@scalebun/react-native 1.10.6 → 1.10.7

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/crypto/nativeVerifier.js

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+"use strict";
+
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
+  value: true
+});
+exports._resetNativeVerifier = _resetNativeVerifier;
+exports.getNativeVerifier = getNativeVerifier;
+var _NativeScaleBunOta = _interopRequireDefault(require("../../../specs/NativeScaleBunOta"));
+var _internalLogger = require("../../../core/logger/internalLogger");
+var _builtinVerifier = require("./builtinVerifier");
+function _interopRequireDefault(e) { return e && e.__esModule ? e : { default: e }; }
+/**
+ * Native ed25519 verifier — platform crypto wrapped as a SignatureVerifier.
+ *
+ * WHY IT EXISTS. The built-in @noble verifier runs in JS, inside the very
+ * bundle it protects: an attacker who lands one malicious bundle can neuter a
+ * JS check for every update after it. Platform crypto (CryptoKit on iOS,
+ * Android's conscrypt on API 33+) sits outside the bundle's reach — and using
+ * it also drops the runtime dependency on the optional @noble peers wherever
+ * the OS provides ed25519.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT FIX, stated plainly: the ORCHESTRATION still lives in JS.
+ * A hostile bundle can skip calling any verifier and drive the native staging
+ * methods directly. Moving the crypto native shrinks the attack surface (no
+ * more tampering with a bundled crypto lib to flip a verdict) but the full
+ * close needs native-ENFORCED staging with a natively-pinned key — an
+ * architectural change tracked separately, not smuggled into this one.
+ *
+ * VERDICT CONTRACT (mirrors the spec): the native side resolves
+ * 'valid' | 'invalid' | 'unavailable'. 'invalid' is a definitive NO.
+ * 'unavailable' (Android < 33, malformed input, machinery failure) means this
+ * source cannot answer — the composed verifier below then delegates to the
+ * @noble builtin, and when that is absent too it THROWS, which the policy
+ * layer converts to a rejection. Every path that cannot verify refuses.
+ */
+
+const ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS = 64;
+
+/** bytes → lowercase hex (the native side takes clean hex only). */
+function bytesToHex(bytes) {
+  let out = '';
+  for (const b of bytes) out += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Strict lowercase-hex normalization; null when the value is not hex. */
+function normalizeHex(value, expectedChars) {
+  const clean = value.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
+  if (clean.length !== expectedChars || /[^0-9a-f]/.test(clean)) return null;
+  return clean;
+}
+let resolved;
+
+/**
+ * The native-first verifier, or null when the native module (or its
+ * verifyEd25519 method — an app running new JS against an old binary) is
+ * absent. Cached like the builtin: module availability does not change at
+ * runtime, and this is consulted on every update check.
+ */
+function getNativeVerifier() {
+  if (resolved !== undefined) return resolved;
+  const native = _NativeScaleBunOta.default;
+  if (!native || typeof native.verifyEd25519 !== 'function') {
+    // Old binary, Jest, web/SSR — not an error, just not this source.
+    resolved = null;
+    return null;
+  }
+  resolved = async ({
+    messageHex,
+    signature,
+    publicKey
+  }) => {
+    // All decoding and validation happens HERE, in one place, so both
+    // platforms' native code only ever sees clean fixed-length hex. The
+    // signature may arrive hex or base64 (the wire allows both) — reuse
+    // the builtin's decoder rather than growing a second, subtly
+    // different one.
+    const message = normalizeHex(messageHex, 64);
+    const key = normalizeHex(publicKey, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS);
+    const sigBytes = (0, _builtinVerifier.decodeSignature)(signature);
+    if (!message || !key || !sigBytes) {
+      // Same messages-by-symptom philosophy as the builtin: a mistyped
+      // key must not present as "every update is a forgery".
+      _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Signature inputs malformed (bundle hash, signature, or public key) — refusing to stage.');
+      return false;
+    }
+    let verdict;
+    try {
+      verdict = await native.verifyEd25519(message, bytesToHex(sigBytes), key);
+    } catch (err) {
+      // A rejected promise is machinery failure, not a forgery verdict.
+      _internalLogger.logger.warn(`[OTA] Native ed25519 verify failed to run: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
+      verdict = 'unavailable';
+    }
+    if (verdict === 'valid') return true;
+    if (verdict === 'invalid') return false;
+
+    // 'unavailable' (Android < 33) — fall back to the JS verifier so those
+    // devices keep verifying rather than losing enforcement.
+    const builtin = (0, _builtinVerifier.getBuiltinVerifier)();
+    if (builtin) {
+      return builtin({
+        messageHex,
+        signature,
+        publicKey
+      });
+    }
+    // No source can verify. Throwing (rather than returning false) keeps
+    // the policy layer's outcome labels honest: this surfaces as machinery
+    // failure with an actionable message, not as "the bundle is forged".
+    throw new Error('ed25519 unavailable: this OS has no native implementation (Android < 13) and the ' + 'optional peers @noble/ed25519 + @noble/hashes are not installed.');
+  };
+  __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.debug('[OTA] Using native ed25519 verifier (platform crypto).');
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+/** Test seam — clears the cached resolution. */
+function _resetNativeVerifier() {
+  resolved = undefined;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=nativeVerifier.js.map

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/signature.js

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
 exports._resetSignatureWarnings = _resetSignatureWarnings;
 exports.verifyBundleSignature = verifyBundleSignature;
 var _internalLogger = require("../../core/logger/internalLogger");
+var _builtinVerifier = require("./crypto/builtinVerifier");
+var _nativeVerifier = require("./crypto/nativeVerifier");
 /**
  * Bundle signature verification (OTA-03).
  *
@@ -19,10 +21,17 @@ var _internalLogger = require("../../core/logger/internalLogger");
  * download and nothing else. On a platform whose entire purpose is remote code
  * delivery, that is the control that matters most.
  *
- * WHY IT IS SHAPED LIKE THIS. The SDK ships zero third-party runtime
- * dependencies, and React Native has no built-in ed25519. So verification is
- * delegated to a host-provided verifier when one is installed, and the SDK's job
- * is to decide — unambiguously — what happens when there is not one.
+ * WHY IT IS SHAPED LIKE THIS. React Native has no built-in ed25519, so the
+ * verification primitive has to come from somewhere. It is resolved in order:
+ * a host-supplied verifier, else the built-in one assembled from the OPTIONAL
+ * `@noble/ed25519` + `@noble/hashes` peers, else nothing — and the SDK's job is
+ * to decide, unambiguously, what happens in that last case.
+ *
+ * The built-in path exists because requiring every adopter to hand-write a
+ * verifier put the most security-critical operation in the product in code the
+ * SDK could neither test nor audit, and made a routine dependency bump able to
+ * silently stop all updates. See `crypto/builtinVerifier.ts`. Signing stays
+ * opt-in, and apps that never adopt it carry no curve arithmetic.
  *
  * THE POLICY, which is the important part:
  *
@@ -52,10 +61,16 @@ let warnedNotConfigured = false;
  * different operational events and must not collapse into one.
  */
 async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
-  const publicKey = config?.publicKey;
+  const rawKey = config?.publicKey;
+
+  // Normalize to a list. A single non-empty string is the pre-rotation config
+  // shape and behaves exactly as before; an array pins several keys at once.
+  const keys = (Array.isArray(rawKey) ? rawKey : rawKey ? [rawKey] : []).filter(k => typeof k === 'string' && k.trim().length > 0);
 
-  // Signing not adopted by this app — nothing to enforce.
-  if (!publicKey) {
+  // Signing not adopted by this app — nothing to enforce. Parity note: a
+  // falsy single value (undefined, '') has always meant "not configured" and
+  // still does.
+  if (rawKey === undefined || rawKey === '' || rawKey === null) {
     if (!warnedNotConfigured) {
       warnedNotConfigured = true;
       _internalLogger.logger.warn('[OTA] No signing public key configured — bundles are accepted on SHA-256 ' + 'integrity alone. Configure `ota.publicSigningKey` to enforce authenticity.');
@@ -66,6 +81,19 @@ async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
     };
   }
 
+  // The host PROVIDED a key config that resolves to zero usable keys — an
+  // empty array, or an array of blank strings. That is a broken attempt to
+  // enable signing, not an absence of one, and the two must not collapse:
+  // treating `publicSigningKeys: []` as "not configured" would let a config
+  // mistake silently downgrade an app to unverified installs. Fail closed.
+  if (keys.length === 0) {
+    _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Signing key config resolves to zero usable keys (empty array or blank ' + 'strings) — refusing to stage. Remove the config to disable signing, or pin ' + 'at least one real key.');
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      reason: 'no_keys'
+    };
+  }
+
   // The app opted in, so a bundle without a signature is a refusal, not a pass.
   if (!signature) {
     _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Bundle has no signature but a signing key is configured — refusing to stage.');
@@ -74,38 +102,70 @@ async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
       reason: 'missing_signature'
     };
   }
-  if (typeof config?.verifier !== 'function') {
-    _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] A signing key is configured but no signature verifier is available — ' + 'refusing to stage. Provide `ota.verifySignature` so signatures can be checked.');
+
+  // Resolution order, and the order matters:
+  //   1. A host-supplied verifier ALWAYS wins. A team with its own crypto
+  //      policy must be able to override whatever the SDK would otherwise pick.
+  //   2. Otherwise the NATIVE verifier (CryptoKit / Android 13+ platform
+  //      ed25519). Preferred over the JS one because it runs outside the
+  //      bundle it protects and needs no optional peers; on OS levels without
+  //      ed25519 it delegates to the builtin internally.
+  //   3. Otherwise the built-in @noble verifier, if the optional peers are
+  //      installed. This is the path that removes ~100 lines of hand-written
+  //      crypto plumbing from every app that adopts signing.
+  //   4. Otherwise reject, because a configured key is a request for
+  //      enforcement and quietly installing unverified code would turn a
+  //      security feature into a placebo.
+  const verifier = typeof config?.verifier === 'function' ? config.verifier : (0, _nativeVerifier.getNativeVerifier)() ?? (0, _builtinVerifier.getBuiltinVerifier)();
+  if (!verifier) {
+    _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] A signing key is configured but no signature verifier is available — ' + 'refusing to stage. Either install the optional peers ' + '`@noble/ed25519` and `@noble/hashes` (the SDK then verifies with no ' + 'further code), or provide your own `ota.verifySignature`.');
     return {
       ok: false,
       reason: 'no_verifier'
     };
   }
-  try {
-    const valid = await config.verifier({
-      messageHex: bundleSha256,
-      signature,
-      publicKey
-    });
-    if (!valid) {
-      _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID — refusing to stage.');
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        reason: 'invalid_signature'
+
+  // Try every pinned key; any single match accepts. The verifier contract is
+  // unchanged (one key per call) so host-supplied verifiers keep working.
+  //
+  // Outcome labelling when nothing matched, and why it matters: if at least
+  // one verifier call RAN TO COMPLETION and said no, the bundle failed
+  // verification — 'invalid_signature'. Only when EVERY call threw is the
+  // machinery itself suspect — 'verifier_threw'. Collapsing those (e.g. by
+  // letting the last key's throw win) would point an investigation at the
+  // host's verifier when the actual event was a forged bundle, or vice versa.
+  let sawThrow = false;
+  let sawCompletion = false;
+  for (const key of keys) {
+    try {
+      const valid = await verifier({
+        messageHex: bundleSha256,
+        signature,
+        publicKey: key
+      });
+      sawCompletion = true;
+      if (valid) return {
+        ok: true,
+        reason: 'verified'
       };
+    } catch (err) {
+      // A throwing verifier is treated as a failed verification for this key,
+      // never as a pass — but the remaining keys still get their chance.
+      sawThrow = true;
+      _internalLogger.logger.error(`[OTA] Signature verifier threw: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
     }
-    return {
-      ok: true,
-      reason: 'verified'
-    };
-  } catch (err) {
-    // A throwing verifier is treated as a failed verification, never as a pass.
-    _internalLogger.logger.error(`[OTA] Signature verifier threw: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
+  }
+  if (sawThrow && !sawCompletion) {
     return {
       ok: false,
       reason: 'verifier_threw'
     };
   }
+  _internalLogger.logger.error(keys.length > 1 ? `[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID under all ${keys.length} pinned keys — refusing to stage.` : '[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID — refusing to stage.');
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    reason: 'invalid_signature'
+  };
 }
 
 /** Test seam — resets the once-per-process "not configured" warning. */

package/lib/commonjs/metro/serializerCompose.js

@@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ function discoverArtifacts(packageRoot) {
   return out;
 }
 
+/** One-shot guard so an Expo build does not print the pass-through notice per bundle. */
+let warnedUnknownShape = false;
+
 /**
  * Build the composing serializer. `hostSerializer` is the app's own customSerializer, if any.
  */
@@ -94,6 +97,35 @@ function createComposingSerializer(artifacts, internals, hostSerializer) {
       const hostResult = await hostSerializer(entryPoint, preModules, graph, options);
       if (typeof hostResult === 'string') {
         code = hostResult;
+      } else if (hostResult && typeof hostResult.code !== 'string') {
+        /**
+         * A shape this wrapper does not understand — pass it back UNTOUCHED.
+         *
+         * Expo is the case that matters. `expo/metro-config` installs a
+         * serializer returning `{ artifacts: [...] }`, a multi-artifact
+         * shape with no top-level `code`. Reading `.code` off it yielded
+         * undefined, and returning `{ code: undefined, map }` made every
+         * `expo export:embed` die with:
+         *
+         *   Serializer did not return expected format. The project copy
+         *   of `expo/metro-config` may be out of date.
+         *
+         * — a message that sends you to upgrade Expo, which is not the
+         * problem. The result: `withScaleBun` broke PRODUCTION BUNDLING
+         * FOR EVERY EXPO APP, and the SDK's own marketing test app could
+         * not build. Found by bundling it.
+         *
+         * Passing it through costs ScaleBun's source-map composition on
+         * Expo (OTA stack traces stay mapped to the bundle rather than to
+         * original sources). That is a real loss and strictly better than
+         * a build that cannot run at all. Composing INTO an artifact
+         * array is the follow-up; it must not be guessed at here.
+         */
+        if (!warnedUnknownShape) {
+          warnedUnknownShape = true;
+          console.warn('[ScaleBun/metro] The host serializer returned a shape this SDK does not ' + 'compose (Expo returns { artifacts }). Passing it through unchanged — ' + 'the build is correct, but ScaleBun source-map composition is skipped.');
+        }
+        return hostResult;
       } else {
         code = hostResult.code;
         try {

package/lib/commonjs/public/ScaleBunFacade.js

@@ -215,12 +215,17 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
   /**
    * Boot the OTA orchestrator when the init config asks for it.
    *
-   * `publicSigningKey` is honoured here so signature enforcement is reachable
-   * from configuration alone. The SDK ships no ed25519 implementation, so a
-   * host that pins a key must also supply `ota.verifySignature`; pinning a key
-   * without a verifier is fail-CLOSED by design (signature.ts) — an update
-   * that cannot be verified is not installed. We say that out loud rather than
-   * letting the app discover it as a silent no-update condition.
+   * `publicSigningKey` / `publicSigningKeys` are honoured here so signature
+   * enforcement is reachable from configuration alone. The list form exists
+   * for key ROTATION: a build pinning [old, new] keeps verifying while the
+   * server moves to the new key, so replacing a key never needs an emergency
+   * store release. Both fields merge (deduplicated) into one pinned set.
+   *
+   * Verification comes from `ota.verifySignature` when supplied, else the
+   * built-in @noble-based verifier (optional peers). Pinning keys with
+   * NEITHER available is fail-CLOSED by design (signature.ts) — an update
+   * that cannot be verified is not installed. We say that out loud rather
+   * than letting the app discover it as a silent no-update condition.
    */
   _maybeStartOta(rawConfig) {
     const ota = rawConfig?.ota;
@@ -232,15 +237,34 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
       const {
         otaOrchestrator
       } = require('../features/ota/OtaOrchestrator');
-      const publicKey = ota.publicSigningKey;
+      const rawSingle = ota.publicSigningKey;
+      const rawList = ota.publicSigningKeys;
+      const publicKeys = Array.from(new Set([...(typeof rawSingle === 'string' && rawSingle ? [rawSingle] : []), ...(Array.isArray(rawList) ? rawList : [])].filter(k => typeof k === 'string' && k.trim().length > 0)));
+      // Signing was REQUESTED if a usable key exists, or the host passed a
+      // keys array at all — an empty one included. `publicSigningKeys: []`
+      // is a broken attempt to enable signing, and it must flow through to
+      // signature.ts's fail-closed handling, not silently disable signing.
+      const signingRequested = publicKeys.length > 0 || Array.isArray(rawList);
       const verifier = ota.verifySignature;
-      if (publicKey && typeof verifier !== 'function') {
-        _internalLogger.logger.warn('[ScaleBun] ota.publicSigningKey is set but ota.verifySignature is not a function. ' + 'Signature checking is fail-closed: updates will be REJECTED until a verifier is supplied.');
+      if (signingRequested && typeof verifier !== 'function') {
+        // A host verifier is optional since the built-in one landed — the
+        // old unconditional warning here told every correctly-configured
+        // app that its updates would be rejected. Warn only when neither
+        // verifier can actually be resolved.
+        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-var-requires
+        const {
+          getBuiltinVerifier
+        } = require('../features/ota/crypto/builtinVerifier');
+        if (!getBuiltinVerifier()) {
+          _internalLogger.logger.warn('[ScaleBun] A signing key is pinned but no signature verifier is available. ' + 'Signature checking is fail-closed: updates will be REJECTED until one exists. ' + 'Install the optional peers `@noble/ed25519` + `@noble/hashes` (no further ' + 'code needed), or supply `ota.verifySignature`.');
+        }
       }
       otaOrchestrator.init({
-        ...(publicKey ? {
+        ...(signingRequested ? {
           signature: {
-            publicKey,
+            // Single key stays a plain string — the shape every
+            // existing consumer and test already handles.
+            publicKey: publicKeys.length === 1 ? publicKeys[0] : publicKeys,
             verifier
           }
         } : {}),
@@ -477,6 +501,45 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
   }
 
   /** Convenience: emit a Phase 1 purchase event (revenue + currency + transaction_id). */
+  /**
+   * Declare which UI state the user is looking at, so taps are attributed to the surface they
+   * happened on rather than averaged across every variant of the screen.
+   *
+   *     ScaleBun.setUiState('filter-sheet', 'open');
+   *     ScaleBun.setUiState('checkout-step', 'payment');
+   *
+   * Call it when the state CHANGES — the value is read at tap time, so it only has to be right by
+   * the time the next tap lands. On React Native this is the ONLY source of UI state: unlike the web,
+   * there is no queryable accessibility tree that says a sheet is up, and guessing would produce a
+   * state key that is right on some apps and silently wrong on others.
+   *
+   * Names and values are identifiers, not content: they become query keys in the dashboard, so a
+   * person's name or a cart total does not belong in one. `;`, `:` and `|` are stripped and both
+   * halves are capped at 32 characters.
+   */
+  setUiState(name, value) {
+    try {
+      const {
+        setUiState
+      } = require('../features/journey/uiState');
+      setUiState(name, value);
+    } catch {/* no-throw: a state declaration must never break the host */}
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Stop reporting a UI state dimension — or, with no argument, all of them.
+   *
+   * Clear on screen unmount. A declaration left behind follows the user onto a surface where it means
+   * nothing, and every tap there is filed under a state that was not on screen.
+   */
+  clearUiState(name) {
+    try {
+      const {
+        clearUiState
+      } = require('../features/journey/uiState');
+      clearUiState(name);
+    } catch {/* no-throw */}
+  }
   trackPurchase(input) {
     (0, _crashSafe.noThrow)(() => this._eventTracker?.trackPurchase(input));
   }

package/lib/module/core/config/schema.js

@@ -289,6 +289,14 @@ const SHAPE = {
         kind: 'str',
         opt: true
       },
+      // Rotation support: several pinned keys, any of which may verify a
+      // bundle. Ship a build pinning [old, new], re-sign server-side with
+      // new, drop old next release — no emergency store submission when a
+      // key must be replaced. Merged with publicSigningKey by the facade.
+      publicSigningKeys: {
+        kind: 'strArr',
+        opt: true
+      },
       mandatoryBlocksUi: bool(false)
     }
   }
@@ -328,7 +336,7 @@ function parseField(field, input, path, issues) {
       present: true
     };
     // Required with no default (matches the base schemas' type errors on undefined).
-    return fail(field.kind === 'bool' ? 'Expected boolean, received undefined' : field.kind === 'num' ? 'Expected number, received undefined' : field.kind === 'str' ? 'Expected string, received undefined' : field.kind === 'enum' ? "Invalid enum value. Expected " + field.values.map(v => `'${v}'`).join(' | ') : 'Expected object, received undefined');
+    return fail(field.kind === 'bool' ? 'Expected boolean, received undefined' : field.kind === 'num' ? 'Expected number, received undefined' : field.kind === 'str' ? 'Expected string, received undefined' : field.kind === 'strArr' ? 'Expected array, received undefined' : field.kind === 'enum' ? "Invalid enum value. Expected " + field.values.map(v => `'${v}'`).join(' | ') : 'Expected object, received undefined');
   }
   switch (field.kind) {
     case 'any':
@@ -354,6 +362,31 @@ function parseField(field, input, path, issues) {
         value: input,
         present: true
       };
+    case 'strArr':
+      {
+        // Mirrors the vendored ArraySchema exactly: element failures are
+        // reported at their index and fail the whole field (no partial
+        // arrays reach the output).
+        if (!Array.isArray(input)) return fail(`Expected array, received ${typeofName(input)}`);
+        let allOk = true;
+        for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++) {
+          if (typeof input[i] !== 'string') {
+            issues.push({
+              path: [...path, i],
+              message: `Expected string, received ${typeofName(input[i])}`
+            });
+            allOk = false;
+          }
+        }
+        return allOk ? {
+          ok: true,
+          value: [...input],
+          present: true
+        } : {
+          ok: false,
+          present: true
+        };
+      }
     case 'num':
       if (typeof input !== 'number' || Number.isNaN(input)) {
         return fail(`Expected number, received ${typeofName(input)}`);

package/lib/module/core/constants/version.js

@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
  * can attribute telemetry to the SDK build that produced it.
  * Keep in sync with package.json "version".
  */
-export const SDK_VERSION = '1.10.6';
+export const SDK_VERSION = '1.10.7';
 //# sourceMappingURL=version.js.map

package/lib/module/features/journey/ScaleBunDebugRoot.js

@@ -496,9 +496,33 @@ export function ScaleBunDebugRoot({
           } = require('../navigation/AutoScreenDetector');
           screen = AutoScreenDetector.getInstance().getCurrentScreen() || undefined;
         } catch {/* no-throw */}
+        /**
+         * UI STATE, read HERE and not later.
+         *
+         * A tap belongs to the surface that was on screen when the finger landed: tapping the
+         * filter button while the sheet is DOWN belongs to `closed`, because that is what the
+         * user was looking at when they reached for it. Reading it after the handler has run
+         * moves every "open the thing" tap into the state it created — the one state it
+         * certainly does not belong to.
+         *
+         * Declared-only on this platform (see uiState.ts): absent means not captured, which
+         * the dashboard keeps distinct from "nothing was open".
+         */
+        let ui;
+        try {
+          const {
+            uiStateSignature
+          } = require('./uiState');
+          ui = uiStateSignature();
+        } catch {/* no-throw: a tap must never be lost to state capture */}
         emitAutomaticEvent('element_interacted', {
           gesture_type: gestureType,
           screen_name: screen,
+          /* THIS MAP ENUMERATES. A field added to the payload and forgotten here reaches the
+             backend as undefined with no error anywhere — the recurring defect class in this
+             codebase. `ui` is the key the grid aggregate reads for state, byte-identical to
+             the web SDK's, so one dashboard control queries both platforms. */
+          ui,
           // testID/nativeID is an author-controlled stable identifier.
           // Accessibility labels and rendered text are deliberately omitted.
           target_id: targetInfo?.testId,

package/lib/module/features/journey/uiState.js

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/**
+ * UI STATE AT INTERACTION TIME — React Native.
+ *
+ * A screen is not just `Cart`. It is `Cart` with the filter sheet down, or up; with the address form
+ * expanded, or collapsed. Those are different interaction surfaces and a tap on one must never be
+ * counted on another — heat from the open sheet painted over the closed layout is a picture of
+ * something that never existed.
+ *
+ * HOW THIS DIFFERS FROM THE WEB, and the difference is not an omission:
+ *
+ *   The web SDK ALSO detects state automatically, by reading `aria-expanded` and open `<dialog>`
+ *   elements out of the live DOM. Those are platform-defined, so reading them is a measurement.
+ *
+ *   React Native has no equivalent. There is no queryable tree of accessibility state that says a
+ *   bottom sheet is up; a sheet is a component with a boolean in someone's store, and the only place
+ *   that boolean exists is the host's own code. Guessing at it — from a modal's presence in the tree, or
+ *   from a component name — would produce a state key that is right on some apps and silently wrong on
+ *   others, and a wrong state key partitions taps into buckets corresponding to nothing.
+ *
+ * So on RN, state is DECLARED and never inferred. `ScaleBun.setUiState('filter-sheet', 'open')` is the
+ * whole mechanism, and its absence means "not captured" rather than "nothing was open". That
+ * distinction is carried all the way to the dashboard: a tap with no declared state is NULL, not '',
+ * and cannot be selected as a state or counted as one. Reporting it as "nothing was open" would be
+ * asserting a measurement nobody took.
+ *
+ * PAIRED WITH: whatzbug-web-sdk/packages/web/src/features/journey/uiState.ts — same wire format
+ * (`name:value` pairs, sorted, `;`-joined, <= 96 chars), same separator stripping, same explicit-wins
+ * precedence, so one dashboard control queries both platforms.
+ */
+
+/** Host-declared state dimensions. The only source on this platform. */
+const declared = new Map();
+
+/**
+ * `;` and `:` are the wire separators and cannot appear inside a name or value; the length is bounded.
+ *
+ * Names and values are IDENTIFIERS, not content. They become aggregation keys in the dashboard, so a
+ * value carrying a person's name or a cart total would put user data into a query key — and into every
+ * chart legend built from it.
+ */
+const clean = s => typeof s === 'string' ? s.replace(/[;:|]/g, '').trim().slice(0, 32) : '';
+
+/**
+ * Declare the state of one UI dimension.
+ *
+ * Call it when the state CHANGES, not on every render: the value is read at interaction time, so it
+ * only has to be correct by the time the next tap lands.
+ */
+export function setUiState(name, value) {
+  const n = clean(name);
+  const v = clean(value);
+  if (n && v) declared.set(n, v);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Stop reporting a dimension — or, with no name, all of them.
+ *
+ * Later taps carry no value for it, which is not the same as carrying a value. Clearing all is what a
+ * screen unmount wants: declarations from the previous screen would otherwise follow the user onto a
+ * surface where they mean nothing, and every tap there would be filed under a state that was not on
+ * screen.
+ */
+export function clearUiState(name) {
+  if (name === undefined) declared.clear();else declared.delete(clean(name));
+}
+
+/**
+ * The signature for the interaction happening RIGHT NOW, or undefined when nothing is declared.
+ *
+ * undefined rather than '' deliberately — see the header. '' is the web's "we looked and nothing was
+ * open"; on RN there is nothing to look at, so the honest answer is silence.
+ */
+export function uiStateSignature() {
+  if (!declared.size) return undefined;
+  /* SORTED, or the same surface produces different signatures depending on the order the host happened
+     to declare things in, and every count fragments into several that mean nothing. */
+  return [...declared.keys()].sort().map(k => `${k}:${declared.get(k)}`).join(';').slice(0, 96);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=uiState.js.map