@rapidmx/web-client 0.35.0 → 0.37.0

package/dist/lib/crypto/sharedMailboxKeys.js

@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Copyright (C) 2026 Jean-Philippe Steinmetz
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/**
+ * Shared mailboxes' zero-access keys (restapi `specs/search.md` §3 *Shared Mailboxes*). A mailbox someone else owns, or that has no owner,
+ * has no master key its members know: its zero-access private key is instead wrapped to each member's own zero-access certificate
+ * (member key wraps), and a member opens it with the zero-access key of a mailbox they own - so a member unlocks it without a password,
+ * once their own mailbox is unlocked. Members get the ability to read, never the master key, signing key or encryption keys.
+ *
+ * `unlockSharedMailbox()` opens a shared mailbox for its member. `maintainSharedMailbox()` is what the client of the owner, or of a member
+ * with full access, does in the background: provisions a key for a mailbox without an owner, wraps the keys for members still waiting,
+ * and - once someone who held the key has left - rotates it, so new mail is encrypted to a key they never had. A mailbox without an owner
+ * has no master key for escrow to open, so when it is assigned to an escrow scope each of its keys is also wrapped to the scope's
+ * certificate: with a new key in the same write, and for keys the scope is still missing (`escrowPending`) in the background.
+ */
+import { ApiRequestError } from "../util/api.js";
+import { fromBase64, toBase64 } from "./encoding.js";
+import { enrollSharedZeroAccessKey, getEncryptionPolicy, getEscrowInfo, getKeyVault, getMyMemberKeyWraps, getSharedKeyStatus, putMemberKeyWraps, putZeroAccessEscrowWraps, removeMemberKeyWraps, } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
+import { certificateHoldsKey } from "./keyPairMatch.js";
+import { exportPrivateKeyPkcs8, generateKeyPairWithCsr, importPrivateKeyPkcs8 } from "./keys.js";
+import { addZeroAccessKey, getUnlockedKeys, installSharedSession, personalSessions, sharedUnlockGeneration, ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, } from "./keySession.js";
+import { buildAad, openWithKey } from "./masterKey.js";
+import { decryptEnvelopedDataWithKeys, encryptForRecipients } from "./smime.js";
+import { provisionZeroAccessKey } from "./zeroAccessKey.js";
+/** Domain-separation prefix of the secret a shared session's `masterKey` stands for. */
+const SESSION_SECRET_LABEL = new TextEncoder().encode("rapidmx-shared-mailbox-session-v1:");
+async function sessionSecret(pkcs8) {
+    const input = new Uint8Array(SESSION_SECRET_LABEL.length + pkcs8.length);
+    input.set(SESSION_SECRET_LABEL);
+    input.set(pkcs8, SESSION_SECRET_LABEL.length);
+    try {
+        return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", input));
+    }
+    finally {
+        input.fill(0);
+    }
+}
+/** The zero-access keys of the mailboxes this user has unlocked themselves - what their member wraps are addressed to. */
+function ownZeroAccessKeys() {
+    return personalSessions().flatMap(({ mailboxUid, unlocked }) => (unlocked.zeroAccessKeys ?? []).map((key) => ({ ...key, mailboxUid })));
+}
+/** Opens `wrap` with the user's own keys: the wrapped PKCS#8 (the caller zeroes it) and the own mailbox whose key opened it, or `undefined`
+ * when no own key opens it. */
+async function openWrap(wrap, own) {
+    const recipient = own.find((key) => key.fingerprint === wrap.recipientFingerprint);
+    if (!recipient) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    try {
+        return { pkcs8: await decryptEnvelopedDataWithKeys(fromBase64(wrap.cms), [recipient]), openedWith: recipient.mailboxUid };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+}
+/** The active key first, then the others newest first - the order `UnlockedKeys.zeroAccessKeys` keeps. */
+function keyOrder(status) {
+    const rank = new Map([...status.zeroAccessKeys]
+        .sort((a, b) => Number(a.fingerprint !== status.activeKeyFingerprint) - Number(b.fingerprint !== status.activeKeyFingerprint) || b.notBefore - a.notBefore)
+        .map((key, index) => [key.fingerprint, index]));
+    return (fingerprint) => rank.get(fingerprint) ?? Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER;
+}
+/**
+ * Opens shared mailbox `mailboxUid` for its member, with no password: their member wraps, opened with the zero-access keys of a mailbox they
+ * own and have unlocked, become this session's keys for it (`installSharedSession()`). See `SharedUnlockOutcome` for when it can't.
+ *
+ * `refresh`: a shared session already open is opened again when it lacks the mailbox's active key and the member now holds a wrap of it -
+ * after a rotation, new mail is sealed to a key the session doesn't have. Its `masterKey` secret is kept, so the local index stays readable.
+ */
+export async function unlockSharedMailbox(mailboxUid, client, refresh = false) {
+    const existing = getUnlockedKeys(mailboxUid);
+    if (existing && !(refresh && existing.shared)) {
+        return "unlocked";
+    }
+    const generation = sharedUnlockGeneration(mailboxUid);
+    let status;
+    try {
+        status = await getSharedKeyStatus(mailboxUid, client);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof ApiRequestError && (err.status === 403 || err.status === 404)) {
+            return existing ? "unlocked" : "not_shared";
+        }
+        throw err;
+    }
+    const holdsActive = (keys) => !!keys?.some((key) => key.fingerprint === status.activeKeyFingerprint);
+    if (existing && (!status.activeKeyFingerprint || holdsActive(existing.zeroAccessKeys))) {
+        return "unlocked";
+    }
+    if (status.role !== "member") {
+        return existing ? "unlocked" : "not_shared";
+    }
+    const wraps = await getMyMemberKeyWraps(mailboxUid, client);
+    // Nothing new to open yet: the active key's wrap is still on its way.
+    if (existing && !holdsActive(wraps.map((wrap) => ({ fingerprint: wrap.zeroAccessKeyFingerprint })))) {
+        return "unlocked";
+    }
+    if (wraps.length === 0) {
+        return "pending";
+    }
+    const own = ownZeroAccessKeys();
+    const rank = keyOrder(status);
+    const opened = [];
+    const openedWith = new Set();
+    let secret;
+    for (const wrap of [...wraps].sort((a, b) => rank(a.zeroAccessKeyFingerprint) - rank(b.zeroAccessKeyFingerprint))) {
+        const certificate = status.zeroAccessKeys.find((key) => key.fingerprint === wrap.zeroAccessKeyFingerprint);
+        const unwrapped = certificate ? await openWrap(wrap, own) : undefined;
+        if (!certificate || !unwrapped) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        const pkcs8 = unwrapped.pkcs8;
+        try {
+            // The certificate is the server's: one that isn't this key's must never be what this session seals to.
+            if (!(await certificateHoldsKey(fromBase64(certificate.publicKey), pkcs8))) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            secret ?? (secret = await sessionSecret(pkcs8));
+            const privateKey = await importPrivateKeyPkcs8(pkcs8, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" }, ["deriveBits"]);
+            opened.push({ fingerprint: wrap.zeroAccessKeyFingerprint, certDer: fromBase64(certificate.publicKey), privateKey });
+            openedWith.add(unwrapped.openedWith);
+        }
+        catch {
+            // A wrap that doesn't hold a usable key (or one its certificate doesn't match) is skipped; the others still open the mailbox.
+        }
+        finally {
+            pkcs8.fill(0);
+        }
+    }
+    if (!secret || opened.length === 0) {
+        return existing ? "unlocked" : "own_keys_locked";
+    }
+    if (existing) {
+        // Opened again: the secret the local index key is derived from stays the one the session started with.
+        secret.fill(0);
+        secret = new Uint8Array(existing.masterKey);
+    }
+    const unlocked = { masterKey: secret, zeroAccessKeys: opened, openedWith: [...openedWith] };
+    installSharedSession(mailboxUid, unlocked, generation);
+    return "unlocked";
+}
+/** The PKCS#8 of every zero-access key of `mailboxUid` the caller can open, by fingerprint - from the vault with the owner's unlocked master
+ * key, or from the caller's own member wraps. Only keys whose certificate in `status` (the server's) is really theirs: a key is wrapped
+ * for members and escrow under that certificate's fingerprint, so a mismatched one is left out. The caller zeroes them. */
+async function openPrivateKeys(mailboxUid, status, ownerUnlocked, client) {
+    const keys = new Map();
+    const keep = async (fingerprint, pkcs8) => {
+        const certificate = status.zeroAccessKeys.find((key) => key.fingerprint === fingerprint);
+        if (certificate && (await certificateHoldsKey(fromBase64(certificate.publicKey), pkcs8))) {
+            keys.set(fingerprint, pkcs8);
+        }
+        else {
+            pkcs8.fill(0);
+        }
+    };
+    if (ownerUnlocked) {
+        const vault = await getKeyVault(mailboxUid, client);
+        const aad = buildAad(mailboxUid, ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE);
+        for (const key of status.zeroAccessKeys) {
+            const wrapped = vault.wrappedKeys.find((w) => w.fingerprint === key.fingerprint && w.useType === "zero-access");
+            if (wrapped) {
+                try {
+                    await keep(key.fingerprint, await openWithKey(ownerUnlocked.masterKey, wrapped, aad));
+                }
+                catch {
+                    // Sealed under a master key since replaced: not this device's to share.
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        return keys;
+    }
+    const own = ownZeroAccessKeys();
+    for (const wrap of await getMyMemberKeyWraps(mailboxUid, client)) {
+        const unwrapped = await openWrap(wrap, own);
+        if (unwrapped) {
+            await keep(wrap.zeroAccessKeyFingerprint, unwrapped.pkcs8);
+        }
+    }
+    return keys;
+}
+async function wrapFor(member, pkcs8) {
+    return {
+        memberUserUid: member.userUid,
+        recipientFingerprint: member.certificate.fingerprint,
+        cms: toBase64(await encryptForRecipients(pkcs8, [fromBase64(member.certificate.publicKey)])),
+    };
+}
+/** The members with a certificate of their own - the ones a key can be wrapped for. A certificate listed under the fingerprint of one of
+ * this user's own opened zero-access keys must be that key's certificate (checked against its private key at unlock): one the server
+ * swapped is left out, so a wrap meant for this user never goes to a key that isn't theirs. */
+function wrappable(status) {
+    const own = ownZeroAccessKeys();
+    return status.members.filter((member) => {
+        if (!member.certificate) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        const mine = own.find((key) => key.fingerprint === member.certificate.fingerprint);
+        return !mine || sameBytes(mine.certDer, fromBase64(member.certificate.publicKey));
+    });
+}
+function sameBytes(a, b) {
+    return a.length === b.length && a.every((byte, index) => byte === b[index]);
+}
+/** `pkcs8` wrapped to the certificate of the escrow scope `escrow` describes. */
+async function escrowWrapFor(escrow, pkcs8) {
+    return { escrowScopeId: escrow.escrowScopeId, cms: toBase64(await encryptForRecipients(pkcs8, [fromBase64(escrow.publicKey.publicKey)])) };
+}
+/** A new keypair for a mailbox without an owner, enrolled together with a wrap of it for every member who can receive one, and for its
+ * escrow scope when it has one. */
+async function enrollNewSharedKey(mailboxUid, mailboxAddress, status, client) {
+    const escrow = status.escrowScopeId ? await getEscrowInfo(mailboxUid, client) : undefined;
+    const { keyPair, csrPem } = await generateKeyPairWithCsr(mailboxAddress, "encrypt");
+    const pkcs8 = await exportPrivateKeyPkcs8(keyPair.privateKey);
+    try {
+        const wraps = await Promise.all(wrappable(status).map((member) => wrapFor(member, pkcs8)));
+        const escrowWrap = escrow ? await escrowWrapFor(escrow, pkcs8) : undefined;
+        return await enrollSharedZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid, { csr: csrPem, wraps, ...(escrowWrap ? { escrowWrap } : {}) }, client);
+    }
+    finally {
+        pkcs8.fill(0);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The background care of a shared mailbox, run by the client of its owner or of a member with full access (`status.manager`); nothing for
+ * anyone else, or while the keys it needs are locked:
+ *
+ * A mailbox without an owner and without a key gets one (unless the administrator disallows zero-access), wrapped for every member who has a
+ * certificate. Once a user who held the active key has left (`rotationPending`), a new key replaces it - enrolled by the owner with their
+ * master key (`provisionZeroAccessKey()`), or for a mailbox without an owner with the members' wraps - and then the departed users' wraps
+ * are removed. Members still waiting (`pending`) get wraps of every key this client can open, one write per key with the active key's
+ * first (a refused older key doesn't stop the rest), and the escrow scope of a mailbox without an owner gets copies of the keys it is
+ * missing (`escrowPending`). A rotation the server refuses (400) is reported in `rotationRefused`, not thrown: the current key stays active
+ * and the rest of the pass goes ahead.
+ */
+export async function maintainSharedMailbox(mailboxUid, mailboxAddress, client) {
+    const result = { provisioned: false, rotated: false, wrapped: 0, refused: 0, removed: 0, escrowed: 0 };
+    let status = await getSharedKeyStatus(mailboxUid, client);
+    if (!status.manager || (status.members.length === 0 && status.departed.length === 0)) {
+        return result;
+    }
+    const ownerUnlocked = status.role === "owner" ? getUnlockedKeys(mailboxUid) : undefined;
+    if (status.role === "owner" && (!ownerUnlocked || ownerUnlocked.shared)) {
+        return result;
+    }
+    if (status.ownerless && !status.activeKeyFingerprint) {
+        const policy = await getEncryptionPolicy(client).catch(() => undefined);
+        if (policy?.allowZeroAccess === false || ownZeroAccessKeys().length === 0) {
+            return result;
+        }
+        status = await enrollNewSharedKey(mailboxUid, mailboxAddress, status, client);
+        result.provisioned = true;
+    }
+    else if (status.rotationPending) {
+        try {
+            if (status.ownerless) {
+                status = await enrollNewSharedKey(mailboxUid, mailboxAddress, status, client);
+            }
+            else {
+                const vault = await getKeyVault(mailboxUid, client);
+                const { key } = await provisionZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid, mailboxAddress, ownerUnlocked.masterKey, vault.masterKeyGeneration, client);
+                // The owner's open session gets the new key as its active one, as `ensureZeroAccessKey()` does: new mail is sealed to it.
+                addZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid, ownerUnlocked, key);
+                status = await getSharedKeyStatus(mailboxUid, client);
+            }
+            result.rotated = true;
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // Refused before any key was issued (restapi: the vault can't hold the new key's member wraps next to those it holds): the
+            // current key stays active, so the rest of the pass - waiting members' wraps of it - still goes ahead. Anything else throws.
+            if (!(err instanceof ApiRequestError) || err.status !== 400) {
+                throw err;
+            }
+            result.rotationRefused = err.message;
+        }
+    }
+    // The departed hold no wrap of the active key any more (or never did): their old wraps go.
+    if (!status.rotationPending) {
+        for (const departed of status.departed) {
+            status = await removeMemberKeyWraps(mailboxUid, departed, client);
+            result.removed++;
+        }
+    }
+    const missing = wrappable(status).filter((member) => status.zeroAccessKeys.some((key) => !member.wrapped.includes(key.fingerprint)));
+    const escrowPending = status.ownerless && status.escrowScopeId ? (status.escrowPending ?? []) : [];
+    if (missing.length > 0 || escrowPending.length > 0) {
+        const keys = await openPrivateKeys(mailboxUid, status, ownerUnlocked, client);
+        try {
+            // One write per key, the active key's first: it alone opens new mail, so a refused backfill of an older key (the server bounds
+            // each key's wraps and the vault's total) never keeps a member from it. A failed older key is left for the next pass.
+            const order = keyOrder(status);
+            for (const [fingerprint, pkcs8] of [...keys].sort(([a], [b]) => order(a) - order(b))) {
+                const wraps = [];
+                for (const member of missing) {
+                    if (!member.wrapped.includes(fingerprint)) {
+                        wraps.push({ ...(await wrapFor(member, pkcs8)), zeroAccessKeyFingerprint: fingerprint });
+                    }
+                }
+                if (wraps.length === 0) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                if (fingerprint === status.activeKeyFingerprint) {
+                    await putMemberKeyWraps(mailboxUid, wraps, client);
+                    result.wrapped += wraps.length;
+                }
+                else {
+                    try {
+                        await putMemberKeyWraps(mailboxUid, wraps, client);
+                        result.wrapped += wraps.length;
+                    }
+                    catch {
+                        result.refused += wraps.length;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            const held = escrowPending.filter((fingerprint) => keys.has(fingerprint));
+            if (held.length > 0) {
+                const escrow = await getEscrowInfo(mailboxUid, client);
+                // Assigned to another scope since the status was read: the next pass sees it.
+                if (escrow.escrowScopeId === status.escrowScopeId) {
+                    const escrowWraps = [];
+                    for (const fingerprint of held) {
+                        escrowWraps.push({ ...(await escrowWrapFor(escrow, keys.get(fingerprint))), zeroAccessKeyFingerprint: fingerprint });
+                    }
+                    await putZeroAccessEscrowWraps(mailboxUid, escrowWraps, client);
+                    result.escrowed = escrowWraps.length;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        finally {
+            for (const pkcs8 of keys.values()) {
+                pkcs8.fill(0);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return result;
+}

package/dist/lib/crypto/smimeMessage.d.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ export interface ProtectedHeaders {
  * (Section 3.3). Applied to produce the OUTER, unprotected envelope's headers from the real
  * (protected) ones; `From`/`To`/`Cc`/`Date` pass through unchanged, `Subject` is obscured. */
 export declare function applyBaselineOuterHeaders(headers: ProtectedHeaders): ProtectedHeaders;
+/** @internal Shared with `pgpMessage.ts`. */
+export declare function base64Wrapped(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
+/** @internal Shared with `pgpMessage.ts`. */
+export declare function generateBoundary(): string;
+/** Strips CR/LF/NUL from a header value that has no further encoding (Date, Message-ID, Content-Type). */
+export declare function flattenHeaderValue(value: string): string;
+/** @internal Shared with `pgpMessage.ts`: the protected header block of an inner entity (with `HP-Outer:` copies of `hpOuter`). */
+export declare function protectedHeaderLines(headers: ProtectedHeaders, hpOuter?: ProtectedHeaders): string;
 /** One MIME entity's worth of headers-beyond-Content-Type plus body, ready for a caller (the actual
  * outbound-message compose step, built on top of this module) to combine with the outer envelope's
  * own `From`/`To`/`Subject`/`Date`/`Message-ID`. */
@@ -106,6 +114,17 @@ export interface ParsedEncryptedMessage {
  * (`messageId` has no `HP-Outer` counterpart; only the fields the outer envelope itself carries do).
  * Exported so `messageSecurity.ts` can build one from a received message's real outer envelope. */
 export type ComparableOuterHeaders = Partial<Pick<ProtectedHeaders, "from" | "to" | "cc" | "date" | "subject">>;
+/** Extracts the outer-envelope header values RFC 9788's `HP-Outer: <Field>: <value>` mechanism embeds
+ * inside an encrypted message's protected content - one line per outer header, all sharing the literal
+ * field name `HP-Outer`, which `splitHeadersAndBody()`'s own flat header map can hold only the last of
+ * (a real bug if reused for this - JSON/`Record` keys aren't multi-valued). Scans the raw header block
+ * text directly instead. Returns `undefined` when no `HP-Outer:` lines are present at all, so a caller
+ * can distinguish "nothing to compare" from "compared and everything matched". */
+export declare function extractHpOuterHeaders(fields: MimeHeaderField[]): ComparableOuterHeaders | undefined;
+/** `true` when every field `hpOuter` actually carries matches `actualOuterHeaders`' value for that same
+ * field - a field `hpOuter` doesn't carry (e.g. no `Cc` on this message) is not compared, since RFC
+ * 9788 never claims coverage for it either way. */
+export declare function outerHeadersMatch(hpOuter: ComparableOuterHeaders, actualOuterHeaders: ComparableOuterHeaders): boolean;
 /** Decrypts (and, if present, verifies the inner signature of) a message built by
  * `buildEncryptedMessage()`. Returns `{ decrypted: false }` (never throws) for anything malformed or
  * undecryptable with the given key — the caller's own concern is distinguishing "wrong key" from
@@ -130,3 +149,5 @@ export declare function splitHeadersAndBody(entity: string): {
     body: string;
     rawHeaderBlock: string;
 };
+/** @internal Shared with `pgpMessage.ts`. */
+export declare function headersToProtectedHeaders(headers: Record<string, string>): ProtectedHeaders;

package/dist/lib/crypto/smimeMessage.js

@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ const BASE64_LINE_WIDTH = 76;
 export function applyBaselineOuterHeaders(headers) {
     return { ...headers, subject: "[...]" };
 }
-function base64Wrapped(bytes) {
+/** @internal Shared with `pgpMessage.ts`. */
+export function base64Wrapped(bytes) {
     const encoded = toBase64(bytes);
     const lines = [];
     for (let i = 0; i < encoded.length; i += BASE64_LINE_WIDTH) {
@@ -46,14 +47,15 @@ function base64Wrapped(bytes) {
     }
     return lines.join(CRLF);
 }
-function generateBoundary() {
+/** @internal Shared with `pgpMessage.ts`. */
+export function generateBoundary() {
     const bytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));
     return `----=_RapidMX_${Array.from(bytes)
         .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
         .join("")}`;
 }
 /** Strips CR/LF/NUL from a header value that has no further encoding (Date, Message-ID, Content-Type). */
-function flattenHeaderValue(value) {
+export function flattenHeaderValue(value) {
     return value.replace(/[\r\n\0]+/g, " ");
 }
 /**
@@ -73,7 +75,8 @@ function headerLines(headers, prefix = "") {
         ...(prefix ? [] : [`Message-ID: ${flattenHeaderValue(headers.messageId)}`]),
     ];
 }
-function protectedHeaderLines(headers, hpOuter) {
+/** @internal Shared with `pgpMessage.ts`: the protected header block of an inner entity (with `HP-Outer:` copies of `hpOuter`). */
+export function protectedHeaderLines(headers, hpOuter) {
     const lines = headerLines(headers);
     if (hpOuter) {
         // RFC 9788 Section 2.2.1's `hp-outer` field: the literal string "HP-Outer:" followed by the
@@ -237,7 +240,7 @@ export function assembleOutboundMime(outerHeaders, part) {
  * (a real bug if reused for this - JSON/`Record` keys aren't multi-valued). Scans the raw header block
  * text directly instead. Returns `undefined` when no `HP-Outer:` lines are present at all, so a caller
  * can distinguish "nothing to compare" from "compared and everything matched". */
-function extractHpOuterHeaders(fields) {
+export function extractHpOuterHeaders(fields) {
     const result = {};
     let found = false;
     for (const { name, value } of fields) {
@@ -253,7 +256,7 @@ function extractHpOuterHeaders(fields) {
 /** `true` when every field `hpOuter` actually carries matches `actualOuterHeaders`' value for that same
  * field - a field `hpOuter` doesn't carry (e.g. no `Cc` on this message) is not compared, since RFC
  * 9788 never claims coverage for it either way. */
-function outerHeadersMatch(hpOuter, actualOuterHeaders) {
+export function outerHeadersMatch(hpOuter, actualOuterHeaders) {
     return Object.keys(hpOuter).every((field) => hpOuter[field] === actualOuterHeaders[field]);
 }
 /** Decrypts (and, if present, verifies the inner signature of) a message built by
@@ -327,7 +330,8 @@ export function splitHeadersAndBody(entity) {
     const { headers, body, rawHeaderBlock } = parseMimeEntity(entity);
     return { headers, contentType: headers["content-type"], body, rawHeaderBlock };
 }
-function headersToProtectedHeaders(headers) {
+/** @internal Shared with `pgpMessage.ts`. */
+export function headersToProtectedHeaders(headers) {
     return {
         from: headers["from"] ?? "",
         to: headers["to"] ?? "",

package/dist/lib/crypto/zeroAccessKey.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/**
+ * Zero-access keys (restapi `specs/search.md` §3): the per-mailbox keypair the server encrypts mail at rest to on arrival.
+ * Generated here like the encryption key - P-256, its certificate issued by restapi's internal CA from a CSR, its PKCS#8
+ * private key sealed under the mailbox master key - but never published: restapi keeps the certificate on
+ * `Mailbox.zeroAccessKeys` and returns it only with the vault.
+ */
+import type { ApiClient } from "../util/api.js";
+import { type KeyVault } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
+import { type RetainedEncryptionKey } from "./keySession.js";
+/** What `provisionZeroAccessKey()` resolves with. */
+export interface ProvisionedZeroAccessKey {
+    /** The vault as restapi returned it after the enrollment. */
+    vault: KeyVault;
+    /** The new key, ready to decrypt with (its private key imported non-extractable for ECDH). */
+    key: RetainedEncryptionKey;
+}
+/**
+ * Generates a zero-access keypair for `mailboxUid`, seals its private key under `masterKey` and enrolls it. The key becomes
+ * the mailbox's active zero-access key (restapi supersedes any earlier one, whose private key stays in the vault). Pass the
+ * vault's `masterKeyGeneration` read alongside `masterKey` as `expectedMasterKeyGeneration`, so restapi refuses (`409`)
+ * the key if another device rotated the master key meanwhile.
+ */
+export declare function provisionZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid: string, mailboxAddress: string, masterKey: Uint8Array, expectedMasterKeyGeneration?: number, client?: ApiClient): Promise<ProvisionedZeroAccessKey>;
+/**
+ * Gives an unlocked mailbox a zero-access key when it has none yet - how a mailbox set up before zero-access encryption
+ * existed gets one, on its owner's next unlock. Resolves `true` when it enrolled a key (and added it to the session), `false`
+ * when there was nothing to do: the mailbox isn't unlocked, or its vault already holds an unrevoked zero-access key.
+ *
+ * Only the mailbox's owner may call this (restapi refuses anybody else's enrollment); a caller decides that, e.g. from
+ * `KeyEnrollmentGate`'s `canProvision`.
+ */
+export declare function ensureZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid: string, mailboxAddress: string, client?: ApiClient): Promise<boolean>;

package/dist/lib/crypto/zeroAccessKey.js

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+import { fromBase64 } from "./encoding.js";
+import { enrollKey, getKeyVault } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
+import { certificateHoldsKey } from "./keyPairMatch.js";
+import { exportPrivateKeyPkcs8, generateKeyPairWithCsr, importPrivateKeyPkcs8 } from "./keys.js";
+import { addZeroAccessKey, getUnlockedKeys, ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE } from "./keySession.js";
+import { buildAad, sealWithKey } from "./masterKey.js";
+/**
+ * Generates a zero-access keypair for `mailboxUid`, seals its private key under `masterKey` and enrolls it. The key becomes
+ * the mailbox's active zero-access key (restapi supersedes any earlier one, whose private key stays in the vault). Pass the
+ * vault's `masterKeyGeneration` read alongside `masterKey` as `expectedMasterKeyGeneration`, so restapi refuses (`409`)
+ * the key if another device rotated the master key meanwhile.
+ */
+export async function provisionZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid, mailboxAddress, masterKey, expectedMasterKeyGeneration, client) {
+    const { keyPair, csrPem } = await generateKeyPairWithCsr(mailboxAddress, "encrypt");
+    const raw = await exportPrivateKeyPkcs8(keyPair.privateKey);
+    try {
+        const sealed = await sealWithKey(masterKey, raw, buildAad(mailboxUid, ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE));
+        const vault = await enrollKey(mailboxUid, {
+            useType: "zero-access",
+            csr: csrPem,
+            wrappedKey: { ciphertext: sealed.ciphertext, nonce: sealed.nonce, algorithm: "AES-256-GCM" },
+            ...(expectedMasterKeyGeneration !== undefined ? { expectedMasterKeyGeneration } : {}),
+        }, client);
+        // restapi appends the new wrapped key last.
+        const enrolled = [...vault.wrappedKeys].reverse().find((k) => k.useType === "zero-access");
+        const certificate = enrolled && vault.zeroAccessKeys?.find((k) => k.fingerprint === enrolled.fingerprint);
+        if (!enrolled || !certificate) {
+            throw new Error("The server did not return the enrolled zero-access key.");
+        }
+        // The certificate is the server's: this device seals to it (index segments, protected meetings' keys), so it must be the new key's.
+        if (!(await certificateHoldsKey(fromBase64(certificate.publicKey), raw))) {
+            throw new Error("The server returned a zero-access certificate that isn't the enrolled key's.");
+        }
+        const privateKey = await importPrivateKeyPkcs8(raw, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" }, ["deriveBits"], false);
+        return { vault, key: { fingerprint: enrolled.fingerprint, certDer: fromBase64(certificate.publicKey), privateKey } };
+    }
+    finally {
+        raw.fill(0);
+    }
+}
+/** Provisions already in flight, per mailbox - a second caller (another effect, a re-render) joins the first. */
+const inFlight = new Map();
+/**
+ * Gives an unlocked mailbox a zero-access key when it has none yet - how a mailbox set up before zero-access encryption
+ * existed gets one, on its owner's next unlock. Resolves `true` when it enrolled a key (and added it to the session), `false`
+ * when there was nothing to do: the mailbox isn't unlocked, or its vault already holds an unrevoked zero-access key.
+ *
+ * Only the mailbox's owner may call this (restapi refuses anybody else's enrollment); a caller decides that, e.g. from
+ * `KeyEnrollmentGate`'s `canProvision`.
+ */
+export function ensureZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid, mailboxAddress, client) {
+    const pending = inFlight.get(mailboxUid);
+    if (pending) {
+        return pending;
+    }
+    const run = (async () => {
+        const unlocked = getUnlockedKeys(mailboxUid);
+        if (!unlocked || unlocked.zeroAccessKeys?.length) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        const vault = await getKeyVault(mailboxUid, client);
+        if ((vault.zeroAccessKeys ?? []).some((k) => !k.revokedAt) || vault.wrappedKeys.length === 0) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        const { key } = await provisionZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid, mailboxAddress, unlocked.masterKey, vault.masterKeyGeneration, client);
+        addZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid, unlocked, key);
+        return true;
+    })().finally(() => inFlight.delete(mailboxUid));
+    inFlight.set(mailboxUid, run);
+    return run;
+}

package/dist/lib/mail/conversationsApi.d.ts

@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ export interface ConversationSummary {
     latestFrom: Recipient;
     /** The most recent message's `bodyPreview` — the snippet a collapsed row shows. */
     latestPreview: string;
+    /** Set when the latest message is sealed at rest (zero-access): its subject and preview are only in `sealedSummary`, which
+     * `messageSecurity.ts`'s `openZeroAccessSummary()` opens with the mailbox's zero-access keys. */
+    latestZeroAccess?: {
+        keyFingerprint: string;
+        sealedSummary: string;
+    };
     /** The most recent message's folder. */
     latestFolderUid: string;
     /** The iTIP `METHOD` of the calendar file the most recent message carries (`Message.meetingMethod`) - `"REQUEST"`, `"REPLY"`,