@serfab/cadre-core 1.13.0 → 1.14.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/cadre-invite-protocol.d.ts +348 -0
- package/dist/cadre-invite-protocol.js +605 -0
- package/dist/cadre-invite-protocol.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/cadre-node.d.ts +523 -180
- package/dist/cadre-node.js +921 -293
- package/dist/cadre-node.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/claim-proof.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/claim-proof.js +132 -0
- package/dist/claim-proof.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/control-authorization.d.ts +80 -19
- package/dist/control-authorization.js +55 -13
- package/dist/control-authorization.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/control-cohort.js +1 -1
- package/dist/control-cohort.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/control-database.d.ts +514 -97
- package/dist/control-database.js +1033 -195
- package/dist/control-database.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/control-protocol-guard.d.ts +142 -0
- package/dist/control-protocol-guard.js +293 -0
- package/dist/control-protocol-guard.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/control-schema.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/control-schema.js +801 -1067
- package/dist/control-schema.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/control-stream.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/control-stream.js +22 -7
- package/dist/control-stream.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/delegate-admission.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/delegate-admission.js +1 -1
- package/dist/device-token.d.ts +11 -9
- package/dist/device-token.js +14 -12
- package/dist/device-token.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/ed25519-key.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/ed25519-key.js +28 -1
- package/dist/ed25519-key.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +14 -9
- package/dist/index.js +27 -9
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/link-budget.d.ts +16 -29
- package/dist/link-budget.js +16 -31
- package/dist/link-budget.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/membership-connection-gater.d.ts +190 -151
- package/dist/membership-connection-gater.js +235 -173
- package/dist/membership-connection-gater.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/node-claim-payload.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/node-claim-payload.js +120 -0
- package/dist/node-claim-payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/owner-anchor-sync.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/owner-anchor-sync.js +143 -0
- package/dist/owner-anchor-sync.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/peer-authorization.d.ts +113 -18
- package/dist/peer-authorization.js +225 -29
- package/dist/peer-authorization.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/peer-dial.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/peer-dial.js +22 -1
- package/dist/peer-dial.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/peer-join-backfill.d.ts +26 -2
- package/dist/peer-join-backfill.js +54 -12
- package/dist/peer-join-backfill.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/peer-record.d.ts +13 -9
- package/dist/peer-record.js +16 -12
- package/dist/peer-record.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/pending-join-runner.d.ts +66 -58
- package/dist/pending-join-runner.js +136 -145
- package/dist/pending-join-runner.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/push-fanout.d.ts +8 -2
- package/dist/push-fanout.js +8 -2
- package/dist/push-fanout.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/seed-bootstrap.d.ts +147 -122
- package/dist/seed-bootstrap.js +284 -269
- package/dist/seed-bootstrap.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/seed-trust-policy.d.ts +98 -37
- package/dist/seed-trust-policy.js +188 -2
- package/dist/seed-trust-policy.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strand-addr-protocol.d.ts +24 -26
- package/dist/strand-addr-protocol.js +19 -26
- package/dist/strand-addr-protocol.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strand-formation-protocol.js +1 -1
- package/dist/strand-formation-protocol.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/strand-revocation-enforcer.d.ts +11 -11
- package/dist/strand-revocation-enforcer.js +11 -11
- package/dist/strand-wake-protocol.d.ts +13 -16
- package/dist/strand-wake-protocol.js +13 -20
- package/dist/strand-wake-protocol.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/trusted-owner-store.d.ts +35 -5
- package/dist/trusted-owner-store.js +50 -8
- package/dist/trusted-owner-store.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types.d.ts +302 -87
- package/dist/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +8 -7
- package/src/cadre-invite-protocol.ts +864 -0
- package/src/cadre-node.ts +9381 -8686
- package/src/claim-proof.ts +147 -0
- package/src/control-authorization.ts +203 -117
- package/src/control-cohort.ts +1 -1
- package/src/control-database.ts +1216 -218
- package/src/control-protocol-guard.ts +348 -0
- package/src/control-schema.ts +812 -1078
- package/src/control-stream.ts +26 -7
- package/src/delegate-admission.ts +1 -1
- package/src/device-token.ts +14 -10
- package/src/ed25519-key.ts +28 -1
- package/src/index.ts +84 -10
- package/src/link-budget.ts +16 -32
- package/src/membership-connection-gater.ts +637 -570
- package/src/node-claim-payload.ts +125 -0
- package/src/owner-anchor-sync.ts +171 -0
- package/src/peer-authorization.ts +258 -29
- package/src/peer-dial.ts +22 -1
- package/src/peer-join-backfill.ts +56 -11
- package/src/peer-record.ts +16 -11
- package/src/pending-join-runner.ts +729 -735
- package/src/push-fanout.ts +8 -2
- package/src/seed-bootstrap.ts +344 -321
- package/src/seed-trust-policy.ts +353 -140
- package/src/strand-addr-protocol.ts +26 -35
- package/src/strand-formation-protocol.ts +1 -1
- package/src/strand-revocation-enforcer.ts +11 -11
- package/src/strand-wake-protocol.ts +13 -23
- package/src/trusted-owner-store.ts +242 -171
- package/src/types.ts +2471 -2242
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import debug from 'debug';
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import { digest, verify } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
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import { controlAuthorizationFields } from './control-authorization.js';
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import { controlAuthorizationFields, unboundAuthorizationFields, cadreInviteRowFields } from './control-authorization.js';
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import { ed25519PublicKeyB64FromPeerId } from './ed25519-key.js';
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const log = debug('sereus:cadre:peer-authorization');
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/**
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* base64url SHA-256 digest over the shared domain-tagged field vector (see
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* base64url SHA-256 digest over the shared domain-tagged, party-bound field vector (see
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* control-authorization.ts). The base64url twin of
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* control-database.ts:buildAuthorizationMessage (which returns the same digest as raw
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* bytes): sign either encoding with input encoding to match and the signed bytes agree.
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* `partyId` is the party the verifier is configured for: a stored proof minted for
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* another party fails here exactly as it fails the schema's `party_id()`-bound check.
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*/
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function taggedDigest(domain, action, rowFields) {
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return digest(controlAuthorizationFields(domain, action, rowFields), 'sha256', 'base64url');
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function taggedDigest(domain, action, partyId, rowFields) {
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return digest(controlAuthorizationFields(domain, action, partyId, rowFields), 'sha256', 'base64url');
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}
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/** {@link taggedDigest} for the two party-free digests (`UnboundControlDomain`). */
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function unboundTaggedDigest(domain, action, rowFields) {
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return digest(unboundAuthorizationFields(domain, action, rowFields), 'sha256', 'base64url');
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}
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/**
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* Canonical digest an owner signs to vouch a peer's ENROLLMENT — the offline
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@@ -23,12 +30,12 @@ function taggedDigest(domain, action, rowFields) {
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* here and both move together.
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*/
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export function peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId) {
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return
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return unboundTaggedDigest('Cadre.Enrollment', 'vouch', [peerId]);
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}
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/**
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* Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` INSERT — the WHOLE row,
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* ending in its single-use `StampId` nonce. SQL mirror:
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* `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', new.PeerId, new.Platform, new.Token,
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* `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', party_id(), new.PeerId, new.Platform, new.Token,
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* coalesce(cast(new.UpdatedAt as text), ''), coalesce(new.Sig, ''), new.StampId)` in
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* `DeviceToken.AuthorizedInsert`.
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*
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@@ -44,8 +51,8 @@ export function peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId) {
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* Distinct from {@link deviceTokenRemoveDigest} so a captured insert approval can never
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* be replayed to delete the token, and vice versa.
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*/
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export function deviceTokenAddDigest(row) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', [
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export function deviceTokenAddDigest(partyId, row) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', partyId, [
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row.peerId,
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row.platform,
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row.token,
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@@ -57,7 +64,7 @@ export function deviceTokenAddDigest(row) {
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/**
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* Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` DELETE, bound to the
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* STORED row's (PeerId, StampId). SQL mirror:
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* `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)` in
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* `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', party_id(), old.PeerId, old.StampId)` in
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* `DeviceToken.AuthorizedDelete`.
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*
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* A narrower vector than {@link deviceTokenAddDigest} on purpose (the same split
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@@ -65,8 +72,8 @@ export function deviceTokenAddDigest(row) {
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* cannot be re-cut into an insert approval, and it is dead the moment the stamp it
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* names is tombstoned.
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*/
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export function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(peerId, stampId) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
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export function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(partyId, peerId, stampId) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', partyId, [peerId, stampId]);
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}
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/**
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* Canonical digest an owner signs to VOUCH a `CadrePeer` membership row (insert
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* a delete. The domain tag keeps the stored, replicated `VouchSig` useless against
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* every OTHER table's rules.
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*
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* SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', new.PeerId, new.StampId)`.
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* SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', party_id(), new.PeerId, new.StampId)`.
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*/
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export function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId, stampId) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', [peerId, stampId]);
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export function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(partyId, peerId, stampId) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', partyId, [peerId, stampId]);
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}
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/**
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* Canonical digest an owner signs to REMOVE a `CadrePeer` row. Deliberately a
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* delete lands, because a re-added row carries a FRESH `StampId` (the removed row's
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* stamp is retired into `CadreControl.Revocation` and never reused).
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* SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)`.
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* SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', party_id(), old.PeerId, old.StampId)`.
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export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId, stampId) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
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export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(partyId, peerId, stampId) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', partyId, [peerId, stampId]);
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}
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/**
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* Canonical digest an owner signs to APPEND a `CadreControl.Revocation` tombstone —
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@@ -104,7 +111,7 @@ export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId, stampId) {
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* (the removed row's primary key: OwnerKey.Key / ValidationKey.Key /
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* CadrePeer.PeerId / DeviceToken.PeerId / Strand.Id) as which row was retired.
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* SQL mirror:
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* `digest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', new.TableName, new.RowKey, new.StampId)`
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* `digest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', party_id(), new.TableName, new.RowKey, new.StampId)`
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* in `Revocation.Authorized`.
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*
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* Its own `'CadreControl.Revocation'` domain tag makes it disjoint from the
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* this tombstone accompanies — a removal signature is not a retirement
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* signature and cannot be replayed as one.
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*/
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export function revocationDigest(tableName, rowKey, stampId) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', [tableName, rowKey, stampId]);
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export function revocationDigest(partyId, tableName, rowKey, stampId) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', partyId, [tableName, rowKey, stampId]);
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}
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/**
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* Does a `Revocation` row's stored signer pair (`SignerKey` / `SignerSig`) verify over the
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* tombstone's own triple, for `partyId`? The read-side mirror of `Revocation.Authorized`,
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* for a node that received the row by replication and must decide whether to honour it.
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* Whether `row.signerKey` is an owner this node trusts is the caller's question, as for
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* {@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher}. Never throws: a malformed row verifies as `false`.
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*/
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export function verifyRevocationSigner(partyId, row) {
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try {
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return verifyB64(revocationDigest(partyId, row.tableName, row.rowKey, row.stampId), row.signerSig, row.signerKey);
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}
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catch (error) {
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log('verifyRevocationSigner failed: %o', error);
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return false;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Canonical digest an owner signs to seat a further `OwnerKey` row — the signed-add branch
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* of `OwnerKey.Authorized`, which stores the pair as `VouchOwner` / `VouchSig`. SQL mirror:
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* `digest('CadreControl.OwnerKey', 'add', party_id(), new.Key, new.StampId)`. The removal
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* digest needs no builder here: it is the generic guarded `'remove'` digest over (Key, StampId).
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*/
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export function ownerKeyAddDigest(partyId, key, stampId) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.OwnerKey', 'add', partyId, [key, stampId]);
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}
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/**
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* Does an owner-signed `OwnerKey` row's stored voucher verify — `vouchSig` by `vouchOwner`
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* over {@link ownerKeyAddDigest} for (`partyId`, `key`, `stampId`)? Whether `vouchOwner` is
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* anchored is the caller's question, as for {@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher}. Never throws.
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*/
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export function verifyOwnerKeyVoucher(partyId, key, stampId, vouchOwner, vouchSig) {
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try {
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return verifyB64(ownerKeyAddDigest(partyId, key, stampId), vouchSig, vouchOwner);
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}
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catch (error) {
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log('verifyOwnerKeyVoucher failed: %o', error);
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return false;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over `peerId`'s
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/**
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* Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over the
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* `CadrePeer` voucher digest for (`peerId`, `stampId`) — the read-side
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* of the voucher {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer} signs and persists into
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* `CadrePeer` voucher digest for (`partyId`, `peerId`, `stampId`) — the read-side
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* mirror of the voucher {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer} signs and persists into
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* `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` (see {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest}).
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*
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* A `true` result means the holder of `ownerPublicKey` vouched THIS membership
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* row (the peer id bound to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce)
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* row (the peer id bound to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce) in THIS party: a
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* voucher copied from another party's table that shares the owner key fails. It says
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* nothing about whether that owner key is itself trustworthy — the caller must
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* separately check the key against the node-local trusted-owner anchor
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* (`TrustedOwnerStore`), never the replicated `OwnerKey` table.
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* {@link verifyPeerAuthorization}): malformed input or any crypto failure
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* resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
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*/
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export function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(peerId, stampId, ownerPublicKey, signature) {
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export function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(partyId, peerId, stampId, ownerPublicKey, signature) {
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try {
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return verify(cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId, stampId), signature, ownerPublicKey, 'ed25519', 'base64url', 'base64url', 'base64url');
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return verify(cadrePeerVoucherDigest(partyId, peerId, stampId), signature, ownerPublicKey, 'ed25519', 'base64url', 'base64url', 'base64url');
|
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@@ -168,12 +215,12 @@ export function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(peerId, stampId, ownerPublicKey, signatur
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* Canonical digest a JOINING peer signs to consent to ONE `FormationUsage`
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* control-database.ts, base64url-encoded instead of raw bytes (see
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* {@link
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* (notably why `strandId` is
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* peer-authorization.spec.ts pins by signing one form and verifying the other.
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* {@link unboundTaggedDigest}). That doc comment carries the field-vector rationale
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* (notably why neither `strandId` nor the party id is signed); the two vectors must not
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* drift, which peer-authorization.spec.ts pins by signing one form and verifying the other.
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*/
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export function formationConsentDigest(token, usageStampId, peerKey, disclosure) {
|
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return
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return unboundTaggedDigest('CadreControl.FormationUsage', 'consent', [token, usageStampId, peerKey, disclosure]);
|
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}
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/**
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* Verify that `row.peerSig` is a valid ed25519 signature over the joining peer's
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@@ -194,4 +241,153 @@ export function verifyFormationConsent(row) {
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* Canonical digest an owner signs to seat a `CadreInvite` row — the read-side mirror
|
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|
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* of `cadreInviteAddMessage` in control-database.ts, base64url instead of raw bytes
|
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* (see {@link taggedDigest}). The whole row is bound, nullable columns as `''` and
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* `ExpiresAt` in its stored canonical form, through the one field builder both sides
|
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* share (`cadreInviteRowFields`). SQL mirror: `CadreInvite.AuthorizedInsert`.
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|
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*/
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|
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export function cadreInviteAddDigest(partyId, row) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadreInvite', 'add', partyId, cadreInviteRowFields(row));
|
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}
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/**
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* Canonical digest the HOLDER of a `CadreInvite`'s private key signs to redeem it once:
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* proof of possession, verified against the invitation key itself
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* (`CadreInviteUsage.InvitePossessed`). Binds the redemption's single-use nonce and the
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* device being admitted, so one redemption cannot be re-presented for another device
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* or another use. Mirror of `cadreInviteRedeemMessage` in control-database.ts.
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*/
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|
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export function cadreInviteRedeemDigest(partyId, inviteKey, usageStampId, peerKey) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage', 'redeem', partyId, [inviteKey, usageStampId, peerKey]);
|
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}
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/**
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* Canonical digest the DEVICE signs to consent to being admitted by one redemption
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* (`CadreInviteUsage.PeerConsented`), over the same fields as
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* {@link cadreInviteRedeemDigest} under a distinct action tag, so the holder's and
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* the device's signatures are never interchangeable. Mirror of
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* `cadreInviteConsentMessage` in control-database.ts.
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*/
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|
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export function cadreInviteConsentDigest(partyId, inviteKey, usageStampId, peerKey) {
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return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage', 'consent', partyId, [inviteKey, usageStampId, peerKey]);
|
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}
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/** ed25519 verify over a base64url digest, with the siblings' never-throws contract left to the caller. */
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|
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function verifyB64(digestB64, signature, publicKey) {
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|
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return verify(digestB64, signature, publicKey, 'ed25519', 'base64url', 'base64url', 'base64url');
|
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|
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}
|
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|
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/**
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|
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* Does a `CadreInvite` row carry a valid `'add'` signature by its own `issuerKey`, for
|
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+
* `partyId`? The redeeming device runs this over the row a member replies with, after
|
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|
+
* checking the issuer against its pinned owner keys and the reply's party against the
|
|
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|
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* invitation's, and a member over a bundle's copy it does not hold yet
|
|
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|
+
* (`ControlDatabase.isCadreInviteLive`); whether that issuer IS an owner is the caller's question.
|
|
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|
+
* Never throws: a malformed row verifies as `false`.
|
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
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|
+
export function verifyCadreInviteRow(partyId, invite) {
|
|
287
|
+
try {
|
|
288
|
+
return verifyB64(cadreInviteAddDigest(partyId, invite), invite.issuerSig, invite.issuerKey);
|
|
289
|
+
}
|
|
290
|
+
catch (error) {
|
|
291
|
+
log('verifyCadreInviteRow failed: %o', error);
|
|
292
|
+
return false;
|
|
293
|
+
}
|
|
294
|
+
}
|
|
295
|
+
/**
|
|
296
|
+
* The two signatures a redemption carries, checked before any database work: the holder's
|
|
297
|
+
* `'redeem'` signature with the invitation key, and the device's `'consent'` signature with
|
|
298
|
+
* its own key, both over (`inviteKey`, `usageStampId`, `peerKey`). The pre-check twin of
|
|
299
|
+
* `CadreInviteUsage.InvitePossessed` / `PeerConsented`, as `verifyFormationConsent` is for
|
|
300
|
+
* formation: the schema stays the authority, this turns a bad signature into a clean
|
|
301
|
+
* refusal instead of a constraint failure at commit. Never throws.
|
|
302
|
+
*/
|
|
303
|
+
export function verifyCadreInviteRedemption(partyId, fields, inviteSig, peerSig) {
|
|
304
|
+
try {
|
|
305
|
+
return verifyB64(cadreInviteRedeemDigest(partyId, fields.inviteKey, fields.usageStampId, fields.peerKey), inviteSig, fields.inviteKey)
|
|
306
|
+
&& verifyB64(cadreInviteConsentDigest(partyId, fields.inviteKey, fields.usageStampId, fields.peerKey), peerSig, fields.peerKey);
|
|
307
|
+
}
|
|
308
|
+
catch (error) {
|
|
309
|
+
log('verifyCadreInviteRedemption failed: %o', error);
|
|
310
|
+
return false;
|
|
311
|
+
}
|
|
312
|
+
}
|
|
313
|
+
/**
|
|
314
|
+
* The links of an invitation admission that do not depend on WHICH table's row was
|
|
315
|
+
* admitted — shared by {@link verifyInvitationAdmission} (`CadrePeer`) and
|
|
316
|
+
* {@link verifyInvitationOwnerAdmission} (`OwnerKey`), which differ only in the row
|
|
317
|
+
* columns the usage must name and, for an owner row, in `grantsOwner`. The chain is
|
|
318
|
+
*
|
|
319
|
+
* row --vouchUsage--> usage --inviteKey--> invitation --issuerKey--> anchored owner
|
|
320
|
+
*
|
|
321
|
+
* and every link here is verified: the issuer is anchored (`isAnchored`) and is the row's
|
|
322
|
+
* `vouchOwner`; the usage names this invitation and is the row's `vouchUsage`; a targeted
|
|
323
|
+
* invitation names the redeeming device; the stored `peerKey` really is the key behind the
|
|
324
|
+
* usage's `peerId` (the schema cannot unwrap a multihash, so a writer could assert any
|
|
325
|
+
* pair); the invitation's stored `'add'` signature verifies over the row rebuilt from its
|
|
326
|
+
* columns; the holder's `'redeem'` signature verifies with the invitation key and the
|
|
327
|
+
* device's `'consent'` signature with its own key. All three signatures are judged for
|
|
328
|
+
* `partyId`. Throws on malformed input; the two callers turn that into `false`.
|
|
329
|
+
*/
|
|
330
|
+
function verifyAdmissionChain(partyId, vouchOwner, vouchUsage, usage, invite, isAnchored) {
|
|
331
|
+
return isAnchored(vouchOwner)
|
|
332
|
+
&& invite.issuerKey === vouchOwner
|
|
333
|
+
&& usage.usageStampId === vouchUsage
|
|
334
|
+
&& usage.inviteKey === invite.key
|
|
335
|
+
&& (invite.peerId === null || invite.peerId === usage.peerId)
|
|
336
|
+
&& ed25519PublicKeyB64FromPeerId(usage.peerId) === usage.peerKey
|
|
337
|
+
&& verifyB64(cadreInviteAddDigest(partyId, invite), invite.issuerSig, invite.issuerKey)
|
|
338
|
+
&& verifyB64(cadreInviteRedeemDigest(partyId, invite.key, usage.usageStampId, usage.peerKey), usage.inviteSig, invite.key)
|
|
339
|
+
&& verifyB64(cadreInviteConsentDigest(partyId, invite.key, usage.usageStampId, usage.peerKey), usage.peerSig, usage.peerKey);
|
|
340
|
+
}
|
|
341
|
+
/**
|
|
342
|
+
* Is an invitation-admitted `CadrePeer` row (`vouchSig` null, `vouchUsage` set) a
|
|
343
|
+
* member this node should trust? The read-side mirror of the consent branch of
|
|
344
|
+
* `CadrePeer.AuthorizedInsert`, re-checked against THIS node's anchor because the
|
|
345
|
+
* replicated `OwnerKey` table can be polluted. The usage must name this peer id and this
|
|
346
|
+
* exact row incarnation (`peerStampId`); every other link is {@link verifyAdmissionChain}.
|
|
347
|
+
*
|
|
348
|
+
* Expiry, use count and withdrawal are deliberately NOT re-checked: they were conditions
|
|
349
|
+
* at redemption (`CadreInviteUsage.Authorized`), and membership persists until an owner
|
|
350
|
+
* removes the row — exactly as an owner-vouched row's membership does. Keeping a device
|
|
351
|
+
* out is removing its row AND withdrawing the invitation.
|
|
352
|
+
*
|
|
353
|
+
* Returns a boolean and never throws (the siblings' contract): malformed input or any
|
|
354
|
+
* crypto failure resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
|
|
355
|
+
*/
|
|
356
|
+
export function verifyInvitationAdmission(partyId, row, usage, invite, isAnchored) {
|
|
357
|
+
try {
|
|
358
|
+
return row.stampId !== null
|
|
359
|
+
&& row.vouchOwner !== null
|
|
360
|
+
&& row.vouchUsage !== null
|
|
361
|
+
&& usage.peerStampId === row.stampId
|
|
362
|
+
&& usage.peerId === row.peerId
|
|
363
|
+
&& verifyAdmissionChain(partyId, row.vouchOwner, row.vouchUsage, usage, invite, isAnchored);
|
|
364
|
+
}
|
|
365
|
+
catch (error) {
|
|
366
|
+
log('verifyInvitationAdmission failed: %o', error);
|
|
367
|
+
return false;
|
|
368
|
+
}
|
|
369
|
+
}
|
|
370
|
+
/**
|
|
371
|
+
* Is an invitation-admitted `OwnerKey` row (`vouchSig` null, `vouchUsage` set) an owner
|
|
372
|
+
* this node should derive into its anchor? The read-side mirror of the consent branch of
|
|
373
|
+
* `OwnerKey.Authorized` (`owner-anchor-sync.ts` → `deriveOwnerAnchor`): the invitation
|
|
374
|
+
* must grant ownership, and the usage must name this key (`peerKey`) and this exact row
|
|
375
|
+
* incarnation (`ownerStampId`); every other link is {@link verifyAdmissionChain}. Same
|
|
376
|
+
* never-throws contract and the same deliberate omissions as
|
|
377
|
+
* {@link verifyInvitationAdmission}.
|
|
378
|
+
*/
|
|
379
|
+
export function verifyInvitationOwnerAdmission(partyId, row, usage, invite, isAnchored) {
|
|
380
|
+
try {
|
|
381
|
+
return row.vouchOwner !== null
|
|
382
|
+
&& row.vouchUsage !== null
|
|
383
|
+
&& invite.grantsOwner
|
|
384
|
+
&& usage.peerKey === row.key
|
|
385
|
+
&& usage.ownerStampId === row.stampId
|
|
386
|
+
&& verifyAdmissionChain(partyId, row.vouchOwner, row.vouchUsage, usage, invite, isAnchored);
|
|
387
|
+
}
|
|
388
|
+
catch (error) {
|
|
389
|
+
log('verifyInvitationOwnerAdmission failed: %o', error);
|
|
390
|
+
return false;
|
|
391
|
+
}
|
|
392
|
+
}
|
|
197
393
|
//# sourceMappingURL=peer-authorization.js.map
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"peer-authorization.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/peer-authorization.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,mCAAmC,CAAC;AACnE,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,MAAM,4BAA4B,CAAC;
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"peer-authorization.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/peer-authorization.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,mCAAmC,CAAC;AACnE,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAE1H,OAAO,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAGjE,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC;AAErD;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,SAAS,YAAY,CAAC,MAA0B,EAAE,MAAqB,EAAE,OAAe,EAAE,SAAmB;IAC3G,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,CAAW,CAAC;AACjH,CAAC;AAED,oFAAoF;AACpF,SAAS,mBAAmB,CAAC,MAA4B,EAAE,MAAqB,EAAE,SAAmB;IACnG,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,CAAW,CAAC;AACxG,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,uBAAuB,CAAC,MAAc;IACpD,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACpE,CAAC;AAuBD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,oBAAoB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,GAA6B;IACjF,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE;QAC9D,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM;QACV,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ;QACZ,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK;QACT,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;QACnD,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE;QACb,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO;KACZ,CAAC,CAAC;AACL,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,uBAAuB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,MAAc,EAAE,OAAe;IACtF,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACxF,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,MAAc,EAAE,OAAe;IACrF,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACrF,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,qBAAqB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,MAAc,EAAE,OAAe;IACpF,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACtF,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,SAAyB,EAAE,MAAc,EAAE,OAAe;IAC1G,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAClG,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,GAAkB;IACxE,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IACpH,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACf,GAAG,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAChD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACf,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,GAAW,EAAE,OAAe;IAC7E,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,uBAAuB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/E,CAAC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,qBAAqB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,GAAW,EAAE,OAAe,EAAE,UAAkB,EAAE,QAAgB;IACvH,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;IACnF,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACf,GAAG,CAAC,kCAAkC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAC/C,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACf,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,uBAAuB,CACrC,MAAc,EACd,cAAsB,EACtB,SAAiB;IAEjB,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,MAAM,CACX,uBAAuB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAC/B,SAAS,EACT,cAAc,EACd,SAAS,EACT,WAAW,EACX,WAAW,EACX,WAAW,CACZ,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACf,GAAG,CAAC,oCAAoC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QACjD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACf,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CACpC,OAAe,EACf,MAAc,EACd,OAAe,EACf,cAAsB,EACtB,SAAiB;IAEjB,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,MAAM,CACX,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAChD,SAAS,EACT,cAAc,EACd,SAAS,EACT,WAAW,EACX,WAAW,EACX,WAAW,CACZ,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACf,GAAG,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAChD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACf,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CACpC,KAAa,EAAE,YAAoB,EAAE,OAAe,EAAE,UAAkB;IAExE,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,6BAA6B,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACnH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CAAC,GAEtC;IACC,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,MAAM,CACX,sBAAsB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAChF,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,CAC3E,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACf,GAAG,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAChD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACf,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,oBAAoB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,GAA4B;IAChF,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,0BAA0B,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7F,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,uBAAuB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,SAAiB,EAAE,YAAoB,EAAE,OAAe;IAC/G,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,+BAA+B,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC9G,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,SAAiB,EAAE,YAAoB,EAAE,OAAe;IAChH,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,+BAA+B,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/G,CAAC;AAED,2GAA2G;AAC3G,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC,SAAiB,EAAE,SAAiB,EAAE,SAAiB;IACxE,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;AACnG,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,oBAAoB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,MAAsB;IAC1E,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9F,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACf,GAAG,CAAC,iCAAiC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9C,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACf,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|
package/dist/peer-dial.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -124,6 +124,19 @@ export interface AddrDialer {
|
|
|
124
124
|
export declare class SelfRelayOnlyError extends Error {
|
|
125
125
|
constructor(label: string);
|
|
126
126
|
}
|
|
127
|
+
/**
|
|
128
|
+
* No connection to the peer formed, so nothing was sent to it. `cause` is what the dial threw:
|
|
129
|
+
* {@link dialPeerAddrs}'s error naming every address and why it failed, or a
|
|
130
|
+
* {@link SelfRelayOnlyError}.
|
|
131
|
+
*
|
|
132
|
+
* Kept apart from failures after a connection formed so a caller can tell "this device could not
|
|
133
|
+
* reach the peer" from "the peer was reached and then something else failed" without reading
|
|
134
|
+
* libp2p's error text. `SeedBootstrapService.deliverSeed` throws it, and so `CadreNode.claimNode`.
|
|
135
|
+
*/
|
|
136
|
+
export declare class PeerUnreachableError extends Error {
|
|
137
|
+
readonly peerId: string;
|
|
138
|
+
constructor(peerId: string, cause: unknown);
|
|
139
|
+
}
|
|
127
140
|
/**
|
|
128
141
|
* Dial one peer from `addrs`, one address per `dial()` call, and return the
|
|
129
142
|
* first connection that forms. Direct addresses are tried before relayed ones
|
|
@@ -184,3 +197,9 @@ export declare function tryAddrsInTurn<T>(addrs: readonly Multiaddr[], budget: P
|
|
|
184
197
|
* bounded amount of time, so the caller's order is the better guide.
|
|
185
198
|
*/
|
|
186
199
|
export declare function directBeforeRelayed(addrs: readonly Multiaddr[]): Multiaddr[];
|
|
200
|
+
/**
|
|
201
|
+
* Yield one macrotask: libp2p's dial queue drops an aborted job only on the next turn, so a
|
|
202
|
+
* dialer that moves on to another address after an abort waits this long first. Shared with
|
|
203
|
+
* the cadre invitation dialer (`cadre-invite-protocol.ts`).
|
|
204
|
+
*/
|
|
205
|
+
export declare function nextMacrotask(): Promise<void>;
|
package/dist/peer-dial.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -118,6 +118,22 @@ export class SelfRelayOnlyError extends Error {
|
|
|
118
118
|
this.name = 'SelfRelayOnlyError';
|
|
119
119
|
}
|
|
120
120
|
}
|
|
121
|
+
/**
|
|
122
|
+
* No connection to the peer formed, so nothing was sent to it. `cause` is what the dial threw:
|
|
123
|
+
* {@link dialPeerAddrs}'s error naming every address and why it failed, or a
|
|
124
|
+
* {@link SelfRelayOnlyError}.
|
|
125
|
+
*
|
|
126
|
+
* Kept apart from failures after a connection formed so a caller can tell "this device could not
|
|
127
|
+
* reach the peer" from "the peer was reached and then something else failed" without reading
|
|
128
|
+
* libp2p's error text. `SeedBootstrapService.deliverSeed` throws it, and so `CadreNode.claimNode`.
|
|
129
|
+
*/
|
|
130
|
+
export class PeerUnreachableError extends Error {
|
|
131
|
+
constructor(peerId, cause) {
|
|
132
|
+
super(`Could not reach ${peerId}: ${cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause)}`, { cause });
|
|
133
|
+
this.peerId = peerId;
|
|
134
|
+
this.name = 'PeerUnreachableError';
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
}
|
|
121
137
|
/**
|
|
122
138
|
* Dial one peer from `addrs`, one address per `dial()` call, and return the
|
|
123
139
|
* first connection that forms. Direct addresses are tried before relayed ones
|
|
@@ -263,7 +279,12 @@ function allAttemptsFailed(label, failures) {
|
|
|
263
279
|
const detail = failures.map((f) => `${f.addr.toString()} — ${f.error.message}`).join('; ');
|
|
264
280
|
return new Error(`${label} failed for all ${failures.length} candidate addresses: ${detail}`, { cause: failures[0].error });
|
|
265
281
|
}
|
|
266
|
-
|
|
282
|
+
/**
|
|
283
|
+
* Yield one macrotask: libp2p's dial queue drops an aborted job only on the next turn, so a
|
|
284
|
+
* dialer that moves on to another address after an abort waits this long first. Shared with
|
|
285
|
+
* the cadre invitation dialer (`cadre-invite-protocol.ts`).
|
|
286
|
+
*/
|
|
287
|
+
export function nextMacrotask() {
|
|
267
288
|
return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
|
|
268
289
|
}
|
|
269
290
|
//# sourceMappingURL=peer-dial.js.map
|
package/dist/peer-dial.js.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"peer-dial.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/peer-dial.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA0BG;AAEH,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AAE1B,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEnD,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AACnD,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAEvD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC;AAE5C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,kDAAkD,GAAG,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;AAExF;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,oCAAoC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAEtD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA4BG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAClD,oCAAoC,GAAG,kDAAkD,CAAC;AAU3F,gEAAgE;AAChE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAA6B;IACjE,YAAY,EAAE,kDAAkD;IAChE,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC;CAC/C,CAAC;AASF;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,kBAAmB,SAAQ,KAAK;IAC5C,YAAY,KAAa;QACxB,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,iFAAiF,CAAC,CAAC;QACjG,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC;IAClC,CAAC;CACD;AAQD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,aAAa,CAClC,MAAkB,EAClB,KAA2B,EAC3B,MAAsB,EACtB,KAAa;IAEb,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1D,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/C,MAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IACrC,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,cAAc,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACtH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAyBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,cAAc,CACnC,KAA2B,EAC3B,MAAsB,EACtB,KAAa,EACb,OAAgF;IAEhF,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7C,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAyB,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1C,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1B,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACxC,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACpB,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,mBAAmB,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,iBAAiB,KAAK,iCAAiC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACpI,SAAS;QACV,CAAC;QACD,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACzB,MAAM,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QACvB,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3D,IAAI,CAAC;YACJ,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACvH,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACd,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAClE,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YAC/B,GAAG,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5D,CAAC;IACF,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAC1C,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,CAAC,KAA2B;IAC9D,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,IAAe,EAAW,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IACzG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC9E,CAAC;AAED,yFAAyF;AACzF,SAAS,kBAAkB,CAAC,MAAkB,EAAE,KAA2B,EAAE,KAAa;IACzF,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE;QAC5B,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACzC,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;QACb,CAAC;QACD,GAAG,CAAC,+CAA+C,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7E,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACd,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,SAAS,aAAa,CAAC,IAAe,EAAE,KAAa;IACpD,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;IACxC,OAAO,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACnH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC,SAAgC,EAAE,IAAY;IAChE,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAChE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC,IAAI,CAAC;QACJ,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;IAClE,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACd,GAAG,CAAC,+DAA+D,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3F,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;AACF,CAAC;AAED,SAAS,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,QAA8B;IACvE,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3B,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;IACtD,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3B,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;IAC1B,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3F,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,mBAAmB,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,yBAAyB,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7H,CAAC;AAED,
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"peer-dial.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/peer-dial.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA0BG;AAEH,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AAE1B,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEnD,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AACnD,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAEvD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC;AAE5C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,kDAAkD,GAAG,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;AAExF;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,oCAAoC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAEtD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA4BG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sCAAsC,GAClD,oCAAoC,GAAG,kDAAkD,CAAC;AAU3F,gEAAgE;AAChE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAA6B;IACjE,YAAY,EAAE,kDAAkD;IAChE,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC;CAC/C,CAAC;AASF;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,kBAAmB,SAAQ,KAAK;IAC5C,YAAY,KAAa;QACxB,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,iFAAiF,CAAC,CAAC;QACjG,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC;IAClC,CAAC;CACD;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,oBAAqB,SAAQ,KAAK;IAC9C,YAAqB,MAAc,EAAE,KAAc;QAClD,KAAK,CAAC,mBAAmB,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QADrF,WAAM,GAAN,MAAM,CAAQ;QAElC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,sBAAsB,CAAC;IACpC,CAAC;CACD;AAQD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,aAAa,CAClC,MAAkB,EAClB,KAA2B,EAC3B,MAAsB,EACtB,KAAa;IAEb,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1D,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/C,MAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IACrC,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,cAAc,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACtH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAyBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,cAAc,CACnC,KAA2B,EAC3B,MAAsB,EACtB,KAAa,EACb,OAAgF;IAEhF,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7C,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAyB,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1C,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1B,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACxC,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACpB,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,mBAAmB,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,iBAAiB,KAAK,iCAAiC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACpI,SAAS;QACV,CAAC;QACD,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACzB,MAAM,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QACvB,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3D,IAAI,CAAC;YACJ,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACvH,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACd,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAClE,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YAC/B,GAAG,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5D,CAAC;IACF,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAC1C,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,CAAC,KAA2B;IAC9D,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,IAAe,EAAW,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IACzG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC9E,CAAC;AAED,yFAAyF;AACzF,SAAS,kBAAkB,CAAC,MAAkB,EAAE,KAA2B,EAAE,KAAa;IACzF,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE;QAC5B,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACzC,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;QACb,CAAC;QACD,GAAG,CAAC,+CAA+C,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7E,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACd,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,SAAS,aAAa,CAAC,IAAe,EAAE,KAAa;IACpD,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;IACxC,OAAO,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACnH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC,SAAgC,EAAE,IAAY;IAChE,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAChE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC,IAAI,CAAC;QACJ,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;IAClE,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACd,GAAG,CAAC,+DAA+D,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3F,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;AACF,CAAC;AAED,SAAS,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,QAA8B;IACvE,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3B,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;IACtD,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3B,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;IAC1B,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3F,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,mBAAmB,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,yBAAyB,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7H,CAAC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,aAAa;IAC5B,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACzD,CAAC"}
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@@ -118,9 +118,15 @@ export declare class PeerJoinBackfill {
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private readonly createPushClient;
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private started;
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private stopped;
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-
/**
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/**
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* Peers fully caught up this runtime (never rescheduled until the runtime is rebuilt; only
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* {@link forceCatchUpPeer} pushes to one again).
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*/
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private readonly done;
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-
/**
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/**
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* Peers with a catch-up currently running, each with that run (suppresses concurrent
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* duplicates; {@link forceCatchUpPeer} waits on the run).
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+
*/
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private readonly inFlight;
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/**
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* Peers whose (re-)schedule arrived while their OWN run was in flight, replayed once
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@@ -179,6 +185,24 @@ export declare class PeerJoinBackfill {
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* caught up, or this backfill is stopped.
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*/
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catchUpPeer(peerId: PeerId): Promise<PeerJoinBackfillResult>;
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+
/**
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* Run one peer's catch-up now and wait for it, whatever this instance remembers about the
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* peer: wait out a run already in flight for it, then push the whole store again even when
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* the peer is memoized as caught up. Never rejects; an all-zero result only when stopped.
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*
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* For a caller that must know the peer holds this store before it proceeds, where
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* {@link catchUpPeer}'s empty answer would hide a run that was denied (a `peer:identify`
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* run can pass the gate a moment before the caller authorized the peer) or a memo older
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* than the commits since.
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+
*/
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+
forceCatchUpPeer(peerId: PeerId): Promise<PeerJoinBackfillResult>;
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/**
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* Register one run in {@link inFlight} before its first await, so no second run for the
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* peer can start beside it, and replay a schedule that arrived while it ran.
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*/
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private trackRun;
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/** One run and what follows from its outcome: the memo, or a backoff re-arm. Never rejects. */
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private settleRun;
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/** Whether this network's libp2p node still holds a connection to that peer. */
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private isConnected;
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/**
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@@ -195,10 +195,16 @@ export class PeerJoinBackfill {
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this.deps = deps;
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this.started = false;
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this.stopped = false;
|
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|
-
/**
|
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+
/**
|
|
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+
* Peers fully caught up this runtime (never rescheduled until the runtime is rebuilt; only
|
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+
* {@link forceCatchUpPeer} pushes to one again).
|
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|
+
*/
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|
this.done = new Set();
|
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|
-
/**
|
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|
-
|
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+
/**
|
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+
* Peers with a catch-up currently running, each with that run (suppresses concurrent
|
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|
+
* duplicates; {@link forceCatchUpPeer} waits on the run).
|
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
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|
+
this.inFlight = new Map();
|
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|
/**
|
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|
* Peers whose (re-)schedule arrived while their OWN run was in flight, replayed once
|
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|
* that run finishes. Load-bearing for the gated path: the gate's authorization check is
|
|
@@ -342,7 +348,51 @@ export class PeerJoinBackfill {
|
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|
if (this.stopped || this.done.has(key) || this.inFlight.has(key)) {
|
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349
|
return emptyResult();
|
|
344
350
|
}
|
|
345
|
-
this.
|
|
351
|
+
return await this.trackRun(peerId);
|
|
352
|
+
}
|
|
353
|
+
/**
|
|
354
|
+
* Run one peer's catch-up now and wait for it, whatever this instance remembers about the
|
|
355
|
+
* peer: wait out a run already in flight for it, then push the whole store again even when
|
|
356
|
+
* the peer is memoized as caught up. Never rejects; an all-zero result only when stopped.
|
|
357
|
+
*
|
|
358
|
+
* For a caller that must know the peer holds this store before it proceeds, where
|
|
359
|
+
* {@link catchUpPeer}'s empty answer would hide a run that was denied (a `peer:identify`
|
|
360
|
+
* run can pass the gate a moment before the caller authorized the peer) or a memo older
|
|
361
|
+
* than the commits since.
|
|
362
|
+
*/
|
|
363
|
+
async forceCatchUpPeer(peerId) {
|
|
364
|
+
const key = peerId.toString();
|
|
365
|
+
for (let pending = this.inFlight.get(key); pending; pending = this.inFlight.get(key)) {
|
|
366
|
+
await pending;
|
|
367
|
+
}
|
|
368
|
+
if (this.stopped) {
|
|
369
|
+
return emptyResult();
|
|
370
|
+
}
|
|
371
|
+
return await this.trackRun(peerId);
|
|
372
|
+
}
|
|
373
|
+
/**
|
|
374
|
+
* Register one run in {@link inFlight} before its first await, so no second run for the
|
|
375
|
+
* peer can start beside it, and replay a schedule that arrived while it ran.
|
|
376
|
+
*/
|
|
377
|
+
async trackRun(peerId) {
|
|
378
|
+
const key = peerId.toString();
|
|
379
|
+
const run = this.settleRun(peerId);
|
|
380
|
+
this.inFlight.set(key, run);
|
|
381
|
+
try {
|
|
382
|
+
return await run;
|
|
383
|
+
}
|
|
384
|
+
finally {
|
|
385
|
+
this.inFlight.delete(key);
|
|
386
|
+
// Replay a schedule that arrived mid-run. `schedulePeer` re-checks `done`, so a run
|
|
387
|
+
// that finished clean re-arms nothing; a denied or failed one gets its retry.
|
|
388
|
+
if (this.rearmAfterFlight.delete(key)) {
|
|
389
|
+
this.schedulePeer(peerId);
|
|
390
|
+
}
|
|
391
|
+
}
|
|
392
|
+
}
|
|
393
|
+
/** One run and what follows from its outcome: the memo, or a backoff re-arm. Never rejects. */
|
|
394
|
+
async settleRun(peerId) {
|
|
395
|
+
const key = peerId.toString();
|
|
346
396
|
try {
|
|
347
397
|
const { result, clean, pushFailed } = await this.runCatchUp(peerId);
|
|
348
398
|
// NOTE: a run that hit `maxBlocks` is still "clean" and still memoizes the peer, so
|
|
@@ -375,14 +425,6 @@ export class PeerJoinBackfill {
|
|
|
375
425
|
log('[%s] catch-up peer=%s failed: %o', this.deps.label, key, error);
|
|
376
426
|
return emptyResult();
|
|
377
427
|
}
|
|
378
|
-
finally {
|
|
379
|
-
this.inFlight.delete(key);
|
|
380
|
-
// Replay a schedule that arrived mid-run. `schedulePeer` re-checks `done`, so a run
|
|
381
|
-
// that finished clean re-arms nothing; a denied or failed one gets its retry.
|
|
382
|
-
if (this.rearmAfterFlight.delete(key)) {
|
|
383
|
-
this.schedulePeer(peerId);
|
|
384
|
-
}
|
|
385
|
-
}
|
|
386
428
|
}
|
|
387
429
|
/** Whether this network's libp2p node still holds a connection to that peer. */
|
|
388
430
|
isConnected(peerId) {
|