@serfab/cadre-core 0.9.0 → 0.11.0

package/dist/control-database.js

@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ import optimysticPlugin from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-optimystic/plugin';
 import { digest, randomBytes } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
 import { CONTROL_SCHEMA } from './control-schema.js';
 import { canonicalDatetime } from './canonical-datetime.js';
+import { controlAuthorizationFields, CONTROL_TABLES } from './control-authorization.js';
+import { requireEd25519PublicKeyB64 } from './ed25519-key.js';
+import { retryControlWrite, SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY } from './control-write-retry.js';
 const log = debug('sereus:cadre:control-db');
 const timing = debug('sereus:cadre:timing');
 /**
@@ -29,6 +32,71 @@ export function generateStampId(peerId) {
     // Convert to base64url
     return uint8ArrayToString(combined, 'base64url');
 }
+/**
+ * A `FormationUsage` was to be recorded against a host `Strand` row that is not
+ * present locally.
+ *
+ * Consent is bound to the strand's one-off `StampId` (see the consent branch of
+ * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`), so the writer must read the live row before inserting.
+ * The ordinary "host strand has not converged on this responder yet" case is caught
+ * earlier and reported as `missing` by `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand`;
+ * reaching here means the row vanished between that check and the write, which is a
+ * genuine race and is surfaced rather than left to fail the deferred `StrandExists`
+ * CHECK at commit (which would drop the write with a far less legible error).
+ */
+export class MissingHostStrandError extends Error {
+    constructor(strandId, token) {
+        super(`Cannot record formation usage for token ${token}: host strand ${strandId} is not present`);
+        this.strandId = strandId;
+        this.token = token;
+        this.name = 'MissingHostStrandError';
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * A formation write was abandoned because the caller's `AbortSignal` fired BEFORE the
+ * `FormationUsage` insert was issued — the invite's single use is NOT spent.
+ *
+ * Thrown by the formation write paths ({@link ControlDatabase.recordFormationUsage},
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation}) and by `ControlFormationUsageRecorder`'s
+ * pre-approval checks when the responder's provisioning budget expires while the work is
+ * still queued (e.g. behind the write lock) or still asking the approval hook. Never
+ * thrown once the insert has been issued: a half-issued write must be allowed to land,
+ * and the formation listener's settle grace then adopts it as a successful join. The
+ * manager rethrows this error instead of mapping it to a retryable conflict — the
+ * listener's timeout path owns the reply.
+ */
+export class FormationAbortedError extends Error {
+    constructor(token, operation, options) {
+        super(`Formation ${operation} for token ${token} was aborted before its write was issued`, options);
+        this.token = token;
+        this.name = 'FormationAbortedError';
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The invitation's seat budget is already spent: the count of recorded `FormationUsage` rows
+ * for the token has reached `FormationInvite.TotalUses`, so this redemption cannot be given a
+ * seat.
+ *
+ * Raised off the committed-count check ({@link ControlDatabase.assertSeatRemains}) ahead of
+ * the write, inside {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation} /
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.recordFormationUsage} — and off nothing else. It exists because
+ * without it the refusal surfaces as a generic `CHECK constraint failed: Authorized` from the
+ * schema's own count-based cap clause, which the manager reports as a retryable
+ * `Formation conflict, retry` — telling the joiner to retry something that can never succeed.
+ * Two redemptions of one token racing on the SAME node serialize behind the local write
+ * queue, so the loser reads the winner's committed row and is refused here by name —
+ * `StrandFormationManager.validateToken`'s `isTokenUsed` check cannot catch that, since it
+ * ran before either redemption wrote anything.
+ */
+export class InvitationExhaustedError extends Error {
+    constructor(token, usesRecorded, totalUses) {
+        super(`Invitation ${token} is exhausted: ${usesRecorded} of ${totalUses} use(s) already recorded`);
+        this.token = token;
+        this.usesRecorded = usesRecorded;
+        this.totalUses = totalUses;
+        this.name = 'InvitationExhaustedError';
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Parse a stored Quereus `datetime` value into epoch milliseconds.
  *
@@ -43,40 +111,123 @@ function parseStoredDatetimeMs(value) {
     const hasZone = /[zZ]$|[+-]\d\d:?\d\d$/.test(value);
     return new Date(hasZone ? value : `${value}Z`).getTime();
 }
+/**
+ * Parse a nullable stored `datetime` column into epoch ms, mapping both "absent"
+ * and "unparseable" to null — i.e. "no expiry". Shared by every `ExpiresAt`
+ * reader so the NaN guard cannot drift between them.
+ */
+function parseNullableStoredDatetimeMs(value) {
+    if (value === null || value === undefined)
+        return null;
+    const parsed = parseStoredDatetimeMs(value);
+    return Number.isNaN(parsed) ? null : parsed;
+}
 /**
  * Build the canonical authorization message that owner signatures are bound to.
  *
- * The message is a SINGLE framed SHA-256 digest over the ordered tuple of fields (the
- * crypto plugin's injective multi-field encoding), in a fixed field order, with the
- * single-use StampId as the final field:
+ * The message is a SINGLE framed SHA-256 digest over the ordered field vector from
+ * {@link controlAuthorizationFields} (the crypto plugin's injective multi-field
+ * encoding): two fixed literals — the domain tag naming the table rule and the action
+ * tag — followed by the row fields in the schema's fixed order, with the single-use
+ * StampId as the final field where the table has one:
  *
- *   message = sha256(encodeFields([field_1, field_2, ..., StampId]))   // raw digest bytes
+ *   message = sha256(encodeFields([domain, action, field_1, ..., StampId]))   // raw digest bytes
  *
  * ed25519 signs these raw digest bytes DIRECTLY (no second hash). The SQL constraints
  * verify the identical bytes with one variadic call
- * (`verify(digest(field_1, ..., StampId), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519')`): SQL
- * `digest(...)` returns the base64url string of the same digest, which `verify`'s default
+ * (`verify(digest('CadreControl.X', 'add', field_1, ...), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519')`):
+ * SQL `digest(...)` returns the base64url string of the same digest, which `verify`'s default
  * base64url input encoding decodes back to those raw bytes — so signer and verifier
  * operate on the same bytes. Every field is TEXT on both sides (the SQL columns are
  * `cast(... as text)` / `coalesce(...,'')`; the TS args are strings), so the per-field
- * type tags agree. This binds the signature to the row contents (not a bare stamp),
- * closing the captured-stamp replay / privilege-escalation hole. Single source of truth:
- * every signed writer (and every test/harness signer) MUST build the message through this
- * function in the schema's field order, or `verify` will reject the row.
+ * type tags agree. Binding the row contents closes captured-stamp replay; the leading
+ * domain/action tags scope the signature to ONE table rule, so an approval minted for
+ * one constraint can never satisfy another (e.g. a ValidationKey enrollment can no
+ * longer double as an OwnerKey enrollment). Single source of truth: every signed writer
+ * (and every test/harness signer) MUST build the message through this function with the
+ * schema's tags and field order, or `verify` will reject the row.
  */
-export function buildAuthorizationMessage(fields) {
-    return digest([...fields], 'sha256', 'bytes');
+export function buildAuthorizationMessage(domain, action, rowFields) {
+    return digest(controlAuthorizationFields(domain, action, rowFields), 'sha256', 'bytes');
 }
-/** Runtime guard mirroring {@link ControlTable} for the dynamic-`from` count. */
-const CONTROL_TABLES = new Set([
-    'OwnerKey',
-    'ValidationKey',
-    'Strand',
-    'CadrePeer',
-    'DeviceToken',
-    'FormationInvite',
-    'FormationUsage',
-]);
+/**
+ * The exact bytes an outside approver signs to authorize ONE redemption of a
+ * `ValidationUrl`-bearing `FormationInvite` — the TS mirror of the `'vouch'` digest in
+ * `FormationUsage.Authorized`, in the schema's field order.
+ *
+ * The approval covers the whole redemption: the invitation (`token`), the single-use nonce
+ * the JOINING peer minted for THIS redemption (`usageStampId`), the network being joined
+ * (`strandId`), the joining peer's own ed25519 public key (`peerKey`), and the disclosure
+ * text. That makes it non-transferable — an approval cannot be re-presented for another use
+ * of the same invitation, another network, or another joiner — and the nonce's `unique`
+ * column makes a verbatim re-presentation a duplicate-row rejection. The joiner mints the
+ * nonce ({@link generateStampId}) and sends it in its contact message; sign these bytes over
+ * that same nonce, then pass BOTH the nonce and the signature to
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation} / {@link ControlDatabase.recordFormationUsage}:
+ * signing one nonce and inserting another fails the CHECK.
+ */
+export function formationVouchMessage(fields) {
+    return buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.FormationUsage', 'vouch', [
+        fields.token, fields.usageStampId, fields.strandId, fields.peerKey, fields.disclosure,
+    ]);
+}
+/**
+ * The exact bytes the JOINING peer signs to consent to ONE redemption of a
+ * `FormationInvite` — the TS mirror of the `'consent'` digest in the schema's
+ * `FormationUsage.PeerConsented` constraint, in its field order.
+ *
+ * A sibling of {@link formationVouchMessage}, not a replacement: the approver's vouch
+ * says the redemption may proceed, this says the joiner itself agreed to it, and the
+ * two are signed by different keys over the same nonce so neither can stand in for
+ * the other. Verify the result with `peer-authorization.ts`'s
+ * `verifyFormationConsent`, whose `formationConsentDigest` is the base64url twin of
+ * this vector — the two must stay in lockstep.
+ *
+ * `strandId` is deliberately absent, unlike its vouch sibling: the joiner cannot know
+ * the strand when it signs (a bound invite's host strand arrives only in the result
+ * frame; an unbound strand is minted by the responder). The responder cannot
+ * substitute one anyway — a bound invite is pinned to its own strand by `Authorized`,
+ * and an unbound redemption mints a fresh strand, so there is no victim to name.
+ */
+export function formationConsentMessage(fields) {
+    return buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.FormationUsage', 'consent', [
+        fields.token, fields.usageStampId, fields.peerKey, fields.disclosure,
+    ]);
+}
+/** Runtime guard for the dynamic-`from` count, over the one table list. */
+const CONTROL_TABLE_SET = new Set(CONTROL_TABLES);
+/**
+ * Which column identifies one row of each guarded table — the ONLY place that mapping
+ * lives, so a stamp read and the delete that binds to it can never disagree about it.
+ * Derived rather than passed: every guarded table has exactly one primary key, so a
+ * `(table, keyColumn)` pair on a signature is a mismatch waiting to happen.
+ */
+const GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN = {
+    OwnerKey: 'Key',
+    CadrePeer: 'PeerId',
+    ValidationKey: 'Key',
+    Strand: 'Id',
+    DeviceToken: 'PeerId',
+};
+/**
+ * Guarded tables a node may reap locally once their tombstone has committed — the
+ * tables whose `AuthorizedDelete` carries the REAP branch (see the constraint comment on
+ * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedDelete` in the schema). `Strand` is deliberately absent: its row
+ * carries `MemberPrivateKey`, the party's own membership secret for that network, stored
+ * nowhere else (tickets/backlog/debt-strand-tombstone-reap.md owns any future change).
+ * `OwnerKey` has no production removal path and `MinOneOwner` makes an automated
+ * owner-key reap a party-bricking hazard.
+ */
+export const REAPABLE_TABLES = ['CadrePeer', 'DeviceToken', 'ValidationKey'];
+/**
+ * Runtime membership test for {@link REAPABLE_TABLES}, narrowing a tombstone's
+ * `TableName` to the subset {@link ControlDatabase.reapRevokedRow} accepts. A tombstone
+ * naming an excluded table (`Strand`, `OwnerKey`) is skipped silently — `Strand`
+ * tombstones are the common case in a party that has unpublished a strand, so a log line
+ * per skip would be per-pass noise.
+ */
+const REAPABLE_TABLE_SET = new Set(REAPABLE_TABLES);
+const isReapableTable = (table) => REAPABLE_TABLE_SET.has(table);
 /**
  * ControlDatabase manages the CadreControl schema using Quereus with Optimystic backend.
  * It provides typed query methods for accessing control network data.
@@ -86,6 +237,17 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         this.db = null;
         this.collectionFactory = null;
         this.initialized = false;
+        this.membershipListener = null;
+        this.guardedDeleteListener = null;
+        /** Tail of the local-write chain — see {@link withWriteLock}. */
+        this.writeQueue = Promise.resolve();
+        /**
+         * Pacing seams for {@link lockedWithRetry}. Production leaves this empty (real backoff,
+         * real clock); specs inject a recorded `sleep` / fake `now` so no test waits out a real
+         * backoff. Applied OVER the call site's policy, so it overrides pacing without a spec
+         * having to restate the policy's attempts or classifier.
+         */
+        this.controlWriteRetryPacing = {};
         this.config = config;
     }
     /**
@@ -151,6 +313,20 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         timing('[controlDb] hydrate: %dms (tables=%d, indexes=%d)', Math.round(performance.now() - t0), hydrated.tables, hydrated.indexes);
         log('Hydrated control catalog (tables=%d, indexes=%d)', hydrated.tables, hydrated.indexes);
         // Load and execute the schema
+        // NOTE: this is where a slow launch is felt. Duration is (raw-storage operations
+        // issued) × per-operation storage latency: ~1ms/op on an idle machine, but
+        // 50-90ms/op on a loaded disk or a phone's flash under launch contention. A cold
+        // start now reaches the backend 172 times (8 tables + 1 index, 21 distinct blocks
+        // — dominated by its 130 genuine writes), a warm restart 52, because cadre-core
+        // wraps every embedder storage in `@optimystic/db-p2p`'s write-through cache
+        // (@serfab/quereus-plugin-sereus's cached-storage.ts). Uncached the same start issued ~2000 operations — the
+        // upstream re-read amplification measured in
+        // tickets/complete/optimystic-block-read-amplification-on-control-start.md (and
+        // its follow-up ...-schema-catalog-reread-per-write-blows-storage-budgets.md),
+        // which also rules out the retry policy and cluster deadlines. The counts are
+        // pinned by packages/cadre-core/test/control-start-storage-op-budget.spec.ts; if
+        // they grow — e.g. the cache leaves this path — that spec fails before anyone
+        // has to debug a launch.
         t0 = performance.now();
         await this.loadSchema();
         timing('[controlDb] loadSchema: %dms', Math.round(performance.now() - t0));
@@ -188,7 +364,36 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             log('Using embedded control schema');
             schemaContent = CONTROL_SCHEMA;
         }
-        await this.db.exec(schemaContent);
+        // Schema init is a DISTRIBUTED write, so it gets the same bounded transient-failure
+        // retry every other control write does ({@link lockedWithRetry}). Every CadreControl
+        // table is optimystic-backed (the default vtab was routed to optimystic just above),
+        // so each `create table` needs a super-majority of the party's peers to answer. On a
+        // node joining a party that already has two live members a single unanswered peer
+        // during any one create otherwise kills startup outright.
+        //
+        // Re-running the WHOLE `exec` after a partial failure is safe, and this is the
+        // non-obvious part:
+        //
+        //  - `apply schema` is a DIFF, not a replay. Quereus collects the live catalog, diffs
+        //    the declared schema against it, and only emits DDL for what is missing — which is
+        //    exactly why `initialize` hydrates persisted optimystic schemas BEFORE getting here.
+        //    Tables that already landed generate no statements on the second pass.
+        //  - a failed `create table` leaves the catalog CLEAN. `SchemaManager.createTable` calls
+        //    the module's `create` first and only registers the table on success, so the table
+        //    that failed is not in the catalog, and neither are the ones after it.
+        //
+        // Together: attempt 2 re-emits exactly the failed table and its successors. No
+        // `if not exists` juggling, no per-table loop, no statement splitting.
+        //
+        // Only the "cohort did not answer, nothing committed" class is retried; the classifier
+        // vetoes indeterminate commits and does not match `Missing block`, which is a durable
+        // convergence fault a retry cannot heal (tracked separately) and must keep propagating.
+        //
+        // This is the ONE call site on a non-default policy: the re-run safety argued above is
+        // also what lets schema init absorb optimystic's self-coordination grace refusal, which
+        // is unsafe for control writes in general. Why, on
+        // `RETRIABLE_SCHEMA_INIT_MATCHERS` in `control-write-retry.ts`.
+        await this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.db.exec(schemaContent), SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY, 'schema-init');
         log('Schema loaded and executed');
     }
     /**
@@ -226,7 +431,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     /**
      * Count rows in a CadreControl table as seen by THIS database instance.
      *
-     * `table` is validated against {@link CONTROL_TABLES} before it is interpolated
+     * `table` is validated against {@link CONTROL_TABLE_SET} before it is interpolated
      * into the `from` clause: the names are not user input, but the check keeps the
      * dynamic query off the injection surface and fails loudly on a typo instead of
      * emitting a malformed statement. The count reflects only the rows this node's
@@ -236,7 +441,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      */
     async countRows(table) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        if (!CONTROL_TABLES.has(table)) {
+        if (!CONTROL_TABLE_SET.has(table)) {
             throw new Error(`Unknown CadreControl table: ${table}`);
         }
         for await (const row of this.db.eval(`select count(1) as Count from CadreControl.${table}`)) {
@@ -269,11 +474,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      */
     async ensureOwnerKey(key) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
+        const trimmed = requireEd25519PublicKeyB64(key, 'owner key');
         if (await this.hasOwnerKey()) {
             log('Owner key already present; skipping genesis insert');
             return false;
         }
-        await this.insertOwnerKey(key);
+        await this.insertOwnerKey(trimmed);
         return true;
     }
     /**
@@ -294,15 +500,42 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     }
     /**
      * Enumerate the CadrePeer rows (cadre membership) for admin/membership reads.
+     * Includes the persisted voucher columns, which
+     * {@link CadreNode.listAuthorizedMembers} re-checks against its node-local anchor.
+     *
+     * Rows whose `StampId` is retired in `CadreControl.Revocation` are excluded HERE, so
+     * every membership reader inherits the exclusion — a revoked peer is neither
+     * authorizable nor addressable (a replayed row planted at a retired stamp must not
+     * be RPC'd or handed out as an address). Reads the retired set through
+     * {@link queryRevokedStamps} rather than inlining the SQL, so tests can interpose on
+     * that seam to model the replicated live-row-plus-tombstone merge state.
+     *
+     * NOTE: runs a second query (the retired-stamp set) per call, and this sits on the
+     * membership-gate refresh path; control tables are a handful of rows today, so this
+     * is cheap — if they ever grow, fold the exclusion into one statement or cache the
+     * retired-stamp set.
+     *
+     * NOTE: this filter is HAND-MIRRORED by the gate suites' fake control databases
+     * (`test/membership-gate-helpers.ts` and `test/cadre-node-authorized-surface.spec.ts`),
+     * which feed the node rows directly. Nothing enforces that the copies stay true, so a
+     * change to the filter's SHAPE here (what it keys on, which table it consults) must be
+     * carried into both, or those suites keep passing against a contract the database no
+     * longer honours. Fine while the filter is one `Set.has` on `StampId`; if it grows a
+     * second dimension, give the fakes a shared fixture or a contract test instead.
      */
     async queryCadrePeers() {
         this.ensureInitialized();
+        const revoked = await this.queryRevokedStamps('CadrePeer');
         const rows = [];
         for await (const row of this.db.eval('select PeerId, Multiaddr, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig from CadreControl.CadrePeer')) {
+            const stampId = row.StampId ?? null;
+            if (stampId !== null && revoked.has(stampId)) {
+                continue;
+            }
             rows.push({
                 peerId: row.PeerId,
                 multiaddr: row.Multiaddr ?? null,
-                stampId: row.StampId ?? null,
+                stampId,
                 vouchOwner: row.VouchOwner ?? null,
                 vouchSig: row.VouchSig ?? null,
             });
@@ -310,22 +543,127 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         return rows;
     }
     /**
-     * Read a single `CadrePeer` row's single-use `StampId` nonce (null when the row
-     * does not exist). Used by the owner delete / re-touch paths, which must bind
-     * their signature to the row's CURRENT nonce ({@link cadrePeerRemoveDigest} /
-     * {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest}).
+     * Every approver public key currently enrolled in `CadreControl.ValidationKey` — the
+     * set a `ValidationUrl` redemption's approval signature must be signed by (see
+     * {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder}, which checks one key at a time via
+     * {@link queryValidationKeyStampId}).
+     *
+     * Sorted in TypeScript rather than SQL so the order is stable regardless of storage
+     * order; the enrolled set is a handful of keys, so the sort is free.
+     */
+    async queryValidationKeys() {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const keys = [];
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select Key from CadreControl.ValidationKey')) {
+            keys.push(row.Key);
+        }
+        return keys.sort();
+    }
+    /**
+     * Read one guarded row's single-use `StampId` nonce (null when the row does not
+     * exist). Every owner-signed delete / re-touch path must bind its signature to the
+     * row's CURRENT nonce, so they all read through here first.
+     *
+     * Deliberately RAW — no `Revocation` filtering (unlike {@link queryCadrePeers} /
+     * {@link queryPeerRecord}): {@link deleteGuardedRow} and the insert-if-absent guard
+     * in the `CadrePeer` upsert need to see a physically present row. Filtering here
+     * would make an insert-if-absent guard read "absent" for a row that exists and
+     * collide on the primary key.
+     *
+     * `table` and its {@link GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN} column are interpolated into the SQL; both
+     * come from closed literal unions — no caller-supplied string can reach the statement
+     * (same injection-surface discipline as {@link countRows}'s `CONTROL_TABLE_SET` guard).
      */
-    async queryCadrePeerStampId(peerId) {
+    async queryStampId(table, keyValue) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select StampId from CadreControl.CadrePeer where PeerId = ?', [peerId])) {
+        const sql = `select StampId from CadreControl.${table} where ${GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN[table]} = ?`;
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval(sql, [keyValue])) {
             return row.StampId ?? null;
         }
         return null;
     }
+    /**
+     * `CadrePeer` stamp nonce — read by {@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer} as its
+     * row-present gate before it delegates to {@link deleteCadrePeer}. The in-class
+     * `CadrePeer` writers ({@link insertCadrePeer}, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}) go
+     * straight to {@link queryStampId}.
+     */
+    queryCadrePeerStampId(peerId) {
+        return this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', peerId);
+    }
+    /**
+     * `DeviceToken` stamp nonce. {@link deleteDeviceToken} reads the stamp itself, so this
+     * is the reader for callers that need to observe a live row's nonce — asserting a token
+     * was seated, or that a removal retired the stamp it named.
+     */
+    queryDeviceTokenStampId(peerId) {
+        return this.queryStampId('DeviceToken', peerId);
+    }
+    /** `Strand` stamp nonce — bound into {@link deleteStrand}'s remove digest. */
+    queryStrandStampId(strandId) {
+        return this.queryStampId('Strand', strandId);
+    }
+    /** `ValidationKey` stamp nonce — bound into {@link deleteValidationKey}'s remove digest. */
+    queryValidationKeyStampId(key) {
+        return this.queryStampId('ValidationKey', key);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Collect the retired `StampId` nonces recorded in `CadreControl.Revocation` for one
+     * {@link RevocableTable}. A stamp
+     * lands here when its row is removed ({@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer},
+     * {@link deleteValidationKey}, {@link deleteStrand}), and retirement is permanent —
+     * rows are never deleted (only their `ReissuedAt` counter moves, via
+     * {@link reissueRevocations}). Read-side mitigation for the write-time race: the
+     * schema's `NotRevoked` CHECK only sees locally visible tombstones, so a node that
+     * converged on a resurrected row before its tombstone can hold both; readers
+     * ({@link queryCadrePeers}, {@link queryPeerRecord},
+     * {@link CadreNode.resolveDeviceToken}) drop any row whose stamp appears here.
+     *
+     * NOTE: re-reads the whole retired set on every call, and the caller runs per inbound
+     * gate request while the table only ever grows. Cheap today (a cadre removes peers
+     * rarely); if removals ever become routine, cache the set and invalidate it on write.
+     */
+    async queryRevokedStamps(tableName) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const stamps = new Set();
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select StampId from CadreControl.Revocation where TableName = ?', [tableName])) {
+            stamps.add(row.StampId);
+        }
+        return stamps;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Every locally-held `CadreControl.Revocation` tombstone — identity triple plus its
+     * `ReissuedAt` counter. Consumed by the cohort-growth re-issue sweep, which
+     * enumerates what this node holds before {@link reissueRevocations} re-broadcasts
+     * it. Plain scan with no `where`, so the composite-primary-key point-lookup hazard
+     * (see the statement comment in {@link reissueRevocations}) does not arise. Unlocked,
+     * like every other read.
+     */
+    async queryRevocations() {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const rows = [];
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select TableName, RowKey, StampId, ReissuedAt from CadreControl.Revocation')) {
+            rows.push({
+                tableName: row.TableName,
+                rowKey: row.RowKey,
+                stampId: row.StampId,
+                reissuedAt: row.ReissuedAt ?? 0,
+            });
+        }
+        return rows;
+    }
     /**
      * Read a single peer's address record (the full `CadrePeer` row) by PeerId.
      *
-     * Returns null when no row exists. Missing/legacy column values are coalesced
+     * Returns null when no row exists, or when the row's `StampId` is retired in
+     * `CadreControl.Revocation` — a revoked peer reads as absent, so the resolver
+     * ({@link CadreNode.resolvePeerAddrs}) never hands out a revoked peer's addresses.
+     * The stamp is read for that check only and then dropped; the returned
+     * {@link PeerAddressRecord} shape is unchanged. Reads the retired set through
+     * {@link queryRevokedStamps} rather than inlining the SQL, so tests can interpose on
+     * that seam (see {@link queryCadrePeers}).
+     *
+     * Missing/legacy column values are coalesced
      * to their empty form (`''` key/sig, `[]` addrs, `0` stamp) so the caller's
      * verify/freshness gates uniformly reject an unpublished or malformed row.
      * The split `addrs` re-join to the exact stored `Multiaddr` (split-on-`,` is
@@ -334,7 +672,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      */
     async queryPeerRecord(peerId) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Sig from CadreControl.CadrePeer where PeerId = ?', [peerId])) {
+        const revoked = await this.queryRevokedStamps('CadrePeer');
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Sig, StampId from CadreControl.CadrePeer where PeerId = ?', [peerId])) {
+            const stampId = row.StampId ?? null;
+            if (stampId !== null && revoked.has(stampId)) {
+                return null;
+            }
             const multiaddr = row.Multiaddr ?? '';
             return {
                 peerId: row.PeerId,
@@ -355,16 +698,29 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * is the refresh path for any member — owner or drone — once its row
      * exists. `PublicKey` is intentionally not in the SET list (it is immutable on
      * self-update and the constraint enforces `new.PublicKey = old.PublicKey`).
+     *
+     * Deliberately NOT wrapped in {@link mutateCadrePeer}, the one `CadrePeer` mutator that
+     * is not: it only ever touches THIS node's own row (sole caller
+     * `CadreNode.publishSelfRecord`), and `CadreNode.listAuthorizedMembers` filters self out
+     * of the membership snapshot, so it cannot change that snapshot. It also runs on the
+     * periodic self-registration refresh, where a notify would add a recurring membership
+     * read for nothing.
+     *
+     * Its INSERT counterpart (`SeedBootstrapService.insertSelfPeerRecord`) does notify. Not an
+     * inconsistency: it shares the one owner-signed insert path with every other member's
+     * row, and a self insert happens once at startup, so the wasted refresh is a single read
+     * — cheaper than a conditional carve-out inside the shared writer. Only the repeating
+     * path is worth exempting.
      */
     async updateSelfPeerRecord(record) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         const multiaddr = record.addrs.join(',');
-        await this.db.exec(`
-      update CadreControl.CadrePeer
-        with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = ?
-        set Multiaddr = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Sig = ?
-        where PeerId = ?
-    `, [record.sig, multiaddr, record.updatedAt, record.sig, record.peerId]);
+        await this.execWrite(`
+      update CadreControl.CadrePeer
+        with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = ?
+        set Multiaddr = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Sig = ?
+        where PeerId = ?
+    `, [record.sig, multiaddr, record.updatedAt, record.sig, record.peerId], 'self-record-update');
         log('Self peer record updated: %s (updatedAt=%d)', record.peerId, record.updatedAt);
     }
     /**
@@ -375,16 +731,21 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * gates uniformly reject an unpublished or malformed row. `platform` is returned
      * verbatim (the resolver validates it against {@link PushPlatform} and re-verifies
      * the self-signature, which covers the platform field).
+     *
+     * `stampId` rides along ({@link DeviceTokenRow}) because the resolver must drop a
+     * row whose stamp is retired in `CadreControl.Revocation`; it is NOT part of
+     * {@link DeviceTokenRecord}, which is the self-signed shape the peer's `Sig` covers.
      */
     async queryDeviceToken(peerId) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select PeerId, Platform, Token, UpdatedAt, Sig from CadreControl.DeviceToken where PeerId = ?', [peerId])) {
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select PeerId, Platform, Token, UpdatedAt, Sig, StampId from CadreControl.DeviceToken where PeerId = ?', [peerId])) {
             return {
                 peerId: row.PeerId,
                 platform: (row.Platform ?? ''),
                 token: row.Token ?? '',
                 updatedAt: row.UpdatedAt ?? 0,
                 sig: row.Sig ?? '',
+                stampId: row.StampId ?? '',
             };
         }
         return null;
@@ -402,12 +763,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      */
     async updateSelfDeviceToken(record) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        await this.db.exec(`
-      update CadreControl.DeviceToken
-        with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = ?
-        set Platform = ?, Token = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Sig = ?
-        where PeerId = ?
-    `, [record.sig, record.platform, record.token, record.updatedAt, record.sig, record.peerId]);
+        await this.execWrite(`
+      update CadreControl.DeviceToken
+        with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = ?
+        set Platform = ?, Token = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Sig = ?
+        where PeerId = ?
+    `, [record.sig, record.platform, record.token, record.updatedAt, record.sig, record.peerId], 'device-token-update');
         log('Self device token updated: %s (platform=%s, updatedAt=%d)', record.peerId, record.platform, record.updatedAt);
     }
     /**
@@ -416,16 +777,20 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     async insertOwnerKey(key) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         log('Inserting owner key: %s', key);
-        // Bootstrap is authorized by the schema's `(select count(1) from OwnerKey) <= 1`
-        // branch, so no signature is needed. We still persist a fresh, unique StampId in the
-        // row's own column to satisfy the not-null/unique anti-replay constraint — the StampId
-        // is now a real column value, not the optimystic `StampId()` SQL function.
+        // Bootstrap is authorized by the schema's genesis branch — `(select count(1) from
+        // committed.OwnerKey) = 0`, i.e. the party had no owner before this transaction — so no
+        // signature is needed. Every other branch of `OwnerKey.Authorized` requires a signature
+        // from a PRE-EXISTING owner, so this method only ever succeeds on a fresh party; seating
+        // a second owner (or removing one) has no writer here and must sign the digests
+        // documented on the schema's `Authorized` constraint. We still persist a fresh, unique
+        // StampId in the row's own column to satisfy the not-null/unique anti-replay constraint —
+        // the StampId is a real column value, not the optimystic `StampId()` SQL function.
         const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
-        await this.db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.OwnerKey (Key, StampId)
-        with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
-        values (?, ?)
-    `, [key, stampId]);
+        await this.execWrite(`
+      insert into CadreControl.OwnerKey (Key, StampId)
+        with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
+        values (?, ?)
+    `, [key, stampId], 'owner-key-insert');
         log('Owner key inserted');
     }
     /**
@@ -449,18 +814,39 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // Generate a unique stamp ID using the peer ID for distributed uniqueness
         const peerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
         const stampId = generateStampId(peerId);
-        // Field order MUST match the schema's Strand `Authorized` verify:
+        // Field order MUST match the schema's Strand `AuthorizedInsert` verify:
         // Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey ('' when null), StampId.
-        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage([strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? '', stampId]);
+        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.Strand', 'add', [strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? '', stampId]);
         const signature = signMessage(message);
         // StampId is a real, unique column (single-use anti-replay), no longer a context value.
-        await this.db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?)
-    `, [ownerKey, signature, strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null, stampId]);
+        await this.execWrite(`
+      insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId)
+        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?)
+    `, [ownerKey, signature, strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null, stampId], 'strand-insert');
         log('Strand inserted: %s', strandId);
     }
+    /**
+     * Delete a strand from the control database using an owner signature.
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link insertStrand}'s row-bound approach for the delete half: the owner
+     * signs the canonical `'remove'`-tagged authorization message over (Id, StampId) — the
+     * schema's `Strand.AuthorizedDelete` verifies this DISTINCT digest, so the insert
+     * approval (which never expires) can never be replayed as a removal. The delete and
+     * the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the row's StampId commit in ONE transaction —
+     * `Strand.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete, and without the tombstone the
+     * stamp would free up and the original formation approval could re-seat the strand.
+     * Body shared with every other guarded delete via {@link deleteGuardedRow}.
+     *
+     * The remove digest binds only (Id, StampId) — not Type/MemberPrivateKey — so this
+     * works identically for open and closed strands.
+     *
+     * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
+     * when a row was actually removed.
+     */
+    deleteStrand(strandId, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        return this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.deleteGuardedRow('Strand', strandId, ownerKey, signMessage), {}, 'strand-delete');
+    }
     /**
      * Insert a validation key into the control database using an owner signature.
      *
@@ -479,32 +865,769 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         log('Inserting validation key: %s', key);
         const peerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
         const stampId = generateStampId(peerId);
-        // Field order MUST match the schema's ValidationKey `Authorized` verify: Key, StampId.
-        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage([key, stampId]);
+        // Field order MUST match the schema's ValidationKey `AuthorizedInsert` verify: Key, StampId.
+        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.ValidationKey', 'add', [key, stampId]);
         const signature = signMessage(message);
-        await this.db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.ValidationKey (Key, StampId)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?)
-    `, [ownerKey, signature, key, stampId]);
+        await this.execWrite(`
+      insert into CadreControl.ValidationKey (Key, StampId)
+        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+        values (?, ?)
+    `, [ownerKey, signature, key, stampId], 'validation-key-insert');
         log('Validation key inserted: %s', key);
     }
+    /**
+     * Delete a validation key from the control database using an owner signature.
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link insertValidationKey}'s row-bound approach for the delete half: the
+     * owner signs the canonical `'remove'`-tagged authorization message over (Key,
+     * StampId) — the schema's `ValidationKey.AuthorizedDelete` verifies this DISTINCT
+     * digest, so the enrollment approval (which never expires) can never be replayed as a
+     * removal. The delete and the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the row's StampId commit
+     * in ONE transaction — `ValidationKey.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete, and
+     * without the tombstone the stamp would free up and the original enrollment approval
+     * could re-seat the key. Body shared with every other guarded delete via
+     * {@link deleteGuardedRow}.
+     *
+     * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
+     * when a row was actually removed.
+     */
+    deleteValidationKey(key, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        return this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.deleteGuardedRow('ValidationKey', key, ownerKey, signMessage), {}, 'validation-key-delete');
+    }
+    /**
+     * Owner-vouched INSERT of one `CadrePeer` membership row, notifying the membership
+     * listener once it has committed.
+     *
+     * Mints a fresh single-use `StampId` and signs the `'vouch'`-tagged authorization
+     * message over (PeerId, StampId) — see {@link buildAuthorizationMessage} — satisfying
+     * the schema's `CadrePeer.AuthorizedInsert`. Binding the peer id to the nonce means a
+     * captured insert approval cannot be replayed (live rows are blocked by the unique
+     * `StampId` column, removed rows by `Revocation` retirement via `CadrePeer.NotRevoked`)
+     * and cannot be repurposed as a delete (which signs a distinct `'remove'`-tagged digest).
+     *
+     * The owner signature does NOT cover the address columns — those are vouched only as far
+     * as the owner asserts them, and a peer's own `Sig` (when present) is what makes the row
+     * resolvable.
+     *
+     * The {@link mutateCadrePeer} wrapper lives here rather than in the caller so no
+     * `CadrePeer` inserter can forget it — the write itself is what lets the admitted peer's
+     * traffic in.
+     *
+     * Idempotent on an already-present row: two writers can legitimately race the SAME peer's
+     * first row — the node's own background self-publish ({@link CadreNode.registerSelf})
+     * against a foreground {@link SeedBootstrapService.authorizePeer} of that node's id — and
+     * the write lock only serializes them; the loser would hit the `CadrePeer.PeerId` UNIQUE
+     * constraint. The existence check runs INSIDE the locked body, so it sees the winner's
+     * committed row (a pre-lock check would re-open the read-then-insert window). The existing
+     * row — voucher, addresses, self-`Sig` — is left untouched; re-touching a live row is
+     * {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}'s job.
+     *
+     * @param row - the membership row's columns; `multiaddr` is the comma-joined address list.
+     * @param ownerKey - public key of the vouching owner, persisted into `VouchOwner`.
+     * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash) with that owner's
+     *   private key, returning a base64url signature.
+     * @returns `true` when this call performed the INSERT, `false` when the in-lock existence
+     *   check found the row already seated. The loser needs to know: an authorize seats a row
+     *   with a null `Sig`, so a self-publish that lost the race must fall through to a
+     *   self-update or its record never lands.
+     */
+    async insertCadrePeer(row, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        // Stamp is minted from the ADMITTED peer's id, not this node's — the nonce names the
+        // row it vouches.
+        const stampId = generateStampId(row.peerId);
+        const signature = signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', [row.peerId, stampId]));
+        return await this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-insert', async () => {
+            if (await this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', row.peerId) !== null) {
+                log('CadrePeer row already present for %s; insert skipped (already a member)', row.peerId);
+                return false;
+            }
+            // Bare `exec`: already inside the write lock, which is NOT re-entrant (see the NOTE
+            // on withWriteLock — re-entry via execWrite hangs silently and permanently).
+            //
+            // Persist the vouching (owner, signature) onto the row (VouchOwner/VouchSig) —
+            // identical to the context pair, which the AuthorizedInsert constraint binds — so a
+            // reader can later re-check the voucher against its node-local trusted-owner anchor.
+            await this.db.exec(`
+        insert into CadreControl.CadrePeer (PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Sig, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig)
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+      `, [ownerKey, signature, row.peerId, row.publicKey, row.multiaddr, row.updatedAt, row.sig, stampId, ownerKey, signature]);
+            return true;
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * Owner "re-touch" of an existing `CadrePeer` membership row: bump `UpdatedAt` and
+     * rewrite `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` under the owner branch of `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate`
+     * (a signature over the SAME `'vouch'`-tagged digest {@link insertCadrePeer} builds), so
+     * the row is re-emitted as a fresh, broadcasting transaction.
+     *
+     * This is the write-while-alone re-replication primitive: a membership row that committed
+     * local-only (its block's cluster ≤1 at insert) is pushed to the cohort once it grows, by
+     * re-issuing this monotonic bump. It is an UPDATE (not the original INSERT) because the row
+     * already exists locally; a re-INSERT would hit the `PeerId` PK. Only the freshness stamp
+     * and voucher change — `PublicKey` / `Multiaddr` / `Sig` are left intact — so it is safe
+     * over a row whose peer has not self-published (`Sig` null); the caller must skip a row
+     * that already carries a self-`Sig` (that row is the owning peer's to refresh, and bumping
+     * `UpdatedAt` without re-signing would invalidate its self-signature).
+     *
+     * Signs over the row's CURRENT `StampId` (unchanged by the re-touch), read BEFORE the lock
+     * is taken. An absent row returns `false` WITHOUT notifying: nothing was written, so the
+     * membership snapshot cannot have changed.
+     *
+     * NOTE: that stamp read is outside the lock, same as {@link deleteGuardedRow}'s. A writer
+     * that removes the row in between makes the `update` match nothing, and this still returns
+     * `true` and notifies — harmless today (the sole caller, the write-while-alone drain, only
+     * logs the result, and a spurious notify just re-reads the member set), and a remove-then-
+     * re-add in the same window fails loudly instead, since the signature binds the retired
+     * stamp. If a caller ever acts on `true` as proof the row was written, fold the stamp read
+     * into the locked body.
+     *
+     * Notifies like the insert/remove paths even though this is "only" a re-touch: it rewrites
+     * VouchOwner/VouchSig, which the authorized-membership predicate judges on, so it CAN
+     * change the member set. Keeping the rule uniform ("every CadrePeer mutator notifies")
+     * beats a per-method exception the next reader has to relearn.
+     *
+     * NOTE: this rebinds VouchOwner to the CALLING owner's key, and the authorized-membership
+     * predicate (`CadreNode.listAuthorizedMembers`) now judges rows by that column against each
+     * reader's node-local anchor. Benign today because the only caller — the write-while-alone
+     * drain — re-touches solely rows this node itself authored (`pendingPeerWrites`), so the
+     * voucher is rewritten to the key that already signed it. If a future path ever lets one
+     * owner re-touch a row a DIFFERENT owner vouched, the voucher silently flips: readers that
+     * anchor the original owner but not this one would drop a legitimate member. Such a path
+     * must re-vouch deliberately (or preserve the existing VouchOwner/VouchSig) rather than
+     * inherit this rebinding.
+     *
+     * @param peerId - the membership row to re-touch.
+     * @param updatedAt - the strictly-increasing freshness stamp to write.
+     * @param ownerKey - public key of the re-vouching owner, rewritten into `VouchOwner`.
+     * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes with that owner's private key.
+     * @returns `true` when the row was re-touched, `false` when no row exists (no notify).
+     */
+    async reauthorizeCadrePeer(peerId, updatedAt, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const stampId = await this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', peerId);
+        if (stampId === null) {
+            log('reauthorizeCadrePeer: no CadrePeer row for %s (nothing to re-touch)', peerId);
+            return false;
+        }
+        const signature = signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', [peerId, stampId]));
+        await this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-reauthorize', async () => {
+            // Bare `exec` — inside the non-re-entrant write lock (see insertCadrePeer).
+            await this.db.exec(`
+        update CadreControl.CadrePeer
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          set UpdatedAt = ?, VouchOwner = ?, VouchSig = ?
+          where PeerId = ?
+      `, [ownerKey, signature, updatedAt, ownerKey, signature, peerId]);
+        });
+        return true;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Owner-signed removal of one `CadrePeer` membership row, notifying the membership
+     * listener once it has committed.
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link deleteStrand} for the membership table: the owner signs the DISTINCT
+     * `'remove'`-tagged digest over (PeerId, StampId), so the row's stored `VouchSig` can
+     * never be replayed to delete it, and the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the stamp
+     * lands in the SAME transaction — `CadrePeer.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete,
+     * and without the tombstone the never-expiring admission approval (which the removed
+     * peer holds a copy of) could re-seat the row.
+     *
+     * The {@link mutateCadrePeer} wrapper lives here rather than in the caller so no
+     * `CadrePeer` remover can forget it. It notifies whenever the body resolves, including
+     * the absent-row no-op below — a caller that must not notify for an already-absent peer
+     * gates on {@link queryCadrePeerStampId} first (see
+     * {@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer}).
+     *
+     * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
+     * when a row was actually removed.
+     */
+    deleteCadrePeer(peerId, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        return this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-remove', () => this.deleteGuardedRow('CadrePeer', peerId, ownerKey, signMessage));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Owner-signed removal of one peer's `DeviceToken` row (logout / token invalidation).
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link deleteStrand}: the owner signs the DISTINCT `'remove'`-tagged digest
+     * over (PeerId, StampId), so the insert approval can never be replayed to clear a token,
+     * and the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the stamp lands in the SAME transaction —
+     * `DeviceToken.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete, and without the tombstone the
+     * never-expiring insert approval (which the cleared device holds a copy of) could
+     * re-seat the token.
+     *
+     * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
+     * when a row was actually removed.
+     */
+    deleteDeviceToken(peerId, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        return this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.deleteGuardedRow('DeviceToken', peerId, ownerKey, signMessage), {}, 'device-token-delete');
+    }
+    /**
+     * Owner-signed delete of one guarded row plus the `Revocation` tombstone retiring its
+     * stamp, in ONE transaction. The single body behind EVERY guarded delete —
+     * {@link deleteStrand}, {@link deleteValidationKey}, {@link deleteCadrePeer},
+     * {@link deleteDeviceToken}; see any of them for the per-table security rationale. Each
+     * of those is a thin named wrapper, so callers never pass a table name and this
+     * generic shape stays off the public surface.
+     *
+     * `OwnerKey` is excluded from `table` only because no owner-key removal path exists in
+     * production yet — the schema has the `'remove'` branch (`OwnerKey.Authorized`, which
+     * requires a DIFFERENT owner as signer) and `control-revocation-replay.spec.ts` drives
+     * it with hand-rolled SQL. Widen this and add a wrapper when that path lands; the body
+     * needs no change.
+     *
+     * The row's CURRENT stamp is read first and signed over, so the remove digest binds to
+     * this exact row instance. A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row is absent —
+     * reported as `false` so a caller can tell "removed" from "was never there" without a
+     * second read (e.g. {@link CadreNode.unpublishStrand}'s committed-while-alone warning,
+     * which must not fire for a no-op).
+     *
+     * NOTE: the stamp read is outside the transaction. A concurrent writer that removes
+     * the row in between makes the signature bind a stamp that is no longer live; the
+     * delete then matches nothing and the tombstone insert collides with the other
+     * writer's on `Revocation`'s (TableName, StampId) primary key, so the transaction
+     * fails rather than silently half-applying. If concurrent owner-device removals ever
+     * become routine, fold the stamp read into the transaction instead.
+     *
+     * Deliberately NOT wrapped in {@link withWriteLock}: every public entry point already
+     * holds the (non-re-entrant) lock, so taking it again here would self-deadlock.
+     *
+     * `table` and its {@link GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN} column are interpolated into the SQL; both
+     * come from closed literal unions — no caller-supplied string reaches the statement.
+     */
+    async deleteGuardedRow(table, keyValue, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const stampId = await this.queryStampId(table, keyValue);
+        if (stampId === null) {
+            log('delete %s: no row for %s (already absent)', table, keyValue);
+            return false;
+        }
+        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage(`CadreControl.${table}`, 'remove', [keyValue, stampId]);
+        const signature = signMessage(message);
+        // The tombstone carries its OWN owner signature (`Revocation.Authorized`): retiring a
+        // stamp is permanent and party-wide, so the delete's signature deliberately does not
+        // cover it — the digests are domain-separated and neither replays as the other.
+        const revocationSignature = signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', [table, keyValue, stampId]));
+        await this.inTransaction(`delete ${table}`, async () => {
+            await this.db.exec(`
+        delete from CadreControl.${table}
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          where ${GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN[table]} = ?
+      `, [ownerKey, signature, keyValue]);
+            // ReissuedAt named explicitly at 0 (the only value FreshTombstone accepts) rather
+            // than leaning on the column default — the seat-at-zero rule is load-bearing for
+            // reissueRevocations' monotonic bump, so state it at the write site.
+            await this.db.exec(`
+        insert into CadreControl.Revocation (TableName, RowKey, StampId, ReissuedAt)
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          values (?, ?, ?, 0)
+      `, [ownerKey, revocationSignature, table, keyValue, stampId]);
+        });
+        log('%s deleted: %s (stamp retired)', table, keyValue);
+        if (this.guardedDeleteListener) {
+            try {
+                this.guardedDeleteListener({ tableName: table, rowKey: keyValue, stampId });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                log('guarded-delete listener threw (committed delete unaffected): %o', error);
+            }
+        }
+        return true;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Delete one guarded row that an ALREADY-COMMITTED `Revocation` tombstone retires —
+     * the local catch-up for a node that converged on a removal's tombstone while still
+     * holding the removed row. That live-row-plus-tombstone state is reachable only by
+     * replication merge (local writes cannot build it: `Revocation.RowIsGone` refuses a
+     * tombstone while the row is live), and replication cannot carry the delete itself —
+     * replaying a delete of a row that is already gone locally is a no-op — so without
+     * this the stale row is permanent garbage on every node that held it at revocation
+     * time. Authorized by the REAP branch of the table's `AuthorizedDelete`: the
+     * tombstone is itself owner-signed (`Revocation.Authorized`), so no owner key is
+     * needed HERE — any node holding row + tombstone may reap, drones included.
+     *
+     * Returns whether a row was removed: `false` without writing when the row is absent
+     * locally (the common case on most nodes), or when its live stamp is not `stampId`
+     * (a fresh incarnation the owner re-seated, which the old tombstone must not touch).
+     *
+     * The delete's WHERE clause binds `StampId` too — required, not belt-and-braces: an
+     * owner may re-seat the row (fresh stamp) between the stamp read below and the
+     * statement, and without the clause the reap would delete the owner's brand-new row.
+     * With it the statement matches nothing and the reap is a silent no-op (the schema
+     * branch would also refuse that delete, but as a constraint error thrown into a
+     * background sweep — matched-nothing is the better failure mode). Like
+     * {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, a race lost AFTER the guard still returns `true`;
+     * harmless — nothing was deleted, and the next sweep re-reads.
+     *
+     * Writes NOTHING to `Revocation`: `RevocationRecorded` is satisfied by the same
+     * committed tombstone that authorizes the reap, so a reap files no second tombstone.
+     * It therefore does NOT fire the guarded-delete listener either — that seam exists to
+     * queue a tombstone for re-issue when it committed while alone, and a reap has no
+     * tombstone of its own to re-issue. A reap that commits while alone needs no
+     * re-replication at all: every OTHER node either already lacks the row, or holds the
+     * same committed tombstone and reaps its own copy.
+     *
+     * NOTE: the reap delete is keyed on the primary key; the `StampId` predicate is applied
+     * where the statement runs. If a reap on one node ever has to be reconciled against an
+     * owner re-seat of the same key that landed on another node, whether the delete or the
+     * re-seat wins is decided by the collection's merge order, not by this clause — the same
+     * ordering question the owner-signed delete path already carries
+     * (`tickets/blocked/forked-control-collection-sync-livelocks.md`). Only matters once a
+     * sweep drives this automatically on connected nodes; if that reconcile ever drops a
+     * freshly re-seated row, this is the site.
+     *
+     * `table` and its {@link GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN} column come from closed literal unions —
+     * no caller-supplied string reaches the statement (same injection-surface discipline
+     * as {@link deleteGuardedRow}). The `with context` clause is PRESENT and bound to
+     * nulls, never omitted: Quereus cannot resolve `context.OwnerKey` at plan time when
+     * the clause is absent while a constraint references `context.*` (nulls through a
+     * present clause are the shape {@link redeemInvitation}'s consent-branch insert ships).
+     *
+     * Driven automatically by {@link reapRevokedRows}, which the periodic control-cohort
+     * reconcile pass runs while the node has at least one control connection.
+     */
+    async reapRevokedRow(table, rowKey, stampId) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const liveStamp = await this.queryStampId(table, rowKey);
+        if (liveStamp === null) {
+            log('reap %s: no row for %s (nothing to reap)', table, rowKey);
+            return false;
+        }
+        if (liveStamp !== stampId) {
+            log('reap %s: %s holds a fresh incarnation (live stamp differs from the tombstoned one); leaving it', table, rowKey);
+            return false;
+        }
+        const sql = `
+      delete from CadreControl.${table}
+        with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
+        where ${GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN[table]} = ? and StampId = ?
+    `;
+        if (table === 'CadrePeer') {
+            // Through mutateCadrePeer so the "EVERY CadrePeer writer goes through here"
+            // invariant keeps holding with no new documented exception. The membership
+            // snapshot cannot actually change — queryCadrePeers already dropped this row via
+            // the retired-stamp gate — so the notify is a redundant refresh. Bare exec:
+            // already inside the non-re-entrant write lock (see insertCadrePeer).
+            //
+            // NOTE: reapRevokedRows calls this in a loop, so a sweep that clears K CadrePeer
+            // rows fires K redundant gate refreshes (two table scans each), awaited serially.
+            // Harmless today — K is the backlog of unreaped rows, which a party burns down to
+            // 0 on its first connected tick and holds there. If a party ever reaps many rows
+            // in one pass, hoist the notify to one refresh after the sweep instead.
+            await this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-reap', () => this.db.exec(sql, [rowKey, stampId]));
+        }
+        else {
+            await this.execWrite(sql, [rowKey, stampId], `reap-${table}`);
+        }
+        // A row leaving the control plane without an owner signature at the write site
+        // should be visible in a log.
+        log('REAPED %s row %s (stamp %s): committed tombstone authorized local removal, no owner signature', table, rowKey, stampId);
+        return true;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Sweep every locally-held `Revocation` tombstone and {@link reapRevokedRow} the guarded
+     * row each one retires, returning how many rows were actually removed.
+     *
+     * This is the enumeration half of the reap: replication carries the tombstone but cannot
+     * carry the delete (replaying a delete of an already-absent row is a no-op), so a node
+     * that converged on a removal while holding the removed row keeps that row as inert
+     * garbage until something walks the tombstones and drops it. `CadreNode`'s periodic
+     * control-cohort reconcile pass is that something, gated on the node having at least one
+     * control connection (a reap is a write, and a write committed alone is local-only).
+     *
+     * Enumerated UNLOCKED, deleted per-row LOCKED: {@link reapRevokedRow} takes the write
+     * lock itself (via {@link mutateCadrePeer} / {@link execWrite}) and the lock is not
+     * re-entrant, so this loop must not hold it. Same structure as
+     * `CadreNode.reissueAuthoredMembershipRows`.
+     *
+     * Two rows are deliberately left alone:
+     *
+     * - **Tables outside {@link REAPABLE_TABLES}** (`Strand`, `OwnerKey`) — no reap branch
+     *   exists on their `AuthorizedDelete`, so the delete would throw rather than no-op.
+     * - **This node's OWN `CadrePeer` / `DeviceToken` row** (`selfPeerId`). Reaping it would
+     *   fight this node's own re-registration: `registerSelf` / `retouchSelfDeviceToken` run
+     *   on the heartbeat and the growth drain, and after a self-reap their insert-if-absent
+     *   guard takes the INSERT path — which needs an owner signature `NotRevoked` refuses for
+     *   a retired stamp, and which a revoked drone cannot produce at all. The trade is
+     *   recurring failure noise every cycle against removing the one stale row nobody else
+     *   reads from this node (every other node already filters it by tombstone). A revoked
+     *   node therefore keeps its own copy of its own row; "a node that learns it has been
+     *   revoked should shut itself down" is a distinct behaviour and its own ticket.
+     *   `ValidationKey` has no self notion and is not special-cased.
+     *
+     * A per-row failure is logged and skipped rather than aborting the sweep: an abort would
+     * starve every tombstone after the failing one on every subsequent pass, and each row is
+     * independent. Returns the count so far if the database is closed mid-sweep.
+     *
+     * `selfPeerId` is a parameter rather than read from the injected libp2p node so the
+     * skip-self rule is exercisable without one.
+     *
+     * NOTE: cost is O(tombstones), not O(live rows) — one {@link queryRevocations} scan plus
+     * one {@link queryStampId} point lookup per tombstone, and the empty-table early return
+     * makes the common case (a party that has never revoked anyone) a single scan per pass.
+     * But `Revocation` is append-only and unbounded, so this is O(all tombstones ever) point
+     * lookups on every reconcile tick. Fine while revocations stay rare for a cadre-sized
+     * party; if the table ever grows, persist a node-local high-water mark of what has
+     * already been reaped instead of re-scanning everything (the same bound the sweep in
+     * `CadreNode.drainPendingRevocations` wants).
+     */
+    async reapRevokedRows(selfPeerId) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const held = await this.queryRevocations();
+        if (held.length === 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+        let reaped = 0;
+        for (const tombstone of held) {
+            // Teardown guard, per row: close() can land mid-sweep (the reconcile pass that
+            // drives this outlives no node, but it does not hold the node's lifecycle either).
+            if (!this.initialized || !this.db) {
+                return reaped;
+            }
+            if (!isReapableTable(tombstone.tableName)) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (tombstone.rowKey === selfPeerId
+                && (tombstone.tableName === 'CadrePeer' || tombstone.tableName === 'DeviceToken')) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            try {
+                if (await this.reapRevokedRow(tombstone.tableName, tombstone.rowKey, tombstone.stampId)) {
+                    reaped++;
+                }
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                log('reap sweep: %s row %s (stamp %s) failed (continuing): %o', tombstone.tableName, tombstone.rowKey, tombstone.stampId, error);
+            }
+        }
+        return reaped;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Owner-signed re-issue of a batch of `Revocation` tombstones: bump each row's
+     * `ReissuedAt` to `reissuedAt` in ONE transaction. Re-writing the row is what makes
+     * the storage layer re-broadcast it — a tombstone that committed while the node was
+     * alone is local-only, and unlike an insert a delete cannot be replayed (the guarded
+     * row is already gone locally), so the tombstone is the half of a removal that can
+     * still carry it to the rest of the party.
+     *
+     * One transaction, not one per row: a sweep may cover every tombstone in the table,
+     * and each separate commit is a separate round of network work. One owner signature
+     * per row: `AuthorizedReissue`'s digest binds (TableName, RowKey, StampId,
+     * ReissuedAt). `reissuedAt` must be STRICTLY above every affected row's current
+     * value (`ReissueOnly`); callers derive it as `Math.max(Date.now(), max(existing) + 1)`,
+     * mirroring {@link CadreNode.reissuePeerAuthorize}'s monotonic bump. Re-issuing a
+     * tombstone whose guarded row was never present locally is the normal case (a node
+     * that converged on the tombstone but never held the row) — a re-issue files no
+     * delete, so `RowIsGone` / `RevocationRecorded` are not involved.
+     *
+     * A constraint failure on any row rolls the WHOLE batch back and propagates —
+     * {@link lockedWithRetry}'s classifier only re-presents transient cluster failures,
+     * so a real refusal (non-owner signer, or a stale counter when two owner devices
+     * sweep concurrently and the loser's `ReissueOnly` CHECK fails) surfaces to the
+     * caller, which retries with a fresh counter on its next sweep. A row whose
+     * `StampId` matches nothing locally is a silent no-op statement; callers enumerate
+     * via {@link queryRevocations} first, so they only name stamps they hold.
+     *
+     * Returns how many UPDATE statements ran (`rows.length` on success).
+     */
+    reissueRevocations(rows, reissuedAt, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        // Signatures minted OUTSIDE the locked body: a retried attempt must re-present the
+        // exact signed message, never re-mint (the contract on withWriteLock). ReissuedAt
+        // rides in the digest as a string — SQL-side it is cast(new.ReissuedAt as text),
+        // and every digest field is TEXT on both sides (see buildAuthorizationMessage).
+        const signed = rows.map((row) => ({
+            row,
+            signature: signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.Revocation', 'reissue', [row.tableName, row.rowKey, row.stampId, String(reissuedAt)])),
+        }));
+        return this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
+            // Counter lives INSIDE the locked body so a lockedWithRetry re-run (which
+            // re-executes the whole body) starts from zero instead of double-counting.
+            let executed = 0;
+            await this.inTransaction('reissue revocations', async () => {
+                for (const { row, signature } of signed) {
+                    // Keyed on StampId ALONE, deliberately. Equality on every column of the
+                    // composite primary key (TableName, StampId) makes the optimystic vtab claim
+                    // the predicate as a point lookup with no engine-side re-check, and that
+                    // descent has been observed returning zero rows for a row that provably
+                    // exists (tickets/backlog/debt-composite-pk-point-lookup-unreliable-untracked).
+                    // A re-issue that silently matched nothing would report success and
+                    // replicate nothing — the exact failure this path exists to remove. StampId
+                    // alone is a non-leading subset of the key, which the module declines, so
+                    // the read is a scan the engine filters; a StampId is 128 bits of CSPRNG
+                    // output minted per row incarnation (generateStampId), so it identifies one
+                    // row across all TableName values. Do NOT "fix" this by adding TableName to
+                    // the where clause.
+                    await this.db.exec(`
+            update CadreControl.Revocation
+              with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+              set ReissuedAt = ?
+              where StampId = ?
+          `, [ownerKey, signature, reissuedAt, row.stampId]);
+                    executed++;
+                }
+            });
+            log('Reissued %d revocation tombstone(s) at %d', executed, reissuedAt);
+            return executed;
+        }, {}, 'revocation-reissue');
+    }
+    /**
+     * Run `body` between `beginTransaction` and `commit`, rolling back on failure.
+     *
+     * A failed `commit()` has already torn the transaction down, so the `rollback()` in
+     * the failure path would itself throw "No transaction active" and mask the real
+     * cause — that secondary throw is logged and swallowed, and the original error always
+     * propagates.
+     *
+     * It opens a transaction unconditionally (Quereus hard-throws on a nested
+     * `beginTransaction`), so a caller already inside one must not call it. A `CadrePeer`
+     * write nests this INSIDE {@link mutateCadrePeer}, never the reverse — see
+     * {@link assertCommitBoundary}.
+     *
+     * Private: every multi-statement control write lives in this class (the owner-signed
+     * delete/tombstone pairs all go through {@link deleteGuardedRow}), so needing to widen
+     * this is a sign the writer that wants it belongs in here too.
+     *
+     * Deliberately NOT wrapped in {@link withWriteLock}: callers already hold the
+     * (non-re-entrant) lock, so taking it again here would self-deadlock.
+     *
+     * @param label - What the transaction was doing, for the rollback log line.
+     */
+    async inTransaction(label, body) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        await this.db.beginTransaction();
+        try {
+            await body();
+            await this.db.commit();
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            try {
+                await this.db.rollback();
+            }
+            catch (rollbackError) {
+                log('Rollback after %s failure was a no-op: %s', label, rollbackError);
+            }
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Wire (or clear, with null) the single listener notified after every committed
+     * `CadreControl.CadrePeer` row write.
+     *
+     * At most one listener: a ControlDatabase instance belongs to exactly one
+     * {@link CadreNode}, which wires this in `start()` and clears it on teardown. A
+     * second call replaces the first rather than fanning out, so a stale node can
+     * never keep receiving notifications for a database it no longer owns.
+     */
+    setMembershipChangeListener(listener) {
+        this.membershipListener = listener;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Wire (or clear, with null) the single listener notified after every committed
+     * guarded-table delete. Same ownership contract as
+     * {@link setMembershipChangeListener}: one CadreNode, one listener, a second
+     * call replaces the first.
+     */
+    setGuardedDeleteListener(listener) {
+        this.guardedDeleteListener = listener;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Run a `CadrePeer` row mutation and notify the membership listener once it has
+     * COMMITTED.
+     *
+     * EVERY `CadrePeer` writer goes through here, with one documented exception
+     * ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord}, which cannot change the snapshot) — that is what makes
+     * the party-membership snapshot refresh automatic rather than a caller obligation. A
+     * writer necessarily holds the target node's ControlDatabase (the `SeedBootstrapService`'s
+     * event callbacks are NOT a viable seam: the temp services `CadreNode.applySeed`/
+     * `dialInvite` build, and services constructed outside `CadreNode` entirely, never get
+     * callbacks wired), so this is the one point on the write path that cannot be bypassed.
+     *
+     * `body` owns its own transaction if it needs one and must COMMIT before returning, so
+     * the notification never makes the listener read uncommitted state. A throwing `body`
+     * propagates and does NOT notify: nothing changed.
+     *
+     * That contract is enforced, not merely documented — see {@link assertCommitBoundary}.
+     *
+     * Runs under {@link withWriteLock}, notification included: with the lock held through
+     * the notify, no other local writer can have a transaction open while the listener
+     * reads, so the listener always sees exactly the committed state it was told about.
+     * The listener itself only READS (it re-materializes the membership snapshot) — a
+     * listener that wrote through a locked method would deadlock.
+     *
+     * Reaches the lock through {@link lockedWithRetry}, so after a transient cluster
+     * failure the WHOLE locked body re-runs — `body` must be atomic and re-runnable (the
+     * contract on {@link withWriteLock}). The notify sits after a successful `body` inside
+     * the same attempt and a throwing attempt never reaches it, so a retried mutation
+     * still notifies exactly once: on the attempt that commits, and not at all on
+     * exhaustion.
+     *
+     * @param reason - Label for the log line only (e.g. `'peer-insert'`).
+     */
+    async mutateCadrePeer(reason, body) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        return this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
+            this.assertCommitBoundary(reason, 'on entry to');
+            const result = await body();
+            this.assertCommitBoundary(reason, 'on return from');
+            await this.notifyMembershipChanged(reason);
+            return result;
+        }, {}, reason);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Run one local write under the database-wide write lock, serializing it against
+     * every other local writer on this ControlDatabase.
+     *
+     * Quereus tracks transaction state per `Database` (`getAutocommit()`), and a write
+     * statement's implicit transaction stays open across the awaits inside `exec`. Two
+     * local writers interleaving mid-statement therefore either trip
+     * {@link assertCommitBoundary} (any `CadrePeer` path) or silently join each other's
+     * open transaction — a torn commit if either side rolls back. This lock closes that
+     * class: every public write method of this class runs its statement(s) under it, and
+     * `SeedBootstrapService` wraps its direct `db.exec` writes in it too. The race is
+     * real, not theoretical: the background self-record publish on a control connection
+     * opening (`CadreNode.drainPendingControlReplication` → `registerSelf`) collided with
+     * a foreground `authorizePeer` — both `CadrePeer` inserts — and tripped the boundary
+     * assert.
+     *
+     * Reads are deliberately not locked: they take no transaction of their own, and
+     * serializing them here would let a listener that reads during a notify (see
+     * {@link mutateCadrePeer}) deadlock. The lock is NOT re-entrant — a locked writer's
+     * body must never call another locked public method; the private bodies it composes
+     * ({@link deleteGuardedRow}, {@link inTransaction}) stay bare for exactly that reason.
+     *
+     * NOTE: re-entry fails SILENTLY and PERMANENTLY. A locked body that calls another
+     * locked public method (including a {@link mutateCadrePeer} body, which runs an
+     * arbitrary caller-supplied callback) queues behind its own tail and never resolves —
+     * no error, and it strands the whole write queue, not only that call. There is no
+     * cheap fail-fast: a "held" flag cannot tell re-entry from a legitimately queued
+     * concurrent writer. Compose bare private bodies instead.
+     *
+     * A locked body must also be ATOMIC and RE-RUNNABLE: the public write surface reaches
+     * this lock through {@link lockedWithRetry}, which re-runs the WHOLE body after a
+     * transient cluster failure. Atomic holds for every body today — one statement, or
+     * wrapped in {@link inTransaction} — so a failed attempt leaves nothing half-applied;
+     * re-runnable means a retry re-runs the body's reads too, which is what makes it safe.
+     * Signatures and stamp ids minted OUTSIDE the body are deliberately NOT re-minted per
+     * attempt: a retry re-presents the exact signed message the first attempt presented.
+     */
+    async withWriteLock(fn) {
+        // Chain behind the current tail regardless of how it settled, then park a
+        // swallowed copy as the new tail so one failed write never poisons the queue.
+        const run = this.writeQueue.then(fn, fn);
+        this.writeQueue = run.then(() => undefined, () => undefined);
+        return run;
+    }
+    /**
+     * {@link withWriteLock} plus the bounded transient-failure retry
+     * ({@link retryControlWrite}) — the wrapper the whole public write surface goes
+     * through, so a control write that failed because the cluster cohort did not answer is
+     * re-presented a moment later instead of surfacing to ~19 callers that are not
+     * uniformly written to retry.
+     *
+     * The retry wraps the LOCK, it does not live inside it: each attempt takes and
+     * releases the lock, and the backoff sleeps with NO lock held, so a write parked in
+     * backoff never stalls the other local writers queued behind it. Safe because every
+     * locked body is atomic and re-runnable (the contract on {@link withWriteLock}).
+     *
+     * Also carries {@link loadSchema}'s distributed DDL, the one caller that runs BEFORE
+     * `initialized` is set — so it reaches this method directly rather than through
+     * {@link execWrite}, whose {@link ensureInitialized} would reject it. The write queue is
+     * necessarily empty at that point, so the lock is uncontended there; it is taken anyway
+     * rather than carving out a lockless path. It is also the ONLY caller that passes a
+     * `policy` — everything else takes the default, whose classifier and attempt count are
+     * unchanged by that call site existing.
+     *
+     * `label` names the operation in this loop's debug lines and nothing else
+     * ({@link ControlWriteRetryOptions.label}). Every call site in this class supplies one:
+     * several writes retry CONCURRENTLY in a real party, so an unlabelled line cannot be
+     * attributed to a write — keep new call sites labelled.
+     */
+    lockedWithRetry(fn, policy = {}, label) {
+        // The label lands LAST so a call site's own name survives both the policy and the
+        // spec-injected pacing; it changes log attribution only, never behaviour.
+        return retryControlWrite(() => this.withWriteLock(fn), { ...policy, ...this.controlWriteRetryPacing, ...(label !== undefined ? { label } : {}) });
+    }
+    /**
+     * One-statement local write, serialized by {@link withWriteLock} and retried on a
+     * transient cluster failure via {@link lockedWithRetry}. Prefer this over a bare
+     * `getDatabase().exec` so a new writer cannot forget the lock — the hazard
+     * {@link assertCommitBoundary} can only catch after the fact.
+     *
+     * Public so `SeedBootstrapService`'s direct `CadrePeer`/`DeviceToken` SQL writes go
+     * through the same seam. Must NOT be called from inside an already-locked body (the
+     * lock is not re-entrant); such a caller uses a bare `getDatabase().exec` instead.
+     *
+     * `label` names the write in the retry loop's debug lines (see {@link lockedWithRetry});
+     * optional only because it is log-only, but every caller in this repo passes one.
+     */
+    execWrite(sql, params, label) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        return this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.db.exec(sql, params), {}, label);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Throw unless the database sits at a committed boundary — `getAutocommit()` is false
+     * exactly while a transaction is open.
+     *
+     * Both ends of a {@link mutateCadrePeer} body are checked, because either open
+     * transaction would notify a listener that then reads PRE-commit state and materializes
+     * a membership snapshot silently missing the write it was told about:
+     *
+     * - open on entry: the wrapper sits INSIDE an enclosing transaction and must be moved
+     *   out to enclose that outer commit.
+     * - open on return: the body opened a transaction and never committed it.
+     *
+     * Neither is reachable from today's callers, so this is a fail-fast guard on a future
+     * mistake rather than a live code path.
+     *
+     * NOTE: `getAutocommit()` reports the whole `Database`, not this call. Local writers
+     * serialize through {@link withWriteLock}, so with every writer locked this can only
+     * trip on the two misuses above. A writer that bypasses the lock (a new method that
+     * forgets it, or raw `getDatabase().exec` outside a locked wrapper) re-opens the
+     * concurrent-writer window, and this assert is what catches it — it throws instead of
+     * silently joining the other write's transaction.
+     */
+    assertCommitBoundary(reason, where) {
+        if (this.db.getAutocommit()) {
+            return;
+        }
+        throw new Error(`mutateCadrePeer(${reason}): a transaction is open ${where} the mutation body — a ` +
+            'CadrePeer write must commit before the membership listener runs; move the ' +
+            'mutateCadrePeer wrapper out to enclose the commit');
+    }
+    /**
+     * Best-effort notify. A listener that throws is logged and swallowed: the write has
+     * already committed, and it must never be reported as failed because a downstream
+     * snapshot refresh did. A null listener (no `CadreNode` attached — e.g. the service
+     * unit tests drive a bare control DB) is a silent no-op.
+     */
+    async notifyMembershipChanged(reason) {
+        if (!this.membershipListener) {
+            return;
+        }
+        try {
+            await this.membershipListener(reason);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            log('Membership change listener failed (%s): %s', reason, error);
+        }
+    }
     /**
      * Insert an owner-signed `FormationInvite` (open invitation token).
      *
      * The invite is the on-network record that later authorizes an
      * owner-signature-FREE `Strand` creation: an invited cadre peer redeems it
      * by inserting a matching `FormationUsage` row (see {@link redeemInvitation}),
-     * which satisfies the consent branch of `Strand.Authorized`.
+     * which satisfies the consent branch of `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`.
      *
      * Like {@link insertStrand}/{@link insertValidationKey}, the owner signs the
      * canonical row-bound authorization message (see {@link buildAuthorizationMessage})
      * over (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId) — NOT a
      * bare stamp — so the signature is bound to this invite's contents and cannot be
      * transplanted onto an attacker-chosen row. The StampId is persisted as a unique
-     * column for single-use anti-replay. `FormationInvite.AuthorizedAddOrRemove` gates
-     * both insert and delete; its `coalesce(new, old)` verify binds the NEW row on
-     * insert and the OLD row on delete.
+     * column for single-use anti-replay. `FormationInvite.AuthorizedInsert` gates insert
+     * over an `'add'`-tagged digest; deletes verify a DISTINCT `'remove'`-tagged digest
+     * (`AuthorizedDelete`), so this insert approval can never be replayed as a revocation.
      *
      * `StrandId` binds the invite to a pre-existing host strand (provision-then-record):
      * when set, a responder redeeming this token records a `FormationUsage` against that
@@ -545,19 +1668,19 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         const totalUsesField = options.totalUses == null ? '' : String(options.totalUses);
         const validationUrlField = options.validationUrl ?? '';
         const strandIdField = options.strandId ?? '';
-        // Field order MUST match the schema's FormationInvite `AuthorizedAddOrRemove` verify:
+        // Field order MUST match the schema's FormationInvite `AuthorizedInsert` verify:
         // Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId.
-        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage([
+        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.FormationInvite', 'add', [
             token, sAppId, expiresAtField, totalUsesField, validationUrlField, strandIdField, stampId,
         ]);
         const signature = signMessage(message);
         // Persist the canonical ExpiresAt string (datetime parse is idempotent on it) so the
         // signed source-of-truth and the stored value are produced once. StampId is a real,
         // unique column (single-use anti-replay), no longer a context value.
-        await this.db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.FormationInvite (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+        await this.execWrite(`
+      insert into CadreControl.FormationInvite (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId)
+        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
     `, [
             ownerKey, signature,
             token, sAppId,
@@ -566,7 +1689,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             options.validationUrl ?? null,
             options.strandId ?? null,
             stampId,
-        ]);
+        ], 'formation-invite-insert');
         log('Formation invite inserted: %s', token);
     }
     /**
@@ -574,78 +1697,163 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * `FormationUsage` row **atomically, in one transaction**.
      *
      * The two CHECK constraints are mutually circular under immediate evaluation:
-     * `Strand.Authorized`'s consent branch requires the `FormationUsage` row, while
-     * `FormationUsage.StrandExists` requires the `Strand` row. Both CHECKs contain
+     * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`'s consent branch requires a `FormationUsage` row naming
+     * this strand's `(Id, StampId)`, while `FormationUsage.StrandExists` requires a
+     * `Strand` row matching that same pair — the ONE freshly-minted `strandStampId` below
+     * satisfies both, which is what binds the consent record to this specific strand ROW
+     * (so a later owner-signed, tombstoned removal cannot be undone by re-inserting the
+     * id with a fresh stamp). Both CHECKs contain
      * subqueries, so Quereus auto-defers them to transaction commit — wrapping both
      * inserts in a single explicit `begin … commit` lets both deferred CHECKs see
      * both rows at commit. The strand is authorised WITHOUT an owner signature
-     * (the `FormationUsage` branch of `Strand.Authorized`) but still gets a fresh,
+     * (the `FormationUsage` branch of `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`) but still gets a fresh,
      * unique `StampId` column to satisfy the not-null/unique anti-replay column.
      *
-     * `UseNumber` is computed as `max(UseNumber)+1` for the token (the `Monotonic`
-     * constraint); callers redeeming concurrently against the same token must
-     * serialise, since the next use number is read before the insert.
+     * The seated strand is always open (`'o'`) and keyless — the consent branch of
+     * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert` accepts nothing else, the invite must be UNBOUND
+     * (`FormationInvite.StrandId` null; a bound invite's host strand is owner-provisioned
+     * and only ever record-only, see {@link recordFormationUsage}), and a given strand id
+     * may be consent-seated once, EVER: after an owner-signed removal, re-joining that id
+     * takes an owner re-seat ({@link insertStrand}) plus a bound invite, never another
+     * redemption.
+     *
+     * The usage row is keyed by the joiner's own nonce (`UsageStampId` is the primary key), so
+     * concurrent redemptions of one token never contend for a shared row key — there is no
+     * lost race to retry and no second trip through the approval hook. The invite's seat
+     * budget is checked by COUNT ({@link assertSeatRemains}) inside the write lock, ahead of
+     * the write, so a spent invite is refused by name (`InvitationExhaustedError`) instead of
+     * as the schema cap clause's generic `Authorized` CHECK failure.
      */
     async redeemInvitation(params) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const { token, strandId, type = 'o', memberPrivateKey, disclosure = '', peerId, peerSignature, nowMs, validationKey, validationSignature, } = params;
+        const { token, strandId, disclosure = '', peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, nowMs, validationKey, validationSignature, signal, totalUses, } = params;
         log('Redeeming invitation %s -> strand %s', token, strandId);
         const localPeerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
+        // A failed attempt rolls its whole transaction back, so nothing was ever persisted under
+        // this stamp, and it is deliberately not part of the approver's signed digest.
         const strandStampId = generateStampId(localPeerId);
-        const useNumber = await this.nextUseNumber(token);
-        await this.db.beginTransaction();
-        try {
-            // 1. Strand row — authorised by the FormationUsage branch (no owner sig),
-            //    still carrying a fresh unique StampId for the anti-replay column.
-            await this.db.exec(`
-        insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId)
-          with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
-          values (?, ?, ?, ?)
-      `, [strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null, strandStampId]);
-            // 2. FormationUsage row — authorised by the matching FormationInvite.
-            await this.execFormationUsageInsert({
-                token, useNumber, disclosure, strandId,
-                peerId: peerId ?? localPeerId, peerSignature: peerSignature ?? null, nowMs: nowMs ?? Date.now(),
-                validationKey: validationKey ?? null, validationSignature: validationSignature ?? null,
-            });
-            await this.db.commit();
-            log('Redeemed invitation %s -> strand %s (use #%d)', token, strandId, useNumber);
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            // A failed commit() already tears down the transaction, so rollback() would
-            // throw "No transaction active" and mask the real cause — swallow only that.
-            try {
-                await this.db.rollback();
+        // Ordering inside the locked body is contractual: the abort check, then the seat check,
+        // then the write — FormationAbortedError may only ever be thrown before the write is
+        // issued, and a transient-failure retry (lockedWithRetry re-runs the whole body) must
+        // re-check both before re-presenting the write.
+        await this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
+            // Inside the lock: a write still parked behind another writer when the caller's
+            // budget expired is abandoned rather than executed.
+            if (signal?.aborted) {
+                throw new FormationAbortedError(token, 'redemption');
             }
-            catch (rollbackError) {
-                log('Rollback after redemption failure was a no-op: %s', rollbackError);
-            }
-            throw error;
-        }
+            await this.assertSeatRemains(token, totalUses);
+            await this.inTransaction('redemption', async () => {
+                // 1. Strand row — authorised by the FormationUsage branch (no owner sig),
+                //    still carrying a fresh unique StampId for the anti-replay column.
+                //    Hard-coded open + keyless: the consent branch admits no other shape.
+                await this.db.exec(`
+          insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId)
+            with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
+            values (?, 'o', null, ?)
+        `, [strandId, strandStampId]);
+                // 2. FormationUsage row — authorised by the matching FormationInvite, and
+                //    carrying the strand's stamp so it authorizes THIS row and no other.
+                await this.execFormationUsageInsert({
+                    token, usageStampId, disclosure, strandId, strandStampId,
+                    peerKey, peerSignature, nowMs: nowMs ?? Date.now(),
+                    validationKey: validationKey ?? null, validationSignature: validationSignature ?? null,
+                });
+            });
+        }, {}, 'formation-usage');
+        log('Redeemed invitation %s -> strand %s (stamp %s)', token, strandId, usageStampId);
+        return { usageStampId };
     }
     /**
      * Record a `FormationUsage` against an **already-existing** `Strand` (no strand
      * insert). This is the redemption path when the strand was provisioned
      * separately (e.g. owner-signed) and the consent record is added after the
      * fact: the single insert auto-commits, and the deferred `StrandExists` CHECK
-     * is satisfied by the pre-existing committed strand row. Returns the assigned
-     * `UseNumber`.
+     * is satisfied by the pre-existing committed strand row. Echoes back the
+     * redemption's `usageStampId` (the row's primary key).
      *
      * Use {@link redeemInvitation} instead when the strand must be created by
      * consent atomically with the usage.
+     *
+     * The strand's live `StampId` is read first and written onto the usage row:
+     * `FormationUsage.StrandExists` matches the (id, stamp) PAIR, and
+     * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`'s consent branch reads the same pair back, so a consent
+     * record authorizes exactly the strand ROW it was recorded against. A missing strand
+     * THROWS here rather than being left to the deferred `StrandExists` CHECK — the
+     * ordinary "host strand has not converged yet" case is already reported as `missing`
+     * by {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand}, so an absent row at this
+     * point is a genuine race and deserves a named error, not a silent rollback.
+     *
+     * The row is keyed by the joiner's own nonce (`UsageStampId` is the primary key), so this
+     * path — the one production actually races on (a bound invite published by `cadre-web` /
+     * `cadre-phone` is always record-only) — never contends with another redemption for a
+     * shared row key: there is no lost race to retry and no second trip through the approval
+     * hook. The invite's seat budget is checked by COUNT ({@link assertSeatRemains}) inside
+     * the write lock, ahead of the write.
      */
     async recordFormationUsage(params) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const { token, strandId, disclosure = '', peerId, peerSignature, nowMs, validationKey, validationSignature, } = params;
-        const localPeerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
-        const useNumber = await this.nextUseNumber(token);
-        await this.execFormationUsageInsert({
-            token, useNumber, disclosure, strandId,
-            peerId: peerId ?? localPeerId, peerSignature: peerSignature ?? null, nowMs: nowMs ?? Date.now(),
-            validationKey: validationKey ?? null, validationSignature: validationSignature ?? null,
-        });
-        log('Recorded formation usage: token=%s strand=%s (use #%d)', token, strandId, useNumber);
-        return useNumber;
+        const { token, strandId, disclosure = '', peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, nowMs, validationKey, validationSignature, signal, totalUses, } = params;
+        // The host strand is pre-existing and owner-signed; its stamp names the strand ROW the
+        // consent record authorizes.
+        const strandStampId = await this.queryStrandStampId(strandId);
+        if (strandStampId === null) {
+            throw new MissingHostStrandError(strandId, token);
+        }
+        // Ordering inside the locked body is contractual — abort check, seat check, write — see
+        // the matching note in redeemInvitation.
+        await this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
+            if (signal?.aborted) {
+                throw new FormationAbortedError(token, 'usage recording');
+            }
+            await this.assertSeatRemains(token, totalUses);
+            await this.execFormationUsageInsert({
+                token, usageStampId, disclosure, strandId, strandStampId,
+                peerKey, peerSignature, nowMs: nowMs ?? Date.now(),
+                validationKey: validationKey ?? null, validationSignature: validationSignature ?? null,
+            });
+        }, {}, 'formation-usage');
+        log('Recorded formation usage: token=%s strand=%s (stamp %s)', token, strandId, usageStampId);
+        return { usageStampId };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Refuse a redemption that would consume a seat the invite does not have.
+     *
+     * The schema's count-based cap clause (`FormationUsage.Authorized`) refuses an over-limit
+     * write at the database anyway — but it fails as a generic `CHECK constraint failed:
+     * Authorized`, which the manager reports as a retryable conflict. Catching it here as
+     * {@link InvitationExhaustedError} lets the joiner be told the invitation is spent instead
+     * of being sent around a loop that can never close. Runs inside the write lock, so on a
+     * same-node race the loser reads the winner's committed row and is refused by name.
+     *
+     * `knownTotalUses` lets a caller that already read the `FormationInvite` row (both
+     * production callers in `ControlFormationUsageRecorder` do) skip a second read on the common,
+     * non-racing path. `undefined` falls back to a fresh read here.
+     *
+     * NOTE: a passed-in budget is a value read BEFORE the write lock (and, for a validating
+     * invite, before an outbound approval call). Safe today because `FormationInvite` is
+     * insert/delete only (its `Immutable` constraint), so the only way to stale it is an owner
+     * revoking the token and re-issuing it with MORE seats mid-redemption; if invites ever gain
+     * an update path, drop the parameter and read here instead.
+     */
+    async assertSeatRemains(token, knownTotalUses) {
+        // A missing invite is left to `Authorized` — it is not an exhaustion, and the CHECK's
+        // rejection is already the right, non-retryable answer for it. That fallback is also what
+        // makes this read's failure mode safe: it is a full-primary-key point lookup
+        // (`FormationInvite where Token = ?`), the shape whose reliability on a networked strand
+        // is still open (tracked by `debt-composite-pk-point-lookup-unreliable-untracked`). A
+        // spurious empty result only costs the attempt its NAMED exhaustion error, reverting it to
+        // today's generic `Authorized` refusal — never a seat the invite does not have.
+        const totalUses = knownTotalUses !== undefined
+            ? knownTotalUses
+            : (await this.queryFormationInvite(token))?.totalUses ?? null;
+        if (totalUses == null) {
+            return;
+        }
+        const used = await this.countFormationUsage(token);
+        if (used >= totalUses) {
+            throw new InvitationExhaustedError(token, used, totalUses);
+        }
     }
     /** Parameterised `FormationUsage` insert shared by redeem + record paths. */
     async execFormationUsageInsert(opts) {
@@ -658,14 +1866,14 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // robustness/consistency change, matching the strand layer's `consumeInvite`,
         // not a fix for an observable mis-ordering.
         const nowCanonical = await canonicalDatetime(this.db, opts.nowMs);
-        await this.db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.FormationUsage (Token, UseNumber, Disclosure, StrandId)
-        with context PeerId = ?, PeerSignature = ?, Now = ?, ValidationKey = ?, ValidationSignature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?)
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      insert into CadreControl.FormationUsage (Token, UsageStampId, PeerKey, PeerSig, Disclosure, StrandId, StrandStampId)
+        with context Now = ?, ValidationKey = ?, ValidationSignature = ?
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
     `, [
-            opts.peerId, opts.peerSignature, nowCanonical,
-            opts.validationKey, opts.validationSignature,
-            opts.token, opts.useNumber, opts.disclosure, opts.strandId,
+            nowCanonical, opts.validationKey, opts.validationSignature,
+            opts.token, opts.usageStampId, opts.peerKey,
+            opts.peerSignature, opts.disclosure, opts.strandId, opts.strandStampId,
         ]);
     }
     /**
@@ -676,14 +1884,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     async queryFormationInvite(token) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         for await (const row of this.db.eval('select Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId from CadreControl.FormationInvite where Token = ?', [token])) {
-            const expiresAt = row.ExpiresAt;
-            const expiresAtMs = expiresAt === null || expiresAt === undefined
-                ? null
-                : parseStoredDatetimeMs(expiresAt);
             return {
                 token: row.Token,
                 sAppId: row.sAppId,
-                expiresAtMs: expiresAtMs !== null && Number.isNaN(expiresAtMs) ? null : expiresAtMs,
+                expiresAtMs: parseNullableStoredDatetimeMs(row.ExpiresAt),
                 totalUses: row.TotalUses ?? null,
                 validationUrl: row.ValidationUrl ?? null,
                 strandId: row.StrandId ?? null,
@@ -693,6 +1897,22 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     }
     /**
      * Count `FormationUsage` rows recorded against a token (uses consumed so far).
+     *
+     * NOTE: `Token` left the primary key in `formation-unique-token-redesign` and gained the
+     * `FormationUsageByToken` secondary index, so this filter is now served by an index SEEK
+     * (a descent through the index collection) where it used to be a leading-key partial match
+     * the optimystic vtab declined and the engine served by scan. That matters because the seat
+     * cap is this count: a descent that under-reports admits a seat the invite does not have,
+     * where a scan could not. Descent misses have been observed on a NETWORKED store (tracked
+     * by `debt-composite-pk-point-lookup-unreliable-untracked`, for full-primary-key lookups);
+     * no miss has been observed on this index on a SINGLE node. Across nodes the index is
+     * currently blind: a sibling never learns index entries for rows written elsewhere (the
+     * distributed commit drops the index update — measured 2026-08-12, tracked by
+     * `blocked/secondary-index-seek-blind-to-sibling-rows`), so on a multi-machine party this
+     * count under-reports and the cap over-admits until the upstream fix lands. If
+     * over-admission ever shows up on a converged single node — a token with more usage rows
+     * than its `TotalUses` and no concurrent redeemers to explain it — suspect this seek first
+     * and drop the index to fall back to the scan.
      */
     async countFormationUsage(token) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
@@ -701,17 +1921,70 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         }
         return 0;
     }
-    /** Next `UseNumber` for a token = max(existing)+1, per the `Monotonic` constraint. */
-    async nextUseNumber(token) {
-        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select coalesce(max(UseNumber), 0) as MaxUse from CadreControl.FormationUsage where Token = ?', [token])) {
-            return row.MaxUse + 1;
+    /**
+     * Is any `FormationInvite` row still redeemable — unexpired AND with usage
+     * below its `TotalUses`? A null `ExpiresAt` never expires and a null
+     * `TotalUses` is unlimited, matching {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder}'s
+     * per-token semantics (`isTokenValid` / `isTokenUsed`).
+     *
+     * Answers the control-network connection gate's coarse "does this node expect
+     * a stranger?" question, which has no token to ask about. The expiry
+     * comparison is `expiresAtMs <= now` — identical to `isTokenValid`'s — so an
+     * invite the formation handler would reject can never hold the gate open.
+     *
+     * The scan is deliberately not pushed into SQL: nothing else here compares a
+     * stored `datetime` with an inequality, so the parse stays in JS via the
+     * shared {@link parseNullableStoredDatetimeMs}. Only invites that are
+     * unexpired AND use-metered cost a {@link countFormationUsage} read, and an
+     * unlimited-use invite anywhere in the scan short-circuits all of them.
+     */
+    async hasOutstandingFormationInvite(nowMs = Date.now()) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        // NOTE: scans every FormationInvite row (expired ones included) on the
+        // stranger path of an inbound connection. Cadre-scale invite counts make
+        // that free today; if a long-lived cadre accumulates thousands of expired
+        // invites and inbound upgrades slow down, add an expiry-ordered index or
+        // prune redeemed/expired rows.
+        const metered = [];
+        let unlimitedOutstanding = false;
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select Token, ExpiresAt, TotalUses from CadreControl.FormationInvite')) {
+            const expiresAtMs = parseNullableStoredDatetimeMs(row.ExpiresAt);
+            if (expiresAtMs !== null && expiresAtMs <= nowMs) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            const totalUses = row.TotalUses ?? null;
+            if (totalUses === null) {
+                unlimitedOutstanding = true;
+            }
+            else {
+                metered.push({ token: row.Token, totalUses });
+            }
         }
-        return 1;
+        if (unlimitedOutstanding) {
+            return true;
+        }
+        for (const invite of metered) {
+            if (await this.countFormationUsage(invite.token) < invite.totalUses) {
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+        return false;
     }
     /**
-     * Close the database and cleanup resources
+     * Close the database and cleanup resources.
+     *
+     * Drains the local-write chain first: {@link withWriteLock} can park a write behind
+     * others across an await, and a queued closure evaluates `this.db!` only when it
+     * finally runs — so nulling the handle out from under it would throw a TypeError on a
+     * null handle instead of committing. The tail never rejects (it swallows both
+     * outcomes), so the bare await is safe.
+     *
+     * NOTE: this makes `close()` wait on a stuck write. Acceptable today — every locked
+     * body is a bounded local `exec` — but revisit (bounded drain, or abandon after a
+     * deadline) if a write can ever hang.
      */
     async close() {
+        await this.writeQueue;
         if (this.collectionFactory) {
             await this.collectionFactory.shutdown();
             this.collectionFactory = null;