string,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Every `CadreInvite` column, in the order {@link cadreInviteRowOf} reads them: the full scan the
+ * `CadreInvite` membership view loads, and the base the point reads append their `where` to.
+ */
 const CADRE_INVITE_SELECT_SQL = 'select Key, PeerId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, IssuerKey, IssuerSig, StampId from CadreControl.CadreInvite';
 
 /**
@@ -827,6 +961,9 @@ function cadreInviteRowOf(row: Record<string, SqlValue>): CadreInviteRow {
   };
 }
 
+/** The full scan the `CadreInviteUsage` membership view loads, in the order {@link cadreInviteUsageRowOf} reads it. */
+const CADRE_INVITE_USAGE_SELECT_SQL = 'select UsageStampId, InviteKey, PeerId, PeerKey, PeerStampId, InviteSig, PeerSig from CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage';
+
 /** A stored `CadreInviteUsage` row as a {@link CadreInviteUsageRow}. */
 function cadreInviteUsageRowOf(row: Record<string, SqlValue>): CadreInviteUsageRow {
   return {
@@ -840,7 +977,7 @@ function cadreInviteUsageRowOf(row: Record<string, SqlValue>): CadreInviteUsageR
   };
 }
 
-/** Every `OwnerGrant` column, in the order {@link ownerGrantRowOf} reads them; callers append their `where`. */
+/** Every `OwnerGrant` column, in the order {@link ownerGrantRowOf} reads them; as {@link CADRE_INVITE_SELECT_SQL}, the view's scan and the point read's base. */
 const OWNER_GRANT_SELECT_SQL = 'select Key, Label, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, IssuerKey, IssuerSig, StampId from CadreControl.OwnerGrant';
 
 /** A stored `OwnerGrant` row as an {@link OwnerGrantRow}; `ExpiresAt` kept canonical, as {@link cadreInviteRowOf} keeps it. */
@@ -856,6 +993,9 @@ function ownerGrantRowOf(row: Record<string, SqlValue>): OwnerGrantRow {
   };
 }
 
+/** The full scan the `OwnerGrantUsage` membership view loads, in the order {@link ownerGrantUsageRowOf} reads it. */
+const OWNER_GRANT_USAGE_SELECT_SQL = 'select UsageStampId, GrantKey, SeatedKey, SeatedStampId, GrantSig, OwnerSig from CadreControl.OwnerGrantUsage';
+
 /** A stored `OwnerGrantUsage` row as an {@link OwnerGrantUsageRow}. */
 function ownerGrantUsageRowOf(row: Record<string, SqlValue>): OwnerGrantUsageRow {
   return {
@@ -901,16 +1041,8 @@ function strandRow(row: Record<string, SqlValue>): StrandRow {
 const STRAND_COLUMNS = 'Id, MemberPrivateKey, Type, FounderOwnerKey, FounderPeerId';
 
 /** A `FormationInvite` row as {@link ControlDatabase.queryFormationInvite} reads it. */
-export interface FormationInviteRow {
+export interface FormationInviteRow extends FormationInviteFacts {
   token: string;
-  sAppId: string;
-  /** Parsed epoch ms of the stored `datetime`; null when the invitation never expires. */
-  expiresAtMs: number | null;
-  /** Null is unlimited. */
-  totalUses: number | null;
-  validationUrl: string | null;
-  /** A bound invitation's host strand; null on the responder-provisions path. */
-  strandId: string | null;
 }
 
 const FORMATION_INVITE_SELECT_SQL = 'select Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId from CadreControl.FormationInvite';
@@ -1120,6 +1252,7 @@ export interface ControlDatabaseConfig {
 export class ControlDatabase {
   private db: Database | null = null;
   private collectionFactory: CollectionFactory | null = null;
+  private txnBridge: CollectionRegistrySource | null = null;
   private readonly config: ControlDatabaseConfig;
   private initialized = false;
   private membershipListener: MembershipChangeListener | null = null;
@@ -1127,6 +1260,26 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   private controlWriteAbandonedListener: ControlWriteAbandonedListener | null = null;
   /** Tail of the local-write chain — see {@link withWriteLock}. */
   private writeQueue: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();
+  /** Subscriptions handed out by {@link watchTables}. */
+  private readonly tableWatches = new TableWatchRegistry();
+  /** The cached membership tables; see {@link readMembershipRows}. */
+  private readonly revocationView = this.membershipView(REVOCATION_SELECT_SQL, 'revocations');
+  private readonly cadrePeerView = this.membershipView(CADRE_PEER_SELECT_SQL, 'cadre-peers');
+  private readonly ownerKeyView = this.membershipView(OWNER_KEY_SELECT_SQL, 'owner-keys');
+  private readonly cadreInviteView = this.membershipView(CADRE_INVITE_SELECT_SQL, 'cadre-invites');
+  private readonly cadreInviteUsageView = this.membershipView(CADRE_INVITE_USAGE_SELECT_SQL, 'cadre-invite-usages');
+  private readonly ownerGrantView = this.membershipView(OWNER_GRANT_SELECT_SQL, 'owner-grants');
+  private readonly ownerGrantUsageView = this.membershipView(OWNER_GRANT_USAGE_SELECT_SQL, 'owner-grant-usages');
+  /** Each membership view by the qualified table it copies, for {@link watchMembershipViews}, {@link watchMembershipTables} and {@link invalidateMembershipViews}. */
+  private readonly membershipViews = new Map<string, MembershipView<Record<string, SqlValue>>>([
+    ['CadreControl.Revocation', this.revocationView],
+    ['CadreControl.CadrePeer', this.cadrePeerView],
+    ['CadreControl.OwnerKey', this.ownerKeyView],
+    ['CadreControl.CadreInvite', this.cadreInviteView],
+    ['CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage', this.cadreInviteUsageView],
+    ['CadreControl.OwnerGrant', this.ownerGrantView],
+    ['CadreControl.OwnerGrantUsage', this.ownerGrantUsageView],
+  ]);
   /**
    * Locked write bodies currently running (see {@link runWriteBody}); what
    * {@link readRowsOnce} consults to route an unlocked read around a write that has
@@ -1166,6 +1319,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     }
 
     log('Initializing ControlDatabase for party: %s', this.config.partyId);
+    this.invalidateMembershipViews();
 
     // Create database instance
     this.db = new Database();
@@ -1199,6 +1353,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     registerPartyIdFunction(this.db, this.config.partyId);
 
     this.collectionFactory = pluginResult.collectionFactory;
+    this.txnBridge = pluginResult.txnBridge;
 
     // Inject the libp2p node into the collection factory
     t0 = performance.now();
@@ -1255,10 +1410,49 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     await this.loadSchema();
     timing('[controlDb] loadSchema: %dms', Math.round(performance.now() - t0));
 
+    this.watchMembershipViews();
     this.initialized = true;
     log('ControlDatabase initialized successfully');
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Drop a membership view whenever its table changes: a commit made here, or a change this
+   * node's storage takes in from elsewhere. `onInvalidate` is the whole consumer, so the run
+   * does nothing; no backstop, since {@link MEMBERSHIP_VIEW_MAX_AGE_MS} bounds what the
+   * subscription cannot hear. {@link close} disposes it with the rest.
+   */
+  private watchMembershipViews(): void {
+    this.tableWatches.watch(this.db!, [...this.membershipViews.keys()], () => Promise.resolve(), {
+      label: 'membership-view',
+      onInvalidate: (table) => this.membershipViews.get(table)?.invalidate(),
+    });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * {@link watchTables} on the membership tables: the seven the membership views copy
+   * (`CadrePeer`, `OwnerKey`, `Revocation`, `CadreInvite`, `CadreInviteUsage`, `OwnerGrant`,
+   * `OwnerGrantUsage`), which are exactly what the membership gate and the owner-anchor sync
+   * read. `CadreNode.start` takes its gate watch here, so the gate hears every table its
+   * reads can depend on and no list of them lives outside this class.
+   */
+  watchMembershipTables(onChange: () => Promise<void>, options: TableChangeWatchOptions): TableChangeWatch {
+    return this.watchTables([...this.membershipViews.keys()], onChange, options);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Empty every membership view, so the next read of each loads afresh and no load in
+   * flight installs. Besides {@link initialize} and {@link close}, `CadreNode` calls it when
+   * a sibling becomes reachable (its identify on a new connection): a machine that was offline
+   * while that sibling committed learns of the commit only when it next reads the block from
+   * storage, and dropping the views makes the pass that starts then read now rather than after
+   * `MEMBERSHIP_VIEW_MAX_AGE_MS`.
+   */
+  invalidateMembershipViews(): void {
+    for (const view of this.membershipViews.values()) {
+      view.invalidate();
+    }
+  }
+
   private async loadSchema(): Promise<void> {
     let declaration: string;
     if (this.config.schemaPath) {
@@ -1271,10 +1465,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
 
     // Declaring runs no DDL; it only records the declaration the check and the apply both read.
     await this.db!.exec(declaration);
-    // A warm store this build cannot apply to without losing data is refused HERE, before the
-    // apply runs anything: the optimystic module refuses most changes to an existing table
-    // part-way through an apply, and a dropped table takes its rows. Migrating a store in place
-    // (control-store-migrates-on-start) widens this check to let catalog-only changes through.
+    // The apply below is also the MIGRATION of a warm store written under an older control
+    // schema version: its diff runs each version's changes in order, every one applied to a
+    // table's catalog record without a row rewritten, and ends by recording this build's version
+    // on the store. A store the apply must not touch is refused HERE, before it runs anything: one
+    // a newer release migrated (this machine is the one to update), one from before migrations,
+    // or one whose diff would rewrite or discard rows (`control-schema-version.ts`).
     await refuseIncompatibleControlStore(this.db!, this.config.partyId);
     await this.applyControlSchema();
     log('Schema loaded and executed');
@@ -1318,6 +1514,20 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     // argument is a statement about the pair, not about Quereus alone — pinned by
     // `test/control-schema-apply-unwind.spec.ts`.
     //
+    // The same argument covers the statements a MIGRATION runs (`control-schema-version.ts`'s
+    // `catalog-only` kinds, from Optimystic 1.16.0): the plugin's `alterTable` arms (add column,
+    // drop column, add and drop CHECK) and the tag change write the table's catalog record under
+    // the batch's per-statement checkpoint, so a step that throws withdraws its own write, and a
+    // batch whose commit fails is discarded whole and the tables it wrote re-persist on their next
+    // touch. A change the record already holds — another machine migrated first — is adopted with
+    // nothing written, and an undo of an adopted change touches this machine's catalog only. The
+    // one arm Quereus marks irreversible is `drop column`: once it has run, a later failure
+    // unwinds nothing (the apply reports the schema as partially migrated), the plugin's
+    // `endSchemaBatch` commits the steps that landed — or, when that commit fails, marks their
+    // tables to re-persist on next touch — and the retry's diff runs only the steps still
+    // missing. No row is lost either way: rows keep a dropped column's field until they are
+    // rewritten, and nothing reads it.
+    //
     // Only the "cohort did not answer, nothing committed" class is retried; the classifier
     // vetoes indeterminate commits and does not match `Missing block`, which is a durable
     // convergence fault a retry cannot heal (tracked separately) and must keep propagating.
@@ -1409,9 +1619,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * behind back-to-back local writes, narrow the count to the span from a body's first
    * statement to its transaction opening.
    */
-  private async readRowsOnce(sql: string, params: SqlParameters | undefined, underWriteLock: boolean): Promise<Record<string, SqlValue>[]> {
+  private async readRowsOnce(sql: string, params: SqlParameters | undefined, underWriteLock: boolean): Promise<RoutedRead> {
+    const committed = this.writeInFlight(underWriteLock);
     let iterator: AsyncIterableIterator<Record<string, SqlValue>>;
-    if (this.writeInFlight(underWriteLock)) {
+    if (committed) {
       log('read-eval: a write is in flight (%s), asking for a committed read: %s',
         this.db!.getAutocommit() ? 'locked body running, no transaction open yet' : 'transaction open', sql);
       iterator = this.db!.eval(sql, params, { readConcurrency: 'committed' });
@@ -1422,7 +1633,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     for await (const row of iterator) {
       rows.push(row);
     }
-    return rows;
+    return { rows, committed };
   }
 
   /**
@@ -1482,12 +1693,26 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * held, and its membership read is opted out at {@link queryCadrePeers}. If another
    * under-lock callback seam is ever added, audit its read graph the same way.
    */
-  private readRows(
+  private async readRows(
     sql: string,
     params: SqlParameters | undefined,
     label: string,
     retry = true
   ): Promise<Record<string, SqlValue>[]> {
+    return (await this.readRowsRouted(sql, params, label, retry)).rows;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * {@link readRows}, also saying whether the attempt that answered took the committed-read
+   * path — which a {@link MembershipView} load needs, since it may not keep such rows (see
+   * {@link membershipView}).
+   */
+  private readRowsRouted(
+    sql: string,
+    params: SqlParameters | undefined,
+    label: string,
+    retry: boolean
+  ): Promise<RoutedRead> {
     // `retry: false` marks the reads that may run inside a locked write body, which is
     // also what readRowsOnce's committed-read routing must know (see writeInFlight).
     // NOTE: the membership-gate refresh passes it on EVERY trigger, including the
@@ -1506,6 +1731,46 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     );
   }
 
+  /**
+   * A view over one membership table, loaded by its full scan `sql` through {@link readRows}'s
+   * funnel. Rows a committed read served are never kept: that read may initialize an untouched
+   * table provisionally, and the Optimystic plugin arms a table's replicated-change bridge only
+   * on its full initialization (`OptimysticTable.initializeForCommittedRead`), so no later change
+   * event would ever drop them.
+   */
+  private membershipView(sql: string, label: string): MembershipView<Record<string, SqlValue>> {
+    return new MembershipView(async (retry) => {
+      const { rows, committed } = await this.readRowsRouted(sql, undefined, label, retry);
+      return { rows, installable: !committed };
+    });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A membership table's raw rows, from its {@link MembershipView}: `Revocation`, `CadrePeer`
+   * and `OwnerKey`, the tables every membership, owner and peer-record read starts from, and
+   * `CadreInvite`, `CadreInviteUsage`, `OwnerGrant` and `OwnerGrantUsage`, the chains every
+   * membership refresh verifies invitation-admitted machines and grant-seated owner keys through.
+   * Callers build fresh result objects from them and never mutate them.
+   *
+   * Reads the table directly instead when a caller under the write lock (`retry: false`) has an
+   * explicit transaction open: such a read sees the transaction's own uncommitted rows, which
+   * the view does not hold, and a rollback fires no change event, so keeping them would cache
+   * rows that never existed. No reader of these tables runs inside {@link inTransaction} today;
+   * this keeps one added later, or a spec's raw-handle transaction, correct.
+   *
+   * Reads that stay plain SQL on purpose: {@link queryStampId} (sees retired rows), the
+   * schema's CHECK constraints, which read inside the committing transaction, the redemption's
+   * one read of the held credential row ({@link queryCadreInvite},
+   * {@link queryOwnerGrant}), and the indexed usage counts.
+   */
+  private readMembershipRows(view: MembershipView<Record<string, SqlValue>>, retry: boolean): Promise<readonly Record<string, SqlValue>[]> {
+    this.ensureInitialized();
+    if (!retry && !this.db!.getAutocommit()) {
+      return view.readThrough(retry);
+    }
+    return view.read(retry);
+  }
+
   /**
    * Query all strands from the control database
    */
@@ -1527,6 +1792,18 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     return rows.length === 0 ? null : strandRow(rows[0]!);
   }
 
+  /**
+   * {@link queryStrand} plus the row's `StampId`, in one read: the formation responder
+   * resolves a bound invite's host strand with it and later records consent against that
+   * stamp ({@link recordFormationUsage}'s `strandStampId`) without reading the row again.
+   */
+  async queryStrandWithStamp(strandId: string): Promise<(StrandRow & { StampId: string }) | null> {
+    this.ensureInitialized();
+    const rows = await this.readRows(
+      `select ${STRAND_COLUMNS}, StampId from CadreControl.Strand where Id = ?`, [strandId], 'strand-with-stamp');
+    return rows.length === 0 ? null : { ...strandRow(rows[0]!), StampId: rows[0]!.StampId as string };
+  }
+
   /**
    * Every strand this party joined from another party (`CadreControl.JoinedStrand`), shaped
    * as a {@link StrandRow} so a reader can treat it like one of the party's own. A joiner
@@ -1616,13 +1893,13 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    *
    * Deliberately RAW (no retired-stamp filter, unlike {@link getOwnerKeys}): the genesis
    * insert is refused by the schema whenever any physical row exists, so this must see one.
+   * Served from the `OwnerKey` membership view ({@link readMembershipRows}), which holds every
+   * physical row, so a genesis caller's pre-check and {@link ensureOwnerKey}'s re-check share
+   * one storage read.
    */
   async hasOwnerKey(): Promise<boolean> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
-    for (const row of await this.readRows('select count(1) as Count from CadreControl.OwnerKey', undefined, 'owner-key-exists')) {
-      return (row.Count as number) > 0;
-    }
-    return false;
+    return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.ownerKeyView, true)).length > 0;
   }
 
   /**
@@ -1630,6 +1907,16 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * the party has none yet. Returns true if it inserted, false if an owner
    * key already existed (so a repeat `--owner` start is a no-op).
    *
+   * Before the insert, gives every control table its empty collection
+   * ({@link commitEmptyControlCollections}). A collection committed while a machine is alone
+   * forks if another machine creates the same collection independently; before genesis the
+   * party has no owner, so no other machine can have been admitted and none can hold any of
+   * its collections. The order makes the step repeatable: a crash between it and the insert
+   * leaves no `OwnerKey` row, so the next start runs genesis again and commits only the
+   * collections still missing, while a founder restart finds the row and commits nothing, so
+   * it can never write an empty second history beside a table another machine has since
+   * written. A failure propagates with nothing inserted.
+   *
    * @param label - the user's name for the key ({@link insertOwnerKey}).
    */
   async ensureOwnerKey(key: string, label?: string): Promise<boolean> {
@@ -1639,10 +1926,42 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
       log('Owner key already present; skipping genesis insert');
       return false;
     }
+    // Two locked steps one after the other: the lock is not re-entrant, and the insert takes it itself.
+    await this.commitEmptyControlCollections();
     await this.insertOwnerKey(trimmed, label);
     return true;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Commit an empty collection for every `CadreControl` table, index tree and unique-enforcement
+   * tree that has none, so a read of a table nobody has written is answered from this machine's
+   * storage instead of asking the block's cohort to prove the collection absent — a round trip
+   * per read on a party of several machines, and an error or a wait while they are offline.
+   * Joining machines get these collections the ordinary way, by reading them from the cohort.
+   *
+   * Under the write lock: the helper commits whatever is staged in those collections outside any
+   * SQL transaction, which is sound only while nothing else writes.
+   *
+   * Parties founded before this step, and tables a later control schema version adds, have no
+   * such collections, and nothing creates them later: the start-time schema apply runs on every
+   * machine, possibly alone, where committing one would be exactly the fork genesis avoids.
+   *
+   * NOTE: one `sync()` per collection, in sequence: 32 collections for today's schema (17 tables,
+   * 3 indexes, 12 `unique` columns). Measured 2026-10-20 on a lone `CadreNode` over the network
+   * transactor (started, then `ensureOwnerKey` alone, 3 runs each): 64–105 ms in memory and
+   * 750–820 ms on `FileRawStorage`, about 25 ms per collection on disk, roughly 1/75 of the edge
+   * node's 60 s `DEFAULT_OWNER_GENESIS_TIMEOUT_MS`. Under the whole cadre-core suite's load (151
+   * geneses) it took a median of 159 ms and at most 4.6 s. If genesis latency starts to matter
+   * (phone flash under launch contention runs 50–90 ms per storage operation, see the NOTE in
+   * `initialize`), ask Optimystic for an API that commits them as one batch, the one strand
+   * founding would use too; do not build a private batching path.
+   */
+  private async commitEmptyControlCollections(): Promise<void> {
+    const t0 = performance.now();
+    const committed = await this.withWriteLock(() => createEmptyCollections(this.db!, this.txnBridge!, [CONTROL_SCHEMA_NAME]));
+    log('Committed %d empty control collections in %dms', committed, Math.round(performance.now() - t0));
+  }
+
   /**
    * Collect every owner key (`CadreControl.OwnerKey.Key`) as a set.
    *
@@ -1684,16 +2003,14 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    *
    * @param retired - the retired `OwnerKey` stamps, when the caller has already read the
    *   tombstones (`CadreNode.syncOwnerAnchor` reads {@link queryRevocations} for their
-   *   signers); omitted, they are read here. Before the ledger marker is filed every
-   *   `Revocation` read is a cohort consult, so the sync passing its own set keeps the
-   *   membership refresh at one such read for the anchor.
+   *   signers); omitted, they are read here. Both come from the same `Revocation` view
+   *   ({@link readMembershipRows}), so passing the set saves only the filtering.
    */
   async queryOwnerKeyRows(retry = true, retired?: ReadonlySet<string>): Promise<OwnerKeyRow[]> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
     const revoked = retired ?? await this.queryRevokedStamps('OwnerKey', retry);
     const rows: OwnerKeyRow[] = [];
-    const sql = 'select Key, Label, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage from CadreControl.OwnerKey';
-    for (const row of await this.readRows(sql, undefined, 'owner-keys', retry)) {
+    for (const row of await this.readMembershipRows(this.ownerKeyView, retry)) {
       const stampId = (row.StampId as string | null) ?? null;
       if (stampId === null) {
         log('queryOwnerKeyRows: dropping OwnerKey row %s with no StampId', row.Key);
@@ -1726,12 +2043,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * {@link queryRevokedStamps} rather than inlining the SQL, so tests can interpose on
    * that seam to model the replicated live-row-plus-tombstone merge state.
    *
-   * NOTE: runs a second query (the retired-stamp set) per call, on the membership-gate
-   * refresh path. Its cost is storage consults, not rows (see {@link queryRevokedStamps}):
-   * while `Revocation` has never been written every call consults the cohort about it, and
-   * the ledger marker ({@link openRevocationLedger}) is what makes it a held block. Folding
-   * the exclusion into one statement would not help (it reads the same block), and caching
-   * the set would hide a tombstone arriving by replication.
+   * Both tables come from their membership views ({@link readMembershipRows}), so a call after
+   * the first costs no storage read until one of the two tables changes.
    *
    * NOTE: this filter is HAND-MIRRORED by the gate suites' fake control databases
    * (`test/membership-gate-helpers.ts` and `test/cadre-node-authorized-surface.spec.ts`),
@@ -1754,27 +2067,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     this.ensureInitialized();
     const revoked = await this.queryRevokedStamps('CadrePeer', retry);
     const rows: CadrePeerRow[] = [];
-    // The proof columns lead and the record columns follow, so this scan keeps a prefix no
-    // other `CadrePeer` statement shares (`queryPeerRecord` starts `PeerId, PublicKey`): the
-    // read-retry spec rigs the membership scan by that prefix.
-    const sql = 'select PeerId, Multiaddr, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage, PublicKey, UpdatedAt, Profile, Sig from CadreControl.CadrePeer';
-    for (const row of await this.readRows(sql, undefined, 'cadre-peers', retry)) {
-      const stampId = (row.StampId as string | null) ?? null;
-      if (stampId !== null && revoked.has(stampId)) {
+    for (const row of await this.readMembershipRows(this.cadrePeerView, retry)) {
+      const peer = cadrePeerRowOf(row);
+      if (peer.stampId !== null && revoked.has(peer.stampId)) {
         continue;
       }
-      rows.push({
-        peerId: row.PeerId as string,
-        publicKey: (row.PublicKey as string | null) ?? null,
-        multiaddr: (row.Multiaddr as string | null) ?? null,
-        updatedAt: (row.UpdatedAt as number | null) ?? 0,
-        profile: (row.Profile as NodeProfile | null) ?? null,
-        sig: (row.Sig as string | null) ?? null,
-        stampId,
-        vouchOwner: (row.VouchOwner as string | null) ?? null,
-        vouchSig: (row.VouchSig as string | null) ?? null,
-        vouchUsage: (row.VouchUsage as string | null) ?? null,
-      });
+      rows.push(peer);
     }
     return rows;
   }
@@ -1831,10 +2129,11 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * guard. A read retrying there would sleep its backoff HOLDING the write lock
    * (`retryControlWrite`'s contract is that backoff sleeps happen with no lock held), and
    * the write funnel already re-runs the body's reads when it re-runs the body. The
-   * unlocked callers — the public stamp readers, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer} and
-   * {@link reapRevokedRow}, whose stamp reads run BEFORE their locks are taken — keep the
-   * default retried path. Explicit per call rather than an ambient flag: unlocked reads
-   * run concurrently with a locked body, so `this`-state cannot tell the two apart.
+   * unlocked callers — the public stamp readers and {@link reapRevokedRow}, whose stamp
+   * read runs BEFORE its lock is taken — keep the default retried path. Explicit per call
+   * rather than an ambient flag: unlocked reads run concurrently with a locked body, so
+   * `this`-state cannot tell the two apart. The same flag threads through
+   * {@link findCadrePeerRow} for the two writers that read the whole row inside their body.
    */
   private async queryStampId(
     table: RevocableTable,
@@ -1852,8 +2151,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   /**
    * `CadrePeer` stamp nonce — read by {@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer} as its
    * row-present gate before it delegates to {@link deleteCadrePeer}. The in-class
-   * `CadrePeer` writers ({@link insertCadrePeer}, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}) go
-   * straight to {@link queryStampId}.
+   * `CadrePeer` writers go straight to {@link queryStampId} ({@link insertCadrePeer}) or read
+   * the whole row ({@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, through {@link findCadrePeerRow}).
    */
   queryCadrePeerStampId(peerId: string): Promise<string | null> {
     return this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', peerId);
@@ -1919,18 +2218,17 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * ({@link queryCadrePeers}, {@link queryPeerRecord},
    * {@link CadreNode.resolveDeviceToken}) drop any row whose stamp appears here.
    *
-   * NOTE: the per-call cost that matters is the storage layer's, not the row count. While
-   * `Revocation` has never been written, this node does not hold its block, and Optimystic
-   * consults a block's cohort on every read of a block it does not hold: 1 consult per
-   * call (measured), each a round trip to every other member on a multi-machine party. The
-   * ledger marker ({@link openRevocationLedger}) ends that — a held block is re-consulted
-   * at most once per read-repair window (10 s). Do not cache the set instead: a cache
-   * cannot see a tombstone arriving by replication, so it would delay a revocation. The
-   * row count only grows (append-only) but stays small while removals are rare; revisit if
+   * Served from the `Revocation` membership view ({@link readMembershipRows}), dropped by
+   * every change to the table, local or replicated into this node's storage, so a tombstone
+   * arriving by replication is seen on the next call. The cost that matters is the storage
+   * layer's, paid by a cold view's load: while `Revocation` has never been written, this node
+   * does not hold its block, and Optimystic consults a block's cohort on every read of a block
+   * it does not hold, each a round trip to every other member on a multi-machine party. The row
+   * count only grows (append-only) but stays small while removals are rare; revisit if
    * removals become routine and the scan itself shows up in a profile.
    *
    * An isolated node that has never received the `Revocation` block reads it as holding no
-   * revocations instead of throwing — see {@link readRevokedStampRows}.
+   * revocations instead of throwing — see {@link readRevocationRowsOrNone}.
    *
    * `retry: false` is forwarded by {@link queryCadrePeers} for the one caller that reads
    * under the write lock — see that method's note.
@@ -1938,22 +2236,26 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   async queryRevokedStamps(tableName: RevocableTable, retry = true): Promise<Set<string>> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
     const stamps = new Set<string>();
-    for (const row of await this.readRevokedStampRows(tableName, retry)) {
-      stamps.add(row.StampId as string);
+    for (const row of await this.readRevocationRowsOrNone(retry)) {
+      if (row.TableName === tableName) {
+        stamps.add(row.StampId as string);
+      }
     }
     return stamps;
   }
 
   /**
-   * The `Revocation` scan behind {@link queryRevokedStamps}, answering NO ROWS when the read
-   * fails `cohort-unreachable` ({@link isCohortUnreachableRead}): this node does not hold
+   * The `Revocation` rows behind {@link queryRevokedStamps}, answering NO ROWS when the view's
+   * load fails `cohort-unreachable` ({@link isCohortUnreachableRead}): this node does not hold
    * the block and could ask no other cohort member about it. Every other failure rethrows.
    * The retry in {@link readRows} runs first, so a node whose connectivity returns within
-   * the read budget still gets the real answer.
+   * the read budget still gets the real answer. The empty answer is never installed in the
+   * view (a failed load keeps nothing), so the next call asks again.
    *
    * Without this, a machine cut off from every other machine in its party before it ever
-   * received the block — the block does not exist anywhere until the owner files the
-   * ledger marker ({@link openRevocationLedger}) on a connected reconcile pass — cannot
+   * received the block — a joining machine gets it only by reading it from the cohort, and
+   * on a party founded before genesis created every control collection it exists nowhere
+   * until the first tombstone or the marker ({@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}) — cannot
    * answer ANY membership, peer-record or device-token lookup, although it holds those
    * rows locally.
    *
@@ -1972,19 +2274,19 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    *
    * NOTE: an isolated node pays the whole read retry (up to
    * `CONTROL_READ_RETRY_BUDGET_MS`, plus the slow attempt that exhausted it) before this
-   * answers, and {@link queryPeerRecord} then issues its row scan on top. If an isolated
-   * node's lookups are seen exceeding the admission gate's 2 s deadline
-   * (`ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS`), skip the retry for this read when the first attempt
-   * fails `cohort-unreachable`.
+   * answers, on every call since the answer is not kept, and {@link queryPeerRecord} may then
+   * load the `CadrePeer` view on top. If an isolated node's lookups are seen exceeding the
+   * admission gate's 2 s deadline (`ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS`), skip the retry for this
+   * read when the first attempt fails `cohort-unreachable`.
    */
-  private async readRevokedStampRows(tableName: RevocableTable, retry: boolean): Promise<Record<string, SqlValue>[]> {
+  private async readRevocationRowsOrNone(retry: boolean): Promise<readonly Record<string, SqlValue>[]> {
     try {
-      return await this.readRows('select StampId from CadreControl.Revocation where TableName = ?', [tableName], 'revoked-stamps', retry);
+      return await this.readMembershipRows(this.revocationView, retry);
     } catch (error) {
       if (!isCohortUnreachableRead(error)) {
         throw error;
       }
-      log('revoked-stamps(%s): no cohort member reachable and the Revocation block is not held here; reading as no revocations known: %s', tableName, error);
+      log('revoked-stamps: no cohort member reachable and the Revocation block is not held here; reading as no revocations known: %s', error);
       return [];
     }
   }
@@ -1997,10 +2299,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * `where`, so the composite-primary-key point-lookup hazard (see the statement comment in
    * {@link reissueRevocations}) does not arise. Unlocked, like every other read.
    *
-   * Skips the ledger marker ({@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}): it retires nothing, so
-   * neither sweep may reap or re-sign it, and skipping it keeps `RevocationRow.tableName`
-   * a {@link RevocableTable}. Filtered on `TableName` alone, in TypeScript: `RowIsGone`
-   * admits no other row under `'Revocation'`.
+   * Skips the ledger marker ({@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}) an older party may hold: it
+   * retires nothing, so neither sweep may reap or re-sign it, and skipping it keeps
+   * `RevocationRow.tableName` a {@link RevocableTable}. Filtered on `TableName` alone, in
+   * TypeScript: `RowIsGone` admits no other row under `'Revocation'`.
    *
    * `retry: false` from a caller that reads under the write lock, for the reason on
    * {@link queryCadrePeers}.
@@ -2008,25 +2310,17 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   async queryRevocations(retry = true): Promise<RevocationRow[]> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
     const rows: RevocationRow[] = [];
-    const sql = 'select TableName, RowKey, StampId, ReissuedAt, SignerKey, SignerSig from CadreControl.Revocation';
-    for (const row of await this.readRows(sql, undefined, 'revocations', retry)) {
-      if (row.TableName === REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER.tableName) {
-        continue;
+    for (const row of await this.readMembershipRows(this.revocationView, retry)) {
+      if (row.TableName !== REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER.tableName) {
+        rows.push(revocationRowOf(row));
       }
-      rows.push({
-        tableName: row.TableName as RevocableTable,
-        rowKey: row.RowKey as string,
-        stampId: row.StampId as string,
-        reissuedAt: (row.ReissuedAt as number | null) ?? 0,
-        signerKey: row.SignerKey as string,
-        signerSig: row.SignerSig as string,
-      });
     }
     return rows;
   }
 
   /**
-   * Read a single peer's address record (the full `CadrePeer` row) by PeerId.
+   * Read a single peer's address record (the full `CadrePeer` row) by PeerId, found in the
+   * `CadrePeer` membership view ({@link readMembershipRows}).
    *
    * Returns null when no row exists, or when the row's `StampId` is retired in
    * `CadreControl.Revocation` — a revoked peer reads as absent, so the resolver
@@ -2042,34 +2336,36 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * The split `addrs` re-join to the exact stored `Multiaddr` (split-on-`,` is
    * the inverse of join-on-`,`), so the resolver re-verifies over the same bytes
    * the publisher signed.
+   *
+   * `retry: false` from the one caller that reads under the write lock,
+   * {@link updateSelfPeerRecord}'s body, for the reason on {@link queryCadrePeers}.
    */
-  async queryPeerRecord(peerId: string): Promise<PeerAddressRecord | null> {
+  async queryPeerRecord(peerId: string, retry = true): Promise<PeerAddressRecord | null> {
+    const row = await this.findCadrePeerRow(peerId, retry);
+    return row === null ? null : peerAddressRecordOf(row);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * One readable `CadrePeer` row by PeerId from the membership view, or null when no row exists
+   * or its stamp is retired in `Revocation` — the single-row read behind {@link queryPeerRecord}
+   * and the two writers that decide over the row inside their locked body
+   * ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord}, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}). Same retired-stamp rule as
+   * {@link queryCadrePeers}, and the same `retry` contract.
+   */
+  private async findCadrePeerRow(peerId: string, retry: boolean): Promise<CadrePeerRow | null> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
-    const revoked = await this.queryRevokedStamps('CadrePeer');
-    for (const row of await this.readRows(
-      'select PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Profile, Sig, StampId from CadreControl.CadrePeer where PeerId = ?',
-      [peerId],
-      'peer-record'
-    )) {
-      const stampId = (row.StampId as string | null) ?? null;
-      if (stampId !== null && revoked.has(stampId)) {
-        return null;
-      }
-      const multiaddr = (row.Multiaddr as string | null) ?? '';
-      return {
-        peerId: row.PeerId as string,
-        publicKey: (row.PublicKey as string | null) ?? '',
-        addrs: multiaddr.length > 0 ? multiaddr.split(',') : [],
-        updatedAt: (row.UpdatedAt as number | null) ?? 0,
-        profile: (row.Profile as NodeProfile | null) ?? null,
-        sig: (row.Sig as string | null) ?? '',
-      };
+    const revoked = await this.queryRevokedStamps('CadrePeer', retry);
+    const row = (await this.readMembershipRows(this.cadrePeerView, retry)).find((candidate) => candidate.PeerId === peerId);
+    if (row === undefined) {
+      return null;
     }
-    return null;
+    const peer = cadrePeerRowOf(row);
+    return peer.stampId !== null && revoked.has(peer.stampId) ? null : peer;
   }
 
   /**
-   * Apply a peer's own self-signed address-record update to an existing row.
+   * Apply a peer's own self-signed address-record update to its existing row: read the row
+   * under the write lock, have `sign` build the record over it, and write that record.
    *
    * Authorization is carried entirely by the record: the `Sig` column (verified
    * by the `AuthorizedUpdate` self-branch against the stored `PublicKey`) plus
@@ -2078,6 +2374,21 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * exists. `PublicKey` is intentionally not in the SET list (it is immutable on
    * self-update and the constraint enforces `new.PublicKey = old.PublicKey`).
    *
+   * The read, the decision and the signature all run INSIDE the locked body, which is what
+   * lets it opt into {@link LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY}: the row has a second writer, the owner's
+   * re-touch ({@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}), and the two fire together while a cadre starts.
+   * When this write loses that race the commit is refused as a lost update and re-run, and the
+   * re-run reads the row the rival left — including its bumped `UpdatedAt`, which a record
+   * signed before the race could no longer exceed — and signs past it. A record signed outside
+   * the body would be re-presented unchanged and refused again, this time by the schema's
+   * monotonic rule, which is correctly never retried. The row's read inside is `retry: false`
+   * (see {@link queryStampId}'s NOTE).
+   *
+   * Returns the record actually written, so the caller's bookkeeping describes the row rather
+   * than the first record it signed; null, and nothing written, when no readable row exists:
+   * the row is absent, or its stamp is retired in `Revocation` (a revoked node reads its own row
+   * as absent every heartbeat, and must not refresh it).
+   *
    * Deliberately NOT wrapped in {@link mutateCadrePeer}, the one `CadrePeer` mutator that
    * is not: it only ever touches THIS node's own row (sole caller
    * `CadreNode.publishSelfRecord`), and `CadreNode.listAuthorizedMembers` filters self out
@@ -2090,17 +2401,42 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * row, and a self insert happens once at startup, so the wasted refresh is a single read
    * — cheaper than a conditional carve-out inside the shared writer. Only the repeating
    * path is worth exempting.
+   *
+   * @param peerId - the row to refresh: this node's own.
+   * @param sign - builds the signed record over the row as read; called once per attempt.
    */
-  async updateSelfPeerRecord(record: PeerAddressRecord): Promise<void> {
+  async updateSelfPeerRecord(peerId: string, sign: SelfRecordSigner): Promise<PeerAddressRecord | null> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
-    const multiaddr = record.addrs.join(',');
-    await this.execWrite(`
-      update CadreControl.CadrePeer
-        with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = ?
-        set Multiaddr = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Profile = ?, Sig = ?
-        where PeerId = ?
-    `, [record.sig, multiaddr, record.updatedAt, record.profile, record.sig, record.peerId], 'self-record-update');
-    log('Self peer record updated: %s (updatedAt=%d)', record.peerId, record.updatedAt);
+    const written = await this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
+      // retry: false — inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
+      // NOTE: this read of the Revocation and CadrePeer views is charged to the retry budget,
+      // so a cold view load that waits out a per-peer read deadline leaves the attempt no room
+      // for its one retry (the 14.7 s abandonment the policy's doc cites). The caller's read
+      // outside the funnel warms the views, so this is a cache hit except when a table change
+      // between the two reads dropped them — the racing case itself. If that residual ever
+      // matters, measure which phase of the losing attempt pays the deadline first; the
+      // retired-stamp check cannot simply move outside, since `publishSelfRecord`'s insert
+      // path reads a revoked node's row as absent and relies on this body to skip it.
+      const current = await this.queryPeerRecord(peerId, false);
+      if (current === null) {
+        return null;
+      }
+      const record = sign(current);
+      // Bare `exec` — inside the non-re-entrant write lock (see insertCadrePeer).
+      await this.db!.exec(`
+        update CadreControl.CadrePeer
+          with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = ?
+          set Multiaddr = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Profile = ?, Sig = ?
+          where PeerId = ?
+      `, [record.sig, record.addrs.join(','), record.updatedAt, record.profile, record.sig, peerId]);
+      return record;
+    }, LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY, 'self-record-update');
+    if (written === null) {
+      log('Self peer record not updated: no readable CadrePeer row for %s (absent, or its stamp retired)', peerId);
+    } else {
+      log('Self peer record updated: %s (updatedAt=%d)', peerId, written.updatedAt);
+    }
+    return written;
   }
 
   /**
@@ -2366,6 +2702,13 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * body, and a row whose stamp is already retired (held without its delete) is skipped rather
    * than tombstoned twice. Nothing to remove writes nothing and returns all false.
    *
+   * Opted into {@link LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY} for the reason on {@link deleteCadrePeer}: every
+   * stamp and signature is minted inside the body, and the invitation keys come from the
+   * caller's plan, which a self-publish does not touch (a withdrawal of an invitation withdrawn
+   * since collides on `Revocation`'s primary key — a constraint failure, never retried, as
+   * before). A lost update after a sibling tree of the transaction already synced arrives as a
+   * partial commit and stays declined.
+   *
    * The caller decides which invitations the machine could use, from its plan
    * (`CadreNode.planMachineRemoval`).
    */
@@ -2402,7 +2745,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         removedDeviceToken: removed.has('DeviceToken'),
         withdrawnInvitations: withdrawals.map((withdrawal) => withdrawal.ref.rowKey),
       };
-    });
+    }, LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -2461,7 +2804,19 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   ): Promise<void> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
     log('Inserting strand: %s (type: %s)', strandId, type);
+    const insert = await this.signStrandInsert(strandId, type, ownerKey, signMessage, memberPrivateKey);
+    await this.execWrite(insert.sql, insert.params, 'strand-insert');
+    log('Strand inserted: %s', strandId);
+  }
 
+  /** The stamped, owner-signed `Strand` insert that {@link insertStrand} and {@link insertFoundingRows} run. */
+  private async signStrandInsert(
+    strandId: string,
+    type: 'o' | 'c',
+    ownerKey: string,
+    signMessage: ControlSign,
+    memberPrivateKey?: string
+  ): Promise<SignedInsert> {
     // Generate a unique stamp ID using the peer ID for distributed uniqueness
     const peerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
     const stampId = generateStampId(peerId);
@@ -2475,13 +2830,55 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
 
     // StampId is a real, unique column (single-use anti-replay), no longer a context value.
     // FounderOwnerKey must equal the signing owner or the constraint rejects the row.
-    await this.execWrite(`
-      insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId, FounderOwnerKey, FounderPeerId)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
-    `, [ownerKey, signature, strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null, stampId, ownerKey, peerId], 'strand-insert');
+    return {
+      sql: `
+        insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId, FounderOwnerKey, FounderPeerId)
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+      `,
+      params: [ownerKey, signature, strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null, stampId, ownerKey, peerId],
+    };
+  }
 
-    log('Strand inserted: %s', strandId);
+  /**
+   * Insert one founding's control rows — the `Strand` row, a closed strand's `StrandPartyKey`
+   * row, and a formation invitation bound to the strand — in ONE transaction: one commit, and
+   * never a strand row without the key or invitation written beside it.
+   *
+   * Each row is stamped and signed exactly as its single-row writer ({@link insertStrand},
+   * {@link insertStrandPartyKey}, {@link insertFormationInvite}) does it, and all of that — the
+   * invitation's {@link canonicalDatetime} read included — happens BEFORE the write lock is
+   * taken: signing may prompt the user, and the lock held across a prompt would stall every
+   * other control write. A {@link lockedWithRetry} re-run re-presents the same signed rows.
+   *
+   * No row's `AuthorizedInsert` reads another of these rows (`StrandPartyKey` and
+   * `FormationInvite` check only `OwnerKey` and `Revocation`), so their order is free; the
+   * `Strand` row goes first, so a founding repeated over a stored row is refused on `Strand.Id`.
+   *
+   * A uniqueness rejection rolls the whole transaction back. The caller resolves it and writes
+   * again: a `Strand.Id` conflict is another founder's row, a `StrandPartyKey.Id` conflict a key
+   * stored with no strand row ({@link isStrandIdConflict}; see `CadreNode.publishStrand`).
+   */
+  async insertFoundingRows(rows: FoundingRows, ownerKey: string, signMessage: ControlSign): Promise<void> {
+    this.ensureInitialized();
+    const { strand, partyKey, formationInvite } = rows;
+    log('Inserting founding rows: strand %s (type: %s, party key: %s, invitation: %s)',
+      strand.id, strand.type, partyKey !== undefined, formationInvite !== undefined);
+    const inserts = [await this.signStrandInsert(strand.id, strand.type, ownerKey, signMessage, strand.memberPrivateKey)];
+    if (partyKey !== undefined) {
+      inserts.push(await this.signStrandPartyKeyInsert(strand.id, partyKey, ownerKey, signMessage));
+    }
+    if (formationInvite) {
+      const { token, sAppId, ...options } = formationInvite;
+      inserts.push(await this.signFormationInviteInsert(token, sAppId, ownerKey, signMessage, { ...options, strandId: strand.id }));
+    }
+    // Bare `exec`: the lock is held, and `execWrite` would take it again and self-deadlock.
+    await this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.inTransaction('found strand', async () => {
+      for (const insert of inserts) {
+        await this.db!.exec(insert.sql, insert.params);
+      }
+    }), {}, 'strand-found');
+    log('Founding rows inserted: strand %s', strand.id);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -2590,22 +2987,33 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   ): Promise<void> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
     log('Inserting strand party key for strand: %s', strandId);
+    const insert = await this.signStrandPartyKeyInsert(strandId, privateKey, ownerKey, signMessage);
+    await this.execWrite(insert.sql, insert.params, 'strand-party-key-insert');
+    log('Strand party key inserted for strand: %s', strandId);
+  }
 
-    const peerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
-    const stampId = generateStampId(peerId);
+  /** The stamped, owner-signed `StrandPartyKey` insert that {@link insertStrandPartyKey} and {@link insertFoundingRows} run. */
+  private async signStrandPartyKeyInsert(
+    strandId: string,
+    privateKey: string,
+    ownerKey: string,
+    signMessage: ControlSign
+  ): Promise<SignedInsert> {
+    const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
 
     // Field order MUST match the schema's StrandPartyKey `AuthorizedInsert` verify:
     // Id, PrivateKey, StampId.
     const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.StrandPartyKey', 'add', this.config.partyId, [strandId, privateKey, stampId]);
     const signature = await signMessage(message);
 
-    await this.execWrite(`
-      insert into CadreControl.StrandPartyKey (Id, PrivateKey, StampId)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?)
-    `, [ownerKey, signature, strandId, privateKey, stampId], 'strand-party-key-insert');
-
-    log('Strand party key inserted for strand: %s', strandId);
+    return {
+      sql: `
+        insert into CadreControl.StrandPartyKey (Id, PrivateKey, StampId)
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          values (?, ?, ?)
+      `,
+      params: [ownerKey, signature, strandId, privateKey, stampId],
+    };
   }
 
   /**
@@ -2969,32 +3377,44 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   }
 
   /**
-   * Owner "re-touch" of an existing `CadrePeer` membership row: bump `UpdatedAt` and
-   * rewrite `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` under the owner branch of `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate`
-   * (a signature over the SAME `'vouch'`-tagged digest {@link insertCadrePeer} builds), so
-   * the row is re-emitted as a fresh, broadcasting transaction.
-   *
-   * This is the write-while-alone re-replication primitive: a membership row that committed
-   * local-only (its block's cluster ≤1 at insert) is pushed to the cohort once it grows, by
-   * re-issuing this monotonic bump. It is an UPDATE (not the original INSERT) because the row
-   * already exists locally; a re-INSERT would hit the `PeerId` PK. Only the freshness stamp
-   * and voucher change — `PublicKey` / `Multiaddr` / `Sig` / `Profile` are left intact (the
-   * owner branch requires them kept: they are the machine's own claim) — so it is safe
-   * over a row whose peer has not self-published (`Sig` null); the caller must skip a row
-   * that already carries a self-`Sig` (that row is the owning peer's to refresh, and bumping
-   * `UpdatedAt` without re-signing would invalidate its self-signature).
-   *
-   * Signs over the row's CURRENT `StampId` (unchanged by the re-touch), read BEFORE the lock
-   * is taken. An absent row returns `false` WITHOUT notifying: nothing was written, so the
-   * membership snapshot cannot have changed.
-   *
-   * NOTE: that stamp read is outside the lock, same as {@link deleteGuardedRow}'s. A writer
-   * that removes the row in between makes the `update` match nothing, and this still returns
-   * `true` and notifies — harmless today (the sole caller, the write-while-alone drain, only
-   * logs the result, and a spurious notify just re-reads the member set), and a remove-then-
-   * re-add in the same window fails loudly instead, since the signature binds the retired
-   * stamp. If a caller ever acts on `true` as proof the row was written, fold the stamp read
-   * into the locked body.
+   * Owner "re-touch" of an existing `CadrePeer` membership row: rewrite `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig`
+   * (and, re-broadcasting, bump `UpdatedAt`) under the owner branch of
+   * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate` — a signature over the SAME `'vouch'`-tagged digest
+   * {@link insertCadrePeer} builds — so the row is re-emitted as a fresh, broadcasting
+   * transaction, or stands on a different owner's voucher.
+   *
+   * Re-broadcasting is the write-while-alone re-replication primitive: a membership row that
+   * committed local-only (its block's cluster ≤1 at insert) is pushed to the cohort once it
+   * grows, by re-issuing this monotonic bump. It is an UPDATE (not the original INSERT) because
+   * the row already exists locally; a re-INSERT would hit the `PeerId` PK. Only the freshness
+   * stamp and voucher change — `PublicKey` / `Multiaddr` / `Sig` / `Profile` are left intact
+   * (the owner branch requires them kept: they are the machine's own claim) — so it is safe
+   * over a row whose peer has not self-published (`Sig` null), and this method itself skips a
+   * row that already carries a self-`Sig` (that row is the owning peer's to refresh, and
+   * bumping `UpdatedAt` without re-signing would invalidate its self-signature).
+   *
+   * The two modes ({@link CadrePeerRetouchMode}) differ in what they write: `'rebroadcast'`
+   * bumps `UpdatedAt` to `max(now, current + 1)` from the row read inside the body and writes
+   * only while the row's `Sig` is null; `'revouch'` leaves `UpdatedAt` out of the `set` list and
+   * writes whether or not the machine has self-published (the owner branch has no monotonic
+   * rule, so the column simply keeps its value).
+   *
+   * The row read (stamp, `Sig`, `UpdatedAt`), the mode's decision and the signature over the
+   * row's CURRENT `StampId` (unchanged by the re-touch) all run INSIDE the locked body, which is
+   * what lets both modes opt into {@link LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY}: the row's other writer is
+   * the machine's own publish ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord}), and the drain's re-broadcast fires
+   * at the moment that publish does. A re-run after losing to it reads the self-signed row and
+   * reports `'self-published'` instead of writing the owner branch over it — which would rewrite
+   * `UpdatedAt` under a `Sig` signed over the old value and make the record unverifiable to
+   * resolvers until the machine's next heartbeat. The decision has to be the body's for that;
+   * a caller's pre-check outside the lock is only a fast path (see below).
+   *
+   * An absent row — none, or its stamp retired, or a stampless row no writer produces — is
+   * `'absent'`. Checked once outside the lock too, as `'self-published'` is: the common case
+   * writes nothing, takes no lock and does NOT notify, so an absent target stays quiet
+   * ({@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer} keeps the same gate for the same reason). The
+   * in-body re-check covers the race; a no-write outcome reached there notifies spuriously,
+   * which only re-reads the member set.
    *
    * Notifies like the insert/remove paths even though this is "only" a re-touch: it rewrites
    * VouchOwner/VouchSig, which the authorized-membership predicate judges on, so it CAN
@@ -3017,36 +3437,52 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * VouchOwner/VouchSig) rather than inherit this rebinding.
    *
    * @param peerId - the membership row to re-touch.
-   * @param updatedAt - the strictly-increasing freshness stamp to write.
+   * @param mode - re-broadcast or re-vouch ({@link CadrePeerRetouchMode}).
    * @param ownerKey - public key of the re-vouching owner, rewritten into `VouchOwner`.
-   * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes with that owner's private key.
-   * @returns `true` when the row was re-touched, `false` when no row exists (no notify).
+   * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes with that owner's private key;
+   *   called inside the lock, once per attempt (the NOTE on {@link ControlSign}).
+   * @returns what was found and done ({@link CadrePeerRetouchOutcome}).
    */
   async reauthorizeCadrePeer(
     peerId: string,
-    updatedAt: number,
+    mode: CadrePeerRetouchMode,
     ownerKey: string,
     signMessage: ControlSign
-  ): Promise<boolean> {
+  ): Promise<CadrePeerRetouchOutcome> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
-    const stampId = await this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', peerId);
-    if (stampId === null) {
-      log('reauthorizeCadrePeer: no CadrePeer row for %s (nothing to re-touch)', peerId);
-      return false;
+    const outside = retouchTarget(await this.findCadrePeerRow(peerId, true), mode);
+    if (typeof outside === 'string') {
+      log('reauthorizeCadrePeer(%s): %s for %s (nothing to write)', mode, outside, peerId);
+      return outside;
     }
-    const signature = await signMessage(
-      buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', this.config.partyId, [peerId, stampId])
-    );
-    await this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-reauthorize', async () => {
+    return await this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-reauthorize', async () => {
+      // retry: false — inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
+      const target = retouchTarget(await this.findCadrePeerRow(peerId, false), mode);
+      if (typeof target === 'string') {
+        log('reauthorizeCadrePeer(%s): %s for %s since the pre-check (nothing to write)', mode, target, peerId);
+        return target;
+      }
+      const signature = await signMessage(
+        buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', this.config.partyId, [peerId, target.stampId])
+      );
       // Bare `exec` — inside the non-re-entrant write lock (see insertCadrePeer).
-      await this.db!.exec(`
-        update CadreControl.CadrePeer
-          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-          set UpdatedAt = ?, VouchOwner = ?, VouchSig = ?, VouchUsage = null
-          where PeerId = ?
-      `, [ownerKey, signature, updatedAt, ownerKey, signature, peerId]);
-    });
-    return true;
+      if (mode === 'rebroadcast') {
+        await this.db!.exec(`
+          update CadreControl.CadrePeer
+            with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+            set UpdatedAt = ?, VouchOwner = ?, VouchSig = ?, VouchUsage = null
+            where PeerId = ?
+        `, [ownerKey, signature, Math.max(Date.now(), target.updatedAt + 1), ownerKey, signature, peerId]);
+      } else {
+        await this.db!.exec(`
+          update CadreControl.CadrePeer
+            with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+            set VouchOwner = ?, VouchSig = ?, VouchUsage = null
+            where PeerId = ?
+        `, [ownerKey, signature, ownerKey, signature, peerId]);
+      }
+      return 'retouched';
+    }, LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -3068,6 +3504,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    *
    * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
    * when a row was actually removed.
+   *
+   * Opted into {@link LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY}: the row's machine may publish its own record
+   * at the moment of the removal (its first publish lands about a second after it starts), and
+   * the removal that loses is refused as a lost update. {@link deleteGuardedRow} reads the stamp
+   * and signs inside the body, and a self-publish never changes the stamp the `'remove'` digest
+   * binds, so the re-run reads the published row and removes it.
    */
   deleteCadrePeer(
     peerId: string,
@@ -3075,7 +3517,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     signMessage: ControlSign
   ): Promise<boolean> {
     return this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-remove', () =>
-      this.deleteGuardedRow('CadrePeer', peerId, ownerKey, signMessage));
+      this.deleteGuardedRow('CadrePeer', peerId, ownerKey, signMessage), LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -3178,9 +3620,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   /**
    * File the owner-signed `Revocation` tombstone retiring one row incarnation — the second
    * statement of every guarded removal ({@link execGuardedRemoval}) and the whole of an
-   * issued row's withdrawal ({@link withdrawIssuedRow}), whose row stays — or the ledger
-   * marker ({@link openRevocationLedger}), which retires nothing. The caller supplies the
-   * lock and, where one is needed, the transaction.
+   * issued row's withdrawal ({@link withdrawIssuedRow}), whose row stays. The caller
+   * supplies the lock and, where one is needed, the transaction.
    *
    * `ReissuedAt` is named explicitly at 0 (the only value `FreshTombstone` accepts) rather
    * than leaning on the column default — the seat-at-zero rule is load-bearing for
@@ -3189,11 +3630,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * `SignerKey` / `SignerSig` store the context pair (`Revocation.Authorized` pins them
    * equal), so a node that receives the row by replication can tell which owner filed it.
    */
-  private async execTombstone(
-    ref: RevokedRowRef | typeof REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER,
-    revocationSignature: string,
-    ownerKey: string
-  ): Promise<void> {
+  private async execTombstone(ref: RevokedRowRef, revocationSignature: string, ownerKey: string): Promise<void> {
     await this.db!.exec(`
       insert into CadreControl.Revocation (TableName, RowKey, StampId, ReissuedAt, SignerKey, SignerSig)
         with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
@@ -3239,9 +3676,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * statement, and without the clause the reap would delete the owner's brand-new row.
    * With it the statement matches nothing and the reap is a silent no-op (the schema
    * branch would also refuse that delete, but as a constraint error thrown into a
-   * background sweep — matched-nothing is the better failure mode). Like
-   * {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, a race lost AFTER the guard still returns `true`;
-   * harmless — nothing was deleted, and the next sweep re-reads.
+   * background sweep — matched-nothing is the better failure mode). A race lost AFTER the
+   * guard still returns `true` here (unlike {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, which reads inside
+   * its lock and reports what it found); harmless — nothing was deleted, and the next sweep
+   * re-reads.
    *
    * Writes NOTHING to `Revocation`: `RevocationRecorded` is satisfied by the same
    * committed tombstone that authorizes the reap, so a reap files no second tombstone.
@@ -3268,7 +3706,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * present clause are the shape {@link redeemInvitation}'s consent-branch insert ships).
    *
    * Driven automatically by {@link reapRevokedRows}, which the periodic control-cohort
-   * reconcile pass runs while the node has at least one control connection.
+   * reconcile pass runs while a sibling is reachable (`CadreNode.hasReachableControlSibling`).
    */
   async reapRevokedRow(table: ReapableTable, rowKey: string, stampId: string): Promise<boolean> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
@@ -3325,8 +3763,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * carry the delete (replaying a delete of an already-absent row is a no-op), so a node
    * that converged on a removal while holding the removed row keeps that row as inert
    * garbage until something walks the tombstones and drops it. `CadreNode`'s periodic
-   * control-cohort reconcile pass is that something, gated on the node having at least one
-   * control connection (a reap is a write, and a write committed alone is local-only).
+   * control-cohort reconcile pass is that something, gated on a sibling being reachable
+   * (a reap is a write, and a write committed alone is local-only).
    *
    * Enumerated UNLOCKED, deleted per-row LOCKED: {@link reapRevokedRow} takes the write
    * lock itself (via {@link mutateCadrePeer} / {@link execWrite}) and the lock is not
@@ -3359,12 +3797,11 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    *
    * NOTE: cost is O(tombstones), not O(live rows) — one {@link queryRevocations} scan plus
    * one {@link queryStampId} point lookup per tombstone, and the empty early return makes
-   * the common case (a party that has never revoked anyone; {@link queryRevocations} skips
-   * the ledger marker) a single scan per pass. That scan consults the cohort on every pass
-   * only while `Revocation` has never been written; the ledger marker
-   * ({@link openRevocationLedger}), filed by the same connected pass, makes it a held block.
+   * the common case (a party that has never revoked anyone) a single scan per pass, served
+   * from the `Revocation` membership view
+   * ({@link readMembershipRows}) unless the table changed since the last read.
    * But `Revocation` is append-only and unbounded, so this is O(all tombstones ever) point
-   * lookups on every reconcile tick. Fine while revocations stay rare for a cadre-sized
+   * lookups on every connected reconcile pass. Fine while revocations stay rare for a cadre-sized
    * party; if the table ever grows, persist a node-local high-water mark of what has
    * already been reaped instead of re-scanning everything (the same bound the sweep in
    * `CadreNode.drainPendingRevocations` wants).
@@ -3482,78 +3919,6 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     }, {}, 'revocation-reissue');
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Owner-signed filing of the singleton `Revocation` ledger marker
-   * ({@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}), the one row in that table that retires nothing.
-   *
-   * Why it exists: while `Revocation` has never been written, this node does not hold its
-   * block, and Optimystic consults a block's cohort on EVERY read of a block it does not
-   * hold — and every membership lookup, and every guarded insert's `NotRevoked` check,
-   * reads this table. Once any row exists the block is held and re-checked at most once per
-   * read-repair window, like every other populated table. The schema's table comment says
-   * why the row can never read as a retirement.
-   *
-   * Insert-if-absent, shaped like {@link reissueRevocations}: the signature is minted
-   * OUTSIDE the locked body so a retried attempt re-presents the same one, and the guard
-   * runs INSIDE it so it sees a concurrent local writer's committed row. The guard scans
-   * the `'Revocation'` rows and compares the stamp in TypeScript rather than seeking the
-   * full composite primary key, which is served as a point lookup that can miss an existing
-   * row on a networked database (tickets/backlog/debt-composite-pk-point-lookup-unreliable-untracked).
-   *
-   * Two owners filing at once: the loser either sees the marker in its guard or is refused
-   * on the primary key, and both answer `'already-open'`.
-   *
-   * The caller decides WHEN. A marker committed while the node is alone is local-only and
-   * can fork the collection, so {@link CadreNode} files it only while connected; this
-   * method does not look at connectivity.
-   *
-   * @param ownerKey - owner public key for the write context (`Revocation.Authorized`).
-   * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash) with that owner's
-   *   private key, returning a base64url signature.
-   * @returns `'opened'` when this call filed the marker, `'already-open'` when it was
-   *   already there.
-   */
-  async openRevocationLedger(
-    ownerKey: string,
-    signMessage: ControlSign
-  ): Promise<RevocationLedgerOpenResult> {
-    this.ensureInitialized();
-    const signature = await signMessage(revocationTombstoneMessage(this.config.partyId, REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER));
-    try {
-      return await this.lockedWithRetry<RevocationLedgerOpenResult>(async () => {
-        if (await this.revocationLedgerFiled()) {
-          return 'already-open';
-        }
-        // execTombstone is a bare `exec`: already inside the write lock, which is NOT re-entrant.
-        await this.execTombstone(REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER, signature, ownerKey);
-        log('Revocation ledger marker filed');
-        return 'opened';
-      }, {}, 'revocation-ledger-open');
-    } catch (error) {
-      if (!isRevocationLedgerConflict(error)) {
-        throw error;
-      }
-      log('Revocation ledger marker already filed (refused on the primary key, most likely by another owner filing first): %s', error);
-      return 'already-open';
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Whether the ledger marker is present locally: a scan of the `'Revocation'` rows with the
-   * stamp compared in TypeScript (see {@link openRevocationLedger} for why not a seek).
-   * Called only inside the locked write body, so never retried (see queryStampId's NOTE).
-   */
-  private async revocationLedgerFiled(): Promise<boolean> {
-    const { tableName, stampId } = REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER;
-    const rows = await this.readRows(
-      'select StampId from CadreControl.Revocation where TableName = ?',
-      [tableName],
-      'revocation-ledger',
-      false
-    );
-    return rows.some(row => row.StampId === stampId);
-  }
-
   /**
    * Run `body` between `beginTransaction` and `commit`, rolling back on failure.
    *
@@ -3600,11 +3965,28 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * {@link CadreNode}, which wires this in `start()` and clears it on teardown. A
    * second call replaces the first rather than fanning out, so a stale node can
    * never keep receiving notifications for a database it no longer owns.
+   *
+   * Only this database's own writes notify here, awaited inside the write so the gate is
+   * current before the write returns. A membership change replicated in from another
+   * machine reaches the gate through the subscription `CadreNode.start` takes on the
+   * membership tables ({@link watchTables}), a coalesced run up to 50 ms after the change
+   * lands in storage; one storage never hears of waits for the reconcile pass's backstop.
    */
   setMembershipChangeListener(listener: MembershipChangeListener | null): void {
     this.membershipListener = listener;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Subscribe `onChange` to changes in control tables (`'CadreControl.Strand'`, …): commits
+   * made here and changes replicated into this node's storage alike, on the single-flight
+   * schedule `table-change-watch.ts` describes. {@link close} disposes every subscription
+   * still live before it drains the write queue.
+   */
+  watchTables(tables: readonly string[], onChange: () => Promise<void>, options: TableChangeWatchOptions): TableChangeWatch {
+    this.ensureInitialized();
+    return this.tableWatches.watch(this.db!, tables, onChange, options);
+  }
+
   /**
    * Wire (or clear, with null) the single listener notified after every committed
    * guarded-table delete. Same ownership contract as
@@ -3665,8 +4047,11 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * exhaustion.
    *
    * @param reason - Label for the log line only (e.g. `'peer-insert'`).
+   * @param policy - The retry policy, default unless the body has earned a wider one: the three
+   *   `CadrePeer` writers whose bodies re-read the row and decide inside pass
+   *   `LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY` (its `NOTE:` names them and the rule).
    */
-  async mutateCadrePeer<T>(reason: string, body: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+  async mutateCadrePeer<T>(reason: string, body: () => Promise<T>, policy: ControlWriteRetryOptions = {}): Promise<T> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
     return this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
       this.assertCommitBoundary(reason, 'on entry to');
@@ -3674,7 +4059,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
       this.assertCommitBoundary(reason, 'on return from');
       await this.notifyMembershipChanged(reason);
       return result;
-    }, {}, reason);
+    }, policy, reason);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -3689,8 +4074,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * class: every public write method of this class runs its statement(s) under it, and
    * `SeedBootstrapService` reaches it through {@link execWrite} rather than touching the
    * `Database` directly, so it is covered too. The race is
-   * real, not theoretical: the background self-record publish on a control connection
-   * opening (`CadreNode.drainPendingControlReplication` → `registerSelf`) collided with
+   * real, not theoretical: the background self-record publish when a sibling becomes
+   * reachable (`CadreNode.drainPendingControlReplication` → `registerSelf`) collided with
    * a foreground `authorizePeer` — both `CadrePeer` inserts — and tripped the boundary
    * assert.
    *
@@ -3714,6 +4099,11 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * re-runnable means a retry re-runs the body's reads too, which is what makes it safe.
    * Signatures and stamp ids minted OUTSIDE the body are deliberately NOT re-minted per
    * attempt: a retry re-presents the exact signed message the first attempt presented.
+   * A body opted into `LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY` is the exception, and must mint INSIDE:
+   * its re-run is a re-decision over a row another writer changed, not a re-presentation of
+   * the same write, so its read of the row, its decision and its signature all run in the
+   * body ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord}, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, {@link deleteGuardedRow}
+   * under {@link deleteCadrePeer}, {@link removeMachine}).
    */
   async withWriteLock<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
     // Chain behind the current tail regardless of how it settled, then park a
@@ -3755,9 +4145,14 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * `initialized` is set — so it reaches this method directly rather than through
    * {@link execWrite}, whose {@link ensureInitialized} would reject it. The write queue is
    * necessarily empty at that point, so the lock is uncontended there; it is taken anyway
-   * rather than carving out a lockless path. It is also the ONLY caller that passes a
-   * `policy` — everything else takes the default, whose classifier and attempt count are
-   * unchanged by that call site existing.
+   * rather than carving out a lockless path.
+   *
+   * Two policies reach here besides the default: `SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY` from that one
+   * call site, and `LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY` from the `CadrePeer` writers that re-read the
+   * row inside their body ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord} directly; {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer},
+   * {@link deleteCadrePeer} and {@link removeMachine} through {@link mutateCadrePeer}'s
+   * policy parameter). Everything else takes the default, whose classifier and attempt count
+   * are unchanged by those call sites existing.
    *
    * `label` names the operation in this loop's debug lines and nothing else
    * ({@link ControlWriteRetryOptions.label}). Every call site in this class supplies one:
@@ -3902,7 +4297,22 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   ): Promise<void> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
     log('Inserting formation invite: %s', token);
+    const insert = await this.signFormationInviteInsert(token, sAppId, ownerKey, signMessage, options);
+    await this.execWrite(insert.sql, insert.params, 'formation-invite-insert');
+    log('Formation invite inserted: %s', token);
+  }
 
+  /**
+   * The stamped, owner-signed `FormationInvite` insert that {@link insertFormationInvite} and
+   * {@link insertFoundingRows} run. Reads the engine once, for the canonical `ExpiresAt`.
+   */
+  private async signFormationInviteInsert(
+    token: string,
+    sAppId: string,
+    ownerKey: string,
+    signMessage: ControlSign,
+    options: { expiresAtMs?: number; totalUses?: number; validationUrl?: string; strandId?: string }
+  ): Promise<SignedInsert> {
     const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
 
     // Build each bound field exactly as the deferred CHECK sees it post-coercion:
@@ -3929,21 +4339,22 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     // Persist the canonical ExpiresAt string (datetime parse is idempotent on it) so the
     // signed source-of-truth and the stored value are produced once. StampId is a real,
     // unique column (single-use anti-replay), no longer a context value.
-    await this.execWrite(`
-      insert into CadreControl.FormationInvite (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
-    `, [
-      ownerKey, signature,
-      token, sAppId,
-      expiresAtCanonical,
-      options.totalUses ?? null,
-      options.validationUrl ?? null,
-      options.strandId ?? null,
-      stampId,
-    ], 'formation-invite-insert');
-
-    log('Formation invite inserted: %s', token);
+    return {
+      sql: `
+        insert into CadreControl.FormationInvite (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId)
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+      `,
+      params: [
+        ownerKey, signature,
+        token, sAppId,
+        expiresAtCanonical,
+        options.totalUses ?? null,
+        options.validationUrl ?? null,
+        options.strandId ?? null,
+        stampId,
+      ],
+    };
   }
 
   /**
@@ -4066,14 +4477,13 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * Use {@link redeemInvitation} instead when the strand must be created by
    * consent atomically with the usage.
    *
-   * The strand's live `StampId` is read first and written onto the usage row:
+   * The strand's live `StampId` is written onto the usage row:
    * `FormationUsage.StrandExists` matches the (id, stamp) PAIR, and
    * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`'s consent branch reads the same pair back, so a consent
-   * record authorizes exactly the strand ROW it was recorded against. A missing strand
-   * THROWS here rather than being left to the deferred `StrandExists` CHECK — the
-   * ordinary "host strand has not converged yet" case is already reported as `missing`
-   * by {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand}, so an absent row at this
-   * point is a genuine race and deserves a named error, not a silent rollback.
+   * record authorizes exactly the strand ROW it was recorded against. A caller that already
+   * read the stamp passes it (`strandStampId`); otherwise it is read here first, and a
+   * missing strand THROWS {@link MissingHostStrandError} rather than being left to the
+   * deferred `StrandExists` CHECK.
    *
    * The row is keyed by the joiner's own nonce (`UsageStampId` is the primary key), so this
    * path — the one production actually races on (a bound invite published by `cadre-web` /
@@ -4108,6 +4518,13 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * {@link queryFormationInvite} read; `null` means "no invite row" / unlimited.
      */
     totalUses?: number | null;
+    /**
+     * The host strand's `StampId`, when the caller already read the row
+     * ({@link queryStrandWithStamp}); `undefined` reads it here. A stamp is fixed for the life
+     * of its row, so one read earlier is the stamp `StrandExists` compares, unless the row was
+     * removed (and re-seated) in between, which that CHECK refuses at commit.
+     */
+    strandStampId?: string;
   }): Promise<FormationUsageResult> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
     const {
@@ -4118,7 +4535,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
 
     // The host strand is pre-existing and owner-signed; its stamp names the strand ROW the
     // consent record authorizes.
-    const strandStampId = await this.queryStrandStampId(strandId);
+    const strandStampId = params.strandStampId ?? await this.queryStrandStampId(strandId);
     if (strandStampId === null) {
       throw new MissingHostStrandError(strandId, token);
     }
@@ -4262,7 +4679,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * permissive PRE-check that runs ahead of it, and a transiently short read costs each of
    * them only a worse outcome for the ATTEMPT, never a seat the invitation did not pay for:
    * {@link assertSeatRemains} loses its named exhaustion error and falls back to the CHECK's
-   * generic refusal; `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.isTokenUsed` reports not-used and lets
+   * generic refusal; `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.readToken` reports a seat free and lets
    * the redemption proceed to the CHECK, which decides; {@link hasOutstandingFormationInvite}
    * holds the stranger-admission door open slightly longer.
    *
@@ -4296,12 +4713,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   /**
    * Is any `FormationInvite` row still redeemable — unexpired AND with usage
    * below its `TotalUses`? A null `ExpiresAt` never expires and a null
-   * `TotalUses` is unlimited, matching {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder}'s
-   * per-token semantics (`isTokenValid` / `isTokenUsed`).
+   * `TotalUses` is unlimited, matching the per-token semantics of `classifyTokenRead`
+   * (`formation-token.ts`).
    *
    * Answers the control-network connection gate's coarse "does this node expect
    * a stranger?" question, which has no token to ask about. The expiry
-   * comparison is `expiresAtMs <= now` — identical to `isTokenValid`'s — so an
+   * comparison is `expiresAtMs <= now` — identical to `isInviteExpired`'s — so an
    * invite the formation handler would reject can never hold the gate open.
    *
    * The scan is deliberately not pushed into SQL: nothing else here compares a
@@ -4494,8 +4911,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * the row is the holder's proof and never goes away; liveness is {@link hasLiveCadreInvite}'s
    * question, and `CadreInviteUsage.Authorized`'s at redemption.
    *
-   * `retry: false` is passed by {@link redeemCadreInvite}, which reads INSIDE its locked write
-   * body — the same per-call opt-out, for the same reason, as {@link queryStampId}'s.
+   * A redemption reads the row once, before its write, and carries it into
+   * {@link isCadreInviteLive} and {@link redeemCadreInvite}. `retry: false` is passed by
+   * {@link redeemCadreInvite} when it was handed none and reads INSIDE its locked write body —
+   * the same per-call opt-out, for the same reason, as {@link queryStampId}'s.
    */
   async queryCadreInvite(key: string, retry = true): Promise<CadreInviteRow | null> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
@@ -4513,23 +4932,16 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * {@link queryCadrePeers}' reason.
    */
   async queryCadreInvites(retry = true): Promise<CadreInviteRow[]> {
-    this.ensureInitialized();
-    const rows = await this.readRows(CADRE_INVITE_SELECT_SQL, undefined, 'cadre-invites', retry);
-    return rows.map(cadreInviteRowOf);
+    return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.cadreInviteView, retry)).map(cadreInviteRowOf);
   }
 
   /**
    * Every `CadreInviteUsage` row this node holds — the redemption records the membership
    * predicate verifies invitation-admitted rows against. Same `retry` contract as
-   * {@link queryCadreInvites}.
+   * {@link queryCadreInvites}; both come from their membership views ({@link readMembershipRows}).
    */
   async queryCadreInviteUsages(retry = true): Promise<CadreInviteUsageRow[]> {
-    this.ensureInitialized();
-    const rows = await this.readRows(
-      'select UsageStampId, InviteKey, PeerId, PeerKey, PeerStampId, InviteSig, PeerSig from CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage',
-      undefined, 'cadre-invite-usages', retry
-    );
-    return rows.map(cadreInviteUsageRowOf);
+    return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.cadreInviteUsageView, retry)).map(cadreInviteUsageRowOf);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -4575,6 +4987,9 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     // counts make that free today; if a long-lived cadre accumulates thousands and inbound
     // upgrades slow down, add an expiry-ordered index or prune withdrawn/expired rows (which
     // first needs every device they admitted re-vouched, so the chain no longer needs them).
+    // NOTE: this scan reaches storage while queryCadreInvites serves the same rows from the
+    // membership view; if the stranger path's reads ever near the gate's 2 s deadline, walk
+    // queryCadreInvites() here instead.
     const metered: Array<{ key: string; totalUses: number }> = [];
     let unlimitedLive = false;
     for (const row of await this.readRows(
@@ -4612,16 +5027,21 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
 
   /**
    * Is this one cadre invitation still redeemable here — the conditions
-   * {@link hasLiveCadreInvite} applies, for one invitation? The row judged is the one this node
-   * holds under `invite.key`; when it holds none, `invite` itself (a bundle's copy, not seated
-   * yet), but only if its issuer signature verifies, because an unsigned copy would otherwise be
-   * judged by whichever owner it names as issuer. A permissive pre-check like
-   * {@link countCadreInviteUsage}: {@link seatCadreInvite} and the redemption's own write are
-   * what enforce every condition.
-   */
-  async isCadreInviteLive(invite: CadreInviteRow, nowMs: number = Date.now()): Promise<boolean> {
+   * {@link hasLiveCadreInvite} applies, for one invitation? The row judged is `held`, the one this
+   * node holds under `invite.key` ({@link queryCadreInvite}, read by the caller); when it holds
+   * none, `invite` itself (a bundle's copy, not seated yet), but only if its issuer signature
+   * verifies, because an unsigned copy would otherwise be judged by whichever owner it names as
+   * issuer. A permissive pre-check like {@link countCadreInviteUsage}: {@link seatCadreInvite}
+   * and the redemption's own write are what enforce every condition.
+   *
+   * The use count read here is read again inside the redemption's write lock
+   * ({@link assertCadreInviteSeatRemains}), on purpose: this one decides whether the device is
+   * pushed the control store before the write, so the holder of a spent invitation is refused
+   * without being sent anything; the in-lock one decides the seat, against a concurrent redemption.
+   */
+  async isCadreInviteLive(invite: CadreInviteRow, held: CadreInviteRow | null, nowMs: number = Date.now()): Promise<boolean> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
-    const row = await this.queryCadreInvite(invite.key) ?? (verifyCadreInviteRow(this.config.partyId, invite) ? invite : null);
+    const row = held ?? (verifyCadreInviteRow(this.config.partyId, invite) ? invite : null);
     return this.issuedRowLive('CadreInvite', row, nowMs, key => this.countCadreInviteUsage(key));
   }
 
@@ -4794,11 +5214,27 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    */
   async redeemCadreInvite(params: {
     inviteKey: string;
+    /**
+     * The row this node holds under `inviteKey`, read before the call ({@link queryCadreInvite});
+     * omitted, it is read inside the locked body. Never a bundle's copy: the requester chooses a
+     * copy's `TotalUses` and `IssuerKey`, and the seat check must judge the stored cap. The
+     * schema refuses every update and delete of the row (`NoUpdate`, `NoDelete`), so the earlier
+     * read is the row a locked read would return; withdrawal is a `Revocation` row, which the schema's
+     * `NotRevoked` and `Authorized` checks still read at commit.
+     */
+    held?: CadreInviteRow;
     peerId: string;
     /** The device's ed25519 public key (base64url); `peerId` is its identity multihash. */
     peerKey: string;
     /** The device's dialable addresses, if known; stored comma-joined as `authorizePeer` does. */
     multiaddrs?: string[];
+    /**
+     * The rest of the device's own signed address record over `multiaddrs`, already verified by
+     * the caller (`admittedRecord` in `cadre-invite-protocol.ts`): stored as the row's
+     * `UpdatedAt`, `Sig` and `Profile`, so the row resolves to the device's addresses from its
+     * admission. Omitted, the row is written unsigned, `UpdatedAt` at this machine's clock.
+     */
+    record?: Pick<PeerAddressRecord, 'updatedAt' | 'profile' | 'sig'>;
     /** Single-use nonce minted by the device; both signatures cover it. */
     usageStampId: string;
     /** The holder's signature with the invitation private key over the `'redeem'` digest. */
@@ -4808,13 +5244,13 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     nowMs?: number;
   }): Promise<CadreInviteRedemptionResult> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
-    const { inviteKey, peerId, peerKey, usageStampId, inviteSig, peerSig } = params;
+    const { inviteKey, peerId, peerKey, record, usageStampId, inviteSig, peerSig } = params;
     const nowMs = params.nowMs ?? Date.now();
     const multiaddr = params.multiaddrs?.length ? params.multiaddrs.join(',') : '';
     log('Redeeming cadre invitation %s for %s', inviteKey, peerId);
 
     return this.mutateCadrePeer('cadre-invite-redeem', async () => {
-      const invite = await this.queryCadreInvite(inviteKey, false);
+      const invite = params.held ?? await this.queryCadreInvite(inviteKey, false);
       if (invite === null) {
         throw new IssuedRowNotHereYetError('CadreInvite', inviteKey);
       }
@@ -4834,10 +5270,11 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
       const nowCanonical = await canonicalDatetime(this.db!, nowMs);
       await this.inTransaction('cadre-invite-redeem', async () => {
         await this.db!.exec(`
-          insert into CadreControl.CadrePeer (PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Sig, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage)
+          insert into CadreControl.CadrePeer (PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Sig, Profile, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage)
             with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
-            values (?, ?, ?, ?, null, ?, ?, null, ?)
-        `, [peerId, peerKey, multiaddr, nowMs, peerStampId, invite.issuerKey, usageStampId]);
+            values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, null, ?)
+        `, [peerId, peerKey, multiaddr, record?.updatedAt ?? nowMs, record?.sig ?? null, record?.profile ?? null,
+          peerStampId, invite.issuerKey, usageStampId]);
         await this.db!.exec(`
           insert into CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage (UsageStampId, InviteKey, PeerId, PeerKey, PeerStampId, InviteSig, PeerSig)
             with context Now = ?
@@ -4947,7 +5384,9 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   /**
    * Read one `OwnerGrant` row by key, or null when absent. Withdrawn rows are returned too,
    * as {@link queryCadreInvite} returns them: the row is the holder's proof and never goes
-   * away. `retry: false` is passed by {@link redeemOwnerGrant}, inside its locked body.
+   * away. Read once per redemption and carried into {@link isOwnerGrantLive} and
+   * {@link redeemOwnerGrant}; `retry: false` is passed by {@link redeemOwnerGrant} when it was
+   * handed none and reads inside its locked body.
    */
   async queryOwnerGrant(key: string, retry = true): Promise<OwnerGrantRow | null> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
@@ -4963,19 +5402,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * `retry: false` is forwarded from the membership-gate refresh for {@link queryCadrePeers}' reason.
    */
   async queryOwnerGrants(retry = true): Promise<OwnerGrantRow[]> {
-    this.ensureInitialized();
-    const rows = await this.readRows(OWNER_GRANT_SELECT_SQL, undefined, 'owner-grants', retry);
-    return rows.map(ownerGrantRowOf);
+    return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.ownerGrantView, retry)).map(ownerGrantRowOf);
   }
 
-  /** Every `OwnerGrantUsage` row this node holds — the redemption records a grant-seated `OwnerKey` row is verified against. Same `retry` contract as {@link queryOwnerGrants}. */
+  /** Every `OwnerGrantUsage` row this node holds — the redemption records a grant-seated `OwnerKey` row is verified against. Same `retry` contract as {@link queryOwnerGrants}; both come from their membership views ({@link readMembershipRows}). */
   async queryOwnerGrantUsages(retry = true): Promise<OwnerGrantUsageRow[]> {
-    this.ensureInitialized();
-    const rows = await this.readRows(
-      'select UsageStampId, GrantKey, SeatedKey, SeatedStampId, GrantSig, OwnerSig from CadreControl.OwnerGrantUsage',
-      undefined, 'owner-grant-usages', retry
-    );
-    return rows.map(ownerGrantUsageRowOf);
+    return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.ownerGrantUsageView, retry)).map(ownerGrantUsageRowOf);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -4989,14 +5421,16 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
 
   /**
    * Is this one owner grant still redeemable here — not withdrawn, unexpired, uses left, issuer
-   * still an owner — judged as {@link isCadreInviteLive} judges an invitation: by the row this
-   * node holds under `grant.key`, else by `grant` itself (a bundle's copy, not seated yet)
-   * when its issuer signature verifies. A permissive pre-check; {@link seatOwnerGrant} and the
-   * redemption's own write enforce every condition.
+   * still an owner — judged as {@link isCadreInviteLive} judges an invitation: by `held`, the row
+   * this node holds under `grant.key` ({@link queryOwnerGrant}, read by the caller), else by
+   * `grant` itself (a bundle's copy, not seated yet) when its issuer signature verifies. A
+   * permissive pre-check; {@link seatOwnerGrant} and the redemption's own write enforce every
+   * condition. Its use count is read again inside the write lock, for
+   * {@link isCadreInviteLive}'s reason.
    */
-  async isOwnerGrantLive(grant: OwnerGrantRow, nowMs: number = Date.now()): Promise<boolean> {
+  async isOwnerGrantLive(grant: OwnerGrantRow, held: OwnerGrantRow | null, nowMs: number = Date.now()): Promise<boolean> {
     this.ensureInitialized();
-    const row = await this.queryOwnerGrant(grant.key) ?? (verifyOwnerGrantRow(this.config.partyId, grant) ? grant : null);
+    const row = held ?? (verifyOwnerGrantRow(this.config.partyId, grant) ? grant : null);
     return this.issuedRowLive('OwnerGrant', row, nowMs, key => this.countOwnerGrantUsage(key));
   }
 
@@ -5058,6 +5492,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    */
   async redeemOwnerGrant(params: {
     grantKey: string;
+    /** The row this node holds under `grantKey`, read before the call; omitted, it is read inside the locked body. Never a bundle's copy, for {@link redeemCadreInvite}'s reason. */
+    held?: OwnerGrantRow;
     /** The owner key to seat (base64url ed25519): the holder generated it, or already holds it. */
     seatedKey: string;
     /** Single-use nonce minted by the holder; both signatures cover it. */
@@ -5074,7 +5510,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     log('Redeeming owner grant %s for %s', grantKey, seatedKey);
 
     return this.mutateCadrePeer('owner-grant-redeem', async () => {
-      const grant = await this.queryOwnerGrant(grantKey, false);
+      const grant = params.held ?? await this.queryOwnerGrant(grantKey, false);
       if (grant === null) {
         throw new IssuedRowNotHereYetError('OwnerGrant', grantKey);
       }
@@ -5114,7 +5550,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
   /**
    * Close the database and cleanup resources.
    *
-   * Drains the local-write chain first: {@link withWriteLock} can park a write behind
+   * Disposes every {@link watchTables} subscription before anything else, so a commit that
+   * lands while the write chain drains schedules no run, and again before dropping the handle.
+   *
+   * Then drains the local-write chain: {@link withWriteLock} can park a write behind
    * others across an await, and a queued closure evaluates `this.db!` only when it
    * finally runs — so nulling the handle out from under it would throw a TypeError on a
    * null handle instead of committing. The tail never rejects (it swallows both
@@ -5125,11 +5564,17 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
    * deadline) if a write can ever hang.
    */
   async close(): Promise<void> {
+    this.tableWatches.disposeAll();
     await this.writeQueue;
     if (this.collectionFactory) {
       await this.collectionFactory.shutdown();
       this.collectionFactory = null;
     }
+    this.txnBridge = null;
+    // Again: a subscription taken during the awaits above would keep its timers past close.
+    this.tableWatches.disposeAll();
+    // Here, not first: a read started during the awaits above must not install either.
+    this.invalidateMembershipViews();
     if (this.db) {
       void this.db.close();
       this.db = null;