@sdelsad/commodity-desk-daily 1.0.30 → 1.0.32

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package/email.txt CHANGED
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  SOFT COMMODITY TRADING
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- Episode 09 · Thursday 20 August 2026 · 11 min 59
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+ Episode 10 · Friday 21 August 2026 · 12 min 35
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- Vegetable oils and biofuels
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- Palm, soy, rape and sun trade as one system, and the spread between them is
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- the switch that rations demand. Then biofuels: how a mandate turns a
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- political decision into a standing bid for a crop, and why a fuel policy is
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- always a protein policy.
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+ Freight: Dry Bulk and Chartering
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+ Why the smaller ship can be the expensive one, and why freight is the one
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+ leg of a hedged trade that stays open.
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- Listen: https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep09.mp3
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- Read online: https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep09.html
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+ Listen: https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@sdelsad/commodity-desk-daily@1.0.31/ep10.mp3
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+ Read online: https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep10.html
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  MARKET PULSE
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  ============
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- Everything in Chicago rallied, and the crusher still had a worse day than
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- the day before.
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+ Corn took the session, and the most interesting price on the screen was not
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+ a grain at all.
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+
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+ Commodity Contract Price Change
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+ ------------------------------------------------
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+ Corn Sep (CBOT) 478¾ c/bu +5¾¢
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+ Corn Dec (CBOT) 503½ c/bu +5½¢
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+ Soybeans Nov (CBOT) 1236½ c/bu −¾¢
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+ Soybeans Jan (CBOT) 1251½ c/bu +¼¢
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+ Soymeal Sep (CBOT) — −1.0%
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+ Soyoil Sep (CBOT) — +2.0%
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+ Wheat SRW Sep (CBOT) 682¾ c/bu +2½¢
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+ Wheat HRW Sep (KC) 762¼ c/bu +¼¢
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+ Baltic Dry Index — 2,791 +15
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+
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+ Corn was the clear winner and December closed above five dollars. The buying
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+ is coming from the Pro Farmer scouts, who keep walking out of fields with
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+ less than last year. Illinois was pegged at 184.2 bu/ac against 199.6 a year
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+ ago and a three-year average of 199.2. Indiana, Nebraska, western Iowa,
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+ South Dakota and Ohio all came in below average. Illinois soybean pod counts
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+ at 1,430 per three-by-three square were under last year's 1,479 but above
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+ the three-year average of 1,390, which is the split that keeps beans flat
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+ while corn rallies.
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+
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+ Beans were narrowly mixed and the complex went the other way from Wednesday:
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+ meal off about 1%, oil up about 2%. Weekly export sales were unremarkable at
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+ 41 m bu of corn, 66 m bu of beans and 14.5 m bu of wheat. New-crop Chinese
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+ commitments now stand at 5.69 mmt with a further 3.82 mmt to unknown
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+ destinations — still a promise on a balance sheet rather than a fact on a
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+ vessel.
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+
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+ The geopolitical read: the missing thing is a ship, not a tonne. Ukrainian
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+ strikes have left Russia unable to move grain through the Sea of Azov. The
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+ transmission most people reach for is export capacity, and that is right,
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+ but the mechanism underneath it is vessel class. Azov is a shallow river-sea
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+ trade worked by 3,000–5,000 t coasters drawing under five metres. No Panamax
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+ can substitute into that water. The cargo has to be railed or trucked
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+ several hundred kilometres to deepwater at Novorossiysk, which is carrying
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+ its own constraints. Capacity does not shrink because tonnage vanished. It
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+ shrinks because the only ships that fit are the ones that cannot sail.
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+
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+ [chart] The smaller ship costs more — A Supramax is roughly a third smaller
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+ than a Panamax and earned 1,687 dollars a day more. The classes are
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+ not one ladder — they serve different trades, and US Gulf Supramax
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+ routes have been firming while Asia-Pacific has gone quiet. — Baltic
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+ Exchange sub-index average earnings, Wednesday 19 August 2026. —
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+ https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-
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+ desk-daily/ep10_chart1.png
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- Commodity Contract Price Change
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- ----------------------------------------------
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- Corn Sep (CBOT) 473 c/bu +9¾¢
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- Corn Dec (CBOT) 498 c/bu +10¢
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- Soybeans Sep (CBOT) 1222¼ c/bu +21½¢
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- Soybeans Nov (CBOT) 1237¾ c/bu +20½¢
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- Soymeal Sep (CBOT) — +2.0%
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- Soyoil Sep (CBOT) — +0.25%
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- Wheat SRW Sep (CBOT) 680¼ c/bu +15¾¢
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- Wheat HRW Sep (KC) 762 c/bu +18¼¢
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- Crude palm oil Sep (BMD) RM 4,648/t +RM 32
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-
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- Wednesday was a broad buying day, and the trigger was boots in fields. The
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- Pro Farmer crop tour is walking the belt this week and the early scouting
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- was reported as less than stellar. USDA still carries a corn yield of 180.7
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- bu/ac. After two days of the tour the trade has started to ask whether that
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- is generous. Flooding in the eastern belt and positioning ahead of the
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- weekly export sales report did the rest. Corn added ten cents in December,
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- beans twenty and a half in November, and wheat took the largest percentage
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- move of the three.
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-
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- The move worth reading was inside the bean complex, and it is the mirror
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- image of Tuesday. Meal led, up about 2%. Oil managed a quarter of a percent.
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- Beans rose more than either product in percentage terms. A day on which
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- every price on the screen is green can still be a losing day for a plant,
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- because the crush is a difference, not a level.
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-
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- The geopolitical read: this morning the policy risk is a fuel rule, not a
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- war. Indonesia's B50 blending programme came into full effect in July, with
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- the 2026 biodiesel allocation set at 16.75 million kilolitres. To fund the
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- subsidy, Jakarta raised the crude palm oil export levy from 10% to 12.5%.
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- The transmission is export capacity, but self-inflicted: the oil exists and
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- the mills are running, and it is simply made expensive to leave. That is a
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- supply withdrawal decided in a ministry, and it lands first on the
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- palm–soyoil spread, then on every vegetable oil that competes with either.
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-
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- [chart] Palm pays you to wait The curve rises 312 ringgit from September
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- to December, about 76 dollars a tonne. Palm is in carry, and the
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- market is paying to hold oil into the low-production quarter rather
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- than sell it now. — MDEX crude palm oil futures, Wednesday 19 August
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- 2026, closing quotes. — https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-
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- audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep09_chart1.png
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-
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- * The four vegetable oils are one market with four tickers. A refiner buys
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- a melting point and a price, not a crop, so the spread between the oils
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- is the switch that rations demand between them.
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-
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- * Palm is the volume leader because the yield per hectare is several times
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- an oilseed's, and it is the only major vegetable oil with a futures
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- contract denominated in neither dollars nor euros.
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-
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- * One cent per pound is $22.05 per tonne. That single factor is what lets
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- a soyoil price in Chicago be compared with a palm price in Kuala Lumpur.
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-
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- * A mandate creates demand that does not respond to price. A food buyer
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- walks away when oil gets expensive; a blender under a legal obligation
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- pays.
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-
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- * Indonesia's 16.75 million kilolitre allocation is roughly 15 million
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- tonnes of palm oil consumed at home — on the order of India's entire
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- annual import demand, decided by one cabinet.
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-
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- * Never multiply a renewable volume by a feedstock factor without checking
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- whether it is stated in physical gallons or RIN gallons. Biodiesel earns
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- 1.5 RINs per physical gallon, so the wrong basis overstates demand by
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- half.
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-
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- * Oil demand and meal demand are joined at the bushel. A billion pounds of
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- incremental oil demand drags in four billion pounds of meal that no fuel
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- policy asked for, which is why the crush captures far less of an oil
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- rally than the oil chart implies.
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-
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- * Vegetable oil balance sheets now contain an energy term. Discretionary
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- blending is live when gasoil trades above the oils and vanishes when
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- crude falls, and no crop model forecasts it.
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-
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- * Indonesia funds the blending subsidy from the export levy, and the
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- mandate's purpose is to shrink the exports the levy is collected on. The
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- levy rate is the honest indicator of whether the programme is still
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- affordable.
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-
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- Term Meaning
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+ * Vessel class is chosen by draft, gear and lot size, and only then by
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+ price. Read the berth before you read the index.
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+
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+ * Deadweight is not cargo. An 82,000 dwt Kamsarmax carries roughly 66,000
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+ t of beans once fuel, water and stores are aboard.
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+
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+ * Baltic index points are not a price. They are a broker panel's route
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+ assessments converted into a time charter equivalent in dollars per day,
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+ and nobody can pay an index.
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+
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+ * Dollars per tonne and dollars per day are the same freight under two
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+ different risk allocations. A voyage charter leaves the queue with the
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+ owner; a time charter buys it back onto your book.
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+
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+ * A smaller vessel can be more expensive twice over — a higher day rate
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+ spread across fewer tonnes. On today's rates that is 30% more per tonne
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+ on the same cargo.
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+
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+ * The moment a CFR sale is made and no vessel is fixed, the seller is
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+ short freight. The grain hedge does nothing about it, and no position
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+ sheet carries freight at the resolution it carries corn.
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+
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+ * Twenty dollars a tonne of freight on a Panamax cargo is about 22,000
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+ dollars a day of hire. That is an ordinary quarter in a market that has
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+ better than doubled inside twelve months.
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+
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+ * FFAs hedge an index built from a basket of named routes, not your
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+ voyage. It is the same cross-hedge problem as pricing Black Sea wheat
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+ off Matif.
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+
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+ * Bunkers sit underneath the freight. A Panamax burns about 30 t a day at
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+ sea, so a hundred-dollar move in fuel is seventeen percent of a sixteen-
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+ dollar margin, decided in the oil market.
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+
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+ * Merchants charter rather than own because a ship is a twenty-five-year
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+ position taken to solve a sixty-day problem, and because knowing where
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+ the cargo is and knowing where the ship is are different businesses.
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+
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+ Term Meaning
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  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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- CPO Crude palm oil, the unrefined oil pressed from the
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- fruit of the oil palm and the benchmark grade traded
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- internationally
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- FCPO The Bursa Malaysia Derivatives crude palm oil
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- futures contract, 25 tonnes per lot, quoted in
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- Malaysian ringgit per tonne
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- Olein and stearin The liquid and solid fractions palm separates into
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- when refined, sold into cooking oil and into fats
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- respectively
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- Kilolitre One thousand litres, the volume unit Asian
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- governments state biofuel mandates in, converted to
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- tonnes using the fuel's density
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- FAME Fatty acid methyl ester, the chemical name for
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- conventional biodiesel made by reacting a vegetable
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- oil with methanol
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- B50 A blending mandate requiring 50% biodiesel in the
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- diesel pool, the level Indonesia moved to in 2026
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- Export levy A tax charged on a commodity leaving the country,
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- used in Indonesia both to discourage exports and to
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- fund the domestic blending subsidy
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- RFS The US Renewable Fuel Standard, the rule that sets
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- annual minimum volumes of renewable fuel that must
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- be blended into American transport fuel
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- RVO Renewable volume obligation, the share of the
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- national mandate assigned to an individual refiner
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- or importer
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- RIN Renewable identification number, the tradable
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- compliance certificate generated with each gallon of
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- renewable fuel, at 1.5 per gallon of biodiesel
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- Biomass-based diesel The RFS category covering biodiesel and renewable
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- diesel made from fats and vegetable oils
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- Renewable diesel (HVO) Hydrotreated vegetable oil, a drop-in diesel
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- chemically identical to fossil diesel and
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- unconstrained by blend walls, unlike FAME
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- Discretionary blending Blending vegetable oil into the fuel pool purely
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- because it is cheaper than gasoil, with no mandate
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- and no subsidy behind it
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- Gasoil The traded middle distillate that diesel prices off,
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- and the reference against which discretionary
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- blending economics are judged
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- Blend wall The physical or warranty limit on how much
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- conventional biodiesel an engine or fuel system will
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- tolerate
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- Substitution spread The price gap between two competing vegetable oils,
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- which sets the point at which a refiner reformulates
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- from one to the other
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- Standing bid Demand that is present regardless of price because
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- it is created by obligation rather than by choice
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-
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-
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- CONVERSION DRILL 9 OF 12 BUSHELS PER ACRE ↔ TONNES PER HECTARE
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- ================================================================
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-
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- Rule: corn: 1 bu/ac 0.0628 t/ha · wheat and soybeans: 1 bu/ac ≈ 0.0673
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- t/ha
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-
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- Fast method: corn: divide by 16. Wheat/soybeans: divide by 15.
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-
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- * US corn at 182 bu/ac → 182 ÷ 16 ≈ 11.4 t/ha
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-
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- * US soybeans at 53 bu/ac → 53 ÷ 15 ≈ 3.5 t/ha
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-
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- * French wheat at 7.5 t/ha 7.5 × 15 ≈ 112 bu/ac
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-
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- Why it matters: US yields are quoted in bushels per acre, European and South
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- American in tonnes per hectare. Comparing crops requires crossing.
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+ Deadweight (dwt) The total weight a vessel can carry — cargo
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+ plus fuel, water, stores and crew so
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+ always more than the cargo it can load
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+ Draft The depth of hull below the waterline,
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+ which rises as the ship loads and is the
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+ hard physical limit on which berths and
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+ rivers a vessel can enter
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+ Handysize The smallest mainstream dry bulk class,
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+ roughly 10,000–40,000 dwt, geared and able
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+ to work berths larger ships cannot reach
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+ Supramax A dry bulk vessel of roughly 50,000–60,000
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+ dwt, normally carrying its own cranes,
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+ which works minor bulks and shorter legs
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+ Panamax / Kamsarmax The 75,000–82,000 dwt workhorse of the
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+ grain and coal trades, usually gearless and
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+ drawing about fourteen metres fully loaded
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+ Capesize A bulk carrier of about 180,000 dwt and up,
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+ too large for the Panama Canal, used mainly
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+ for iron ore and coal
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+ Geared vessel A ship carrying its own cranes, which can
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+ therefore discharge at a berth with no
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+ shore equipment
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+ Part cargo Loading a vessel below capacity because the
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+ berth, river or canal cannot take her full
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+ draft
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+ Baltic Dry Index (BDI) The Baltic Exchange's headline dry bulk
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+ freight index, a weighted composite of the
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+ Capesize, Panamax, Supramax and Handysize
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+ route assessments
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+ Time charter equivalent (TCE) A voyage's economics restated as dollars
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+ per day, which is how a shipowner compares
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+ one employment against another
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+ Voyage charter Hiring a vessel to move a stated cargo
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+ between named ports for a price in dollars
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+ per tonne, with the owner carrying the
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+ voyage and delay risk
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+ Time charter Hiring the vessel itself for a period at a
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+ price in dollars per day, with the
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+ charterer taking speed, weather, port delay
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+ and usually fuel
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+ Fixing Agreeing the charter of a specific vessel,
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+ the moment a freight exposure stops being
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+ open
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+ Forward freight agreement (FFA) A cash-settled swap on a Baltic index route
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+ or basket over a calendar month, the only
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+ liquid way to hedge freight
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+ Bunkers The vessel's fuel, priced separately from
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+ the hire and carried by the owner on a
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+ voyage charter and by the charterer on a
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+ time charter
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+ P7 / P8 Baltic Panamax route codes for US Gulf to
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+ Qingdao and Santos to Qingdao, the two
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+ assessments that set the soybean origin arb
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+ River-sea vessel A small shallow-draft ship built to work
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+ both inland waterways and short sea legs,
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+ the only class able to load in the Sea of
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+ Azov
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+ Demand-to-supply ratio The Baltic's measure of tonne-mile demand
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+ growth against fleet growth, above 1.0 when
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+ cargo is outrunning ships
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+
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+
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+ CONVERSION DRILL 10 OF 12 DOLLARS EUROS PER TONNE
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+ =====================================================
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+
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+ Rule: divide by the EUR/USD rate to go from $/t to €/t
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+
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+ Fast method: at 1.10, $ → €: take off 9% (÷1.1 ≈ ×0.91). € → $: add 10%. At
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+ 1.05, it is 5% each way; at 1.20, take off 17% / add 20%.
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+
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+ * $239/t wheat at 1.10 → 239 − 21 = €218/t
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+
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+ * €205/t Matif at 1.10 → 205 + 20 = $225/t
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+
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+ * $350/t at 1.05 → €333/t
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+
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+ Why it matters: Matif quotes euros per tonne, Chicago dollars per bushel.
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+ Any Matif–CBOT arb crosses both a unit and a currency.
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  QUIZ
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  ====
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- Q1. September palm settled at RM 4,648/t with the ringgit near 4.08 to the
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- dollar, and Chicago soybean oil was quoted near 69 c/lb in mid-August.
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- Express both in dollars per tonne and give the substitution spread. A
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- European refiner uses 40,000 t of soybean oil a year and can reformulate up
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- to 30% of that volume into palm. Compute the annual saving at today's
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- spread, then name the two new exposures the switch creates that the refiner
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- did not have while buying soyoil.
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-
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- Q2. A rule change is expected to add 1.4 billion pounds of annual US soybean
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- oil demand. Compute the incremental crush in bushels and the incremental
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- soybean meal in short tons. Then explain why a trader who buys the board
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- crush on that headline is likely to be disappointed, and say which single
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- leg he should be positioned against instead.
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-
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- Q3. Gasoil rallies 25% and moves above both palm and soybean oil on an
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- energy-equivalent basis. Describe what happens to the palm–soyoil spread, to
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- Indonesia's subsidy bill, and to the reliability of a soyoil balance sheet
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- whose demand side contains only food and mandated volumes. Then say what
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- happens to all three if crude subsequently falls 30%.
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-
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- Q4. (Ep 8) Take the board crush formula from ep 8 and start from meal at
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- $325.00/short ton, oil at 69.00 c/lb and November beans at 1217¼. Apply
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- Wednesday's moves: meal +2.0%, oil +0.25%, beans +20½¢. Compute the change
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- in the board crush in cents per bushel, and state whether Wednesday was a
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- good or a bad day for a plant. Then say what this tells you about reading a
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- complex from a screen of green numbers.
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-
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- Q5. (Ep 8) Ep 8 established that the plant crush is the board crush adjusted
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- for three separate bases, minus conversion cost, and that the bean basis at
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- the gate is the line that moves most. Suppose a sustained fuel-driven bid
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- pushes the oil share from 52% to 58% and lifts the board crush to a two-year
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- high. Explain the mechanism by which the plant crush can stay flat
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- throughout, and name the one number you would watch to confirm it is
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- happening.
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-
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- Q6. (Ep 6) Ep 6 established that corn is a demand story, and that ethanol is
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- one of the two buyers that walks away at a price. On Wednesday ethanol
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- production fell to a one-month low of 1.089 m barrels a day and ethanol
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- stocks rose 1%, and December corn still rallied ten cents. Reconcile those
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- facts. Then state what would have to be true for that divergence to persist
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- for a month rather than a day.
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-
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- Q7. (Ep 6) Ep 6 argued that a weather premium decays on the calendar rather
216
- than on the forecast. Wednesday's rally was driven by early Pro Farmer tour
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- results rather than by a forecast. Explain what is structurally different
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- about tour-driven buying compared with forecast-driven buying, and what that
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- difference implies for how long the move should be expected to hold.
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-
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- Q8 Conversion drill. A Mato Grosso soybean field yields 3.72 t/ha. An
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- Illinois field is quoted at 58.5 bu/ac. Convert each into the other's unit
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- and say which is the higher yield. Then take the 91 million bushels of
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- incremental crush from today's worked example and compute how many hectares
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- of Brazilian beans, at 3.72 t/ha, would be needed to supply it. Give the
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- answer in hectares and in acres.
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+ Q1. A trader has 66,000 t of soybeans to move from Santos to Qingdao and can
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+ use either a Kamsarmax at 18,964 $/day or two Supramaxes at 20,651 $/day
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+ carrying 33,000 t each. Assume a 60-day round voyage for either class.
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+ Compute the freight cost per tonne both ways and state the difference in
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+ total dollars. Then give the two physical conditions under which the more
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+ expensive option is the only option, and explain why the day-rate comparison
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+ alone is the wrong first question.
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+
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+ Q2. A desk buys 66,000 t FOB Santos and sells the same cargo CFR Qingdao at
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+ a gross spread of $74.00/t. Freight is expected at $52.00/t and other costs
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+ run $6.00/t. The board is fully hedged and both differentials are fixed in
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+ writing. The vessel is not yet fixed. Compute the expected margin in dollars
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+ per tonne and in total. Then recompute after freight rallies $20/t. Express
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+ that $20 as an equivalent change in daily hire, say which of the desk's
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+ risks was actually open, and name the instrument that would have covered it
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+ and the residual risk that instrument leaves behind.
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+
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+ Q3. Baltic assessments this week put US Gulf–Qingdao at $73.81/t and
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+ Santos–Qingdao at $51.98/t. A Chinese crusher is indifferent between origins
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+ on delivered cost. US Gulf beans are offered FOB at a differential 15 c/bu
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+ below Santos. Convert that differential to dollars per tonne, combine it
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+ with the freight spread, and say which origin wins and by how much. Then
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+ explain what has to happen to the freight spread — not to the differentials
209
+ before the US Gulf becomes competitive, and why a Brazilian exporter
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+ watches the Panama Canal draft restrictions more closely than he watches
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+ CBOT.
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+
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+ Q4. (Ep 9) Ep 9 established that a mandate creates demand that does not
214
+ respond to price. Indonesia funds its B50 subsidy from a palm export levy it
215
+ raised from 10% to 12.5%. Explain why a rising levy rate is a bearish signal
216
+ for the programme's durability even though it is a bullish signal for palm
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+ prices today. Then say what a freight desk would want to know about
218
+ Indonesian export volumes before pricing a Panamax to Rotterdam six months
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+ forward.
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+
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+ Q5. (Ep 9) On Thursday soymeal fell about 1% while soyoil rose about 2%.
222
+ Using ep 9's point that oil demand and meal demand are joined at the bushel,
223
+ explain what that split does to the board crush and to the oil share, and
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+ say which of the two products a crusher would rather see lead a rally if the
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+ plant is running at capacity.
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+
227
+ Q6. (Ep 7) Ep 7 established that ending stocks is a residual roughly a tenth
228
+ the size of production, so a 1% crop error is a 10% carryout error. Pro
229
+ Farmer has Illinois corn at 184.2 bu/ac against USDA's national 180.7.
230
+ Explain why a state number above the national number is not evidence that
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+ USDA is too low, and set out the two things you would need before letting a
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+ tour result move your own balance sheet.
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+
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+ Q7. (Ep 7) A desk's own corn sheet uses 88.6 m harvested acres and its own
235
+ yield. It wants to test how much of a yield miss the export line could
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+ absorb before the carryout falls below 1.400 bn bu. Starting from a carryout
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+ of 1.653 bn, compute how many bushels of cushion exist, convert that into
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+ bushels per acre of yield, and then explain why using exports as the
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+ offsetting line is a different kind of assumption from using feed and
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+ residual.
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+
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+ Q8 — Conversion drill. A Rouen exporter is offered Matif November milling
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+ wheat at €218/t. A competing cargo is quoted CFR Rotterdam at $268/t. Assume
244
+ EUR/USD at 1.16. Put both on the same currency and say which is cheaper, and
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+ by how much in euros per tonne. Then, if freight from the Black Sea to
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+ Rotterdam is $18/t, compute the implied FOB Black Sea value of that cargo in
247
+ both dollars and euros per tonne.
227
248
 
228
249
 
229
250
  ============================================================================
@@ -258,416 +279,431 @@ answer in hectares and in acres.
258
279
  SOLUTIONS
259
280
  =========
260
281
 
261
- A1. Both sides first, in dollars per tonne.
262
-
263
- Oil Quote Conversion $/t
264
- --------------------------------------------------------
265
- Palm, Sep BMD RM 4,648/t ÷ 4.08 RM per $ $1,139
266
- Soybean oil, CBOT 69.00 c/lb × 22.0462 $1,521
267
- Substitution spread $382/t
268
-
269
- Thirty percent of 40,000 t is 12,000 t. At $382/t that is about $4.6 m a
270
- year, which is why formulation teams exist.
271
-
272
- The two new exposures. The first is currency. FCPO settles in ringgit, so a
273
- refiner hedging palm on the board is short ringgit-denominated futures
274
- against a dollar or euro cost base, and the hedge itself creates an FX
275
- position of roughly RM 55 m on that volume. Nothing in the physical trade
276
- asked for that. The second is policy. Palm's FOB price contains an
277
- Indonesian export levy that a ministry can change by decree, as it just did
278
- from 10% to 12.5%. Soybean oil is exposed to US policy too, but the refiner
279
- buying soyoil in Rotterdam is not paying a tax that moves on a fortnight's
280
- notice.
281
-
282
- Two further answers deserve half credit because they are real: basis risk,
283
- since Rotterdam CIF palm does not track BMD futures perfectly, and
284
- specification risk, since palm and soyoil have different melting points and
285
- oxidative stability, so "reformulate" is not a switch you can flip and
286
- unflip weekly.
287
-
288
- A2. The arithmetic runs through the bushel.
289
-
290
- Step Working Result
291
- ----------------------------------------------------------
292
- Incremental oil demand given 1,400 m lb
293
- Oil per bushel ÷ 11 lb 127.3 m bu of crush
294
- Meal produced × 44 lb 5,601 m lb
295
- In short tons ÷ 2,000 2.80 m short tons of meal
296
-
297
- Why the crush buyer is disappointed. The board crush is meal × 0.022 plus
298
- oil × 0.11 minus the bean price. The headline lifts one of those three
299
- terms. But 127 million bushels of extra crush has to be sourced, so crushers
300
- bid the bean, which raises the term being subtracted. And it produces 2.8
301
- million short tons of meal into a market that has no incremental demand for
302
- protein, so the meal term falls. Two of the three legs move against the
303
- position that the headline appears to justify.
304
-
305
- The clean expression of the view is not the crush. It is short meal against
306
- long oil the oil share trade. That isolates the thing the policy actually
307
- changes, which is the relative value of the two products, and it does not
308
- require you to also be right about the bean basis. A trader who buys the
309
- whole crush is expressing a view on the oil rule and an unintended view on
310
- the bean market at the same time.
311
-
312
- The deeper point: any demand shock that arrives through only one joint
313
- product has to be released through the other. Fixed proportions mean the by-
314
- product is always the shock absorber, and the by-product market is where the
315
- price damage shows up.
316
-
317
- A3. Take them in order.
318
-
319
- The palm–soyoil spread narrows. Discretionary blending is not fussy about
320
- which oil it burns it buys the cheapest tonne of fat that meets spec. So
321
- the marginal energy bid lands on palm, which is the cheaper of the two, and
322
- pulls it toward soyoil. The spread compresses from the bottom.
323
-
324
- Indonesia's subsidy bill falls. The blending subsidy exists to cover the gap
325
- between the palm-based biodiesel price and the diesel it replaces. If gasoil
326
- is above palm, that gap is negative and the mandate becomes self-financing.
327
- This is the quiet condition under which aggressive mandates get announced:
328
- they are cheapest to promise when energy is expensive.
329
-
330
- The balance sheet becomes unreliable in the direction of understating
331
- demand. A demand side built from food use plus mandated volumes has no line
332
- for the tonnes that a fuel trader buys purely on arbitrage. In a high-gasoil
333
- regime those tonnes are real and can be large, and they will show up as an
334
- unexplained stock draw that the analyst books to "residual".
335
-
336
- If crude then falls 30%, all three reverse, and not symmetrically.
337
- Discretionary blending switches off essentially overnight, because it is a
338
- per-cargo economic decision rather than a contracted programme, so the
339
- palm–soyoil spread widens again quickly. The subsidy bill reappears
340
- immediately, and now has to be paid out of an export levy pot that the
341
- mandate itself has shrunk which is the loop that forces levy increases.
342
- The balance sheet swings from understating demand to overstating it, because
343
- the analyst who finally added an energy line will carry it forward. The
344
- failure mode is the same in both directions: an energy term added at the top
345
- of a cycle is a crop analyst's most expensive habit.
346
-
347
- A4. Build the change leg by leg. Only the changes matter, not the levels.
348
-
349
- Leg Move Multiplier ¢/bu effect
350
- --------------------------------------------------------------------
351
- Meal +2.0% of $325.00 = +$6.50/st × 0.022 +14.3
352
- Oil +0.25% of 69.00 = +0.1725 c/lb × 0.11 +1.9
353
- Beans +20.5 c/bu −1 −20.5
354
- Board crush −4.3
355
-
356
- So the board crush fell about 4.3 c/bu on a day when all three prices rose.
357
- Wednesday was a bad day for a plant.
358
-
359
- What it tells you: the crush is a difference between large numbers, so its
360
- sign is set by relative moves, not by direction. Meal was the strongest
361
- product in percentage terms and still could not carry the bean move, because
362
- meal's contribution is scaled by 0.022 and the bean's by one. A 2% meal
363
- rally is worth 14 cents of crush; a 20-cent bean rally costs 20. The screen
364
- of green tells you nothing about the margin, and a trader who reads a
365
- complex by looking at how many contracts are up is not reading the complex
366
- at all.
367
-
368
- A5. The mechanism is competition for beans, and it runs through the gate.
369
-
370
- A wide board crush is a public number. Every plant in the country sees it at
371
- the same moment, and every plant responds the same way: raise the run rate
372
- and buy more beans. Crush capacity cannot be added inside a marketing year,
373
- so the only variable that clears the increased demand for beans is the bean
374
- basis at the gate. Plants bid against each other and against the export
375
- elevator, and the basis rises until the marginal plant is indifferent again.
376
-
377
- That is the whole answer. The board crush went to a two-year high and the
378
- bean basis absorbed it. The plant crushboard crush, minus bean basis,
379
- minus the meal and oil basis effects, minus conversion cost is flat
380
- because the second line rose by as much as the first.
381
-
382
- There is a second-order piece worth noting here. The rising oil share means
383
- the extra product value arrives disproportionately in oil, but the extra
384
- volume arrives in both products in the fixed 44-to-11 ratio. So higher run
385
- rates push meal basis down as well, which subtracts a second time. The plant
386
- crush can in fact end up lower than before the fuel-driven rally.
387
-
388
- The number to watch is the bean basis at the plant gate relative to the
389
- export elevator's bid in the same draw area. If the crusher is winning that
390
- contest, he is paying up for beans and the board crush is being competed
391
- away in exactly the place ep 8 said it would be. Watching the board crush
392
- alone tells you the opposite of what is happening.
393
-
394
- A6. They are not in conflict, because they are statements about different
395
- weeks.
396
-
397
- The ethanol print is a demand datapoint about last week's grind: production
398
- at a one-month low of 1.089 m bbl/day with stocks up 1% is a mildly negative
399
- corn signal, worth a fraction of a cent. Wednesday's rally was a supply
400
- datapoint about this year's crop: scouts in the field reporting worse-than-
401
- expected conditions, against a USDA yield of 180.7 that the trade already
402
- suspected. In August, the supply side of the corn balance sheet has a
403
- variance many times larger than the demand side, because a two-bushel yield
404
- change moves the carryout by roughly 180 million bushels while a week of
405
- soft grind moves it by a few million. The market prices the larger variance
406
- first.
407
-
408
- For the divergence to persist a month rather than a day, the tour would have
409
- to be confirmed by something structural, and ethanol margins would have to
410
- hold. Specifically: the tour findings would need to be validated by the
411
- September and October USDA reports, so that the yield cut becomes a balance
412
- sheet fact rather than a rumour; and ethanol's weakness would need to prove
413
- seasonal a maintenance-driven dip — rather than margin-driven. If ethanol
414
- grind is falling because the ethanol crush margin is negative at $4.98 corn,
415
- then ep 6's point bites: that buyer is walking away at a price, and a rally
416
- built on supply will be capped by the demand it destroys. The tell is the
417
- ethanol margin itself, not the production number.
418
-
419
- A7. The difference is what kind of information each contains.
420
-
421
- A forecast is a probability distribution over an event that has not
422
- happened. It is revised twice a day, it can be wrong, and the market
423
- discounts it accordingly. Crucially, it decays on the calendar: once
424
- pollination is past, a forecast of heat cannot change the ear count, and the
425
- premium bleeds out whether or not the weather actually improves.
426
-
427
- A crop tour is a measurement of an event that has already happened. Scouts
428
- count ears and pods in fields where the yield is largely already set. That
429
- information does not decay, because there is no subsequent event that can
430
- falsify it only a better measurement can, and the better measurement is
431
- the USDA survey in September.
432
-
433
- So the two moves behave differently. Tour-driven buying should be stickier
434
- than forecast-driven buying, because it is not waiting on an outcome. But it
435
- is also narrower: a tour samples a route, not a population, and its
436
- historical relationship to the final national yield is loose. The honest
437
- expectation is that a tour move holds until the next authoritative
438
- measurement and then gets marked to it, which makes the September WASDE the
439
- event risk that matters, not the weekend forecast.
440
-
441
- The practical implication for positioning: a weather premium is something
442
- you sell into strength as the calendar runs out. A tour-driven move is
443
- something you carry to the next report and then reassess. Treating the
444
- second like the first is how a good supply read turns into a bad trade.
445
-
446
- A8 Conversion drill. Soybeans convert at 1 bu/ac ≈ 0.0673 t/ha, or divide
447
- by 15 as a fast method.
448
-
449
- Field Given Converted
450
- ----------------------------------------------
451
- Illinois 58.5 bu/ac × 0.0673 = 3.94 t/ha
452
- Mato Grosso 3.72 t/ha ÷ 0.0673 = 55.3 bu/ac
453
-
454
- Illinois is the higher yield, by about 0.22 t/ha or 3.2 bu/ac — roughly 6%.
455
- The fast method gets you there too: 58.5 ÷ 15 = 3.9 t/ha, and 3.72 × 15 =
456
- 55.8 bu/ac. Close enough to answer the question in a phone call.
457
-
458
- Now the area. First cross bushels into tonnes, at 36.744 bu per tonne of
459
- soybeans:
460
-
461
- Step Working Result
462
- -------------------------------------------------------
463
- Incremental crush 91,000,000 bu ÷ 36.744 2.476 m t
464
- Area required ÷ 3.72 t/ha 666,000 ha
465
- In acres × 2.471 1.65 m acres
466
-
467
- Two-thirds of a million hectares of Brazilian soybeans, to feed one billion
468
- pounds of American oil demand. It is worth holding that picture next to the
469
- mandate that created it: a line in a regulation, denominated in gallons,
470
- reaching across a hemisphere and asking for an area roughly the size of a
471
- small country's entire arable base.
282
+ A1. Take the hire first, then divide by what actually loads.
283
+
284
+ Kamsarmax Two Supramaxes
285
+ ---------------------------------------------
286
+ Cargo 66,000 t 2 × 33,000 t
287
+ Day rate $18,964 $20,651 each
288
+ Days 60 60
289
+ Total hire $1,137,840 $2,478,120
290
+ Freight per tonne $17.24 $37.55
291
+
292
+ The two-ship answer is roughly $20.31/t worse, or $1,340,280 on the cargo.
293
+ That is the compounding penalty: a higher rate spread over half the tonnes
294
+ each, twice.
295
+
296
+ The realistic version is a single 55,000 t Supramax at $22.53/t, $5.29/t
297
+ worse than the Kamsarmax still about 31% more freight for the same job.
298
+
299
+ The two conditions that force the smaller ship are draft and gear. If the
300
+ discharge berth carries nine metres of water, a loaded Kamsarmax at fourteen
301
+ metres cannot enter, and part-cargoing her destroys the per-tonne advantage
302
+ anyway. If the berth has no shore cranes, only a geared vessel can
303
+ discharge, and Panamaxes are usually gearless. A third, softer condition is
304
+ lot size: a buyer who wants 55,000 t is not going to take 66,000 t to help
305
+ your freight.
306
+
307
+ The trap is the day-rate comparison. Freight per tonne has a numerator and a
308
+ denominator, and the denominator is set by physics — hydrography and crane
309
+ fitting — not by the market. The first question is what the berth can take.
310
+ Only then does the rate matter.
311
+
312
+ A2. The margin, twice.
313
+
314
+ As expected After the rally
315
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------
316
+ Gross spread (CFR sale FOB buy) $74.00/t $74.00/t
317
+ Freight −$52.00/t −$72.00/t
318
+ Finance, insurance, port −$6.00/t −$6.00/t
319
+ Margin $16.00/t −$4.00/t
320
+ On 66,000 t $1,056,000 −$264,000
321
+
322
+ A swing of $1,320,000 with the board never moving.
323
+
324
+ As daily hire: $20/t × 66,000 t = $1,320,000, spread over 60 days, is
325
+ $22,000/day. Hire would have to go from about $18,964 to roughly $41,000 —
326
+ near today's Capesize level. The Baltic Dry Index has ranged from 1,261 to
327
+ 2,845 over the past 52 weeks, better than a double, so that is not an exotic
328
+ scenario. It is a bad quarter.
329
+
330
+ The open risk was freight, and it was open because the desk sold CFR.
331
+ Selling CFR means promising delivered cargo at a fixed price while still
332
+ having to buy the ocean leg. That is structurally short freight. It hid
333
+ because a position sheet has columns for bushels and lots and none for
334
+ tonne-miles.
335
+
336
+ The instrument is an FFA — a cash-settled swap on the Baltic Panamax index,
337
+ sized to the freight exposure, bought (long) to cover a short-freight
338
+ position. The residual is basis risk in a new suit. The FFA settles against
339
+ the P5TC basket average over a calendar month. The exposure is one voyage,
340
+ on one route, fixed on one day. The Santos route can move against the
341
+ basket, the fixing date can miss the settlement window, and the tonnage
342
+ mismatch is never exact. It is the Black Sea wheat problem from ep 5,
343
+ wearing shipping clothes.
344
+
345
+ A3. Convert the differential first. Soybeans run 36.7439 bu/t, so 15 c/bu ×
346
+ 36.7439 ÷ 100 = $5.51/t.
347
+
348
+ US Gulf Santos
349
+ -----------------------------------------
350
+ FOB differential −$5.51/t reference
351
+ Freight to Qingdao $73.81/t $51.98/t
352
+ Delivered, relative +$68.30/t +$51.98/t
353
+
354
+ Santos wins by $16.32/t. The freight spread is $21.83/t and the FOB discount
355
+ recovers only a quarter of it.
356
+
357
+ For the US Gulf to compete, the freight spread has to close by more than
358
+ $16.32/t on its own the differential is not going to do it, because 15
359
+ c/bu is already a serious concession and $16.32/t is another 44 c/bu on top.
360
+ Freight spreads move for structural reasons: Panama Canal transit
361
+ availability and draft restrictions, Capesize demand pulling Panamax tonnage
362
+ out of the Atlantic, US Gulf river levels forcing part cargoes, and the
363
+ seasonal ballast pattern that leaves ships positioned in the wrong ocean.
364
+
365
+ The Brazilian exporter watches canal draft because it is the cheapest lever
366
+ on his competitor's cost. A draft restriction at Gatún adds days and dollars
367
+ to every US Gulf–Asia voyage, or pushes it around the Cape of Good Hope, and
368
+ every dollar of that lands on the delivered price of the beans he is
369
+ competing with. CBOT moves both origins together and nets out of the arb.
370
+ The canal moves only one of them.
371
+
372
+ A4. The two signals point in opposite directions because they are about
373
+ different horizons.
374
+
375
+ Today the levy is bullish palm: a higher export tax raises the FOB price a
376
+ foreign buyer must pay and withdraws exportable supply, which is a supply
377
+ shock decided in a ministry rather than in a plantation.
378
+
379
+ For the programme it is bearish, because the levy is the funding mechanism
380
+ and the mandate's purpose is to shrink the export base the levy is collected
381
+ on. A subsidy funded by a tax on the thing it is designed to reduce has to
382
+ raise the rate as it succeeds. The rate is therefore the honest gauge of
383
+ affordability. A rising rate says the per-tonne burden on a shrinking export
384
+ volume is climbing, which is exactly the path toward a mandate that gets
385
+ quietly deferred.
386
+
387
+ A freight desk pricing a Panamax to Rotterdam six months forward wants
388
+ export volume, not price. Freight is paid on tonne-miles. If B50 plus the
389
+ levy takes several million tonnes a year out of the Indonesian export
390
+ programme, that is Panamax and Supramax cargoes that stop existing on the
391
+ Indonesia–Europe and Indonesia–India legs, and tonnage that has to
392
+ reposition or accept lower rates. The palm price can rise while the freight
393
+ demand it generates falls. Those are not the same trade.
394
+
395
+ A5. Oil up 2% and meal down 1% moves the oil share up and does very little
396
+ for the board crush, which is a weighted difference rather than a level.
397
+
398
+ Meal is the larger revenue line for a US crusher a bushel yields roughly
399
+ 44 lb of meal and 11 lb of oil so a 1% loss on meal is close to offsetting
400
+ a 2% gain on oil in absolute dollars. Beans were roughly unchanged, so the
401
+ crush was roughly unchanged: a flat day disguised as a two-way move.
402
+
403
+ If the plant is running at capacity, the crusher would rather see meal lead.
404
+ Meal is where the tonnage is, and meal has to be sold locally into a feed
405
+ market that cannot be arbitraged across an ocean cheaply. An oil-led rally
406
+ is the one the crusher captures least of, because meeting the oil demand
407
+ forces out four pounds of meal for every extra pound of oil, and that meal
408
+ has to find a home at whatever price clears it. This is the joined-at-the-
409
+ bushel constraint: at capacity there is no volume response available, so the
410
+ only thing that helps is the price of the product you are already making the
411
+ most of.
412
+
413
+ A6. A state yield above a national yield is not evidence of anything,
414
+ because they are different populations. The national number is an area-
415
+ weighted average across all producing states, and it includes the ones the
416
+ tour has just called below average — Nebraska, South Dakota, Ohio, Indiana,
417
+ western Iowa. Illinois is usually one of the strongest corn states in the
418
+ country. Its yield sits above the national average in almost every year, so
419
+ 184.2 against a national 180.7 says nothing until it is compared with
420
+ Illinois's own history, which is 199.6 last year and 199.2 on a three-year
421
+ average. On that basis it is a very large miss, not a beat.
422
+
423
+ Two things are needed before a tour result moves a sheet. First, the
424
+ methodology gap: Pro Farmer counts ears and measures grain length in a
425
+ sample of fields on a fixed route in mid-August, then applies a fixed
426
+ kernel-weight factor. USDA's August number comes from a farmer survey plus
427
+ objective plot counts, and it will be revised as kernel weight is actually
428
+ measured in September and October. The tour is a good early read on ear
429
+ counts and a poor read on final kernel weight, and kernel weight is where
430
+ the last ten bushels live. Second, the weighting: a yield is worth nothing
431
+ without harvested area behind it. Moving Illinois down fifteen bushels
432
+ changes the national number by roughly the ratio of Illinois harvested acres
433
+ to the US total, so the arithmetic has to be done state by state and
434
+ weighted, not intuited from a headline.
435
+
436
+ A7. The cushion first.
437
+
438
+ Bushels
439
+ -----------------------------
440
+ Carryout, USDA 1,653,000,000
441
+ Target floor 1,400,000,000
442
+ Cushion 253,000,000
443
+
444
+ Across 88.6 m harvested acres that is 253 ÷ 88.6 = 2.86 bu/ac. A yield of
445
+ 180.7 falling to about 177.8 takes the carryout to 1.400 bn, all else equal.
446
+
447
+ Using exports as the offsetting line is a behavioural assumption. Exports
448
+ are a competitive outcome: they depend on what Brazil has, on freight, on
449
+ FX, on Chinese buying policy. If the crop shrinks and the price rises,
450
+ exports should fall, so the two lines are genuinely linked and the offset
451
+ has an economic story behind it. But it is a forecast about other people's
452
+ decisions, and it can be wrong in either direction for a whole season.
453
+
454
+ Using feed and residual is a different animal, because that line is not
455
+ measured at all. It is backed out of the quarterly Grain Stocks survey, so
456
+ it absorbs both real livestock feeding and every measurement error in
457
+ production and in stocks. Flexing it is not a demand forecast — it is an
458
+ admission that the sheet does not balance and a decision about where to put
459
+ the difference. Both are legitimate. But one is a view on the world and the
460
+ other is a view on your own arithmetic, and confusing them is how a desk
461
+ convinces itself it has an edge when it only has a rounding error.
462
+
463
+ A8 Conversion drill. Cross the currency first.
464
+
465
+ Quote Conversion Common currency
466
+ ------------------------------------------------------------
467
+ Matif Nov milling wheat €218/t × 1.16 $252.88/t
468
+ CFR Rotterdam cargo $268/t ÷ 1.16 €231.03/t
469
+
470
+ The Matif value is the cheaper of the two, by $15.12/t, or €13.03/t.
471
+
472
+ Now back the freight out of the imported cargo. CFR Rotterdam $268/t less
473
+ $18/t of freight leaves an implied FOB Black Sea of $250.00/t, which at 1.16
474
+ is €215.52/t.
475
+
476
+ Which is the useful part of the exercise: the imported cargo looked $15
477
+ expensive on a delivered basis, but its FOB value sits €2.48/t below the
478
+ Matif quote. The freight was carrying the entire difference and then some.
479
+ Any Matif-versus-origin comparison that skips the freight leg is comparing
480
+ two prices that were never quoted on the same terms.
472
481
 
473
482
 
474
483
  THE EPISODE, IN WRITING
475
484
  =======================
476
485
 
486
+ Yesterday a Supramax bulk carrier earned $20,651 a day. A Panamax, about a
487
+ third bigger, earned $18,964. The smaller ship was the more expensive ship,
488
+ and it was the more expensive ship per tonne by a much wider margin than
489
+ that gap suggests.
477
490
 
491
+ That inversion is a good place to start, because it breaks the intuition
492
+ that the dry bulk fleet is a ladder with cheap small ships at the bottom and
493
+ expensive large ones at the top. It is not a ladder. It is four separate
494
+ markets that happen to be measured on the same page.
478
495
 
479
- One market with four tickers
480
- ----------------------------
481
-
482
- Palm, soybean oil, rapeseed oil and sunflower oil are grown on different
483
- continents, harvested on different calendars and traded on different
484
- exchanges. They are nonetheless a single market, and the reason is that
485
- almost nobody in the chain wants the crop.
486
-
487
- A refiner in Rotterdam, a bottler in Mumbai, a snack manufacturer in Jakarta
488
- — each is buying a liquid with a melting point, an oxidative stability and a
489
- price. Within limits, the recipe is a choice. Below a certain spread they
490
- reformulate toward the cheaper oil; above it they do not. That switching
491
- behaviour is what welds four crops into one system, and it means the
492
- substitution spread between two oils is more informative than either flat
493
- price.
494
-
495
- Palm is the volume leader. An oil palm produces several tonnes of oil per
496
- hectare where a soybean produces well under one, which is why a crop grown
497
- in a narrow equatorial band supplies more vegetable oil than any other
498
- single source. Its benchmark is the FCPO contract on Bursa Malaysia
499
- Derivatives.
500
-
501
- The unit moment. One FCPO lot is 25 tonnes of crude palm oil, quoted in
502
- Malaysian ringgit per tonne, with a minimum tick of RM 1 — so RM 25 per lot.
503
- It is quoted in ringgit because it settles against Malaysian physical
504
- delivery. That is a detail with teeth: it is the only major vegetable oil
505
- benchmark denominated in neither dollars nor euros, so every non-Malaysian
506
- hedger acquires a currency position that no part of the underlying trade
507
- asked for.
508
-
509
- Crossing into Chicago requires one number. Soybean oil is quoted in cents
510
- per pound, 60,000 lb to a contract, and 1 c/lb = $22.05/t. Commit that to
511
- memory and the two halves of the oil world become comparable in a single
512
- multiplication.
513
-
514
- Market Quote In $/t
515
- --------------------------------------------------------------
516
- Palm, Sep BMD RM 4,648/t at 4.08 RM/$ $1,139
517
- Soybean oil, CBOT, mid-August 69.00 c/lb $1,521
518
- Spread $382/t
519
-
520
- Nearly four hundred dollars a tonne between two liquids that a refiner can,
521
- within limits, use interchangeably. That gap is not a mispricing waiting to
522
- be arbitraged. It is the price of two different national policies, and the
523
- rest of this edition is about how those policies get there.
524
-
525
- Reading the palm curve
526
- ----------------------
527
-
528
- Wednesday's palm board also carries a shape worth reading, and it is a
529
- chance to apply the curve grammar from ep 3 to a market that behaves nothing
530
- like Chicago wheat.
531
-
532
- [chart] The carry is front-loaded — Most of the 312-ringgit carry sits in
533
- the first spread and it shrinks steadily thereafter. The market is
534
- paying hardest to move oil out of September, which is a statement
535
- about the next few weeks rather than about the fourth quarter. —
536
- Derived from MDEX crude palm oil closing quotes, Wednesday 19 August
537
- 2026. — https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-
538
- audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep09_chart2.png
539
-
540
- The curve rises RM 312 from September to December, roughly $76/t, or about
541
- 6.7% over three months. On the ep 3 framing that is a carry market: the
542
- board is paying you to hold oil rather than sell it prompt. But the
543
- decomposition matters more than the total. The Sep–Oct spread alone is RM
544
- 139, and each subsequent spread is smaller. A carry that is front-loaded is
545
- not a general statement that oil is abundant. It is a statement that oil is
546
- abundant now, and that the market expects the fourth-quarter production
547
- decline — palm's output falls seasonally into the northern winter — to
548
- tighten things later.
549
-
550
- A mandate is a standing bid
551
- ---------------------------
552
-
553
- Ordinary demand curves slope downward. Somebody stops buying when the price
554
- rises. This is the assumption underneath every balance sheet: the demand
555
- lines are estimates of behaviour, and behaviour responds to price.
556
-
557
- A mandate breaks that. A blender legally required to put 50% biodiesel into
558
- the diesel pool does not walk away at a higher palm price. He pays, or he
559
- does not sell fuel. That converts a political decision into a standing bid —
560
- demand that exists regardless of price — and it is the single most important
561
- structural fact about vegetable oils today.
562
-
563
- Work the Indonesian number, because the arithmetic is the lesson.
564
-
565
- Step Working Result
496
+ The fleet, and why the sizes are not arbitrary
497
+ ----------------------------------------------
498
+
499
+ The classes, in deadweight tonnes:
500
+
501
+ Class Deadweight Typical cargo Gear
566
502
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
567
- 2026 biodiesel allocation stated by Jakarta 16.75 m kL
568
- Volume to mass × 0.88 t/m³ (biodiesel 14.74 m t of fuel
569
- density)
570
- Fuel to feedstock × ~1.03 t CPO per t FAME ≈ 15.2 m t of CPO
571
-
572
- Fifteen million tonnes of palm oil, consumed inside the country that
573
- produced it. That is on the order of a third of Indonesian output, and it is
574
- roughly the size of India's entire annual vegetable oil import demand. One
575
- cabinet decision, sized like the world's largest importer.
576
-
577
- The funding mechanism is where it gets interesting. The blending subsidy is
578
- paid out of the export levy, which was raised from 10% to 12.5% this year.
579
- But the mandate's purpose is to reduce the exports on which the levy is
580
- collected. The more successful the programme, the smaller the pot that pays
581
- for it. That is not a stable arrangement, and it is why the levy rate — not
582
- the mandate headlineis the honest indicator of whether the programme is
583
- affordable. Watch the rate.
584
-
585
- The American version, and the trap in it
586
- ----------------------------------------
587
-
588
- The United States sets its volumes through the Renewable Fuel Standard. The
589
- final rule for 2026 put total renewable fuel at 26.81 bn gallons and
590
- biomass-based diesel at 8.86 bn gallons, with an advanced biofuel line of
591
- 10.82 bn.
592
-
593
- The temptation is to multiply a volume by a feedstock factor and call it
594
- demand. Do not, without first checking the basis. Some RFS volumes are
595
- stated in physical gallons and some in RIN gallons, and biodiesel generates
596
- 1.5 RINs per physical gallon. Read the wrong basis and the resulting
597
- feedstock estimate is 50% too large. This mistake is made in public, by
598
- people who should know better, and it is the fastest way to be confidently
599
- wrong about a soybean oil balance sheet.
600
-
601
- The safe method is to work in the increment, where the equivalence factors
602
- cancel. Suppose a policy change adds one billion pounds of annual soybean
603
- oil demand.
604
-
605
- [chart] One billion of oil, four of meal The mandate asks for the oil. The
606
- bushel delivers four times as much meal alongside it about two
607
- million short tons that no fuel policy requested and no fuel
608
- industry can use. Worked example, episode 9, using the 11 lb oil
609
- and 44 lb meal yields per bushel from episode 8.
610
- https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-
611
- desk-daily/ep09_chart3.png
612
-
613
- A bushel of soybeans yields 11 lb of oil and 44 lb of meal, in fixed
614
- proportion. One billion pounds of oil therefore requires about 91 million
615
- bushels of additional crush — and that crush produces about 4.0 billion
616
- pounds of meal, or 2.0 million short tons.
617
-
618
- That meal was not requested by anyone. It has to be fed to an animal,
619
- somewhere, at some price, and the price is what adjusts. So the chain runs:
620
- a fuel rule bids up oil, crushers raise run rates, meal supply floods, and
621
- the meal price falls. Ep 8's board crush formula makes the consequence
622
- arithmetic rather than opinion — meal × 0.022, plus oil × 0.11, minus the
623
- bean. An oil-driven demand shock lifts the second term, depresses the first,
624
- and raises the third as crushers compete for beans. The crush captures far
625
- less of the move than the oil chart suggests.
626
-
627
- The general principle is worth stating cleanly: any demand shock arriving
628
- through one joint product must be released through the other. Fixed
629
- proportions make the by-product the shock absorber, and the by-product
630
- market is where the price damage lands. A fuel policy is always, whether it
631
- intends to be or not, a protein policy.
632
-
633
- Why balance sheets now have an energy term
503
+ Handysize 10,000–40,000 dwt Minor bulks, short Geared
504
+ legs
505
+ Supramax 50,000–60,000 dwt Minor bulks, grain Geared
506
+ part cargoes
507
+ Panamax / 75,000–82,000 dwt Grain, coal Usually gearless
508
+ Kamsarmax
509
+ Capesize 180,000 dwt and up Iron ore, coal Gearless
510
+
511
+ Deadweight is not cargo. It is everything the ship can carry: cargo,
512
+ bunkers, fresh water, stores, crew and their effects. An 82,000 dwt
513
+ Kamsarmax sailing Santos to Qingdao is carrying something like 3,000 tonnes
514
+ of fuel before a single bean goes in the hold. She loads roughly 66,000 t.
515
+ Treating dwt as cargo capacity overstates a cargo by a fifth, and that error
516
+ propagates straight into a freight-per-tonne number.
517
+
518
+ The classes exist because of draft — the depth of hull below the waterline,
519
+ which increases as the ship loads. A fully laden Panamax draws about
520
+ fourteen metres. A very large number of the world's berths, rivers and
521
+ approach channels cannot take fourteen metres. When they cannot, there are
522
+ exactly two options: load the big ship partly full, which is called a part
523
+ cargo and throws away the scale advantage, or take a smaller ship.
524
+
525
+ The second constraint is gear. A Supramax normally carries its own cranes. A
526
+ Panamax normally does not. If the discharge berth has no shore equipment,
527
+ the vessel class has already been decided, and no freight rate changes that.
528
+
529
+ This is why the Sea of Azov story is a vessel-class story rather than a
530
+ tonnage story. Azov is shallow water worked by 3,000–5,000 t river-sea
531
+ vessels drawing under five metres. When that trade is shut, the world's
532
+ spare Panamax tonnage is entirely irrelevant to it. The ships that fit
533
+ cannot sail, and the ships that can sail do not fit.
534
+
535
+ The screens: what a Baltic index actually is
536
+ --------------------------------------------
537
+
538
+ The Baltic Exchange publishes a headline index, the BDI, and a sub-index for
539
+ each class. On Thursday the BDI printed 2,791, up 15.
540
+
541
+ Here is the unit moment that matters most on this subject: those points are
542
+ not a price, and nobody can pay them. The Baltic surveys a panel of
543
+ shipbrokers each day on a fixed basket of named routes, then converts the
544
+ assessments into a time charter equivalent TCE, in dollars per day. That
545
+ is the number a shipowner thinks in, because it is what lets him compare a
546
+ grain voyage against a coal voyage against a period fix.
547
+
548
+ Index Points Average earnings
634
549
  ------------------------------------------
550
+ Capesize (BCI) 4,376 $39,684/day
551
+ Panamax (BPI) 2,107 $18,964/day
552
+ Supramax (BSI) 1,634 $20,651/day
553
+ Handysize (BHSI) 867 $15,605/day
554
+
555
+ Read the middle two again. The Supramax is the smaller vessel and it is
556
+ earning more per day. They are different trades: Panamaxes live on coal and
557
+ large grain lots, Supramaxes on minor bulks and shorter legs, and US Gulf
558
+ Supramax routes have been firming recently while Asia-Pacific has gone
559
+ quiet.
560
+
561
+ [chart] Same cargo, two vessel classes — A 60-day round voyage at
562
+ Wednesday's rates. The Supramax costs 31% more per tonne — a higher
563
+ day rate spread across fewer tonnes, so the penalty compounds.
564
+ Nobody chooses this. The berth chooses it. — Worked example, episode
565
+ 10, using Baltic average earnings of 18,964 and 20,651 USD per day.
566
+ — https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-
567
+ desk-daily/ep10_chart2.png
568
+
569
+ The two currencies of freight
570
+ -----------------------------
571
+
572
+ Freight is quoted two ways, and fluency in both is not optional.
573
+
574
+ Voyage charter Time charter
575
+ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
576
+ Unit $/tonne of cargo $/day of hire
577
+ What you buy Carriage of a stated The vessel itself, for a
578
+ cargo between named ports period
579
+ Weather and speed risk Owner Charterer
580
+ Port queue and delay Owner (subject to laytime Charterer
581
+ and demurrage)
582
+ Bunkers Owner Charterer
583
+
584
+ Same steel, two prices, two completely different risk allocations.
585
+ Converting between them is what a chartering desk does all day, and the
586
+ conversion is never clean, because it requires a view on how long the voyage
587
+ will actually take.
588
+
589
+ That view is the whole argument:
635
590
 
636
- Palm and soybean oil each sit on two bids.
591
+ | TRADER: Sixty-six Santos, first half October. What's it costing me?
637
592
 
638
- The first is the mandate: contracted, price-insensitive, known in advance.
639
- The second is discretionary blending — a refiner buying vegetable oil purely
640
- because it is cheaper than gasoil, with no subsidy and no legal obligation.
641
- Through the middle of this year that bid was live, because gasoil rallied
642
- roughly 30% in a fortnight and inverted above both palm and soybean oil,
643
- making the blend profitable on its own economics.
593
+ | CHARTERER: Fifty-two on voyage. Or I put you on a Kamsarmax, time
594
+ | charter, nineteen five.
644
595
 
645
- That second bid is the energy term, and it has three properties that make it
646
- dangerous for a crop analyst.
596
+ | TRADER: Which one do I want?
647
597
 
648
- It is large. When it is on, it competes directly with food demand for the
649
- same tonnes.
598
+ | CHARTERER: Depends who you think eats the queue at Santos.
650
599
 
651
- It is fast. Discretionary blending is a per-cargo decision, not a programme.
652
- It switches on and off with the gasoil–vegoil relationship, which means it
653
- can disappear within a week of a crude sell-off.
600
+ Neither of them called freight $52 and left it there. One number is a price;
601
+ the other is a transfer of risk. Whichever is cheaper depends on the line-up
602
+ at Santos in October, and neither of them knows the line-up in October. What
603
+ they are actually negotiating is who carries that ignorance.
654
604
 
655
- It is unforecastable from agricultural data. Nothing in a crop model, a
656
- stocks report or a weather forecast tells you where gasoil will trade. An
657
- analyst who adds an energy demand line is importing a variable from a market
658
- with its own supply, its own politics and its own volatility.
605
+ The arb, and the leg everybody leaves open
606
+ ------------------------------------------
607
+
608
+ Baltic route assessments this week put P7, US Gulf to Qingdao, at $73.81/t,
609
+ and P8, Santos to Qingdao, at $51.98/t. That $21.83/t gap decides whose
610
+ beans China buys far more often than the FOB differential does — 15 c/bu of
611
+ origin discount is only $5.51/t, barely a quarter of the freight spread.
659
612
 
660
- The failure mode is symmetrical and worth naming. Build a balance sheet with
661
- no energy line during a high-gasoil regime and you will systematically
662
- understate demand, and book the missing tonnes to residual. Add the line at
663
- the top of the cycle, then carry it forward through a 30% crude decline, and
664
- you will overstate demand by exactly the amount you were previously missing.
665
- Both errors feel like diligence at the time.
613
+ Now the trade that actually kills people. Buy 66,000 t FOB Santos, sell the
614
+ same cargo CFR Qingdao.
666
615
 
667
- The discipline is to treat the energy term as a regime, not a level: state
668
- the gasoil condition under which the line is live, size it, and set it to
669
- zero the moment the condition fails. That is a harder forecast than a crop,
670
- and it is now unavoidable, because a soybean is no longer only a food.
616
+ Line $/tonne
617
+ ------------------------------------------
618
+ Gross spread (CFR sale FOB buy) 74.00
619
+ Freight −52.00
620
+ Finance, insurance, port −6.00
621
+ Margin 16.00
622
+
623
+ Sixteen dollars a tonne is $1,056,000 on the cargo. Sell the board against
624
+ the physical and flat price is gone. Both differentials are agreed in
625
+ writing. The trade looks locked.
626
+
627
+ Except the vessel is not fixed. Freight rallies $20/t before it is.
628
+
629
+ [chart] Santos to Qingdao, one Panamax — Freight is two thirds of the gross
630
+ spread before a single dollar of margin is counted. A twenty-dollar
631
+ rally on the unfixed leg turns 1.06 million dollars of profit into a
632
+ 264,000 dollar loss, and the board never moved. — Worked example,
633
+ episode 10, freight from Baltic P8 Santos–Qingdao at 51.98 USD per
634
+ tonne. — https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-
635
+ audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep10_chart3.png
636
+
637
+ The margin goes to −$4.00/t, a loss of $264,000. A swing of $1.32 m on a
638
+ fully hedged trade.
639
+
640
+ Is $20/t an outrageous move? Spread over the 66,000 t cargo and the 60-day
641
+ round voyage, it is about $22,000 a day of extra hire — taking a Panamax
642
+ from $18,964 to roughly $41,000, which is near today's Capesize level. The
643
+ BDI has ranged between 1,261 and 2,845 over the past 52 weeks, better than a
644
+ double. Twenty dollars is not a tail event. It is a bad quarter.
645
+
646
+ The position nobody writes down
647
+ -------------------------------
648
+
649
+ Here is the sentence worth keeping: the moment a CFR sale is made and no
650
+ vessel is fixed, the seller is short freight.
651
+
652
+ It runs both ways. Buy CFR and sell FOB and the position is long freight.
653
+ Two trades can look identically flat on the grain and point in opposite
654
+ directions on the ocean.
655
+
656
+ The reason this hides is structural rather than careless. A position sheet
657
+ has columns for bushels, lots, months and locations. It very rarely carries
658
+ freight at the same resolution, and when it does, the exposure is often
659
+ booked at the expected rate rather than marked to the index. A book that is
660
+ flat in every grain column can be carrying seven figures of directional
661
+ freight risk that nothing on the page names.
662
+
663
+ FFAs are the answer, as far as there is one: cash-settled swaps on a Baltic
664
+ index route or basket, over a calendar month. A short-freight position is
665
+ covered by buying FFAs. But the hedge is an index built from a basket of
666
+ named routes, and the exposure is one voyage on one route fixed on one day.
667
+ The route can move against the basket, the fixing can miss the settlement
668
+ window, and the tonnage never matches exactly. This is the cross-hedge
669
+ problem from ep 5 — a Black Sea cargo hedged on Matif — wearing shipping
670
+ clothes.
671
+
672
+ Underneath the freight sits fuel. A Panamax burns roughly 30 t a day at sea,
673
+ so a 60-day voyage is about 1,800 t of bunkers. A hundred-dollar move in
674
+ fuel is $180,000, or $2.73/t on the cargo — seventeen percent of a sixteen-
675
+ dollar margin, decided in the oil market. On a voyage charter the owner
676
+ wears it. On a time charter, the charterer does, which is a large part of
677
+ what the two quotes in that dialogue were really about.
678
+
679
+ Why merchants charter rather than own
680
+ -------------------------------------
681
+
682
+ If freight matters this much, why does almost every merchant rent its
683
+ tonnage?
684
+
685
+ Three reasons, and only the third is about shipping.
686
+
687
+ A ship is a twenty-five-year asset and a cargo is a sixty-day problem.
688
+ Owning one to solve the other means holding a two-decade position to cover a
689
+ two-month exposure, which is not a hedge — it is a second business.
690
+
691
+ The merchant's edge is knowing where the cargo is, not knowing where the
692
+ ship is. Those are genuinely different information games, played by
693
+ different people, on different cycles.
694
+
695
+ And shipping is more violently cyclical than grain. A trading margin
696
+ financed by a shipping balance sheet stops behaving like a trading margin:
697
+ the freight cycle's drawdowns are deep enough to constrain the working
698
+ capital that the grain business runs on, at exactly the moments when grain
699
+ opportunities appear.
700
+
701
+ The houses that do own tonnage mostly own it for a narrower reason: to
702
+ guarantee access on the days when access, not price, is the binding
703
+ constraint. That is a real reason. It is just not a trading reason, and the
704
+ distinction is worth holding onto, because it is the same distinction that
705
+ separates owning an elevator from having a view on basis — which is Monday's
706
+ subject.
671
707
 
672
708
 
673
709
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -675,7 +711,7 @@ Soft Commodity Trading — a daily briefing on physical commodity trading.
675
711
 
676
712
  GLOSSARY
677
713
  Every unit and expression the show has introduced lives on the episode page:
678
- https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep09.html#glossary
714
+ https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep10.html#glossary
679
715
 
680
716
  All episodes: https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/index.html
681
717
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