@serfab/cadre-core 1.13.0 → 1.15.0

package/dist/membership-connection-gater.d.ts

@@ -1,121 +1,160 @@
 /**
- * Control-network inbound admission gates (defense-in-depth): the
- * encrypted-connection checkpoint and the circuit-relay reservation checkpoint.
- *
- * Layer 2 of the membership enforcement chain: the PRIMARY gates are per-stream
- * — every sensitive sereus control protocol rejects a peer that fails the
- * voucher-anchored membership check (wake and strand-addr via
- * `CadreNode.isAuthorizedMember`; the Optimystic control-DB protocols via the
- * materialized-snapshot gate `CadreNode.authorizeInboundControlStream`), and
- * the replicated rows an outsider *can* still write are disbelieved at read
- * time. This module adds the opportunistic connection-level layer on top: a
- * peer this node can positively determine is NOT authorized is refused at the
- * encrypted-connection checkpoint, before any protocol negotiation, so a
- * known-nothing outsider is never even in the conversation — EXCEPT on a node
- * that runs the circuit-relay server, where the refusal moves to the
- * relay-reservation checkpoint instead (see "The relay-reservation seam").
- *
- * ## The stranger allowlist (the ONE place it is defined)
- *
- * A libp2p connection gater decides per CONNECTION, before protocols are
- * negotiated, so "allow seed, deny repo" cannot be expressed here — instead the
- * policy admits a connection whenever a legitimate stranger interaction could be
- * riding it, and the per-stream gates take over. The complete set of protocols a
- * NOT-yet-authorized peer may legitimately speak on a control node is:
- *
- *  - `/sereus/seed/1.0.0` ({@link SEED_PROTOCOL}) — enrollment seed delivery.
+ * Control-network inbound admission gates: the encrypted-connection checkpoint
+ * and the circuit-relay reservation checkpoint.
+ *
+ * The fail-closed layer of the membership enforcement chain is per-stream: the
+ * control node's protocol guard (`control-protocol-guard.ts`) refuses a peer that
+ * is not an authorized member on every protocol not declared open to strangers,
+ * before its handler runs, and the replicated rows an outsider *can* still write
+ * are disbelieved at read time. This module is NOT a stranger boundary on an
+ * enrolled node — outside the bring-up quiet period it admits every inbound
+ * connection. Its jobs are:
+ *
+ *  - the bring-up quiet period (below), the one state in which it denies;
+ *  - deciding which admitted peers carry a deadline: a peer the policy cannot
+ *    place is admitted PROVISIONALLY, and its connection is closed at the
+ *    deadline unless the policy admits it by then (see "Provisional admission");
+ *  - handing circuit-relay reservations to the reservation policy (see "The
+ *    relay-reservation seam").
+ *
+ * Why a stranger's connection is admitted at all: the gate sees only a peer id,
+ * after the encrypted handshake and before any protocol, so it cannot tell an
+ * outsider from a device carrying a cadre invitation this node has not received
+ * yet, or from a sibling whose membership row is still replicating. Refusing
+ * would fail those at the connection; admitting costs a mute connection for a
+ * bounded time, because the protocol guard refuses it every members-only protocol.
+ *
+ * ## Admitted outright
+ *
+ * A peer the policy CAN place gets no deadline. Besides members, configured
+ * infrastructure and an un-enrolled node's whole world (empty anchor or empty
+ * authorized set), that covers the stranger windows: states in which this node
+ * expects a stranger on one of the `stranger-open` protocols declared in
+ * `controlProtocolClasses` (`control-protocol-guard.ts`):
+ *
+ *  - `/sereus/seed/1.0.0` — enrollment seed delivery.
  *    An owner dials a brand-new node to seed it (the new node has no members
- *    yet, so its gate is inert), and an invited phone dials the owner before it
- *    is authorized (admitted via the enrollment window `CadreNode.createInvite`
- *    opens). The handler's own trust decision is the anchored seed-trust policy.
- *  - `/sereus/formation/1.0.0` ({@link FORMATION_PROTOCOL}) — cross-party
+ *    yet, so it admits everyone outright). The handler's own trust decision is the
+ *    anchored seed-trust policy — or, on a node started with a claim secret
+ *    (`CadreNodeConfig.claim`), the claim-secret policy. Such a node is the one
+ *    stranger-facing state that is NOT "admit the connection and let the
+ *    per-stream gates sort it out": while it waits to be claimed
+ *    (`CadreNode.isAwaitingClaim`) its connection is admitted, because the claim
+ *    seed has to ride one, but its control-DB streams and relay reservations are
+ *    refused ahead of every admission below, the empty-anchor one included. An
+ *    unclaimed node has no siblings to replicate from, and one on a public
+ *    address must not relay for anyone. The claim anchors the owner, after which
+ *    the ordinary rules apply.
+ *  - `/sereus/formation/1.0.0` — cross-party
  *    strand formation via open invitations. Stranger-facing BY DESIGN: the
  *    initiator is another party, and its token is only checkable inside the
- *    protocol. The exemption is therefore keyed on EXPECTATION of a stranger,
- *    not capability to serve one: stranger denial is suspended only while this
- *    node has at least one UNEXPIRED, NOT-FULLY-CONSUMED open invitation
- *    outstanding (`StrandSolicitationService.hasOutstandingInvitation` — the
- *    tokens this process minted or published, plus any still-redeemable
- *    `FormationInvite` row the usage recorder can see). Registering the
- *    responder does NOT suspend it, so every node — each registers one at
- *    `CadreNode.start` — keeps a live gate. The
+ *    protocol. The window is keyed on EXPECTATION of a stranger, not capability
+ *    to serve one: it is open only while this node has at least one UNEXPIRED,
+ *    NOT-FULLY-CONSUMED open invitation outstanding
+ *    (`StrandSolicitationService.hasOutstandingInvitation` — the tokens this
+ *    process minted or published, plus any still-redeemable `FormationInvite`
+ *    row the usage recorder can see). Registering the responder does NOT open
+ *    it, so on every node — each registers one at `CadreNode.start` — a stranger
+ *    with no invitation in play stays on the provisional deadline. The
  *    handler's own trust decision remains the per-token check, which is
  *    strictly finer than this one: a peer admitted here can still be rejected
  *    in-protocol for a bogus or spent token.
+ *  - `/sereus/cadre-invite/1.0.0` — redemption
+ *    of a cadre invitation at any member machine. Stranger-facing BY DESIGN:
+ *    the device is not a member until the redemption writes its row, and its
+ *    proof of possession (a signature with the invitation's private key) is
+ *    only checkable inside the protocol. Keyed on expectation, as formation's
+ *    is: open only while this node holds at least one LIVE `CadreInvite` row
+ *    (`ControlDatabase.hasLiveCadreInvite`: not withdrawn, unexpired, uses left,
+ *    issuer still an owner). A member that has not yet received the device's
+ *    row by replication admits the device provisionally instead, seats the row
+ *    from the invitation bundle during the redemption, and so admits it at the
+ *    deadline's re-check.
  *
  * There is one further connection-level carve-out, which is NOT a protocol
- * exemption and needs no stranger window:
+ * window:
  *
  *  - **Announced delegate peers** (`delegate-admission.ts`). A member's strand
  *    node runs as a separate libp2p identity whose peerId no sibling can
  *    recompute. Before starting a strand node, a member's control node
  *    announces that peerId over the already-authenticated strand-addr RPC, and
  *    the receiver holds a short-lived grant for it
- *    (`CadreNode.grantDelegateAdmission`). The grant admits the CONNECTION,
- *    admits the peer's RESERVATION at the seam below (without spending the
- *    unauthorized budget), and nothing else — it is deliberately invisible to
- *    the per-stream gate, so a delegate still gets refused on every
+ *    (`CadreNode.grantDelegateAdmission`). The grant admits the CONNECTION
+ *    outright, admits the peer's RESERVATION at the seam below (without
+ *    spending the unauthorized budget), and nothing else — it is deliberately
+ *    invisible to the protocol guard, so a delegate still gets refused on every
  *    members-only protocol.
  *
+ * ## Provisional admission
+ *
+ * A peer the policy cannot place (`'admit-provisionally'`) gets its connection
+ * and a deadline — {@link PROVISIONAL_ADMISSION_DEADLINE_MS} at the default
+ * declaration; `CadreNode` passes the one derived from its OWN declared link,
+ * because the member is the machine that decides. At the deadline the gate asks
+ * the policy again:
+ *
+ *  - `'admit'` — the peer has since become a member, holds a delegate grant, or
+ *    this node now holds a live invitation (a redeeming device's row was
+ *    seated): the connection stays, and nothing is re-armed;
+ *  - `'admit-provisionally'` — the connection is closed (a bounded graceful
+ *    close, with an abort only as the escalation);
+ *  - the question throws or outlasts the decision deadline — the connection
+ *    stays (see "Fail-open, deliberately").
+ *
+ * A connection that is already gone by then costs no question. One peer may hold
+ * several provisional connections; each deadline re-asks on its own.
+ *
+ * The gate does not decide which peers this node sends control writes to. A
+ * provisionally admitted stranger can open or advertise the party's protocols;
+ * what keeps it out of the control-database cohort is the control node's
+ * membership predicate (`CadreNode.isControlNetworkMember`, wired as Optimystic's
+ * `isNetworkMember`). FRET's ring still counts it: `docs/architecture.md` →
+ * "Per-stream protocol guard" → "What it does not cover".
+ *
  * ## The relay-reservation seam
  *
  * A circuit-relay reservation is established by the reserving peer DIALING the
- * relay, so at the relay it is an inbound connection — and killing that
+ * relay, so at the relay it rides an inbound connection — and closing that
  * connection kills the reservation. For a genuine member whose `CadrePeer` row
- * has not yet replicated to this node, a connection-level deny here is NOT
- * self-healing the way a data connection's is: an outbound reconcile dial
- * re-establishes a data link, but no outbound dial can grant the REMOTE peer a
- * reservation, and a relay-only peer has no address of its own to dial back —
- * the reservation IS its address. Boot ordering makes the window ordinary (a
- * node's circuit listener runs inside `libp2p.start()`, before its own row
- * could have replicated anywhere), and a stalled replication makes it
- * unbounded. So the relay would be answering a RELAY question ("may this peer
- * use my forwarding capacity?") with a MEMBERSHIP answer, at a checkpoint where
- * a wrong answer is unrecoverable.
- *
- * On a node whose relay server is enabled the two questions are separated:
- *
- *  - The policy returns `'admit-for-relay'` instead of `'deny'`, and the
- *    connection is ADMITTED. The fail-closed per-stream gates still refuse such
- *    a peer every members-only protocol, so it gains identify/ping and the
- *    relay hop protocol, nothing else.
- *  - The reservation itself is decided at libp2p's
- *    `denyInboundRelayReservation` hook (the circuit-relay server consults it
- *    per RESERVE request): the policy admits members, delegates and configured
- *    infra outright, and admits peers it cannot place only within a bounded
- *    budget ({@link UnauthorizedReservationBudget}) — a member whose row is in
- *    flight always finds a slot under any sane cap, while outsiders cannot
- *    annex the party's relay capacity. COUNT and lifetime are the only bounds
- *    on such a peer: a party-run relay forwards without libp2p's per-connection
- *    data and duration limit by default (`relay-server.ts`), so what a granted
- *    slot carries is not capped.
- *  - An `'admit-for-relay'` connection that is NOT reserving is dropped: it has
- *    {@link RELAY_ADMISSION_RESERVE_DEADLINE_MS} to get a reservation ADMITTED
- *    at that hook, after which the gate CLOSES the underlying connection so
- *    both ends let go of the socket. The guarantee above thus weakens on
- *    relay-enabled nodes from "never in the conversation" to "in it briefly,
- *    and can speak nothing".
+ * has not yet replicated to this node that would NOT be self-healing the way a
+ * data connection's close is: an outbound reconcile dial re-establishes a data
+ * link, but no outbound dial can grant the REMOTE peer a reservation, and a
+ * relay-only peer has no address of its own to dial back — the reservation IS
+ * its address. Boot ordering makes the window ordinary (a node reserves at the
+ * end of its own `start()`, before its row could have replicated anywhere), and
+ * a stalled replication makes it unbounded. So the reservation is decided on its
+ * own terms, not by the connection's:
+ *
+ *  - It is decided at libp2p's `denyInboundRelayReservation` hook (the
+ *    circuit-relay server consults it per RESERVE request): the policy admits
+ *    members, delegates and configured infra outright, and admits peers it
+ *    cannot place only within a bounded budget
+ *    ({@link UnauthorizedReservationBudget}) — a member whose row is in flight
+ *    always finds a slot under any sane cap, while outsiders cannot annex the
+ *    party's relay capacity. COUNT and lifetime are the only bounds on such a
+ *    peer: a party-run relay forwards without libp2p's per-connection data and
+ *    duration limit by default (`relay-server.ts`), so what a granted slot
+ *    carries is not capped.
+ *  - An ADMITTED reservation disarms every provisional deadline the peer holds
+ *    here, so its connection outlives the deadline even while the peer is still
+ *    unplaced. A refused one disarms nothing.
  *
  * The deadline clears on reservation ADMISSION, not on the reservation's own
  * success: this gate cannot observe the server-side `reserve()` outcome, so a
  * peer whose admitted reservation is then refused for server capacity keeps its
  * connection until either side closes it — bounded and mute, so harmless.
  *
- * Everything else a control node handles — the Optimystic control-DB protocols
- * (`/optimystic/control-<party>/{repo,cluster,sync,block-transfer}/…`), wake
- * (`/sereus/strand-wake/1.0.0`), and strand-addr (`/sereus/strand-addr/1.0.0`)
- * — is members-only, and every one of them enforces that per-stream. Wake and
- * strand-addr check `isAuthorizedMember` inside their handlers; the four
- * control-DB protocols are gated by the fail-closed
- * `CadreNode.authorizeInboundControlStream` (wired as libp2p's
- * `authorizeInboundStream` upstream hook), which judges each inbound stream
- * against the MATERIALIZED authorized-peer snapshot — synchronous and
- * in-memory, because a live DB read from inside the gate would deadlock into
- * mutual denial. The two layers complement, not duplicate: this connection
- * gate is fail-open over a live DB read (deny only on positive proof of an
- * outsider), the stream gate is fail-closed over the snapshot and has NO
- * stranger carve-outs — an enrollment window admits a stranger's connection
- * for seed delivery, yet its repo streams are still refused.
+ * Everything else a control node serves is either libp2p plumbing open to any
+ * connection (identify, ping, hole punching, AutoNAT, the relay protocols) or
+ * members-only — wake, strand-addr, the Optimystic control-DB protocols and FRET —
+ * and the fail-closed layer for all of it is the protocol guard
+ * (`control-protocol-guard.ts`), one seam that wraps every handler at dispatch,
+ * with a protocol nobody classed treated as members-only. The two layers
+ * complement, not duplicate: this connection gate is fail-open over a live DB
+ * read and decides only how long a connection lasts, the protocol guard is
+ * fail-closed and has NO stranger carve-outs — a live invitation admits a
+ * stranger's connection outright for redemption, yet its repo and FRET streams
+ * are still refused.
  *
  * ## The bring-up quiet period
  *
@@ -151,55 +190,49 @@
  *
  * ## Fail-open, deliberately
  *
- * Outside that window this layer only ever denies on a POSITIVE determination of
- * "unauthorized outsider while no stranger path is open". Any error, missing
- * dependency, or ambiguous state admits the connection (and the reservation) and
- * defers to the fail-closed stream gates — a DB hiccup must not partition a
- * legitimate cadre.
+ * Outside that window this layer never denies, and it closes a provisional
+ * connection only on a positive answer that the peer is still unplaced. Any
+ * error, missing dependency, timeout or ambiguous state admits the connection
+ * outright (and the reservation), or keeps a provisional connection at its
+ * deadline, and defers to the fail-closed stream gates — a DB hiccup must not
+ * partition a legitimate cadre.
  */
 import type { ConnectionGater } from '@libp2p/interface';
 /**
- * The protocols a not-yet-authorized peer may legitimately speak on a control
- * node (see the module doc above for why each is open and where its own trust
- * decision lives). Exported as the single reference point so the allowlist
- * cannot silently drift across modules.
- */
-export declare const STRANGER_OPEN_PROTOCOLS: readonly string[];
-/**
- * How long `CadreNode.createInvite` holds the inbound gate open for strangers
- * when the invite carries no explicit expiry: the invitee must dial in before
- * it is authorized, and an expiry-less invite gives the gate no bound of its
- * own. Redeeming after this window still works once the owner re-mints (or the
- * caller re-opens the window via `CadreNode.openEnrollmentWindow`).
- */
-export declare const DEFAULT_ENROLLMENT_WINDOW_MS: number;
-/**
- * How long an `'admit-for-relay'` connection may exist without a relay
- * reservation being ADMITTED at the `denyInboundRelayReservation` hook, after
- * which the gate closes the underlying connection. A reserving client asks for
- * its slot immediately after the connection upgrades (`relay-reservation.ts`
- * dials and requests in one drive; a strand node's configured circuit listener
- * does the same from inside its own `listen()`), so a connection idle past this
- * deadline is not reserving.
- *
- * Derived from the link ({@link relayAdmissionReserveDeadlineMs}): one link round trip for the
- * request to arrive plus one admission decision on it. This is the value at the default
- * declaration; `CadreNode` passes the one derived from the relay's OWN declaration, because the
- * relay is the machine that decides.
+ * How long a provisionally admitted connection lasts before the gate re-asks the
+ * policy and closes it unless the peer is admissible by then (see the module
+ * doc's "Provisional admission").
+ *
+ * {@link relayedRequestBudgetMs}: 28 500 ms at the default declaration. The
+ * longest exchange a stranger legitimately starts on a fresh connection is a
+ * cadre invitation redemption, and the device abandons each member address after
+ * that same budget of its own declared link (`redeemAtMembers`): it covers the
+ * dial, the request, the member's catch-up push, the seat and the redemption. So
+ * a member never cuts an exchange the device is still waiting on, and a
+ * reservation request lands well inside it. This is the value at the default
+ * declaration; `CadreNode` passes the one derived from its OWN declaration.
+ *
+ * NOTE: accepted tradeoff — any stranger can hold a mute connection to any
+ * enrolled member for this long, weighed against letting a device redeem an
+ * invitation at a member that has not yet received its row (maintainer,
+ * 2026-10-07, plan `cadre-invite-redeemable-before-the-row-replicates`). It can
+ * open only stranger-open and transport streams (the protocol guard), and
+ * libp2p's connection-manager limits bound how many it holds. Revisit if stranger
+ * connections show up as load on a member.
  */
-export declare const RELAY_ADMISSION_RESERVE_DEADLINE_MS: number;
+export declare const PROVISIONAL_ADMISSION_DEADLINE_MS: number;
 /**
- * Bound on the graceful close of an expired relay-only connection. It exists
+ * Bound on the graceful close of an expired provisional connection. It exists
  * because `AbstractMultiaddrConnection.close()` awaits an `idle`/`drain` event
  * when the connection still has unsent bytes, and that wait has no timeout of
  * its own — an unsignalled one never ends. This gate writes nothing to a
- * stranger, so the wait is not reachable today; the bound is here so a timer
+ * stranger, so the wait is not reachable from here; the bound is here so a timer
  * callback can never hold an unending await.
  *
  * Applied through {@link withDeadline}, not `AbortSignal.timeout`: the latter is
  * not reliably present on React Native/Hermes, which loads this same module.
  */
-export declare const RELAY_ADMISSION_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;
+export declare const PROVISIONAL_ADMISSION_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;
 /**
  * Default cap on concurrent relay reservations held by peers the membership
  * check could not place (see {@link UnauthorizedReservationBudget}). Small on
@@ -221,15 +254,16 @@ export declare const MAX_UNAUTHORIZED_RELAY_RESERVATIONS = 8;
 /**
  * The connection-level outcome of the admission policy:
  *  - `'admit'` — a peer with a legitimate claim on the connection (member,
- *    delegate, infra, open stranger window, or any fail-open state).
- *  - `'deny'` — positively an outsider, and this node runs no relay server, so
- *    the connection can carry nothing legitimate.
- *  - `'admit-for-relay'` — positively an outsider (or an unreplicated member —
- *    indistinguishable), but this node runs the relay server: admit the
- *    connection so a reservation can be asked for, decide at the reservation
- *    seam, and drop the connection if no reservation is admitted in time.
+ *    delegate, infra, open stranger window, or any fail-open state); no deadline.
+ *  - `'admit-provisionally'` — a peer the policy cannot place (an outsider, a
+ *    device whose invitation row this node does not hold yet, or a member whose
+ *    row is still replicating — indistinguishable here): admit the connection,
+ *    and at the deadline ask again and close it unless the answer is `'admit'`.
+ *
+ * There is no deny: the gate's only denial is the bring-up quiet period, which
+ * is not a judgement of the peer.
  */
-export type InboundConnectionVerdict = 'admit' | 'deny' | 'admit-for-relay';
+export type InboundConnectionVerdict = 'admit' | 'admit-provisionally';
 /**
  * The admission decisions the gate defers to — implemented by
  * `CadreNode.admitInboundControlConnection` /
@@ -239,7 +273,10 @@ export type InboundConnectionVerdict = 'admit' | 'deny' | 'admit-for-relay';
  * composition/fail-open behavior is unit-testable without a full node.
  */
 export interface InboundAdmissionPolicy {
-    /** Verdict on an inbound encrypted connection from this peer. */
+    /**
+     * Verdict on an inbound encrypted connection from this peer. Asked again at a
+     * provisional connection's deadline, so it must answer from current state.
+     */
     admitInbound(remotePeerId: string): Promise<InboundConnectionVerdict> | InboundConnectionVerdict;
     /** Should this peer be granted a circuit-relay reservation slot? */
     admitRelayReservation(remotePeerId: string): Promise<boolean> | boolean;
@@ -304,27 +341,30 @@ export declare class UnauthorizedReservationBudget {
  * membership — this node decides for itself who to talk to.
  *
  * Composition semantics: every hook of `base` is preserved as-is; on the three
- * composed hooks a deny from EITHER the base gater or the admission policy
- * denies. A policy error — or a decision slower than `decisionTimeoutMs` —
- * takes the fail-open outcome (connection admitted / reservation admitted, see
- * module doc); the base gater's verdict is still honored first.
+ * composed hooks a deny from the base gater denies, and so does the quiet
+ * period. The admission policy never denies a connection. A policy error — or a
+ * decision slower than `decisionTimeoutMs` — takes the fail-open outcome
+ * (connection admitted outright / reservation admitted, see module doc); the
+ * base gater's verdict is still honored first.
  *
- * An `'admit-for-relay'` verdict admits the connection and arms a
- * `reserveDeadlineMs` timer against it; the timer is disarmed when a
- * reservation for that peer is ADMITTED at the reservation hook, and closes the
- * underlying `MultiaddrConnection` when it fires first.
+ * An `'admit-provisionally'` verdict admits the connection and arms a
+ * `provisionalDeadlineMs` timer against it. When the timer fires the policy is
+ * asked again, and the underlying `MultiaddrConnection` is closed unless it now
+ * answers `'admit'`; a reservation for that peer ADMITTED at the reservation
+ * hook disarms the timer first.
  *
  * NOTE: `base` is spread, so a gater passed as a CLASS INSTANCE would lose its
  * prototype methods; every caller in this repo (and libp2p's own default)
  * supplies a plain object. If a class-based gater ever shows up, delegate
  * per-hook instead of spreading.
  *
- * Deny timing, as observed by the denied dialer: noise negotiates the muxer in
- * the security handshake's early data, so the DIALER's upgrade may complete
- * (its `dial()` resolves) before this receiver-side hook runs. The deny then
- * aborts the receiver's upgrade — the receiver never registers the connection
- * and never creates its muxer, so no protocol can ever be negotiated — and the
- * dialer sees its "open" connection close moments later.
+ * Deny timing, as observed by the denied dialer (a quiet-period or base-gater
+ * deny): noise negotiates the muxer in the security handshake's early data, so
+ * the DIALER's upgrade may complete (its `dial()` resolves) before this
+ * receiver-side hook runs. The deny then aborts the receiver's upgrade — the
+ * receiver never registers the connection and never creates its muxer, so no
+ * protocol can ever be negotiated — and the dialer sees its "open" connection
+ * close moments later.
  *
  * Control node only: strand cohort nodes legitimately connect cross-party
  * peers, so cadre membership never gates them. An OPEN strand's node receives
@@ -333,7 +373,7 @@ export declare class UnauthorizedReservationBudget {
  * evidence, not this module's membership admission — see
  * `strand-revocation-enforcer.ts`.
  */
-export declare function createMembershipConnectionGater(policy: InboundAdmissionPolicy, base?: ConnectionGater, decisionTimeoutMs?: number, reserveDeadlineMs?: number): ConnectionGater;
+export declare function createMembershipConnectionGater(policy: InboundAdmissionPolicy, base?: ConnectionGater, decisionTimeoutMs?: number, provisionalDeadlineMs?: number): ConnectionGater;
 /**
  * Run one admission decision under `timeoutMs`, resolving to `fallback` (the
  * fail-open outcome) if it has not settled in time — see