@serfab/cadre-core 1.13.0 → 1.15.0

package/dist/peer-authorization.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-import type { RevocableTable } from './control-authorization.js';
+import type { CadreInviteSignedFields, RevocableTable } from './control-authorization.js';
+import type { CadreInviteRow, CadreInviteUsageRow, CadrePeerVoucherFields, OwnerKeyRow, RevocationRow } from './types.js';
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to vouch a peer's ENROLLMENT — the offline
  * credential `cadre enroll register` verifies. No table checks this digest, so it
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ export interface DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow {
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` INSERT — the WHOLE row,
  * ending in its single-use `StampId` nonce. SQL mirror:
- * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', new.PeerId, new.Platform, new.Token,
+ * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', party_id(), new.PeerId, new.Platform, new.Token,
  * coalesce(cast(new.UpdatedAt as text), ''), coalesce(new.Sig, ''), new.StampId)` in
  * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedInsert`.
  *
@@ -50,11 +51,11 @@ export interface DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow {
  * Distinct from {@link deviceTokenRemoveDigest} so a captured insert approval can never
  * be replayed to delete the token, and vice versa.
  */
-export declare function deviceTokenAddDigest(row: DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow): string;
+export declare function deviceTokenAddDigest(partyId: string, row: DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow): string;
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` DELETE, bound to the
  * STORED row's (PeerId, StampId). SQL mirror:
- * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)` in
+ * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', party_id(), old.PeerId, old.StampId)` in
  * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedDelete`.
  *
  * A narrower vector than {@link deviceTokenAddDigest} on purpose (the same split
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ export declare function deviceTokenAddDigest(row: DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow): str
  * cannot be re-cut into an insert approval, and it is dead the moment the stamp it
  * names is tombstoned.
  */
-export declare function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string;
+export declare function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(partyId: string, peerId: string, stampId: string): string;
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to VOUCH a `CadrePeer` membership row (insert
  * and the owner re-touch update — same semantics, deliberately the same digest).
@@ -74,9 +75,9 @@ export declare function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string)
  * a delete. The domain tag keeps the stored, replicated `VouchSig` useless against
  * every OTHER table's rules.
  *
- * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', new.PeerId, new.StampId)`.
+ * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', party_id(), new.PeerId, new.StampId)`.
  */
-export declare function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string;
+export declare function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(partyId: string, peerId: string, stampId: string): string;
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to REMOVE a `CadrePeer` row. Deliberately a
  * distinct payload from {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest} (the `'remove'` action tag)
@@ -86,16 +87,16 @@ export declare function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string):
  * delete lands, because a re-added row carries a FRESH `StampId` (the removed row's
  * stamp is retired into `CadreControl.Revocation` and never reused).
  *
- * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)`.
+ * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', party_id(), old.PeerId, old.StampId)`.
  */
-export declare function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string;
+export declare function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(partyId: string, peerId: string, stampId: string): string;
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to APPEND a `CadreControl.Revocation` tombstone —
  * the row retiring `stampId` for the named guarded table, and recording `rowKey`
  * (the removed row's primary key: OwnerKey.Key / ValidationKey.Key /
  * CadrePeer.PeerId / DeviceToken.PeerId / Strand.Id) as which row was retired.
  * SQL mirror:
- * `digest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', new.TableName, new.RowKey, new.StampId)`
+ * `digest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', party_id(), new.TableName, new.RowKey, new.StampId)`
  * in `Revocation.Authorized`.
  *
  * Its own `'CadreControl.Revocation'` domain tag makes it disjoint from the
@@ -104,7 +105,28 @@ export declare function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string):
  * this tombstone accompanies — a removal signature is not a retirement
  * signature and cannot be replayed as one.
  */
-export declare function revocationDigest(tableName: RevocableTable, rowKey: string, stampId: string): string;
+export declare function revocationDigest(partyId: string, tableName: RevocableTable, rowKey: string, stampId: string): string;
+/**
+ * Does a `Revocation` row's stored signer pair (`SignerKey` / `SignerSig`) verify over the
+ * tombstone's own triple, for `partyId`? The read-side mirror of `Revocation.Authorized`,
+ * for a node that received the row by replication and must decide whether to honour it.
+ * Whether `row.signerKey` is an owner this node trusts is the caller's question, as for
+ * {@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher}. Never throws: a malformed row verifies as `false`.
+ */
+export declare function verifyRevocationSigner(partyId: string, row: RevocationRow): boolean;
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to seat a further `OwnerKey` row — the signed-add branch
+ * of `OwnerKey.Authorized`, which stores the pair as `VouchOwner` / `VouchSig`. SQL mirror:
+ * `digest('CadreControl.OwnerKey', 'add', party_id(), new.Key, new.StampId)`. The removal
+ * digest needs no builder here: it is the generic guarded `'remove'` digest over (Key, StampId).
+ */
+export declare function ownerKeyAddDigest(partyId: string, key: string, stampId: string): string;
+/**
+ * Does an owner-signed `OwnerKey` row's stored voucher verify — `vouchSig` by `vouchOwner`
+ * over {@link ownerKeyAddDigest} for (`partyId`, `key`, `stampId`)? Whether `vouchOwner` is
+ * anchored is the caller's question, as for {@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher}. Never throws.
+ */
+export declare function verifyOwnerKeyVoucher(partyId: string, key: string, stampId: string, vouchOwner: string, vouchSig: string): boolean;
 /**
  * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over `peerId`'s
  * authorization digest, using `ownerPublicKey` (base64url).
@@ -122,12 +144,13 @@ export declare function revocationDigest(tableName: RevocableTable, rowKey: stri
 export declare function verifyPeerAuthorization(peerId: string, ownerPublicKey: string, signature: string): boolean;
 /**
  * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over the
- * `CadrePeer` voucher digest for (`peerId`, `stampId`) — the read-side mirror
- * of the voucher {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer} signs and persists into
+ * `CadrePeer` voucher digest for (`partyId`, `peerId`, `stampId`) — the read-side
+ * mirror of the voucher {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer} signs and persists into
  * `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` (see {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest}).
  *
  * A `true` result means the holder of `ownerPublicKey` vouched THIS membership
- * row (the peer id bound to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce). It says
+ * row (the peer id bound to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce) in THIS party: a
+ * voucher copied from another party's table that shares the owner key fails. It says
  * nothing about whether that owner key is itself trustworthy — the caller must
  * separately check the key against the node-local trusted-owner anchor
  * (`TrustedOwnerStore`), never the replicated `OwnerKey` table.
@@ -136,14 +159,14 @@ export declare function verifyPeerAuthorization(peerId: string, ownerPublicKey:
  * {@link verifyPeerAuthorization}): malformed input or any crypto failure
  * resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
  */
-export declare function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(peerId: string, stampId: string, ownerPublicKey: string, signature: string): boolean;
+export declare function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(partyId: string, peerId: string, stampId: string, ownerPublicKey: string, signature: string): boolean;
 /**
  * Canonical digest a JOINING peer signs to consent to ONE `FormationUsage`
  * redemption — the read-side mirror of `formationConsentMessage` in
  * control-database.ts, base64url-encoded instead of raw bytes (see
- * {@link taggedDigest}). That doc comment carries the field-vector rationale
- * (notably why `strandId` is not signed); the two vectors must not drift, which
- * peer-authorization.spec.ts pins by signing one form and verifying the other.
+ * {@link unboundTaggedDigest}). That doc comment carries the field-vector rationale
+ * (notably why neither `strandId` nor the party id is signed); the two vectors must not
+ * drift, which peer-authorization.spec.ts pins by signing one form and verifying the other.
  */
 export declare function formationConsentDigest(token: string, usageStampId: string, peerKey: string, disclosure: string): string;
 /**
@@ -163,3 +186,75 @@ export declare function verifyFormationConsent(row: {
     disclosure: string;
     peerSig: string;
 }): boolean;
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to seat a `CadreInvite` row — the read-side mirror
+ * of `cadreInviteAddMessage` in control-database.ts, base64url instead of raw bytes
+ * (see {@link taggedDigest}). The whole row is bound, nullable columns as `''` and
+ * `ExpiresAt` in its stored canonical form, through the one field builder both sides
+ * share (`cadreInviteRowFields`). SQL mirror: `CadreInvite.AuthorizedInsert`.
+ */
+export declare function cadreInviteAddDigest(partyId: string, row: CadreInviteSignedFields): string;
+/**
+ * Canonical digest the HOLDER of a `CadreInvite`'s private key signs to redeem it once:
+ * proof of possession, verified against the invitation key itself
+ * (`CadreInviteUsage.InvitePossessed`). Binds the redemption's single-use nonce and the
+ * device being admitted, so one redemption cannot be re-presented for another device
+ * or another use. Mirror of `cadreInviteRedeemMessage` in control-database.ts.
+ */
+export declare function cadreInviteRedeemDigest(partyId: string, inviteKey: string, usageStampId: string, peerKey: string): string;
+/**
+ * Canonical digest the DEVICE signs to consent to being admitted by one redemption
+ * (`CadreInviteUsage.PeerConsented`), over the same fields as
+ * {@link cadreInviteRedeemDigest} under a distinct action tag, so the holder's and
+ * the device's signatures are never interchangeable. Mirror of
+ * `cadreInviteConsentMessage` in control-database.ts.
+ */
+export declare function cadreInviteConsentDigest(partyId: string, inviteKey: string, usageStampId: string, peerKey: string): string;
+/**
+ * Does a `CadreInvite` row carry a valid `'add'` signature by its own `issuerKey`, for
+ * `partyId`? The redeeming device runs this over the row a member replies with, after
+ * checking the issuer against its pinned owner keys and the reply's party against the
+ * invitation's, and a member over a bundle's copy it does not hold yet
+ * (`ControlDatabase.isCadreInviteLive`); whether that issuer IS an owner is the caller's question.
+ * Never throws: a malformed row verifies as `false`.
+ */
+export declare function verifyCadreInviteRow(partyId: string, invite: CadreInviteRow): boolean;
+/**
+ * The two signatures a redemption carries, checked before any database work: the holder's
+ * `'redeem'` signature with the invitation key, and the device's `'consent'` signature with
+ * its own key, both over (`inviteKey`, `usageStampId`, `peerKey`). The pre-check twin of
+ * `CadreInviteUsage.InvitePossessed` / `PeerConsented`, as `verifyFormationConsent` is for
+ * formation: the schema stays the authority, this turns a bad signature into a clean
+ * refusal instead of a constraint failure at commit. Never throws.
+ */
+export declare function verifyCadreInviteRedemption(partyId: string, fields: {
+    inviteKey: string;
+    usageStampId: string;
+    peerKey: string;
+}, inviteSig: string, peerSig: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Is an invitation-admitted `CadrePeer` row (`vouchSig` null, `vouchUsage` set) a
+ * member this node should trust? The read-side mirror of the consent branch of
+ * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedInsert`, re-checked against THIS node's anchor because the
+ * replicated `OwnerKey` table can be polluted. The usage must name this peer id and this
+ * exact row incarnation (`peerStampId`); every other link is {@link verifyAdmissionChain}.
+ *
+ * Expiry, use count and withdrawal are deliberately NOT re-checked: they were conditions
+ * at redemption (`CadreInviteUsage.Authorized`), and membership persists until an owner
+ * removes the row — exactly as an owner-vouched row's membership does. Keeping a device
+ * out is removing its row AND withdrawing the invitation.
+ *
+ * Returns a boolean and never throws (the siblings' contract): malformed input or any
+ * crypto failure resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
+ */
+export declare function verifyInvitationAdmission(partyId: string, row: CadrePeerVoucherFields, usage: CadreInviteUsageRow, invite: CadreInviteRow, isAnchored: (ownerKey: string) => boolean): boolean;
+/**
+ * Is an invitation-admitted `OwnerKey` row (`vouchSig` null, `vouchUsage` set) an owner
+ * this node should derive into its anchor? The read-side mirror of the consent branch of
+ * `OwnerKey.Authorized` (`owner-anchor-sync.ts` → `deriveOwnerAnchor`): the invitation
+ * must grant ownership, and the usage must name this key (`peerKey`) and this exact row
+ * incarnation (`ownerStampId`); every other link is {@link verifyAdmissionChain}. Same
+ * never-throws contract and the same deliberate omissions as
+ * {@link verifyInvitationAdmission}.
+ */
+export declare function verifyInvitationOwnerAdmission(partyId: string, row: OwnerKeyRow, usage: CadreInviteUsageRow, invite: CadreInviteRow, isAnchored: (ownerKey: string) => boolean): boolean;

package/dist/peer-authorization.js

@@ -1,15 +1,22 @@
 import debug from 'debug';
 import { digest, verify } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
-import { controlAuthorizationFields } from './control-authorization.js';
+import { controlAuthorizationFields, unboundAuthorizationFields, cadreInviteRowFields } from './control-authorization.js';
+import { ed25519PublicKeyB64FromPeerId } from './ed25519-key.js';
 const log = debug('sereus:cadre:peer-authorization');
 /**
- * base64url SHA-256 digest over the shared domain-tagged field vector (see
+ * base64url SHA-256 digest over the shared domain-tagged, party-bound field vector (see
  * control-authorization.ts). The base64url twin of
  * control-database.ts:buildAuthorizationMessage (which returns the same digest as raw
  * bytes): sign either encoding with input encoding to match and the signed bytes agree.
+ * `partyId` is the party the verifier is configured for: a stored proof minted for
+ * another party fails here exactly as it fails the schema's `party_id()`-bound check.
  */
-function taggedDigest(domain, action, rowFields) {
-    return digest(controlAuthorizationFields(domain, action, rowFields), 'sha256', 'base64url');
+function taggedDigest(domain, action, partyId, rowFields) {
+    return digest(controlAuthorizationFields(domain, action, partyId, rowFields), 'sha256', 'base64url');
+}
+/** {@link taggedDigest} for the two party-free digests (`UnboundControlDomain`). */
+function unboundTaggedDigest(domain, action, rowFields) {
+    return digest(unboundAuthorizationFields(domain, action, rowFields), 'sha256', 'base64url');
 }
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to vouch a peer's ENROLLMENT — the offline
@@ -23,12 +30,12 @@ function taggedDigest(domain, action, rowFields) {
  * here and both move together.
  */
 export function peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId) {
-    return taggedDigest('Cadre.Enrollment', 'vouch', [peerId]);
+    return unboundTaggedDigest('Cadre.Enrollment', 'vouch', [peerId]);
 }
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` INSERT — the WHOLE row,
  * ending in its single-use `StampId` nonce. SQL mirror:
- * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', new.PeerId, new.Platform, new.Token,
+ * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', party_id(), new.PeerId, new.Platform, new.Token,
  * coalesce(cast(new.UpdatedAt as text), ''), coalesce(new.Sig, ''), new.StampId)` in
  * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedInsert`.
  *
@@ -44,8 +51,8 @@ export function peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId) {
  * Distinct from {@link deviceTokenRemoveDigest} so a captured insert approval can never
  * be replayed to delete the token, and vice versa.
  */
-export function deviceTokenAddDigest(row) {
-    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', [
+export function deviceTokenAddDigest(partyId, row) {
+    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', partyId, [
         row.peerId,
         row.platform,
         row.token,
@@ -57,7 +64,7 @@ export function deviceTokenAddDigest(row) {
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` DELETE, bound to the
  * STORED row's (PeerId, StampId). SQL mirror:
- * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)` in
+ * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', party_id(), old.PeerId, old.StampId)` in
  * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedDelete`.
  *
  * A narrower vector than {@link deviceTokenAddDigest} on purpose (the same split
@@ -65,8 +72,8 @@ export function deviceTokenAddDigest(row) {
  * cannot be re-cut into an insert approval, and it is dead the moment the stamp it
  * names is tombstoned.
  */
-export function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(peerId, stampId) {
-    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
+export function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(partyId, peerId, stampId) {
+    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', partyId, [peerId, stampId]);
 }
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to VOUCH a `CadrePeer` membership row (insert
@@ -79,10 +86,10 @@ export function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(peerId, stampId) {
  * a delete. The domain tag keeps the stored, replicated `VouchSig` useless against
  * every OTHER table's rules.
  *
- * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', new.PeerId, new.StampId)`.
+ * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', party_id(), new.PeerId, new.StampId)`.
  */
-export function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId, stampId) {
-    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', [peerId, stampId]);
+export function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(partyId, peerId, stampId) {
+    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', partyId, [peerId, stampId]);
 }
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to REMOVE a `CadrePeer` row. Deliberately a
@@ -93,10 +100,10 @@ export function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId, stampId) {
  * delete lands, because a re-added row carries a FRESH `StampId` (the removed row's
  * stamp is retired into `CadreControl.Revocation` and never reused).
  *
- * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)`.
+ * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', party_id(), old.PeerId, old.StampId)`.
  */
-export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId, stampId) {
-    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
+export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(partyId, peerId, stampId) {
+    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', partyId, [peerId, stampId]);
 }
 /**
  * Canonical digest an owner signs to APPEND a `CadreControl.Revocation` tombstone —
@@ -104,7 +111,7 @@ export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId, stampId) {
  * (the removed row's primary key: OwnerKey.Key / ValidationKey.Key /
  * CadrePeer.PeerId / DeviceToken.PeerId / Strand.Id) as which row was retired.
  * SQL mirror:
- * `digest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', new.TableName, new.RowKey, new.StampId)`
+ * `digest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', party_id(), new.TableName, new.RowKey, new.StampId)`
  * in `Revocation.Authorized`.
  *
  * Its own `'CadreControl.Revocation'` domain tag makes it disjoint from the
@@ -113,8 +120,47 @@ export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId, stampId) {
  * this tombstone accompanies — a removal signature is not a retirement
  * signature and cannot be replayed as one.
  */
-export function revocationDigest(tableName, rowKey, stampId) {
-    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', [tableName, rowKey, stampId]);
+export function revocationDigest(partyId, tableName, rowKey, stampId) {
+    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', partyId, [tableName, rowKey, stampId]);
+}
+/**
+ * Does a `Revocation` row's stored signer pair (`SignerKey` / `SignerSig`) verify over the
+ * tombstone's own triple, for `partyId`? The read-side mirror of `Revocation.Authorized`,
+ * for a node that received the row by replication and must decide whether to honour it.
+ * Whether `row.signerKey` is an owner this node trusts is the caller's question, as for
+ * {@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher}. Never throws: a malformed row verifies as `false`.
+ */
+export function verifyRevocationSigner(partyId, row) {
+    try {
+        return verifyB64(revocationDigest(partyId, row.tableName, row.rowKey, row.stampId), row.signerSig, row.signerKey);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        log('verifyRevocationSigner failed: %o', error);
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to seat a further `OwnerKey` row — the signed-add branch
+ * of `OwnerKey.Authorized`, which stores the pair as `VouchOwner` / `VouchSig`. SQL mirror:
+ * `digest('CadreControl.OwnerKey', 'add', party_id(), new.Key, new.StampId)`. The removal
+ * digest needs no builder here: it is the generic guarded `'remove'` digest over (Key, StampId).
+ */
+export function ownerKeyAddDigest(partyId, key, stampId) {
+    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.OwnerKey', 'add', partyId, [key, stampId]);
+}
+/**
+ * Does an owner-signed `OwnerKey` row's stored voucher verify — `vouchSig` by `vouchOwner`
+ * over {@link ownerKeyAddDigest} for (`partyId`, `key`, `stampId`)? Whether `vouchOwner` is
+ * anchored is the caller's question, as for {@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher}. Never throws.
+ */
+export function verifyOwnerKeyVoucher(partyId, key, stampId, vouchOwner, vouchSig) {
+    try {
+        return verifyB64(ownerKeyAddDigest(partyId, key, stampId), vouchSig, vouchOwner);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        log('verifyOwnerKeyVoucher failed: %o', error);
+        return false;
+    }
 }
 /**
  * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over `peerId`'s
@@ -141,12 +187,13 @@ export function verifyPeerAuthorization(peerId, ownerPublicKey, signature) {
 }
 /**
  * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over the
- * `CadrePeer` voucher digest for (`peerId`, `stampId`) — the read-side mirror
- * of the voucher {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer} signs and persists into
+ * `CadrePeer` voucher digest for (`partyId`, `peerId`, `stampId`) — the read-side
+ * mirror of the voucher {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer} signs and persists into
  * `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` (see {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest}).
  *
  * A `true` result means the holder of `ownerPublicKey` vouched THIS membership
- * row (the peer id bound to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce). It says
+ * row (the peer id bound to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce) in THIS party: a
+ * voucher copied from another party's table that shares the owner key fails. It says
  * nothing about whether that owner key is itself trustworthy — the caller must
  * separately check the key against the node-local trusted-owner anchor
  * (`TrustedOwnerStore`), never the replicated `OwnerKey` table.
@@ -155,9 +202,9 @@ export function verifyPeerAuthorization(peerId, ownerPublicKey, signature) {
  * {@link verifyPeerAuthorization}): malformed input or any crypto failure
  * resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
  */
-export function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(peerId, stampId, ownerPublicKey, signature) {
+export function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(partyId, peerId, stampId, ownerPublicKey, signature) {
     try {
-        return verify(cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId, stampId), signature, ownerPublicKey, 'ed25519', 'base64url', 'base64url', 'base64url');
+        return verify(cadrePeerVoucherDigest(partyId, peerId, stampId), signature, ownerPublicKey, 'ed25519', 'base64url', 'base64url', 'base64url');
     }
     catch (error) {
         log('verifyCadrePeerVoucher failed: %o', error);
@@ -168,12 +215,12 @@ export function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(peerId, stampId, ownerPublicKey, signatur
  * Canonical digest a JOINING peer signs to consent to ONE `FormationUsage`
  * redemption — the read-side mirror of `formationConsentMessage` in
  * control-database.ts, base64url-encoded instead of raw bytes (see
- * {@link taggedDigest}). That doc comment carries the field-vector rationale
- * (notably why `strandId` is not signed); the two vectors must not drift, which
- * peer-authorization.spec.ts pins by signing one form and verifying the other.
+ * {@link unboundTaggedDigest}). That doc comment carries the field-vector rationale
+ * (notably why neither `strandId` nor the party id is signed); the two vectors must not
+ * drift, which peer-authorization.spec.ts pins by signing one form and verifying the other.
  */
 export function formationConsentDigest(token, usageStampId, peerKey, disclosure) {
-    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.FormationUsage', 'consent', [token, usageStampId, peerKey, disclosure]);
+    return unboundTaggedDigest('CadreControl.FormationUsage', 'consent', [token, usageStampId, peerKey, disclosure]);
 }
 /**
  * Verify that `row.peerSig` is a valid ed25519 signature over the joining peer's
@@ -194,4 +241,153 @@ export function verifyFormationConsent(row) {
         return false;
     }
 }
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to seat a `CadreInvite` row — the read-side mirror
+ * of `cadreInviteAddMessage` in control-database.ts, base64url instead of raw bytes
+ * (see {@link taggedDigest}). The whole row is bound, nullable columns as `''` and
+ * `ExpiresAt` in its stored canonical form, through the one field builder both sides
+ * share (`cadreInviteRowFields`). SQL mirror: `CadreInvite.AuthorizedInsert`.
+ */
+export function cadreInviteAddDigest(partyId, row) {
+    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadreInvite', 'add', partyId, cadreInviteRowFields(row));
+}
+/**
+ * Canonical digest the HOLDER of a `CadreInvite`'s private key signs to redeem it once:
+ * proof of possession, verified against the invitation key itself
+ * (`CadreInviteUsage.InvitePossessed`). Binds the redemption's single-use nonce and the
+ * device being admitted, so one redemption cannot be re-presented for another device
+ * or another use. Mirror of `cadreInviteRedeemMessage` in control-database.ts.
+ */
+export function cadreInviteRedeemDigest(partyId, inviteKey, usageStampId, peerKey) {
+    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage', 'redeem', partyId, [inviteKey, usageStampId, peerKey]);
+}
+/**
+ * Canonical digest the DEVICE signs to consent to being admitted by one redemption
+ * (`CadreInviteUsage.PeerConsented`), over the same fields as
+ * {@link cadreInviteRedeemDigest} under a distinct action tag, so the holder's and
+ * the device's signatures are never interchangeable. Mirror of
+ * `cadreInviteConsentMessage` in control-database.ts.
+ */
+export function cadreInviteConsentDigest(partyId, inviteKey, usageStampId, peerKey) {
+    return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage', 'consent', partyId, [inviteKey, usageStampId, peerKey]);
+}
+/** ed25519 verify over a base64url digest, with the siblings' never-throws contract left to the caller. */
+function verifyB64(digestB64, signature, publicKey) {
+    return verify(digestB64, signature, publicKey, 'ed25519', 'base64url', 'base64url', 'base64url');
+}
+/**
+ * Does a `CadreInvite` row carry a valid `'add'` signature by its own `issuerKey`, for
+ * `partyId`? The redeeming device runs this over the row a member replies with, after
+ * checking the issuer against its pinned owner keys and the reply's party against the
+ * invitation's, and a member over a bundle's copy it does not hold yet
+ * (`ControlDatabase.isCadreInviteLive`); whether that issuer IS an owner is the caller's question.
+ * Never throws: a malformed row verifies as `false`.
+ */
+export function verifyCadreInviteRow(partyId, invite) {
+    try {
+        return verifyB64(cadreInviteAddDigest(partyId, invite), invite.issuerSig, invite.issuerKey);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        log('verifyCadreInviteRow failed: %o', error);
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The two signatures a redemption carries, checked before any database work: the holder's
+ * `'redeem'` signature with the invitation key, and the device's `'consent'` signature with
+ * its own key, both over (`inviteKey`, `usageStampId`, `peerKey`). The pre-check twin of
+ * `CadreInviteUsage.InvitePossessed` / `PeerConsented`, as `verifyFormationConsent` is for
+ * formation: the schema stays the authority, this turns a bad signature into a clean
+ * refusal instead of a constraint failure at commit. Never throws.
+ */
+export function verifyCadreInviteRedemption(partyId, fields, inviteSig, peerSig) {
+    try {
+        return verifyB64(cadreInviteRedeemDigest(partyId, fields.inviteKey, fields.usageStampId, fields.peerKey), inviteSig, fields.inviteKey)
+            && verifyB64(cadreInviteConsentDigest(partyId, fields.inviteKey, fields.usageStampId, fields.peerKey), peerSig, fields.peerKey);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        log('verifyCadreInviteRedemption failed: %o', error);
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The links of an invitation admission that do not depend on WHICH table's row was
+ * admitted — shared by {@link verifyInvitationAdmission} (`CadrePeer`) and
+ * {@link verifyInvitationOwnerAdmission} (`OwnerKey`), which differ only in the row
+ * columns the usage must name and, for an owner row, in `grantsOwner`. The chain is
+ *
+ *   row --vouchUsage--> usage --inviteKey--> invitation --issuerKey--> anchored owner
+ *
+ * and every link here is verified: the issuer is anchored (`isAnchored`) and is the row's
+ * `vouchOwner`; the usage names this invitation and is the row's `vouchUsage`; a targeted
+ * invitation names the redeeming device; the stored `peerKey` really is the key behind the
+ * usage's `peerId` (the schema cannot unwrap a multihash, so a writer could assert any
+ * pair); the invitation's stored `'add'` signature verifies over the row rebuilt from its
+ * columns; the holder's `'redeem'` signature verifies with the invitation key and the
+ * device's `'consent'` signature with its own key. All three signatures are judged for
+ * `partyId`. Throws on malformed input; the two callers turn that into `false`.
+ */
+function verifyAdmissionChain(partyId, vouchOwner, vouchUsage, usage, invite, isAnchored) {
+    return isAnchored(vouchOwner)
+        && invite.issuerKey === vouchOwner
+        && usage.usageStampId === vouchUsage
+        && usage.inviteKey === invite.key
+        && (invite.peerId === null || invite.peerId === usage.peerId)
+        && ed25519PublicKeyB64FromPeerId(usage.peerId) === usage.peerKey
+        && verifyB64(cadreInviteAddDigest(partyId, invite), invite.issuerSig, invite.issuerKey)
+        && verifyB64(cadreInviteRedeemDigest(partyId, invite.key, usage.usageStampId, usage.peerKey), usage.inviteSig, invite.key)
+        && verifyB64(cadreInviteConsentDigest(partyId, invite.key, usage.usageStampId, usage.peerKey), usage.peerSig, usage.peerKey);
+}
+/**
+ * Is an invitation-admitted `CadrePeer` row (`vouchSig` null, `vouchUsage` set) a
+ * member this node should trust? The read-side mirror of the consent branch of
+ * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedInsert`, re-checked against THIS node's anchor because the
+ * replicated `OwnerKey` table can be polluted. The usage must name this peer id and this
+ * exact row incarnation (`peerStampId`); every other link is {@link verifyAdmissionChain}.
+ *
+ * Expiry, use count and withdrawal are deliberately NOT re-checked: they were conditions
+ * at redemption (`CadreInviteUsage.Authorized`), and membership persists until an owner
+ * removes the row — exactly as an owner-vouched row's membership does. Keeping a device
+ * out is removing its row AND withdrawing the invitation.
+ *
+ * Returns a boolean and never throws (the siblings' contract): malformed input or any
+ * crypto failure resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
+ */
+export function verifyInvitationAdmission(partyId, row, usage, invite, isAnchored) {
+    try {
+        return row.stampId !== null
+            && row.vouchOwner !== null
+            && row.vouchUsage !== null
+            && usage.peerStampId === row.stampId
+            && usage.peerId === row.peerId
+            && verifyAdmissionChain(partyId, row.vouchOwner, row.vouchUsage, usage, invite, isAnchored);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        log('verifyInvitationAdmission failed: %o', error);
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Is an invitation-admitted `OwnerKey` row (`vouchSig` null, `vouchUsage` set) an owner
+ * this node should derive into its anchor? The read-side mirror of the consent branch of
+ * `OwnerKey.Authorized` (`owner-anchor-sync.ts` → `deriveOwnerAnchor`): the invitation
+ * must grant ownership, and the usage must name this key (`peerKey`) and this exact row
+ * incarnation (`ownerStampId`); every other link is {@link verifyAdmissionChain}. Same
+ * never-throws contract and the same deliberate omissions as
+ * {@link verifyInvitationAdmission}.
+ */
+export function verifyInvitationOwnerAdmission(partyId, row, usage, invite, isAnchored) {
+    try {
+        return row.vouchOwner !== null
+            && row.vouchUsage !== null
+            && invite.grantsOwner
+            && usage.peerKey === row.key
+            && usage.ownerStampId === row.stampId
+            && verifyAdmissionChain(partyId, row.vouchOwner, row.vouchUsage, usage, invite, isAnchored);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        log('verifyInvitationOwnerAdmission failed: %o', error);
+        return false;
+    }
+}
 //# sourceMappingURL=peer-authorization.js.map

package/dist/peer-authorization.js.map

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