@raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic 2.8.0 → 2.10.0

package/agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent/metadata.json

@@ -3,16 +3,29 @@
   "name": "Azure WAF Security Review",
   "type": "agent",
   "provider": "azure",
-  "harnesses": ["codex", "copilot", "claude-code", "cursor", "gemini", "kiro"],
-  "summary": "Agent for azure-waf-security-review. Review Azure workload security posture against the Well-Architected Framework Security pillar covering identity, network boundaries, data protection, threat detection, DevSecOps maturity, and policy compliance.",
-  "companion_skills": ["azure-waf-security-review"],
+  "harnesses": [
+    "codex",
+    "copilot",
+    "claude-code",
+    "cursor",
+    "gemini",
+    "kiro"
+  ],
+  "summary": "Review Azure workload security against Well-Architected security principles, Zero Trust, CIA, IAM, segmentation, data protection, threat detection, DevSecOps, and posture evidence.",
+  "companion_skills": [
+    "azure-waf-security-review"
+  ],
   "source_type": "original",
   "official_docs": [
-    "https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/well-architected/security/",
-    "https://learn.microsoft.com/security/benchmark/azure/"
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/security/principles",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/security/checklist",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/training/modules/azure-well-architected-security/",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/security/monitor-threats",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/zero-trust"
   ],
-  "security_notes": "Read-only advisory. Do not modify Entra ID policies, Conditional Access rules, Azure Policy, or Defender configurations without explicit approval.",
-  "last_verified": "2026-05-09",
+  "security_notes": "The bad review pattern is to say Security pillar and then inventory tools. Defender, Sentinel, private endpoints, and scans are not proof of a secure workload unless they map to threat model, identity, data, network, deployment, detection, response, and recovery evidence.",
+  "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
   "path": "agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent",
   "harness_variants": {
     "codex": "agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
@@ -24,5 +37,5 @@
     "kiro-cli": "agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
   },
   "author": "github: Raishin",
-  "version": "0.1.0"
+  "version": "0.1.1"
 }

package/agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent/references/mcp-and-evidence.md

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Documentation MCP and Evidence
+
+## Approved phrasing
+
+Use generic wording when mentioning Azure documentation tooling:
+
+- Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP
+- configured documentation MCP evidence
+- read-only configured-environment evidence, when a client exposes safe discovery tools
+
+## Evidence ordering
+
+1. Microsoft Learn for current documented service behavior.
+2. Read-only configured-environment evidence for sampled current state, if available.
+3. Sanitized user evidence for workload-specific context.
+4. Clearly labeled inference only when evidence is incomplete.
+
+## Do not overstate
+
+- Documentation does not prove any tenant, subscription, quota, RBAC, deployment, cost, incident, compliance, or production-readiness state.
+- A sampled tool result does not prove broad regional availability or full account posture.
+- Tool availability does not imply permission to mutate resources.

package/agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent/references/official-sources.md

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Official sources
+
+Use this reference when grounding current Azure behavior for `azure-waf-security-review`.
+
+Last refreshed: 2026-06-05
+
+## Microsoft Learn sources
+
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/security/principles
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/security/checklist
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/training/modules/azure-well-architected-security/
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/security/monitor-threats
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/zero-trust
+
+## Grounding rules
+
+- Use Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for Azure service behavior.
+- Treat documentation as documentation-based evidence only. It does not prove the user's tenant, subscription, RBAC, quota, deployed resources, costs, logs, incidents, compliance, or production readiness.
+- Use read-only configured-environment evidence only when available and label it as sampled evidence.
+- If documentation and sampled evidence conflict, report both and prefer the narrower conclusion.
+- Do not mention private tool labels, workstation aliases, connection handles, or environment-specific identifiers in committed docs or final answers.

package/agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent/references/safety-checklist.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Safety checklist
+
+Use before recommendations that affect access, cost, network exposure, data, compliance, production availability, or automation.
+
+## Non-negotiables
+
+- Prefer Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for Azure service behavior.
+- Use read-only configured-environment evidence only when available and label it as sampled evidence.
+- Never ask for credentials, tokens, tenant identifiers, subscription identifiers, connection strings, certificates, private keys, kubeconfigs, negotiated discount sheets, or customer data.
+- Require explicit approval before recommending or executing mutations, deletes, privilege changes, secret-bearing reads, billing-impacting actions, or production-impacting operations.
+- State what is unknown; documentation proves service behavior, not the user's deployed state.
+- Keep action permissions least-privilege and scoped to the task.
+- Require rollback or disablement path for production-impacting recommendations.
+- Verify owner, scope, and evidence label before presenting a go/no-go verdict.
+
+## Component risks
+
+- Identity and access: standing privilege, broad roles, stale owners, weak approval, and missing review outcome evidence.
+- Network and data exposure: public access, private DNS gaps, sensitive logs, secret-bearing reads, and unclassified exports.
+- Production operations: missing rollback, unclear target, untested recovery, stale alerts, and unsafe automation.
+- Security posture: false assurance from tool presence, missing threat model, policy bypass, untuned detections, and unowned exceptions.
+
+## Evidence labels
+
+Use sampled evidence, repo evidence, user-provided sanitized evidence, documentation-based, or inference. Documentation alone never proves the user's live Azure environment.

package/agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent/references/waf-security-agent-operations.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Azure WAF Security Review operations
+
+> Version note: refreshed 2026-06-05 from Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP. Documentation-based evidence does not prove any user's deployed Azure state. Do not paste secrets, identifiers, billing exports, or customer data into commands or files.
+
+## What people get wrong
+
+The bad review pattern is to say Security pillar and then inventory tools. Defender, Sentinel, private endpoints, and scans are not proof of a secure workload unless they map to threat model, identity, data, network, deployment, detection, response, and recovery evidence.
+
+## Officially grounded service shape
+
+Microsoft Learn grounds the Azure Well-Architected Security pillar in Zero Trust and the CIA triad: verify explicitly, use least privilege, assume breach, protect confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and continuously improve posture. The checklist adds concrete review areas for baseline, secure development, data classification, segmentation, IAM, networking, encryption, and hardening. That is the key insight: Azure WAF Security is an evidence-backed workload risk review, not a tool coverage checklist.
+
+## Non-negotiable design rules
+
+### 1. Start from workload threat model, data classification, and business impact, not from a product inventory.
+### 2. Verify Zero Trust explicitly: identity, permissions, duration, asset scope, device or workload context, and expected location.
+### 3. Treat standing privileged access, shared credentials, local accounts, and service principals with secrets as high-risk until justified.
+### 4. Review segmentation across networks, roles, workload identities, and resource organization; one boundary does not replace the others.
+### 5. Require detection, response, and recovery evidence; prevention-only security is incomplete.
+### 6. Do not recommend policy, Conditional Access, Defender, Sentinel, network, or production changes without approval and rollback.
+
+## Minimal safe implementation flow
+
+1. Classify workload, data sensitivity, threat model, compliance drivers, and production impact.
+2. Ground Well-Architected Security behavior in Microsoft Learn and label it documentation-based.
+3. Review sanitized evidence for IAM, segmentation, data protection, network controls, hardening, Defender, Sentinel, DevSecOps, and policy compliance.
+4. Separate proven controls, unverified claims, compensating controls, exceptions, and risky remediations.
+5. Return verdict, evidence level, blockers, safe next actions, and open questions.
+
+## High-risk assumptions to kill
+
+- Defender for Cloud coverage proves the workload is secure.
+- A high secure score replaces threat modeling.
+- Private endpoints compensate for weak identity or missing data classification.
+- Sentinel enabled with default rules means detection is mature.
+- SAST or secret scanning alone satisfies DevSecOps maturity.
+- Documentation proves the user's current security posture.
+
+## Safe command/code verification targets
+
+- Threat model, security baseline, data classification, regulatory mapping, and workload owner evidence.
+- RBAC/PIM/Conditional Access, managed identities, credential elimination, and access review evidence.
+- Network segmentation, NSGs, firewall/WAF policies, private endpoints, DNS, ingress and egress paths.
+- Encryption, Key Vault posture, key ownership, purge protection, backup/recovery, and audit logs.
+- Defender recommendations, secure score controls, Sentinel analytics coverage, incident handling, and alert routing.
+- Pipeline SAST, secret scanning, IaC scanning, image scanning, dependency scanning, and release gates.
+
+## When to push back
+
+- The user wants a security verdict from tool presence alone.
+- Evidence omits scope, timestamp, owner, or sanitized source.
+- A remediation weakens availability, recovery, or operations without risk acceptance.
+- The request asks for secrets, tokens, tenant identifiers, subscription identifiers, connection strings, certificates, private keys, or customer data.

package/agents/azure/azure-waf-security-review-agent/references/workflow-and-output.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Workflow and output contract
+
+## Workflow
+
+1. Classify the workload, security domain, scope, and risk.
+2. Load the required skill and the agent-local references relevant to the task.
+3. Ground service behavior in Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP.
+4. Add read-only configured-environment evidence only when available, and label it as sampled.
+5. Separate blockers from unknowns. Do not hide missing evidence behind optimistic language.
+6. Recommend the smallest safe next action and the verification target.
+
+## Output contract
+
+1. Verdict
+2. Evidence level
+3. Blockers / risks
+4. Safe next actions
+5. Open questions
+
+Keep the response concise. Do not paste secrets, raw inventories, billing exports, or long documentation excerpts.

package/agents/netsuite/AGENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+# Oracle NetSuite Agents
+
+Enterprise-grade Oracle NetSuite advisor roles with judgment for architecture, operations, and compliance review. Static review only—no live mutations without separate authorization.
+
+## Portfolio Overview
+
+**25 agents across 3 layers:**
+- **Layer 1:** Maestro routing, governance, and live-mutation gates (5 agents)
+- **Layer 2:** Domain specialists with cert alignment and enterprise roles (20 agents)
+
+## Operating Principles
+
+- **Least privilege by default:** Custom roles derived from standard roles, never Administrator
+- **Static review only:** No live NetSuite mutations, workflow activation, data edits, or permission changes absent separate authorization
+- **Evidence-based:** Official documentation and live evidence only—no fabricated facts
+- **OAuth2 priority:** OAuth2 over legacy TBA; SOAP marked as deprecation risk (timeline: 2026.1 for defaults, 2028.2 for sunset)
+- **Cross-domain coordination:** Maestro and netsuite-routing-protocol coordinate multi-domain matters
+
+## Routing Reference
+
+See `skills/cross-functional/netsuite-routing-protocol/SKILL.md` for:
+- 12+ routing domains with keywords
+- Cross-domain overlap matrix (7 scenarios)
+- Conflict-resolution protocol
+- Stop conditions for live mutations, credentials, and regulated data
+
+## Key Safety Gates
+
+| Gate | Trigger | Handler |
+|------|---------|---------|
+| **Live mutation** | Workflow, deploy, data edit, permission change | netsuite-live-org-mutation-guard-agent (refuse by default) |
+| **Credential request** | Agent asks for tokens/credentials | ALL agents refuse; stop and escalate |
+| **Administrator role** | Agent recommends or depends on Administrator | Refusal trigger; mark as high-privilege violation |
+| **Cross-subsidiary data** | Report/search exposes multiple subsidiaries | Parallel: saved-searches + oneworld + data-governance |
+| **SOAP deprecation** | New SOAP integration proposed | Escalate timeline: 2026.1 (defaults to REST), 2028.2 (SOAP sunset) |
+
+## Layer 1: Governance & Routing (5 agents)
+
+### netsuite-maestro-agent
+Classify incoming NetSuite matters and dispatch to specialists. Routes via `netsuite-routing-protocol`.
+
+### netsuite-live-org-mutation-guard-agent
+Gate for any live-account action: deploy, workflow activation, data edits, permission changes. Refuse by default; requires explicit separate authorization.
+
+### netsuite-evidence-release-drift-agent
+Biannual release drift analysis, evidence labeling, certification-sensitive claims. Tracks NetSuite's 5 certification tracks and release timelines.
+
+### netsuite-enterprise-architecture-agent
+Multi-account/OneWorld topology, solution design, platform strategy, scalability.
+
+### netsuite-audit-controls-sox-agent
+Segregation of duties, posting, period close, revenue recognition, audit workflows, compliance.
+
+## Layer 2: Domain Specialists (20 agents)
+
+### Foundation & Administration (3)
+- **netsuite-suitefoundation-agent** – SuiteFoundation setup and governance
+- **netsuite-administrator-agent** – General administration and configuration
+- **netsuite-erp-consultant-agent** – ERP consulting and implementation
+
+### Finance & Reporting (4)
+- **netsuite-financial-foundations-agent** – AP/AR, accounting setup (escalates close-impacting to audit-sox)
+- **netsuite-bi-reporting-agent** – Reports, dashboards, KPIs, analytics
+- **netsuite-saved-searches-workbook-agent** – Saved searches, SuiteAnalytics Workbooks, PII-in-export
+- **netsuite-ai-foundations-agent** – AI-powered analytics and insights
+
+### Development (4)
+- **netsuite-application-developer-agent** – SuiteScript records, UIF, SPA
+- **netsuite-suitecloud-developer-agent** – SDF, SuiteScript upgrade
+- **netsuite-suitescript-secure-code-review-agent** – Static security review of SuiteScript
+- **netsuite-suiteflow-automation-agent** – SuiteFlow workflow design and review
+
+### Identity & Integration (4)
+- **netsuite-identity-access-role-permission-agent** – Roles, permissions, segregation of duties
+- **netsuite-sso-oauth-tba-agent** – OAuth2, TBA, SSO, SAML authentication (OAuth2 preferred)
+- **netsuite-web-services-integration-agent** – SuiteTalk REST/SOAP APIs
+- **netsuite-integration-migration-agent** – SOAP→REST migration, integration architecture
+
+### Governance & Deployment (5)
+- **netsuite-oneworld-multisubsidiary-agent** – Subsidiary boundaries, currency, legal entities
+- **netsuite-data-governance-privacy-agent** – PII, retention, field-level access, export controls
+- **netsuite-ai-connector-mcp-agent** – AI Connector & MCP governance, tool allowlists
+- **netsuite-sandbox-nonproduction-governance-agent** – Sandbox isolation, OAuth re-auth
+- **netsuite-sdf-devops-release-agent** – SDF project structure, deployment controls, environment promotion
+
+## Companion Skills
+
+Each agent has a 1:1 companion skill under `skills/netsuite/<agent-id>-skill/`:
+- `SKILL.md` – procedure and decision logic
+- `metadata.json` – catalog metadata
+- `references/*.md` – official sources, safety checklists, least-privilege notes, release drift, topic-specific guides
+
+## Escalation Flow
+
+```
+matter arrives
+  ↓
+netsuite-maestro-agent (classify via routing-protocol)
+  ↓
+[ specialist agent(s) ]
+  ↓
+[if live mutation?] → netsuite-live-org-mutation-guard-agent (refuse by default)
+[if cross-domain?] → parallel review + conflict-resolution protocol
+[if escalation gate?] → pause and escalate to human owner
+[if cred/admin requested?] → STOP and REFUSE
+```
+
+## Least-Privilege Role Template
+
+All agents operate with least-privilege custom roles:
+1. Start with a standard role (e.g., Administrator for initial scoping)
+2. Remove unnecessary permissions
+3. Add only required modules (e.g., Financial, Accounting)
+4. Enable 2FA for privileged roles
+5. Document in agent's `LEAST-PRIVILEGES.md`
+
+Standard roles: Administrator, SuiteFlex, System Administrator, Accounting Manager, Finance Manager, VP Sales, IT Administrator, Operations Manager.
+
+## Certification Alignment
+
+NetSuite maintains 5 certification tracks:
+- SuiteFoundation (entry-level platform)
+- NetSuite Administrator (org setup, users, roles, permissions)
+- NetSuite Developer (SuiteScript, SDF, APIs)
+- NetSuite OpenAir (project accounting)
+- NetSuite Advanced Developer (advanced SuiteScript, integration, performance)
+
+Agents map to tracks where applicable; certification "Coming Soon" items are blocked (no assumed availability).
+
+## Release Sensitivity
+
+NetSuite ships biannual releases (2026.1, 2026.2, 2027.1, 2027.2, etc.). Key dates:
+- **2026.1** – OAuth 2.0 becomes default auth; SOAP marks as deprecated
+- **2027.1** – New SOAP integrations disabled
+- **2028.2** – SOAP API sunset (estimated)
+
+Evidence-release-drift-agent tracks these; all agents must label claims as "release-sensitive" where applicable.
+
+## No Live Mutations
+
+Static review / advisory ONLY. This portfolio does NOT:
+- Deploy SDF changes
+- Activate workflows
+- Edit data
+- Modify permissions
+- Publish saved searches
+- Rotate certificates
+
+Those require `netsuite-live-org-mutation-guard-agent` + separate human authorization via an out-of-band protocol.
+
+## Refusal Triggers
+
+All agents refuse:
+1. Requests for account credentials, API tokens, OAuth tokens
+2. Requests to assume Administrator role or bypass permission checks
+3. Requests for live-account mutations without explicit separate authorization
+4. Certification claims marked "Coming Soon" in official docs
+5. Requests involving regulated PII without known jurisdiction
+6. Requests to export broad MCP tool scopes
+
+## Security Posture
+
+- **Authentication:** OAuth2 default for REST/RESTlets/SuiteAnalytics Connect; TBA only as fallback
+- **No user credentials:** Never accept end-user passwords; always use service accounts with OAuth2
+- **2FA:** Required for Administrator and all privileged custom roles
+- **Least privilege:** Start from zero, add only necessary permissions per agent role
+- **MCP governance:** AI Connector never under Administrator; tool allowlists reviewed per escalation gate
+- **Data classification:** All data is PII until proven otherwise; export requires data-governance review
+
+## Supporting Files
+
+- `AGENTS.md` – this document (agent portfolio overview)
+- `README.md` – netsuite provider overview
+- `skills/netsuite/README.md` – skills portfolio
+- `skills/cross-functional/netsuite-routing-protocol/SKILL.md` – routing and conflict resolution
+- `catalog/agents.json` – machine-readable agent manifest
+- `catalog/skills.json` – machine-readable skills manifest
+
+---
+
+**Last updated:** 2026-06-09  
+**Source:** github: Raishin  
+**Version:** 0.1.0