@raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic 3.6.0 → 3.7.0

package/catalog/agents.json

@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/ai-advertising-targeting-fairness-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/ai-advertising-targeting-fairness-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@
     "security_notes": "ACK cluster version upgrades are irreversible. Node pool scale-down may evict workloads. Production namespace mutations require confirmation. ACK Serverless (ASK) has no node-level access — do not recommend node-level debugging commands for ASK.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-ack-container-platform-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-ack-container-platform-operator"
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not delete ActionTrail trails, SLS logstores, or audit evidence without backup verification — audit log destruction may violate MLPS 2.0 retention requirements.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-actiontrail-audit-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-actiontrail-audit-analyst"
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not change AnalyticDB cluster node types, Hologres instance specs, or billing mode without analyzing query concurrency and cost impact.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-analyticdb-realtime-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-analyticdb-realtime"
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-certificate-manager-issuer-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-certificate-manager-issuer-review"
     ]
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-change-impact-advisor-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-change-impact-advisor"
     ]
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Cross-border data transfer from CN-* regions without DSL Article 31 compliance assessment violates Chinese law. ICP filing is mandatory for internet-facing CN-* services. Flag all such cases immediately.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-china-compliance-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-china-compliance"
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-cost-anomaly-watch-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-cost-anomaly-watch-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not modify Reserved Instance purchases, Savings Plan commitments, or billing configurations without verifying coverage gaps and rollback options.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-cost-finops-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-cost-finops-analyst"
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-daily-operations-briefing-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-daily-operations-briefing-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not modify production deployment pipelines or ACR image delete policies without approval gates and rollback verification.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-devops-cicd-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-devops-cicd-operator"
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not stop, restart, or delete ECS instances, modify Auto Scaling policies affecting running instance count, or run Cloud Assistant commands on production instances without explicit confirmation of blast radius.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-ecs-compute-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-ecs-compute-operator"
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-event-driven-architecture-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-event-driven-architecture-review"
     ]
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Function Compute concurrency limit changes affect all function instances simultaneously. SAE scaling policy changes trigger rolling restarts. EDAS namespace mutations affect all applications in the namespace.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-function-serverless-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-function-serverless-operator"
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-iac-change-safety-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-iac-change-safety-review"
     ]
@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not schedule CMK deletion, revoke grants, or modify SSM secret rotation without impact analysis for access, recovery, auditability, and rollback. CMK pending deletion default is 30 days (min 7 days).",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-kms-secret-lifecycle-steward-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-kms-secret-lifecycle-steward"
@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Control Policy deny statements cascade to all accounts in the org. Test in simulation before enforcement. RAM AdministratorAccess at org-root scope is a critical blast-radius risk.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-landing-zone-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-landing-zone-architect"
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@
     "security_notes": "ACK cluster version upgrades cannot be downgraded once complete. Node pool scaling that removes nodes must verify PodDisruptionBudgets and drain posture. Managed/dedicated/serverless cluster types have different mutation procedures. Never approve a cluster version change without explicit rollback posture and PDB audit.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-live-ack-rollout-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-live-ack-rollout-guard"
     ]
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Savings Plan and RI purchases are non-refundable committed spend. Budget threshold reduction below current spend suspends services immediately. Requires 6-step live-guard gate.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-live-cost-budget-action-guard"
@@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Alibaba KMS scheduled deletion window is 30 days by default (minimum 7 days). Once deleted: OSS SSE-KMS objects, ECS encrypted disk snapshots, RDS/PolarDB TDE data are all permanently unrecoverable. Key disable is reversible; key deletion is not. Never schedule deletion without a complete CMK dependency audit.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-live-kms-key-mutation-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-live-kms-key-mutation-guard"
     ]
@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OSS public ACL = public-read/write is irreversible in practical terms (crawlers index within seconds). Cross-border replication from CN-* regions requires DSL Article 31 assessment. Requires 6-step live-guard gate before any bucket policy mutation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-live-oss-bucket-policy-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-live-oss-bucket-policy-guard"
@@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@
     "security_notes": "RAM AdministratorAccess is account-wide; assigning it to any RAM user/role is the highest-risk RAM mutation. RAM policy deletion may break active STS tokens immediately. Resource Directory Control Policy changes affect all member accounts in that OU — require org-admin equivalent approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-live-ram-policy-change-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-live-ram-policy-change-guard"
     ]
@@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@
     "security_notes": "RDS/PolarDB instance deletion without backup retention removes all data immediately and permanently. Spec downgrade may cause connection drops. Requires 6-step live-guard gate.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-live-rds-polardb-mutation-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-live-rds-polardb-mutation-guard"
@@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-load-balancer-traffic-engineer-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-load-balancer-traffic-engineer"
     ]
@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable. RAM AdministratorAccess mutations and KMS key deletion are irreversible. China mainland (CN-*) regions carry DSL/MLPS 2.0/PIPL obligations — always flag cross-border data transfer and compliance grading questions before routing.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-maestro-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
   {
@@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not switch MaxCompute billing mode (CU package to on-demand) without modeling cost impact — wrong mode can multiply costs 10x.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-maxcompute-dataworks-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-maxcompute-dataworks-analyst"
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not initiate DNS cutover or DTS primary failover without completing the data validation checklist and confirming rollback DNS TTL reduction was done 48h prior.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-migration-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-migration-architect"
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not modify Nacos config namespaces, Sentinel flow rules in production, or Seata global transaction data without impact analysis and rollback plan.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-mse-microservice-engine-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-mse-microservice-engine"
@@ -1330,7 +1330,7 @@
     "security_notes": "CLB=legacy. SLB=classic L4+L7. ALB=new L7 with advanced features. NLB=new L4 high-performance. Do not recommend public-facing NLB/ALB endpoints without WAF integration review.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-network-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-network-architect"
@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not silence alarms or modify notification channels without verifying on-call coverage. SLS log retention changes are irreversible once data is deleted.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-observability-incident-responder-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-observability-incident-responder"
@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-oss-data-perimeter-governor-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-oss-data-perimeter-governor"
     ]
@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not make buckets public, delete lifecycle rules, or disable cross-region replication without verifying downstream consumers and DR requirements.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-oss-storage-steward-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-oss-storage-steward"
@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@
     "security_notes": "PolarDB/RDS deletion without verified backup retention is permanently destructive. Spec downgrades require maintenance window. Failover testing must be coordinated with application teams.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-polardb-rds-dba-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-polardb-rds-dba"
@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never request RAM AccessKey/SecretKey, STS tokens, or any production credential. RAM AdministratorAccess on any principal is a critical finding. Resource Directory Control Policy overrides RAM policies.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-ram-iam-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-ram-iam-review"
@@ -1505,7 +1505,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-registry-artifact-governor-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-registry-artifact-governor"
     ]
@@ -1536,7 +1536,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-resilience-bcdr-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-resilience-bcdr-review"
     ]
@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Cloud Firewall policy changes affect all instances in scope simultaneously. WAF bypass via IP whitelist should require documented justification. Anti-DDoS protection tier downgrade during an active attack is blocked.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-security-center-hardening-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-security-center-hardening"
@@ -1596,7 +1596,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-serverless-production-readiness-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-serverless-production-readiness"
     ]
@@ -1624,7 +1624,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not recommend architecture changes that reduce HA, remove encryption at rest, or widen RAM permissions without explicit blast radius and rollback analysis.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-solution-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-solution-architect"
@@ -1655,7 +1655,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-support-incident-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-support-incident-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-ticket-triage-escalation-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "alibaba-ticket-triage-escalation-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -1726,7 +1726,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-waf-cost-optimization-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-waf-cost-optimization-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -1757,7 +1757,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not modify Auto Scaling policies, backup configurations, or DR plans without explicit approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-waf-reliability-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -1787,7 +1787,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not modify RAM policies, Security Group rules, KMS keys, or ActionTrail configurations without explicit approval. Note: Alibaba Cloud has separate China (CN-*) and international regions with different regulatory scopes — always confirm region before assessing compliance.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/alibaba/alibaba-waf-security-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/analytics-data-minimization-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/analytics-data-minimization-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -1987,7 +1987,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not hardcode credentials, tokens, client secrets, account IDs, or customer data. Prefer AgentCore Identity/Gateway for managed credentials, enforce Cedar policy where Gateway is used, verify region and preview-feature constraints, keep least-privilege roles, and require explicit approval before deployment or tool-exposure changes.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-agentcore-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2015,7 +2015,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve public API or edge changes without auth, throttling, TLS, logging, WAF/origin protection where appropriate, sensitive-log controls, and rollback path.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-api-edge-delivery-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2043,7 +2043,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not grant broad tool or data access to Bedrock agents. Require least privilege, prompt-injection tests, guardrail coverage, PII controls, observability, and kill-switch/rollback design.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-bedrock-agent-security-governor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2071,7 +2071,7 @@
     "security_notes": "This role is advisory only. Do not approve execution from weak evidence. Require explicit rollback, dependency, owner, and communication clarity before treating a change as low-risk.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-change-impact-advisor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2099,7 +2099,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve production pipelines without artifact integrity, least-privilege deploy roles, quality/security gates, deployment telemetry, rollback criteria, and post-deploy validation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-ci-cd-release-engineer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2127,7 +2127,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not claim compliance from tool output alone. Label evidence freshness, scope, inconclusive evidence, missing Config/Security Hub coverage, and need for legal/compliance review.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-compliance-evidence-mapper-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2155,7 +2155,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Keep the role advisory and non-destructive. Do not stop workloads or alter purchasing commitments from this role. Focus on evidence, hypotheses, safe next checks, and escalation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-cost-anomaly-watch-coordinator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2183,7 +2183,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not recommend cost cuts that remove backups, logging, security controls, redundancy, or tested capacity without explicit risk acceptance and rollback evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-cost-optimization-governor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2211,7 +2211,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not treat dashboards as proof. Keep reporting read-only, evidence-based, and explicit about unknowns. Never recommend mutation or production changes without separate approval and deeper technical review.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-daily-operations-briefing-coordinator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2239,7 +2239,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not treat snapshots as sufficient data protection. Check restore permissions, KMS access, vault policy, immutability, cross-account isolation, and tested recovery evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-data-protection-backup-steward-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2265,7 +2265,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Repo write access only. Do not deploy, apply, destroy, or mutate live AWS resources from this role by default. Require explicit human approval for any step beyond repo patching and validation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-deployment-hotfix-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2293,7 +2293,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not create AWS DevOps Agent skills with vague descriptions, broad agent targeting, secret-handling instructions, unsupported executable assumptions, or missing success criteria.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-devops-agent-skill-designer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2321,7 +2321,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not recommend DynamoDB schemas without explicit access patterns, partition cardinality, index tradeoffs, capacity/cost implications, and migration or backfill safety.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-dynamodb-data-modeling-performance-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2349,7 +2349,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve EC2 fleet operations without patch compliance, managed access, health checks, rollback, backup/snapshot posture, IAM instance-profile review, and launch-template evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-ec2-compute-operations-steward-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2377,7 +2377,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve ECS/Fargate production changes without task-role separation, deployment rollback behavior, health check evidence, logs, secrets posture, and load balancer/target group validation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-ecs-fargate-platform-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2404,7 +2404,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Repo write access only. Do not force new deployments, scale services, or alter live task state from this role by default. Surface rollout and rollback implications explicitly.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-ecs-service-remediation-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2432,7 +2432,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not call an EKS cluster production-ready without explicit identity, network isolation, upgrade, node disruption, image/runtime security, and observability evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-eks-platform-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2460,7 +2460,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not accept event-driven designs without precise patterns, DLQs/retry semantics, idempotent consumers, monitoring, cross-account policy review, and loop/cost controls.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-event-driven-architecture-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2492,7 +2492,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer serverless managed services for this role unless a concrete blocker is provided. Do not approve broad model access, unsafe prompt/tool flows, weak auth, uncontrolled retention, or missing observability and cost controls.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-generative-ai-developer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2520,7 +2520,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never approve an AWS IaC deployment from source diff alone when production state, generated artifacts, change sets, drift, replacements, destructive changes, or rollback are unresolved.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-iac-change-safety-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2547,7 +2547,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Can edit IaC files, not execute live infra changes. Never hide replacements, blast-radius risks, or IAM broadening. Always surface validation gaps and rollback concerns.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-iac-patch-executor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2575,7 +2575,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer read-only inspection and minimum permission changes. Do not broaden IAM access, invent ARNs, or approve production trust changes without Access Analyzer validation where available.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-iam-least-privilege-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2603,7 +2603,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not change key policies, grants, key deletion, secret rotation, or multi-Region encryption without impact analysis for access, recovery, auditability, and rollback.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-kms-secrets-lifecycle-steward-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2631,7 +2631,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not collapse environments into one account for convenience. Treat weak OU design, missing centralized logging, unmanaged SCPs, and unclear account ownership as governance risks.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-landing-zone-governor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2659,7 +2659,7 @@
     "security_notes": "This role may work in repos connected to live AWS credentials. Never run live deployment mutations without explicit target confirmation, preview evidence, approval, rollback readiness, and post-change verification.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-live-deployment-guarded-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2687,7 +2687,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Live ECS rollout actions require exact service targeting, health evidence, rollback posture, and explicit approval. Never treat force-new-deployment as a harmless default.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-live-ecs-rollout-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2716,7 +2716,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Live IaC execution only with explicit preview evidence, confirmed targets, rollback triggers or equivalent safeguards, and human approval before execute. Never treat repo write access as enough authority for live infrastructure mutation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-live-iac-change-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2744,7 +2744,7 @@
     "security_notes": "This role may interact with real pipeline approvals. Never approve, reject, or resume the wrong execution. Require exact targeting, approver authority, evidence review, and post-action verification.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-live-pipeline-approval-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2772,7 +2772,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Live serverless rollout actions require exact alias or deployment targeting, explicit approval, alarms, rollback posture, and post-change observation. Never shift traffic casually in a live environment.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-live-serverless-release-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2810,7 +2810,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2838,7 +2838,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve migration cutover without dependency evidence, tested launch, acceptance checks, rollback, security baseline, observability, and clear business owner signoff.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-migration-cutover-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2868,7 +2868,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not recommend public exposure, broad routes, overlapping CIDRs, route propagation, hybrid connectivity, DNS forwarding, or centralized inspection changes without traffic-flow evidence, rollback, and blast-radius analysis.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-network-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2896,7 +2896,7 @@
     "security_notes": "This role must stay non-destructive. Prefer notification, approval, reporting, and evidence-collection flows. Escalate if the request drifts into mutation, remediation, or destructive operational automation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-non-destructive-task-automation-advisor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2924,7 +2924,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not claim root cause without evidence. Separate live telemetry, service health, deployment changes, AI-derived insights, and human inference; require rollback or containment for active incidents.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-observability-incident-responder-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -2951,7 +2951,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Repo write access only. Do not manually trigger pipelines, rotate secrets, or bypass approval gates from this role. Keep fixes explicit, reviewable, and reversible.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-pipeline-fix-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3007,7 +3007,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not recommend resizing, failover, parameter changes, or index changes without evidence separating CPU, I/O, lock, query-plan, storage, connection, and application-driver causes.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-rds-aurora-performance-investigator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3035,7 +3035,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not accept backup configuration as recovery proof. Require restore tests, RTO/RPO evidence, drift controls, owner/runbook clarity, and blast-radius analysis.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-resilience-bcdr-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3063,7 +3063,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not broaden S3 public or cross-account access. Prefer Block Public Access, disabled ACLs, scoped policies, TLS-only conditions, encryption, logging, and Access Analyzer validation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-s3-data-perimeter-governor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3091,7 +3091,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not treat a green dashboard as proof of security. Verify service coverage, Regions, delegated admin, Config recording, suppressions, public exposure, and remediation evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-security-posture-hardening-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3119,7 +3119,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve serverless workloads that lack least-privilege execution roles, retry/DLQ semantics, concurrency controls, observability, idempotency, and rollback evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-serverless-production-readiness-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3146,7 +3146,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Can edit serverless rollout definitions in repo files only. Must not invoke live deploys, traffic shifts, or destructive remediation without separate explicit approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-serverless-rollout-corrector-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3175,7 +3175,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve an AWS architecture without account-boundary, IAM, network exposure, data protection, observability, recovery, and cost evidence. Label unknowns instead of pretending the diagram is proof.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-solution-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3203,7 +3203,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not mutate infrastructure, suppress alerts, or close issues without evidence and approval. This role classifies, routes, and escalates; it does not perform destructive remediation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-29",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-ticket-triage-escalation-coordinator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3232,7 +3232,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not cancel Reserved Instances, Savings Plans, or delete resources without explicit approval and resource inventory confirmation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-waf-cost-optimization-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -3260,7 +3260,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not modify Auto Scaling policies, backup schedules, or DR configurations without explicit approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-waf-reliability-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -3288,7 +3288,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not modify IAM policies, SCPs, GuardDuty configurations, or KMS keys without explicit approval. Work from AWS Config exports, Security Hub findings, or sanitized descriptions.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/aws/aws-waf-security-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -3315,7 +3315,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use official Microsoft Learn documentation for documented behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-ai-foundry-ops-governor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.2",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3343,7 +3343,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use official Microsoft Learn documentation for documented behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-aks-platform-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.2",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3372,7 +3372,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use official Microsoft Learn documentation for documented behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-app-service-production-readiness-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.2",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3401,7 +3401,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use official Microsoft Learn documentation for documented behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-cosmosdb-application-developer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
   {
@@ -3430,7 +3430,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use official Microsoft Learn documentation for documented behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-cosmosdb-performance-investigator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
   {
@@ -3462,7 +3462,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use Microsoft Learn documentation for documented Azure behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, owner/scope review, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-04",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-cosmosdb-platform-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
   {
@@ -3491,7 +3491,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use Microsoft Learn documentation for documented Azure behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, owner/scope review, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-04",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-cost-estimation-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3522,7 +3522,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use Microsoft Learn documentation for documented Azure behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, owner/scope review, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-04",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-cost-optimization-governor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3555,7 +3555,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use Microsoft Learn documentation for documented Azure behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, owner/scope review, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-04",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-entra-id-specialist-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
   {
@@ -3585,7 +3585,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Use Microsoft Learn documentation for documented Azure behavior and sampled read-only configured-environment evidence for observed state. Enforce least privilege, credential boundaries, evidence labels, owner/scope review, and explicit approval before production-impacting or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-04",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-governance-policy-guardrails-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3615,7 +3615,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for service behavior, use read-only configured-environment evidence only as sampled evidence, avoid secrets and identifiers, and require explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-identity-governance-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3647,7 +3647,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for service behavior, use read-only configured-environment evidence only as sampled evidence, avoid secrets and identifiers, and require explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-key-vault-secret-lifecycle-auditor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3709,7 +3709,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for service behavior, use read-only configured-environment evidence only as sampled evidence, avoid secrets and identifiers, and require explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-landing-zone-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3740,7 +3740,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for service behavior, use read-only configured-environment evidence only as sampled evidence, avoid secrets and identifiers, and require explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-aks-rollout-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3768,7 +3768,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never perform or approve a production slot swap without sticky-settings diff evidence, warmup health evidence, target-slot confirmation, rollback posture, and explicit human approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-app-service-slot-swap-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3796,7 +3796,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never execute an ARM, Bicep, or Deployment Stack change without what-if or equivalent preview evidence, target-scope confirmation, unmanaged-resource impact review, deny-settings review, and explicit human approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-arm-deployment-stack-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3825,7 +3825,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never approve budget, quota, or high-cost SKU mutations without sampled spend evidence, cost-data freshness caveats, explicit financial approval, alert coverage, and teardown or rollback posture.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3854,7 +3854,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never create, update, or delete privileged Microsoft Entra or Azure RBAC assignments without least-privilege scope evidence, PIM eligibility review, explicit approval, and rollback posture.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-entra-role-assignment-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3883,7 +3883,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never grant purge rights, purge objects, enable purge-impacting changes, or disable key versions without recovery evidence, dependency evidence, irreversibility warning, and explicit human approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3911,7 +3911,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never activate or approve privileged access on weak evidence. PIM is just-in-time access control, not proof that the requester, device, ticket, or production change is safe.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-pim-jit-activation-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3948,7 +3948,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -3976,7 +3976,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Azure Migrate readiness is not cutover readiness. A safe cutover needs tested landing-zone, network, DNS, identity, monitoring, rollback, and owner evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-migrate-landing-zone-cutover-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -4004,7 +4004,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not bless a topology because it is labeled hub-spoke. The evidence must prove routing, DNS, private access, egress, monitoring, and ownership boundaries.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-network-topology-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -4032,7 +4032,7 @@
     "security_notes": "An alert is a symptom, not root cause. Missing telemetry is evidence too; label it instead of guessing.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-observability-investigator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -4060,7 +4060,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Automation does not make platform change safe. The safe pattern separates plan or what-if identities from apply identities, forces human review for production, and treats drift as evidence, not noise.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-platform-automation-devops-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -4088,7 +4088,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Private endpoint adoption fails most often through DNS, not through endpoint creation. A private IP is useless if clients resolve the wrong name or the wrong zone owns the record.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-private-endpoint-adoption-planner-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -4116,7 +4116,7 @@
     "security_notes": "RBAC risk is usually scope plus privilege plus permanence. A role that looks reasonable at resource scope can be dangerous at subscription or management-group scope.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-rbac-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -4144,7 +4144,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Zero-downtime and zero-data-loss claims are expensive, rare, and usually false without tested architecture evidence. Untested DR is not DR.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-resilience-bcdr-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -4172,7 +4172,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Provider health signals are evidence, not automatic root cause. A tenant-side deployment, config change, quota issue, or dependency can coincide with a service event.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-resource-health-incident-triage-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -4200,7 +4200,7 @@
     "security_notes": "The lazy answer is Owner or Contributor. That is not role selection; it is permission dumping.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-role-selector-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": [
       "azure-role-selector"
@@ -4230,7 +4230,7 @@
     "security_notes": "A security score is not a security posture. It is a prioritized signal that still needs scope, owner, exception, and remediation evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-security-posture-hardening-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": [
       "azure-security-posture-hardening"
@@ -4260,7 +4260,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Resource groups are not isolation boundaries for everything. If the governance, policy, cost, network, and ownership boundary is really a subscription or management group, pretending a resource group is enough is self-deception.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-subscription-resource-organization-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": [
       "azure-subscription-resource-organization"
@@ -4293,7 +4293,7 @@
     "security_notes": "A savings percentage without baseline, utilization, and trade-off evidence is finance theater.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-waf-cost-optimization-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1"
   },
   {
@@ -4323,7 +4323,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Reliability is not a SKU checkbox. If the workload has no measured targets, no health model, and no tested recovery path, it is not reliable by design.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-waf-reliability-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1"
   },
   {
@@ -4355,7 +4355,7 @@
     "security_notes": "The bad review pattern is to say Security pillar and then inventory tools. Defender, Sentinel, private endpoints, and scans are not proof of a secure workload unless they map to threat model, identity, data, network, deployment, detection, response, and recovery evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
     "path": "agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1"
   },
   {
@@ -4500,7 +4500,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — reads CI workflow and branch-protection configuration, never triggers or runs pipelines. Flags secret exposure to test jobs on pull_request_target or fork PRs. Never requests CI secrets, deploy keys, or registry tokens.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
     "path": "agents/qa/ci-test-pipeline-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "ci-test-pipeline-review"
@@ -4587,7 +4587,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OAuth2 password grant tokens expire in ~5 minutes — never cache or log them. Credentials must remain in environment variables. Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK; recommend cntb CLI or REST API. Contractual periods (1, 3, 6, 12 months) are binding at instance creation — capacity plans must declare the period and its billing impact. SSH keys are managed as secret IDs; never expose raw key material in plans or API calls.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/contabo/contabo-capacity-planner-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "contabo-capacity-planner"
     ],
@@ -4625,7 +4625,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OAuth2 password grant tokens expire in ~5 minutes — never cache or log them. Store CONTABO_CLIENT_ID, CONTABO_CLIENT_SECRET, CONTABO_API_USER, CONTABO_API_PASSWORD in environment variables only. Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK; recommend cntb CLI or REST API. Contractual billing periods (1, 3, 6, 12 months) create irreversible obligations — always surface billing impact before any sizing or period recommendation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/contabo/contabo-cost-optimization-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "contabo-cost-optimization-analyst"
     ],
@@ -4662,7 +4662,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OAuth2 password grant tokens expire in ~5 minutes — refresh handling must not log token values. Credentials must remain in environment variables. Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK; recommend cntb CLI or REST API with curl + jq. Contractual periods (1, 3, 6, 12 months) are binding at creation — cancellation may incur early-termination billing. x-request-id (UUIDv4) is mandatory for all mutation calls to enable support traceability. Hard-stop on any lifecycle action without explicit period acknowledgment and rollback plan.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/contabo/contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "contabo-live-instance-lifecycle-guard"
     ],
@@ -4699,7 +4699,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OAuth2 password grant tokens expire in ~5 minutes — refresh handling must not log token values. Credentials must remain in environment variables. Contabo Object Storage is S3-compatible — access key and secret key for S3 API must be stored as environment variables, never hardcoded. x-request-id (UUIDv4) is mandatory for Contabo REST API calls. Hard-stop on any bucket deletion without verified backup evidence. Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK; recommend cntb CLI or REST API with curl + jq and S3-compatible tools for Object Storage.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/contabo/contabo-live-storage-operations-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "contabo-live-storage-operations-guard"
     ],
@@ -4736,7 +4736,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OAuth2 password grant tokens expire in ~5 minutes — never cache or log them. Credentials must remain in environment variables. The x-request-id UUIDv4 header is mandatory for support traceability. Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK; recommend cntb CLI or REST API. Contractual periods (1, 3, 6, 12 months) create billing obligations — never route lifecycle changes without explicit period acknowledgment.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/contabo/contabo-maestro-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "contabo-maestro"
     ],
@@ -4773,7 +4773,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OAuth2 password grant tokens expire in ~5 minutes — short TTL reduces exposure window but refresh logic must not log tokens. Credentials (CONTABO_CLIENT_ID, CONTABO_CLIENT_SECRET, CONTABO_API_USER, CONTABO_API_PASSWORD) must never be hardcoded. Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK; recommend cntb CLI or REST API. SSH keys are referenced via secret IDs — raw private key material must never appear in API payloads, scripts, or recommendations. The x-request-id UUIDv4 header is mandatory for audit traceability.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/contabo/contabo-security-hardening-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "contabo-security-hardening"
     ],
@@ -5755,7 +5755,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/email-sender-authentication-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/email-sender-authentication-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -5825,7 +5825,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/eu-ai-act-marketing-system-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/eu-ai-act-marketing-system-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -6235,7 +6235,7 @@
     "security_notes": "All pricing endpoints are public and unauthenticated. Never request or accept API keys, account IDs, tenant IDs, billing access, or private cost exports. Optional read-only inventory roles are documented in PERMISSIONS.md but are never required for list-price analysis.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-13",
     "path": "agents/finops/finops-ai-economist-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.2",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
     "companion_skills": [
@@ -6283,7 +6283,7 @@
     ],
     "last_verified": "2026-05-13",
     "path": "agents/finops/finops-cloud-price-advisor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
     "companion_skills": [
@@ -6317,7 +6317,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only; never executes kubectl or any cluster command. Refuses kubeconfig files, bearer tokens, service account JWT tokens, and in-cluster credentials unconditionally. WebFetch limited to public documentation and public pricing APIs. All cluster inputs arrive as user-pasted text, YAML, or CSV only.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-13",
     "path": "agents/finops/finops-kubernetes-rightsizer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.2",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
     "companion_skills": [
@@ -6349,7 +6349,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only routing agent. Never accepts, stores, or relays cloud credentials, billing account IDs, tenant identifiers, or customer data. No cloud API calls made directly — all API access delegated to dispatched specialists. No auto-mutation: any mutating specialist dispatch requires an explicit human approval gate and a handoff packet. FOCUS-aware classification.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-13",
     "path": "agents/finops/finops-maestro-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.2",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
     "companion_skills": [
@@ -6622,7 +6622,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only planning and advisory. Do not modify production AlloyDB schemas, model endpoint registrations, or IAM bindings without explicit approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-alloydb-ai-developer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -6649,7 +6649,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Private IP is strongly preferred over public IP for Cloud SQL. AlloyDB is NOT a drop-in replacement for Cloud SQL — backup/restore procedures differ. Always set maintenance windows to off-peak hours.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-alloydb-cloudsql-dba-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-alloydb-cloudsql-dba"
@@ -6679,7 +6679,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Policy Controller audit mode detects violations but does not block them — enforcement mode is required for hard compliance guarantees. Connect Gateway enables kubectl access without exposing the Kubernetes API to the internet; verify it is used instead of direct API server access. Fleet-level IAM controls cluster management scope.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-anthos-multicloud-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-anthos-multicloud-architect"
@@ -6708,7 +6708,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Misconfigured Apigee security policies directly expose backend services. SpikeArrest alone does not protect against sustained load — both SpikeArrest and Quota are required. Target servers should always be used instead of hardcoded backend URLs. Apigee X is scoped to GCP infrastructure; do not conflate with Apigee hybrid or Apigee Edge.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-apigee-api-platform-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-apigee-api-platform-operator"
@@ -6738,7 +6738,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not modify BigQuery dataset expiration policies, access controls, or reservation assignments without impact analysis. Changing reservation assignment affects all queries in that project.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-bigquery-cost-performance-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-bigquery-cost-performance-analyst"
@@ -6769,7 +6769,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-certificate-manager-issuer-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-certificate-manager-issuer-review"
     ]
@@ -6800,7 +6800,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-change-impact-advisor-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-change-impact-advisor"
     ]
@@ -6832,7 +6832,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Never generate, store, or echo credentials, tokens, or service account keys. If a user pastes a key, flag it immediately as a security risk and advise rotation. Validate all auth designs against least-privilege principle.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-cloud-auth-advisor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -6859,7 +6859,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Always-on CPU is required for background tasks or WebSockets. Direct VPC Egress is preferred over VPC connector for Cloud Run private VPC access. CPU is not allocated during idle by default.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-cloud-run-functions-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-cloud-run-functions-operator"
@@ -6889,7 +6889,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Cloud Build service accounts are commonly over-privileged — minimum required permissions are Cloud Run Admin + Artifact Registry Writer + GKE Developer. Over-privileged build accounts are a supply chain risk. SLSA provenance combined with Binary Authorization prevents tampered artifacts from reaching production.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-cloudbuild-deploy-cicd-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-cloudbuild-deploy-cicd-operator"
@@ -6918,7 +6918,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Not all GCP services are authorized for every compliance framework — always verify against the applicable authorized services list before recommending a service. HIPAA requires Google BAA coverage for any service storing PHI. ITAR configuration restricts personnel access to US persons. Assured Workloads creates a compliance boundary but does not replace customer-side controls.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-compliance-assured-workloads-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-compliance-assured-workloads"
@@ -6948,7 +6948,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Spot VMs are preempted without advance notice — never use for latency-sensitive or non-fault-tolerant workloads. OS Login is preferred over metadata SSH keys for enterprise environments.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-compute-engine-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-compute-engine-operator"
@@ -6980,7 +6980,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-cost-anomaly-watch-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-cost-anomaly-watch-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -7010,7 +7010,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not request live billing account credentials, billing export data with customer details, or production project identifiers. Work from sanitized billing exports, aggregated reports, or structured user descriptions.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-cost-finops-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-cost-finops-analyst"
@@ -7042,7 +7042,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-daily-operations-briefing-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-daily-operations-briefing-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -7072,7 +7072,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Dead letter topics are critical for any production Pub/Sub pipeline. Use ephemeral Dataproc clusters for cost efficiency. Pub/Sub delivers at-least-once — design consumers for idempotency.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-data-pipeline-engineer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-data-pipeline-engineer"
@@ -7105,7 +7105,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-event-driven-architecture-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-event-driven-architecture-review"
     ]
@@ -7139,7 +7139,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not deploy to production, modify Firestore security rules, or change Firebase project settings without explicit approval. Client config (apiKey, projectId) is public — service account keys are private and must never be embedded in client code.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-firebase-developer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -7168,7 +7168,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-gcs-data-perimeter-governor-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-gcs-data-perimeter-governor"
     ]
@@ -7199,7 +7199,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Never embed API keys or service account credentials in code examples. Use ADC and environment variables. Do not call batch jobs or fine-tuning jobs on production data without explicit user approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-gemini-api-developer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -7226,7 +7226,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Binary Authorization must be set to WARN mode before ENFORCE mode — enforce mode will break deployments if images are unsigned. Always prefer Workload Identity over mounted SA key files.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-gke-platform-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-gke-platform-operator"
@@ -7258,7 +7258,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-iac-change-safety-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-iac-change-safety-review"
     ]
@@ -7288,7 +7288,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer read-only inspection and minimum permission changes. Do not broaden IAM bindings, invent resource paths, or approve production trust changes without grounding in sanitized evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-iam-least-privilege-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-iam-least-privilege-review"
@@ -7318,7 +7318,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Org policies applied at org node apply to ALL resources — test in non-prod folder first. Data Access audit logs must be enabled for sensitive services (KMS, IAM, BigQuery) — not enabled by default.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-landing-zone-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-landing-zone-architect"
@@ -7347,7 +7347,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Dataset deletion removes all tables, views, and routines permanently. Downstream Data Transfer jobs, scheduled queries, Looker/BI connections, and Dataflow pipelines all break immediately. BigQuery dataset deletion is immediate and permanent — there is no recycle bin for datasets. Tables with default expiration may be partially recoverable if within the expiration window.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-live-bigquery-dataset-deletion-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-live-bigquery-dataset-deletion-guard"
@@ -7376,7 +7376,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Migrating 100% traffic to a broken revision causes complete service unavailability. Min-instances changes affect cost and cold-start behavior. Revision deletion prevents rollback to that revision — never delete a revision that holds traffic or is the last known-good. No automatic rollback exists in Cloud Run; rollback requires a new traffic split or re-deployment.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-live-cloud-run-traffic-migration-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-live-cloud-run-traffic-migration-guard"
@@ -7405,7 +7405,7 @@
     "security_notes": "CUD commitments are 1-3 year contracts worth thousands to millions of dollars and cannot be cancelled once purchased. Budget threshold reductions can cause unexpected service suspension. Quota increases can enable runaway spend by automated systems. Requires financial-authority (billing account owner) approval for all actions.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-live-cost-budget-action-guard"
@@ -7435,7 +7435,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Node pool upgrades cannot be downgraded once complete. PDB violations during upgrades can cause complete workload unavailability. Failed upgrades may require manual node recreation. Never approve a cluster version change without explicit rollback posture and PDB audit.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-live-gke-rollout-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-live-gke-rollout-guard"
@@ -7464,7 +7464,7 @@
     "security_notes": "IAM bindings at org level propagate to ALL folders and projects. Service Account key creation creates long-lived credentials that cannot be auto-expired. Removing a binding can cause immediate lockout. Adding a binding to the wrong principal gives persistent access. Requires CISO-equivalent or security-authority approval for org-level changes.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-live-iam-policy-change-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-live-iam-policy-change-guard"
@@ -7493,7 +7493,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Key version destruction is permanent after the pending period (minimum 24 hours). All Cloud SQL instances, GCS buckets, BigQuery datasets, Compute Engine disks, and Secrets using the CMEK key version become permanently inaccessible. No recovery is possible after destruction completes. Requires a complete CMEK dependency audit before any destruction schedule is set.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-live-kms-key-destruction-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-live-kms-key-destruction-guard"
@@ -7525,7 +7525,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-load-balancer-traffic-engineer-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-load-balancer-traffic-engineer"
     ]
@@ -7555,7 +7555,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable. The 6 live-guard agents must never be auto-dispatched — GCP IAM org-level mutations and KMS key destruction are irreversible. Always require blast-radius assessment and explicit human written confirmation before routing to any live-guard agent.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-maestro-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
   {
@@ -7581,7 +7581,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Keep original source available for minimum 30 days post-cutover. DNS TTL must be reduced to 60s at least 24-48h before cutover — reverting DNS is faster than reverting data if cutover fails. DMS continuous replication must be validated before cutover window begins.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-migration-cutover-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-migration-cutover-architect"
@@ -7612,7 +7612,7 @@
     "security_notes": "GCP VPCs are global — a single VPC spans all regions. Shared VPC IAM roles at subnet level control service project access. Never expose internal services through public IP without Cloud Armor or equivalent WAF protection.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-network-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-network-architect"
@@ -7645,7 +7645,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only forensic analysis. Never modify firewall rules, routes, or NAT configs. Never run queries that write data. Print SQL before executing for user review.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-networking-observability-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -7673,7 +7673,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Log Router sinks to GCS/BigQuery/Pub/Sub are required for compliance log retention — missing sinks may violate audit requirements. Do not claim root cause without evidence. Separate live telemetry from inference. Require containment before remediation for active incidents.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-observability-incident-responder-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-observability-incident-responder"
@@ -7704,7 +7704,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-registry-artifact-governor-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-registry-artifact-governor"
     ]
@@ -7733,7 +7733,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Cloud SQL HA standby is zone-redundant but not region-redundant — cross-region failover requires manual replica promotion. Cloud Run has no built-in multi-region failover. RTO/RPO targets without tested recovery evidence are aspirational. Require last recovery test date and result before marking BCDR as operational.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-resilience-bcdr-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-resilience-bcdr-review"
@@ -7762,7 +7762,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Cloud Asset Inventory change history covers 35 days — be explicit about this window when investigating historical changes. Stale resources (unattached static IPs, persistent disks, orphaned firewall rules) incur ongoing charges. Resources missing required labels cannot be attributed in billing exports, creating cost allocation gaps.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-resource-inventory-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-resource-inventory-analyst"
@@ -7793,7 +7793,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer read-only inspection. Do not delete key versions, disable keys, or modify CMEK bindings without explicit user approval and a confirmed rollback plan — key deletion or disablement can cause irreversible data loss.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-secret-kms-lifecycle-steward-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-secret-kms-lifecycle-steward"
@@ -7824,7 +7824,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer read-only inspection. Do not modify SCC findings, org policies, or Binary Authorization policies without explicit user approval and grounding in sanitized evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-security-posture-hardening-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-security-posture-hardening"
@@ -7856,7 +7856,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-serverless-production-readiness-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-serverless-production-readiness"
     ]
@@ -7884,7 +7884,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve a GCP architecture without resource hierarchy, IAM, network exposure, data protection, observability, recovery, and cost evidence. Label unknowns instead of pretending the diagram is proof.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-solution-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-solution-architect"
@@ -7914,7 +7914,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Monotonically increasing keys (e.g., auto-increment integers) cause all writes to hit the same split — use UUIDs or bit-reversed sequential IDs. Over-indexing in Spanner is expensive and slows writes — every indexed column is replicated.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-spanner-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-spanner-architect"
@@ -7945,7 +7945,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-support-incident-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-support-incident-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -7975,7 +7975,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-ticket-triage-escalation-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-ticket-triage-escalation-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -8004,7 +8004,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Training jobs have no automatic cost cap — always verify max_run_time is set. Feature Store writes are irreversible and can silently corrupt training data. Gemini via Vertex AI has different privacy commitments than via AI Studio. Prefer least-privilege service accounts and read-only discovery before mutation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-vertex-ai-mlops-engineer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-vertex-ai-mlops-engineer"
@@ -8035,7 +8035,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer dry-run mode before enforcement. Do not switch perimeters to enforcement mode without reviewing dry-run violations — live enforcement silently blocks API calls and can disrupt production workloads.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-vpc-service-controls-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "gcp-vpc-service-controls-architect"
@@ -8067,7 +8067,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not cancel commitments, delete resources, or modify billing accounts without explicit user approval and confirmation of resource inventory.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-waf-cost-optimization-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -8096,7 +8096,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not modify production infrastructure or SLO configs without explicit approval. Treat all architecture info as potentially sensitive.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-waf-reliability-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -8126,7 +8126,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not modify IAM policies, org policies, or security controls without explicit user approval. Work from sanitized evidence only.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/gcp/gcp-waf-security-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -8184,7 +8184,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Hetzner does not offer auto-scaling — always verify current resource counts via API before planning growth to avoid quota exhaustion surprises. Storage Box Snapshot Plans require both hour and minute parameters; incomplete snapshot schedules may silently fail. Do not expose project API tokens in capacity reports.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-capacity-planner-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-capacity-planner-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -8222,7 +8222,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never recommend deleting Volumes or snapshots that serve as the only recovery path. Unattached Floating IPs and Primary IPs incur cost — verify attachment state before recommending deletion. Do not expose project API tokens or billing credentials in analysis output.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-cost-optimization-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-cost-optimization-analyst-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -8260,7 +8260,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Public IPs on Hetzner are opt-in since API v1.34 — flag servers with unnecessary public IPs. Hetzner Firewalls must be explicitly attached to servers or Labels groups; an unattached Firewall provides zero protection. Load Balancer health checks must be verified before production traffic routing changes.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-infrastructure-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-infrastructure-reviewer-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -8298,7 +8298,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Must snapshot current Firewall rules before any mutation — Hetzner Firewall changes are immediate and affect all attached servers. Verify project-scoped API token scope before any write operation. Public IPs are opt-in since API v1.34 — verify exposure before and after rule changes. Never proceed without explicit human approval confirming the target Firewall ID, blast-radius, and rollback plan.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-live-firewall-rule-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-live-firewall-rule-guard-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -8336,7 +8336,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Server deletion on Hetzner is irreversible — always require a confirmed snapshot before deletion. Public IPs (IPv4/IPv6) are opt-in since API v1.34 and must be explicitly requested; do not auto-enable them. Server type changes require server stop — confirm downtime window. Always verify API token is project-scoped before any write operation. Never proceed without server ID, region, explicit human approval, and rollback plan.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-live-server-lifecycle-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-live-server-lifecycle-guard-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -8373,7 +8373,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never attempt live Hetzner Cloud API mutations from the routing layer. Always verify API tokens are project-scoped before any routing involving live data. Public IPs on Hetzner are opt-in since API v1.34 — do not assume servers have public IPs.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-maestro-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/hetzner/hetzner-maestro-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -8714,7 +8714,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -8850,7 +8850,7 @@
     "security_notes": "CCE cluster version downgrade is not supported. Node pool scale-down evicts workloads. Production namespace mutations require explicit confirmation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-cce-container-platform-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-cce-container-platform-operator"
@@ -8880,7 +8880,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-certificate-manager-issuer-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-certificate-manager-issuer-review"
     ]
@@ -8911,7 +8911,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-change-impact-advisor-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-change-impact-advisor"
     ]
@@ -8938,7 +8938,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve production deployments without passing approval gates, image vulnerability scans, and CodeArts Inspector sign-off. Canary and blue-green rollbacks must be verified before promoting.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-codearts-devops-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-codearts-devops-operator"
@@ -8966,7 +8966,7 @@
     "security_notes": "MLPS Level 3 gap represents regulatory risk. Data stored outside CN-* regions for Chinese entities may violate CSL. Always flag cross-border data movement for MLPS assessment.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-compliance-sovereignty-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-compliance-sovereignty"
@@ -8996,7 +8996,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-cost-anomaly-watch-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-cost-anomaly-watch-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -9023,7 +9023,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not recommend cost cuts that remove backups, logging, security controls, redundancy, or tested capacity without explicit risk acceptance and rollback evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-cost-finops-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-cost-finops-analyst"
@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-daily-operations-briefing-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-daily-operations-briefing-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -9082,7 +9082,7 @@
     "security_notes": "KMS key deletion is irreversible post-pending-window. CSMS secret deletion without backup loses the secret permanently. CBH session logs must be retained per MLPS requirements.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-dew-kms-lifecycle-steward-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-dew-kms-lifecycle-steward"
@@ -9110,7 +9110,7 @@
     "security_notes": "DRS task deletion during sync stops replication permanently. CDM job retry without deduplication may cause duplicate records. DMS Kafka partition count can only be increased, never decreased.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-drs-data-replication-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-drs-data-replication-operator"
@@ -9138,7 +9138,7 @@
     "security_notes": "DWS schema/table deletion is permanent. DLI job configuration changes take effect on next run. MRS cluster resizing affects all jobs in flight.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-dws-dli-data-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-dws-dli-data-analyst"
@@ -9165,7 +9165,7 @@
     "security_notes": "ECS deletion without CSBS backup is permanently destructive. AS scale-in terminates instances — verify stateless before enabling. DeH migration to shared host requires explicit approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-ecs-compute-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-ecs-compute-operator"
@@ -9196,7 +9196,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-event-driven-architecture-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-event-driven-architecture-review"
     ]
@@ -9223,7 +9223,7 @@
     "security_notes": "FunctionGraph concurrency limit changes take effect immediately. ServiceStage rolling update requires health check configuration. CSE config namespace changes affect all consuming services.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-functiongraph-serverless-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-functiongraph-serverless-operator"
@@ -9251,7 +9251,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Database deletion without backup is permanently destructive. GaussDB for Oracle PL/SQL compatibility gaps can break migration — test before cutover. Failover testing must be coordinated with application teams.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-gaussdb-rds-dba-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-gaussdb-rds-dba"
@@ -9282,7 +9282,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-iac-change-safety-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-iac-change-safety-review"
     ]
@@ -9308,7 +9308,7 @@
     "security_notes": "SCP deny statements cascade to all member accounts. Never request credentials or access tokens. IAM policy with full admin access (*:*) is a critical finding.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-iam-least-privilege-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-iam-least-privilege-review"
@@ -9335,7 +9335,7 @@
     "security_notes": "IEF node deregistration removes all edge applications on that node. Device twin deletion removes IoT device state permanently. Do not update edge application versions without rollback plan.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-ief-edge-computing-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-ief-edge-computing-operator"
@@ -9363,7 +9363,7 @@
     "security_notes": "SCP deny at org level cannot be overridden by IAM in member accounts. Test SCP in simulation before enforcement. Enterprise Project deletion removes all resource associations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-landing-zone-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-landing-zone-architect"
@@ -9392,7 +9392,7 @@
     "security_notes": "CCE cluster version downgrades are not supported. Failed node pool operations may require manual node recreation. Addon upgrades (CoreDNS, NGINX Ingress) can break workloads if version incompatible. Node pool drain must be verified before scaling down. Never approve a cluster version change without explicit rollback posture and workload disruption budget audit.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-live-cce-rollout-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-live-cce-rollout-guard"
     ]
@@ -9418,7 +9418,7 @@
     "security_notes": "RI/CUD purchases are non-refundable. Budget threshold reduction below current spend suspends services. 6-step live-guard gate required.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-live-cost-budget-action-guard"
@@ -9449,7 +9449,7 @@
     "security_notes": "GaussDB/RDS deletion is permanent without CBR backup. MLPS Level 3: data destruction may trigger mandatory incident reporting within 24 hours. 6-step live-guard gate required.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-live-gaussdb-mutation-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
@@ -9475,7 +9475,7 @@
     "security_notes": "SCP deny statements at Organizations level cascade to ALL member accounts and CANNOT be overridden by IAM policies in member accounts. Granting FullAccess system policies gives complete service control. Agency trust relationships granting SecurityAdministrator are among the most dangerous grants. IAM policy changes propagate across Huawei Cloud services — confirm post-change access for all dependent systems.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-live-iam-policy-change-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-live-iam-policy-change-guard"
     ]
@@ -9501,7 +9501,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Key deletion is permanent post-window. Must enumerate all encrypted resources before allowing deletion. MLPS Level 3 data destruction may trigger mandatory incident reporting within 24 hours. 6-step live-guard gate required.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-live-kms-key-destruction-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-live-kms-key-destruction-guard"
@@ -9531,7 +9531,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OBS public ACL exposes data immediately (indexed by crawlers within seconds). Cross-border replication from CN-* regions requires MLPS/DSL assessment. 6-step live-guard gate required.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-live-obs-bucket-policy-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -9557,7 +9557,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-load-balancer-traffic-engineer-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-load-balancer-traffic-engineer"
     ]
@@ -9587,7 +9587,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable. The 6 live-guard agents must never be auto-dispatched. SCP deny statements cascade to all member accounts and are irreversible without manual remediation. DEW/KMS key deletion is permanent with no recovery path. MLPS 2.0 Level 3 workloads have mandatory incident reporting obligations for data destruction events. Always require blast-radius assessment and explicit human written confirmation before routing to any live-guard agent.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-maestro-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
   {
@@ -9613,7 +9613,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve migration cutover without dependency evidence, tested launch, acceptance checks, rollback path, and clear business owner signoff. GaussDB Oracle migration requires PL/SQL compatibility assessment before cutover.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-migration-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-migration-architect"
@@ -9640,7 +9640,7 @@
     "security_notes": "ModelArts training jobs have no automatic cost cap. Specify budget limit before starting large GPU/NPU jobs. Ascend NPU OOM errors differ from Nvidia CUDA OOM — know the error pattern before acting.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-modelarts-mlops-engineer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-modelarts-mlops-engineer"
@@ -9670,7 +9670,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve a Huawei Cloud network design without VPC boundary, ELB exposure, CFW east-west policy, Anti-DDoS EIP binding, DC Gateway authentication, and Cloud Connect peering evidence.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-network-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-network-architect"
@@ -9700,7 +9700,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-obs-data-perimeter-governor-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-obs-data-perimeter-governor"
     ]
@@ -9727,7 +9727,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OBS bucket ACL public-read/write exposes data immediately. EVS detach/reattach requires instance stop on most flavors. CBR backup policy deletion removes scheduled backup protection.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-obs-storage-steward-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-obs-storage-steward"
@@ -9757,7 +9757,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not disable alarms, mute notification channels, or modify audit log retention without explicit risk acceptance. MLPS Level 3 audit gaps must be reported before closure.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-observability-incident-responder-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-observability-incident-responder"
@@ -9787,7 +9787,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-registry-artifact-governor-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-registry-artifact-governor"
     ]
@@ -9818,7 +9818,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-resilience-bcdr-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-resilience-bcdr-review"
     ]
@@ -9848,7 +9848,7 @@
     "security_notes": "SecMaster alert suppression rules can mask real threats. HSS agent uninstall removes all host-level visibility. CFW policy changes in offline mode require confirmation before online enforcement.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-secmaster-security-operations-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -9875,7 +9875,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-serverless-production-readiness-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-serverless-production-readiness"
     ]
@@ -9903,7 +9903,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Do not approve a Huawei Cloud architecture without region sovereignty, enterprise-project boundary, IAM, network exposure, data protection, MLPS compliance, and cost evidence. Label unknowns instead of pretending the diagram is proof.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-solution-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-solution-architect"
@@ -9933,7 +9933,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-support-incident-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-support-incident-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -9964,7 +9964,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
     "path": "agents/huawei/huawei-ticket-triage-escalation-coordinator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "huawei-ticket-triage-escalation-coordinator"
     ]
@@ -10005,7 +10005,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/huawei/huawei-waf-cost-optimization-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/huawei/huawei-waf-cost-optimization-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -10044,7 +10044,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/huawei/huawei-waf-reliability-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/huawei/huawei-waf-reliability-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -10083,7 +10083,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/huawei/huawei-waf-security-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/huawei/huawei-waf-security-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -10123,7 +10123,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/influencer-disclosure-compliance-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/influencer-disclosure-compliance-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -10182,7 +10182,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/ionos/ionos-cost-optimization-analyst-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "ionos-cost-optimization-analyst"
     ]
@@ -10212,7 +10212,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/ionos/ionos-datacenter-designer-reviewer-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "ionos-datacenter-designer-reviewer"
     ]
@@ -10242,7 +10242,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/ionos/ionos-kubernetes-platform-operator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "ionos-kubernetes-platform-operator"
     ]
@@ -10272,7 +10272,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/ionos/ionos-live-database-lifecycle-guard-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "ionos-live-database-lifecycle-guard"
     ]
@@ -10301,7 +10301,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/ionos/ionos-maestro-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "ionos-maestro"
     ]
@@ -10331,7 +10331,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/ionos/ionos-security-compliance-reviewer-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "ionos-security-compliance-reviewer"
     ]
@@ -11496,7 +11496,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Capture current RBAC state before every mutation — no built-in rollback. Block escalate, bind, and impersonate verbs without platform-team approval. Never approve wildcard grants. Cached tokens remain valid after binding deletion until expiry. Per docs/least-privilege-rbac.md the agent now runs a pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any mutation; refuses if any must-not check returns yes (binding over-scoped) or if operator is cluster-admin / system:masters. References shipped: least-privilege-rbac.yaml (deny-by-default ClusterRole), rbac-pre-flight.md (positive + negative resourceName tests), refusal-list.md (universal one-way doors plus domain-specific HARD REFUSE list). Refuses to read or process credentials volunteered by the operator; uses only the in-pod ServiceAccount token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-rbac-mutation-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "kubernetes-live-rbac-mutation-guard"
@@ -11714,7 +11714,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Prefer read-only inspection. Do not recommend cluster-admin bindings, wildcard grants, or shared ServiceAccounts without explicit justification. Always prefer namespace-scoped Roles before ClusterRoles for workloads that do not need cluster-wide access.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
     "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-rbac-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -11840,7 +11840,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -12198,7 +12198,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/lookalike-audience-upload-compliance-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/lookalike-audience-upload-compliance-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -12598,7 +12598,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/marketing-consent-data-collection-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/marketing-consent-data-collection-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -12638,7 +12638,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/marketing-conversion-flow-dark-pattern-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/marketing-conversion-flow-dark-pattern-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -12678,7 +12678,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/marketing-email-list-retention-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/marketing-email-list-retention-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -12718,7 +12718,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/marketing-gpc-signal-honoring-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/marketing-gpc-signal-honoring-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -12744,7 +12744,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only routing agent. Never accepts, stores, or relays real visitor data, consent-string archives, ad-platform credentials, API keys, OAuth tokens, or tenant data. No external API calls made directly — all artifact review delegated to dispatched specialists. No auto-mutation: any mutating specialist dispatch requires an explicit human approval gate and a handoff packet.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
     "path": "agents/marketing/marketing-maestro-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "marketing-maestro"
@@ -12798,7 +12798,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/marketing-pixel-data-leakage-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/marketing-pixel-data-leakage-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -12838,7 +12838,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/martech-access-governance-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/martech-access-governance-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -13755,7 +13755,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [
       "nvidia-agentic-ai-platform-review"
     ],
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -13788,7 +13788,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [
       "nvidia-ai-infrastructure-operations"
     ],
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -13821,7 +13821,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [
       "nvidia-ai-networking-fabric-review"
     ],
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -13854,7 +13854,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [
       "nvidia-ai-operations-day2"
     ],
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -13894,7 +13894,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/nvidia/nvidia-cuda-kernel-performance-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/nvidia/nvidia-cuda-kernel-performance-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -13927,7 +13927,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [
       "nvidia-generative-ai-platform-review"
     ],
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -13960,7 +13960,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [
       "nvidia-gpu-operator-kubernetes-hardening"
     ],
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -14000,7 +14000,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [
       "nvidia-maestro"
     ],
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -14035,7 +14035,7 @@
     },
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
     "execution_tier": "read-only-runtime",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -14068,7 +14068,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [
       "nvidia-ngc-nim-supply-chain-governor"
     ],
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -14108,7 +14108,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/nvidia/nvidia-tensorrt-llm-deployment-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/nvidia/nvidia-tensorrt-llm-deployment-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -14148,7 +14148,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/nvidia/nvidia-triton-inference-serving-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/nvidia/nvidia-triton-inference-serving-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -14173,7 +14173,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-autonomous-database-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14228,7 +14228,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-cloud-guard-responder-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.2",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14254,7 +14254,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-compute-instance-agent-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14280,7 +14280,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-compute-platform-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14306,7 +14306,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-cost-finops-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14332,7 +14332,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-database-platform-dba-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14358,7 +14358,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-dbtools-sql-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14384,7 +14384,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-devops-container-platform-engineer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14410,7 +14410,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-exadata-platform-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14436,7 +14436,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-fusion-apps-environment-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14462,7 +14462,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-goldengate-replication-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14488,7 +14488,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-identity-access-governor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14514,7 +14514,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-iot-digital-twin-engineer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14540,7 +14540,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-limits-capacity-planner-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14567,7 +14567,7 @@
     "security_notes": "ADB termination is permanent — the database and all backups are deleted. Always verify protection tags before any terminate operation. ADB storage scale-up cannot be reversed. Termination blocked by defined-tag protection requires explicit tag removal approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-autonomous-db-lifecycle-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14595,7 +14595,7 @@
     "security_notes": "GPU/HPC shapes (BM.GPU4.8, A100, BM.HPC2.36) can generate six-figure monthly costs when left running. Never approve quota increases or budget threshold raises without explicit financial-authority approval. Emergency stop requires Compute operator rights — escalate if not held.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-cost-budget-runaway-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14622,7 +14622,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Any-user and any-group policies in tenancy root are the most common OCI security misconfiguration. Never approve manage-verb policies at tenancy scope without compartment scoping. Policy deletes take effect immediately with no grace period.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-iam-policy-compartment-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14650,7 +14650,7 @@
     "security_notes": "oci network security-list update is a full replace — always capture current rules before writing. Never approve 0.0.0.0/0 ingress on database subnets. Enable VCN Flow Logs before any rule change.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-network-security-rule-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14678,7 +14678,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Never advance an OKE rollout past an approval stage without rollout status and PDB health evidence. kubectl rollout undo is irreversible in the sense that the prior version may not be identical to the deployed artifact — confirm target revision before undo.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-oke-rollout-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14706,7 +14706,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI Resource Manager auto-locks a stack state during job execution. Never approve an apply or destroy job without a plan-job output review and drift detection evidence. Repo write access does not authorize live OCI infrastructure mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-resource-manager-stack-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14733,7 +14733,7 @@
     "security_notes": "After the scheduled deletion window expires, HSM-backed keys are cryptographically wiped. All data encrypted exclusively by that key version is permanently unrecoverable. Recovery SLA from OCI Support: NONE. Always use a 30-day window and audit data associations before scheduling.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-vault-key-destruction-guard-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14759,7 +14759,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-load-balancer-traffic-engineer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14796,7 +14796,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14822,7 +14822,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-migration-cutover-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14848,7 +14848,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-multi-cloud-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14874,7 +14874,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-mysql-heatwave-ai-specialist-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14900,7 +14900,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-network-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14926,7 +14926,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-observability-incident-responder-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14952,7 +14952,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-recovery-service-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -14979,7 +14979,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-registry-artifact-governor-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -15005,7 +15005,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-resource-search-inventory-analyst-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -15032,7 +15032,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-security-compliance-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -15059,7 +15059,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-solution-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -15086,7 +15086,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-storage-backup-steward-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -15112,7 +15112,7 @@
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-support-incident-coordinator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.2.1",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -15152,7 +15152,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/oci/oci-waf-cost-optimization-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/oci/oci-waf-cost-optimization-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1"
   },
   {
@@ -15182,7 +15182,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not modify backup policies, DR plans, or autoscaling configurations without explicit approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-waf-reliability-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1"
   },
   {
@@ -15212,7 +15212,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not modify IAM policies, compartment structures, Security Zones, or Cloud Guard configurations without explicit approval. Work from OCI audit logs, Cloud Guard findings, or sanitized architecture descriptions.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-06",
     "path": "agents/oci/oci-waf-security-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.1"
   },
   {
@@ -15547,7 +15547,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Live-execution agent, read-only-runtime tier. Default mode is static and runs nothing; runtime execution is a per-session opt-in requiring explicit operator confirmation of a non-production target. Allowlisted commands only — npx playwright test, install, show-report. Refuses production targets. Never accepts or echoes credentials, tokens, or storageState. Incomplete runs degrade to manual-review, never auto-pass.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
     "path": "agents/qa/playwright-e2e-execution-run-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "playwright-e2e-execution-run"
@@ -15580,7 +15580,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — never executes the suite, launches browsers, or contacts a target application. Never requests live URLs with embedded credentials, bearer tokens, real storageState files, or .env secrets.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
     "path": "agents/qa/playwright-e2e-suite-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "playwright-e2e-suite-review"
@@ -15611,7 +15611,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — never connects to a live PLC, never writes to a controller, never advises bypassing a safety function. Never requests live controller IP addresses, plant-network hostnames, historian credentials, or production asset identifiers. Ask for sanitized, anonymized exports only.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
     "path": "agents/qa/plc-control-logic-safety-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "plc-control-logic-safety-review"
@@ -15794,7 +15794,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/marketing/programmatic-supply-chain-integrity-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/marketing/programmatic-supply-chain-integrity-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -17012,7 +17012,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — never connects to a live orchestrator, never executes a bot, and never requests runner credentials or orchestrator connection strings. Never accepts workflow exports containing live PII, real customer data, or production connection strings.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
     "path": "agents/qa/rpa-workflow-resilience-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "rpa-workflow-resilience-review"
@@ -17083,7 +17083,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-agentforce-ai-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17124,7 +17124,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-analytics-tableau-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17164,7 +17164,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-app-builder-automation-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17204,7 +17204,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-business-analyst-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17354,7 +17354,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-compliance-privacy-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17431,7 +17431,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-data-architecture-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17471,7 +17471,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-development-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17511,7 +17511,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-devops-release-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17552,7 +17552,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-enterprise-architect-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17592,7 +17592,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-experience-cloud-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17670,7 +17670,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-industry-cloud-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17710,7 +17710,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-integration-mulesoft-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17749,7 +17749,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-live-guard-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17787,7 +17787,7 @@
     "companion_skills": [],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-maestro-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17828,7 +17828,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-marketing-cloud-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17905,7 +17905,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-platform-admin-review-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -17945,7 +17945,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-sales-cloud-revenue-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -18057,7 +18057,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-security-identity-access-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -18097,7 +18097,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-service-field-service-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -18174,7 +18174,7 @@
     ],
     "execution_tier": "static-review",
     "lifecycle": "experimental",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "harness_variants": {
       "codex": "agents/salesforce/salesforce-slack-collaboration-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -18218,7 +18218,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no ABAP Development Tools (ADT) connections, no SE80/SE24 execution, no transport request creation or release, no RFC or BAPI calls. Never accepts ABAP source files containing hardcoded RFC destination passwords, S-user credentials, or system-specific logical system names that could expose landscape topology. Clean-core compliance findings are advisory; all remediation steps must pass ABAP Unit test suites, ATC check runs, and operator-approved transport to the target system.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-abap-cloud-rap-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18248,7 +18248,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no AI Core Management API calls, no model deployment creation or deletion, no Generative AI Hub prompt execution on behalf of the user, no object-store credential access, no BTP subaccount manipulation. Never accepts AI Core resource-group configurations, AI Launchpad connection files, or Generative AI Hub API payloads containing AI Core service-key client secrets, object-store HMAC keys, tenant-specific deployment IDs with embedded tokens, or personally identifiable information in sample prompts or grounding-data excerpts. Data-privacy findings for RAG pipelines and embedding stores are escalated per the AI-governance protocol; remediation requires privacy-legal review and operator approval before re-deployment.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-ai-core-genai-hub-governance-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18283,7 +18283,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no SAC API calls, no live tenant connections, no story or model rendering. Never accepts real SAC tenant URLs, OAuth client credentials, BTP destination service binding details, personal data from planning grids, or user email addresses. All governance and access control recommendations are advisory; changes to SAC models, planning versions, DAC rules, and story permissions require authorised SAC Administrator or Planning Administrator approval and may affect active users and scheduled data refreshes.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-analytics-cloud-planning-governance-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18318,7 +18318,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static advisory only — no Bash, no SAP system connections, no transport import, no GRC workflow execution. Never includes in output or accepts as input: real user passwords, certificate private keys, OAuth tokens, production system credentials, personal identity data (names, national IDs, personnel numbers, email addresses), or data classified as restricted or confidential. Never generates, fabricates, or extrapolates evidence content — missing evidence is flagged as a gap, never synthesised. All packaging guidance is advisory; evidence packages must be reviewed and approved by the internal audit lead or external auditor before submission. Framework mapping claims require verification by the customer's internal audit or compliance function.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-audit-evidence-packager-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18352,7 +18352,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no BTP CLI execution, no live cockpit API calls. Never accepts tenant IDs, client secrets, service binding credentials, or personal data. All governance recommendations are advisory; changes to BTP account structure require authorised Global Account Administrator approval and may affect billing.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-btp-account-entitlement-governance-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18383,7 +18383,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Mutating-runtime agent — every BTP entitlement or quota change may alter cost commitments, restrict or expand service availability for dependent applications, trigger commercial implications, and affect multiple subaccounts sharing an entitlement pool. Must not be invoked without gating by sap-maestro-agent. Requires dual named-approver confirmation: a platform-owner approver (Global Account Administrator or authorized directory administrator) and a separate FinOps approver, both distinct from the requesting user. Requires a valid change ticket, target account and service explicit confirmation, and a current-quota snapshot and blast-radius including estimated cost delta before any entitlement command. Never combines discovery and mutation in a single step. Never approves its own change request. SoD check is mandatory — requesting user must not be either approver, and neither approver may be the other. All actions must produce audit evidence: timestamp, both approvers, ticket, service and plan, old and new quota values, estimated cost delta, rollback values, post-change verification result. Refuses if any gate step is ambiguous, incomplete, or contradicted. Never requests or relays global account administrator passwords, platform API client secrets, or billing account tokens.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-btp-entitlement-guarded-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "mutating-runtime"
   },
@@ -18415,7 +18415,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no BTP CLI calls, no CDS compilation or deployment execution. Never accepts CDS files, package.json, or .env files containing BTP service-binding credentials, XSUAA client secrets, HDI container passwords, or destination service tokens. Findings on @requires and @restrict coverage are advisory; authorization changes must pass through CAP service review, MTX tenant provisioning tests, and operator approval before deployment to production BTP subaccounts.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-cap-architecture-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18450,7 +18450,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no system connection, no live RFC or API calls. Never accepts raw ABAP source with embedded credentials, user names, or production system IDs. All remediation guidance is advisory; custom-code changes in production systems require transport and change-management approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-clean-core-debt-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18482,7 +18482,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no Cloud ALM API calls, no monitoring rule mutations, no incident record modifications, no deployment job execution. Never accepts production Cloud ALM API credentials, SAP BTP service instance keys, incident records with personal data, or transport request content that includes configuration secrets. Any finding representing a complete monitoring blind spot for a production-critical SAP service, an ungated production deployment path, or an absent incident escalation route for P1 incidents MUST be escalated to the SRE lead, Cloud ALM administrator, IT operations manager, and where change-control gaps affect audit compliance, the internal audit function, before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; Cloud ALM monitoring rule changes, SLO definitions, runbook updates, and change management workflow modifications require operations change-management approval and audit-trail documentation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-cloud-alm-sre-incident-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18517,7 +18517,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static advisory review only — no Bash, no system connections, no ATC remote runs, no transport release actions, no mutation of any ABAP object or repository. Never accepts custom code containing embedded RFC credentials, dialog user passwords, client-specific system IDs, or database connection strings. All remediation guidance is advisory; code changes in customer systems require ABAP unit testing, functional sign-off, and transport and change-management approval before activation. Findings are labelled documentation-based or inference; verify deprecated-API replacement status against the specific target S/4HANA release simplification list and the ABAP repository released_objects view.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-custom-code-remediation-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18551,7 +18551,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static advisory readiness review only — this agent never executes, triggers, schedules, or monitors any live migration task, data transfer, cutover step, RFC call, BAPI invocation, or post-processing run. That execution boundary is absolute and must be stated explicitly in every response. Never accepts migration project documents or mapping files containing database connection strings, schema passwords, SFTP credentials, S-user tokens, cloud storage access keys, or production client IDs. All readiness findings and go/no-go assessments are advisory; the formal go/no-go decision requires sign-off from the customer project manager, SAP basis team, functional leads, and quality gate owner. Cutover execution must be performed only through the guarded live-execution agent or authorised operational tooling under approved change-management controls. Findings are labelled documentation-based or inference; verify reconciliation thresholds and Migration Cockpit version capabilities against the customer's specific system landscape and SAP for Me product availability.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-data-migration-cutover-readiness-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18586,7 +18586,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no Datasphere API calls, no live space connections, no data preview. Never accepts real BTP tenant IDs, Datasphere space credentials, personal data column samples, or database user passwords. All architecture and access control recommendations are advisory; changes to Datasphere spaces, data products, sharing policies, and DAC rules require authorised Space Administrator or DW Administrator approval and may affect active consumers and scheduled flows.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-datasphere-data-product-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18620,7 +18620,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no RFC/BAPI calls, no SAP GUI transaction execution, no table-level mutations. Never creates, confirms, or posts a warehouse task, warehouse order, freight order, transfer order, goods movement, or any EWM/TM execution document. Never creates or modifies warehouse master data, storage type rules, carrier assignments, dangerous-goods classification records, or any logistics configuration object. Never accepts real SAP system credentials, SAP basis passwords, carrier contract rates or confidential logistics pricing, actual inventory quantities or values from live systems, dangerous-goods transport documents with real shipment data, or legally sensitive freight agreements. Findings indicating goods movements postable without dual authorisation, dangerous-goods classification records missing for active freight order types, inventory adjustments above tolerance threshold postable without a second approver, or carrier selection overrides possible without documented approval MUST be escalated to the Head of Logistics and the Supply Chain Compliance Officer before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; EWM/TM configuration changes require transport management, change-control board approval, regression testing of warehouse task creation and freight settlement workflows in a quality system, and coordination with the Head of Logistics before transport to production.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-ewm-tm-logistics-execution-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18655,7 +18655,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no RFC/BAPI calls, no SAP GUI transaction execution, no table-level mutations. Never posts or reverses a financial document. Never activates or deactivates posting periods or closing cockpit steps. Never accepts real SAP system credentials, basis passwords, transport IDs tied to production systems, or live financial posting data. Findings indicating bypassed closing-cockpit sequences, unrestricted posting-period access, or unexplained parallel-ledger divergence must be escalated to the Finance Controller and internal audit before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; FI-CO configuration changes require transport management, change-control board approval, and dual-control sign-off in productive systems.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-finance-fico-controls-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18686,7 +18686,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no UI5 tooling execution, no Fiori launchpad mutations, no SAP BTP deployment operations. Never accepts real SAP system credentials, OAuth tokens, BTP service keys, or personal user data. All remediation guidance is advisory; UI5 code and Fiori configuration changes require development team review and regression testing. Accessibility findings require sign-off from the accessibility lead before closure. Never modifies source files, Fiori catalog entries, or UI5 library configuration.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-fiori-ui5-ux-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18721,7 +18721,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Mutating-runtime agent — every import changes production or quality system state and may be irreversible without a counter-transport. Must not be invoked without gating by sap-maestro-agent. Requires named approver confirmation, a valid change ticket number, target-system explicit confirmation, and completed preflight before any tp or CTS import command. Never combines discovery and mutation in a single step. Never approves its own change request. SoD check is mandatory — the requesting user must not be the transport creator and the approver must not be the transport author. All import actions must produce audit evidence (timestamp, approver, ticket, diff summary, rollback transport ID).",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-guarded-transport-import-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "mutating-runtime"
   },
@@ -18754,7 +18754,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no hdbsql execution, no HANA Cloud Central API calls, no live SQL plan capture, no M_ monitoring view queries. Never accepts real HANA Cloud instance connection strings, hdbsql credentials, SAP BTP service binding JSON with passwords, personal data row samples, or encryption key material. All sizing, performance, and cost recommendations are advisory; instance resizing, schema changes, workload class modifications, and NSE tier reassignments require authorised HANA Cloud DBA or BTP account administrator approval and may cause planned downtime or affect running workloads.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-hana-cloud-performance-cost-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18786,7 +18786,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no SAP system API calls, no incident record mutations, no hypercare plan modifications, no support ticket updates, no cutover checklist changes. Never accepts production system credentials, SAP support portal credentials, incident records with personal data, user master data migration files, or financial data migration audit trails. Any finding representing an absent incident commander assignment for the go-live period, a missing production fallback decision tree with defined rollback thresholds, a critical monitoring blind spot for a key SAP business process during hypercare, or a production support handover package that is incomplete at go-live MUST be escalated to the project manager, go-live incident commander, operations lead, and SAP engagement manager before the go-live event proceeds. All guidance is advisory; hypercare plan updates, incident command structure changes, cutover checklist modifications, and production handover package corrections require project change-management approval and audit-trail documentation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-hypercare-incident-commander-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18817,7 +18817,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Mutating-runtime agent — every iFlow deployment changes live message-routing behavior on the target Integration Suite tenant and may silently break dependent business processes, B2B partner channels, or downstream SAP and non-SAP systems. Must not be invoked without gating by sap-maestro-agent. Requires named integration-owner approver confirmation, a valid change ticket, target-tenant URL and artifact ID explicit confirmation, and a completed artifact preflight and configuration diff before any deploy command. Never combines discovery and mutation in a single step. Never approves its own change request. SoD check is mandatory — the requesting developer must not be the sole approver and the approver must not have authored the artifact change. All deployment actions must produce audit evidence: timestamp, approver, ticket, artifact ID and version, target tenant, configuration diff summary, previous version ID for rollback, post-change message-monitoring result. Refuses if any gate step is ambiguous, incomplete, or contradicted. Never requests or relays OAuth client secrets, tenant administrator passwords, or Security Material store credentials.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-integration-flow-guarded-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "mutating-runtime"
   },
@@ -18850,7 +18850,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no tenant API calls, no iFlow deployment or activation. Never accepts real OAuth client secrets, Basic Auth credentials, certificate private keys, or tenant-specific endpoint URLs with embedded tokens. All remediation guidance is advisory; iFlow and API policy changes require transport through Integration Suite CTS+ or Git-based versioning and operator approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-integration-suite-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18882,7 +18882,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no Joule API calls, no BTP entitlement changes, no connected-system mutations. Never accepts production Joule interaction logs with personal data, production BTP credentials, OAuth client secrets, or real employee or customer data. Findings where Joule can access sensitive personal data, execute financial transactions without confirmation, or where custom skill registrations bypass existing approval controls MUST be escalated to the AI governance officer, CISO, data protection officer, and legal counsel before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; Joule entitlement changes, API scope restrictions, and skill registration controls require architecture review, change-management approval, and audit-trail documentation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-joule-governance-adoption-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18914,7 +18914,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static analysis only — no Bash, no BTP CLI execution, no SAP Licence Audit tool API calls, no live commercial system connections. Never accepts real contract pricing, customer-specific discount schedules, SAP Licence Audit correspondence, personal data of licence contacts, or production system credentials. All remediation guidance is advisory; licence metric changes, CPEA reallocations, and commercial model adjustments require authorised SAP contract owner approval and may affect existing billing commitments.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-license-btp-consumption-finops-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -18945,7 +18945,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only runtime — all tool calls must be list/get/describe/export only. Forbidden mutations explicitly enumerated: create IAS application registrations; update or delete IAS application registrations; modify BTP trust configurations or corporate IdP federation settings; assign or revoke XSUAA role collections; create or modify XSUAA role templates; rotate IAS client certificates or OAuth secrets; trigger IPS provisioning jobs; create or modify IPS source or target system connectors; enable or disable MFA policies; enable or disable risk-based authentication rules; any write to a system of record. Never stores, logs, relays, or includes in output: IAS client secrets, OAuth tokens, SAML signing certificate private keys, user email addresses, shadow user credentials, or service-key credentials. Must stop and escalate immediately if a requested action would change system state. Sensitive values must be masked in all output.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-live-readonly-identity-trust-discovery-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "read-only-runtime"
   },
@@ -18976,7 +18976,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Read-only runtime — all tool calls must be list/get/describe/export only. Forbidden mutations: btp create, btp update, btp delete, btp assign, btp unassign, btp enable, any deploy or import command, any role-collection assignment, any secret or credential rotation. Never stores or relays subaccount IDs, service keys, client secrets, or user email addresses beyond what is required to scope the current discovery task. Must stop and escalate if a requested action would change system state.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-live-readonly-landscape-discovery-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "read-only-runtime"
   },
@@ -19007,7 +19007,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Classification and coordination only. Never accepts system credentials, transport keys, client/system IDs, or landscape topology details beyond the minimum needed to classify the task. Never auto-dispatches any agent that mutates SAP systems — all live-guard agents require explicit human approval before dispatch. All outputs are advisory; production changes require change-management approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-maestro-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "read-only-runtime"
   },
@@ -19041,7 +19041,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no RFC/BAPI calls, no SAP GUI transaction execution, no table-level mutations. Never creates, releases, confirms, or settles a production order, process order, or planned order. Never creates or modifies a BOM master, routing master, work centre master, production version, batch classification record, or any PP/DS configuration object. Never accepts real SAP system credentials, SAP basis passwords, production formulas or proprietary process parameters, actual batch quantities or yield data from live production runs, quality inspection results from live systems, or legally sensitive regulatory submission data. Findings indicating production orders releasable without dual authorisation, BOM changes possible outside the ECM change number workflow for regulated or safety-critical materials, quality inspection usage decisions releasable without a qualified QM approver, or MES integration IDoc errors accumulating without monitored alerting MUST be escalated to the Head of Manufacturing and the Quality Assurance Director before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; PP/DS configuration changes require transport management, change-control board approval, regression testing of production order creation, BOM explosion, confirmation, and settlement workflows in a quality system, and coordination with the Head of Manufacturing before transport to production.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-manufacturing-execution-risk-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19076,7 +19076,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no MDG API calls, no BRFplus rule activation, no governance workflow execution, no master data record mutation. Never triggers a change request or initiates a governance workflow step. Never accepts real SAP system credentials, client-level passwords, transport IDs tied to production, or personal data from actual master data records (real customer names, vendor bank details, employee data). Findings indicating bypassed governance workflow steps, inactive compliance-relevant validation rules (VAT registration, bank account dual-control), or mass change objects active without change-log configuration must be escalated to the Data Governance Owner and internal audit before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; MDG configuration changes require transport management, data governance board approval, and testing in a quality client before transport to production.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-mdg-master-data-quality-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19110,7 +19110,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no RFC/BAPI calls, no SAP GUI transaction execution, no table-level mutations. Never creates or modifies a sales order, billing document, customer master record, pricing condition record, or revenue accounting contract. Never accepts real SAP system credentials, SAP basis passwords, customer credit card or bank data, actual invoice amounts from live systems, or legally sensitive contract terms. Findings indicating credit holds releasable without dual authorisation, revenue accounting contracts lacking performance-obligation rule coverage for active order types, or unapplied cash balances exceeding the policy age threshold must be escalated to the Revenue Controller and the Director of Credit before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; OTC configuration changes require transport management, change-control board approval, and regression testing of pricing and billing output in a quality system before transport to production.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-order-to-cash-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19144,7 +19144,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no RFC/BAPI calls, no Ariba API mutations, no SAP GUI transaction execution, no table-level mutations. Never creates or modifies a purchase order, supplier record, sourcing event, or contract. Never accepts real Ariba realm credentials, SAP basis passwords, supplier bank account data, actual invoice amounts from live systems, or contract commercial terms under NDA. Findings indicating approval-workflow bypass without compensating control, invoice tolerance bands permitting systematic overbilling, or disabled duplicate-invoice detection must be escalated to the Chief Procurement Officer and internal audit before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; Ariba configuration changes require change-control board approval, supplier communication planning, and regression testing in a quality system before deployment to productive environments.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-procurement-ariba-value-leakage-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19176,7 +19176,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no SAP system API calls, no transport imports, no transport release actions, no change document mutations, no release calendar modifications. Never accepts production system credentials, ChaRM user passwords, transport request content with configuration secrets or financial data, or SAP BTP service instance keys. Any finding representing an unresolved object collision for a transport targeting the current production release window, a ChaRM approval bypass for a production change, a change blackout violation, or a downgrade-protected object modification without exception approval MUST be escalated to the release manager, basis administrator, change manager, and where regulatory freeze periods are violated, the compliance function before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; transport sequencing changes, ChaRM workflow modifications, release window adjustments, and downgrade protection exception approvals require change-management approval and audit-trail documentation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-release-change-collision-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19208,7 +19208,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static analysis only — no Bash, no contract system API calls, no live vendor management tool connections. Never accepts real contract identifiers, negotiated pricing terms, customer tenant credentials, or personally identifiable data from vendor contacts. All remediation guidance is advisory; changes to RISE SLA terms, shared-responsibility boundaries, or escalation paths require formal contract amendment and authorised vendor management approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-rise-sla-vendor-risk-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19239,7 +19239,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Mutating-runtime agent — every role assignment or revocation changes the effective permission set of a named user and may grant access to sensitive transactions, financial data, or system administration functions. Must not be invoked without gating by sap-maestro-agent. Requires named approver confirmation (approver must not be the target user or the requesting user), a valid change ticket, target-user and system explicit confirmation, a completed SoD pre-check, and a dry-run permissions delta before any assignment command. Never grants a role collection that creates an SoD conflict — stops and refuses until a documented risk acceptance is provided by a named second approver. Never combines discovery and mutation in a single step. Never approves its own change request. Never self-assigns roles to the session identity or requesting user. SoD check is mandatory before every assignment. All actions must produce audit evidence: timestamp, approver, ticket, target user, roles changed, permissions delta, SoD result, rollback snapshot reference, post-change verification result. Refuses if any gate step is ambiguous, incomplete, or contradicted.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-role-assignment-guarded-operator-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "mutating-runtime"
   },
@@ -19273,7 +19273,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static advisory review only — no Bash, no system connections, no live SAP Readiness Check API calls, no mutation of SAP Activate project plans or roadmap items. Never accepts landscape diagrams or project documents containing internal system IDs, tenant credentials, S-user tokens, cloud connector certificates, or SAP Cloud Identity provisioning secrets. All architectural guidance is advisory; deployment-path decisions and activation of RISE contracts require formal SAP engagement and customer change-management approval. Findings are labelled documentation-based or inference; verify against the customer's specific release target and Readiness Check results in SAP for Me.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-s4hana-transformation-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19307,7 +19307,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no IAS/IPS API calls, no GRC workflow execution, no XSUAA management plane mutations. Never accepts real user passwords, certificate private keys, client secrets, personal identity data (name, national ID, HR record), or production tenant credentials. SoD conflicts and critical identity findings must be escalated to the security team, HR, and legal per the customer's incident response protocol before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; role and GRC changes require change-management approval and audit trail.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-security-iam-grc-sod-reviewer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19341,7 +19341,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Signavio API calls, no investigation configuration changes, no connector extraction modifications, no process model mutations. Never creates or deletes a process investigation or BPMN model. Never accepts real Signavio tenant credentials, API tokens, or personally identifiable process participant data extracted from event logs. Findings indicating material KPI misalignment to the board-approved business case, conformance deviation rates above 30% without root-cause investigation, or investigations not refreshed for more than 90 days in high-velocity processes must be escalated to the Process Excellence Owner and programme sponsor before conclusions are communicated to executive stakeholders. All recommendations are advisory; changes to investigation scope, connector configuration, or reference model alignment require approval from the Process Excellence Owner and, where the investigation underpins a compliance or audit process, sign-off from the relevant control owner.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-signavio-process-mining-value-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19373,7 +19373,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no SuccessFactors OData API calls, no permission role mutations, no employee record access. Never accepts real employee records, national IDs, salary figures, bank account numbers, medical data, immigration documents, or production SuccessFactors tenant credentials. Any finding involving exposure of national ID, bank account, medical or disability data, immigration status, or salary to unauthorised roles MUST be escalated to HR leadership, the data protection officer, legal counsel, and information security before any remediation is applied. SuccessFactors inputs must always be sanitised or anonymised exports — raw PII is never accepted. All guidance is advisory; permission role and workflow changes require HR change-management approval, data protection impact assessment where applicable, and audit-trail documentation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-successfactors-hr-process-risk-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19407,7 +19407,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no IBP OData API calls, no S/4HANA RFC/BAPI mutations, no planning model changes, no master data writes. Never triggers a planning run, modifies a supply network model, or alters any IBP configuration object. Never accepts real IBP tenant credentials, S/4HANA basis passwords, actual supplier contract quantities, current inventory positions from live systems, or customer order data. Findings indicating supply network model failure to reflect current sourcing constraints, undetectable multi-tier demand-shock amplification, or persistent IBP-to-S/4HANA replication errors blocking planned-order transfer must be escalated to the Supply Chain VP and IBP platform owner before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; IBP planning model changes require regression testing in a sandbox environment before productive deployment, and S/4HANA supply-chain changes require transport management and change-control board approval.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-supply-chain-ibp-resilience-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19439,7 +19439,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no SAP system API calls, no test case mutations, no quality gate configuration changes, no defect record modifications. Never accepts production system credentials, SAP BTP service instance keys, defect records with personal data, or test data exports containing personal or financial data. Any finding representing a completely untested critical business process path, an absent quality gate for production transport promotion, or a test data exposure risk involving production-derived personal data MUST be escalated to the quality manager, release manager, test lead, and data protection officer before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; test plan updates, quality gate threshold changes, automation suite additions, and defect management process modifications require change-management approval and audit-trail documentation.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-testing-quality-gate-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19471,7 +19471,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static classification and prioritisation only — no Bash, no API calls, no roadmap tool mutations, no live system connections. Never accepts real employee data, internal project financials, client-identifiable programme names without consent, or confidential contract details. All triage guidance is advisory; transformation sequencing decisions require sign-off from the Programme Director and relevant business process owners, and may affect contractual delivery commitments.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-transformation-portfolio-triage-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19505,7 +19505,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — no Bash, no RFC/BAPI calls, no SAP GUI transaction execution, no table-level mutations. Never executes a payment, trade, money market transaction, FX deal, or hedge designation. Never creates or modifies a bank account master record, payment approval workflow, market risk position, hedge relationship, financial instrument valuation run, or intercompany netting agreement. Never accepts real SAP system credentials, SAP basis passwords, treasury dealing passwords, bank account numbers or IBANs from live systems, actual trade confirmations or settlement amounts, counterparty credit agreements, or legally sensitive netting master agreements. Findings indicating payments executable without dual authorisation, hedge accounting designation documents incomplete for active hedge relationships, market risk position limits not configured for material FX or interest rate exposures, or IHC on-behalf-of payments releasable without a second approver MUST be escalated to the Group Treasurer and the Chief Risk Officer before any remediation is applied. All guidance is advisory; TRM configuration changes require transport management, change-control board approval, regression testing of valuation runs and payment workflows in a quality system, and coordination with the Group Treasurer before transport to production.",
     "last_verified": "2026-06-19",
     "path": "agents/sap/sap-treasury-cash-risk-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "execution_tier": "static-review"
   },
@@ -19535,7 +19535,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/scaleway/scaleway-cost-optimizer-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "scaleway-cost-optimizer"
     ],
@@ -19569,7 +19569,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/scaleway/scaleway-iam-policy-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "scaleway-iam-policy-review"
     ],
@@ -19604,7 +19604,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/scaleway/scaleway-kapsule-platform-operator-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "scaleway-kapsule-platform-operator"
     ],
@@ -19639,7 +19639,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/scaleway/scaleway-live-kapsule-rollout-guard-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "scaleway-live-kapsule-rollout-guard"
     ],
@@ -19672,7 +19672,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/scaleway/scaleway-maestro-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "scaleway-maestro"
     ],
@@ -19707,7 +19707,7 @@
     "last_verified": "2026-05-10",
     "path": "agents/scaleway/scaleway-network-architect-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "companion_skills": [
       "scaleway-network-architect"
     ],
@@ -19951,7 +19951,7 @@
       "kiro-ide": "agents/terraform/terraform-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
       "kiro-cli": "agents/terraform/terraform-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
     },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -19977,7 +19977,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Default to review and plan mode. Do not apply Terraform changes unless the user explicitly requests apply and the workspace is confirmed.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
     "path": "agents/terraform/terraform-reviewer",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": null
   },
@@ -20006,7 +20006,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — reads test source and coverage reports, never executes tests or runs a coverage tool. Never requests credentials, fixtures with real customer data, or production database snapshots.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
     "path": "agents/qa/test-coverage-quality-review-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "test-coverage-quality-review"
@@ -20037,7 +20037,7 @@
     "security_notes": "Static review only — analyzes failure logs, rerun history, and test source; never executes or re-runs tests. Never requests CI credentials, dashboard API tokens, or production data embedded in logs.",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-17",
     "path": "agents/qa/test-flakiness-triage-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "companion_skills": [
       "test-flakiness-triage"