@rebasepro/server-postgres 0.17.3-canary.gdd23447 → 0.18.0

package/src/security/policy-drift.ts

@@ -1,473 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Compare the RLS policies a database actually has against the ones the
- * collections describe.
- *
- * Policies live in Postgres; the collection config is only their *source*.
- * Nothing reconciled the two, which is how the demo database served empty
- * collections indefinitely: its policies granted `TO authenticated` (a Supabase
- * role name) while requests run as `rebase_user`, so RLS filtered every row.
- * The config was later corrected and the database never noticed — an empty
- * table is indistinguishable from a table with no data.
- *
- * Expected policies are parsed from `generatePostgresPoliciesDdl`, the same
- * function `db push` uses to write `drizzle/policies.sql`, so this compares
- * against exactly what would be applied rather than a reimplementation.
- */
-import { RLS_UID_SQL, type CollectionConfig } from "@rebasepro/types";
-
-import { generatePostgresPoliciesDdl } from "../schema/generate-postgres-ddl-logic";
-
-export interface PolicyRef {
-    schema: string;
-    table: string;
-    name: string;
-    /** Roles in the TO clause. */
-    roles: string[];
-    /** SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE / ALL. */
-    command: string;
-    /** Whether a USING clause is present at all (not what it says). */
-    hasUsing: boolean;
-    /** Whether a WITH CHECK clause is present at all (not what it says). */
-    hasWithCheck: boolean;
-    /**
-     * PERMISSIVE or RESTRICTIVE — the `AS` clause.
-     *
-     * An exact catalogue value on both sides, so it belongs with roles and
-     * command rather than with the expression text. It matters more than either:
-     * permissive policies are ORed together and restrictive ones ANDed, so a rule
-     * declared `mode: "restrictive"` whose live policy is PERMISSIVE has had its
-     * gate turned from a requirement into an alternative — the maximally
-     * permissive way for this to be wrong.
-     *
-     * The DDL regex captured this from the start and the destructuring threw it
-     * away; `pg_policies.permissive` was never selected.
-     */
-    mode?: "PERMISSIVE" | "RESTRICTIVE";
-    /**
-     * The live clause text, when read from `pg_policies`. Present only for live
-     * policies (the expected side is parsed from DDL and does not carry it).
-     * Used solely for the insecure-tautology scan, not for divergence — Postgres
-     * rewrites this text, so it is not safe to diff against expected.
-     */
-    qual?: string | null;
-    withCheck?: string | null;
-}
-
-export interface PolicyDrift {
-    /** Described by the collections, absent from the database. */
-    missing: PolicyRef[];
-    /** In the database, described by no collection — stale pushes live here. */
-    orphaned: PolicyRef[];
-    /** Same policy name, different roles or command. */
-    diverged: { expected: PolicyRef; actual: PolicyRef; differences: string[] }[];
-    /**
-     * A live policy whose expression is the known-permissive tautology
-     * `rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL` — true for anonymous visitors too, because the
-     * user path coerces a blank id to the `'anonymous'` sentinel. This is what
-     * `policy.authenticated()` used to compile to, so a database pushed before
-     * that fix carries it, and neither the name, roles, command nor clause
-     * *presence* differs from the corrected policy — the only thing that changed
-     * is the expression text, which this checker otherwise (correctly) ignores.
-     * So it is the one drift that hides from every other check here.
-     *
-     * @see reason  a sentence naming the clause and what to do.
-     */
-    insecure: { policy: PolicyRef; reason: string }[];
-    /**
-     * A table the collections describe whose RLS switch is off.
-     *
-     * `ALTER TABLE posts DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` leaves every row in
-     * `pg_policies` untouched, so before this category every expected policy
-     * still matched on name, roles, command and clause presence and the checker
-     * reported clean — on a table Postgres was applying no filter to at all.
-     * Requests run as `rebase_user`, which holds full DML, so the table is wide
-     * open while `doctor` certifies it.
-     *
-     * `forced` reports `relforcerowsecurity`, which is what also subjects the
-     * table's *owner* to its policies. Its absence is not drift on its own —
-     * Rebase does not connect as the owner in the request path — so it is
-     * reported for context rather than raised as a failure.
-     */
-    rlsDisabled: { schema: string; table: string; forced: boolean }[];
-}
-
-export interface Queryable {
-    query<R>(text: string, values?: unknown[]): Promise<{ rows: R[] }>;
-}
-
-// The trailing group captures whichever clause follows the TO list, which is
-// what tells us the clause is present.
-const CREATE_POLICY = /CREATE POLICY "([^"]+)" ON "([^"]+)"\."([^"]+)"\s+AS (\w+)\s+FOR (\w+)\s+TO ([^\n]+?)(\s+USING\s*\(|\s+WITH CHECK\s*\(|;)/gi;
-
-const WITH_CHECK_NEXT = /^\s+WITH CHECK\s*\(/i;
-
-/**
- * Index just past the `)` closing a clause whose `(` ends at `open`.
- *
- * Needed because a policy expression nests parens and can contain a quoted
- * literal holding either character, so "find the next `)`" would stop early and
- * miss the `WITH CHECK` that follows.
- */
-function clauseEnd(ddl: string, open: number): number {
-    let depth = 1;
-    let inQuote = false;
-    for (let i = open; i < ddl.length; i++) {
-        const c = ddl[i];
-        if (inQuote) {
-            // '' is an escaped quote inside a string, not a close.
-            if (c === "'") {
-                if (ddl[i + 1] === "'") i++;
-                else inQuote = false;
-            }
-            continue;
-        }
-        if (c === "'") inQuote = true;
-        else if (c === "(") depth++;
-        else if (c === ")" && --depth === 0) return i + 1;
-    }
-    return ddl.length;
-}
-
-/**
- * `AS PERMISSIVE` / `AS RESTRICTIVE` from either side, or undefined.
- *
- * The DDL spells it as a bare word; `pg_policies.permissive` is the string
- * `"PERMISSIVE"`/`"RESTRICTIVE"` on modern Postgres but a boolean on some
- * drivers and older servers, so both are accepted. Anything unrecognised
- * becomes `undefined` and the comparison below skips it rather than inventing
- * drift from a shape we did not anticipate.
- */
-function normalizeMode(raw: unknown): "PERMISSIVE" | "RESTRICTIVE" | undefined {
-    if (typeof raw === "boolean") return raw ? "PERMISSIVE" : "RESTRICTIVE";
-    if (typeof raw !== "string") return undefined;
-    const upper = raw.trim().toUpperCase();
-    if (upper === "PERMISSIVE" || upper === "TRUE" || upper === "T") return "PERMISSIVE";
-    if (upper === "RESTRICTIVE" || upper === "FALSE" || upper === "F") return "RESTRICTIVE";
-    return undefined;
-}
-
-/** Parse the generated DDL rather than rebuilding the shape by hand. */
-export function parseExpectedPolicies(ddl: string): PolicyRef[] {
-    const found: PolicyRef[] = [];
-    for (const m of ddl.matchAll(CREATE_POLICY)) {
-        const [, name, schema, table, modeRaw, command, rolesRaw, clause] = m;
-        const roles = rolesRaw
-            .split(",")
-            .map((r) => r.trim().replace(/^"|"$/g, ""))
-            .filter(Boolean);
-
-        // The generator emits USING before WITH CHECK, so what follows the TO
-        // list settles USING; WITH CHECK is then whatever follows that clause.
-        const hasUsing = /USING/i.test(clause);
-        const hasWithCheck = hasUsing
-            ? WITH_CHECK_NEXT.test(ddl.slice(clauseEnd(ddl, m.index + m[0].length)))
-            : /WITH CHECK/i.test(clause);
-
-        found.push({
-            schema, table, name, roles,
-            command: command.toUpperCase(),
-            hasUsing, hasWithCheck,
-            mode: normalizeMode(modeRaw)
-        });
-    }
-    return found;
-}
-
-async function readLivePolicies(client: Queryable, schemas: string[]): Promise<PolicyRef[]> {
-    const { rows } = await client.query<{
-        schemaname: string; tablename: string; policyname: string; roles: string[] | string; cmd: string;
-        qual: string | null; with_check: string | null; permissive: string | boolean | null;
-    }>(
-        `SELECT schemaname, tablename, policyname, roles, cmd, qual, with_check, permissive
-         FROM pg_policies
-         WHERE schemaname = ANY($1)`,
-        [schemas]
-    );
-
-    return rows.map((r) => ({
-        schema: r.schemaname,
-        table: r.tablename,
-        name: r.policyname,
-        // node-postgres yields text[] as an array; some drivers hand back "{a,b}".
-        roles: Array.isArray(r.roles)
-            ? r.roles
-            : String(r.roles ?? "").replace(/^\{|\}$/g, "").split(",").filter(Boolean),
-        command: (r.cmd ?? "ALL").toUpperCase(),
-        // Presence only. Postgres rewrites the text, but it does not invent or
-        // drop a clause: NULL here means the policy genuinely has none.
-        hasUsing: r.qual != null,
-        hasWithCheck: r.with_check != null,
-        mode: normalizeMode(r.permissive),
-        qual: r.qual,
-        withCheck: r.with_check
-    }));
-}
-
-/**
- * Tables the collections describe whose RLS switch is off.
- *
- * Read from `pg_class` because `pg_policies` cannot answer it: disabling RLS
- * leaves the policy rows in place, so every other comparison in this file keeps
- * matching while Postgres applies none of them.
- *
- * Only tables that expect at least one policy are considered. A table with no
- * declared rules is not asserting anything about RLS, and reporting it would
- * make the check noisy on exactly the projects least able to judge the noise.
- */
-async function readTablesWithRlsOff(
-    client: Queryable,
-    tables: { schema: string; table: string }[]
-): Promise<{ schema: string; table: string; forced: boolean }[]> {
-    if (tables.length === 0) return [];
-    const { rows } = await client.query<{
-        schemaname: string; tablename: string; relrowsecurity: boolean; relforcerowsecurity: boolean;
-    }>(
-        `SELECT n.nspname AS schemaname,
-                c.relname AS tablename,
-                c.relrowsecurity,
-                c.relforcerowsecurity
-           FROM pg_class c
-           JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
-          WHERE c.relkind = 'r'
-            AND (n.nspname || '.' || c.relname) = ANY($1)`,
-        [tables.map((t) => `${t.schema}.${t.table}`)]
-    );
-
-    return rows
-        .filter((r) => !r.relrowsecurity)
-        .map((r) => ({
-            schema: r.schemaname,
-            table: r.tablename,
-            forced: !!r.relforcerowsecurity
-        }));
-}
-
-/**
- * The permissive tautology `rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL`, without the
- * `<> 'anonymous'` guard that makes it mean "signed in".
- *
- * Whitespace varies with Postgres's rewrite, so match on a collapsed form. The
- * guard clause (`<> 'anonymous'`, in any spelling) is what distinguishes the
- * corrected policy from the stale one, so its presence clears the text.
- *
- * Both schema spellings are matched. The helpers moved from `auth` to `rebase`
- * in 1.0, and this check reads policies *as the database stored them*: a
- * database pushed before the move still holds `auth.uid()` until it is
- * recompiled, while everything written since — including raw `securityRules`
- * SQL, which the compiler rewrites on the way in — stores `rebase.uid()`.
- * Matching only the pre-1.0 name made the check blind to every policy a current
- * release could write, which is precisely the set still worth scanning.
- */
-function isPermissiveAuthTautology(clause: string | null | undefined): boolean {
-    if (!clause) return false;
-    const flat = clause.toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, " ");
-    if (!/\b(?:rebase|auth)\.uid\s*\(\s*\)\s*is not null/.test(flat)) return false;
-    // The fix appends `AND rebase.uid() <> 'anonymous'`; Postgres may store the
-    // literal as `'anonymous'::text`. Either spelling means it is the corrected
-    // policy, not the tautology.
-    return !/<>\s*'anonymous'/.test(flat) && !/!=\s*'anonymous'/.test(flat);
-}
-
-const keyOf = (p: PolicyRef) => `${p.schema}.${p.table}.${p.name}`;
-const sameRoles = (a: string[], b: string[]) =>
-    a.length === b.length && [...a].sort().join(",") === [...b].sort().join(",");
-
-/**
- * Diff expected against live.
- *
- * Compares names, roles, command, and whether each clause exists — all exact
- * values. Policy expression *text* is deliberately not compared: Postgres
- * rewrites `qual`/`with_check` when storing them (parenthesising, casting,
- * schema-qualifying), so text comparison reports drift that does not exist, and
- * a check that cries wolf gets ignored.
- *
- * Presence is not text, though. A NULL `qual` is not a rewrite of an
- * expression, it is the absence of one, and absence has no false-positive risk:
- * either the generator emitted a clause or it did not. That distinction is worth
- * the extra comparison — a production database was found with a SELECT policy
- * whose `qual` was NULL, matching on every field this checked and denying 100%
- * of reads. The same blindness would hide a policy that fails open.
- */
-export async function checkPolicyDrift(
-    client: Queryable,
-    collections: CollectionConfig[]
-): Promise<PolicyDrift> {
-    const expected = parseExpectedPolicies(generatePostgresPoliciesDdl(collections));
-    const schemas = [...new Set(expected.map((p) => p.schema))];
-    // Nothing expected means nothing to reconcile against; scanning every
-    // schema would report the whole database as orphaned.
-    if (schemas.length === 0) return { missing: [], orphaned: [], diverged: [], insecure: [], rlsDisabled: [] };
-
-    const live = await readLivePolicies(client, schemas);
-    const liveByKey = new Map(live.map((p) => [keyOf(p), p]));
-    const expectedByKey = new Map(expected.map((p) => [keyOf(p), p]));
-
-    const drift: PolicyDrift = { missing: [], orphaned: [], diverged: [], insecure: [], rlsDisabled: [] };
-
-    // Before comparing policy against policy: is the switch even on? A table
-    // with RLS disabled matches every expected policy on every field compared
-    // below, so this has to be asked separately or it cannot be asked at all.
-    const expectedTables = [...new Map(
-        expected.map((p) => [`${p.schema}.${p.table}`, { schema: p.schema, table: p.table }])
-    ).values()];
-    drift.rlsDisabled = await readTablesWithRlsOff(client, expectedTables);
-
-    // Scan every live policy for the permissive tautology. This is deliberately
-    // independent of the name-keyed diff below: a database pushed before the
-    // `authenticated()` fix matches its expected policy on name, roles, command
-    // and clause presence, so nothing else here would flag it.
-    for (const p of live) {
-        const clause = isPermissiveAuthTautology(p.qual)
-            ? "USING"
-            : isPermissiveAuthTautology(p.withCheck) ? "WITH CHECK" : null;
-        if (clause) {
-            drift.insecure.push({
-                policy: p,
-                reason: `${clause} is \`${RLS_UID_SQL} IS NOT NULL\`, which is true for anonymous ` +
-                    `visitors too — this grants access to signed-out requests. It predates the ` +
-                    `\`policy.authenticated()\` fix; re-run \`rebase db push\` to tighten it.`
-            });
-        }
-    }
-
-    for (const [key, want] of expectedByKey) {
-        const got = liveByKey.get(key);
-        if (!got) {
-            drift.missing.push(want);
-            continue;
-        }
-        const differences: string[] = [];
-        if (!sameRoles(want.roles, got.roles)) {
-            differences.push(`roles: expected [${want.roles.join(", ")}], database has [${got.roles.join(", ")}]`);
-        }
-        if (want.command !== got.command) {
-            differences.push(`command: expected ${want.command}, database has ${got.command}`);
-        }
-        // Skipped when either side is unknown: an unrecognised catalogue shape
-        // should not manufacture drift. See `normalizeMode`.
-        if (want.mode && got.mode && want.mode !== got.mode) {
-            differences.push(
-                `mode: expected ${want.mode}, database has ${got.mode}` +
-                (got.mode === "PERMISSIVE"
-                    ? " — a RESTRICTIVE rule is ANDed with the others, a PERMISSIVE one is ORed, so this policy now widens access instead of narrowing it"
-                    : " — a PERMISSIVE rule is ORed with the others, a RESTRICTIVE one is ANDed, so this policy now narrows access instead of widening it")
-            );
-        }
-        for (const clause of ["USING", "WITH CHECK"] as const) {
-            const key = clause === "USING" ? "hasUsing" : "hasWithCheck";
-            if (want[key] === got[key]) continue;
-            differences.push(want[key]
-                ? `${clause}: expected an expression, database has none — this policy matches no rows`
-                : `${clause}: expected none, database has an expression`);
-        }
-        if (differences.length > 0) drift.diverged.push({ expected: want, actual: got, differences });
-    }
-
-    for (const [key, got] of liveByKey) {
-        if (!expectedByKey.has(key)) drift.orphaned.push(got);
-    }
-
-    return drift;
-}
-
-/**
- * Does this name look like one the generator produced for this table?
- *
- * Unnamed rules compile to `<table>_<op>_<sha1[0:7]>` (plus `_<idx>` when one
- * rule spans several operations), and the hash covers the rule's semantics — so
- * *editing* a rule renames its policy. The policy under the old name is left
- * behind by `db push`, which only DROPs the names it is about to CREATE, and
- * Postgres ORs PERMISSIVE policies together: a superseded `USING (true)` keeps
- * granting everything no matter how tight its replacement is.
- *
- * Matching the shape is what makes dropping them safe. A hand-written policy
- * would have to collide with a 7-hex digest to be mistaken for generated one;
- * a policy named anything else is left alone and merely reported, because a
- * custom name is indistinguishable from one someone wrote in SQL on purpose.
- */
-export function isGeneratedPolicyName(name: string, table: string): boolean {
-    return new RegExp(`^${table.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&")}_(select|insert|update|delete|all)_[0-9a-f]{7}(_\\d+)?$`)
-        .test(name);
-}
-
-export interface OrphanCleanup {
-    /** Superseded generated policies that were dropped. */
-    dropped: PolicyRef[];
-    /** Orphans left in place because their names are not generator-shaped. */
-    kept: PolicyRef[];
-}
-
-/**
- * Drop the policies an earlier push superseded but never removed.
- *
- * Only touches tables the collections describe — a table with no expected
- * policy is not ours to reconcile, and scanning by schema alone would sweep up
- * policies belonging to something else sharing the database.
- */
-export async function dropOrphanedPolicies(
-    client: Queryable,
-    drift: PolicyDrift,
-    collections: CollectionConfig[]
-): Promise<OrphanCleanup> {
-    const expected = parseExpectedPolicies(generatePostgresPoliciesDdl(collections));
-    const managed = new Set(expected.map((p) => `${p.schema}.${p.table}`));
-
-    const cleanup: OrphanCleanup = { dropped: [], kept: [] };
-    for (const p of drift.orphaned) {
-        if (!managed.has(`${p.schema}.${p.table}`) || !isGeneratedPolicyName(p.name, p.table)) {
-            cleanup.kept.push(p);
-            continue;
-        }
-        // Identifiers are quoted, and the name came from pg_policies rather than
-        // from user input, so it is already a valid identifier.
-        await client.query(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "${p.name}" ON "${p.schema}"."${p.table}"`);
-        cleanup.dropped.push(p);
-    }
-    return cleanup;
-}
-
-export const hasDrift = (d: PolicyDrift): boolean =>
-    d.missing.length > 0 || d.orphaned.length > 0 || d.diverged.length > 0 || d.insecure.length > 0
-    || d.rlsDisabled.length > 0;
-
-/** Human-readable report; empty string when the database matches the config. */
-export function formatPolicyDrift(drift: PolicyDrift): string {
-    if (!hasDrift(drift)) return "";
-    const lines: string[] = [];
-
-    // First, because it subsumes every other finding on the same table: if RLS
-    // is off, the policies listed below are not being applied at all.
-    if (drift.rlsDisabled.length > 0) {
-        lines.push("  RLS DISABLED — the table has policies, and Postgres is applying none of them:");
-        for (const t of drift.rlsDisabled) {
-            lines.push(`    • ${t.schema}.${t.table}${t.forced ? "" : " (and FORCE is off)"}`);
-        }
-        lines.push("    Every row is readable and writable by any request that reaches the table.");
-        lines.push(`    Fix: ALTER TABLE "<schema>"."<table>" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY; or re-run \`rebase db push\`.`);
-    }
-    if (drift.missing.length > 0) {
-        lines.push("  Missing — described by your collections, absent from the database:");
-        for (const p of drift.missing) lines.push(`    • ${p.schema}.${p.table} → "${p.name}" (${p.command} TO ${p.roles.join(", ")})`);
-        lines.push("    Run `rebase db push` to apply them.");
-    }
-    if (drift.orphaned.length > 0) {
-        lines.push("  Orphaned — in the database, described by no collection:");
-        for (const p of drift.orphaned) lines.push(`    • ${p.schema}.${p.table} → "${p.name}" (${p.command} TO ${p.roles.join(", ")})`);
-        lines.push("    Left behind by an earlier push. These still filter rows.");
-    }
-    if (drift.diverged.length > 0) {
-        lines.push("  Diverged — same policy, different definition:");
-        for (const d of drift.diverged) {
-            lines.push(`    • ${d.expected.schema}.${d.expected.table} → "${d.expected.name}"`);
-            for (const diff of d.differences) lines.push(`        ${diff}`);
-        }
-    }
-    if (drift.insecure.length > 0) {
-        lines.push("  Insecure — a live policy grants access it should not:");
-        for (const i of drift.insecure) {
-            lines.push(`    • ${i.policy.schema}.${i.policy.table} → "${i.policy.name}"`);
-            lines.push(`        ${i.reason}`);
-        }
-    }
-    return lines.join("\n");
-}