@scalebun/react-native 1.10.6 → 1.10.7

package/lib/module/features/ota/crypto/builtinVerifier.js

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/**
+ * Built-in ed25519 verifier, assembled from OPTIONAL peer dependencies.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS REPLACES. Pinning `ota.publicSigningKey` used to require the host
+ * app to write its own `verifySignature` — roughly a hundred lines of hex and
+ * base64 decoding wrapped around a crypto library. That put the single most
+ * security-critical operation in the product, the one deciding whether remote
+ * code is authentic before it executes, in code the SDK could neither test nor
+ * audit. Three failure modes all landed on the app author:
+ *
+ *   - A verifier that always returns `true` silently disables the feature, and
+ *     nothing can detect it.
+ *   - @noble's hash-provider property moved between major versions, so a
+ *     routine dependency bump made every update fail closed with no signal
+ *     pointing at the cause.
+ *   - Hand-written base64 decoders tend to omit base64url, so a signature
+ *     containing `-` or `_` is rejected as a forgery.
+ *
+ * All three are now the SDK's problem, which is where they belong. A host that
+ * installs `@noble/ed25519` and `@noble/hashes` gets verification by pinning a
+ * key and writing no code at all.
+ *
+ * WHY OPTIONAL AND NOT A HARD DEPENDENCY. Most apps never adopt bundle
+ * signing, and they should not carry curve arithmetic they will not run. The
+ * `verifySignature` hook remains supported and still WINS over this, for teams
+ * with their own crypto policy or a native implementation to delegate to.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS DOES NOT FIX. Verification still happens in JS, inside the very
+ * bundle it protects. An attacker who lands one malicious bundle by other means
+ * can neuter the check for every update after it. Closing that needs native
+ * verification — CryptoKit on iOS (13.4+, already the deployment target) and
+ * `Signature.getInstance("Ed25519")` on Android API 33+, with a fallback below.
+ */
+
+import { loadEd25519 } from './loadEd25519';
+import { loadSha512 } from './loadSha512';
+import { logger } from '../../../core/logger/internalLogger';
+const ED25519_SIGNATURE_BYTES = 64;
+const ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES = 32;
+
+/** Hex → bytes. Returns null rather than throwing; callers treat null as "reject". */
+function hexToBytes(hex) {
+  const clean = hex.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
+  if (clean.length === 0 || clean.length % 2 !== 0 || /[^0-9a-f]/.test(clean)) return null;
+  const out = new Uint8Array(clean.length / 2);
+  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {
+    out[i] = parseInt(clean.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+const B64_ALPHABET = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/';
+
+/**
+ * Base64 → bytes, accepting base64url as well.
+ *
+ * The `-`/`_` handling is the point. A verifier that omits it rejects a
+ * perfectly valid signature as a forgery the moment the signing side emits
+ * base64url, and the resulting symptom — updates silently stop installing —
+ * looks nothing like a decoding bug.
+ */
+function base64ToBytes(b64) {
+  const s = b64.trim().replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/').replace(/=+$/, '');
+  if (s.length === 0) return null;
+  const out = [];
+  let buffer = 0;
+  let bits = 0;
+  for (const ch of s) {
+    const idx = B64_ALPHABET.indexOf(ch);
+    if (idx === -1) return null;
+    buffer = buffer << 6 | idx;
+    bits += 6;
+    if (bits >= 8) {
+      bits -= 8;
+      out.push(buffer >> bits & 0xff);
+    }
+  }
+  return Uint8Array.from(out);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decode a detached signature that may arrive hex- or base64-encoded.
+ *
+ * Tries the unambiguous case first: 128 hex characters is exactly 64 bytes and
+ * cannot be anything else. Otherwise base64, then hex as a last resort. Only a
+ * result of exactly 64 bytes is accepted, so a string that decodes under the
+ * wrong scheme is rejected rather than fed to the curve code as garbage.
+ */
+export function decodeSignature(sig) {
+  const trimmed = sig.trim();
+  if (/^(0x)?[0-9a-fA-F]{128}$/.test(trimmed)) {
+    const hex = hexToBytes(trimmed);
+    if (hex && hex.length === ED25519_SIGNATURE_BYTES) return hex;
+  }
+  const b64 = base64ToBytes(trimmed);
+  if (b64 && b64.length === ED25519_SIGNATURE_BYTES) return b64;
+  const hex = hexToBytes(trimmed);
+  if (hex && hex.length === ED25519_SIGNATURE_BYTES) return hex;
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Give @noble its SHA-512 provider.
+ *
+ * The property it reads moved between major versions — v2 wants
+ * `etc.sha512Sync`, v3 wants `hashes.sha512` — so both are populated when
+ * present. Getting this wrong does not fail loudly: verification simply throws
+ * from inside the curve code and the outer catch converts it to "rejected",
+ * which is indistinguishable from an actual forgery. That ambiguity is exactly
+ * what made this a bad thing to ask app authors to maintain.
+ */
+function wireSha512(ed, sha512) {
+  // VARIADIC ON PURPOSE. @noble calls its hash provider with several byte
+  // arrays to be hashed as one concatenated message. A wrapper taking a
+  // single argument hashes only the first, silently produces the wrong
+  // digest, and every genuine signature is then reported as INVALID — no
+  // error, no exception, just an authenticity check that always says no.
+  // Verified against a real CLI-produced signature; the single-argument form
+  // failed every positive case while passing every negative one, which is
+  // the most misleading shape a bug of this kind can take.
+  const concat = parts => {
+    if (parts.length === 1) return parts[0];
+    let total = 0;
+    for (const p of parts) total += p.length;
+    const out = new Uint8Array(total);
+    let off = 0;
+    for (const p of parts) {
+      out.set(p, off);
+      off += p.length;
+    }
+    return out;
+  };
+  const sync = (...msgs) => sha512(concat(msgs));
+  const asyncFn = async (...msgs) => sha512(concat(msgs));
+
+  // EACH BRANCH GETS ITS OWN try. Wrapping both in one is a trap, and it cost
+  // an afternoon: under v3 the `hashes` assignment succeeds and the `etc`
+  // object is FROZEN, so the v2-shaped assignment throws "object is not
+  // extensible" — discarding a verifier that was, by then, already correctly
+  // wired. Only "neither shape took" means unavailable.
+  let wired = false;
+  try {
+    if (ed.hashes && typeof ed.hashes === 'object') {
+      if (typeof ed.hashes.sha512 !== 'function') ed.hashes.sha512 = sync;
+      if (typeof ed.hashes.sha512Async !== 'function') ed.hashes.sha512Async = asyncFn;
+      wired = typeof ed.hashes.sha512 === 'function';
+    }
+  } catch {
+    /* frozen or absent — try the other shape */
+  }
+  try {
+    if (ed.etc && typeof ed.etc === 'object') {
+      if (typeof ed.etc.sha512Sync !== 'function') ed.etc.sha512Sync = sync;
+      if (typeof ed.etc.sha512Async !== 'function') ed.etc.sha512Async = asyncFn;
+      wired = wired || typeof ed.etc.sha512Sync === 'function';
+    }
+  } catch {
+    /* frozen or absent — `wired` already records whether the other shape took */
+  }
+  return wired;
+}
+let resolved;
+
+/**
+ * The built-in verifier, or null when the optional deps are not installed.
+ * Resolution is cached, including the negative result — a missing dependency
+ * does not become present at runtime, and retrying the require on every update
+ * check would be pure overhead.
+ */
+export function getBuiltinVerifier() {
+  if (resolved !== undefined) return resolved;
+  const ed = loadEd25519();
+  const sha512 = loadSha512();
+  if (!ed || !sha512) {
+    resolved = null;
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (!wireSha512(ed, sha512)) {
+    // A shape neither branch matched — a @noble major this SDK predates.
+    // Report "no verifier", which is actionable, rather than letting every
+    // update fail deep inside the curve code with an opaque error.
+    logger.error('[OTA] @noble/ed25519 is installed but its SHA-512 provider could not be ' + 'wired (unrecognised version shape). Supply `ota.verifySignature` ' + 'yourself, or pin a @noble/ed25519 version this SDK supports.');
+    resolved = null;
+    return null;
+  }
+  resolved = async ({
+    messageHex,
+    signature,
+    publicKey
+  }) => {
+    const message = hexToBytes(messageHex);
+    const pub = hexToBytes(publicKey);
+    const sig = decodeSignature(signature);
+    if (!message) {
+      logger.error('[OTA] Bundle SHA-256 is not valid hex — refusing to stage.');
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!pub || pub.length !== ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES) {
+      // Worth naming precisely: a mistyped or wrongly-encoded key would
+      // otherwise present as "every update is a forgery".
+      logger.error(`[OTA] ota.publicSigningKey must be ${ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES} bytes of hex ` + `(${ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES * 2} characters) — got ` + `${pub ? `${pub.length} bytes` : 'a value that is not hex'}.`);
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!sig) {
+      logger.error('[OTA] Bundle signature is not a 64-byte hex/base64 value.');
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // @noble THROWS rather than returning false for bytes that are not a
+    // well-formed point — which is most forgeries, since a tampered
+    // signature usually decodes to garbage rather than to a valid-but-wrong
+    // point. Swallowing that here is deliberate: from the SDK's side a
+    // malformed signature IS a rejection, and letting it escape would
+    // surface as `verifier_threw`, the outcome reserved for a HOST verifier
+    // misbehaving. Conflating "this bundle is forged" with "your verifier
+    // is broken" would point every investigation in the wrong direction.
+    try {
+      // SYNC FIRST, and this is not a style preference. @noble's
+      // `verifyAsync` reaches for `crypto.subtle` — "crypto.subtle must be
+      // defined, consider polyfill" — which React Native does not provide
+      // and neither does a plain Node test environment. The sync `verify`
+      // uses the SHA-512 provider wired above and needs no WebCrypto, so
+      // it is the path that actually works on a phone. Verification is a
+      // few hundred microseconds over a 32-byte digest, once per update
+      // check, so there is nothing to gain from the async form anyway.
+      if (typeof ed.verify === 'function') return ed.verify(sig, message, pub);
+      if (typeof ed.verifyAsync === 'function') return await ed.verifyAsync(sig, message, pub);
+      return false;
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  };
+  __DEV__ && logger.debug('[OTA] Using built-in ed25519 verifier (@noble/ed25519 detected).');
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+/** Test seam — clears the cached resolution. */
+export function _resetBuiltinVerifier() {
+  resolved = undefined;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=builtinVerifier.js.map

package/lib/module/features/ota/crypto/loadEd25519.js

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/**
+ * Isolated lazy loader for the OPTIONAL `@noble/ed25519` dep.
+ *
+ * WHY ITS OWN FILE: Metro's dependency collector emits a dependency map one
+ * entry short for a module containing TWO OR MORE different-string inline
+ * `require()` calls, so the require indices desync and `_dependencyMap[N]`
+ * reads `undefined` ("Requiring unknown module 'undefined'"). Exactly ONE
+ * inline require per module avoids the miscount. `loadSha512` is a sibling file
+ * for the same reason — see `push/adapters/loadNotifee.ts`, which hit this first.
+ *
+ * The string must still be STATICALLY resolvable at bundle time; hosts that do
+ * not install it stub it via `withScaleBun`.
+ */
+
+/** The subset of the @noble/ed25519 surface this SDK uses. */
+
+export function loadEd25519() {
+  try {
+    const mod = require('@noble/ed25519');
+    const ed = mod?.default ?? mod;
+    // Validate the API actually used, not mere truthiness: when the package
+    // is absent `withScaleBun` resolves it to an EMPTY STUB MODULE, which is
+    // a perfectly truthy object. A stub must read as "unavailable", because
+    // treating it as available would make every signed update fail with a
+    // crypto error instead of the actionable "no verifier" message.
+    if (typeof ed?.verifyAsync === 'function' || typeof ed?.verify === 'function') {
+      return ed;
+    }
+    return null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=loadEd25519.js.map

package/lib/module/features/ota/crypto/loadSha512.js

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/**
+ * Isolated lazy loader for the OPTIONAL `@noble/hashes` SHA-512.
+ *
+ * Separate file from `loadEd25519` because Metro miscounts a module holding two
+ * different-string inline `require()` calls — see the comment there.
+ *
+ * ed25519 is defined in terms of SHA-512, and React Native has no native
+ * SHA-512, so @noble/ed25519 cannot verify anything until a hash provider is
+ * wired into it. Which property it expects differs by major version, so the
+ * wiring lives in `builtinVerifier`, not here; this module only obtains the
+ * function.
+ */
+
+export function loadSha512() {
+  try {
+    // The `.js` SUFFIX IS REQUIRED, not stylistic. @noble/hashes v2 declares
+    // its exports map with extensions — `"./sha2.js"`, not `"./sha2"` — so
+    // the extensionless form misses the map entirely. Node still resolves it
+    // by falling back to file-based lookup, which is why it passes here,
+    // but Metro prints
+    //   "Attempted to import … not listed in the exports … Falling back to
+    //    file-based resolution"
+    // on every bundle, and that fallback is exactly what a stricter resolver
+    // (or a future Metro) drops. Caught while bundling a real Expo app.
+    const mod = require('@noble/hashes/sha2.js');
+    const sha512 = mod?.sha512 ?? mod?.default?.sha512;
+    // A stubbed module yields undefined here, which correctly reads as
+    // "unavailable" rather than throwing deep inside the curve code later.
+    return typeof sha512 === 'function' ? sha512 : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=loadSha512.js.map

package/lib/module/features/ota/crypto/nativeVerifier.js

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/**
+ * Native ed25519 verifier — platform crypto wrapped as a SignatureVerifier.
+ *
+ * WHY IT EXISTS. The built-in @noble verifier runs in JS, inside the very
+ * bundle it protects: an attacker who lands one malicious bundle can neuter a
+ * JS check for every update after it. Platform crypto (CryptoKit on iOS,
+ * Android's conscrypt on API 33+) sits outside the bundle's reach — and using
+ * it also drops the runtime dependency on the optional @noble peers wherever
+ * the OS provides ed25519.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT FIX, stated plainly: the ORCHESTRATION still lives in JS.
+ * A hostile bundle can skip calling any verifier and drive the native staging
+ * methods directly. Moving the crypto native shrinks the attack surface (no
+ * more tampering with a bundled crypto lib to flip a verdict) but the full
+ * close needs native-ENFORCED staging with a natively-pinned key — an
+ * architectural change tracked separately, not smuggled into this one.
+ *
+ * VERDICT CONTRACT (mirrors the spec): the native side resolves
+ * 'valid' | 'invalid' | 'unavailable'. 'invalid' is a definitive NO.
+ * 'unavailable' (Android < 33, malformed input, machinery failure) means this
+ * source cannot answer — the composed verifier below then delegates to the
+ * @noble builtin, and when that is absent too it THROWS, which the policy
+ * layer converts to a rejection. Every path that cannot verify refuses.
+ */
+
+import NativeScaleBunOta from '../../../specs/NativeScaleBunOta';
+import { logger } from '../../../core/logger/internalLogger';
+import { decodeSignature, getBuiltinVerifier } from './builtinVerifier';
+const ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS = 64;
+
+/** bytes → lowercase hex (the native side takes clean hex only). */
+function bytesToHex(bytes) {
+  let out = '';
+  for (const b of bytes) out += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Strict lowercase-hex normalization; null when the value is not hex. */
+function normalizeHex(value, expectedChars) {
+  const clean = value.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
+  if (clean.length !== expectedChars || /[^0-9a-f]/.test(clean)) return null;
+  return clean;
+}
+let resolved;
+
+/**
+ * The native-first verifier, or null when the native module (or its
+ * verifyEd25519 method — an app running new JS against an old binary) is
+ * absent. Cached like the builtin: module availability does not change at
+ * runtime, and this is consulted on every update check.
+ */
+export function getNativeVerifier() {
+  if (resolved !== undefined) return resolved;
+  const native = NativeScaleBunOta;
+  if (!native || typeof native.verifyEd25519 !== 'function') {
+    // Old binary, Jest, web/SSR — not an error, just not this source.
+    resolved = null;
+    return null;
+  }
+  resolved = async ({
+    messageHex,
+    signature,
+    publicKey
+  }) => {
+    // All decoding and validation happens HERE, in one place, so both
+    // platforms' native code only ever sees clean fixed-length hex. The
+    // signature may arrive hex or base64 (the wire allows both) — reuse
+    // the builtin's decoder rather than growing a second, subtly
+    // different one.
+    const message = normalizeHex(messageHex, 64);
+    const key = normalizeHex(publicKey, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS);
+    const sigBytes = decodeSignature(signature);
+    if (!message || !key || !sigBytes) {
+      // Same messages-by-symptom philosophy as the builtin: a mistyped
+      // key must not present as "every update is a forgery".
+      logger.error('[OTA] Signature inputs malformed (bundle hash, signature, or public key) — refusing to stage.');
+      return false;
+    }
+    let verdict;
+    try {
+      verdict = await native.verifyEd25519(message, bytesToHex(sigBytes), key);
+    } catch (err) {
+      // A rejected promise is machinery failure, not a forgery verdict.
+      logger.warn(`[OTA] Native ed25519 verify failed to run: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
+      verdict = 'unavailable';
+    }
+    if (verdict === 'valid') return true;
+    if (verdict === 'invalid') return false;
+
+    // 'unavailable' (Android < 33) — fall back to the JS verifier so those
+    // devices keep verifying rather than losing enforcement.
+    const builtin = getBuiltinVerifier();
+    if (builtin) {
+      return builtin({
+        messageHex,
+        signature,
+        publicKey
+      });
+    }
+    // No source can verify. Throwing (rather than returning false) keeps
+    // the policy layer's outcome labels honest: this surfaces as machinery
+    // failure with an actionable message, not as "the bundle is forged".
+    throw new Error('ed25519 unavailable: this OS has no native implementation (Android < 13) and the ' + 'optional peers @noble/ed25519 + @noble/hashes are not installed.');
+  };
+  __DEV__ && logger.debug('[OTA] Using native ed25519 verifier (platform crypto).');
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+/** Test seam — clears the cached resolution. */
+export function _resetNativeVerifier() {
+  resolved = undefined;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=nativeVerifier.js.map

package/lib/module/features/ota/signature.js

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 import { logger } from '../../core/logger/internalLogger';
+import { getBuiltinVerifier } from './crypto/builtinVerifier';
+import { getNativeVerifier } from './crypto/nativeVerifier';
 
 /**
  * Bundle signature verification (OTA-03).
@@ -13,10 +15,17 @@ import { logger } from '../../core/logger/internalLogger';
  * download and nothing else. On a platform whose entire purpose is remote code
  * delivery, that is the control that matters most.
  *
- * WHY IT IS SHAPED LIKE THIS. The SDK ships zero third-party runtime
- * dependencies, and React Native has no built-in ed25519. So verification is
- * delegated to a host-provided verifier when one is installed, and the SDK's job
- * is to decide — unambiguously — what happens when there is not one.
+ * WHY IT IS SHAPED LIKE THIS. React Native has no built-in ed25519, so the
+ * verification primitive has to come from somewhere. It is resolved in order:
+ * a host-supplied verifier, else the built-in one assembled from the OPTIONAL
+ * `@noble/ed25519` + `@noble/hashes` peers, else nothing — and the SDK's job is
+ * to decide, unambiguously, what happens in that last case.
+ *
+ * The built-in path exists because requiring every adopter to hand-write a
+ * verifier put the most security-critical operation in the product in code the
+ * SDK could neither test nor audit, and made a routine dependency bump able to
+ * silently stop all updates. See `crypto/builtinVerifier.ts`. Signing stays
+ * opt-in, and apps that never adopt it carry no curve arithmetic.
  *
  * THE POLICY, which is the important part:
  *
@@ -46,10 +55,16 @@ let warnedNotConfigured = false;
  * different operational events and must not collapse into one.
  */
 export async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
-  const publicKey = config?.publicKey;
+  const rawKey = config?.publicKey;
+
+  // Normalize to a list. A single non-empty string is the pre-rotation config
+  // shape and behaves exactly as before; an array pins several keys at once.
+  const keys = (Array.isArray(rawKey) ? rawKey : rawKey ? [rawKey] : []).filter(k => typeof k === 'string' && k.trim().length > 0);
 
-  // Signing not adopted by this app — nothing to enforce.
-  if (!publicKey) {
+  // Signing not adopted by this app — nothing to enforce. Parity note: a
+  // falsy single value (undefined, '') has always meant "not configured" and
+  // still does.
+  if (rawKey === undefined || rawKey === '' || rawKey === null) {
     if (!warnedNotConfigured) {
       warnedNotConfigured = true;
       logger.warn('[OTA] No signing public key configured — bundles are accepted on SHA-256 ' + 'integrity alone. Configure `ota.publicSigningKey` to enforce authenticity.');
@@ -60,6 +75,19 @@ export async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
     };
   }
 
+  // The host PROVIDED a key config that resolves to zero usable keys — an
+  // empty array, or an array of blank strings. That is a broken attempt to
+  // enable signing, not an absence of one, and the two must not collapse:
+  // treating `publicSigningKeys: []` as "not configured" would let a config
+  // mistake silently downgrade an app to unverified installs. Fail closed.
+  if (keys.length === 0) {
+    logger.error('[OTA] Signing key config resolves to zero usable keys (empty array or blank ' + 'strings) — refusing to stage. Remove the config to disable signing, or pin ' + 'at least one real key.');
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      reason: 'no_keys'
+    };
+  }
+
   // The app opted in, so a bundle without a signature is a refusal, not a pass.
   if (!signature) {
     logger.error('[OTA] Bundle has no signature but a signing key is configured — refusing to stage.');
@@ -68,38 +96,70 @@ export async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
       reason: 'missing_signature'
     };
   }
-  if (typeof config?.verifier !== 'function') {
-    logger.error('[OTA] A signing key is configured but no signature verifier is available — ' + 'refusing to stage. Provide `ota.verifySignature` so signatures can be checked.');
+
+  // Resolution order, and the order matters:
+  //   1. A host-supplied verifier ALWAYS wins. A team with its own crypto
+  //      policy must be able to override whatever the SDK would otherwise pick.
+  //   2. Otherwise the NATIVE verifier (CryptoKit / Android 13+ platform
+  //      ed25519). Preferred over the JS one because it runs outside the
+  //      bundle it protects and needs no optional peers; on OS levels without
+  //      ed25519 it delegates to the builtin internally.
+  //   3. Otherwise the built-in @noble verifier, if the optional peers are
+  //      installed. This is the path that removes ~100 lines of hand-written
+  //      crypto plumbing from every app that adopts signing.
+  //   4. Otherwise reject, because a configured key is a request for
+  //      enforcement and quietly installing unverified code would turn a
+  //      security feature into a placebo.
+  const verifier = typeof config?.verifier === 'function' ? config.verifier : getNativeVerifier() ?? getBuiltinVerifier();
+  if (!verifier) {
+    logger.error('[OTA] A signing key is configured but no signature verifier is available — ' + 'refusing to stage. Either install the optional peers ' + '`@noble/ed25519` and `@noble/hashes` (the SDK then verifies with no ' + 'further code), or provide your own `ota.verifySignature`.');
     return {
       ok: false,
       reason: 'no_verifier'
     };
   }
-  try {
-    const valid = await config.verifier({
-      messageHex: bundleSha256,
-      signature,
-      publicKey
-    });
-    if (!valid) {
-      logger.error('[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID — refusing to stage.');
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        reason: 'invalid_signature'
+
+  // Try every pinned key; any single match accepts. The verifier contract is
+  // unchanged (one key per call) so host-supplied verifiers keep working.
+  //
+  // Outcome labelling when nothing matched, and why it matters: if at least
+  // one verifier call RAN TO COMPLETION and said no, the bundle failed
+  // verification — 'invalid_signature'. Only when EVERY call threw is the
+  // machinery itself suspect — 'verifier_threw'. Collapsing those (e.g. by
+  // letting the last key's throw win) would point an investigation at the
+  // host's verifier when the actual event was a forged bundle, or vice versa.
+  let sawThrow = false;
+  let sawCompletion = false;
+  for (const key of keys) {
+    try {
+      const valid = await verifier({
+        messageHex: bundleSha256,
+        signature,
+        publicKey: key
+      });
+      sawCompletion = true;
+      if (valid) return {
+        ok: true,
+        reason: 'verified'
       };
+    } catch (err) {
+      // A throwing verifier is treated as a failed verification for this key,
+      // never as a pass — but the remaining keys still get their chance.
+      sawThrow = true;
+      logger.error(`[OTA] Signature verifier threw: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
     }
-    return {
-      ok: true,
-      reason: 'verified'
-    };
-  } catch (err) {
-    // A throwing verifier is treated as a failed verification, never as a pass.
-    logger.error(`[OTA] Signature verifier threw: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
+  }
+  if (sawThrow && !sawCompletion) {
     return {
       ok: false,
       reason: 'verifier_threw'
     };
   }
+  logger.error(keys.length > 1 ? `[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID under all ${keys.length} pinned keys — refusing to stage.` : '[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID — refusing to stage.');
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    reason: 'invalid_signature'
+  };
 }
 
 /** Test seam — resets the once-per-process "not configured" warning. */

package/lib/module/metro/serializerCompose.js

@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ export function discoverArtifacts(packageRoot) {
   return out;
 }
 
+/** One-shot guard so an Expo build does not print the pass-through notice per bundle. */
+let warnedUnknownShape = false;
+
 /**
  * Build the composing serializer. `hostSerializer` is the app's own customSerializer, if any.
  */
@@ -85,6 +88,35 @@ export function createComposingSerializer(artifacts, internals, hostSerializer)
       const hostResult = await hostSerializer(entryPoint, preModules, graph, options);
       if (typeof hostResult === 'string') {
         code = hostResult;
+      } else if (hostResult && typeof hostResult.code !== 'string') {
+        /**
+         * A shape this wrapper does not understand — pass it back UNTOUCHED.
+         *
+         * Expo is the case that matters. `expo/metro-config` installs a
+         * serializer returning `{ artifacts: [...] }`, a multi-artifact
+         * shape with no top-level `code`. Reading `.code` off it yielded
+         * undefined, and returning `{ code: undefined, map }` made every
+         * `expo export:embed` die with:
+         *
+         *   Serializer did not return expected format. The project copy
+         *   of `expo/metro-config` may be out of date.
+         *
+         * — a message that sends you to upgrade Expo, which is not the
+         * problem. The result: `withScaleBun` broke PRODUCTION BUNDLING
+         * FOR EVERY EXPO APP, and the SDK's own marketing test app could
+         * not build. Found by bundling it.
+         *
+         * Passing it through costs ScaleBun's source-map composition on
+         * Expo (OTA stack traces stay mapped to the bundle rather than to
+         * original sources). That is a real loss and strictly better than
+         * a build that cannot run at all. Composing INTO an artifact
+         * array is the follow-up; it must not be guessed at here.
+         */
+        if (!warnedUnknownShape) {
+          warnedUnknownShape = true;
+          console.warn('[ScaleBun/metro] The host serializer returned a shape this SDK does not ' + 'compose (Expo returns { artifacts }). Passing it through unchanged — ' + 'the build is correct, but ScaleBun source-map composition is skipped.');
+        }
+        return hostResult;
       } else {
         code = hostResult.code;
         try {