@rise-maritime/keelson-js 0.6.0-alpha.282.dev.2 → 0.6.0-alpha.307.dev.2

package/dist/interfaces/OperationalAuthority.d.ts

@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
-import { BinaryReader, BinaryWriter } from "@bufbuild/protobuf/wire";
-export declare const protobufPackage = "keelson";
-/**
- * The vessel's own view of how much operating authority it can currently
- * justify. Distinct from command_authority (who holds the conn) and
- * roc_status (intent) — this is the vessel's veto on accepting remote
- * control, and it is therefore computed on the vessel.
- *
- * The determination has two independent halves, and they are reported
- * separately on purpose:
- *
- *   composite_score  how healthy the monitored fleet is, in aggregate.
- *                    Compensatory: healthy components offset unhealthy ones.
- *
- *   authority_score  what the vessel is actually permitted to claim.
- *                    Non-compensatory: an unsatisfied safety prerequisite
- *                    caps this outright, and no amount of healthy unrelated
- *                    equipment can buy the cap back.
- *
- * The two legitimately disagree. One hard-down essential component out of
- * twelve leaves composite_score at 0.917 while authority_score is 0.0 — the
- * fleet really is mostly healthy, and the vessel really may not accept remote
- * control. Consumers deciding whether to grant control MUST read `level` (or
- * authority_score), never composite_score.
- */
-export interface OperationalAuthority {
-    /** The source timestamp of the authority determination */
-    timestamp: Date | undefined;
-    /**
-     * The maximum authority level currently permitted. This is the field a
-     * consumer acts on.
-     */
-    level: OperationalAuthority_AuthorityLevel;
-    /**
-     * Aggregate health, evidence-adjusted and UNCAPPED by essential
-     * constraints (0.0 = all failed, 1.0 = all healthy).
-     *
-     * Each source contributes score(level) * coverage_fraction, and the
-     * composite is their mean — one vote per source, so the number of
-     * diagnostic subjects a source happens to publish is not a safety weight.
-     * Deliberately left uncapped: overwriting it when an essential component
-     * fails would falsely report that all monitored health had failed.
-     *
-     * `optional` because not every policy publishing on this subject scores:
-     * a policy that derives `level` from claim standings rather than from a
-     * score (see the warrant_aggregator connector) publishes no
-     * composite_score at all, and its absence must be distinguishable from
-     * 0.0, which asserts that all monitored health failed.
-     */
-    compositeScore?: number | undefined;
-    /**
-     * Human-readable explanation. For operators and logs only — consumers
-     * MUST NOT parse this. Everything it says is available structurally in
-     * source_assessments and active_constraints.
-     */
-    reason: string;
-    /**
-     * Per-source effective scores (key = source id, value = 0.0-1.0), i.e.
-     * health already multiplied by coverage. Sources excluded from the
-     * composite do not appear.
-     */
-    componentScores: {
-        [key: string]: number;
-    };
-    /**
-     * composite_score after every active authority ceiling has been applied;
-     * this is what `level` is derived from.
-     *
-     * Absent when no valid determination could be made (see
-     * AUTHORITY_LEVEL_UNKNOWN). `optional` matters here: 0.0 is a perfectly
-     * ordinary value meaning "all stop", and must be distinguishable from
-     * "not determined".
-     */
-    authorityScore?: number | undefined;
-    /**
-     * Per-source arithmetic, so an auditor can reconstruct the decision
-     * without parsing `reason`.
-     */
-    sourceAssessments: OperationalAuthority_SourceAssessment[];
-    /**
-     * Every ceiling currently limiting authority, and why. Empty when nothing
-     * is capping the vessel.
-     */
-    activeConstraints: OperationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint[];
-    /**
-     * Identifies the policy that produced this determination, so a recorded
-     * message can be replayed against the rules that were actually in force.
-     */
-    policyId?: string | undefined;
-    policyConfigDigest?: Uint8Array | undefined;
-}
-export declare enum OperationalAuthority_AuthorityLevel {
-    /**
-     * AUTHORITY_LEVEL_UNKNOWN - No valid determination could be made — not a determination that the
-     * minimum is permissible. Raised when an essential requirement is not
-     * even advertised, so the monitor cannot tell whether it is satisfied.
-     * Consumers MUST treat this as non-authorizing, exactly like
-     * MINIMAL_SAFE_MODE, and MUST NOT treat it as "no constraints known".
-     */
-    AUTHORITY_LEVEL_UNKNOWN = 0,
-    AUTHORITY_LEVEL_MINIMAL_SAFE_MODE = 1,
-    AUTHORITY_LEVEL_SUPERVISED_REMOTE = 2,
-    AUTHORITY_LEVEL_REMOTE_CONTROLLED = 3,
-    AUTHORITY_LEVEL_ASSISTED_AUTONOMOUS = 4,
-    AUTHORITY_LEVEL_FULL_AUTONOMOUS = 5,
-    UNRECOGNIZED = -1
-}
-export declare function operationalAuthority_AuthorityLevelFromJSON(object: any): OperationalAuthority_AuthorityLevel;
-export declare function operationalAuthority_AuthorityLevelToJSON(object: OperationalAuthority_AuthorityLevel): string;
-export interface OperationalAuthority_ComponentScoresEntry {
-    key: string;
-    value: number;
-}
-/**
- * One source's contribution to composite_score, with the arithmetic left
- * visible: effective_score = health_score * coverage_fraction.
- *
- * Keeping all three distinguishes 0.5 "half the subsystems are degraded" from
- * 0.5 "everything we could see was fine, and we could see half of it" — which
- * the composite alone cannot express.
- */
-export interface OperationalAuthority_SourceAssessment {
-    sourceId: string;
-    /** score(source.level) before the coverage discount. */
-    healthScore?: number | undefined;
-    /**
-     * assessed_subject_count / eligible_subject_count. The proportion of
-     * watched subjects that reached a determinate verdict — NOT a calibrated
-     * confidence, and NOT IEC 61508 diagnostic coverage.
-     *
-     * A known failure counts as assessed: CRITICAL and INACTIVE already score
-     * zero and do not reduce coverage. Only "we learned nothing" does.
-     */
-    coverageFraction?: number | undefined;
-    /** health_score * coverage_fraction — what actually enters the mean. */
-    effectiveScore?: number | undefined;
-    /**
-     * Denominator: watched subjects that could in principle be assessed.
-     * Subjects this source does not advertise are excluded, since those are
-     * facts about the monitor's config rather than about the vessel.
-     */
-    eligibleSubjectCount: number;
-    assessedSubjectCount: number;
-    /**
-     * Named so an operator can act. Subjects that reached no verdict, and
-     * subjects the source never claimed (typically a config typo).
-     */
-    unassessedSubjects: string[];
-    notAdvertisedSubjects: string[];
-    /**
-     * Whether this source carries an essential requirement, and the ceiling
-     * it currently imposes if so.
-     */
-    essential: boolean;
-    authorityCap?: number | undefined;
-}
-/**
- * A prerequisite that is limiting authority. Non-compensatory: this ceiling
- * applies regardless of how healthy everything else is.
- */
-export interface OperationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint {
-    /** The source carrying the requirement. */
-    componentId: string;
-    /** The ceiling this constraint imposes. */
-    capLevel: OperationalAuthority_AuthorityLevel;
-    capScore?: number | undefined;
-    cause: OperationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint_Cause;
-    /**
-     * Set when the requirement is one subject rather than the whole source —
-     * a GNSS source's position fix may be essential while its ancillary
-     * diagnostics are not.
-     */
-    subjectId?: string | undefined;
-}
-export declare enum OperationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint_Cause {
-    CAUSE_UNSPECIFIED = 0,
-    CAUSE_DEGRADED = 1,
-    CAUSE_CRITICAL = 2,
-    CAUSE_INACTIVE = 3,
-    /**
-     * CAUSE_UNKNOWN - No evidence either way. Capped because absence of evidence is not
-     * evidence of health for a component something depends on.
-     */
-    CAUSE_UNKNOWN = 4,
-    /**
-     * CAUSE_NOT_ADVERTISED - Expected but never advertised — the monitor cannot tell whether the
-     * requirement is met, so no valid determination exists.
-     */
-    CAUSE_NOT_ADVERTISED = 5,
-    CAUSE_CONFIGURATION_INVALID = 6,
-    UNRECOGNIZED = -1
-}
-export declare function operationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint_CauseFromJSON(object: any): OperationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint_Cause;
-export declare function operationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint_CauseToJSON(object: OperationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint_Cause): string;
-export declare const OperationalAuthority: MessageFns<OperationalAuthority>;
-export declare const OperationalAuthority_ComponentScoresEntry: MessageFns<OperationalAuthority_ComponentScoresEntry>;
-export declare const OperationalAuthority_SourceAssessment: MessageFns<OperationalAuthority_SourceAssessment>;
-export declare const OperationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint: MessageFns<OperationalAuthority_AuthorityConstraint>;
-type Builtin = Date | Function | Uint8Array | string | number | boolean | undefined;
-export type DeepPartial<T> = T extends Builtin ? T : T extends globalThis.Array<infer U> ? globalThis.Array<DeepPartial<U>> : T extends ReadonlyArray<infer U> ? ReadonlyArray<DeepPartial<U>> : T extends {} ? {
-    [K in keyof T]?: DeepPartial<T[K]>;
-} : Partial<T>;
-type KeysOfUnion<T> = T extends T ? keyof T : never;
-export type Exact<P, I extends P> = P extends Builtin ? P : P & {
-    [K in keyof P]: Exact<P[K], I[K]>;
-} & {
-    [K in Exclude<keyof I, KeysOfUnion<P>>]: never;
-};
-export interface MessageFns<T> {
-    encode(message: T, writer?: BinaryWriter): BinaryWriter;
-    decode(input: BinaryReader | Uint8Array, length?: number): T;
-    fromJSON(object: any): T;
-    toJSON(message: T): unknown;
-    create<I extends Exact<DeepPartial<T>, I>>(base?: I): T;
-    fromPartial<I extends Exact<DeepPartial<T>, I>>(object: I): T;
-}
-export {};