@seasonkoh/webaz 0.1.27 → 0.1.29

package/dist/merchant-bond-exposure.js

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+import { toUnits } from './money.js';
+export const EXPOSURE_FACTOR_BPS_PARAM = 'direct_pay.exposure_factor_bps';
+export const EXPOSURE_FACTOR_BPS_DEFAULT = 8000;
+export class ExposureCapConfigError extends Error {
+}
+/** fail-closed 读取 factor:整数 ∈ [1,10000];缺失/非数/越界 → 抛 ExposureCapConfigError。 */
+export function readExposureFactorBps(getProtocolParam) {
+    const raw = getProtocolParam(EXPOSURE_FACTOR_BPS_PARAM, undefined);
+    const n = Number(raw);
+    if (raw === undefined || raw === null || raw === '' || !Number.isFinite(n) || !Number.isInteger(n) || n <= 0 || n > 10000) {
+        throw new ExposureCapConfigError(`${EXPOSURE_FACTOR_BPS_PARAM} invalid (got ${JSON.stringify(raw)}); must be integer in [1,10000]`);
+    }
+    return n;
+}
+/** 卖家当前有效抵押(USDC integer units,big-int 安全):merchant_bond_deposits status='active' 之和。无 → 0n。 */
+export function getActiveCollateralUnits(db, sellerId) {
+    let rows = [];
+    // 表缺失(旧/最小库)→ 视作无抵押(0n),休眠安全:不让缺表破坏现有直付建单。
+    try {
+        rows = db.prepare("SELECT collateral_units FROM merchant_bond_deposits WHERE seller_id = ? AND status = 'active'").all(sellerId);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return 0n;
+    }
+    let sum = 0n;
+    for (const r of rows) {
+        try {
+            sum += BigInt(r.collateral_units || '0');
+        }
+        catch { /* 坏行跳过,不计入(fail-closed:少算抵押更保守) */ }
+    }
+    return sum;
+}
+/**
+ * 开放敞口状态(未完全关闭的 direct_p2p 单)。终态【不】计入(释放敞口):
+ *   completed / cancelled / fault_* / resolved_for_seller / refunded_partial / refunded_full / dispute_dismissed / expired。
+ * ⚠️ direct_expired_unconfirmed 是【非终态】(超时不静默关单,仍可转 disputed / cancelled,见 transitions.ts)→ 必须计入,
+ *    漏算会低估敞口(对风险闸是危险方向)。created 为建单原子前态(direct_p2p 一般即转 window),防御性纳入(过度计入只会更严、无害)。
+ */
+export const OPEN_EXPOSURE_STATUSES = [
+    'created', 'direct_pay_window', 'direct_expired_unconfirmed',
+    'accepted', 'shipped', 'picked_up', 'in_transit', 'delivered', 'confirmed', 'disputed',
+];
+/** 卖家当前 Direct Pay 开放敞口(units):未完全关闭的 direct_p2p 单 total_amount 之和。 */
+export function computeDirectPayOpenExposureUnits(db, sellerId) {
+    const placeholders = OPEN_EXPOSURE_STATUSES.map(() => '?').join(',');
+    const rows = db.prepare(`SELECT total_amount FROM orders WHERE seller_id = ? AND payment_rail = 'direct_p2p' AND status IN (${placeholders})`).all(sellerId, ...OPEN_EXPOSURE_STATUSES);
+    let sum = 0n;
+    for (const r of rows)
+        sum += BigInt(toUnits(Number(r.total_amount) || 0));
+    return sum;
+}
+/** 纯函数:本单是否在敞口上限内。allowed = collateral × bps / 10000;open + new ≤ allowed。 */
+export function withinExposureCap(args) {
+    const allowed = args.activeCollateralUnits * BigInt(args.factorBps) / 10000n;
+    return args.openExposureUnits + args.newOrderUnits <= allowed;
+}
+/**
+ * create-gate 主入口。休眠安全:collateral==0 → ok(N/A,缓交路径由 deferral quota 管,不读 factor)。
+ * collateral>0 → 读 factor(fail-closed)+ 比较;超出 → 拒(EXPOSURE_CAP_EXCEEDED)。
+ */
+export function enforceCollateralExposureGate(db, sellerId, newOrderUnits, getProtocolParam) {
+    const collateral = getActiveCollateralUnits(db, sellerId);
+    if (collateral <= 0n)
+        return { ok: true }; // 无真实抵押 → 敞口上限不适用(休眠)
+    let factorBps;
+    try {
+        factorBps = readExposureFactorBps(getProtocolParam);
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        return { ok: false, error_code: 'EXPOSURE_CAP_CONFIG', reason: e.message };
+    } // fail-closed
+    const openExposureUnits = computeDirectPayOpenExposureUnits(db, sellerId);
+    if (!withinExposureCap({ activeCollateralUnits: collateral, openExposureUnits, newOrderUnits: BigInt(newOrderUnits), factorBps })) {
+        return { ok: false, error_code: 'EXPOSURE_CAP_EXCEEDED', reason: 'direct-pay open exposure exceeds collateral-backed cap' };
+    }
+    return { ok: true };
+}

package/dist/merchant-bond-watcher.js

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/**
+ * Merchant Base-Bond — chain watcher skeleton (PR1, testnet/dev scaffold).
+ *
+ * 设计:docs/modules/MERCHANT-BASE-BOND-DESIGN.INTERNAL.md §4.1/§4.2。
+ * 职责(未来 testnet 才接真实 RPC):监听合约 deposit/slash/withdraw event → ≥N confirmations 后
+ *   更新 DB 镜像(merchant_bond_*)。reorg 后冻结派生资格 + 告警。
+ *
+ * ⚠️ PR1 阶段:**纯骨架、默认关、不连任何 RPC、不写资金、不接 live 路径。** 启用前需:
+ *   chain profile 定稿 + 法务 + 外部合约审计 + Holden 批准(设计稿 §9)。
+ */
+import { MERCHANT_BOND_V1_ENABLED, MERCHANT_BOND_CHAIN_PROFILE } from './merchant-bond-domain.js';
+/**
+ * 启动 watcher。**PR1:若未启用(默认)或 chain profile 未定稿 → 直接返回 no-op,绝不连 RPC。**
+ * 真实事件处理(deposit recognition / confirmations / reorg freeze)留待后续 testnet PR。
+ */
+export function startMerchantBondWatcher(_deps = {}) {
+    const profileReady = MERCHANT_BOND_CHAIN_PROFILE.chainId != null
+        && MERCHANT_BOND_CHAIN_PROFILE.usdcAddress != null
+        && MERCHANT_BOND_CHAIN_PROFILE.minConfirmations != null;
+    if (!MERCHANT_BOND_V1_ENABLED || !profileReady) {
+        // disabled scaffold:no RPC、no timer、no DB write。
+        return { enabled: false, stop: () => { } };
+    }
+    // 真实监听实现 = 后续 testnet PR(deposit/slash/withdraw event → ≥N confirmations → DB 镜像;reorg 冻结+告警)。
+    throw new Error('MerchantBondWatcher: real chain listening not implemented in PR1 scaffold');
+}

package/dist/payment-rails.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import { takeFeeAtCompletion, releaseFeeStake, slashFeeStakeToPenalty } from './direct-pay-ledger.js';
+/**
+ * Rail 1 = 非托管场外直付 + 信誉(buyer protection = reputation-only, refund = none)。
+ * ⚠️ 本 seam 当前【未接线】(getPaymentRail 无调用方)。Rail1 平台费【实时路径】= 首单宽限 + 预充值续用:
+ *   建单走【首单宽限 + 预充值门】(direct-pay-create.ts),完成时 accrue 应收(server.ts settleOrder direct_p2p 分支)。
+ *   下方 collectFeeAtCompletion/release/slash 仍指向旧 WAZ fee-stake helper = 遗留/forward-compat 占位;
+ *   若将来真接线本 seam,须改为应收/预充值语义(accrue / prepay)。
+ */
+export const RAIL_DIRECT_P2P = {
+    contract: {
+        id: 'direct_p2p',
+        buyerProtection: 'reputation_only',
+        refund: 'none',
+        disputeRemedyBasis: 'evidence_reputation',
+        custodialOfTradeFunds: false,
+    },
+    collectFeeAtCompletion: (db, orderId) => takeFeeAtCompletion(db, { orderId }),
+    releaseOnExpiryOrCancel: (db, orderId) => releaseFeeStake(db, { orderId }),
+    slashOnFault: (db, orderId, txnId, reason) => slashFeeStakeToPenalty(db, { orderId, txnId, reason }),
+};
+/**
+ * 取轨道实现。只 Rail 1 已实现;'escrow' 走既有系统(不经此抽象);'onchain_full_stake' / 'psp' = GATED(未实现)。
+ * 故意用显式 switch,不建插件注册框架(anti-YAGNI)。
+ */
+export function getPaymentRail(railId) {
+    if (railId === 'direct_p2p')
+        return RAIL_DIRECT_P2P;
+    return null; // escrow=既有系统; onchain_full_stake/psp=未实现(forward-compat 契约见上)
+}

package/dist/product-verification.js

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+export const MAX_URL_LEN = 2048;
+export const MAX_PLATFORM_LEN = 60;
+export const MAX_NOTES_LEN = 500;
+const ACTIVE = "('issued','submitted','verified')";
+const getActiveForProduct = (db, productId) => db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM product_verifications WHERE product_id = ? AND status IN ${ACTIVE} ORDER BY created_at DESC, rowid DESC LIMIT 1`).get(productId);
+/** http(s) 链接最弱校验(仅存储,不抓取):必须 http/https、长度受限。拒 javascript:/data: 等危险 scheme。 */
+function isStorableHttpUrl(url) {
+    if (typeof url !== 'string' || url.length === 0 || url.length > MAX_URL_LEN)
+        return false;
+    return /^https?:\/\/[^\s]+$/i.test(url.trim());
+}
+/** 卖家为【某产品】申请认证 → issued(签发 code)。绝不自动 verify。单一活跃(per product)。调用方须先校验 seller 拥有该产品。 */
+export function requestProductVerification(db, args) {
+    const { id, productId, sellerId, code } = args;
+    if (!id || !productId || !sellerId || !code)
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'missing id/productId/sellerId/code' };
+    const platform = args.platform ? String(args.platform).trim().slice(0, MAX_PLATFORM_LEN) : null;
+    const active = getActiveForProduct(db, productId);
+    if (active)
+        return { ok: false, reason: `该产品已有进行中的认证(${active.status})` };
+    db.prepare(`INSERT INTO product_verifications (id, product_id, seller_id, code, platform, status, created_at, updated_at)
+    VALUES (?,?,?,?,?, 'issued', datetime('now'), datetime('now'))`).run(id, productId, sellerId, code, platform);
+    return { ok: true, status: 'issued', code };
+}
+/** 卖家为【某产品】提交外部链接 → submitted。要求该产品有 issued 记录;链接仅存储(不抓取)。调用方须校验 seller 拥有该产品。 */
+export function submitProductVerificationLink(db, args) {
+    const url = String(args.externalUrl || '').trim();
+    if (!isStorableHttpUrl(url))
+        return { ok: false, reason: '请提交有效的 http(s) 商品链接' };
+    const active = getActiveForProduct(db, args.productId);
+    if (!active)
+        return { ok: false, reason: '请先为该产品申请认证获取验证码' };
+    if (active.status === 'verified')
+        return { ok: false, reason: '该产品认证已通过,无需重复提交' };
+    const platform = args.platform != null ? String(args.platform).trim().slice(0, MAX_PLATFORM_LEN) : active.platform;
+    db.prepare(`UPDATE product_verifications SET external_url = ?, platform = ?, status = 'submitted', updated_at = datetime('now') WHERE id = ?`)
+        .run(url, platform, active.id);
+    return { ok: true, status: 'submitted' };
+}
+/** 真人 admin 手动核对结论 → verified | rejected。仅从 submitted 流转。reviewerId 必填(责任分层;ROOT/Passkey 由调用方强制)。 */
+export function reviewProductVerification(db, args) {
+    const { id, reviewerId, decision } = args;
+    if (!reviewerId)
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'reviewProductVerification requires a human reviewerId' };
+    if (decision !== 'verified' && decision !== 'rejected')
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'decision must be verified|rejected' };
+    const row = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM product_verifications WHERE id = ?').get(id);
+    if (!row)
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'product verification not found' };
+    if (row.status === decision)
+        return { ok: true, status: decision, already: true };
+    if (row.status !== 'submitted')
+        return { ok: false, reason: `cannot review from status '${row.status}' (need submitted)` };
+    const notes = args.notes != null ? String(args.notes).slice(0, MAX_NOTES_LEN) : null;
+    db.prepare(`UPDATE product_verifications SET status = ?, reviewed_by = ?, reviewed_at = datetime('now'), notes = ?, updated_at = datetime('now') WHERE id = ?`)
+        .run(decision, reviewerId, notes, id);
+    return { ok: true, status: decision };
+}
+/** 某产品最新一条认证记录(任意状态)。无 → null。 */
+export function getProductVerification(db, productId) {
+    return db.prepare('SELECT * FROM product_verifications WHERE product_id = ? ORDER BY created_at DESC, rowid DESC LIMIT 1').get(productId) ?? null;
+}
+/** 某卖家所有产品认证记录(供卖家自助面板逐产品展示状态)。最新在前。 */
+export function listSellerProductVerifications(db, sellerId) {
+    return db.prepare('SELECT * FROM product_verifications WHERE seller_id = ? ORDER BY created_at DESC, rowid DESC').all(sellerId);
+}
+export function toSellerProductVerificationView(row) {
+    return {
+        id: row.id, product_id: row.product_id, code: row.code, platform: row.platform, external_url: row.external_url,
+        status: row.status, reviewed_at: row.reviewed_at, created_at: row.created_at, updated_at: row.updated_at,
+    }; // 故意省略 reviewed_by + notes(admin 身份 / 内部备注)
+}
+/** admin 队列:按 status 过滤(默认全部),最新在前。纯读。 */
+export function listProductVerifications(db, opts = {}) {
+    if (opts.status)
+        return db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM product_verifications WHERE status = ? ORDER BY created_at DESC, rowid DESC`).all(opts.status);
+    return db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM product_verifications ORDER BY created_at DESC, rowid DESC`).all();
+}
+/** 硬门读取:该产品是否【已验证】(有 verified 记录)。供 direct-pay create/availability 强制(未验证 → 不可直付)。 */
+export function productStoreVerified(db, productId) {
+    return !!db.prepare("SELECT 1 FROM product_verifications WHERE product_id = ? AND status = 'verified' LIMIT 1").get(productId);
+}
+/**
+ * 反作弊生命周期:商品发生【重大编辑】(标题/价格/详情/外部链接)时作废其验证 → status='stale'。
+ *   之后 productStoreVerified=false(硬门重新拦截),且 active 记录被清(卖家可重新申领→提交→admin 重核)。
+ *   防"先把商品 A 验证通过,再改标题/价格/详情/链接变成商品 B"绕过逐品门。返回作废条数。纯写,只改本表。
+ *   注:store-level 豁免卖家不依赖逐品验证,本作废对其直付资格无影响。
+ */
+export function invalidateProductVerification(db, productId) {
+    const r = db.prepare(`UPDATE product_verifications SET status = 'stale', updated_at = datetime('now')
+    WHERE product_id = ? AND status IN ('issued','submitted','verified')`).run(productId);
+    return { invalidated: r.changes };
+}

package/dist/pwa/acp-feed.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { displayCurrency } from '../currency.js'; // agent-facing 币种统一 WAZ,遗留 'DCP' 读时归一化(绝不外泄 DCP)
 const BASE = 'https://webaz.xyz';
 // ACP availability 枚举(spec):in_stock | out_of_stock | pre_order | backorder | unknown
 function availability(stock) {
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ export function buildAcpProductFeed(db, opts = {}) {
             description: plainText(p.description, 5000), // spec: plain text, max 5000
             url: `${BASE}/#order-product/${p.id}`, // 商品详情页(SPA hash,200)
             // price: spec = Number + ISO 4217 code。WAZ 非 ISO 4217 → 见 feed 级 _disclosures.currency
-            price: { amount: Number(p.price), currency: p.currency || 'WAZ' },
+            price: { amount: Number(p.price), currency: displayCurrency(p.currency) },
             availability: availability(p.stock),
             is_digital: p.product_type === 'digital',
             seller_name: (p.seller_name || p.seller_id).slice(0, 70),
@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ export function buildAcpProductFeed(db, opts = {}) {
         },
         _disclosures: {
             phase: 'pre-launch',
-            currency: "Each item's price.currency is the protocol's SIMULATED pre-launch internal unit (WAZ, or legacy 'DCP'), NOT an ISO 4217 fiat currency. No real money is involved.",
+            currency: "Each item's price.currency is the protocol's SIMULATED pre-launch internal unit, always emitted as WAZ (legacy internal-code rows are normalized to WAZ on read), NOT an ISO 4217 fiat currency. No real money is involved.",
             checkout: 'is_eligible_checkout is false for every item: ACP checkout is not yet wired. Products are DISCOVERABLE via ACP, not yet PURCHASABLE via ACP. Native WebAZ checkout + escrow + state machine govern real purchases (see RFC-015).',
         },
         product_count: products.length,

package/dist/pwa/contract-fingerprint.js

@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ export const CONTRACT_CHANGES = [
     { contract_version: 3, date: '2026-06-09', surface: 'entity', kind: 'changed', summary: '§① order lifecycle: corrected declined_nofault state meaning text — it is NOT terminal (transitions declined_nofault→completed on settlement). Dropped the contradictory "(terminal)" label that conflicted with the auto-derived terminal:false. Semantics/state-machine unchanged; text-only clarification for agents reading the entity dictionary.' },
     { contract_version: 4, date: '2026-06-09', surface: 'capability', kind: 'changed', summary: '§② capability matrix: POST /api/reviews/:type/:id/claim now requires the new "review_claim" action scope instead of being SAFE (unscoped). The review-claim path locks a 5 WAZ stake (escrow), so it belongs under default-deny accountability like other value writes. GET reviews endpoints stay open.', migration: 'A declared agent that calls review claim must add the "review_claim" scope to its api_key (or hold a Passkey, or declare "*"). Passkey-bound humans and "*" agents are unaffected; GET reviews unchanged.' },
     { contract_version: 5, date: '2026-06-24', surface: 'integration', kind: 'added', summary: '§④ integration-contract entry (/.well-known/webaz-integration.json) gains an agent_quickstart block: a 60-second stranger-agent cold-start with discrete, machine-parseable fields (canonical_start_url, public_readonly_entrypoints, anonymous_allowed_actions, authenticated_required_actions, safe_next_actions, proposal_flow, contribution_boundary). Additive — no existing field changed; agents may ignore. NB: this surface is NOT covered by the §②/§① fingerprint, so it is registered here by hand.' },
+    { contract_version: 6, date: '2026-06-27', surface: 'entity', kind: 'added', summary: '§① order lifecycle gains two Direct Pay Rail 1 (non-custodial off-protocol payment) states: direct_pay_window (seller fee-stake locked, payment method shown, awaiting buyer off-protocol payment) and direct_expired_unconfirmed (payment window timed out without buyer confirmation — order is NOT silently closed; buyer retains a dispute/confirm window). Additive — existing order states/transitions unchanged; escrow orders never enter these states; agents may ignore unless they place direct_p2p orders.' },
+    { contract_version: 7, date: '2026-06-27', surface: 'capability', kind: 'added', summary: '§② capability matrix RESERVES a new "direct_pay" action scope for the future /api/direct-pay/* surface (Direct Pay Rail 1). SCAFFOLD ONLY: this revision ships the D1/D2 disclosure helper + append-only ack model and a Passkey RISK-guard helper for later wiring — NO production route is gated yet, and the current order-action paths (mark_paid / cancel / confirm / confirm-in-person) do NOT yet enforce the Passkey or the two-disclosure-ack gate. The classifier maps /api/direct-pay/* → direct_pay so that surface is RISK-scoped the moment routes are added. Additive — no existing action changed.', migration: 'No behavioural change yet — do NOT assume Direct Pay order actions are Passkey-gated or disclosure-gated at this revision, and do NOT assume agents are blocked from them. Real enforcement (Passkey + two-disclosure-ack on mark_paid/confirm/confirm-in-person) is wired in a later PR together with the create route, ack endpoints, and UI.' },
+    { contract_version: 8, date: '2026-07-02', surface: 'capability', kind: 'added', summary: 'Direct Pay Rail 1 (non-custodial) buyer account selection: POST /api/orders now accepts an OPTIONAL direct_receive_account_id — when a seller offers multiple receive accounts (GET /api/direct-receive/selectable-accounts, metadata-only), the buyer picks one and the create route snapshots THAT account. Omitted → unchanged dual-read fallback to the seller\'s single legacy payment instruction (no behaviour change for sellers with only that). The direct_p2p order gains a direct_pay_account_snapshot (non-sensitive metadata {account_id,method,currency,label,qr_ref} frozen at create); the raw instruction text stays in the existing disclosure-gated snapshot. New buyer read GET /api/orders/:id/direct-pay-qr serves the snapshotted receive-QR image bytes, gated to the order buyer AND both D1/D2 disclosure acks (non-enumerating 404 otherwise). Additive — this create-body field + order-metadata snapshot are NOT part of the §②/§① fingerprint projection, so registered here by hand; no existing action or order state changed.', migration: 'Agents placing direct_p2p orders MAY pass direct_receive_account_id (from selectable-accounts) to choose how they pay; omitting it preserves the prior single-instruction behaviour. The raw payment instruction and the QR image remain revealed only after both disclosure acks.' },
 ];
 export function buildChangeFeed() {
     return {

package/dist/pwa/direct-pay-guards.js

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/**
+ * 直付 / 直接收款 RISK 门:
+ *   ① 无 Passkey credential → 硬拒(agent 路径:agent 不可能持有 Passkey assertion → 永远过不了)。
+ *   ② 需一次性真人 WebAuthn gate token(purpose-bound, 60s)。
+ * 两步都过才返回 ok。无自助批准路径。
+ */
+export function requireDirectPayHumanPasskey(deps, args) {
+    const { db, consumeGateToken } = deps;
+    const { userId, webauthnToken, purpose, validate } = args;
+    // ① agent 硬拒:没有 Passkey 凭证的身份(agent)绝不能发起/批准直付
+    const hasPk = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE user_id = ?').get(userId).n > 0;
+    if (!hasPk) {
+        return { ok: false, error_code: 'PASSKEY_REQUIRED_FOR_DIRECT_PAY', reason: '直付/直接收款是 RISK 操作:需绑定 Passkey 并真人二次确认,agent 不可代操作' };
+    }
+    // ② 一次性 purpose-bound 真人 WebAuthn gate token
+    const gate = consumeGateToken(userId, webauthnToken, purpose, validate ?? (() => true));
+    if (!gate.ok)
+        return { ok: false, error_code: 'HUMAN_PRESENCE_REQUIRED', reason: gate.reason || '需真实人工 WebAuthn 验证' };
+    return { ok: true };
+}

package/dist/pwa/direct-pay-order-redaction.js

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+import { requireBothDisclosuresAcked } from '../direct-pay-disclosures.js';
+/** 买家自视角:未 both-acked 的 direct_p2p 订单,删收款目标(instruction 原文 + 账号快照 qr_ref)。就地改 o。 */
+export function redactUnackedDirectPayTarget(db, o, userId) {
+    if (o.payment_rail !== 'direct_p2p' || o.buyer_id !== userId)
+        return;
+    if (requireBothDisclosuresAcked(db, o.id).ok)
+        return;
+    delete o.direct_pay_instruction_snapshot;
+    if (o.direct_pay_account_snapshot != null) {
+        try {
+            const s = JSON.parse(o.direct_pay_account_snapshot);
+            delete s.qr_ref;
+            o.direct_pay_account_snapshot = JSON.stringify(s);
+        }
+        catch {
+            delete o.direct_pay_account_snapshot;
+        }
+    }
+}
+/** 无条件删除收款目标(instruction 快照 + 整个账号快照)。用于非买家第三方 reader,他们绝不该看到收款目标。就地改 o。 */
+export function stripDirectPayPaymentTarget(o) {
+    delete o.direct_pay_instruction_snapshot;
+    delete o.direct_pay_account_snapshot;
+}

package/dist/pwa/endpoint-actions.js

@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ export const WRITE_RULES = [
     { method: 'POST', re: /^\/api\/skill-market\/[^/]+\/purchase/, action: 'purchase' },
     { method: 'POST', re: /^\/api\/secondhand\/[^/]+\/order/, action: 'buy_secondhand' },
     { method: 'POST', re: /^\/api\/group-buys\/[^/]+\/join/, action: 'group_buy_join' },
+    // Direct Pay (Rail 1) = RISK scope:为【未来】/api/direct-pay/* 写面【保留】'direct_pay' 分类(该面尚无路由)。
+    //   ⚠️ SCAFFOLD:Passkey/两次披露门当前是 helper,【尚未】接到任何 handler;真实 enforcement 随 create-route/UI/ack 端点在后续 PR 落地。
+    { method: 'WRITE', re: /^\/api\/direct-pay\//, action: 'direct_pay' },
     // Codex #98 P1:review claim 锁 5 WAZ stake(扣 balance + escrowed)—— 资金写,绝不能落 SAFE,纳入 default-deny 问责门。
     //   只命中 .../:type/:id/claim;其余 reviews 写无规则 → 落通用 'write'(仍 default-deny),GET reviews 由 endpointToAction(GET) 返回 null。
     { method: 'POST', re: /^\/api\/reviews\/[^/]+\/[^/]+\/claim$/, action: 'review_claim' },