@serfab/cadre-core 0.8.1 → 0.10.0

package/src/peer-authorization.ts

@@ -1,30 +1,160 @@
 import debug from 'debug';
 import { digest, verify } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
+import { controlAuthorizationFields } from './control-authorization.js';
+import type { ControlAction, ControlDomain, RevocableTable } from './control-authorization.js';
 
 const log = debug('sereus:cadre:peer-authorization');
 
 /**
- * Canonical digest an authority signs to authorize a peer.
+ * base64url SHA-256 digest over the shared domain-tagged field vector (see
+ * control-authorization.ts). The base64url twin of
+ * control-database.ts:buildAuthorizationMessage (which returns the same digest as raw
+ * bytes): sign either encoding with input encoding to match and the signed bytes agree.
+ */
+function taggedDigest(domain: ControlDomain, action: ControlAction, rowFields: string[]): string {
+  return digest(controlAuthorizationFields(domain, action, rowFields), 'sha256', 'base64url') as string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to vouch a peer's ENROLLMENT — the offline
+ * credential `cadre enroll register` verifies. No table checks this digest, so it
+ * carries its own `'Cadre.Enrollment'` domain tag to stay disjoint from every
+ * CadreControl table rule (pre-tag it collided with the `DeviceToken` owner digests,
+ * so an enrollment vouch doubled as a push-token delete approval).
  *
- * This is the exact byte construction {@link SeedBootstrapService.authorizePeer}
- * signs over when it inserts an authorized `CadrePeer` row:
- * `digest([peerId], 'sha256', 'base64url')`. Factored into one place so the
- * producer (authority signing) and the verifier (the offline `cadre enroll
- * register` check) can never drift apart — change the digest here and both move
- * together. The SQL mirror is the bare single-field `digest(coalesce(new.PeerId, old.PeerId))`.
+ * Factored into one place so the producer (owner signing) and the verifier (the
+ * offline `cadre enroll register` check) can never drift apart — change the digest
+ * here and both move together.
  */
 export function peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId: string): string {
-  return digest([peerId], 'sha256', 'base64url') as string;
+  return taggedDigest('Cadre.Enrollment', 'vouch', [peerId]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The `CadreControl.DeviceToken` columns {@link deviceTokenAddDigest} binds, in the
+ * schema's order. A whole-row struct rather than six positional strings, so a caller
+ * cannot silently transpose `platform` and `token` (both opaque strings) and mint a
+ * signature over a row it did not mean to approve.
+ *
+ * Structurally satisfied by a `DeviceTokenRecord` spread with the row's `stampId`;
+ * `types.ts:DeviceTokenRecord` deliberately does NOT carry the stamp — it is the
+ * SELF-signed record shape, and the peer's own `Sig` does not cover `StampId`.
+ * `updatedAt` / `sig` are nullable because the columns are: both sign as `''` when
+ * absent, mirroring the schema's `coalesce(...)`.
+ */
+export interface DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow {
+  peerId: string;
+  platform: string;
+  token: string;
+  updatedAt: number | null;
+  sig: string | null;
+  stampId: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` INSERT — the WHOLE row,
+ * ending in its single-use `StampId` nonce. SQL mirror:
+ * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', new.PeerId, new.Platform, new.Token,
+ * coalesce(cast(new.UpdatedAt as text), ''), coalesce(new.Sig, ''), new.StampId)` in
+ * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedInsert`.
+ *
+ * Binding every column means a captured approval can only ever reproduce the exact row
+ * it approved — never one carrying attacker-chosen `Platform`/`Token`/`UpdatedAt` — and
+ * binding the stamp makes it single-use: while the row lives the `unique` column blocks
+ * a replay, and after a clear the stamp is retired permanently into
+ * `CadreControl.Revocation` (`DeviceToken.NotRevoked`). This matters more here than for
+ * `CadrePeer`: a resurrected push token has NO freshness ceiling to retire it
+ * (`CadreNode.resolveDeviceToken` defaults `maxAgeMs` to infinity by design), so stamp
+ * retirement is the only thing that sticks.
+ *
+ * Distinct from {@link deviceTokenRemoveDigest} so a captured insert approval can never
+ * be replayed to delete the token, and vice versa.
+ */
+export function deviceTokenAddDigest(row: DeviceTokenAuthorizedRow): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'add', [
+    row.peerId,
+    row.platform,
+    row.token,
+    row.updatedAt === null ? '' : String(row.updatedAt),
+    row.sig ?? '',
+    row.stampId,
+  ]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to authorize a `DeviceToken` DELETE, bound to the
+ * STORED row's (PeerId, StampId). SQL mirror:
+ * `digest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)` in
+ * `DeviceToken.AuthorizedDelete`.
+ *
+ * A narrower vector than {@link deviceTokenAddDigest} on purpose (the same split
+ * `CadrePeer` makes): the clear approval names only which row is being retired, so it
+ * cannot be re-cut into an insert approval, and it is dead the moment the stamp it
+ * names is tombstoned.
+ */
+export function deviceTokenRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.DeviceToken', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to VOUCH a `CadrePeer` membership row (insert
+ * and the owner re-touch update — same semantics, deliberately the same digest).
+ * Binds the peer id to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce, so a captured signed
+ * insert cannot be replayed — while the row lives the `unique` column blocks it, and
+ * after a removal the stamp is retired permanently into `CadreControl.Revocation`
+ * (`CadrePeer.NotRevoked`) — and, because {@link cadrePeerRemoveDigest} scopes a
+ * DIFFERENT payload, the stored voucher (`VouchSig`) cannot be replayed to authorize
+ * a delete. The domain tag keeps the stored, replicated `VouchSig` useless against
+ * every OTHER table's rules.
+ *
+ * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', new.PeerId, new.StampId)`.
+ */
+export function cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', [peerId, stampId]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to REMOVE a `CadrePeer` row. Deliberately a
+ * distinct payload from {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest} (the `'remove'` action tag)
+ * so the row's stored voucher — a signature over the voucher digest — can never
+ * satisfy this delete check. The signature is supplied in write context and never
+ * stored, so no reader can replay it; a captured remove is also dead after the
+ * delete lands, because a re-added row carries a FRESH `StampId` (the removed row's
+ * stamp is retired into `CadreControl.Revocation` and never reused).
+ *
+ * SQL mirror: `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)`.
+ */
+export function cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId: string, stampId: string): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', [peerId, stampId]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest an owner signs to APPEND a `CadreControl.Revocation` tombstone —
+ * the row retiring `stampId` for the named guarded table, and recording `rowKey`
+ * (the removed row's primary key: OwnerKey.Key / ValidationKey.Key /
+ * CadrePeer.PeerId / DeviceToken.PeerId / Strand.Id) as which row was retired.
+ * SQL mirror:
+ * `digest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', new.TableName, new.RowKey, new.StampId)`
+ * in `Revocation.Authorized`.
+ *
+ * Its own `'CadreControl.Revocation'` domain tag makes it disjoint from the
+ * `'CadreControl.CadrePeer'` (or `OwnerKey` / `ValidationKey` / `Strand`)
+ * `'remove'` digest the same owner signs in the SAME transaction for the delete
+ * this tombstone accompanies — a removal signature is not a retirement
+ * signature and cannot be replayed as one.
+ */
+export function revocationDigest(tableName: RevocableTable, rowKey: string, stampId: string): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', [tableName, rowKey, stampId]);
 }
 
 /**
- * Verify that `signature` is a valid authority ed25519 signature over `peerId`'s
- * authorization digest, using `authorityPublicKey` (base64url).
+ * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over `peerId`'s
+ * authorization digest, using `ownerPublicKey` (base64url).
  *
  * This is the mirror of the signing done in
  * {@link SeedBootstrapService.authorizePeer}: it checks the signature against
  * {@link peerAuthorizationDigest}. A `true` result means the holder of the
- * authority private key vouched for this peer ID — it does NOT mean the peer is
+ * owner private key vouched for this peer ID — it does NOT mean the peer is
  * registered anywhere.
  *
  * Returns a boolean and never throws: malformed base64url, a bad/garbage key, or
@@ -33,14 +163,14 @@ export function peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId: string): string {
  */
 export function verifyPeerAuthorization(
   peerId: string,
-  authorityPublicKey: string,
+  ownerPublicKey: string,
   signature: string
 ): boolean {
   try {
     return verify(
       peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId),
       signature,
-      authorityPublicKey,
+      ownerPublicKey,
       'ed25519',
       'base64url',
       'base64url',
@@ -51,3 +181,79 @@ export function verifyPeerAuthorization(
     return false;
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * Verify that `signature` is a valid owner ed25519 signature over the
+ * `CadrePeer` voucher digest for (`peerId`, `stampId`) — the read-side mirror
+ * of the voucher {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer} signs and persists into
+ * `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` (see {@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest}).
+ *
+ * A `true` result means the holder of `ownerPublicKey` vouched THIS membership
+ * row (the peer id bound to the row's single-use `StampId` nonce). It says
+ * nothing about whether that owner key is itself trustworthy — the caller must
+ * separately check the key against the node-local trusted-owner anchor
+ * (`TrustedOwnerStore`), never the replicated `OwnerKey` table.
+ *
+ * Returns a boolean and never throws (same contract as
+ * {@link verifyPeerAuthorization}): malformed input or any crypto failure
+ * resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
+ */
+export function verifyCadrePeerVoucher(
+  peerId: string,
+  stampId: string,
+  ownerPublicKey: string,
+  signature: string
+): boolean {
+  try {
+    return verify(
+      cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId, stampId),
+      signature,
+      ownerPublicKey,
+      'ed25519',
+      'base64url',
+      'base64url',
+      'base64url'
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    log('verifyCadrePeerVoucher failed: %o', error);
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical digest a JOINING peer signs to consent to ONE `FormationUsage`
+ * redemption — the read-side mirror of `formationConsentMessage` in
+ * control-database.ts, base64url-encoded instead of raw bytes (see
+ * {@link taggedDigest}). That doc comment carries the field-vector rationale
+ * (notably why `strandId` is not signed); the two vectors must not drift, which
+ * peer-authorization.spec.ts pins by signing one form and verifying the other.
+ */
+export function formationConsentDigest(
+  token: string, usageStampId: string, peerKey: string, disclosure: string
+): string {
+  return taggedDigest('CadreControl.FormationUsage', 'consent', [token, usageStampId, peerKey, disclosure]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify that `row.peerSig` is a valid ed25519 signature over the joining peer's
+ * consent digest (see {@link formationConsentDigest}) — the row's OWN `peerKey`.
+ *
+ * Unlike {@link verifyCadrePeerVoucher} there is no separate enrolled/owner row to
+ * look up: the identity IS the key carried on the row, so a forged consent would
+ * need that joiner's own private key. Returns a boolean and never throws (same
+ * contract as the siblings above): malformed input or any crypto failure resolves
+ * to `false`, logged at debug.
+ */
+export function verifyFormationConsent(row: {
+  token: string; usageStampId: string; peerKey: string; disclosure: string; peerSig: string;
+}): boolean {
+  try {
+    return verify(
+      formationConsentDigest(row.token, row.usageStampId, row.peerKey, row.disclosure),
+      row.peerSig, row.peerKey, 'ed25519', 'base64url', 'base64url', 'base64url'
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    log('verifyFormationConsent failed: %o', error);
+    return false;
+  }
+}

package/src/peer-record.ts

@@ -3,24 +3,29 @@
  * signs when publishing its own `CadrePeer` row and re-verifies when resolving
  * another peer's row.
  *
- * The signed payload is a single SHA-256 digest of a delimited string of the
- * authenticated fields. It is intentionally NOT JSON-canonicalized: a delimited
- * digest is trivially deterministic across node/browser/RN (plain string concat
- * + sha256, no key ordering) and — crucially — is reconstructable inside the
- * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate` SQL constraint from the row's own columns:
+ * The signed payload is a single SHA-256 digest over the shared domain-tagged
+ * field vector (see control-authorization.ts) — the crypto plugin's injective
+ * multi-field encoding, so no field split is ambiguous. It is intentionally NOT
+ * JSON-canonicalized (deterministic across node/browser/RN, no key ordering)
+ * and — crucially — is reconstructable inside the `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate`
+ * SQL constraint from the row's own columns:
  *
- *   digest(new.PeerId || '|' || new.Multiaddr || '|' || cast(new.UpdatedAt as text))
+ *   digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'publish',
+ *          new.PeerId, new.Multiaddr, cast(new.UpdatedAt as text))
  *
  * Keep {@link peerRecordSignedPayload} and that constraint byte-for-byte in
- * sync. The `'|'` delimiter is safe: a base58btc PeerId, a multiaddr (which uses
- * `/`), and a base-10 integer never contain it.
+ * sync. The `'publish'` action tag marks this as a peer's SELF-signed record
+ * (signed with the peer's own key, not an owner key) and keeps it disjoint from
+ * every owner-signed digest.
  *
  * `publicKey` is deliberately excluded from the payload — it is the key the
  * signature is verified *with* (so a signature already commits to exactly one
  * key), and its binding to `peerId` is checked separately at resolve time.
  */
 
+import type { Multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr';
 import { digest, sign, verify } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
+import { controlAuthorizationFields } from './control-authorization.js';
 import type { PeerAddressRecord, PeerResolveTrustPolicy } from './types.js';
 
 /**
@@ -51,8 +56,8 @@ const SIGNALING_PREFIX = '/p2p-circuit';
  * @param updatedAt - epoch-ms freshness stamp
  */
 export function peerRecordSignedPayload(peerId: string, multiaddr: string, updatedAt: number): string {
-  const joined = `${peerId}|${multiaddr}|${updatedAt}`;
-  return digest([joined], 'sha256', 'base64url') as string;
+  const fields = controlAuthorizationFields('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'publish', [peerId, multiaddr, String(updatedAt)]);
+  return digest(fields, 'sha256', 'base64url') as string;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -61,7 +66,7 @@ export function peerRecordSignedPayload(peerId: string, multiaddr: string, updat
  * preserved and is the order signed over).
  *
  * @param fields - the record fields to sign (signaling addr first by convention)
- * @param privateKeyB64 - base64url ed25519 seed (see `authorityKeyFromLibp2p`)
+ * @param privateKeyB64 - base64url ed25519 seed (see `ed25519KeyPairFromLibp2p`)
  */
 export function signPeerRecord(
   fields: { peerId: string; publicKey: string; addrs: string[]; updatedAt: number },
@@ -117,6 +122,19 @@ export function isSignalingAddr(addr: string): boolean {
   return addr.includes(SIGNALING_PREFIX);
 }
 
+/**
+ * The peer id a multiaddr terminates in, or `null` when it names none.
+ *
+ * The LAST `/p2p/` component is the dial target: a circuit address
+ * (`…/p2p/<relay>/p2p-circuit/p2p/<target>`) names the relay first and the peer
+ * being reached last. Replaces the deprecated `Multiaddr.getPeerId()`, which
+ * cannot express that distinction.
+ */
+export function trailingPeerId(addr: Multiaddr): string | null {
+  const p2p = addr.getComponents().filter((c) => c.name === 'p2p');
+  return p2p.length > 0 ? (p2p[p2p.length - 1].value ?? null) : null;
+}
+
 /**
  * Return `addrs` with signaling (`/p2p-circuit`) addrs first, otherwise stable.
  * Used to present the WebRTC dial input ahead of direct addrs. Does NOT mutate
@@ -132,8 +150,8 @@ export function orderSignalingFirst(addrs: string[]): string[] {
 /**
  * Default resolve trust gate: trust any peer that has a `CadrePeer` row.
  *
- * A row only exists because an authority signed its `AuthorizedInsert`, so row
- * presence already means "authority-vouched member". This is the seam where a
+ * A row only exists because an owner signed its `AuthorizedInsert`, so row
+ * presence already means "owner-vouched member". This is the seam where a
  * stricter policy (trust circle, pinned keys) plugs in — see
  * {@link PeerResolveTrustPolicy}.
  */

package/src/push-node.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * push-node.ts — Node-only subpath entry for platform push **construction**.
+ *
+ * Import from the dedicated subpath, never the package root:
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * import { createPushNotifier } from '@serfab/cadre-core/push-node';
+ * ```
+ *
+ * The FCM/APNs implementations reach for `node:crypto` / `node:http2`, so they
+ * are quarantined here — unreachable from the cross-platform `./index.js` graph
+ * (same isolation pattern as `./key-store-file`). A React Native / browser entry
+ * never resolves this path, so the Node builtins never reach a bundler that
+ * cannot satisfy them. The core references only the {@link PushNotifier}
+ * *interface* (`push-notifier.ts`) and a Node host injects the instance built
+ * here into `CadreNodeConfig.push.notifier`.
+ */
+
+import type { PushCredentials, PushPlatform } from './types.js';
+import type { PushMessage, PushNotifier, PushSendResult } from './push-notifier.js';
+import { createFcmPushNotifier, type FcmPushDeps } from './push-notifier-fcm.js';
+import { createApnsPushNotifier, type ApnsPushDeps } from './push-notifier-apns.js';
+
+/**
+ * Per-platform transport/clock/log seams, injected by tests. Defaults are the
+ * real implementations (global `fetch` for FCM, a `node:http2` session for APNs).
+ */
+export interface PushNotifierDeps {
+  fcm?: FcmPushDeps;
+  apns?: ApnsPushDeps;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a {@link PushNotifier} router over the configured credentials. Only the
+ * platforms whose credentials are present get a backing implementation; a `send`
+ * for an unconfigured platform returns a best-effort `no <platform> credentials`
+ * failure rather than throwing.
+ */
+export function createPushNotifier(creds: PushCredentials, deps: PushNotifierDeps = {}): PushNotifier {
+  const fcm = creds.fcm ? createFcmPushNotifier(creds.fcm, deps.fcm) : undefined;
+  const apns = creds.apns ? createApnsPushNotifier(creds.apns, deps.apns) : undefined;
+
+  async function send(msg: PushMessage): Promise<PushSendResult> {
+    if (msg.platform === 'fcm') return fcm ? fcm.send(msg) : noCreds('fcm');
+    if (msg.platform === 'apns') return apns ? apns.send(msg) : noCreds('apns');
+    return { ok: false, unregistered: false, error: `unknown platform ${String(msg.platform)}` };
+  }
+
+  async function close(): Promise<void> {
+    await Promise.all([fcm?.close(), apns?.close()]);
+  }
+
+  return { send, close };
+}
+
+/** Best-effort no-op result for a platform with no configured credentials. */
+function noCreds(platform: PushPlatform): PushSendResult {
+  return { ok: false, unregistered: false, error: `no ${platform} credentials` };
+}
+
+// Per-platform builders + their injected-dep types, for a host that wants a
+// single-platform notifier or to inject a fake transport directly.
+export { createFcmPushNotifier, createApnsPushNotifier };
+export type { FcmPushDeps, ApnsPushDeps };

package/src/push-notifier-apns.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,16 @@
 /**
  * push-notifier-apns.ts — APNs HTTP/2 strand-wake delivery.
  *
- * Server-only: signs a provider JWT (ES256, JOSE raw r‖s via `node:crypto`) and
- * sends a background data push over an HTTP/2 session to Apple's gateway.
+ * Node-only: signs a provider JWT (ES256, JOSE raw r‖s via `node:crypto`) and
+ * sends a background data push over an HTTP/2 session to Apple's gateway. APNs
+ * mandates HTTP/2, so `node:http2` is unavoidable here — one reason the push
+ * path is injected rather than rebuilt on WebCrypto/`fetch`.
+ *
+ * Reachable only through the `@serfab/cadre-core/push-node` subpath — never from
+ * the cross-platform `./index.js` graph — so the `node:crypto` / `node:http2`
+ * imports below are safe: no RN/browser bundler ever resolves this module. (Plain
+ * named imports; the old namespace-import-to-only-warn dance is obsolete now that
+ * the module is unreachable from a browser build by construction.)
  *
  * The HTTP/2 call is behind an injected `Http2Requester` seam (bundled with a
  * `close` into an {@link ApnsTransport}) so unit tests assert the request shape
@@ -19,12 +27,8 @@
  * token prefix.
  */
 
-// Namespace import (not `import { sign }`): a *named* import of the
-// browser-externalized `node:crypto` hard-fails the web build, whereas a
-// namespace import only warns — same reasoning as the `node:http2` import below
-// and the matching note in push-notifier-fcm.ts. Server-only; never run in browser.
-import * as nodeCrypto from 'node:crypto';
-import * as http2 from 'node:http2';
+import { sign } from 'node:crypto';
+import { connect, type ClientHttp2Session } from 'node:http2';
 import debug from 'debug';
 import type { ApnsCredentials } from './types.js';
 import type { PushMessage, PushNotifier, PushSendResult } from './push-notifier.js';
@@ -171,7 +175,7 @@ export function createApnsPushNotifier(creds: ApnsCredentials, deps: ApnsPushDep
     const header = { alg: 'ES256', kid: creds.keyId };
     const claims = { iss: creds.teamId, iat };
     const signingInput = `${b64urlJson(header)}.${b64urlJson(claims)}`;
-    const sig = nodeCrypto.sign('SHA256', Buffer.from(signingInput), {
+    const sig = sign('SHA256', Buffer.from(signingInput), {
       key: creds.privateKey,
       dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363',
     }).toString('base64url');
@@ -195,11 +199,11 @@ export function createApnsPushNotifier(creds: ApnsCredentials, deps: ApnsPushDep
  * network) — tests inject a fake transport; the real path is validated out-of-band.
  */
 function createHttp2Transport(host: string): ApnsTransport {
-  let session: http2.ClientHttp2Session | null = null;
+  let session: ClientHttp2Session | null = null;
 
-  function ensureSession(): http2.ClientHttp2Session {
+  function ensureSession(): ClientHttp2Session {
     if (session && !session.closed && !session.destroyed) return session;
-    const s = http2.connect(host);
+    const s = connect(host);
     // Drop a dead session so ensureSession recreates it on the next request.
     s.on('error', () => { if (session === s) session = null; });
     s.on('goaway', () => { s.destroy(); });

package/src/push-notifier-fcm.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
 /**
  * push-notifier-fcm.ts — FCM HTTP v1 strand-wake delivery.
  *
- * Server-only: mints a Google OAuth2 access token (RS256 JWT bearer grant signed
+ * Node-only: mints a Google OAuth2 access token (RS256 JWT bearer grant signed
  * with `node:crypto`) and POSTs a data message to the FCM v1 endpoint. The legacy
  * server-key `fcm.googleapis.com/fcm/send` API is deprecated, so we use HTTP v1.
  *
+ * Reachable only through the `@serfab/cadre-core/push-node` subpath — never from
+ * the cross-platform `./index.js` graph — so the `node:crypto` import below is
+ * safe: no RN/browser bundler ever resolves this module. (Plain named import;
+ * the old namespace-import-to-only-warn dance is obsolete now that the module is
+ * unreachable from a browser build by construction.)
+ *
  * The network call is behind an injected `fetch`-like seam so unit tests assert
  * the request shape and map every documented response code with no real network
  * and no credentials. Failures are returned as {@link PushSendResult} values.
@@ -14,14 +20,7 @@
  * code and a redacted token prefix.
  */
 
-// Namespace import (not `import { sign }`): this module is server-only and is
-// reached only via the guarded dynamic import in CadreNode, but bundlers still
-// analyse that lazy chunk. A *named* import of `node:crypto` hard-fails the
-// browser build ("sign is not exported by __vite-browser-external"), whereas a
-// namespace import of the deliberately-unaliased external only warns (matching
-// the `node:http2` namespace import in push-notifier-apns.ts). The browser
-// never executes this code (config.push is node-only), so the warning is benign.
-import * as nodeCrypto from 'node:crypto';
+import { sign } from 'node:crypto';
 import debug from 'debug';
 import type { FcmCredentials } from './types.js';
 import type { PushMessage, PushNotifier, PushSendResult } from './push-notifier.js';
@@ -166,7 +165,7 @@ export function createFcmPushNotifier(creds: FcmCredentials, deps: FcmPushDeps =
       exp: iat + 3600,
     };
     const signingInput = `${b64urlJson(header)}.${b64urlJson(claims)}`;
-    const sig = nodeCrypto.sign('RSA-SHA256', Buffer.from(signingInput), creds.privateKey).toString('base64url');
+    const sig = sign('RSA-SHA256', Buffer.from(signingInput), creds.privateKey).toString('base64url');
     return `${signingInput}.${sig}`;
   }
 

package/src/push-notifier.ts

@@ -1,30 +1,26 @@
 /**
- * push-notifier.ts — the platform-push **delivery** seam for strand-wake.
+ * push-notifier.ts — the platform-push **delivery** contract for strand-wake.
  *
- * Given a resolved mobile peer token, send one `strand-wake` data message over
- * the right platform channel (FCM for Android, APNs for iOS). This module owns no
- * policy — *who* to wake and *when* is the fan-out (`push-fanout.ts`). It is the
- * reusable, credential-injected, transport-injected unit the fan-out constructs
- * inside a participating `CadreNode` when push credentials are configured.
+ * This module is the cross-platform-safe *interface* half: the message shape
+ * ({@link PushMessage}), the outcome value ({@link PushSendResult}), and the
+ * {@link PushNotifier} port a `CadreNode` sends over. It carries ZERO runtime
+ * dependencies and imports no implementation — so the RN/browser entry graph can
+ * reference the type without ever resolving `node:crypto` / `node:http2`.
  *
- * `createPushNotifier` returns a router that dispatches by `msg.platform` to an
- * `FcmPushNotifier` and/or `ApnsPushNotifier`, constructing only the
- * implementations whose credentials are present. Failures are values, never
- * thrown — mirroring `ServiceWakeResult` / `resolveDeviceToken`'s no-throw
- * conventions so a best-effort fan-out can branch on the outcome.
+ * The concrete FCM/APNs implementations (`push-notifier-fcm.ts` /
+ * `push-notifier-apns.ts`) and the `createPushNotifier` router that builds them
+ * live behind the Node-only subpath `@serfab/cadre-core/push-node`
+ * (`push-node.ts`). A Node host constructs a notifier from that subpath and
+ * injects the instance into `CadreNodeConfig.push.notifier`; the cross-platform
+ * core never constructs one, so the Node-only builtins stay out of its graph.
  *
- * Server-only by construction: the FCM/APNs implementations reach for
- * `node:crypto` / `node:http2`. They are never pulled into the RN/browser bundle
- * because the cross-platform `index.ts` re-exports only the *types* here (a
- * type-only re-export is erased at emit), and the only runtime constructor of a
- * notifier is the in-package fan-out that runs inside a Node `CadreNode`. A
- * cross-platform consumer imports the payload contract + types, never this value.
+ * Keep this file zero-import (beyond erased type-only imports): the whole point
+ * of the seam is that referencing the interface can never drag an implementation
+ * module into a bundler's graph.
  */
 
-import type { PushPlatform, PushCredentials } from './types.js';
+import type { PushPlatform } from './types.js';
 import type { StrandWakePayload } from './strand-wake-payload.js';
-import { createFcmPushNotifier, type FcmPushDeps } from './push-notifier-fcm.js';
-import { createApnsPushNotifier, type ApnsPushDeps } from './push-notifier-apns.js';
 
 /** One strand-wake data message addressed to one device. */
 export interface PushMessage {
@@ -54,40 +50,3 @@ export interface PushNotifier {
   /** Release transport resources (e.g. the APNs HTTP/2 session). */
   close(): Promise<void>;
 }
-
-/**
- * Per-platform transport/clock/log seams, injected by tests. Defaults are the
- * real implementations (global `fetch` for FCM, a `node:http2` session for APNs).
- */
-export interface PushNotifierDeps {
-  fcm?: FcmPushDeps;
-  apns?: ApnsPushDeps;
-}
-
-/**
- * Build a {@link PushNotifier} router over the configured credentials. Only the
- * platforms whose credentials are present get a backing implementation; a `send`
- * for an unconfigured platform returns a best-effort `no <platform> credentials`
- * failure rather than throwing.
- */
-export function createPushNotifier(creds: PushCredentials, deps: PushNotifierDeps = {}): PushNotifier {
-  const fcm = creds.fcm ? createFcmPushNotifier(creds.fcm, deps.fcm) : undefined;
-  const apns = creds.apns ? createApnsPushNotifier(creds.apns, deps.apns) : undefined;
-
-  async function send(msg: PushMessage): Promise<PushSendResult> {
-    if (msg.platform === 'fcm') return fcm ? fcm.send(msg) : noCreds('fcm');
-    if (msg.platform === 'apns') return apns ? apns.send(msg) : noCreds('apns');
-    return { ok: false, unregistered: false, error: `unknown platform ${String(msg.platform)}` };
-  }
-
-  async function close(): Promise<void> {
-    await Promise.all([fcm?.close(), apns?.close()]);
-  }
-
-  return { send, close };
-}
-
-/** Best-effort no-op result for a platform with no configured credentials. */
-function noCreds(platform: PushPlatform): PushSendResult {
-  return { ok: false, unregistered: false, error: `no ${platform} credentials` };
-}