@raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic 3.6.0 → 3.7.0

package/skills/marketing/marketing-pixel-data-leakage-review/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: marketing-pixel-data-leakage-review
 description: Use this skill when reviewing advertising pixels and event-tracking for personal-data leakage to third-party ad networks. Trigger when a user provides a tag-manager container, a Meta/TikTok/Google/LinkedIn pixel snippet, a conversion-event payload, a dataLayer specification, or asks whether their tracking pixels leak email, phone numbers, health, or financial data to ad platforms, or whether pixels on sensitive pages create a breach or HIPAA exposure.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-05-17"
   category: security

package/skills/marketing/marketing-pixel-data-leakage-review/metadata.json

@@ -16,6 +16,6 @@
   "security_notes": "Advertising pixels that capture email, phone, health, or financial data transmit personal data to third-party ad networks with no contract, no consent scope, and no breach visibility — a pattern behind major HIPAA settlements, FTC Health Breach Notification Rule actions, and wiretap class actions. Review works from sanitized payloads and container exports only; never request real visitor data or ad-platform credentials.",
   "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
   "path": "skills/marketing/marketing-pixel-data-leakage-review",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0"
 }

package/skills/marketing/martech-access-governance-review/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: martech-access-governance-review
 description: Use this skill when reviewing access governance across a marketing technology stack — OAuth grants and connected apps, API keys and tokens, CRM and marketing-automation role assignments, and integration scopes. Trigger when a user provides an OAuth connected-app inventory, an integration scope list, a CRM/MAP role matrix, an API-key inventory, or asks whether their martech integrations are over-permissioned, whether stale connectors still hold live tokens, or how to apply least privilege to their marketing stack.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-05-17"
   category: security

package/skills/marketing/martech-access-governance-review/metadata.json

@@ -16,6 +16,6 @@
   "security_notes": "A marketing technology stack holds the full customer database and accumulates OAuth grants, API keys, and seats faster than it deprovisions them. Over-broad connector scopes, shared non-rotating credentials, and stale grants from departed staff or ended vendors are a heavily exploited SaaS breach path. Review works from sanitized inventories only; never request, collect, or echo credential values, tokens, or secrets.",
   "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
   "path": "skills/marketing/martech-access-governance-review",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0"
 }

package/skills/marketing/programmatic-supply-chain-integrity-review/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: programmatic-supply-chain-integrity-review
 description: Use this skill when reviewing ads.txt, app-ads.txt, and sellers.json files for a publisher or advertiser's programmatic supply chain to detect unauthorized resellers, domain-spoofing exposure, and SupplyChain Object gaps. Trigger when a user provides an ads.txt file, an app-ads.txt file, a sellers.json endpoint response, or asks whether their programmatic supply chain has unauthorized intermediaries, IVT exposure, domain-spoofing risk, or whether their supply chain declaration satisfies IAB Tech Lab, MRC, or DSP procurement requirements.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-05-17"
   category: finops

package/skills/marketing/programmatic-supply-chain-integrity-review/metadata.json

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Supply chain integrity reviews work from the raw text of ads.txt, app-ads.txt, and sellers.json files pasted as input. Never request DSP credentials, exchange account tokens, or bid-stream logs. ads.txt and sellers.json are publicly resolvable files; the artifact is the publisher's or exchange's own exported text, not a live crawl of production endpoints.",
   "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
   "path": "skills/marketing/programmatic-supply-chain-integrity-review",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "lifecycle": "experimental"
 }

package/skills/microsoft/copilot-governance-maestro/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: copilot-governance-maestro
 description: Route Microsoft Copilot and Copilot Studio governance requests to the narrowest specialist or team of specialists from the catalog. Use when you do not already know the specialist. Not for direct Copilot governance answers; Maestro classifies, dispatches, and synthesizes only. Dispatches single agent for focused tasks, parallel team (max 4) for multi-domain tasks. Never auto-dispatches live-guard agents — requires explicit human confirmation with blast-radius and rollback before routing to any broad agent publishing or connector/plugin access grant operation.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: ai

package/skills/microsoft/copilot-governance-maestro/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable: never auto-dispatch to broad Copilot Studio agent publishing or connector/plugin access grant operations without explicit human confirmation, blast-radius assessment, and rollback path. Do not ask for secrets, tenant IDs, Graph tokens, or environment-specific values.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/copilot-governance-maestro",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "ai",
   "companion_agents": ["copilot-governance-maestro-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/copilot-studio-agent-governance-alm/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: copilot-studio-agent-governance-alm
 description: Review Microsoft Copilot Studio agent governance and application lifecycle management health including authentication configuration, DLP policies for connectors and actions, environment strategy, solution-based ALM across dev/test/prod, content moderation, analytics and telemetry, human-handoff and approval boundaries, sharing and publishing controls, and compliance posture via Microsoft Purview. Use to detect ungoverned agent publishing, overly permissive connector grants, absent DLP enforcement, and missing ALM discipline. Static review only; broad publishing and connector grants are live-guard gated.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: ai

package/skills/microsoft/copilot-studio-agent-governance-alm/metadata.json

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Static review only. Never approve broad agent publishing to an organization or connector grants without a completed governance review; these are live-guard gated. Do not recommend production DLP policy changes, environment-level publishing controls, or ALM stage bypasses without explicit human approval, blast-radius assessment, and a tested rollback path. Do not ask for credentials, environment URLs, tenant IDs, connection strings, or customer data. Treat agents deployed without authentication, absent DLP coverage, ungoverned connector grants, and missing ALM discipline as organizational security risks until reviewed.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/copilot-studio-agent-governance-alm",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "ai",
   "companion_agents": ["copilot-studio-agent-governance-alm-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-commerce/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-commerce
 description: Review Dynamics 365 Commerce across omnichannel retail operations — Store Commerce POS, e-commerce storefront, call center channels, Commerce Scale Unit, channel management, product catalogs and assortments, pricing and discounts, inventory visibility, and store operations. Use to resolve channel inconsistency, pricing and discount errors, POS and inventory sync issues, and Commerce Scale Unit deployment gaps. Static review only; production channel and pricing configuration changes are escalated.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: operational

package/skills/microsoft/d365-commerce/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Static review only. Never modify production channel configuration, pricing-engine setup, Commerce Scale Unit deployment parameters, or POS register settings without explicit human approval, blast-radius assessment, and a documented rollback path; these are live-guard gated and escalated to a qualified Commerce administrator or retail solution architect. Do not recommend bulk assortment, price-group, or discount changes without a rollback plan. Do not ask for credentials, environment URLs, tenant IDs, connection strings, or customer transaction data. Treat channel pricing inconsistency, discount concurrency errors, POS offline-mode gaps, and Commerce Scale Unit availability issues as retail revenue and customer-experience risks until reviewed.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-commerce",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "operational",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-commerce-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-customer-insights-journeys/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-customer-insights-journeys
 description: Review Dynamics 365 Customer Insights — Data (CDP: data unification, segments, measures) and Customer Insights — Journeys (real-time marketing journeys, triggers, consent/compliance, channel orchestration) design and configuration. Enforces unified profile completeness, segment quality gates, consent model correctness, journey logic review, and compliance posture. Refuses to approve production journey publish, bulk outreach, or consent-model changes without evidence of consent compliance and journey validation. Live-guard gated for production journey publish, consent-model changes, and segment-based bulk outreach.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: data

package/skills/microsoft/d365-customer-insights-journeys/metadata.json

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never approve production journey publish or bulk outreach without documented evidence of consent compliance review, audience segment validation, and journey logic sign-off. Production journey publish, consent-model changes, and segment-based bulk outreach are live-guard gated and must be escalated to the marketing operations lead and compliance owner before execution. Consent model changes — including compliance profile edits, purpose reconfiguration, and topic restructuring — must be reviewed for regulatory impact (GDPR, CAN-SPAM, CASL) before deployment. Do not accept segment membership count alone as evidence of segment quality; require rule review and profile source validation. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, environment URLs, API keys, customer PII, or consent data exports. Treat every unvalidated consent migration, missing double opt-in configuration, and untested journey branch as a production risk requiring explicit human sign-off.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-customer-insights-journeys",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "data",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-customer-insights-journeys-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-customer-service-contact-center/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-customer-service-contact-center
 description: Review Dynamics 365 Customer Service and Contact Center operations across the case-to-resolution lifecycle — case management, unified routing, Omnichannel for Customer Service, queues, entitlements, service-level agreements (SLAs), knowledge management, and Copilot in Service. Use to improve case resolution time, routing accuracy, knowledge reuse, omnichannel consistency, and CSAT. Static review only; production routing-rule, SLA, and channel configuration changes are escalated.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: operational

package/skills/microsoft/d365-customer-service-contact-center/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Static review only. Do not modify production unified-routing rules, SLA configurations, channel/workstream setup, or knowledge publishing workflows; these are escalated to a qualified Customer Service administrator with a rollback plan. Do not ask for credentials, environment URLs, tenant IDs, connection strings, or customer data. Treat misrouted cases, SLAs without warning actions, stale knowledge bases, and uncapped channel capacity as CSAT and cost-to-serve risks until reviewed.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-customer-service-contact-center",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "operational",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-customer-service-contact-center-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-data-migration-cutover/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-data-migration-cutover
 description: Review Dynamics 365 data migration planning and go-live cutover readiness. Enforces mock migration evidence, data quality gates, staging table validation, reconciliation controls, cutover runbook completeness, rollback plan, and owner sign-off before production migration. Refuses to bless production cutover without reconciliation evidence and rollback plan. Production data migration is live-guard gated and requires escalation.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: data

package/skills/microsoft/d365-data-migration-cutover/metadata.json

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never approve production data migration or cutover without documented evidence of at least one completed mock migration, reconciliation sign-off comparing source and target record counts, and a tested rollback plan. Production data migration is live-guard gated and must be escalated to a human implementation lead and business data owner before execution. Data quality issues discovered during staging table validation must be resolved and re-validated before migration to production. Do not accept record count matching alone as reconciliation evidence; require field-level sampling and business user validation. Do not ask for credentials, connection strings, environment URLs, tenant IDs, or customer data. Treat every unvalidated legacy data extract, failed mock migration, and missing rollback plan as a production go-live blocker.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-data-migration-cutover",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "data",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-data-migration-cutover-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-field-service-to-cash/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-field-service-to-cash
 description: Review Dynamics 365 Field Service operations across the service-to-cash (now "service to deliver") lifecycle — work order management, Universal Resource Scheduling, schedule board and Resource Scheduling Optimization, bookable resources, technician mobile execution, asset and preventive maintenance, inventory/truck stock, and work-order-to-invoice billing. Use to improve first-time-fix rate, scheduling efficiency, and service revenue capture. Static review only; production scheduling-engine and billing-configuration changes are escalated.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: operational

package/skills/microsoft/d365-field-service-to-cash/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Static review only. Do not modify production scheduling engine configuration, Resource Scheduling Optimization parameters, or billing/invoicing setup; these are escalated to a qualified Field Service administrator with a rollback plan. Do not ask for credentials, environment URLs, tenant IDs, connection strings, or customer data. Treat unscheduled work order backlogs, low first-time-fix rates, untracked truck-stock consumption, and uninvoiced completed bookings as service revenue leakage risks until reviewed.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-field-service-to-cash",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "operational",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-field-service-to-cash-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-finance-close-to-report/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-finance-close-to-report
 description: Review Dynamics 365 Finance general ledger configuration, sub-ledger reconciliation, period-end and year-end close procedures, financial consolidation and elimination, posting profiles, tax setup, and financial reporting controls. Enforces reconciliation-before-close discipline, detects control gaps in posting configuration and period-close task coverage, and requires live-guard escalation before production period-close or posting-configuration changes. Refuses to approve a close process without reconciliation and financial controls evidence.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: finance

package/skills/microsoft/d365-finance-close-to-report/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never approve a period-end or year-end close process without reconciliation evidence and financial controls sign-off. Production posting-configuration changes, period-status updates (On Hold, Permanently Closed), and consolidation runs are live-guard gated and must be escalated to a human finance controller or system administrator. Reject close process approval where sub-ledger to GL reconciliation gaps are unresolved. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, environment URLs, or customer financial data. Treat every unreconciled balance, unposted journal, and unapproved posting profile change as a reporting risk until evidenced otherwise. Tax configuration and foreign currency revaluation parameter changes must be validated by a qualified tax or finance controller before production use.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-finance-close-to-report",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "finance",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-finance-close-to-report-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-fno-developer-extension/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-fno-developer-extension
 description: Review Dynamics 365 Finance & Operations developer and extension engineering work — X++ extensions (not over-layering), Chain of Command, extension models, deployable packages, Azure DevOps and Lifecycle Services ALM, build and test automation, upgrade-safe customization, and performance. Detects unsafe customizations, upgrade blockers, fragile extensions, and ALM anti-patterns. Refuses to approve production deployable package deployment or schema changes without sandbox validation evidence and rollback plan. Live-guard gated for deploying packages to production and schema changes.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: devsecops

package/skills/microsoft/d365-fno-developer-extension/metadata.json

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never approve production deployable package deployment or schema changes without documented evidence of sandbox validation, automated test results (SysTest or RSAT), and a rollback plan with a named owner. Production package deployment is live-guard gated and must be escalated to the implementation lead and release manager before execution. Extension code that uses over-layering, modifies base application objects directly, or bypasses Chain of Command must be flagged as an upgrade blocker. Do not accept build pipeline success alone as deployment readiness; require sandbox environment sign-off and business process test coverage. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, environment URLs, LCS project IDs, Azure DevOps PATs, or source code containing secrets. Treat every unvalidated X++ customization, missing rollback plan, and untested deployable package as a production deployment blocker.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-fno-developer-extension",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "devsecops",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-fno-developer-extension-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-integration-dual-write/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-integration-dual-write
 description: Review Dynamics 365 integration design and operations — dual-write (Finance & Operations to/from Dataverse bidirectional sync), virtual entities, table map configuration, initial sync planning, error handling and monitoring, master-data ownership, and Power Platform integration boundary. Detects ERP/CRM data inconsistency, dual-write drift, integration failures, and broken master-data ownership. Refuses to approve enabling or disabling dual-write table maps in production or initial sync runs without dependency analysis, conflict resolution plan, and rollback readiness. Live-guard gated for enabling or disabling dual-write maps in production and initial sync runs.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: platform

package/skills/microsoft/d365-integration-dual-write/metadata.json

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never approve enabling or disabling dual-write table maps in production or running initial sync without documented dependency analysis, conflict resolution plan (master-data ownership declared per entity), and rollback readiness. Enabling/disabling production dual-write maps and initial sync runs are live-guard gated and must be escalated to the integration lead and data governance owner before execution. Dual-write initial sync copies pre-existing data from both sides; merge conflicts require a declared master-data owner per table map before sync begins. Do not accept map status Running alone as evidence of integration health; require error log review and alert threshold configuration. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, environment URLs, LCS project IDs, Dataverse connection strings, or integration key values. Treat every undeclared master-data ownership, missing error alert configuration, and untested rollback path as a production integration risk.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-integration-dual-write",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "platform",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-integration-dual-write-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-live-record-field-update-guard/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-live-record-field-update-guard
 description: Mutating-runtime live-guard for updating one or more named fields on a single Dataverse row identified by table and record GUID, via the Dataverse Web API PATCH (data plane). Strictly scoped — one record, named fields only. Requires explicit written human approval token referencing the exact target, proposed change, and blast-radius. PREFLIGHT performs a dry-run diff before any write. Fully reversible — prior field values are captured and the inverse PATCH is the rollback. Gate-only; never auto-dispatched. Phase B mutating-runtime.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: data

package/skills/microsoft/d365-live-record-field-update-guard/metadata.json

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Mutating-runtime Phase B. Custom least-privilege write role with Write (prvWrite) on the one in-scope table only. System Administrator, System Customizer, Delete, bulk, wildcard, ownership changes, security-role/privilege edits, and Power Platform management SPN path are all explicitly denied. Requires written human approval token referencing exact target. PREFLIGHT dry-run diff required before any write. Prior field values captured for ROLLBACK inverse PATCH. Output signed with idempotency key and audit-logged.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-live-record-field-update-guard",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-live-record-field-update-guard-agent"]
 }

package/skills/microsoft/d365-live-security-role-guard/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-live-security-role-guard
 description: Live read-only Dataverse security posture discovery — enumerate security roles, team and business-unit assignments, application users, over-privileged System Administrator assignments, and SoD-relevant privilege combinations — then propose least-privilege role design with rollback plan. Phase A read-only-runtime only; no mutation. Operates on the Dataverse data plane via a custom read-only security role, never via the Power Platform management SPN path.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: security

package/skills/microsoft/d365-live-security-role-guard/metadata.json

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Operates on the Dataverse data plane via a custom read-only security role. System Administrator and System Customizer are explicitly denied. The Power Platform management SPN path is explicitly forbidden (cannot be least-privileged). Phase A only — no mutation.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-live-security-role-guard",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-live-security-role-guard-agent"]
 }

package/skills/microsoft/d365-maestro/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-maestro
 description: Route Dynamics 365 tasks to the narrowest D365 specialist from the catalog. Use when you do not already know the specialist. Not for direct D365 answers; Maestro classifies, dispatches, and synthesizes only. Dispatches single agent for focused tasks, parallel team (max 4) for multi-domain tasks. Enforces Success by Design gates and segregation-of-duties escalation. Never auto-dispatches live-guard agents — requires explicit human confirmation with blast-radius and rollback before routing to any D365 production cutover, data migration to prod, or posting-config agent.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: platform

package/skills/microsoft/d365-maestro/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable: never auto-dispatch any agent executing D365 production cutover, migrating data to production, or changing posting configuration without explicit human confirmation, blast-radius assessment, and rollback path. Enforce Success by Design stage gates (solution blueprint, data migration strategy, cutover strategy, security model). Escalate segregation-of-duties conflicts to d365-security-segregation-of-duties-steward before live dispatch. Do not ask for secrets, tenant IDs, or environment-specific values.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-maestro",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "platform",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-maestro-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-project-operations/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-project-operations
 description: Review Dynamics 365 Project Operations across the project-to-profit lifecycle — project contracts, project planning and scheduling, resource management and assignment, time and expense, project budgeting and cost control, billing and revenue recognition, and integration with Dynamics 365 Finance. Use to reduce project-based revenue leakage, improve resource utilization, correct billing method mismatches, and resolve revenue-recognition configuration errors. Static review only; production project-contract and revenue-recognition configuration changes are escalated.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: operational

package/skills/microsoft/d365-project-operations/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Static review only. Never modify production project-contract configuration, revenue-recognition setup, billing-method settings, or Finance integration parameters without explicit human approval, blast-radius assessment, and a documented rollback path; these are live-guard gated and escalated to a qualified Project Operations administrator or Finance functional consultant. Do not recommend bulk time/expense adjustment or revenue-recognition elimination without a rollback plan. Do not ask for credentials, environment URLs, tenant IDs, connection strings, or customer financial data. Treat revenue leakage from billing method mismatches, WIP imbalances, unreconciled bookings, and uncapped resource over-allocation as project-financial risks until reviewed.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-project-operations",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "operational",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-project-operations-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-sales-revenue-operations/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-sales-revenue-operations
 description: Review and advise on Dynamics 365 Sales revenue operations — pipeline and opportunity management, sales forecasting, lead qualification, sales accelerator configuration, CRM data hygiene, and sales insights. Detects pipeline trust gaps, forecast inaccuracy, CRM hygiene failures, and revenue leakage patterns. Refuses to approve live production forecast configuration or sales-process changes without live-guard escalation. Static review and advisory only.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: operational

package/skills/microsoft/d365-sales-revenue-operations/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never approve production forecast configuration changes or bulk sales-process modifications without documented business owner sign-off and live-guard escalation to a qualified Dynamics 365 Sales administrator. Do not recommend bulk opportunity updates, pipeline purges, or forecast category resets without an explicit rollback plan. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, environment URLs, connection strings, or customer data. Treat every stale pipeline record, uncategorized forecast item, and unvalidated quota assignment as a potential revenue leakage risk until reviewed.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-sales-revenue-operations",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "operational",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-sales-revenue-operations-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-security-sod-governance/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-security-sod-governance
 description: Review Dynamics 365 Finance & Operations security role design, duty and privilege assignments, segregation of duties (SoD) conflict rules, user-role assignments, and audit evidence for least-privilege compliance. Enforces SoD conflict detection, security reports review, role layering analysis, and privileged access controls. Refuses to approve role changes that introduce SoD conflicts or bypass audit controls. Production role changes are live-guard gated and require escalation.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: compliance

package/skills/microsoft/d365-security-sod-governance/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never approve role changes that introduce SoD conflicts or remove audit controls without documented evidence and owner sign-off. Production role assignment changes are live-guard gated and must be escalated to a human administrator. SoD override approvals must include a documented business justification and compensating control. Do not accept system administrator role assignments as a workaround for missing duty design. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, environment URLs, or customer data. Treat every unresolved SoD conflict and every broad privilege assignment as a risk until proven mitigated.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-security-sod-governance",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "compliance",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-security-sod-governance-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-success-by-design-governance/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-success-by-design-governance
 description: Review Dynamics 365 implementation governance against the Success by Design framework. Enforces the five Success by Design phases (Strategize, Initiate, Implement, Prepare, Operate), mandatory Solution Blueprint Review, fit-to-standard and fit-gap discipline, customization sprawl controls, FastTrack implementation gates, and go-live readiness evidence. Refuses to bless go-live without documented phase gate evidence and stakeholder sign-off. Production deployment is live-guard gated and requires escalation.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: architecture

package/skills/microsoft/d365-success-by-design-governance/metadata.json

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never approve go-live without documented evidence of a completed Solution Blueprint Review, fit-gap analysis sign-off, mock cutover results, and business stakeholder readiness approval. Production deployment is live-guard gated and requires explicit human escalation with written go/no-go decision from project sponsor. Customizations that bypass standard product processes without documented business justification and architectural review must be flagged as high risk. Do not approve SBR waivers, phase gate bypasses, or missing implementation reviews without compensating controls and owner sign-off. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, environment URLs, or customer data. Treat every unresolved SBR finding and every undocumented customization as a transformation risk until proven mitigated.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-success-by-design-governance",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "architecture",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-success-by-design-governance-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/d365-supply-chain-plan-to-produce/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: d365-supply-chain-plan-to-produce
 description: Review Dynamics 365 Supply Chain Management master planning (Planning Optimization/MRP), inventory management accuracy, procurement and sourcing configuration, warehouse management setup, and production control parameters including BOMs and routes. Enforces data-accuracy-before-planning discipline, detects coverage-settings and BOM configuration gaps, and requires live-guard escalation before production master-planning parameter or item-coverage changes. Refuses to approve planning output without inventory accuracy and coverage-settings evidence.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: operational

package/skills/microsoft/d365-supply-chain-plan-to-produce/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never approve master-planning parameter changes or item-coverage reconfigurations without inventory accuracy evidence and supply chain controller sign-off. Production master plan runs, coverage group modifications, and BOM or route activations are live-guard gated and must be escalated to a human supply chain manager or system administrator. Reject planning output approval where on-hand inventory data is unvalidated or safety stock levels are undocumented. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, environment URLs, or customer supply chain data. Treat every unvalidated coverage setting, unapproved planned order firm action, and unreconciled inventory discrepancy as a production risk until evidenced otherwise. Procurement policy changes and vendor lead-time updates must be validated by a qualified supply chain manager before production use.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/d365-supply-chain-plan-to-produce",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "operational",
   "companion_agents": ["d365-supply-chain-plan-to-produce-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/fabric-analytics-engineering/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: fabric-analytics-engineering
 description: Review Microsoft Fabric analytics engineering artifacts — Fabric Data Warehouse T-SQL design and anti-patterns, dimensional modeling (star schema, fact and dimension tables, relationships), semantic model design (Direct Lake vs Import vs DirectQuery selection, table layout, relationship cardinality), DAX measure correctness and optimization (iterators, filter context, variables, CALCULATE), data preparation and transformation quality, and reusable certified semantic models feeding Power BI reports. Use to fix bad star schemas, slow DAX, untrustworthy measures, and warehouse anti-patterns. Distinct from governance: this is build quality and modeling correctness, not RLS or workspace trust. Static review only; production warehouse schema changes and semantic-model deployment are escalated.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: data

package/skills/microsoft/fabric-analytics-engineering/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Static review only. Never execute DDL or DML against production Fabric Data Warehouse schemas, deploy or overwrite production semantic models, publish Power BI reports to production workspaces, or modify deployment-pipeline stages without explicit human approval, blast-radius assessment, and a rollback path; these are live-guard gated and must be escalated to a Fabric or analytics administrator. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, workspace URLs, or customer data. Treat missing surrogate keys in fact tables, fan-out or chasm-trap join patterns, incorrect DAX filter context, measures using calculated columns instead of explicit DAX, DirectQuery fallback on Direct Lake SQL views, and unverified measure outputs as correctness risks until reviewed. Label every finding as documented artifact, user-provided sanitized evidence, documentation-based, or inference.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/fabric-analytics-engineering",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "data",
   "companion_agents": ["fabric-analytics-engineering-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/fabric-data-engineering/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: fabric-data-engineering
 description: Review Microsoft Fabric data engineering artifacts — Lakehouse and OneLake design, medallion (bronze/silver/gold) architecture, Spark notebooks and Spark job definitions, Data pipelines and Dataflows Gen2, Delta/Parquet storage and OneLake shortcuts, Real-Time Intelligence (eventstreams, KQL databases, eventhouse), Direct Lake semantic-model source design, ingestion and orchestration patterns, Capacity Unit (CU) efficiency, and Git integration and deployment pipelines for engineering items. Use to fix brittle pipelines, poor medallion layering, capacity overruns, and fragile ingestion patterns. Static review only; production pipeline runs, capacity changes, and deployment-pipeline promotions are escalated.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: data

package/skills/microsoft/fabric-data-engineering/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Static review only. Never execute production Spark notebooks, trigger production pipeline runs, promote deployment-pipeline stages, resize or pause Fabric capacity, or modify OneLake folder-level or item-level access controls without explicit human approval, blast-radius assessment, and a documented rollback path; these are live-guard gated and must be escalated to a Fabric administrator. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, workspace URLs, connection strings, or customer data. Treat unpartitioned bronze tables, missing Delta optimization (V-Order, Liquid Clustering), unbounded Spark jobs, unchecked CU consumption, missing incremental-load logic, and eventstream destinations without error handling as reliability and capacity risks until reviewed. Label every finding as documented artifact, user-provided sanitized evidence, documentation-based, or inference.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/fabric-data-engineering",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "data",
   "companion_agents": ["fabric-data-engineering-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/fabric-power-bi-business-insights-governance/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: fabric-power-bi-business-insights-governance
 description: Review Microsoft Fabric and Power BI business-insights governance — semantic model trust (shared/endorsed/certified models, Build permission), row-level and object-level security, workspace roles, OneLake catalog discoverability and lineage, sensitivity labels and Microsoft Purview DLP for Power BI, certified-dataset reuse, and capacity oversight. Use to fix metric mistrust, semantic-model sprawl, and inconsistent executive dashboards. Static review only; production workspace-role, RLS, and capacity changes are escalated.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: observability

package/skills/microsoft/fabric-power-bi-business-insights-governance/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Static review only. Do not modify production workspace roles, row-level/object-level security, sensitivity labels, DLP policies, or Fabric capacity; these are escalated to a Fabric administrator with a rollback plan. Note RLS only restricts Viewer-role users — it does not apply to Admin/Member/Contributor. Do not ask for credentials, tenant IDs, workspace URLs, or customer data. Treat duplicated/uncertified semantic models, reports on personal models, missing RLS on sensitive models, and over-broad workspace roles as metric-trust and data-exposure risks until reviewed.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/fabric-power-bi-business-insights-governance",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "observability",
   "companion_agents": ["fabric-power-bi-business-insights-governance-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/m365-backup-bcdr-data-resilience/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: m365-backup-bcdr-data-resilience
 description: Review Microsoft 365 backup posture and business continuity readiness — Microsoft 365 Backup coverage for Exchange Online, SharePoint, and OneDrive; retention-versus-backup distinction; ransomware recovery readiness; RPO and RTO targets; Backup Storage architecture; and third-party backup solution boundary guidance. Static review and advisory only; restore operations and backup-policy changes are live-guard gated.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: resilience

package/skills/microsoft/m365-backup-bcdr-data-resilience/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Never initiate or approve restore operations, backup policy changes, or offboarding actions without explicit human confirmation and a documented rollback path. Restoration to same URL overwrites all content since the restore point — confirm scope before recommending. Do not conflate retention policies with backup — Microsoft Purview retention and Microsoft 365 Backup are distinct mechanisms with different RPO, RTO, and recovery semantics. Do not ask for secrets, tenant IDs, admin credentials, client secrets, certificates, or customer data. Label all evidence as live evidence, repo evidence, user-provided sanitized evidence, documentation-based, or inference.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-17",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/m365-backup-bcdr-data-resilience",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "resilience",
   "companion_agents": ["m365-backup-bcdr-data-resilience-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/m365-copilot-readiness-governance/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: m365-copilot-readiness-governance
 description: Review Microsoft 365 Copilot readiness posture and data-exposure governance against the Microsoft Zero Trust 7-layer model. Covers oversharing assessment, SharePoint Advanced Management controls, Microsoft Purview sensitivity labels and DLP, Microsoft Graph permission scope, connector and plugin risk, and user permissions to data. Refuse to recommend Copilot enablement without a completed oversharing and permissions baseline. Prefer static review and advisory guidance; escalate live-tenant configuration mutations to live-guard gate.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-16"
   category: ai

package/skills/microsoft/m365-copilot-readiness-governance/metadata.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
   "security_notes": "Refuse to recommend Microsoft 365 Copilot enablement without evidence of a completed oversharing assessment and permissions baseline. Never auto-dispatch live-tenant configuration mutations — sensitivity label publishing, DLP policy creation, Conditional Access changes, and connector permission grants all require explicit human confirmation, blast-radius assessment, and rollback path. Do not ask for secrets, tenant IDs, admin credentials, or customer data. Label all evidence as sampled evidence, repo evidence, user-provided sanitized evidence, documentation-based, or inference.",
   "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
   "path": "skills/microsoft/m365-copilot-readiness-governance",
-  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "category": "ai",
   "companion_agents": ["m365-copilot-readiness-governance-agent"]

package/skills/microsoft/m365-defender-xdr-security-operations/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: m365-defender-xdr-security-operations
 description: Review Microsoft Defender XDR security operations (SecOps) posture — unified incident queue, alert correlation, advanced hunting with KQL, automated investigation and response (AIR), Defender for Office 365 / Endpoint / Identity / Cloud Apps signal, incident triage and severity assessment, containment and response runbooks, and integration with Microsoft Sentinel. Apply Zero Trust assume-breach. Cert anchor: SC-200 Security Operations Analyst Associate. Static review and advisory only; containment actions (isolate device, disable user, block), automated-response policy changes, and live SecOps actions are live-guard gated. Escalate to SecOps owner before any containment action.
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
 metadata:
-  author: "github: Raishin"
+  author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
   version: "0.1.0"
   updated: "2026-06-17"
   category: security