@rapidmx/web-client 0.35.0 → 0.37.0

package/dist/lib/crypto/keyExport.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/**
+ * "Export keys for Outlook/phone" (restapi `specs/search.md` §3, *Clients that don't run RapidMX*): a passphrase-protected
+ * PKCS#12 file holding the private keys a mail client needs to read this mailbox's mail on its own - every zero-access key
+ * (mail at rest is S/MIME `enveloped-data` to these) and every end-to-end encryption key (current and retained), plus, only
+ * when asked, the active signing key. Built entirely here from a fresh master-password unlock: the session's own private
+ * keys are non-extractable, and the server never sees the file or the passphrase. restapi only records that an export
+ * happened (`key_vault.export`), with the fingerprints exported and nothing else.
+ */
+import "reflect-metadata";
+import type { ApiClient } from "../util/api.js";
+import { type PublicKey } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
+/** PBKDF2 iterations for the shrouded key bags and the PKCS#12 MAC. Windows, macOS and iOS all accept this. */
+export declare const KEY_EXPORT_ITERATIONS = 100000;
+/** The shortest export passphrase accepted. The file grants read access to all of this mailbox's mail. */
+export declare const MIN_EXPORT_PASSPHRASE_LENGTH = 12;
+/** Which key a bag holds, for its friendly name and the export's audit record. */
+export type ExportedKeyKind = "zero-access" | "encrypt" | "sign";
+/** What `exportKeysAsPkcs12()` takes. */
+export interface KeyExportInput {
+    mailboxUid: string;
+    /** The mailbox's address, used in each key's friendly name. */
+    mailboxAddress: string;
+    /** The mailbox's published keys (`Mailbox.keys`): the encryption and signing certificates. */
+    mailboxKeys: PublicKey[];
+    /** The master password, for the fresh unlock every export needs. */
+    masterPassword: string;
+    /** Protects the PKCS#12 file. At least `MIN_EXPORT_PASSPHRASE_LENGTH` characters. */
+    exportPassphrase: string;
+    /** Whether to include the active signing key, for clients that will sign. Off unless the user opts in. */
+    includeSigningKey?: boolean;
+}
+/** One key in the export. */
+export interface ExportedKey {
+    kind: ExportedKeyKind;
+    fingerprint: string;
+}
+/** What `exportKeysAsPkcs12()` resolves with. */
+export interface KeyExport {
+    /** The DER-encoded PKCS#12 (`.p12`) file. */
+    pkcs12: Uint8Array;
+    /** The keys it holds, zero-access keys first. */
+    keys: ExportedKey[];
+}
+/** The export has nothing to hold - the vault has no zero-access or encryption private key this password opens. */
+export declare class NothingToExportError extends Error {
+    constructor();
+}
+/**
+ * Builds the "Export keys for Outlook/phone" PKCS#12 for `input.mailboxUid` (see this module's comment) and records the
+ * export with restapi. Re-opens the vault with `masterPassword` - rejecting as `unlockWithPassword()` does on a wrong
+ * one - and never touches the in-memory session. Every opened private key and the master key are zeroed before this
+ * returns, whether or not it succeeds. Throws `NothingToExportError` when no key opens.
+ */
+export declare function exportKeysAsPkcs12(input: KeyExportInput, client?: ApiClient): Promise<KeyExport>;

package/dist/lib/crypto/keyExport.js

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Copyright (C) 2026 Jean-Philippe Steinmetz
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/**
+ * "Export keys for Outlook/phone" (restapi `specs/search.md` §3, *Clients that don't run RapidMX*): a passphrase-protected
+ * PKCS#12 file holding the private keys a mail client needs to read this mailbox's mail on its own - every zero-access key
+ * (mail at rest is S/MIME `enveloped-data` to these) and every end-to-end encryption key (current and retained), plus, only
+ * when asked, the active signing key. Built entirely here from a fresh master-password unlock: the session's own private
+ * keys are non-extractable, and the server never sees the file or the passphrase. restapi only records that an export
+ * happened (`key_vault.export`), with the fingerprints exported and nothing else.
+ */
+import "reflect-metadata";
+import * as asn1js from "asn1js";
+import * as pkijs from "pkijs";
+import { fromBase64 } from "./encoding.js";
+import { findActivePublicKey, isOpenPgpKey, recordKeyExport } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
+import { ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS, openMasterKeyWithPassword, SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, } from "./keySession.js";
+import { buildAad, openWithKey } from "./masterKey.js";
+/** PBKDF2 iterations for the shrouded key bags and the PKCS#12 MAC. Windows, macOS and iOS all accept this. */
+export const KEY_EXPORT_ITERATIONS = 100000;
+/** The shortest export passphrase accepted. The file grants read access to all of this mailbox's mail. */
+export const MIN_EXPORT_PASSPHRASE_LENGTH = 12;
+const PKCS8_SHROUDED_KEY_BAG = "1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.2";
+const CERT_BAG = "1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.3";
+const X509_CERTIFICATE = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.22.1";
+const FRIENDLY_NAME = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.20";
+const LOCAL_KEY_ID = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.21";
+/** The shrouded key bags' cipher. pkijs's type wants an `iv`, but it generates a fresh one for every bag and ignores this one. */
+const AES_256_CBC = { name: "AES-CBC", length: 256, iv: new Uint8Array(16) };
+/** The export has nothing to hold - the vault has no zero-access or encryption private key this password opens. */
+export class NothingToExportError extends Error {
+    constructor() {
+        super("This mailbox has no keys to export yet.");
+        this.name = "NothingToExportError";
+    }
+}
+function toArrayBuffer(bytes) {
+    return bytes.buffer.slice(bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteOffset + bytes.byteLength);
+}
+function hexBytes(hex) {
+    const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length >> 1);
+    for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {
+        out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+function bagAttributes(friendlyName, localKeyId) {
+    return [
+        new pkijs.Attribute({ type: FRIENDLY_NAME, values: [new asn1js.BmpString({ value: friendlyName })] }),
+        new pkijs.Attribute({ type: LOCAL_KEY_ID, values: [new asn1js.OctetString({ valueHex: toArrayBuffer(localKeyId) })] }),
+    ];
+}
+function friendlyName(kind, address, index) {
+    const label = kind === "zero-access" ? "zero-access key" : kind === "encrypt" ? "encryption key" : "signing key";
+    return `RapidMX ${label} (${address})${index > 0 ? ` ${index + 1}` : ""}`;
+}
+/** Opens one wrapped private key to its raw PKCS#8, or `undefined` when it won't open under this master key - an export
+ * carries what it can rather than failing on one stale wrap. */
+async function openPkcs8(masterKey, wrapped, aad) {
+    try {
+        return await openWithKey(masterKey, wrapped, aad);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+}
+/** Opens every key the export holds, in order: zero-access keys (unrevoked newest first), the encryption keys (active
+ * first, then retained newest first), then the active signing key if asked. Each list is capped like the session's. */
+async function openExportedKeys(input, vault, masterKey) {
+    const opened = [];
+    const wrappedFor = (fingerprint) => vault.wrappedKeys.find((k) => k.fingerprint === fingerprint);
+    const take = async (kind, keys, purpose, max) => {
+        const aad = buildAad(input.mailboxUid, purpose);
+        const seen = new Set();
+        for (const key of keys) {
+            const wrapped = wrappedFor(key.fingerprint);
+            if (!wrapped || seen.has(key.fingerprint) || seen.size === max) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            const pkcs8 = await openPkcs8(masterKey, wrapped, aad);
+            if (pkcs8) {
+                seen.add(key.fingerprint);
+                opened.push({ kind, fingerprint: key.fingerprint, certDer: fromBase64(key.publicKey), pkcs8 });
+            }
+        }
+    };
+    const zeroAccess = [...(vault.zeroAccessKeys ?? [])].sort((a, b) => Number(!!a.revokedAt) - Number(!!b.revokedAt) || b.notBefore - a.notBefore);
+    await take("zero-access", zeroAccess, ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1);
+    const active = findActivePublicKey(input.mailboxKeys, "encrypt");
+    const encryption = [
+        ...(active ? [active] : []),
+        ...input.mailboxKeys.filter((k) => k.useType === "encrypt" && !isOpenPgpKey(k) && k !== active).sort((a, b) => b.notBefore - a.notBefore),
+    ];
+    await take("encrypt", encryption, ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1);
+    if (input.includeSigningKey) {
+        const signing = findActivePublicKey(input.mailboxKeys, "sign");
+        await take("sign", signing ? [signing] : [], SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, 1);
+    }
+    return opened;
+}
+/** Builds the PKCS#12 file: one PBES2 (PBKDF2-SHA256, AES-256-CBC) shrouded key bag and one certificate bag per key,
+ * paired by `localKeyID`, in an unencrypted SafeContents, under a SHA-256 MAC. */
+async function buildPkcs12(keys, address, passphrase) {
+    const crypto = pkijs.getCrypto(true);
+    // UTF-8 for both: pkijs re-encodes it as the BMPString the PKCS#12 MAC derivation (RFC 7292 Appendix B) takes.
+    const utf8 = toArrayBuffer(new TextEncoder().encode(passphrase));
+    const bags = [];
+    const shrouded = [];
+    const counts = { "zero-access": 0, encrypt: 0, sign: 0 };
+    for (const key of keys) {
+        const name = friendlyName(key.kind, address, counts[key.kind]++);
+        const localKeyId = hexBytes(key.fingerprint).slice(0, 20);
+        const keyBag = new pkijs.PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag({ parsedValue: pkijs.PrivateKeyInfo.fromBER(toArrayBuffer(key.pkcs8)) });
+        shrouded.push(keyBag);
+        bags.push(new pkijs.SafeBag({ bagId: PKCS8_SHROUDED_KEY_BAG, bagValue: keyBag, bagAttributes: bagAttributes(name, localKeyId) }));
+        const certBag = new pkijs.CertBag({ certId: X509_CERTIFICATE, parsedValue: pkijs.Certificate.fromBER(toArrayBuffer(key.certDer)) });
+        bags.push(new pkijs.SafeBag({ bagId: CERT_BAG, bagValue: certBag, bagAttributes: bagAttributes(name, localKeyId) }));
+    }
+    for (const keyBag of shrouded) {
+        await keyBag.makeInternalValues({ password: utf8, contentEncryptionAlgorithm: AES_256_CBC, hmacHashAlgorithm: "SHA-256", iterationCount: KEY_EXPORT_ITERATIONS }, crypto);
+    }
+    const pfx = new pkijs.PFX({
+        parsedValue: {
+            integrityMode: 0,
+            authenticatedSafe: new pkijs.AuthenticatedSafe({ parsedValue: { safeContents: [{ privacyMode: 0, value: new pkijs.SafeContents({ safeBags: bags }) }] } }),
+        },
+    });
+    await pfx.parsedValue.authenticatedSafe.makeInternalValues({ safeContents: [{}] }, crypto);
+    await pfx.makeInternalValues({ password: utf8, iterations: KEY_EXPORT_ITERATIONS, pbkdf2HashAlgorithm: { name: "SHA-256" }, hmacHashAlgorithm: "SHA-256" }, crypto);
+    return new Uint8Array(pfx.toSchema().toBER(false));
+}
+/**
+ * Builds the "Export keys for Outlook/phone" PKCS#12 for `input.mailboxUid` (see this module's comment) and records the
+ * export with restapi. Re-opens the vault with `masterPassword` - rejecting as `unlockWithPassword()` does on a wrong
+ * one - and never touches the in-memory session. Every opened private key and the master key are zeroed before this
+ * returns, whether or not it succeeds. Throws `NothingToExportError` when no key opens.
+ */
+export async function exportKeysAsPkcs12(input, client) {
+    if (input.exportPassphrase.length < MIN_EXPORT_PASSPHRASE_LENGTH) {
+        throw new Error(`The export passphrase must be at least ${MIN_EXPORT_PASSPHRASE_LENGTH} characters.`);
+    }
+    const { vault, masterKey } = await openMasterKeyWithPassword(input.mailboxUid, input.masterPassword, client);
+    let opened = [];
+    try {
+        opened = await openExportedKeys(input, vault, masterKey);
+        if (!opened.some((k) => k.kind !== "sign")) {
+            throw new NothingToExportError();
+        }
+        const pkcs12 = await buildPkcs12(opened, input.mailboxAddress, input.exportPassphrase);
+        const keys = opened.map(({ kind, fingerprint }) => ({ kind, fingerprint }));
+        await recordKeyExport(input.mailboxUid, keys, client);
+        return { pkcs12, keys };
+    }
+    finally {
+        masterKey.fill(0);
+        for (const key of opened) {
+            key.pkcs8.fill(0);
+        }
+    }
+}

package/dist/lib/crypto/keyPairMatch.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+/**
+ * Whether a certificate the server lists is really the one of a private key this device opened. A zero-access key's private half comes
+ * from an authenticated seal (or a member's wrap), but its certificate comes from the server as it is: what this device then encrypts
+ * to that certificate - the search index segments it builds from end-to-end mail, a protected meeting's key - must not go to a key the
+ * server swapped in. Plain WebCrypto and a few lines of DER, so the unlock path loads no certificate library.
+ */
+/** Whether `certDer` (a P-256 certificate) carries the public half of `pkcs8` (a P-256 private key). Never rejects: anything that won't
+ * parse or import is `false`. */
+export declare function certificateHoldsKey(certDer: Uint8Array, pkcs8: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean>;

package/dist/lib/crypto/keyPairMatch.js

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Copyright (C) 2026 Jean-Philippe Steinmetz
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/**
+ * Whether a certificate the server lists is really the one of a private key this device opened. A zero-access key's private half comes
+ * from an authenticated seal (or a member's wrap), but its certificate comes from the server as it is: what this device then encrypts
+ * to that certificate - the search index segments it builds from end-to-end mail, a protected meeting's key - must not go to a key the
+ * server swapped in. Plain WebCrypto and a few lines of DER, so the unlock path loads no certificate library.
+ */
+/** One DER element of `der` at `offset`: where its header starts, where its content starts, where it ends. */
+function element(der, offset) {
+    const tag = der[offset];
+    let length = der[offset + 1];
+    let content = offset + 2;
+    if (length & 0x80) {
+        const bytes = length & 0x7f;
+        if (bytes === 0 || bytes > 4) {
+            throw new Error("Unsupported DER length.");
+        }
+        length = 0;
+        for (let i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
+            length = length * 256 + der[content + i];
+        }
+        content += bytes;
+    }
+    const end = content + length;
+    if (tag === undefined || end > der.length) {
+        throw new Error("Truncated DER.");
+    }
+    return { tag, header: offset, content, end };
+}
+/** The children of the constructed element `parent`. */
+function children(der, parent) {
+    const found = [];
+    for (let offset = parent.content; offset < parent.end; offset = found[found.length - 1].end) {
+        found.push(element(der, offset));
+    }
+    return found;
+}
+/** The SubjectPublicKeyInfo of X.509 certificate `certDer` (RFC 5280: the seventh field of `tbsCertificate`, the sixth when it has no
+ * explicit version). */
+function subjectPublicKeyInfo(certDer) {
+    const [tbs] = children(certDer, element(certDer, 0));
+    const fields = children(certDer, tbs);
+    const spki = fields[fields[0].tag === 0xa0 ? 6 : 5];
+    if (!spki || spki.tag !== 0x30) {
+        throw new Error("No subject public key.");
+    }
+    return certDer.subarray(spki.header, spki.end);
+}
+const P256_ECDH = { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" };
+/** Whether `certDer` (a P-256 certificate) carries the public half of `pkcs8` (a P-256 private key). Never rejects: anything that won't
+ * parse or import is `false`. */
+export async function certificateHoldsKey(certDer, pkcs8) {
+    try {
+        const publicKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey("spki", subjectPublicKeyInfo(certDer), P256_ECDH, true, []);
+        const privateKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey("pkcs8", pkcs8, P256_ECDH, true, ["deriveBits"]);
+        const [certified, held] = await Promise.all([crypto.subtle.exportKey("jwk", publicKey), crypto.subtle.exportKey("jwk", privateKey)]);
+        return !!certified.x && certified.x === held.x && certified.y === held.y;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}

package/dist/lib/crypto/keySession.d.ts

@@ -17,14 +17,18 @@
  * follow-up, not a silent gap: a mailbox enrolled *only* with a passkey has no way to unlock through this
  * module today.
  */
-import { type PublicKey } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
+import { type KeyVault, type PublicKey } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
+import type { ApiClient } from "../util/api.js";
 import { KeysLockedError } from "./masterKey.js";
+import type { OpenPgpPrivateKey } from "./openpgp.js";
 /** AAD purpose labels — MUST exactly match what `KeyEnrollmentGate.tsx` used when it originally
  * sealed each of these values, or `openWithKey()` fails (GCM authenticates the AAD, not just the
  * ciphertext). Centralized here as the one place both wrapping and unwrapping refer to. */
 export declare const MASTER_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "master-key";
 export declare const SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "sign-private-key";
 export declare const ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "encrypt-private-key";
+export declare const ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "zero-access-private-key";
+export declare const OPENPGP_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "openpgp-private-key";
 export { KeysLockedError };
 /** How many retained (non-active) encryption keys an unlock opens at most: the most recently issued ones by
  * `notBefore`. Each costs an AEAD open and a key import at unlock, and `smime.ts`'s `decryptEnvelopedDataWithKeys()`
@@ -60,6 +64,24 @@ export interface UnlockedKeys {
      * that). A compromised key is kept because reading one's own mail encrypted to it is still needed. Absent when there
      * are none. */
     retainedEncryptionKeys?: RetainedEncryptionKey[];
+    /** The mailbox's zero-access private keys (restapi `specs/search.md` §3) - the keys the server encrypts mail at rest,
+     * index entries and sealed summaries to - the active one first, then retained ones newest first, at most
+     * `MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1`. Decryption only. Absent when the mailbox has none (or none opened). */
+    zeroAccessKeys?: RetainedEncryptionKey[];
+    /** The mailbox's OpenPGP secret keys (restapi `specs/end-to-end_encryption.md` *OpenPGP Interoperability*) - the active one
+     * first, then retained ones newest first, at most `MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1`: what opens mail OpenPGP users encrypt to
+     * the mailbox, and signs what it sends them. Absent when the mailbox has none (or none opened). */
+    openPgpKeys?: {
+        fingerprint: string;
+        privateKey: OpenPgpPrivateKey;
+    }[];
+    /** A shared mailbox opened through this user's member key wraps (`sharedMailboxKeys.ts`), not with its own master key: it holds
+     * only `zeroAccessKeys`, and `masterKey` is a per-key secret derived from its zero-access private key (what the local search
+     * index's key is derived from), never a key that opens the mailbox's vault. */
+    shared?: boolean;
+    /** A shared session only: the user's own mailboxes whose zero-access keys opened its member key wraps. Locking any of them locks it too -
+     * it was opened with their keys, so it doesn't outlive them. */
+    openedWith?: string[];
 }
 /** What changed in the session store — passed to every `subscribeKeySession()` listener. */
 export interface KeySessionEvent {
@@ -76,6 +98,36 @@ export type KeySessionListener = (event: KeySessionEvent) => void;
  * nothing. Returns an unsubscribe function.
  */
 export declare function subscribeKeySession(listener: KeySessionListener): () => void;
+/**
+ * Makes a zero-access key this device has just enrolled (`zeroAccessKey.ts`'s `provisionZeroAccessKey()`) the active one
+ * of `unlocked` - the session object the key's private half was sealed under - so zero-access mail encrypted to it reads
+ * without another unlock. Does nothing when `unlocked` is no longer this mailbox's session (it was locked or replaced
+ * meanwhile; the next unlock opens the key from the vault anyway).
+ */
+export declare function addZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid: string, unlocked: UnlockedKeys, key: RetainedEncryptionKey): void;
+/**
+ * Makes an OpenPGP key this device has just enrolled (`openPgpKey.ts`'s `ensureOpenPgpKey()`) the active one of `unlocked`, so
+ * OpenPGP mail to it reads without another unlock - the same rules as `addZeroAccessKey()`.
+ */
+export declare function addOpenPgpKey(mailboxUid: string, unlocked: UnlockedKeys, key: {
+    fingerprint: string;
+    privateKey: OpenPgpPrivateKey;
+}): void;
+/**
+ * Stores the keys of a shared mailbox opened through member key wraps (`sharedMailboxKeys.ts`'s `unlockSharedMailbox()`) as that mailbox's
+ * session, exactly as an unlock would - tracked for `destroyUnlockedKeys()`, and notified - unless the mailbox was locked since `generation`
+ * was taken (`sharedUnlockGeneration()`), when they are destroyed instead and `KeysLockedError` is thrown.
+ */
+export declare function installSharedSession(mailboxUid: string, unlocked: UnlockedKeys, generation: string): void;
+/** The lock generation to pass `installSharedSession()`, taken before a shared unlock starts its requests. */
+export declare function sharedUnlockGeneration(mailboxUid: string): string;
+/** Every mailbox unlocked this session with its own keys (not a shared one opened through member key wraps). */
+export declare function personallyUnlockedKeys(): UnlockedKeys[];
+/** `personallyUnlockedKeys()` with each mailbox's uid. */
+export declare function personalSessions(): {
+    mailboxUid: string;
+    unlocked: UnlockedKeys;
+}[];
 /** Reads back a mailbox's already-unlocked keys this session, or `undefined` if it hasn't been
  * unlocked yet (or was destroyed). Never triggers an unlock itself. */
 export declare function getUnlockedKeys(mailboxUid: string): UnlockedKeys | undefined;
@@ -128,11 +180,20 @@ export declare class UnopenableEncryptionKeyError extends Error {
  * "incorrect password," not a generic error, but this module doesn't presume a specific UI's error copy.
  * Once the master key has opened, the password is known to be right: an active signing key that then
  * won't open is skipped and listed in `UnlockResult.unopenableKeys` (so is a retained encryption key); an active
- * encryption key that won't
- * open still fails the unlock, with `UnopenableEncryptionKeyError`. Throws `KeysLockedError` when
+ * encryption key that won't open, or whose certificate isn't its own,
+ * still fails the unlock, with `UnopenableEncryptionKeyError`. Throws `KeysLockedError` when
  * `destroyUnlockedKeys()` locked this mailbox (or all mailboxes) while the unlock was in flight.
  */
 export declare function unlockWithPassword(mailboxUid: string, mailboxKeys: PublicKey[], password: string): Promise<UnlockResult>;
+/**
+ * Fetches `mailboxUid`'s vault and opens its master key with the password wrap, touching no session - for an operation that
+ * must re-prove the password even while the mailbox is unlocked (`keyExport.ts`). Rejects exactly as `unlockWithPassword()`
+ * does on a missing wrap, an unknown KDF or a wrong password. The caller owns the returned master key and must zero it.
+ */
+export declare function openMasterKeyWithPassword(mailboxUid: string, password: string, client?: ApiClient): Promise<{
+    vault: KeyVault;
+    masterKey: Uint8Array;
+}>;
 /** What `unlockWithRecoveryCode()` resolves with. */
 export interface RecoveryUnlockResult extends UnlockResult {
     /** The `methodId` of the recovery wrap the code opened (e.g. `"recovery-3"`). Recovery codes are single-use: