@serfab/cadre-core 0.8.1 → 0.10.0

package/dist/control-database.d.ts

@@ -1,36 +1,216 @@
 import { Database } from '@quereus/quereus';
+import type { SqlParameters } from '@quereus/quereus';
 import type { Libp2p } from '@libp2p/interface';
 import type { IRepo } from '@optimystic/db-core';
-import type { StrandRow, PeerAddressRecord, DeviceTokenRecord } from './types.js';
+import type { StrandRow, PeerAddressRecord, CadrePeerRow, RevocationRow, DeviceTokenRecord, DeviceTokenRow } from './types.js';
+import type { ControlTable, RevocableTable, ControlDomain, ControlAction } from './control-authorization.js';
+export type { ControlTable, RevocableTable, ControlDomain, ControlAction } from './control-authorization.js';
 /**
- * Build the canonical authorization message that authority signatures are bound to.
+ * Generate a unique stamp ID for transaction authorization.
+ * Format: 32 bytes base64url encoded
+ * - First 16 bytes: SHA-256 hash of peer ID (for distributed uniqueness)
+ * - Last 16 bytes: Random bytes (for collision resistance)
+ */
+export declare function generateStampId(peerId: string): string;
+/**
+ * A `FormationUsage` was to be recorded against a host `Strand` row that is not
+ * present locally.
+ *
+ * Consent is bound to the strand's one-off `StampId` (see the consent branch of
+ * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`), so the writer must read the live row before inserting.
+ * The ordinary "host strand has not converged on this responder yet" case is caught
+ * earlier and reported as `missing` by `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand`;
+ * reaching here means the row vanished between that check and the write, which is a
+ * genuine race and is surfaced rather than left to fail the deferred `StrandExists`
+ * CHECK at commit (which would drop the write with a far less legible error).
+ */
+export declare class MissingHostStrandError extends Error {
+    readonly strandId: string;
+    readonly token: string;
+    constructor(strandId: string, token: string);
+}
+/**
+ * A formation write was abandoned because the caller's `AbortSignal` fired BEFORE the
+ * `FormationUsage` insert was issued — the invite's single use is NOT spent.
+ *
+ * Thrown by the formation write paths ({@link ControlDatabase.recordFormationUsage},
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation}) and by `ControlFormationUsageRecorder`'s
+ * pre-approval checks when the responder's provisioning budget expires while the work is
+ * still queued (e.g. behind the write lock) or still asking the approval hook. Never
+ * thrown once the insert has been issued: a half-issued write must be allowed to land,
+ * and the formation listener's settle grace then adopts it as a successful join. The
+ * manager rethrows this error instead of mapping it to a retryable conflict — the
+ * listener's timeout path owns the reply.
+ */
+export declare class FormationAbortedError extends Error {
+    readonly token: string;
+    constructor(token: string, operation: string, options?: {
+        cause?: unknown;
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * A redemption could not be given a `UseNumber` within the invite's seat budget: the use
+ * number the writer would have to take is past `FormationInvite.TotalUses`, so the
+ * invitation is spent.
+ *
+ * Raised inside {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation} / {@link ControlDatabase.recordFormationUsage}
+ * on EVERY attempt, including the first: two redemptions of one token racing on the SAME node
+ * serialize behind the local write queue, so the loser's first attempt already takes a use
+ * number past the seat budget — `StrandFormationManager.validateToken`'s `isTokenUsed` check
+ * cannot catch this, since it ran before either redemption wrote anything. Without this the
+ * write would fail as a generic `CHECK constraint failed: Authorized`, which the manager
+ * reports as a retryable `Formation conflict, retry` — telling the joiner to retry something
+ * that can never succeed.
+ */
+export declare class InvitationExhaustedError extends Error {
+    readonly token: string;
+    readonly useNumber: number;
+    readonly totalUses: number;
+    constructor(token: string, useNumber: number, totalUses: number);
+}
+/**
+ * Did this write fail purely because another writer took the `UseNumber` it picked — i.e. is
+ * re-presenting the SAME approval under the next free use number the right response?
+ *
+ * Classifies by MESSAGE, walking the `cause` chain with Quereus' own {@link unwrapError}:
+ * neither surface can be recognised by type. The deferred `Monotonic` failure is thrown as a
+ * bare `QuereusError`, not a `ConstraintError` (see
+ * `quereus/src/runtime/deferred-constraint-queue.ts`), so an `instanceof ConstraintError` gate
+ * would silently drop the branch this retry exists for. Messages also carry an
+ * ` (at line N, column M)` suffix and arrive wrapped when the write ran inside a transaction,
+ * so the match is a substring test rather than an equality one.
+ *
+ * NOTE: this is the one piece of the retry that depends on engine error TEXT. Its own test
+ * (`control-formation-use-number-retry.spec.ts`) produces all three messages from the real
+ * engine rather than from string literals, so a reworded storage-layer error fails that spec
+ * instead of silently disabling the retry.
+ */
+export declare function isLostUseNumberRace(error: unknown): boolean;
+/**
+ * What a recorded `FormationUsage` row came out as.
  *
- * The message is a SINGLE framed SHA-256 digest over the ordered tuple of fields (the
- * crypto plugin's injective multi-field encoding), in a fixed field order, with the
- * single-use StampId as the final field:
+ * `usageStampId` is echoed back so a caller that obtained an approver sign-off can prove the
+ * nonce it signed over is the one that landed — the two must match or
+ * `FormationUsage.Authorized` rejects the row (see {@link formationVouchMessage}).
+ */
+export interface FormationUsageResult {
+    /** The `UseNumber` assigned to this redemption (1-based per token). */
+    useNumber: number;
+    /** The single-use nonce written to `UsageStampId` — the caller's, or a freshly minted one. */
+    usageStampId: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Build the canonical authorization message that owner signatures are bound to.
  *
- *   message = sha256(encodeFields([field_1, field_2, ..., StampId]))   // raw digest bytes
+ * The message is a SINGLE framed SHA-256 digest over the ordered field vector from
+ * {@link controlAuthorizationFields} (the crypto plugin's injective multi-field
+ * encoding): two fixed literals — the domain tag naming the table rule and the action
+ * tag — followed by the row fields in the schema's fixed order, with the single-use
+ * StampId as the final field where the table has one:
+ *
+ *   message = sha256(encodeFields([domain, action, field_1, ..., StampId]))   // raw digest bytes
  *
  * ed25519 signs these raw digest bytes DIRECTLY (no second hash). The SQL constraints
  * verify the identical bytes with one variadic call
- * (`verify(digest(field_1, ..., StampId), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519')`): SQL
- * `digest(...)` returns the base64url string of the same digest, which `verify`'s default
+ * (`verify(digest('CadreControl.X', 'add', field_1, ...), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519')`):
+ * SQL `digest(...)` returns the base64url string of the same digest, which `verify`'s default
  * base64url input encoding decodes back to those raw bytes — so signer and verifier
  * operate on the same bytes. Every field is TEXT on both sides (the SQL columns are
  * `cast(... as text)` / `coalesce(...,'')`; the TS args are strings), so the per-field
- * type tags agree. This binds the signature to the row contents (not a bare stamp),
- * closing the captured-stamp replay / privilege-escalation hole. Single source of truth:
- * every signed writer (and every test/harness signer) MUST build the message through this
- * function in the schema's field order, or `verify` will reject the row.
+ * type tags agree. Binding the row contents closes captured-stamp replay; the leading
+ * domain/action tags scope the signature to ONE table rule, so an approval minted for
+ * one constraint can never satisfy another (e.g. a ValidationKey enrollment can no
+ * longer double as an OwnerKey enrollment). Single source of truth: every signed writer
+ * (and every test/harness signer) MUST build the message through this function with the
+ * schema's tags and field order, or `verify` will reject the row.
+ */
+export declare function buildAuthorizationMessage(domain: ControlDomain, action: ControlAction, rowFields: string[]): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * The exact bytes an outside approver signs to authorize ONE redemption of a
+ * `ValidationUrl`-bearing `FormationInvite` — the TS mirror of the `'vouch'` digest in
+ * `FormationUsage.Authorized`, in the schema's field order.
+ *
+ * The approval covers the whole redemption: the invitation (`token`), the single-use nonce
+ * the JOINING peer minted for THIS redemption (`usageStampId`), the network being joined
+ * (`strandId`), the joining peer's own ed25519 public key (`peerKey`), and the disclosure
+ * text. That makes it non-transferable — an approval cannot be re-presented for another use
+ * of the same invitation, another network, or another joiner — and the nonce's `unique`
+ * column makes a verbatim re-presentation a duplicate-row rejection. The joiner mints the
+ * nonce ({@link generateStampId}) and sends it in its contact message; sign these bytes over
+ * that same nonce, then pass BOTH the nonce and the signature to
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation} / {@link ControlDatabase.recordFormationUsage}:
+ * signing one nonce and inserting another fails the CHECK.
+ */
+export declare function formationVouchMessage(fields: {
+    token: string;
+    usageStampId: string;
+    strandId: string;
+    peerKey: string;
+    disclosure: string;
+}): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * The exact bytes the JOINING peer signs to consent to ONE redemption of a
+ * `FormationInvite` — the TS mirror of the `'consent'` digest in the schema's
+ * `FormationUsage.PeerConsented` constraint, in its field order.
+ *
+ * A sibling of {@link formationVouchMessage}, not a replacement: the approver's vouch
+ * says the redemption may proceed, this says the joiner itself agreed to it, and the
+ * two are signed by different keys over the same nonce so neither can stand in for
+ * the other. Verify the result with `peer-authorization.ts`'s
+ * `verifyFormationConsent`, whose `formationConsentDigest` is the base64url twin of
+ * this vector — the two must stay in lockstep.
+ *
+ * `strandId` is deliberately absent, unlike its vouch sibling: the joiner cannot know
+ * the strand when it signs (a bound invite's host strand arrives only in the result
+ * frame; an unbound strand is minted by the responder). The responder cannot
+ * substitute one anyway — a bound invite is pinned to its own strand by `Authorized`,
+ * and an unbound redemption mints a fresh strand, so there is no victim to name.
+ */
+export declare function formationConsentMessage(fields: {
+    token: string;
+    usageStampId: string;
+    peerKey: string;
+    disclosure: string;
+}): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * Guarded tables a node may reap locally once their tombstone has committed — the
+ * tables whose `AuthorizedDelete` carries the REAP branch (see the constraint comment on
+ * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedDelete` in the schema). `Strand` is deliberately absent: its row
+ * carries `MemberPrivateKey`, the party's own membership secret for that network, stored
+ * nowhere else (tickets/backlog/debt-strand-tombstone-reap.md owns any future change).
+ * `OwnerKey` has no production removal path and `MinOneOwner` makes an automated
+ * owner-key reap a party-bricking hazard.
+ */
+export declare const REAPABLE_TABLES: readonly ["CadrePeer", "DeviceToken", "ValidationKey"];
+export type ReapableTable = (typeof REAPABLE_TABLES)[number];
+/**
+ * Notified after a `CadreControl.CadrePeer` row write has COMMITTED.
+ *
+ * The one hook the party-membership snapshot a node admits control-DB traffic
+ * against ({@link CadreNode.refreshMembershipGate}) hangs off, so that snapshot
+ * is refreshed by the WRITE rather than by whoever remembered to ask. `reason`
+ * only labels the log line. Must not reject (the notifier swallows and logs
+ * anyway — a committed write never fails because a snapshot refresh did).
+ */
+export type MembershipChangeListener = (reason: string) => Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * Identity of the tombstone a committed guarded delete wrote — a
+ * {@link RevocationRow} minus its `ReissuedAt` counter, which a fresh tombstone
+ * always seats at 0 (`FreshTombstone`) and so carries no information.
  */
-export declare function buildAuthorizationMessage(fields: string[]): Uint8Array;
+export type RevokedRowRef = Omit<RevocationRow, 'reissuedAt'>;
 /**
- * Names of the CadreControl tables that {@link ControlDatabase.countRows} can
- * read. Constraining to this union keeps the dynamic `from` clause off the
- * SQL-injection surface and hands callers (e.g. the integration harness's
- * `waitForControlSync`) a typo-proof table argument.
+ * Notified after a guarded-table delete — and the `CadreControl.Revocation`
+ * tombstone it writes in the same transaction — has COMMITTED.
+ *
+ * The seam the write-while-alone re-replication queue hangs off
+ * ({@link CadreNode.noteGuardedDelete}): one listener covers all four guarded
+ * tables (`CadrePeer` / `DeviceToken` / `Strand` / `ValidationKey`) because every
+ * owner delete funnels through {@link deleteGuardedRow}. Synchronous — the
+ * handler only records the tombstone's identity; it must not throw (the notifier
+ * swallows and logs anyway — a committed delete never fails because bookkeeping did).
  */
-export type ControlTable = 'AuthorityKey' | 'ValidationKey' | 'Strand' | 'CadrePeer' | 'DeviceToken' | 'FormationInvite' | 'FormationUsage';
+export type GuardedDeleteListener = (revocation: RevokedRowRef) => void;
 export interface ControlDatabaseConfig {
     /** Party ID for the control network */
     partyId: string;
@@ -54,6 +234,17 @@ export declare class ControlDatabase {
     private collectionFactory;
     private readonly config;
     private initialized;
+    private membershipListener;
+    private guardedDeleteListener;
+    /** Tail of the local-write chain — see {@link withWriteLock}. */
+    private writeQueue;
+    /**
+     * Pacing seams for {@link lockedWithRetry}. Production leaves this empty (real backoff,
+     * real clock); specs inject a recorded `sleep` / fake `now` so no test waits out a real
+     * backoff. Applied OVER the call site's policy, so it overrides pacing without a spec
+     * having to restate the policy's attempts or classifier.
+     */
+    private controlWriteRetryPacing;
     constructor(config: ControlDatabaseConfig);
     /**
      * Initialize the database - load schema and register plugins
@@ -74,11 +265,11 @@ export declare class ControlDatabase {
     /**
      * Count rows in a CadreControl table as seen by THIS database instance.
      *
-     * `table` is validated against {@link CONTROL_TABLES} before it is interpolated
+     * `table` is validated against {@link CONTROL_TABLE_SET} before it is interpolated
      * into the `from` clause: the names are not user input, but the check keeps the
      * dynamic query off the injection surface and fails loudly on a typo instead of
      * emitting a malformed statement. The count reflects only the rows this node's
-     * control DB has converged on — in the integration harness that is the authority
+     * control DB has converged on — in the integration harness that is the owner
      * node (one ControlDatabase per party), i.e. the authoritative control-network
      * view, not a per-drone convergence guarantee.
      */
@@ -88,36 +279,124 @@ export declare class ControlDatabase {
      */
     getDatabase(): Database;
     /**
-     * Check whether any authority key exists in the control database.
+     * Check whether any owner key exists in the control database.
      * Used to decide whether a fresh-party genesis insert is required.
      */
-    hasAuthorityKey(): Promise<boolean>;
+    hasOwnerKey(): Promise<boolean>;
     /**
-     * Idempotent genesis: insert `key` as the founding authority key only when
-     * the party has none yet. Returns true if it inserted, false if an authority
-     * key already existed (so a repeat `--authority` start is a no-op).
+     * Idempotent genesis: insert `key` as the founding owner key only when
+     * the party has none yet. Returns true if it inserted, false if an owner
+     * key already existed (so a repeat `--owner` start is a no-op).
      */
-    ensureAuthorityKey(key: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    ensureOwnerKey(key: string): Promise<boolean>;
     /**
-     * Collect every authority key (`CadreControl.AuthorityKey.Key`) as a set.
+     * Collect every owner key (`CadreControl.OwnerKey.Key`) as a set.
      *
      * This is the steady-state trust anchor for seeds: a seed's signer key is
      * trusted only if it is already enrolled here (see `SeedTrustPolicy`). It is
-     * also the authority-identity source for `queryPeers`, decoupling authority
+     * also the owner-identity source for `queryPeers`, decoupling owner
      * status from the libp2p transport peer ID.
      */
-    getAuthorityKeys(): Promise<Set<string>>;
+    getOwnerKeys(): Promise<Set<string>>;
     /**
      * Enumerate the CadrePeer rows (cadre membership) for admin/membership reads.
+     * Includes the persisted voucher columns, which
+     * {@link CadreNode.listAuthorizedMembers} re-checks against its node-local anchor.
+     *
+     * Rows whose `StampId` is retired in `CadreControl.Revocation` are excluded HERE, so
+     * every membership reader inherits the exclusion — a revoked peer is neither
+     * authorizable nor addressable (a replayed row planted at a retired stamp must not
+     * be RPC'd or handed out as an address). Reads the retired set through
+     * {@link queryRevokedStamps} rather than inlining the SQL, so tests can interpose on
+     * that seam to model the replicated live-row-plus-tombstone merge state.
+     *
+     * NOTE: runs a second query (the retired-stamp set) per call, and this sits on the
+     * membership-gate refresh path; control tables are a handful of rows today, so this
+     * is cheap — if they ever grow, fold the exclusion into one statement or cache the
+     * retired-stamp set.
      */
-    queryCadrePeers(): Promise<Array<{
-        peerId: string;
-        multiaddr: string | null;
-    }>>;
+    queryCadrePeers(): Promise<CadrePeerRow[]>;
+    /**
+     * Every approver public key currently enrolled in `CadreControl.ValidationKey` — the
+     * set a `ValidationUrl` redemption's approval signature must be signed by (see
+     * {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder}, which checks one key at a time via
+     * {@link queryValidationKeyStampId}).
+     *
+     * Sorted in TypeScript rather than SQL so the order is stable regardless of storage
+     * order; the enrolled set is a handful of keys, so the sort is free.
+     */
+    queryValidationKeys(): Promise<string[]>;
+    /**
+     * Read one guarded row's single-use `StampId` nonce (null when the row does not
+     * exist). Every owner-signed delete / re-touch path must bind its signature to the
+     * row's CURRENT nonce, so they all read through here first.
+     *
+     * Deliberately RAW — no `Revocation` filtering (unlike {@link queryCadrePeers} /
+     * {@link queryPeerRecord}): {@link deleteGuardedRow} and the insert-if-absent guard
+     * in the `CadrePeer` upsert need to see a physically present row. Filtering here
+     * would make an insert-if-absent guard read "absent" for a row that exists and
+     * collide on the primary key.
+     *
+     * `table` and its {@link GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN} column are interpolated into the SQL; both
+     * come from closed literal unions — no caller-supplied string can reach the statement
+     * (same injection-surface discipline as {@link countRows}'s `CONTROL_TABLE_SET` guard).
+     */
+    private queryStampId;
+    /**
+     * `CadrePeer` stamp nonce — read by {@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer} as its
+     * row-present gate before it delegates to {@link deleteCadrePeer}. The in-class
+     * `CadrePeer` writers ({@link insertCadrePeer}, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}) go
+     * straight to {@link queryStampId}.
+     */
+    queryCadrePeerStampId(peerId: string): Promise<string | null>;
+    /**
+     * `DeviceToken` stamp nonce. {@link deleteDeviceToken} reads the stamp itself, so this
+     * is the reader for callers that need to observe a live row's nonce — asserting a token
+     * was seated, or that a removal retired the stamp it named.
+     */
+    queryDeviceTokenStampId(peerId: string): Promise<string | null>;
+    /** `Strand` stamp nonce — bound into {@link deleteStrand}'s remove digest. */
+    queryStrandStampId(strandId: string): Promise<string | null>;
+    /** `ValidationKey` stamp nonce — bound into {@link deleteValidationKey}'s remove digest. */
+    queryValidationKeyStampId(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
+    /**
+     * Collect the retired `StampId` nonces recorded in `CadreControl.Revocation` for one
+     * {@link RevocableTable}. A stamp
+     * lands here when its row is removed ({@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer},
+     * {@link deleteValidationKey}, {@link deleteStrand}), and retirement is permanent —
+     * rows are never deleted (only their `ReissuedAt` counter moves, via
+     * {@link reissueRevocations}). Read-side mitigation for the write-time race: the
+     * schema's `NotRevoked` CHECK only sees locally visible tombstones, so a node that
+     * converged on a resurrected row before its tombstone can hold both; readers
+     * ({@link queryCadrePeers}, {@link queryPeerRecord},
+     * {@link CadreNode.resolveDeviceToken}) drop any row whose stamp appears here.
+     *
+     * NOTE: re-reads the whole retired set on every call, and the caller runs per inbound
+     * gate request while the table only ever grows. Cheap today (a cadre removes peers
+     * rarely); if removals ever become routine, cache the set and invalidate it on write.
+     */
+    queryRevokedStamps(tableName: RevocableTable): Promise<Set<string>>;
+    /**
+     * Every locally-held `CadreControl.Revocation` tombstone — identity triple plus its
+     * `ReissuedAt` counter. Consumed by the cohort-growth re-issue sweep, which
+     * enumerates what this node holds before {@link reissueRevocations} re-broadcasts
+     * it. Plain scan with no `where`, so the composite-primary-key point-lookup hazard
+     * (see the statement comment in {@link reissueRevocations}) does not arise. Unlocked,
+     * like every other read.
+     */
+    queryRevocations(): Promise<RevocationRow[]>;
     /**
      * Read a single peer's address record (the full `CadrePeer` row) by PeerId.
      *
-     * Returns null when no row exists. Missing/legacy column values are coalesced
+     * Returns null when no row exists, or when the row's `StampId` is retired in
+     * `CadreControl.Revocation` — a revoked peer reads as absent, so the resolver
+     * ({@link CadreNode.resolvePeerAddrs}) never hands out a revoked peer's addresses.
+     * The stamp is read for that check only and then dropped; the returned
+     * {@link PeerAddressRecord} shape is unchanged. Reads the retired set through
+     * {@link queryRevokedStamps} rather than inlining the SQL, so tests can interpose on
+     * that seam (see {@link queryCadrePeers}).
+     *
+     * Missing/legacy column values are coalesced
      * to their empty form (`''` key/sig, `[]` addrs, `0` stamp) so the caller's
      * verify/freshness gates uniformly reject an unpublished or malformed row.
      * The split `addrs` re-join to the exact stored `Multiaddr` (split-on-`,` is
@@ -130,10 +409,23 @@ export declare class ControlDatabase {
      *
      * Authorization is carried entirely by the record: the `Sig` column (verified
      * by the `AuthorizedUpdate` self-branch against the stored `PublicKey`) plus
-     * the strictly-increasing `UpdatedAt`. No authority key is involved, so this
-     * is the refresh path for any member — authority or drone — once its row
+     * the strictly-increasing `UpdatedAt`. No owner key is involved, so this
+     * is the refresh path for any member — owner or drone — once its row
      * exists. `PublicKey` is intentionally not in the SET list (it is immutable on
      * self-update and the constraint enforces `new.PublicKey = old.PublicKey`).
+     *
+     * Deliberately NOT wrapped in {@link mutateCadrePeer}, the one `CadrePeer` mutator that
+     * is not: it only ever touches THIS node's own row (sole caller
+     * `CadreNode.publishSelfRecord`), and `CadreNode.listAuthorizedMembers` filters self out
+     * of the membership snapshot, so it cannot change that snapshot. It also runs on the
+     * periodic self-registration refresh, where a notify would add a recurring membership
+     * read for nothing.
+     *
+     * Its INSERT counterpart (`SeedBootstrapService.insertSelfPeerRecord`) does notify. Not an
+     * inconsistency: it shares the one owner-signed insert path with every other member's
+     * row, and a self insert happens once at startup, so the wasted refresh is a single read
+     * — cheaper than a conditional carve-out inside the shared writer. Only the repeating
+     * path is worth exempting.
      */
     updateSelfPeerRecord(record: PeerAddressRecord): Promise<void>;
     /**
@@ -144,14 +436,18 @@ export declare class ControlDatabase {
      * gates uniformly reject an unpublished or malformed row. `platform` is returned
      * verbatim (the resolver validates it against {@link PushPlatform} and re-verifies
      * the self-signature, which covers the platform field).
+     *
+     * `stampId` rides along ({@link DeviceTokenRow}) because the resolver must drop a
+     * row whose stamp is retired in `CadreControl.Revocation`; it is NOT part of
+     * {@link DeviceTokenRecord}, which is the self-signed shape the peer's `Sig` covers.
      */
-    queryDeviceToken(peerId: string): Promise<DeviceTokenRecord | null>;
+    queryDeviceToken(peerId: string): Promise<DeviceTokenRow | null>;
     /**
      * Apply a peer's own self-signed device-token update to an existing row.
      *
      * Authorization is carried entirely by the record: the `Sig` column (verified by
      * the `DeviceToken.AuthorizedUpdate` self-branch against the stored
-     * `CadrePeer.PublicKey`) plus the strictly-increasing `UpdatedAt`. No authority key
+     * `CadrePeer.PublicKey`) plus the strictly-increasing `UpdatedAt`. No owner key
      * is involved, so this is the refresh / rotation path for any member once both its
      * `CadrePeer` row (for the PublicKey) and its `DeviceToken` row exist. `PeerId` is
      * intentionally not in the SET list (immutable; the constraint enforces
@@ -159,55 +455,559 @@ export declare class ControlDatabase {
      */
     updateSelfDeviceToken(record: DeviceTokenRecord): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Insert the initial authority key (bootstrap - no existing authorities required)
+     * Insert the initial owner key (bootstrap - no existing owners required)
      */
-    insertAuthorityKey(key: string): Promise<void>;
+    insertOwnerKey(key: string): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Insert a strand into the control database using an authority signature.
+     * Insert a strand into the control database using an owner signature.
      *
-     * The authority signs the canonical row-bound authorization message (see
+     * The owner signs the canonical row-bound authorization message (see
      * {@link buildAuthorizationMessage}) — NOT a bare stamp — so the signature is bound to
      * this strand's contents and cannot be transplanted onto an attacker-chosen row. The
      * StampId is persisted as a unique column for single-use anti-replay.
      *
      * @param strandId - Unique identifier for the strand
      * @param type - Strand type: 'o' for open, 'c' for closed
-     * @param authorityKey - Public key of the authorizing authority
+     * @param ownerKey - Public key of the authorizing owner
      * @param signMessage - Function that ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash)
-     *   with the authority's private key, returning a base64url signature
+     *   with the owner's private key, returning a base64url signature
      * @param memberPrivateKey - Optional private key for membership in closed strands
      */
-    insertStrand(strandId: string, type: 'o' | 'c', authorityKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string, memberPrivateKey?: string): Promise<void>;
+    insertStrand(strandId: string, type: 'o' | 'c', ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string, memberPrivateKey?: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Delete a strand from the control database using an owner signature.
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link insertStrand}'s row-bound approach for the delete half: the owner
+     * signs the canonical `'remove'`-tagged authorization message over (Id, StampId) — the
+     * schema's `Strand.AuthorizedDelete` verifies this DISTINCT digest, so the insert
+     * approval (which never expires) can never be replayed as a removal. The delete and
+     * the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the row's StampId commit in ONE transaction —
+     * `Strand.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete, and without the tombstone the
+     * stamp would free up and the original formation approval could re-seat the strand.
+     * Body shared with every other guarded delete via {@link deleteGuardedRow}.
+     *
+     * The remove digest binds only (Id, StampId) — not Type/MemberPrivateKey — so this
+     * works identically for open and closed strands.
+     *
+     * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
+     * when a row was actually removed.
+     */
+    deleteStrand(strandId: string, ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<boolean>;
     /**
-     * Insert a validation key into the control database using an authority signature.
+     * Insert a validation key into the control database using an owner signature.
      *
-     * Mirrors {@link insertStrand}: the authority signs the canonical row-bound
+     * Mirrors {@link insertStrand}: the owner signs the canonical row-bound
      * authorization message over (Key, StampId), and the StampId is persisted as a unique
      * column for single-use anti-replay. A `ValidationKey` authorizes verifying strand
      * formation disclosures.
      *
      * @param key - The validation public key to enroll
-     * @param authorityKey - Public key of the authorizing authority
+     * @param ownerKey - Public key of the authorizing owner
      * @param signMessage - Function that ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash)
-     *   with the authority's private key, returning a base64url signature
+     *   with the owner's private key, returning a base64url signature
+     */
+    insertValidationKey(key: string, ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Delete a validation key from the control database using an owner signature.
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link insertValidationKey}'s row-bound approach for the delete half: the
+     * owner signs the canonical `'remove'`-tagged authorization message over (Key,
+     * StampId) — the schema's `ValidationKey.AuthorizedDelete` verifies this DISTINCT
+     * digest, so the enrollment approval (which never expires) can never be replayed as a
+     * removal. The delete and the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the row's StampId commit
+     * in ONE transaction — `ValidationKey.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete, and
+     * without the tombstone the stamp would free up and the original enrollment approval
+     * could re-seat the key. Body shared with every other guarded delete via
+     * {@link deleteGuardedRow}.
+     *
+     * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
+     * when a row was actually removed.
+     */
+    deleteValidationKey(key: string, ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Owner-vouched INSERT of one `CadrePeer` membership row, notifying the membership
+     * listener once it has committed.
+     *
+     * Mints a fresh single-use `StampId` and signs the `'vouch'`-tagged authorization
+     * message over (PeerId, StampId) — see {@link buildAuthorizationMessage} — satisfying
+     * the schema's `CadrePeer.AuthorizedInsert`. Binding the peer id to the nonce means a
+     * captured insert approval cannot be replayed (live rows are blocked by the unique
+     * `StampId` column, removed rows by `Revocation` retirement via `CadrePeer.NotRevoked`)
+     * and cannot be repurposed as a delete (which signs a distinct `'remove'`-tagged digest).
+     *
+     * The owner signature does NOT cover the address columns — those are vouched only as far
+     * as the owner asserts them, and a peer's own `Sig` (when present) is what makes the row
+     * resolvable.
+     *
+     * The {@link mutateCadrePeer} wrapper lives here rather than in the caller so no
+     * `CadrePeer` inserter can forget it — the write itself is what lets the admitted peer's
+     * traffic in.
+     *
+     * Idempotent on an already-present row: two writers can legitimately race the SAME peer's
+     * first row — the node's own background self-publish ({@link CadreNode.registerSelf})
+     * against a foreground {@link SeedBootstrapService.authorizePeer} of that node's id — and
+     * the write lock only serializes them; the loser would hit the `CadrePeer.PeerId` UNIQUE
+     * constraint. The existence check runs INSIDE the locked body, so it sees the winner's
+     * committed row (a pre-lock check would re-open the read-then-insert window). The existing
+     * row — voucher, addresses, self-`Sig` — is left untouched; re-touching a live row is
+     * {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}'s job.
+     *
+     * @param row - the membership row's columns; `multiaddr` is the comma-joined address list.
+     * @param ownerKey - public key of the vouching owner, persisted into `VouchOwner`.
+     * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash) with that owner's
+     *   private key, returning a base64url signature.
+     * @returns `true` when this call performed the INSERT, `false` when the in-lock existence
+     *   check found the row already seated. The loser needs to know: an authorize seats a row
+     *   with a null `Sig`, so a self-publish that lost the race must fall through to a
+     *   self-update or its record never lands.
+     */
+    insertCadrePeer(row: {
+        peerId: string;
+        publicKey: string | null;
+        multiaddr: string;
+        updatedAt: number;
+        sig: string | null;
+    }, ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Owner "re-touch" of an existing `CadrePeer` membership row: bump `UpdatedAt` and
+     * rewrite `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` under the owner branch of `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate`
+     * (a signature over the SAME `'vouch'`-tagged digest {@link insertCadrePeer} builds), so
+     * the row is re-emitted as a fresh, broadcasting transaction.
+     *
+     * This is the write-while-alone re-replication primitive: a membership row that committed
+     * local-only (its block's cluster ≤1 at insert) is pushed to the cohort once it grows, by
+     * re-issuing this monotonic bump. It is an UPDATE (not the original INSERT) because the row
+     * already exists locally; a re-INSERT would hit the `PeerId` PK. Only the freshness stamp
+     * and voucher change — `PublicKey` / `Multiaddr` / `Sig` are left intact — so it is safe
+     * over a row whose peer has not self-published (`Sig` null); the caller must skip a row
+     * that already carries a self-`Sig` (that row is the owning peer's to refresh, and bumping
+     * `UpdatedAt` without re-signing would invalidate its self-signature).
+     *
+     * Signs over the row's CURRENT `StampId` (unchanged by the re-touch), read BEFORE the lock
+     * is taken. An absent row returns `false` WITHOUT notifying: nothing was written, so the
+     * membership snapshot cannot have changed.
+     *
+     * NOTE: that stamp read is outside the lock, same as {@link deleteGuardedRow}'s. A writer
+     * that removes the row in between makes the `update` match nothing, and this still returns
+     * `true` and notifies — harmless today (the sole caller, the write-while-alone drain, only
+     * logs the result, and a spurious notify just re-reads the member set), and a remove-then-
+     * re-add in the same window fails loudly instead, since the signature binds the retired
+     * stamp. If a caller ever acts on `true` as proof the row was written, fold the stamp read
+     * into the locked body.
+     *
+     * Notifies like the insert/remove paths even though this is "only" a re-touch: it rewrites
+     * VouchOwner/VouchSig, which the authorized-membership predicate judges on, so it CAN
+     * change the member set. Keeping the rule uniform ("every CadrePeer mutator notifies")
+     * beats a per-method exception the next reader has to relearn.
+     *
+     * NOTE: this rebinds VouchOwner to the CALLING owner's key, and the authorized-membership
+     * predicate (`CadreNode.listAuthorizedMembers`) now judges rows by that column against each
+     * reader's node-local anchor. Benign today because the only caller — the write-while-alone
+     * drain — re-touches solely rows this node itself authored (`pendingPeerWrites`), so the
+     * voucher is rewritten to the key that already signed it. If a future path ever lets one
+     * owner re-touch a row a DIFFERENT owner vouched, the voucher silently flips: readers that
+     * anchor the original owner but not this one would drop a legitimate member. Such a path
+     * must re-vouch deliberately (or preserve the existing VouchOwner/VouchSig) rather than
+     * inherit this rebinding.
+     *
+     * @param peerId - the membership row to re-touch.
+     * @param updatedAt - the strictly-increasing freshness stamp to write.
+     * @param ownerKey - public key of the re-vouching owner, rewritten into `VouchOwner`.
+     * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes with that owner's private key.
+     * @returns `true` when the row was re-touched, `false` when no row exists (no notify).
+     */
+    reauthorizeCadrePeer(peerId: string, updatedAt: number, ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Owner-signed removal of one `CadrePeer` membership row, notifying the membership
+     * listener once it has committed.
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link deleteStrand} for the membership table: the owner signs the DISTINCT
+     * `'remove'`-tagged digest over (PeerId, StampId), so the row's stored `VouchSig` can
+     * never be replayed to delete it, and the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the stamp
+     * lands in the SAME transaction — `CadrePeer.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete,
+     * and without the tombstone the never-expiring admission approval (which the removed
+     * peer holds a copy of) could re-seat the row.
+     *
+     * The {@link mutateCadrePeer} wrapper lives here rather than in the caller so no
+     * `CadrePeer` remover can forget it. It notifies whenever the body resolves, including
+     * the absent-row no-op below — a caller that must not notify for an already-absent peer
+     * gates on {@link queryCadrePeerStampId} first (see
+     * {@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer}).
+     *
+     * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
+     * when a row was actually removed.
+     */
+    deleteCadrePeer(peerId: string, ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Owner-signed removal of one peer's `DeviceToken` row (logout / token invalidation).
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link deleteStrand}: the owner signs the DISTINCT `'remove'`-tagged digest
+     * over (PeerId, StampId), so the insert approval can never be replayed to clear a token,
+     * and the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the stamp lands in the SAME transaction —
+     * `DeviceToken.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete, and without the tombstone the
+     * never-expiring insert approval (which the cleared device holds a copy of) could
+     * re-seat the token.
+     *
+     * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
+     * when a row was actually removed.
      */
-    insertValidationKey(key: string, authorityKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<void>;
+    deleteDeviceToken(peerId: string, ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<boolean>;
     /**
-     * Insert an authority-signed `FormationInvite` (open invitation token).
+     * Owner-signed delete of one guarded row plus the `Revocation` tombstone retiring its
+     * stamp, in ONE transaction. The single body behind EVERY guarded delete —
+     * {@link deleteStrand}, {@link deleteValidationKey}, {@link deleteCadrePeer},
+     * {@link deleteDeviceToken}; see any of them for the per-table security rationale. Each
+     * of those is a thin named wrapper, so callers never pass a table name and this
+     * generic shape stays off the public surface.
+     *
+     * `OwnerKey` is excluded from `table` only because no owner-key removal path exists in
+     * production yet — the schema has the `'remove'` branch (`OwnerKey.Authorized`, which
+     * requires a DIFFERENT owner as signer) and `control-revocation-replay.spec.ts` drives
+     * it with hand-rolled SQL. Widen this and add a wrapper when that path lands; the body
+     * needs no change.
+     *
+     * The row's CURRENT stamp is read first and signed over, so the remove digest binds to
+     * this exact row instance. A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row is absent —
+     * reported as `false` so a caller can tell "removed" from "was never there" without a
+     * second read (e.g. {@link CadreNode.unpublishStrand}'s committed-while-alone warning,
+     * which must not fire for a no-op).
+     *
+     * NOTE: the stamp read is outside the transaction. A concurrent writer that removes
+     * the row in between makes the signature bind a stamp that is no longer live; the
+     * delete then matches nothing and the tombstone insert collides with the other
+     * writer's on `Revocation`'s (TableName, StampId) primary key, so the transaction
+     * fails rather than silently half-applying. If concurrent owner-device removals ever
+     * become routine, fold the stamp read into the transaction instead.
+     *
+     * Deliberately NOT wrapped in {@link withWriteLock}: every public entry point already
+     * holds the (non-re-entrant) lock, so taking it again here would self-deadlock.
+     *
+     * `table` and its {@link GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN} column are interpolated into the SQL; both
+     * come from closed literal unions — no caller-supplied string reaches the statement.
+     */
+    private deleteGuardedRow;
+    /**
+     * Delete one guarded row that an ALREADY-COMMITTED `Revocation` tombstone retires —
+     * the local catch-up for a node that converged on a removal's tombstone while still
+     * holding the removed row. That live-row-plus-tombstone state is reachable only by
+     * replication merge (local writes cannot build it: `Revocation.RowIsGone` refuses a
+     * tombstone while the row is live), and replication cannot carry the delete itself —
+     * replaying a delete of a row that is already gone locally is a no-op — so without
+     * this the stale row is permanent garbage on every node that held it at revocation
+     * time. Authorized by the REAP branch of the table's `AuthorizedDelete`: the
+     * tombstone is itself owner-signed (`Revocation.Authorized`), so no owner key is
+     * needed HERE — any node holding row + tombstone may reap, drones included.
+     *
+     * Returns whether a row was removed: `false` without writing when the row is absent
+     * locally (the common case on most nodes), or when its live stamp is not `stampId`
+     * (a fresh incarnation the owner re-seated, which the old tombstone must not touch).
+     *
+     * The delete's WHERE clause binds `StampId` too — required, not belt-and-braces: an
+     * owner may re-seat the row (fresh stamp) between the stamp read below and the
+     * statement, and without the clause the reap would delete the owner's brand-new row.
+     * With it the statement matches nothing and the reap is a silent no-op (the schema
+     * branch would also refuse that delete, but as a constraint error thrown into a
+     * background sweep — matched-nothing is the better failure mode). Like
+     * {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, a race lost AFTER the guard still returns `true`;
+     * harmless — nothing was deleted, and the next sweep re-reads.
+     *
+     * Writes NOTHING to `Revocation`: `RevocationRecorded` is satisfied by the same
+     * committed tombstone that authorizes the reap, so a reap files no second tombstone.
+     * It therefore does NOT fire the guarded-delete listener either — that seam exists to
+     * queue a tombstone for re-issue when it committed while alone, and a reap has no
+     * tombstone of its own to re-issue. A reap that commits while alone needs no
+     * re-replication at all: every OTHER node either already lacks the row, or holds the
+     * same committed tombstone and reaps its own copy.
+     *
+     * NOTE: the reap delete is keyed on the primary key; the `StampId` predicate is applied
+     * where the statement runs. If a reap on one node ever has to be reconciled against an
+     * owner re-seat of the same key that landed on another node, whether the delete or the
+     * re-seat wins is decided by the collection's merge order, not by this clause — the same
+     * ordering question the owner-signed delete path already carries
+     * (`tickets/blocked/forked-control-collection-sync-livelocks.md`). Only matters once a
+     * sweep drives this automatically on connected nodes; if that reconcile ever drops a
+     * freshly re-seated row, this is the site.
+     *
+     * `table` and its {@link GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN} column come from closed literal unions —
+     * no caller-supplied string reaches the statement (same injection-surface discipline
+     * as {@link deleteGuardedRow}). The `with context` clause is PRESENT and bound to
+     * nulls, never omitted: Quereus cannot resolve `context.OwnerKey` at plan time when
+     * the clause is absent while a constraint references `context.*` (nulls through a
+     * present clause are the shape {@link redeemInvitation}'s consent-branch insert ships).
+     *
+     * Driven automatically by {@link reapRevokedRows}, which the periodic control-cohort
+     * reconcile pass runs while the node has at least one control connection.
+     */
+    reapRevokedRow(table: ReapableTable, rowKey: string, stampId: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Sweep every locally-held `Revocation` tombstone and {@link reapRevokedRow} the guarded
+     * row each one retires, returning how many rows were actually removed.
+     *
+     * This is the enumeration half of the reap: replication carries the tombstone but cannot
+     * carry the delete (replaying a delete of an already-absent row is a no-op), so a node
+     * that converged on a removal while holding the removed row keeps that row as inert
+     * garbage until something walks the tombstones and drops it. `CadreNode`'s periodic
+     * control-cohort reconcile pass is that something, gated on the node having at least one
+     * control connection (a reap is a write, and a write committed alone is local-only).
+     *
+     * Enumerated UNLOCKED, deleted per-row LOCKED: {@link reapRevokedRow} takes the write
+     * lock itself (via {@link mutateCadrePeer} / {@link execWrite}) and the lock is not
+     * re-entrant, so this loop must not hold it. Same structure as
+     * `CadreNode.reissueAuthoredMembershipRows`.
+     *
+     * Two rows are deliberately left alone:
+     *
+     * - **Tables outside {@link REAPABLE_TABLES}** (`Strand`, `OwnerKey`) — no reap branch
+     *   exists on their `AuthorizedDelete`, so the delete would throw rather than no-op.
+     * - **This node's OWN `CadrePeer` / `DeviceToken` row** (`selfPeerId`). Reaping it would
+     *   fight this node's own re-registration: `registerSelf` / `retouchSelfDeviceToken` run
+     *   on the heartbeat and the growth drain, and after a self-reap their insert-if-absent
+     *   guard takes the INSERT path — which needs an owner signature `NotRevoked` refuses for
+     *   a retired stamp, and which a revoked drone cannot produce at all. The trade is
+     *   recurring failure noise every cycle against removing the one stale row nobody else
+     *   reads from this node (every other node already filters it by tombstone). A revoked
+     *   node therefore keeps its own copy of its own row; "a node that learns it has been
+     *   revoked should shut itself down" is a distinct behaviour and its own ticket.
+     *   `ValidationKey` has no self notion and is not special-cased.
+     *
+     * A per-row failure is logged and skipped rather than aborting the sweep: an abort would
+     * starve every tombstone after the failing one on every subsequent pass, and each row is
+     * independent. Returns the count so far if the database is closed mid-sweep.
+     *
+     * `selfPeerId` is a parameter rather than read from the injected libp2p node so the
+     * skip-self rule is exercisable without one.
+     *
+     * NOTE: cost is O(tombstones), not O(live rows) — one {@link queryRevocations} scan plus
+     * one {@link queryStampId} point lookup per tombstone, and the empty-table early return
+     * makes the common case (a party that has never revoked anyone) a single scan per pass.
+     * But `Revocation` is append-only and unbounded, so this is O(all tombstones ever) point
+     * lookups on every reconcile tick. Fine while revocations stay rare for a cadre-sized
+     * party; if the table ever grows, persist a node-local high-water mark of what has
+     * already been reaped instead of re-scanning everything (the same bound the sweep in
+     * `CadreNode.drainPendingRevocations` wants).
+     */
+    reapRevokedRows(selfPeerId: string): Promise<number>;
+    /**
+     * Owner-signed re-issue of a batch of `Revocation` tombstones: bump each row's
+     * `ReissuedAt` to `reissuedAt` in ONE transaction. Re-writing the row is what makes
+     * the storage layer re-broadcast it — a tombstone that committed while the node was
+     * alone is local-only, and unlike an insert a delete cannot be replayed (the guarded
+     * row is already gone locally), so the tombstone is the half of a removal that can
+     * still carry it to the rest of the party.
+     *
+     * One transaction, not one per row: a sweep may cover every tombstone in the table,
+     * and each separate commit is a separate round of network work. One owner signature
+     * per row: `AuthorizedReissue`'s digest binds (TableName, RowKey, StampId,
+     * ReissuedAt). `reissuedAt` must be STRICTLY above every affected row's current
+     * value (`ReissueOnly`); callers derive it as `Math.max(Date.now(), max(existing) + 1)`,
+     * mirroring {@link CadreNode.reissuePeerAuthorize}'s monotonic bump. Re-issuing a
+     * tombstone whose guarded row was never present locally is the normal case (a node
+     * that converged on the tombstone but never held the row) — a re-issue files no
+     * delete, so `RowIsGone` / `RevocationRecorded` are not involved.
+     *
+     * A constraint failure on any row rolls the WHOLE batch back and propagates —
+     * {@link lockedWithRetry}'s classifier only re-presents transient cluster failures,
+     * so a real refusal (non-owner signer, or a stale counter when two owner devices
+     * sweep concurrently and the loser's `ReissueOnly` CHECK fails) surfaces to the
+     * caller, which retries with a fresh counter on its next sweep. A row whose
+     * `StampId` matches nothing locally is a silent no-op statement; callers enumerate
+     * via {@link queryRevocations} first, so they only name stamps they hold.
+     *
+     * Returns how many UPDATE statements ran (`rows.length` on success).
+     */
+    reissueRevocations(rows: readonly RevocationRow[], reissuedAt: number, ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string): Promise<number>;
+    /**
+     * Run `body` between `beginTransaction` and `commit`, rolling back on failure.
+     *
+     * A failed `commit()` has already torn the transaction down, so the `rollback()` in
+     * the failure path would itself throw "No transaction active" and mask the real
+     * cause — that secondary throw is logged and swallowed, and the original error always
+     * propagates.
+     *
+     * It opens a transaction unconditionally (Quereus hard-throws on a nested
+     * `beginTransaction`), so a caller already inside one must not call it. A `CadrePeer`
+     * write nests this INSIDE {@link mutateCadrePeer}, never the reverse — see
+     * {@link assertCommitBoundary}.
+     *
+     * Private: every multi-statement control write lives in this class (the owner-signed
+     * delete/tombstone pairs all go through {@link deleteGuardedRow}), so needing to widen
+     * this is a sign the writer that wants it belongs in here too.
+     *
+     * Deliberately NOT wrapped in {@link withWriteLock}: callers already hold the
+     * (non-re-entrant) lock, so taking it again here would self-deadlock.
+     *
+     * @param label - What the transaction was doing, for the rollback log line.
+     */
+    private inTransaction;
+    /**
+     * Wire (or clear, with null) the single listener notified after every committed
+     * `CadreControl.CadrePeer` row write.
+     *
+     * At most one listener: a ControlDatabase instance belongs to exactly one
+     * {@link CadreNode}, which wires this in `start()` and clears it on teardown. A
+     * second call replaces the first rather than fanning out, so a stale node can
+     * never keep receiving notifications for a database it no longer owns.
+     */
+    setMembershipChangeListener(listener: MembershipChangeListener | null): void;
+    /**
+     * Wire (or clear, with null) the single listener notified after every committed
+     * guarded-table delete. Same ownership contract as
+     * {@link setMembershipChangeListener}: one CadreNode, one listener, a second
+     * call replaces the first.
+     */
+    setGuardedDeleteListener(listener: GuardedDeleteListener | null): void;
+    /**
+     * Run a `CadrePeer` row mutation and notify the membership listener once it has
+     * COMMITTED.
+     *
+     * EVERY `CadrePeer` writer goes through here, with one documented exception
+     * ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord}, which cannot change the snapshot) — that is what makes
+     * the party-membership snapshot refresh automatic rather than a caller obligation. A
+     * writer necessarily holds the target node's ControlDatabase (the `SeedBootstrapService`'s
+     * event callbacks are NOT a viable seam: the temp services `CadreNode.applySeed`/
+     * `dialInvite` build, and services constructed outside `CadreNode` entirely, never get
+     * callbacks wired), so this is the one point on the write path that cannot be bypassed.
+     *
+     * `body` owns its own transaction if it needs one and must COMMIT before returning, so
+     * the notification never makes the listener read uncommitted state. A throwing `body`
+     * propagates and does NOT notify: nothing changed.
+     *
+     * That contract is enforced, not merely documented — see {@link assertCommitBoundary}.
+     *
+     * Runs under {@link withWriteLock}, notification included: with the lock held through
+     * the notify, no other local writer can have a transaction open while the listener
+     * reads, so the listener always sees exactly the committed state it was told about.
+     * The listener itself only READS (it re-materializes the membership snapshot) — a
+     * listener that wrote through a locked method would deadlock.
+     *
+     * Reaches the lock through {@link lockedWithRetry}, so after a transient cluster
+     * failure the WHOLE locked body re-runs — `body` must be atomic and re-runnable (the
+     * contract on {@link withWriteLock}). The notify sits after a successful `body` inside
+     * the same attempt and a throwing attempt never reaches it, so a retried mutation
+     * still notifies exactly once: on the attempt that commits, and not at all on
+     * exhaustion.
+     *
+     * @param reason - Label for the log line only (e.g. `'peer-insert'`).
+     */
+    mutateCadrePeer<T>(reason: string, body: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
+    /**
+     * Run one local write under the database-wide write lock, serializing it against
+     * every other local writer on this ControlDatabase.
+     *
+     * Quereus tracks transaction state per `Database` (`getAutocommit()`), and a write
+     * statement's implicit transaction stays open across the awaits inside `exec`. Two
+     * local writers interleaving mid-statement therefore either trip
+     * {@link assertCommitBoundary} (any `CadrePeer` path) or silently join each other's
+     * open transaction — a torn commit if either side rolls back. This lock closes that
+     * class: every public write method of this class runs its statement(s) under it, and
+     * `SeedBootstrapService` wraps its direct `db.exec` writes in it too. The race is
+     * real, not theoretical: the background self-record publish on a control connection
+     * opening (`CadreNode.drainPendingControlReplication` → `registerSelf`) collided with
+     * a foreground `authorizePeer` — both `CadrePeer` inserts — and tripped the boundary
+     * assert.
+     *
+     * Reads are deliberately not locked: they take no transaction of their own, and
+     * serializing them here would let a listener that reads during a notify (see
+     * {@link mutateCadrePeer}) deadlock. The lock is NOT re-entrant — a locked writer's
+     * body must never call another locked public method; the private bodies it composes
+     * ({@link deleteGuardedRow}, {@link inTransaction}) stay bare for exactly that reason.
+     *
+     * NOTE: re-entry fails SILENTLY and PERMANENTLY. A locked body that calls another
+     * locked public method (including a {@link mutateCadrePeer} body, which runs an
+     * arbitrary caller-supplied callback) queues behind its own tail and never resolves —
+     * no error, and it strands the whole write queue, not only that call. There is no
+     * cheap fail-fast: a "held" flag cannot tell re-entry from a legitimately queued
+     * concurrent writer. Compose bare private bodies instead.
+     *
+     * A locked body must also be ATOMIC and RE-RUNNABLE: the public write surface reaches
+     * this lock through {@link lockedWithRetry}, which re-runs the WHOLE body after a
+     * transient cluster failure. Atomic holds for every body today — one statement, or
+     * wrapped in {@link inTransaction} — so a failed attempt leaves nothing half-applied;
+     * re-runnable means a retry re-runs the body's reads too, which is what makes it safe.
+     * Signatures and stamp ids minted OUTSIDE the body are deliberately NOT re-minted per
+     * attempt: a retry re-presents the exact signed message the first attempt presented.
+     */
+    withWriteLock<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
+    /**
+     * {@link withWriteLock} plus the bounded transient-failure retry
+     * ({@link retryControlWrite}) — the wrapper the whole public write surface goes
+     * through, so a control write that failed because the cluster cohort did not answer is
+     * re-presented a moment later instead of surfacing to ~19 callers that are not
+     * uniformly written to retry.
+     *
+     * The retry wraps the LOCK, it does not live inside it: each attempt takes and
+     * releases the lock, and the backoff sleeps with NO lock held, so a write parked in
+     * backoff never stalls the other local writers queued behind it. Same reason
+     * {@link withUseNumberRetry} re-takes the lock per attempt — see the note on
+     * `USE_NUMBER_ATTEMPTS`. Safe because every locked body is atomic and re-runnable
+     * (the contract on {@link withWriteLock}).
+     *
+     * Also carries {@link loadSchema}'s distributed DDL, the one caller that runs BEFORE
+     * `initialized` is set — so it reaches this method directly rather than through
+     * {@link execWrite}, whose {@link ensureInitialized} would reject it. The write queue is
+     * necessarily empty at that point, so the lock is uncontended there; it is taken anyway
+     * rather than carving out a lockless path. It is also the ONLY caller that passes a
+     * `policy` — everything else takes the default, whose classifier and attempt count are
+     * unchanged by that call site existing.
+     */
+    private lockedWithRetry;
+    /**
+     * One-statement local write, serialized by {@link withWriteLock} and retried on a
+     * transient cluster failure via {@link lockedWithRetry}. Prefer this over a bare
+     * `getDatabase().exec` so a new writer cannot forget the lock — the hazard
+     * {@link assertCommitBoundary} can only catch after the fact.
+     *
+     * Public so `SeedBootstrapService`'s direct `CadrePeer`/`DeviceToken` SQL writes go
+     * through the same seam. Must NOT be called from inside an already-locked body (the
+     * lock is not re-entrant); such a caller uses a bare `getDatabase().exec` instead.
+     */
+    execWrite(sql: string, params?: SqlParameters): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Throw unless the database sits at a committed boundary — `getAutocommit()` is false
+     * exactly while a transaction is open.
+     *
+     * Both ends of a {@link mutateCadrePeer} body are checked, because either open
+     * transaction would notify a listener that then reads PRE-commit state and materializes
+     * a membership snapshot silently missing the write it was told about:
+     *
+     * - open on entry: the wrapper sits INSIDE an enclosing transaction and must be moved
+     *   out to enclose that outer commit.
+     * - open on return: the body opened a transaction and never committed it.
+     *
+     * Neither is reachable from today's callers, so this is a fail-fast guard on a future
+     * mistake rather than a live code path.
+     *
+     * NOTE: `getAutocommit()` reports the whole `Database`, not this call. Local writers
+     * serialize through {@link withWriteLock}, so with every writer locked this can only
+     * trip on the two misuses above. A writer that bypasses the lock (a new method that
+     * forgets it, or raw `getDatabase().exec` outside a locked wrapper) re-opens the
+     * concurrent-writer window, and this assert is what catches it — it throws instead of
+     * silently joining the other write's transaction.
+     */
+    private assertCommitBoundary;
+    /**
+     * Best-effort notify. A listener that throws is logged and swallowed: the write has
+     * already committed, and it must never be reported as failed because a downstream
+     * snapshot refresh did. A null listener (no `CadreNode` attached — e.g. the service
+     * unit tests drive a bare control DB) is a silent no-op.
+     */
+    private notifyMembershipChanged;
+    /**
+     * Insert an owner-signed `FormationInvite` (open invitation token).
      *
      * The invite is the on-network record that later authorizes an
-     * authority-signature-FREE `Strand` creation: an invited cadre peer redeems it
+     * owner-signature-FREE `Strand` creation: an invited cadre peer redeems it
      * by inserting a matching `FormationUsage` row (see {@link redeemInvitation}),
-     * which satisfies the consent branch of `Strand.Authorized`.
+     * which satisfies the consent branch of `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`.
      *
-     * Like {@link insertStrand}/{@link insertValidationKey}, the authority signs the
+     * Like {@link insertStrand}/{@link insertValidationKey}, the owner signs the
      * canonical row-bound authorization message (see {@link buildAuthorizationMessage})
      * over (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId) — NOT a
      * bare stamp — so the signature is bound to this invite's contents and cannot be
      * transplanted onto an attacker-chosen row. The StampId is persisted as a unique
-     * column for single-use anti-replay. `FormationInvite.AuthorizedAddOrRemove` gates
-     * both insert and delete; its `coalesce(new, old)` verify binds the NEW row on
-     * insert and the OLD row on delete.
+     * column for single-use anti-replay. `FormationInvite.AuthorizedInsert` gates insert
+     * over an `'add'`-tagged digest; deletes verify a DISTINCT `'remove'`-tagged digest
+     * (`AuthorizedDelete`), so this insert approval can never be replayed as a revocation.
      *
      * `StrandId` binds the invite to a pre-existing host strand (provision-then-record):
      * when set, a responder redeeming this token records a `FormationUsage` against that
@@ -225,13 +1025,13 @@ export declare class ControlDatabase {
      *
      * @param token - Invitation token (the `FormationInvite` primary key)
      * @param sAppId - The sApp a redeemed strand will use
-     * @param authorityKey - Public key of the authorizing authority
+     * @param ownerKey - Public key of the authorizing owner
      * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash),
      *   returning a base64url signature — the same callback shape {@link insertStrand} uses
      * @param options - Optional `expiresAtMs` (epoch ms), `totalUses`, `validationUrl`,
      *   `strandId` (bind to a pre-existing host strand for provision-then-record)
      */
-    insertFormationInvite(token: string, sAppId: string, authorityKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string, options?: {
+    insertFormationInvite(token: string, sAppId: string, ownerKey: string, signMessage: (message: Uint8Array) => string, options?: {
         expiresAtMs?: number;
         totalUses?: number;
         validationUrl?: string;
@@ -242,51 +1042,174 @@ export declare class ControlDatabase {
      * `FormationUsage` row **atomically, in one transaction**.
      *
      * The two CHECK constraints are mutually circular under immediate evaluation:
-     * `Strand.Authorized`'s consent branch requires the `FormationUsage` row, while
-     * `FormationUsage.StrandExists` requires the `Strand` row. Both CHECKs contain
+     * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`'s consent branch requires a `FormationUsage` row naming
+     * this strand's `(Id, StampId)`, while `FormationUsage.StrandExists` requires a
+     * `Strand` row matching that same pair — the ONE freshly-minted `strandStampId` below
+     * satisfies both, which is what binds the consent record to this specific strand ROW
+     * (so a later owner-signed, tombstoned removal cannot be undone by re-inserting the
+     * id with a fresh stamp). Both CHECKs contain
      * subqueries, so Quereus auto-defers them to transaction commit — wrapping both
      * inserts in a single explicit `begin … commit` lets both deferred CHECKs see
-     * both rows at commit. The strand is authorised WITHOUT an authority signature
-     * (the `FormationUsage` branch of `Strand.Authorized`) but still gets a fresh,
+     * both rows at commit. The strand is authorised WITHOUT an owner signature
+     * (the `FormationUsage` branch of `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`) but still gets a fresh,
      * unique `StampId` column to satisfy the not-null/unique anti-replay column.
      *
+     * The seated strand is always open (`'o'`) and keyless — the consent branch of
+     * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert` accepts nothing else, the invite must be UNBOUND
+     * (`FormationInvite.StrandId` null; a bound invite's host strand is owner-provisioned
+     * and only ever record-only, see {@link recordFormationUsage}), and a given strand id
+     * may be consent-seated once, EVER: after an owner-signed removal, re-joining that id
+     * takes an owner re-seat ({@link insertStrand}) plus a bound invite, never another
+     * redemption.
+     *
      * `UseNumber` is computed as `max(UseNumber)+1` for the token (the `Monotonic`
-     * constraint); callers redeeming concurrently against the same token must
-     * serialise, since the next use number is read before the insert.
+     * constraint), inside the write lock and re-read per attempt by
+     * {@link withUseNumberRetry} — so concurrent redemptions of one token no longer need
+     * the caller to serialise them, and a use number lost to another writer is retried here
+     * with the caller's parameters passed through UNCHANGED. That is what makes the retry
+     * safe: the approval is bound to the nonce, not to the use number, so re-presenting it
+     * cannot drift, and no second trip through the approval hook is possible from in here.
      */
     redeemInvitation(params: {
         token: string;
         strandId: string;
-        type?: 'o' | 'c';
-        memberPrivateKey?: string;
+        /** The joining peer's own ed25519 public key. Required: it is inside BOTH signed digests (see {@link formationVouchMessage} / {@link formationConsentMessage}). */
+        peerKey: string;
         disclosure?: string;
-        peerId?: string;
-        peerSignature?: string;
+        /** Single-use nonce for this redemption, minted by the JOINER; both signed digests cover it. */
+        usageStampId: string;
+        /** The joiner's signature over the `'consent'` digest — verified by the `PeerConsented` CHECK. */
+        peerSignature: string;
         nowMs?: number;
         validationKey?: string;
         validationSignature?: string;
-    }): Promise<void>;
+        /**
+         * Aborted when the caller has given up. Checked once PER ATTEMPT, inside the write lock,
+         * before that attempt's transaction is opened — never between the two inserts — throwing
+         * {@link FormationAbortedError} with the invite unspent.
+         */
+        signal?: AbortSignal;
+        /**
+         * The invite's seat budget, when the caller already has it in hand (e.g. it already read
+         * the `FormationInvite` row to get here). Passed through to {@link withUseNumberRetry} so
+         * every attempt can check the seat budget without an extra read. `undefined` falls back to
+         * a fresh {@link queryFormationInvite} read; `null` means "no invite row" / unlimited.
+         */
+        totalUses?: number | null;
+    }): Promise<FormationUsageResult>;
     /**
      * Record a `FormationUsage` against an **already-existing** `Strand` (no strand
      * insert). This is the redemption path when the strand was provisioned
-     * separately (e.g. authority-signed) and the consent record is added after the
+     * separately (e.g. owner-signed) and the consent record is added after the
      * fact: the single insert auto-commits, and the deferred `StrandExists` CHECK
      * is satisfied by the pre-existing committed strand row. Returns the assigned
      * `UseNumber`.
      *
      * Use {@link redeemInvitation} instead when the strand must be created by
      * consent atomically with the usage.
+     *
+     * The strand's live `StampId` is read first and written onto the usage row:
+     * `FormationUsage.StrandExists` matches the (id, stamp) PAIR, and
+     * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`'s consent branch reads the same pair back, so a consent
+     * record authorizes exactly the strand ROW it was recorded against. A missing strand
+     * THROWS here rather than being left to the deferred `StrandExists` CHECK — the
+     * ordinary "host strand has not converged yet" case is already reported as `missing`
+     * by {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand}, so an absent row at this
+     * point is a genuine race and deserves a named error, not a silent rollback.
+     *
+     * `UseNumber` is read inside the write lock and re-read per attempt by
+     * {@link withUseNumberRetry}: this is the path production actually races on (a bound
+     * invite published by `cadre-web` / `cadre-phone` is always record-only), and a use number
+     * lost to another writer is retried here with the caller's parameters — nonce, approver
+     * sign-off, strand, peer key, disclosure — passed through UNCHANGED, so a granted approval
+     * is never thrown away for a second trip through the approval hook.
      */
     recordFormationUsage(params: {
         token: string;
         strandId: string;
+        /** The joining peer's own ed25519 public key. Required: it is inside BOTH signed digests (see {@link formationVouchMessage} / {@link formationConsentMessage}). */
+        peerKey: string;
         disclosure?: string;
-        peerId?: string;
-        peerSignature?: string;
+        /** Single-use nonce for this redemption, minted by the JOINER; both signed digests cover it. */
+        usageStampId: string;
+        /** The joiner's signature over the `'consent'` digest — verified by the `PeerConsented` CHECK. */
+        peerSignature: string;
         nowMs?: number;
         validationKey?: string;
         validationSignature?: string;
-    }): Promise<number>;
+        /**
+         * Aborted when the caller has given up. Checked once PER ATTEMPT, inside the write lock,
+         * at the top of the attempt — before it reads a use number and before its insert is
+         * issued — throwing {@link FormationAbortedError} with the invite unspent. Never checked
+         * once an insert has been issued.
+         */
+        signal?: AbortSignal;
+        /**
+         * The invite's seat budget, when the caller already has it in hand (e.g. it already read
+         * the `FormationInvite` row to get here). Passed through to {@link withUseNumberRetry} so
+         * every attempt can check the seat budget without an extra read. `undefined` falls back to
+         * a fresh {@link queryFormationInvite} read; `null` means "no invite row" / unlimited.
+         */
+        totalUses?: number | null;
+    }): Promise<FormationUsageResult>;
+    /**
+     * Assign a `UseNumber` and run `write` under it, re-picking and retrying when another
+     * writer took that number first.
+     *
+     * Each attempt takes {@link withWriteLock} and, inside it, reads {@link nextUseNumber}
+     * afresh. Reading under the lock is the whole fix for the common case: two redemptions of
+     * one token on the SAME node are serialized by the local write queue, so each computes a
+     * number the other has already committed and neither collides. The retry covers the writers
+     * this lock does not reach — another node of the cadre, another `Database` handle over the
+     * same store — which can still take the number between our read and our commit.
+     *
+     * `write` receives ONLY the use number; every other parameter of the redemption (the nonce,
+     * the approver's signature, the strand, the joining peer key, the disclosure) is closed over
+     * by the caller and passed through untouched. So by construction a retry re-presents the
+     * IDENTICAL approval and the four non-nonce fields inside the approver's signed digest
+     * cannot drift. No second call to the approval hook is reachable from in here either:
+     * `obtainApproval` lives a layer up in `ControlFormationUsageRecorder` and is never
+     * re-entered.
+     *
+     * `write` must be a BARE private body ({@link inTransaction} /
+     * {@link execFormationUsageInsert}) — {@link withWriteLock} is not re-entrant and a `write`
+     * that called another locked public method would hang silently and strand the write queue.
+     *
+     * A failed attempt has written nothing (a bare insert never landed; a transactional one
+     * rolled back), so the abort check at the top of each attempt stays inside
+     * {@link FormationAbortedError}'s contract — it is only ever thrown before this attempt's
+     * write is issued.
+     *
+     * @param operation - `'redemption'` | `'usage recording'`, for the abort error's text.
+     * @param knownTotalUses - The invite's seat budget when the caller already has it in hand
+     * (`undefined` to fall back to a fresh {@link queryFormationInvite} read; `null` for "no
+     * invite row" / unlimited). Passed through to {@link assertSeatRemains} on every attempt.
+     * @returns The `UseNumber` the successful attempt wrote under.
+     */
+    private withUseNumberRetry;
+    /**
+     * Refuse an attempt that would consume a seat the invite does not have.
+     *
+     * `FormationUsage.Authorized` already enforces `FI.TotalUses is null or FI.TotalUses >=
+     * new.UseNumber`, so an over-limit write fails at the database anyway — but it fails as a
+     * generic `CHECK constraint failed: Authorized`, which the manager reports as a retryable
+     * conflict. Catching it here as {@link InvitationExhaustedError} lets the joiner be told the
+     * invitation is spent instead of being sent around a loop that can never close. Run on EVERY
+     * attempt, including the first: two redemptions racing on the SAME node serialize behind the
+     * local write queue, so the loser's first attempt is already over budget, with no retry
+     * involved.
+     *
+     * `knownTotalUses` lets a caller that already read the `FormationInvite` row (both
+     * production callers in `ControlFormationUsageRecorder` do) skip a second read on the common,
+     * non-racing path. `undefined` falls back to a fresh read here.
+     *
+     * NOTE: a passed-in budget is a value read BEFORE the write lock (and, for a validating
+     * invite, before an outbound approval call). Safe today because `FormationInvite` is
+     * insert/delete only (its `Immutable` constraint), so the only way to stale it is an owner
+     * revoking the token and re-issuing it with MORE seats mid-redemption; if invites ever gain
+     * an update path, drop the parameter and read here on every attempt instead.
+     */
+    private assertSeatRemains;
     /** Parameterised `FormationUsage` insert shared by redeem + record paths. */
     private execFormationUsageInsert;
     /**
@@ -306,10 +1229,44 @@ export declare class ControlDatabase {
      * Count `FormationUsage` rows recorded against a token (uses consumed so far).
      */
     countFormationUsage(token: string): Promise<number>;
-    /** Next `UseNumber` for a token = max(existing)+1, per the `Monotonic` constraint. */
+    /**
+     * Is any `FormationInvite` row still redeemable — unexpired AND with usage
+     * below its `TotalUses`? A null `ExpiresAt` never expires and a null
+     * `TotalUses` is unlimited, matching {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder}'s
+     * per-token semantics (`isTokenValid` / `isTokenUsed`).
+     *
+     * Answers the control-network connection gate's coarse "does this node expect
+     * a stranger?" question, which has no token to ask about. The expiry
+     * comparison is `expiresAtMs <= now` — identical to `isTokenValid`'s — so an
+     * invite the formation handler would reject can never hold the gate open.
+     *
+     * The scan is deliberately not pushed into SQL: nothing else here compares a
+     * stored `datetime` with an inequality, so the parse stays in JS via the
+     * shared {@link parseNullableStoredDatetimeMs}. Only invites that are
+     * unexpired AND use-metered cost a {@link countFormationUsage} read, and an
+     * unlimited-use invite anywhere in the scan short-circuits all of them.
+     */
+    hasOutstandingFormationInvite(nowMs?: number): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Next `UseNumber` for a token = max(existing)+1, per the `Monotonic` constraint.
+     *
+     * Called only from inside {@link withUseNumberRetry}'s locked body — a read takes no
+     * transaction of its own, so it is safe there, and reading it under the lock is what stops
+     * two local redemptions of one token from picking the same number.
+     */
     private nextUseNumber;
     /**
-     * Close the database and cleanup resources
+     * Close the database and cleanup resources.
+     *
+     * Drains the local-write chain first: {@link withWriteLock} can park a write behind
+     * others across an await, and a queued closure evaluates `this.db!` only when it
+     * finally runs — so nulling the handle out from under it would throw a TypeError on a
+     * null handle instead of committing. The tail never rejects (it swallows both
+     * outcomes), so the bare await is safe.
+     *
+     * NOTE: this makes `close()` wait on a stuck write. Acceptable today — every locked
+     * body is a bounded local `exec` — but revisit (bounded drain, or abandon after a
+     * deadline) if a write can ever hang.
      */
     close(): Promise<void>;
     private ensureInitialized;