@serfab/cadre-core 1.13.0 → 1.14.0

package/dist/cadre-node.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import type { Libp2p, PeerId } from '@libp2p/interface';
 import type { Multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr';
-import type { CadreNodeConfig, StrandInstance, StrandRow, StrandConfig, FoundStrandConfig, FoundStrandResult, SAppConfig, CadreNodeEvents, ControlNetworkSeed, ApplySeedResult, AddDroneOptions, AddPhoneOptions, DroneInitResult, InviteResult, CadreInvite, OpenInvitation, FormStrandResult, StrandFormationDisclosure, StrandMembershipInvite, ResolveOpts, SelfRegistrationOutcome, ServiceWakeResult, PushPlatform, DeviceTokenRecord, ResolveDeviceTokenOpts, PendingJoinStatus } from './types.js';
+import type { CadreNodeConfig, StrandInstance, StrandRow, StrandConfig, FoundStrandConfig, FoundStrandResult, SAppConfig, CadreNodeEvents, ControlNetworkSeed, ApplySeedResult, SeedAckMessage, SeedDeliveryTarget, AddDroneOptions, DroneInitResult, OpenInvitation, FormStrandResult, StrandFormationDisclosure, StrandMembershipInvite, ResolveOpts, SelfRegistrationOutcome, ServiceWakeResult, PushPlatform, DeviceTokenRecord, CadreInviteStatus, CreateCadreInvitationOptions, CreateCadreInvitationResult, RedeemCadreInvitationResult, ResolveDeviceTokenOpts, PendingJoinStatus } from './types.js';
 import { type Ed25519KeyPair } from './ed25519-key.js';
 import { type TrustedOwnerStore, type TrustSource } from './trusted-owner-store.js';
 import { type BootstrapPeerStore } from './bootstrap-peer-store.js';
@@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ import { type SAppIdLookup } from './strand-watcher.js';
 import { type ControlCohortReconcileResult } from './control-cohort.js';
 import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.js';
 import { ControlDatabase } from './control-database.js';
+import { type CadreInvitation } from './cadre-invite-protocol.js';
 import { SeedBootstrapService } from './seed-bootstrap.js';
-import type { SeedTrustPolicy } from './seed-trust-policy.js';
+import { type SeedTrustPolicy } from './seed-trust-policy.js';
 import { StrandSolicitationService, type StrandSolicitationServiceOptions } from './strand-solicitation.js';
 import { type RelayReservationState, type RelayReservationSupervisorOptions } from './relay-reservation.js';
 import type { WakeAck } from './types.js';
@@ -38,6 +39,15 @@ export declare const STRAND_PEER_ADDR_REFRESH_MS: number;
  * minute rather than one a tick.
  */
 export declare const STRAND_PEER_ADDR_RETRY_MS: number;
+/**
+ * Default lifetime of an UNTARGETED, OWNER-GRANTING cadre invitation
+ * ({@link CadreNode.createCadreInvitation}): whoever holds the bundle becomes an owner, so
+ * it is a bearer credential for admin rights and lives only long enough to be pasted or
+ * scanned by the device it was minted for.
+ */
+export declare const OWNER_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS: number;
+/** Default lifetime of every other cadre invitation: targeted, or granting membership only. */
+export declare const CADRE_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS: number;
 type EventHandler<T> = (data: T) => void;
 /**
  * CadreNode is the main entry point for a cadre member.
@@ -78,11 +88,25 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * start() cycle rebuilds it with a fresh caught-up-peer memo.
      */
     private controlBackfill;
+    /**
+     * Devices whose invitation redemption this member has verified and is admitting right now,
+     * each with its count of overlapping redemptions. The control backfill's gate admits them
+     * as it admits a member, for that window only ({@link catchUpRedeemingDevice}).
+     */
+    private readonly admittingDevices;
     private strandWatcher;
     private strandManager;
     private hibernationManager;
     private enrollmentService;
     private seedBootstrapService;
+    /**
+     * The claim-secret trust policy of a node started with `config.claim`, built once by
+     * {@link initializeClaimPolicy} over {@link trustedOwnerStore} and handed to every
+     * seed service this node constructs ({@link inboundSeedTrustPolicy}). Kept across
+     * stop()→start() like the anchor it writes: its in-process latch and failure window
+     * are per node, not per seed service. Null when the node has no claim secret.
+     */
+    private claimTrustPolicy;
     private strandSolicitationService;
     /**
      * The service whose formation handler is registered on the control node. Trails
@@ -101,6 +125,13 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * stops conflating control addresses with strand seeding.
      */
     private strandAddrService;
+    /**
+     * Cadre invitation redemption handler (`/sereus/cadre-invite/1.0.0`): a device holding an
+     * invitation dials this machine and proves possession; the handler seats the row and
+     * admits the device against this node's control database. Registered by {@link start}
+     * once that database is up, on every node.
+     */
+    private cadreInviteHandler;
     /**
      * Server-side push-wake fan-out. Constructed by {@link start} only when
      * `config.push` (an injected `PushNotifier` + policy) is present — without it
@@ -205,24 +236,10 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     /**
      * Most-recently pushed invite addresses (see {@link setInviteAddresses}).
      * When non-null these take priority over `libp2pNode.getMultiaddrs()` when
-     * minting invites — the host pushes NAT-resolved addresses here so the
-     * control-network node never needs to dial back to the manager.
+     * minting cadre invitations — the host pushes NAT-resolved addresses here so
+     * the control-network node never needs to dial back to the manager.
      */
     private latestInviteAddresses;
-    /**
-     * Epoch ms until which the control-network inbound gate admits
-     * not-yet-authorized peers (see {@link admitInboundControlConnection} /
-     * {@link openEnrollmentWindow}). 0 = no window open. Opened automatically by
-     * {@link createInvite}; deliberately NOT reset on stop() — a stop/start cycle
-     * inside an outstanding invite's validity must not strand the invitee.
-     *
-     * NOTE: in-memory only, so a PROCESS restart mid-invite closes the door until
-     * the owner re-mints or the invitee is authorized. Fine while invites are
-     * short-lived and redeemed promptly; if long-lived invites or restart-prone
-     * hosts become normal, persist the window (or derive it from the issued-invite
-     * records `SeedBootstrapService` already keeps).
-     */
-    private enrollmentWindowUntil;
     /**
      * Lazily-parsed PeerIds of `controlNetwork.bootstrapNodes` (see
      * {@link getBootstrapPeerIds}) — infrastructure the inbound gate always admits.
@@ -284,10 +301,8 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * Does this node's CONTROL libp2p run the circuit-relay server, and with which
      * init? Resolved once from `network` and `profile` by the same function every
      * strand node's build uses (`relay-server.ts`). Read by
-     * {@link buildControlNodeOptions} (which configures the server from it),
-     * {@link admitInboundControlConnection} (whose deny/admit-for-relay branch must
-     * agree with whether a reservation is even servable here), and the
-     * unauthorized budget above (whose TTL is the server's).
+     * {@link buildControlNodeOptions} (which configures the server from it) and
+     * the unauthorized budget above (whose TTL is the server's).
      */
     private readonly relayServer;
     /**
@@ -393,7 +408,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     private readonly pendingMembershipInvites;
     /**
      * Invite keys of the membership invitations this process has staged, by
-     * {@link adoptFormationMembershipInvite} or from a `joined` `PendingJoin` row
+     * {@link adoptFormationMembershipInvite} or from a `JoinSuccess` row
      * ({@link stageMembershipInvitesFromPendingJoins}), so one the reconciler has settled is not
      * staged again by the next pending-join pass. Same lifetime as
      * {@link pendingMembershipInvites}: a restarted process stages each live one once more, and the
@@ -737,17 +752,63 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     private resolveIdentityKey;
     /**
      * Construct (or adopt) the node-local trusted-owner anchor and seed the
-     * out-of-band pinned keys from `config.trustedOwners`. The store is NEVER
-     * sourced from the replicated control DB — its entries come only from
-     * genesis self-trust ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}), config pins (here),
-     * or runtime enrollment pins ({@link trustOwnerKeys}).
+     * out-of-band pinned keys from `config.trustedOwners`. The anchor's BASE comes
+     * only from out of band — genesis self-trust ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}),
+     * config pins (here), runtime enrollment pins ({@link trustOwnerKeys}) and a
+     * claim; everything else in it is derived from that base along verifiable
+     * chains through the replicated `OwnerKey` table ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}),
+     * never read from the table directly.
      *
      * Idempotent across stop()→start(): the store instance is kept, and
      * re-seeding config pins is a no-op ({@link TrustedOwnerStore.trust} is
      * idempotent). An injected store scoped to a different party is a
      * configuration error (fail closed before any network bring-up).
+     *
+     * NOTE: a config pin of a key the owners have since REMOVED is re-anchored here at
+     * every start and removed again by the first sync (`refreshMembershipGate('start')`,
+     * fired without await from {@link start}), so such a pin is honoured for at most one
+     * membership refresh per start; dropping the pin from the config ends that.
      */
     private initializeTrustedOwnerStore;
+    /**
+     * Refuse a `config.claim` that sits beside another cold-start trust source. A node
+     * has exactly ONE, so `claim` with a non-empty `trustedOwners.pinnedKeys` or a
+     * `seedTrustPolicy` is refused here rather than silently letting one of them win.
+     * Asserted at this seam, not by a type: the embedders build `CadreNodeConfig` as one
+     * object literal with every optional field present, which a discriminated union over
+     * the whole config would not express.
+     *
+     * Runs BEFORE {@link initializeTrustedOwnerStore}, which writes the config pins into
+     * the anchor: on a persistent anchor a pin written ahead of this refusal would outlive
+     * the failed start, and the node, restarted with the pin dropped from its config and
+     * `claim` kept, would read as claimed by that pin and never accept its claimant.
+     */
+    private validateClaimConfig;
+    /**
+     * Build {@link claimTrustPolicy} from `config.claim`, once per node (a restart keeps
+     * the policy, as {@link initializeTrustedOwnerStore} keeps the anchor it writes).
+     * Runs after the anchor exists and before any network bring-up, so a malformed secret
+     * fails `start()` closed with nothing to tear down; `parseClaimSecret` names the
+     * problem and never echoes the value. The conflicts with the other trust sources are
+     * {@link validateClaimConfig}'s, checked before the anchor is written.
+     */
+    private initializeClaimPolicy;
+    /**
+     * Is this node waiting to be claimed: started with `config.claim` and owned by nobody
+     * yet (empty anchor)? Read live from the anchor every time, as
+     * {@link admitControlPeerUnconditionally} reads it per stream: the anchor is the one
+     * source of truth for "claimed", and a cached flag would need its own invalidation
+     * from the policy's persist, the rollback and a restart. False on a node with no claim
+     * secret, on a claimed one (restarted with the secret still set or not), and before
+     * {@link start} has built the anchor.
+     *
+     * While true the node admits strangers' CONNECTIONS (the claim seed has to ride one)
+     * and refuses their control-database streams ({@link authorizeInboundControlStream})
+     * and relay reservations ({@link admitControlRelayReservation}): an unclaimed node has
+     * no siblings to replicate from and must not become a public relay while it waits.
+     * cadre-cli reports this on `/status`; `claim:accepted` is the event form.
+     */
+    isAwaitingClaim(): boolean;
     /**
      * Construct (or adopt) the node-local cold-start bootstrap-peer store (see
      * {@link bootstrapPeerStore}). Synchronous: an injected store has already
@@ -828,35 +889,33 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     getTrustedOwnerStore(): TrustedOwnerStore | null;
     /**
      * Persist out-of-band-established owner keys into the node-local anchor —
-     * the runtime enrollment seam: call with `CadreInvite.ownerKeys` when
-     * redeeming an invite (BEFORE the first `applySeed`, so the anchor already
-     * holds the pins when seed trust consults it), or with an operator-supplied
-     * pin. Idempotent. ('genesis' provenance is reserved for the node's own
-     * founding key, seeded internally by {@link initializeSeedBootstrap}.)
+     * the runtime enrollment seam: {@link redeemCadreInvitation} calls it with the
+     * cadre invitation's `ownerKeys` BEFORE dialing a member (so the anchor already
+     * holds the pins when the reply and the rows that follow are judged), and an
+     * embedder calls it with an operator-supplied pin. Idempotent. ('genesis'
+     * provenance is reserved for the node's own founding key, seeded internally by
+     * {@link initializeSeedBootstrap}; 'chain' is written only by {@link syncOwnerAnchor}.)
      *
      * Validates every key's shape before trusting any of them (all-or-nothing):
      * a malformed entry anywhere in `keys` rejects the whole call before a
-     * single key is anchored. For the invite route this means a `CadreInvite`
+     * single key is anchored. For the invitation route this means a bundle
      * carrying one malformed `ownerKeys` entry fails the redemption outright —
      * consistent with the anchor's existing whole-record-or-nothing policy for
      * a corrupt persisted entry (see `trusted-owner-store.ts`'s
      * `unusableEntry: 'discard-all'`) — rather than silently anchoring a subset
      * and leaving the caller to notice a key went missing.
      */
-    trustOwnerKeys(keys: Iterable<string>, source: Exclude<TrustSource, 'genesis'>): Promise<void>;
+    trustOwnerKeys(keys: Iterable<string>, source: Exclude<TrustSource, 'genesis' | 'chain'>): Promise<void>;
     private createControlNode;
     /**
-     * The control libp2p node's Optimystic network name — ONE binding for every
-     * derivation from it (`db-p2p` namespaces all of the node's protocol ids as
-     * `/optimystic/<networkName>/...`), so the node options and the block-transfer
-     * protocol prefix the control backfill dials can never drift apart.
-     *
-     * NOTE: the party id goes in UNENCODED here, unlike in `controlStorageScope`. Safe
-     * today because a party id is locally configured rather than replicated in, and both
-     * ends of a connection derive this string identically — an odd party id yields an odd
-     * but consistent protocol id, not a mismatch or an escaped name. If a party id ever
-     * arrives from the network, encode it here as the storage scope key already does.
+     * Refuse non-members on every members-only protocol of the control node, at one seam
+     * (`control-protocol-guard.ts`). Wake and strand-addr are judged by the live
+     * {@link isAuthorizedMember}, bounded by the asker's own attempt deadline at this
+     * node's declared link; everything a control-database read depends on is judged by
+     * the snapshot ({@link authorizeInboundControlStream}).
      */
+    private installControlProtocolGuard;
+    /** This node's control network name ({@link controlNetworkName}, the one binding for it). */
     private controlNetworkName;
     /**
      * Arm the CONTROL network's peer-join block catch-up: push every block in the
@@ -883,12 +942,27 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * reconnect re-runs identify), and — because the production join order is
      * connect-then-authorize — on every committed membership change via
      * {@link refreshAuthorizedControlPeers}'s `scheduleConnectedPeers()` call.
+     * The one non-member the gate admits is a device whose invitation
+     * redemption this member is admitting ({@link catchUpRedeemingDevice}).
      *
      * No-ops (logged) when the embedder configured no control storage or the
      * node exposes no key network — the backfill would have nothing to read or
      * no way to dial.
      */
     private startControlBackfill;
+    /**
+     * Push this member's control store to a device whose invitation redemption has verified,
+     * and wait for the push, before the redemption seats the invitation's row and writes the
+     * device's rows (the handler's `catchUpDevice`; `CadreInviteHandler.catchUpDeviceIfLive`
+     * says why those writes need it).
+     * The device is admitted at the backfill's gate for the length of the push only.
+     *
+     * Through {@link PeerJoinBackfill.forceCatchUpPeer}, not `catchUpPeer`: the device's own
+     * `peer:identify` scheduled a run a moment earlier, which was denied if it passed the gate
+     * before the device was added here, and `catchUpPeer` would answer that run's in-flight
+     * status with an empty result.
+     */
+    private catchUpRedeemingDevice;
     /**
      * The control database's cache-wrapped raw storage, resolved from
      * `config.storage.provider` on first use and then held in {@link controlStorage}
@@ -945,78 +1019,76 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     private logRelayServerSettings;
     /**
-     * Decide whether an inbound CONTROL-network connection from `remotePeerId`
-     * should be admitted — the policy behind the connection gater wired in
-     * {@link createControlNode}. Deny only on a positive "unauthorized outsider
-     * while no stranger path is open" determination; everything ambiguous admits
-     * and defers to the fail-closed per-stream gates (see
+     * Decide how an inbound CONTROL-network connection from `remotePeerId` is
+     * admitted — the policy behind the connection gater wired in
+     * {@link createControlNode}. Every connection is admitted; the answer decides
+     * only whether it carries the provisional deadline (see
      * `membership-connection-gater.ts` for the layer's rationale and the
-     * stranger-open protocol allowlist).
+     * stranger-open protocol allowlist). Asked once when the connection arrives
+     * and again at a provisional connection's deadline.
      *
-     * Returns `'admit'` when ANY of:
+     * Returns `'admit'` (no deadline) when ANY of:
      *  1. a shared-baseline check admits ({@link admitControlPeerUnconditionally}
      *     — not running / DB torn down, absent-or-empty trusted-owner anchor, or
      *     configured bootstrap/relay infrastructure);
-     *  2. an enrollment window is open ({@link openEnrollmentWindow}, opened by
-     *     {@link createInvite}) — the invitee dials in before it is authorized;
-     *  3. the peer holds a live DELEGATE ADMISSION GRANT — an authorized member
+     *  2. the peer holds a live DELEGATE ADMISSION GRANT — an authorized member
      *     announced it (over the strand-addr RPC) as the transport peerId of its
      *     own strand node, so a NAT'd member's strand node can hold a
      *     circuit-relay reservation here (see `delegate-admission.ts`).
      *     Connection only: the per-stream gate below never honors a grant;
-     *  4. the authorized-member set is empty — cold start: the rows that would
+     *  3. the authorized-member set is empty — cold start: the rows that would
      *     authorize anyone arrive by replication over these very connections;
-     *  5. the peer IS an authorized member; or
-     *  6. an open invitation is OUTSTANDING — at least one unexpired,
+     *  4. the peer IS an authorized member; or
+     *  5. an open invitation is OUTSTANDING — at least one unexpired,
      *     not-fully-consumed invitation this node minted or persisted (see
      *     `StrandSolicitationService.hasOutstandingInvitation`). A formation
      *     initiator is another party's peer by design and its token is only
      *     checkable inside the protocol, so the gate asks the coarser question
      *     "does this node expect a stranger at all?". REGISTERING the responder
-     *     does not suspend stranger denial: every node registers one at
-     *     {@link start}, and registering mints no invitation.
+     *     does not count: every node registers one at {@link start}, and
+     *     registering mints no invitation; or
+     *  6. a LIVE cadre invitation exists — a `CadreInvite` row this node holds
+     *     that is not withdrawn, unexpired, has uses left and whose issuer is
+     *     still an owner (`ControlDatabase.hasLiveCadreInvite`). The device that
+     *     redeems it is a stranger until the redemption writes its row, and its
+     *     proof of possession is only checkable inside `/sereus/cadre-invite/1.0.0`;
+     *     same reasoning as check 5, and the same expectation-of-a-stranger key.
      *
      * Ordering is semantically free (the checks are OR'd) but decides who pays:
-     * checks 1-3 are in-memory, 4/5 share one control-DB read, and only a peer
-     * already on the deny path reaches check 6's invitation lookup.
+     * checks 1-2 are in-memory, 3/4 share one control-DB read, and only a peer
+     * that is otherwise headed for a provisional admission reaches check 5's and
+     * 6's invitation lookups.
      *
-     * Caveats of check 6, both self-healing:
+     * Caveats of check 5:
      *  - the in-memory mint registry dies with the process, so after a restart
      *    only invitations persisted as `FormationInvite` rows still hold the
-     *    exemption open (re-mint otherwise — same story as the enrollment window);
+     *    window open (re-mint otherwise);
      *  - a peer holding a token whose `FormationInvite` row has not replicated to
-     *    this node yet is denied even though the formation handler would have
-     *    accepted it, exactly like the unreplicated-membership-row case below.
-     *
-     * When every check falls through, the verdict depends on whether this node
-     * runs the circuit-relay server ({@link relayServer}): without one,
-     * `'deny'`; with one, `'admit-for-relay'` — a circuit-relay reservation is
-     * established by the reserving peer DIALING the relay, so a connection deny
-     * here kills the reservation, and that deny is NOT self-healing: an outbound
-     * reconcile re-dial re-establishes a data link, but no outbound dial can
-     * grant the remote peer a reservation, and a relay-only peer has no address
-     * of its own to dial back — the reservation IS its address. The gater admits
-     * such a connection, decides the reservation via
-     * {@link admitControlRelayReservation}, and drops the connection if no
-     * reservation is admitted in time (see `membership-connection-gater.ts` →
-     * "The relay-reservation seam").
-     *
-     * NOTE: check 4/5 runs a control-DB read per inbound connection
+     *    this node yet is admitted only provisionally, so its connection is closed
+     *    at the deadline unless the row has landed by then.
+     *
+     * When every check falls through: `'admit-provisionally'`, on every node,
+     * relay server or not. The gate sees only a peer id, so it cannot tell an
+     * outsider from a device whose invitation row this node has not received yet
+     * (it redeems here by seating the row from its bundle, after which check 6
+     * admits) or from a sibling whose membership row is still replicating (check 4
+     * admits once it lands; if it has not landed by the deadline, the connection
+     * is closed and either side's next reconcile dial re-forms it, since outbound
+     * dials are never gated). The protocol guard refuses all of them every
+     * members-only protocol meanwhile. A circuit-relay reservation admitted by
+     * {@link admitControlRelayReservation} disarms the deadline (see
+     * `membership-connection-gater.ts` → "The relay-reservation seam").
+     *
+     * NOTE: check 3/4 runs a control-DB read per inbound connection
      * (`listAuthorizedMembers`); connections are rare and cadres small, and this
      * layer is fail-open behind `ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS`, so the live
      * read is safe here — unlike the per-stream gate, which must consult the
      * materialized {@link authorizedControlPeers} snapshot instead.
-     * NOTE: check 6 adds a second control read (`hasOutstandingFormationInvite`) for a
-     * stranger with no locally minted invitation in play, on every node now that every
-     * node runs the responder — a relay-enabled storage node included. If stranger
-     * connections to such a node ever arrive fast enough for that read to show, cache
-     * the answer for a few seconds.
-     * NOTE: on a relay-DISABLED node, a sibling whose membership row has not yet
-     * replicated here is denied until the row converges (typically via the
-     * owner); either side's next outbound reconcile dial (outbound is never
-     * gated) re-establishes the DATA link — self-healing for data, visible as a
-     * transient deny. That self-healing story never covered a reservation, which
-     * is exactly why the relay-enabled path above exists.
+     * NOTE: checks 5 and 6 add two more control reads (`hasOutstandingFormationInvite`,
+     * `hasLiveCadreInvite`) for a stranger with no locally minted invitation in play, on
+     * every node, and a provisional connection's deadline runs the whole decision once
+     * more. If stranger connections ever arrive fast enough for those reads — on arrival
+     * or at the deadline — to show, cache the answers for a few seconds.
      */
     private admitInboundControlConnection;
     /**
@@ -1026,7 +1098,13 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * "The relay-reservation seam"); the circuit-relay server consults it per
      * RESERVE request, so it is never called on a node whose relay server is off.
      *
-     * Admits when ANY of:
+     * Refuses everyone, ahead of every admission below, while this node is waiting to be
+     * claimed ({@link isAwaitingClaim}): a storage-profile node runs the relay server by
+     * default, and an unclaimed node on a public address must not become anyone's relay.
+     * The empty-anchor admission in check 1 exists for a node that will be enrolled by
+     * its siblings, which an unclaimed node has none of.
+     *
+     * Otherwise admits when ANY of:
      *  1. a shared-baseline check admits ({@link admitControlPeerUnconditionally}
      *     — not running / DB torn down, absent-or-empty trusted-owner anchor, or
      *     configured bootstrap/relay infrastructure);
@@ -1046,31 +1124,23 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * that boots, reserves, and only then has its row replicate here would
      * otherwise keep that slot spent for the rest of the entry's TTL.
      *
-     * The connection gate's stranger carve-outs (an open enrollment window, an
-     * outstanding formation invitation) deliberately do NOT extend here: they
-     * exist so a stranger's SEED or FORMATION stream can ride a connection, and
-     * neither needs relay capacity. A genuine invitee that does need a relay slot
-     * takes one from the budget like any other unplaced peer, so an open window
-     * never becomes an unbounded grant of this node's forwarding capacity.
+     * The connection gate's stranger carve-outs (an outstanding formation
+     * invitation, a live cadre invitation) deliberately do NOT extend here: they
+     * exist so a stranger's FORMATION or CADRE-INVITE stream can ride a connection,
+     * and neither needs relay capacity. A genuine invitee that does need a relay
+     * slot takes one from the budget like any other unplaced peer, so a live
+     * invitation never becomes an unbounded grant of this node's forwarding capacity.
      */
     private admitControlRelayReservation;
     /** Admit a reservation on the peer's own merits, giving back any budget slot it still holds. */
     private admitReservationUncounted;
-    /**
-     * Hold the control-network inbound gate open for not-yet-authorized peers
-     * until `untilEpochMs` (extends, never shrinks, an already-open window).
-     * {@link createInvite} calls this automatically; a host running an
-     * out-of-band enrollment flow (e.g. accepting a phone whose invite this node
-     * never minted) can open it explicitly before the stranger dials in.
-     */
-    openEnrollmentWindow(untilEpochMs: number): void;
     /**
      * Record (or refresh) a delegate admission grant: `delegatePeerId` is the
      * transport peerId of `announcerPeerId`'s strand-`strandId` node, admitted
      * at the CONNECTION and RESERVATION levels (all a circuit-relay reservation
      * needs, without spending the unauthorized-reservation budget) for
-     * `DELEGATE_GRANT_TTL_MS`. Called by the strand-addr responder after its
-     * authorized-membership gate has passed; public so tests can drive the
+     * `DELEGATE_GRANT_TTL_MS`. Called by the strand-addr responder, which the
+     * protocol guard admits only authorized members to; public so tests can drive the
      * admission policy without a full strand launch. A re-announce for the same
      * (announcer, strand) REPLACES the previous delegate rather than
      * accumulating. Never honored by {@link authorizeInboundControlStream}.
@@ -1097,25 +1167,35 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     private admitControlPeerUnconditionally;
     /**
-     * Per-stream authorization for the four Optimystic control-DB protocols
-     * (`/optimystic/control-<party>/{repo,cluster,sync,block-transfer}/…`),
-     * wired as `authorizeInboundStream` in {@link createControlNode} — the
-     * fail-closed layer behind the fail-open connection gater. Control node
-     * ONLY: strand cohort nodes legitimately serve cross-party peers.
+     * Per-stream authorization for the protocol guard's `members-snapshot` class
+     * (`control-protocol-guard.ts`): the four Optimystic control-DB protocols
+     * (`/optimystic/control-<party>/{repo,cluster,sync,block-transfer}/…`), FRET's
+     * five, and any protocol nobody classed. Also wired as Optimystic's
+     * `authorizeInboundStream` in {@link createControlNode} for the four DB
+     * protocols. The fail-closed layer behind the fail-open connection gater.
+     * Control node ONLY: strand cohort nodes legitimately serve cross-party peers.
      *
      * The STRICT SUBSET of {@link admitInboundControlConnection}: the same
      * "no basis to judge" admissions (shared via
      * {@link admitControlPeerUnconditionally}), minus the stranger carve-outs
-     * (enrollment window, outstanding open invitation, delegate admission
-     * grant). The first two exist so a stranger can reach `/sereus/seed/1.0.0`
-     * and `/sereus/formation/1.0.0` — neither is gated here, and admitting a
-     * stranger to `repo` during an enrollment window is exactly the hole this
+     * (outstanding open invitation, live cadre invitation, delegate admission
+     * grant). The first two exist so a stranger can reach `/sereus/formation/1.0.0`
+     * and `/sereus/cadre-invite/1.0.0` — neither is gated here, and admitting a
+     * stranger to `repo` while an invitation is live is exactly the hole this
      * gate closes. A DELEGATE-admitted connection (a member's strand node
      * holding a circuit-relay reservation, see `delegate-admission.ts`) is
      * likewise exactly a case this gate must still refuse: the delegate gets
      * the connection and never the control DB.
      *
-     * Admits when ANY of:
+     * Refuses everyone, ahead of every admission below, while this node is waiting to be
+     * claimed ({@link isAwaitingClaim}). The empty-anchor and empty-snapshot admissions
+     * exist so a brand-new node can take replication from the siblings that will
+     * authorize it; an unclaimed node has no siblings yet, and the rows that will
+     * authorize anyone arrive only after the claim, over the owner's streams that the
+     * same two admissions then let in. Configured bootstrap infra is refused too: a
+     * relay opens no control-database stream.
+     *
+     * Otherwise admits when ANY of:
      *  1. a shared-baseline check admits (not running / no DB, empty anchor,
      *     configured bootstrap infra);
      *  2. the materialized authorized set is empty — cold start, before the
@@ -1152,6 +1232,10 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * read here would sleep its backoff holding the lock and stall every other local
      * writer. Nothing is lost — this refresh already keeps the previous snapshot on
      * failure and is re-driven by the next membership write and by the timed reconcile.
+     *
+     * The trusted-owner anchor sync ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}) runs FIRST, so the snapshot
+     * built here judges `CadrePeer` rows against the anchor as the `OwnerKey` table now
+     * has it. The invitation chain both reads may need is loaded at most once per refresh.
      */
     private refreshAuthorizedControlPeers;
     /**
@@ -1322,6 +1406,18 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *   since that key is internal to libp2p and not exposed.
      */
     getIdentityOwnerKey(): Ed25519KeyPair;
+    /**
+     * Publish this node's own address record from the reconcile pass, for a CLAIMED node that
+     * has not published one this session. Its owner writes its `CadrePeer` row only after the
+     * claim is accepted (`claimNode`), so the row reaches this node by replication, after the
+     * boot-time publish and the first-growth drain have both found nothing to publish; without
+     * this the record would wait for the heartbeat ({@link startRecordRefresh}), and the cadre
+     * could not resolve the node's addresses until then. The reconcile pass is where replicated
+     * membership is picked up, so each pass tries until the first publish lands. A try before
+     * the row has arrived is a `skipped` publish: one `CadrePeer` read. A claimed node later
+     * removed from its cadre never publishes again, so it pays that read on every pass.
+     */
+    private publishSelfRecordOnceClaimed;
     /**
      * Collect this node's current dialable addresses for publication, signaling
      * (`/p2p-circuit`) first. Prefers the best invite/NAT-resolved set and folds
@@ -1502,8 +1598,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * addresses ({@link dialPeerAddrs}): the reconcile pass's steady-state sibling
      * ({@link dialControlSibling}) and cold-start bootstrap peer
      * ({@link dialBootstrapPeer}) dials, and — handed to every
-     * {@link SeedBootstrapService} this node builds — `applySeed`'s owner dials and
-     * `dialInvite`.
+     * {@link SeedBootstrapService} this node builds — `applySeed`'s owner dials.
      *
      * See `peer-dial.ts`'s `DEFAULT_CONTROL_COHORT_DIAL_TIMEOUT_MS` for why a peer's dial is
      * bounded as a whole, and `DEFAULT_CONTROL_COHORT_PER_ADDRESS_DIAL_TIMEOUT_MS` for why each
@@ -3168,14 +3263,21 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *  1. it is not this node itself — a node publishes its own `CadrePeer` address
      *     row so its dialable address rides in seeds, but "self" is not a peer this
      *     node authorized;
-     *  2. its `CadrePeer` row carries a complete voucher (`StampId`, `VouchOwner`,
-     *     `VouchSig` all non-null);
+     *  2. its `CadrePeer` row carries a complete proof: EITHER an owner voucher
+     *     (`StampId`, `VouchOwner`, `VouchSig` all non-null) OR an invitation admission
+     *     (`VouchSig` null, `VouchUsage` naming a `CadreInviteUsage` row);
      *  3. `VouchOwner` is in the NODE-LOCAL trusted-owner anchor
-     *     ({@link getTrustedOwnerStore}) — never the replicated `OwnerKey` table,
-     *     which any stranger can genesis-pollute; and
-     *  4. `VouchSig` verifies as that owner's signature over the row's voucher
-     *     digest ({@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher}), so the anchored owner really
-     *     vouched THIS peer id under THIS row's nonce; and
+     *     ({@link getTrustedOwnerStore}), which follows the replicated `OwnerKey` table
+     *     only along chains that verify from this node's out-of-band keys
+     *     ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}) — never the table itself, which any stranger can
+     *     genesis-pollute; and
+     *  4. the proof verifies: for a voucher, `VouchSig` is that owner's signature over
+     *     the row's voucher digest ({@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher}), so the anchored
+     *     owner really vouched THIS peer id under THIS row's nonce; for an admission,
+     *     the chain row → usage → invitation → anchored issuer verifies link by link
+     *     ({@link verifyInvitationAdmission} — the issuer is `VouchOwner`, the invitation's
+     *     own owner signature, the holder's and the device's signatures, and the stored
+     *     peer key really is the key behind the peer id); and
      *  5. the row's `StampId` is NOT retired in `CadreControl.Revocation` — enforced
      *     upstream in {@link ControlDatabase.queryCadrePeers}, which drops retired rows
      *     before ANY reader (this predicate included) sees them, so a row resurrected
@@ -3184,18 +3286,26 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *     local rows) is still inert to every reader that has the tombstone.
      *
      * Fail-closed at every step: a missing anchor (pre-start), an empty anchor (a
-     * not-yet-enrolled node authorizes no one), a null/partial voucher, an
-     * unanchored `VouchOwner`, or a bad signature all yield "not authorized" —
-     * having an address row is NOT membership. The control-network wake and
-     * strand-address gates consult this set, NOT the addressable one.
+     * not-yet-enrolled node authorizes no one), a null/partial proof, an
+     * unanchored `VouchOwner`, a bad signature, or a usage or invitation row this node
+     * does not hold all yield "not authorized" — having an address row is NOT
+     * membership. The protocol guard admits wake and strand-address requests by this set,
+     * NOT the addressable one.
+     *
+     * The usage and invitation tables are read only when at least one row needs them,
+     * so a cadre with no invitation-admitted member stays at one read per call.
      *
      * NOTE (rotation): if a party owner rotates keys and only the NEW key is pinned
      * in the anchor, rows the OLD key vouched fail check 3 until re-vouched — a
      * legit member goes un-authorized on readers that only pin the new key. Full
      * rotation handling (re-vouch on rotate) is the
-     * `flip-strand-membership-rotation-known-gap` work, not this predicate's.
+     * `flip-strand-membership-rotation-known-gap` work, not this predicate's. The
+     * `OwnerKey` table differs: an owner the rotated-out (or removed) key vouched keeps
+     * its place in every anchor that had derived it ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}: a derived
+     * entry stays while its own row is live), and is only out of reach for a machine that
+     * never held it until a remaining owner re-adds it or an invitation pins it.
      *
-     * @param retry - Whether the underlying membership read may retry a transient cluster
+     * @param retry - Whether the underlying membership reads may retry a transient cluster
      *   failure. Only {@link refreshAuthorizedControlPeers} passes `false`, because it runs
      *   as the control database's membership listener with that database's write lock held;
      *   see its comment.
@@ -3204,11 +3314,96 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
         peerId: string;
         multiaddr: string | null;
     }>>;
+    /**
+     * The body of {@link listAuthorizedMembers}, with the invitation chain supplied as a
+     * source so the membership refresh can share one load with {@link syncOwnerAnchor}.
+     */
+    private collectAuthorizedMembers;
     /**
      * Checks 2–4 of the authorized-membership predicate (see
-     * {@link listAuthorizedMembers}) for one `CadrePeer` row: complete voucher,
-     * `VouchOwner` in the node-local anchor, signature valid over the row's
-     * (PeerId, StampId) voucher digest.
+     * {@link listAuthorizedMembers}) for one `CadrePeer` row, by the kind of proof it
+     * carries: an owner voucher ({@link hasAnchoredVoucher}) or an invitation admission
+     * ({@link verifyInvitationAdmission} over the usage and invitation rows in `chain`,
+     * loaded only when some row needs them). A row with a `VouchSig` is judged as a
+     * voucher even if it also names a usage — the signature is the stronger proof and the
+     * one an owner re-vouch leaves behind.
+     */
+    private hasAnchoredProof;
+    /**
+     * Recompute the node-local trusted-owner anchor from the replicated `OwnerKey` table along
+     * verifiable chains (`owner-anchor-sync.ts` → {@link deriveOwnerAnchor}), as the first step
+     * of every membership refresh ({@link refreshAuthorizedControlPeers}) so the snapshot built
+     * in the same pass judges `CadrePeer` rows against the updated anchor. A key whose live
+     * row's stored proof verifies against a key already anchored enters under `chain` and
+     * stays while its row is live; a key an anchored owner's verifiable tombstone names
+     * leaves, base pins included — which is how a config pin of a removed key, re-anchored at
+     * every start ({@link initializeTrustedOwnerStore}), is removed again. The derivation
+     * refuses removals that would empty the anchor; they are logged here.
+     *
+     * With an EMPTY anchor the sync does nothing: there is no key to derive from, and a node
+     * waiting to be claimed ({@link isAwaitingClaim}: claim secret set, anchor empty) must
+     * stay empty until the claim anchors its claimant — the replicated table must never seat
+     * the first key. The early return below is the seam that rests on.
+     *
+     * Any read failure skips the whole pass and leaves the anchor as it was; the refresh then
+     * builds its snapshot against that anchor, which is also what its previous snapshot was
+     * judged against. Caught here rather than failing the refresh, because the membership read
+     * tolerates an unreachable `Revocation` block on an isolated node
+     * (`ControlDatabase.readRevokedStampRows`) and `queryRevocations` does not: failing the
+     * whole refresh on that would freeze such a node's gate snapshot.
+     * NOTE: on such a node the sync is skipped at every refresh until the block is held; if an
+     * isolated node ever has to derive owner additions while cut off, give `queryRevocations`
+     * the same cohort-unreachable fallback.
+     *
+     * NOTE: cost per membership refresh is one `OwnerKey` read and one `Revocation` read (the
+     * tombstone list, whose `OwnerKey` stamps are handed to `queryOwnerKeyRows` so it does not
+     * read the retired set again), plus the invitation chain when some owner row is
+     * invitation-admitted — shared with the membership read through `loadChain`; the memo
+     * suggestion on {@link loadInvitationChain} covers that part. Before the Revocation ledger
+     * marker is filed that one read is a cohort consult per refresh, which
+     * `control-founding-consult-budget.spec.ts` pins.
+     *
+     * @param retry - forwarded to every read; `false` on the refresh path, for the reason on
+     *   {@link refreshAuthorizedControlPeers}.
+     */
+    private syncOwnerAnchor;
+    /**
+     * Apply one pass's result: `chain` entries for the keys it newly derived, removal of the keys
+     * it started with that are outside `target` — base keys a verifiable tombstone named, and
+     * `chain` entries whose row is gone.
+     *
+     * Diffed against `before`, the snapshot the derivation was computed from, NOT the live store:
+     * the anchor is written out of band while the pass's reads are in flight (an invitation pin,
+     * the genesis anchor, a claim, a seed), and such a key is outside `target` only because the
+     * pass never saw it — judging the live store would remove it. Likewise a key removed
+     * meanwhile (a claim rollback) must not come back as `chain`. Both are judged by the next
+     * pass. Each change lands in memory synchronously (`TrustedOwnerStore.trust` / `remove`); a
+     * failed PERSIST is logged and does not stop the pass or fail the refresh, as
+     * `SeedBootstrapService.anchorAcceptedSigner` treats the same failure.
+     */
+    private applyOwnerAnchor;
+    /**
+     * A per-refresh {@link InvitationChainSource}: the first call loads the chain through
+     * {@link loadInvitationChain}, every later call shares that load.
+     */
+    private invitationChainSource;
+    /**
+     * The usage and invitation rows {@link hasAnchoredProof} and {@link syncOwnerAnchor}
+     * resolve an invitation-admitted row through, keyed for lookup. Both reads honour `retry`
+     * for {@link listAuthorizedMembers}' reason.
+     *
+     * NOTE: once invitations are the only admission route (ticket
+     * `cadre-invitations-redeemable-by-any-member`), every cadre with a member not yet
+     * re-vouched pays these two whole-table reads and three ed25519 verifies per row on every
+     * membership refresh. Both tables are append-only and a verified chain never changes (expiry,
+     * use count and withdrawal are not re-checked), so if the gate's admission deadline ever
+     * shows this, memoise verified (row stamp → usage stamp) pairs per node and skip the reads
+     * when every admitted row is already memoised.
+     */
+    private loadInvitationChain;
+    /**
+     * The owner-voucher half of {@link hasAnchoredProof}: complete voucher, `VouchOwner` in
+     * the node-local anchor, signature valid over the row's (PeerId, StampId) voucher digest.
      *
      * NOTE: verifies the ed25519 signature on every call (no memo of already-
      * verified (peerId, stampId, vouchSig) triples). Cadres are a handful of
@@ -3219,8 +3414,8 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     private hasAnchoredVoucher;
     /**
      * Probe whether a given peer is an AUTHORIZED party member (see
-     * {@link listAuthorizedMembers}) — the gate the control-network wake and
-     * strand-address responders consult, NOT {@link isMember} (the addressable
+     * {@link listAuthorizedMembers}) — the check the protocol guard runs ahead of the
+     * control-network wake and strand-address handlers, NOT {@link isMember} (the addressable
      * surface). Deliberately scans the full membership (one `CadrePeer` query)
      * rather than adding a single-row read path: cadres are small, and one code
      * path keeps the predicate impossible to drift from the list.
@@ -3233,20 +3428,23 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * record (via {@link resolvePeerAddrs}, signaling/relay first — so a NAT'd peer
      * is reachable through its circuit-relay address), dials `WAKE_PROTOCOL`, sends
      * the {@link WakeRequest}, and returns the peer's {@link WakeAck}. The receiver
-     * gates the request on cadre membership and only resumes a strand it already
-     * participates in; it acks once it has decided, before the strand is up. The
-     * dial deadlines derive from this node's `network.linkRoundTripMs`.
+     * only resumes a strand it already participates in; it acks once it has decided,
+     * before the strand is up. The dial deadlines derive from this node's
+     * `network.linkRoundTripMs`.
      *
      * @param targetPeerId - The hibernating cadre peer to wake.
      * @param strandId - The strand the caller knows has pending activity.
      * @param reason - Optional cause hint, e.g. `"activity"` or `"manual"`.
-     * @throws if the node is not started or the target has no dialable address.
+     * @throws if the node is not started, the target has no dialable address, or no
+     *   attempt got an ack — including when the receiver does not count this node as an
+     *   authorized member, since its protocol guard resets the stream without a reply.
      */
     pushWake(targetPeerId: string, strandId: string, reason?: string): Promise<WakeAck>;
     /**
      * Enable the seed listener for receiving seeds via the /sereus/seed/1.0.0 protocol.
      * This is for drone nodes that need to receive seeds without being an owner.
-     * Does not require an owner key.
+     * Does not require an owner key. Idempotent; a node started with `config.claim`
+     * calls it itself inside {@link start}, so an embedder's own call is a no-op.
      */
     enableSeedListener(): Promise<void>;
     /**
@@ -3278,6 +3476,15 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * vouched for stays denied until the next timed cohort reconcile.
      */
     private seedEventCallbacks;
+    /**
+     * The node-wide default trust policy for INBOUND seeds, the one value every
+     * {@link SeedBootstrapService} this node constructs is given — the owner service,
+     * the listener, and `applySeed`'s temp service — so the three cannot drift. The
+     * claim policy when the node was started with `config.claim` (the two are refused
+     * together at start, so there is nothing to merge), otherwise the configured
+     * `seedTrustPolicy`, and `undefined` for the service's anchored default.
+     */
+    private inboundSeedTrustPolicy;
     /**
      * Re-materialize the authorized-peer snapshot that the fail-closed per-stream
      * control-DB gate ({@link authorizeInboundControlStream}) judges against.
@@ -3359,6 +3566,26 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * @param peerId - The peer ID to remove
      */
     removePeer(peerId: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Seat another owner key, signed by this node's owner key (the signed-add branch of
+     * `OwnerKey.Authorized`; the row stores the vouching pair). The write notifies the
+     * membership hub, so the refresh it triggers has run by the time this resolves.
+     *
+     * @param ownerPublicKeyB64 - the new owner's ed25519 public key (base64url).
+     * @returns `true` when the row was seated, `false` when the key is already a live owner.
+     */
+    addOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Remove an owner key, signed by this node's owner key (which must be a different owner):
+     * the delete and its `Revocation` tombstone commit together. Refused by name when the key
+     * is this node's own or the only live owner. The write notifies the membership hub; the
+     * tombstone rides the committed-delete seam ({@link noteGuardedDelete}), so one committed
+     * while alone is re-issued on cohort growth like every other removal.
+     *
+     * @param ownerPublicKeyB64 - the owner's ed25519 public key (base64url).
+     * @returns `true` when the row was removed, `false` when the key is not a live owner here.
+     */
+    removeOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64: string): Promise<boolean>;
     /**
      * Create a seed from the current control network state.
      * The seed contains peer information and is signed by an owner.
@@ -3368,10 +3595,12 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * Apply a seed to populate the peer cache and enable connections.
      *
      * Validates the seed signature, then evaluates a trust anchor for the signer
-     * key (see `SeedTrustPolicy`). An enrollment caller can pass a per-seed
-     * `trustPolicy` override — e.g. a `pinnedKeyTrustPolicy` built from a
-     * `CadreInvite.ownerKeys` — so a cold-start node can accept its first
-     * seed without reconfiguring the service.
+     * key (see `SeedTrustPolicy`). An operator-driven caller can pass a per-seed
+     * `trustPolicy` override — e.g. a `pinnedKeyTrustPolicy` built from a pinned
+     * owner key — so a cold-start node can accept its first seed without
+     * reconfiguring the service. The override wins on a node started with
+     * `config.claim` as well: the claim secret is the node's default inbound policy,
+     * not a lock on its local operator, who already controls the process.
      */
     applySeed(seed: ControlNetworkSeed, options?: {
         trustPolicy?: SeedTrustPolicy;
@@ -3385,11 +3614,17 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     private noteAppliedSeed;
     /**
      * Deliver a seed directly to a peer via the /sereus/seed/1.0.0 protocol.
+     *
+     * `target` is a multiaddr string, or a peer id with its addresses (the form a phone
+     * uses for a node it scanned), which are dialed one at a time before the request
+     * (`SeedBootstrapService.deliverSeed`). `options.claimProof` rides beside the seed when
+     * the target is a brand-new node being claimed (`claim-proof.ts`).
+     *
+     * @throws {PeerUnreachableError} for a peer id with addresses, when no connection to it formed.
      */
-    deliverSeed(targetMultiaddr: string, seed: ControlNetworkSeed): Promise<{
-        accepted: boolean;
-        reason?: string;
-    }>;
+    deliverSeed(target: SeedDeliveryTarget, seed: ControlNetworkSeed, options?: {
+        claimProof?: string;
+    }): Promise<SeedAckMessage>;
     /**
      * Encode a seed for out-of-band delivery (e.g., QR code, copy/paste).
      */
@@ -3423,32 +3658,138 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     addDrone(options: AddDroneOptions): Promise<DroneInitResult>;
     /**
-     * Create an invite for a phone to join the cadre.
-     * Use when a server wants to invite a NAT'd phone.
-     */
-    createInvite(token?: string, expiresIn?: number): Promise<InviteResult>;
-    /**
-     * Accept a phone connection using an invite.
-     * Call this when a phone dials in with an invite token.
-     */
-    acceptPhone(options: AddPhoneOptions, issuedInvite?: CadreInvite): Promise<void>;
+     * Claim a node that was started with a claim secret (`CadreNodeConfig.claim`), from
+     * the peer id, addresses and secret its host showed (the QR code): mint a seed, prove
+     * possession of the secret beside it (`claim-proof.ts`), deliver it, and on acceptance
+     * vouch the node into this cadre and keep its addresses as a dial target. The owner
+     * side of the claim-secret entry in the Seed Delivery Protocol (`docs/architecture.md`).
+     *
+     * Requires the seed service with an owner key ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}), as
+     * {@link addDrone} does. The order is the REVERSE of `addDrone`'s: seed first, row
+     * second. A refused claim or a failed delivery therefore leaves no `CadrePeer` row and
+     * no retained dial target behind on this node — a phone that typed the wrong secret,
+     * or scanned a node someone else already owns, has nothing to clean up.
+     *
+     * A failure is one of three kinds a caller can tell apart:
+     *
+     * - `ClaimRefusedError` — the node was reached and refused, with its refusal code when
+     *   its policy gave one.
+     * - `PeerUnreachableError` — no connection to the node formed from any of its addresses,
+     *   so nothing was sent. Each address is dialed in turn on its own limit, so this can
+     *   take up to the per-peer dial limit plus the seed request's (114.5 s at the default
+     *   declared link) when none answers.
+     * - anything else — the node was reached and the exchange failed, or a local step failed
+     *   (a malformed secret or address among them). Repeating the claim with the same secret
+     *   is safe (see below).
+     *
+     * Idempotent for the same owner: a second call after a dropped response is accepted
+     * by the node (its anchored branch), the row insert is a no-op on an existing row
+     * (`ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer`), and the dial target is replaced, not duplicated.
+     *
+     * The first dial is kicked (not awaited) so it happens now rather than on the next
+     * timed reconcile pass; a caller that wants to wait for the connection awaits
+     * {@link reconcileControlCohort} itself, with `addDrone`'s caveat that a pass already
+     * in flight is joined rather than restarted. The claimed node dials this one back too,
+     * from the seed's owner list, when this node has a listen or relay address; a phone
+     * with neither is reached by its own reconcile pass alone.
+     *
+     * @throws {ClaimRefusedError} when the node was reached and refused the claim.
+     * @throws {PeerUnreachableError} when the node was never reached.
+     */
+    claimNode(target: {
+        peerId: string;
+        multiaddrs: string[];
+        secret: string;
+    }): Promise<void>;
     /**
      * Add a phone to the cadre with relay support.
      * Use when both nodes are NAT'd (phone-to-phone).
      */
     addPhoneWithRelay(phonePeerId: string): Promise<DroneInitResult>;
     /**
-     * Encode an invite for out-of-band delivery (QR, link, etc.).
-     */
-    encodeInvite(invite: CadreInvite): string;
-    /**
-     * Decode an invite from base64url encoding.
-     */
-    decodeInvite(encoded: string): CadreInvite;
-    /**
-     * Dial an owner from an invite (for phone joining via invite).
-     */
-    dialInvite(invite: CadreInvite): Promise<void>;
+     * Mint an owner-signed cadre invitation that a device can redeem at ANY member machine of
+     * this party, the owner offline included ({@link redeemCadreInvitation}). Requires the
+     * owner key ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}).
+     *
+     * The invitation is an ed25519 keypair: the public half is the `CadreInvite` row's key,
+     * the private half rides in the returned bundle as the proof of possession. Whoever holds
+     * the bundle can redeem it, so an UNTARGETED, OWNER-GRANTING invitation — a bearer
+     * credential for admin rights — defaults to a 15-minute lifetime; every other kind to 24
+     * hours. One use unless `uses` says otherwise. The bundle carries the signed row (so a
+     * member that has not received it by replication seats it from the bundle), this node's
+     * anchored owner keys — every current owner this node has verified, the out-of-band ones
+     * and those derived along verifiable chains ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}) — (the device pins
+     * them and checks the member's reply against them; sourced from the node-local anchor
+     * only, never the raw replicated `OwnerKey` table, because the device anchors whatever
+     * arrives and a stranger's genesis-inserted key must not ride an invitation into a fresh
+     * node's anchor; an empty anchor is refused because a reply could not be checked), and
+     * the addresses of this machine first
+     * ({@link resolveInviteAddresses}, which honours pushed NAT addresses) then up to three
+     * other members ({@link siblingInvitationAddrs}).
+     *
+     * The row commits locally and replicates like any other control write; minted while
+     * alone (a phone with no connection), it reaches the other members through the
+     * peer-join block catch-up on the next connection. The device can redeem at any member it
+     * reaches meanwhile: a member that does not hold the row yet admits the device's connection
+     * provisionally ({@link admitInboundControlConnection}) and seats the row from the bundle.
+     *
+     * @throws when no owner key is wired, the anchor is empty, `uses` is not a positive
+     *   integer, or neither this machine nor any other member has an address.
+     */
+    createCadreInvitation(options: CreateCadreInvitationOptions): Promise<CreateCadreInvitationResult>;
+    /**
+     * Every cadre invitation this node holds — minted here or replicated in — with its
+     * standing ({@link CadreInviteStatus}: live, withdrawn, redemptions recorded).
+     */
+    listCadreInvitations(): Promise<CadreInviteStatus[]>;
+    /**
+     * Withdraw a cadre invitation: an owner-signed `Revocation` tombstone over its row, which
+     * stays as the proof of membership for every device it admitted. No further redemption
+     * succeeds anywhere the tombstone reaches, and a member holding it refuses the bundle's
+     * copy of the row. A withdrawal committed while alone is re-issued on cohort growth like
+     * any other tombstone.
+     *
+     * @returns `true` when this call filed the tombstone, `false` when the row is not held
+     *   here or was already withdrawn.
+     */
+    withdrawCadreInvitation(key: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Join the cadre an invitation names by redeeming it at one of the member machines it
+     * lists, the owner that minted it offline or not. Needs a started node with a stable
+     * identity (`keyStore` or `privateKey`): the redemption is signed with the key behind
+     * this node's peer id, and the member checks that the two match.
+     *
+     * Steps: refuse an invitation for another party; pin its `ownerKeys` into the node-local
+     * anchor (`'invite'` provenance — the pin sticks even if the redemption then fails, as it
+     * does for a seed invite, so a later attempt or seed from the same owner is anchored);
+     * sign the request; dial the listed members in order ({@link redeemAtMembers}); on
+     * acceptance verify the reply against the pinned keys, merge its dial hints into the peer
+     * store, retain the answering member as a cold-start dial target, refresh the membership
+     * gate and start a cohort reconcile pass. This node then syncs the control database over
+     * the connection it already holds, the same unified behaviour as after a seed.
+     *
+     * A device that is already a member (a restart with the invitation still configured) is
+     * answered as accepted by the member's idempotent redemption, with no second usage row.
+     *
+     * When the invitation grants ownership, the member seats this node's key as an `OwnerKey`
+     * row by consent. The caller still has to wire that key for signing afterwards —
+     * `initializeSeedBootstrap(ownKey)`, which anchors it; never `ensureOwnerKey`, the row is
+     * already there. Other machines derive this node's key into their anchors from the row's
+     * stored proof on their next membership refresh ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}).
+     *
+     * Limit: the reply check ({@link verifyRedeemReply}) does not authenticate the member. A
+     * forged bundle, or a legitimate one whose addresses were swapped, dials a machine that
+     * can echo the owner-signed row it was just sent; that is what pasting an attacker's
+     * invitation means. What protects this node afterwards is its anchor: every row it then
+     * syncs is judged against the pinned owner keys, so a machine that is not a member of the
+     * cadre the invitation names can admit nobody this node will trust.
+     *
+     * @throws `CadreInviteRejectedError` on a final refusal, `CadreInviteReplyInvalidError` on
+     *   an acceptance that fails the reply check, `CadreInviteUnreachableError` when every
+     *   listed address was tried without an acceptance, and a plain `Error` for the
+     *   preconditions above.
+     */
+    redeemCadreInvitation(invitation: CadreInvitation): Promise<RedeemCadreInvitationResult>;
     /**
      * Replace this node's strand solicitation service — the formation responder every node
      * installs at {@link start}, and the initiator side of {@link formStrand}. Optional: call it
@@ -3501,10 +3842,12 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     createOpenInvitation(sAppId: string, expirationMs?: number): Promise<OpenInvitation>;
     /**
-     * Addresses of the party's other machines for an invitation's bootstrap list
-     * ({@link selectInvitationSiblingAddrs} picks which). The source is each authorized
-     * member's signed `CadrePeer` record ({@link resolvePeerRecord}), so a machine whose record
-     * is missing, stale or untrusted is left out; live connections only order them.
+     * Addresses of the party's other machines for an invitation's bootstrap list — an open
+     * strand invitation's ({@link createOpenInvitation}) or a cadre invitation's
+     * ({@link createCadreInvitation}); {@link selectInvitationSiblingAddrs} picks which. The
+     * source is each authorized member's signed `CadrePeer` record ({@link resolvePeerRecord}),
+     * so a machine whose record is missing, stale or untrusted is left out; live connections
+     * only order them.
      *
      * Best-effort: a failed read leaves the invitation naming this machine alone, which is what
      * it named before siblings were added.
@@ -3525,7 +3868,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * Ask to join through `invitation` and have the party keep trying until the join works, the
      * invitation is used up or expires, or the request is dismissed: across restarts, and from
      * any owner machine of the party (`docs/strands.md` → "Joining while the inviter is
-     * offline"). Records a party-wide `PendingJoin` row, runs one attempt on this machine at
+     * offline"). Records a party-wide `JoinRequest` row, runs one attempt on this machine at
      * once, and returns the status after it: `'joined'` when the inviter answered yes, `'waiting'`
      * when it was unreachable or not ready, `'failed'` when it refused for good.
      *
@@ -3555,17 +3898,17 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     /** This machine's owner key and signer for an owner-signed control write, or a throw carrying `refusal`. */
     private requireOwnerSigner;
     /**
-     * Write a join request's row, or adopt the party's existing row for the same invitation: a
-     * pending one as it is, a finished one replaced by `requested` (the user asked again).
+     * Write a join request, or adopt the party's existing request for the same invitation: a
+     * pending one as it is, a finished one rewritten as `requested` (the user asked again).
      */
     private recordJoinRequest;
     /** Build and start the pending-join retry loop over this node (see {@link pendingJoinRunner}). */
     private startPendingJoinRunner;
-    /** The invitation a `PendingJoin` row stores. A failure names the row, never the invitation, which is a bearer credential. */
+    /** The invitation a `JoinRequest` row stores. A failure names the row, never the invitation, which is a bearer credential. */
     private pendingJoinInvitation;
     private pendingJoinSAppId;
     /**
-     * Stage the membership invitation of each `joined` row this process has not staged yet, so a
+     * Stage the membership invitation of each joined request this process has not staged yet, so a
      * closed strand joined on another owner machine is seated by whichever machine launches it
      * first; the party key it admits is the replicated `StrandPartyKey` row the finishing machine
      * seated. A strand that already has an invitation staged keeps it, for the reconciler to