@raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic 2.8.0 → 2.10.0

package/skills/azure/azure-live-entra-role-assignment-guard/references/role-assignment-operations.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Azure Entra and RBAC Role Assignment Operations
+
+Use this reference for current, source-grounded service behavior and the hard live-operation gates that the lean `SKILL.md` intentionally does not carry.
+
+## What people get wrong
+
+- Assigning Owner because Contributor failed without diagnosing the missing permission.
+- Granting broad subscription or management-group scope when resource-group or resource scope is enough.
+- Creating permanent assignment when PIM eligible access satisfies the need.
+- Skipping principal-type checks for guests, service principals, and groups.
+- Assuming deletion instantly revokes every cached token.
+
+## Officially grounded service shape
+
+Microsoft Learn evidence says Azure RBAC grants who can access Azure resources, what they can do, and where. Best practices require least privilege, narrow scope, limiting privileged administrator roles, assigning to groups where manageable, and using PIM for just-in-time access. Privileged role assignments such as Owner, Contributor, and User Access Administrator are powerful and can be monitored with alerts; role assignment changes can take time to propagate.
+
+- Azure RBAC assignment combines principal, role definition, and scope.
+- Privileged administrator roles create broad blast radius and should be minimized.
+- PIM can provide time-bound access for Azure resource roles.
+- Alerts can detect privileged role assignment events at subscription scope.
+- Propagation and token caching mean assignment or deletion may not be immediately observed.
+
+## Non-negotiable design rules
+
+- Confirm tenant, subscription, management group/resource scope, principal, role, and active caller before write.
+- Prefer built-in job-function roles and narrow scopes before privileged administrator roles.
+- Require PIM alternative analysis for privileged or temporary need.
+- Classify principal type and external/guest risk before approval.
+- Provide rollback delete command but state propagation caveats.
+
+## Minimal safe implementation flow
+
+- Scope requested role assignment or deletion and business justification.
+- Collect read-only evidence: principal details, existing assignments, target scope, role definition, and PIM eligibility.
+- Classify risk by role power, scope breadth, principal type, duration, and blast radius.
+- Gate mutation on explicit approval and rollback plan.
+- Verify assignment or deletion, alerts/audit trail, and expected propagation window.
+
+## High-risk assumptions to kill
+
+- A role assignment request is not safe because the requester knows the principal name; principal type, ownership, guest status, and stale service-principal risk still matter.
+- Owner, Contributor, User Access Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, and Global Administrator are not troubleshooting shortcuts.
+- Permanent access is not the default for temporary work; PIM eligibility and activation evidence must be considered first for privileged roles.
+- Removing a role assignment does not prove immediate revocation everywhere because token caching and propagation can delay observable effects.
+- Group-based assignments can hide blast radius unless membership, role-assignable status, and approval process are reviewed.
+
+## Safe command/code verification targets
+
+- Resolve principal, role definition, assignment scope, inherited assignments, and existing eligible/active PIM state before any write.
+- Compare requested role permissions with least-privilege built-in alternatives and narrower scopes.
+- Check whether the request creates standing privileged access, guest/external access, or broad group blast radius.
+- Verify audit log or assignment evidence after change, while labeling propagation and token-cache caveats.
+- Prepare a rollback deletion command and monitoring query before creating privileged access.
+
+## Safe verification targets
+
+- Role is the least privileged role that meets the task.
+- Scope is the narrowest practical scope.
+- Principal type and owner are known and not an unapproved guest or stale service principal.
+- PIM eligible assignment was considered for privileged or temporary access.
+- Privileged assignment monitoring or audit evidence exists.
+
+## When to push back
+
+- The assignee identity or scope is ambiguous.
+- The request wants permanent privileged access for convenience.
+- Guest or broad group assignment lacks documented exception.
+- The user demands immediate revocation proof despite propagation limitations.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-entra-role-assignment-guard/references/rollback-playbook.md

@@ -2,13 +2,17 @@
 
 Permanent role assignments do not expire automatically. Rollback means explicit deletion. Always capture the assignment details before write so deletion is unambiguous.
 
+## Evidence-variable convention
+
+Variables such as $APPROVED_AZURE_SCOPE, $ASSIGNEE_LOOKUP_VALUE, $ROLE_DEFINITION_NAME, $KEY_VAULT_NAME, and $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME are local operator placeholders. Do not commit real values, and redact them from shared evidence unless the change record explicitly allows disclosure.
+
 ## Before any assignment write — capture the full assignment for rollback
 
 ```bash
 # Save the exact object ID, role definition ID, and scope
 az role assignment list \
-  --assignee <PRINCIPAL_OBJECT_ID_OR_UPN> \
-  --scope <SCOPE> \
+  --assignee $ASSIGNEE_LOOKUP_VALUE \
+  --scope $APPROVED_AZURE_SCOPE \
   --query "[].{name:name, roleDefinitionId:roleDefinitionId, principalId:principalId, scope:scope}"
 ```
 
@@ -16,31 +20,31 @@ az role assignment list \
 
 ```bash
 az role assignment delete \
-  --ids /subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION_ID>/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/<ASSIGNMENT_NAME>
+  --ids $ROLE_ASSIGNMENT_ID
 ```
 
 ## Remove by role + assignee + scope (if name not captured)
 
 ```bash
 az role assignment delete \
-  --assignee <PRINCIPAL_OBJECT_ID_OR_UPN> \
-  --role "<ROLE_NAME_OR_ID>" \
-  --scope <SCOPE>
+  --assignee $ASSIGNEE_LOOKUP_VALUE \
+  --role "$ROLE_DEFINITION_NAME" \
+  --scope $APPROVED_AZURE_SCOPE
 ```
 
 ## Verify deletion took effect
 
 ```bash
 az role assignment list \
-  --assignee <PRINCIPAL_OBJECT_ID_OR_UPN> \
-  --scope <SCOPE> \
+  --assignee $ASSIGNEE_LOOKUP_VALUE \
+  --scope $APPROVED_AZURE_SCOPE \
   --query "[].{role:roleDefinitionName, scope:scope}"
 # Should return empty or not include the deleted assignment
 ```
 
 ## Caveats
 
-- Token caching: deleted assignments may still appear valid for up to 5 minutes due to Azure AD token caching. Wait before declaring rollback complete.
+- Token caching: deleted assignments may still appear valid for up to 10 minutes due to Azure Resource Manager caching; managed identity group membership can have longer cache behavior. Wait before declaring rollback complete.
 - Inherited assignments: if the assignment was at a parent scope (subscription or management group), removing it at the child scope is not possible — you must delete from the parent scope where it was created.
 - Guest accounts: if the principal is a guest and the assignment was their only entitlement, removal may trigger MFA re-enrollment on next access. Communicate with the affected user.
 - Audit log: the deletion will appear in Azure Activity Log under `Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/delete`. Retain the activity log entry as evidence.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-entra-role-assignment-guard/references/safety-checklist.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Safety Checklist
+
+## Evidence labels
+
+- `documentation-based`: grounded in Microsoft Learn or listed official documentation.
+- `sampled-current-state`: grounded in read-only Azure or Kubernetes observations from the user's configured tools.
+- `user-provided`: grounded in sanitized snippets supplied by the user.
+- `inference`: reasoned from evidence but not directly proven.
+
+## Mutation boundary
+
+- Default to read-only review.
+- Do not perform create, update, delete, rotate, purge, recover, apply, swap, reset, complete, deploy, assign, revoke, deallocate, quota, budget, or policy changes unless the user explicitly asks and approval is clear.
+- Prefer preview, what-if, dry-run, status, describe, list, show, diff, activity-log, and policy evaluation evidence before any mutation.
+
+## Credential and data boundary
+
+- Never ask users to paste credentials, tokens, tenant IDs, subscription IDs, customer data, private keys, kubeconfig contents, CA requester credentials, secret values, connection strings, or raw environment dumps.
+- Summarize sensitive evidence by field presence, control state, and risk; do not reproduce secret material.
+
+## Risk gates
+
+- Stop on ambiguous target, ambiguous principal, missing approval, missing rollback, missing financial owner, or missing asset owner for high-impact assets.
+- Treat broad permissions, permanent privileged access, public exposure, purge authority, destructive deployment behavior, quota increases, budget automation, and production slot swaps as high-risk.
+- Separate documented product behavior from sampled configured-environment evidence.
+
+## Asset-specific hard line
+
+Never create or delete privileged role assignments without confirmed tenant/scope, assignee identity, principal type, role definition, existing assignment evidence, PIM alternative review, explicit approval, propagation caveat, and rollback command.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-entra-role-assignment-guard/references/workflow-and-output.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Workflow and Output Contract
+
+## Execution flow
+
+1. Scope the exact target, environment boundary, owner, requested operation, approval state, and rollback owner.
+2. Load `official-sources.md`, then the component operations guide for service behavior and risk gates.
+3. Gather sampled read-only evidence only when available and safe.
+4. Compare observed posture against documented behavior, least-privilege expectations, and live-operation safety rules.
+5. Refuse or defer mutation if target, approval, rollback, or evidence is incomplete.
+6. Return a verdict with evidence level, blockers, safe next actions, and open questions.
+
+## Required output
+
+- `verdict`: pass, warn, fail, or blocked.
+- `evidence_level`: documentation-based, sampled-current-state, user-provided, inference, or mixed.
+- `scope`: what was reviewed and what was not reviewed.
+- `approval_status`: explicit approval, missing approval, or not applicable for read-only review.
+- `blockers`: issues that prevent a safe or production-ready conclusion.
+- `findings`: severity-labeled risks with source labels.
+- `rollback_posture`: exact rollback path or explicit non-reversibility caveat.
+- `safe_next_actions`: reversible actions first; mutation only with explicit approval.
+- `open_questions`: missing facts that would change the verdict.
+
+## Stress checks
+
+- What assumption would make this recommendation unsafe?
+- Which role, policy, budget, quota, deployment, swap, or purge action has the largest blast radius?
+- What evidence would disprove the claimed readiness?
+- Is the answer accidentally treating documentation as environment-specific proof?
+
+## Response discipline
+
+Use Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for documented Azure behavior. Use sampled read-only Azure evidence only for current configured-environment observations and label it as sampled evidence.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/SKILL.md

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ description: Guard Key Vault key rotation, rotation policy changes, soft-delete
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob WebFetch
 metadata:
   author: "github: Raishin"
-  version: "0.1.0"
-  updated: "2026-05-05"
+  version: 0.1.6
+  updated: "2026-06-05"
   category: security
 ---
 
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Use this skill when:
 
 ## Lean operating rules
 
-- Prefer Azure CLI (`az`) official documentation when available; fall back to Microsoft Learn docs and sanitized user evidence.
+- Prefer Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP; use sampled read-only Azure evidence when available, then sanitized user evidence.
 - Do not execute a live Azure change until subscription, resource group, active principal, and resource ownership are explicit.
 - Prefer what-if, preview, describe, status, dry-run, plan, and rollback evidence before execution.
 - If the request skips preview or rollback design, push back.
@@ -36,9 +36,13 @@ Use this skill when:
 
 Load these only when needed:
 
+- [Azure Key Vault Rotation and Purge Operations](references/keyvault-rotation-purge-operations.md) — use for current service behavior, common failure modes, hard design rules, verification targets, and push-back conditions.
 - [Preflight commands](references/preflight-commands.md) — CLI commands to run before any mutation.
 - [Rollback playbook](references/rollback-playbook.md) — concrete rollback steps for this service.
 - [Permission model](references/permission-model.md) — RBAC role definitions and PIM guidance.
+- [MCP and evidence path](references/mcp-and-evidence.md) — use when choosing documentation-based evidence, sampled read-only evidence, or sanitized user evidence.
+- [Safety checklist](references/safety-checklist.md) — use for evidence labels, rotation policy safety, soft-delete state, purge-protection irreversibility, recoverability, backup boundaries, and purge-right separation.
+- [Workflow and output contract](references/workflow-and-output.md) — execution flow and final response contract.
 - [Official sources](references/official-sources.md) — authoritative Azure documentation links.
 
 ## Response minimum

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/metadata.json

@@ -11,17 +11,19 @@
     "kiro",
     "other"
   ],
-  "summary": "Guard Key Vault key rotation, rotation policy changes, soft-delete enforcement, and purge-protection enablement with irreversibility warnings and rollback evidence.",
+  "summary": "Guard Key Vault key and secret rotation, rotation policy changes, soft-delete checks, purge-protection enablement, recover decisions, and purge attempts with irreversibility warnings and rollback evidence.",
   "source_type": "original",
   "official_docs": [
-    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/key-vault-recovery",
-    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/keys/about-keys-details",
-    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/keys/how-to-configure-key-rotation",
-    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/best-practices"
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/general/key-vault-recovery",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/general/soft-delete-overview",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/general/secure-key-vault",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/keys/how-to-configure-key-rotation",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/keys/secure-keys",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/policy-reference"
   ],
-  "security_notes": "Purge-protection enable is irreversible. Soft-deleted keys can be recovered within the retention window. HSM-backed hard-purged keys cannot be recovered. Never grant purge rights to routine rotation operators.",
-  "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+  "security_notes": "Purge protection enablement is irreversible, purge is permanent when allowed, and key/secret rotation can break dependent workloads. Never grant purge rights to routine rotation operators or mutate production vault lifecycle controls without owner approval and dependency evidence.",
+  "last_verified": "2026-06-05",
   "path": "skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard",
   "author": "github: Raishin",
-  "version": "0.1.0"
+  "version": "0.1.6"
 }

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/references/keyvault-rotation-purge-operations.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Azure Key Vault Rotation and Purge Operations
+
+Use this reference for current, source-grounded service behavior and the hard live-operation gates that the lean `SKILL.md` intentionally does not carry.
+
+## What people get wrong
+
+- Treating rotation as safe because Key Vault creates a new version.
+- Purging soft-deleted material before proving no dependent service needs recovery.
+- Granting purge rights to the same operators who rotate keys or secrets.
+- Enabling purge protection without warning that it cannot be disabled.
+- Disabling old key versions before re-encryption or dependent services are migrated.
+
+## Officially grounded service shape
+
+Microsoft Learn evidence says soft delete retains deleted vaults and objects for a configurable period, cannot be disabled once enabled, and purge protection prevents permanent deletion until retention elapses. Purge protection cannot be disabled or overridden after enablement. Key rotation should use versioning and rotation policy with dependent-service planning; purge operations require elevated permissions and can be irreversible.
+
+- Soft delete and purge protection are recovery controls with retention windows.
+- Purge protection depends on soft delete and prevents purge until retention passes.
+- Key rotation creates new versions; consumers must either follow latest version safely or be updated deliberately.
+- Secret rotation requires dependent application validation and rollback.
+- Azure Policy can audit or deny missing soft delete and purge protection.
+
+## Non-negotiable design rules
+
+- Never request or print key material, secret values, connection strings, or private keys.
+- Separate rotation authority from purge authority.
+- List dependencies before rotate, disable, delete, recover, or purge.
+- Warn explicitly when an operation is irreversible or not fully rollbackable.
+- Prefer recovery and quarantine over purge unless destruction is approved and evidenced.
+
+## Minimal safe implementation flow
+
+- Scope vault, object type, object name, environment, owner, and dependent services.
+- Collect read-only evidence for soft delete, purge protection, retention, RBAC, object versions, rotation policy, and deleted-object state.
+- Classify requested action as rotation, policy update, enable protection, recover, delete, disable, or purge.
+- Gate mutation on dependency impact, backup/recovery posture, and explicit approval.
+- Verify new version, consumer health, recovery posture, audit events, and remaining risk.
+
+## High-risk assumptions to kill
+
+- Rotation does not prove consumers follow the latest version; pinned key, secret, or certificate versions can break silently after disable/delete.
+- Soft delete is not backup. Recovering a vault does not restore all integrated services such as RBAC role assignments or Event Grid subscriptions.
+- Purge protection cannot be disabled after enablement and purge can be immediate and irrecoverable when protection does not block it.
+- Purge permission should not live with routine rotation automation; separation of duties is the safety control.
+- Secret, key, certificate, connection-string, or private-key material must never be pasted into the workflow as evidence.
+
+## Safe command/code verification targets
+
+- Verify vault soft-delete state, purge-protection state, retention period, RBAC/access model, deleted-object state, and object versions.
+- Check rotation policy and consumer version-pinning before rotate, disable, delete, recover, or purge.
+- Confirm purge authority is narrow, approved, and not reused for normal rotation paths.
+- Validate dependent service health against the new version before disabling old versions.
+- Label purge and protection changes as irreversible or time-bound where Microsoft Learn documents those constraints.
+
+## Safe verification targets
+
+- Soft delete and purge protection state are known and documented.
+- Purge role assignments are narrow, JIT where possible, and not routine automation.
+- Rotation policy aligns with compliance and consumer behavior.
+- Dependent services are tested against new key/secret versions.
+- Recovery or purge decision has owner approval and retention/irreversibility caveat.
+
+## When to push back
+
+- The user asks to purge without dependency and approval evidence.
+- The user asks to paste or export secret/key material.
+- Rotation would break pinned-version consumers with no migration plan.
+- Purge protection or retention implications are not understood by the approver.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/references/mcp-and-evidence.md

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Documentation and Evidence Path
+
+## Preferred evidence order
+
+1. Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for documented Azure behavior.
+2. Sampled read-only Azure evidence, when safely available, for current configured-environment observations.
+3. Sanitized user-provided evidence.
+4. Clearly labeled inference.
+
+## What each evidence type can prove
+
+- Microsoft Learn documentation can prove documented service behavior, supported concepts, limitations, and recommended patterns.
+- Sampled read-only evidence can prove the sampled configured state at the time observed.
+- Sanitized user evidence can prove only what the snippet shows.
+- None of these alone prove broad regional availability, future success, full account posture, or production readiness.
+
+## Safe usage pattern
+
+- State whether each claim is documentation-based, sampled-current-state, user-provided, or inference.
+- Use read-only queries before recommending changes.
+- Do not include sensitive internal identifiers, tenant identifiers, subscription identifiers, or secrets in committed docs or final findings.
+- If no sampled evidence is available, say the review is documentation-based and list the exact evidence still needed.
+
+## Live-operation rule
+
+For live operations, documentation is never enough. Require target confirmation, current-state evidence, explicit approval, rollback constraints, and post-action verification.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/references/official-sources.md

@@ -1,13 +1,35 @@
-# Official Sources: Azure Live Key Vault Rotation Purge Guard
+# Official Sources
 
-## Key Vault key management
+Use these sources to ground the skill. Microsoft Learn documentation proves documented Azure behavior; it does not prove the user's tenant, subscription, RBAC, quota, deployed resources, current cost, vault state, app health, or production readiness.
 
-- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/keys/about-keys
-- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/keys/how-to-configure-key-rotation
-- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/soft-delete-overview
-- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/key-vault-recovery
+## Primary Microsoft Learn sources
 
-## Source-grounding rule
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/general/key-vault-recovery
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/general/soft-delete-overview
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/general/secure-key-vault
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/keys/how-to-configure-key-rotation
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/keys/secure-keys
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/policy-reference
+
+## Grounding notes
+
+- Documentation-based claim: Microsoft Learn evidence says soft delete retains deleted vaults and objects for a configurable period, cannot be disabled once enabled, and purge protection prevents permanent deletion until retention elapses. Purge protection cannot be disabled or overridden after enablement. Key rotation should use versioning and rotation policy with dependent-service planning; purge operations require elevated permissions and can be irreversible.
+- Current-state claim: requires sampled read-only Azure evidence or sanitized user-provided evidence.
+- Live-operation claim: requires target, principal, approval, preflight evidence, rollback constraints, and post-action verification.
+- Inference: allowed only when labeled and tied to observed fields or documented behavior.
+- Do not include sensitive internal identifiers or secret material in findings.
+
+## Source use rules
+
+- Prefer Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for current Azure service behavior.
+- Use sampled read-only Azure evidence only to validate current configured-environment observations.
+- If documentation and sampled evidence appear to conflict, report both and stop short of a production-ready verdict.
+- Re-check official sources before changing high-risk guidance, because cloud behavior and feature availability can change.
+
+## Current Microsoft Learn deltas checked on 2026-06-05
+
+- Soft delete is enabled by default for new vaults and cannot be disabled after enablement.
+- Purge protection is not enabled by default, but once enabled it cannot be disabled or bypassed during the retention period.
+- Key rotation creates a new key version; it does not re-encrypt dependent data by itself, so old and new versions may both be needed during rewrap/migration.
+- Recovering a soft-deleted vault does not automatically restore every integrated artifact such as role assignments or event subscriptions.
 
-Use official Microsoft Learn documentation as the source of truth for Key Vault behavior.
-Purge-protection and soft-delete mechanics change between API versions — verify against current docs.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/references/permission-model.md

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 # Permission Model: Azure Live Key Vault Rotation Purge Guard
 
+## Evidence-variable convention
+
+Shell variables in examples are local operator placeholders from an approved change record or already configured shell context. Do not commit real values, and redact them from shared evidence unless disclosure is explicitly approved.
+
 ## Rotation operator role — no delete, no purge
 
 ```json
@@ -34,7 +38,7 @@
     "Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/certificates/purge/action"
   ],
   "AssignableScopes": [
-    "/subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION_ID>/resourceGroups/<TARGET_RG>/providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/<VAULT_NAME>"
+    "$APPROVED_KEY_VAULT_SCOPE"
   ]
 }
 ```
@@ -62,3 +66,5 @@ until the retention period (7–90 days) expires. This is a one-way door.
 - `Key Vault Administrator` standing (includes purge rights)
 - `Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/purge/action` to rotation operators
 - `Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/accessPolicies/write` to non-admins (legacy access policy model)
+
+Use exact resource scopes from approved change records; do not paste raw subscription identifiers into chat.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/references/preflight-commands.md

@@ -1,32 +1,38 @@
 # Preflight Commands: Azure Live Key Vault Rotation Purge Guard
 
+Use shell variables for examples instead of raw identifiers. Populate them from an approved change record or already configured shell context; never paste tenant, subscription, resource, or secret values into chat.
+
+## Evidence-variable convention
+
+Variables such as $AZURE_RESOURCE_GROUP_NAME, $APP_SERVICE_APP_NAME, or $KEY_VAULT_NAME are local operator placeholders. Do not commit real values, and redact them from shared evidence unless the change record explicitly allows disclosure.
+
 Run these before any Key Vault rotation or purge operation.
 
 ## 1. Confirm identity and vault target
 
 ```bash
 az account show --query "{subscription:id, name:name, user:user.name}"
-az keyvault show -n <VAULT_NAME> -g <RESOURCE_GROUP> \
+az keyvault show -n $KEY_VAULT_NAME -g $AZURE_RESOURCE_GROUP_NAME \
   --query "{name:name, enableSoftDelete:properties.enableSoftDelete, enablePurgeProtection:properties.enablePurgeProtection, softDeleteRetentionInDays:properties.softDeleteRetentionInDays}"
 ```
 
 ## 2. List key versions and identify current/active
 
 ```bash
-az keyvault key list-versions --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> -n <KEY_NAME> \
+az keyvault key list-versions --vault-name $KEY_VAULT_NAME -n $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME \
   --query "[].{kid:kid, enabled:attributes.enabled, created:attributes.created, expires:attributes.expires}"
 ```
 
 ## 3. Check rotation policy
 
 ```bash
-az keyvault key rotation-policy show --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> -n <KEY_NAME>
+az keyvault key rotation-policy show --vault-name $KEY_VAULT_NAME -n $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME
 ```
 
 ## 4. List soft-deleted keys (purge risk check)
 
 ```bash
-az keyvault key list-deleted --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> \
+az keyvault key list-deleted --vault-name $KEY_VAULT_NAME \
   --query "[].{name:name, deletedDate:attributes.deletedDate, scheduledPurgeDate:attributes.scheduledPurgeDate}"
 ```
 
@@ -35,14 +41,19 @@ az keyvault key list-deleted --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> \
 ```bash
 # Check disk encryption sets using this vault
 az disk-encryption-set list --query \
-  "[?activeKey.sourceVault.id contains '<VAULT_NAME>'].{name:name, id:id}"
+  "[?activeKey.sourceVault.id contains '$KEY_VAULT_NAME'].{name:name, id:id}"
 # Check Storage accounts with CMK
 az storage account list --query \
-  "[?encryption.keyVaultProperties.keyVaultUri contains '<VAULT_NAME>'].{name:name}"
+  "[?encryption.keyVaultProperties.keyVaultUri contains '$KEY_VAULT_NAME'].{name:name}"
 ```
 
 ## 6. Confirm backup exists before any key version operation
 
 ```bash
-az keyvault key backup --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> -n <KEY_NAME> -f <KEY_NAME>-backup.json
+az keyvault key backup --vault-name $KEY_VAULT_NAME -n $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME -f $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME-backup.json
 ```
+
+
+## Read-only configured evidence labels
+
+Treat key, secret, certificate, and Managed HSM metadata reads as sampled read-only Azure evidence. Do not print secret values. A successful metadata read proves only the sampled vault/object state, not tenant-wide Key Vault posture.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/references/rollback-playbook.md

@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
 # Rollback Playbook: Azure Live Key Vault Rotation Purge Guard
 
+## Evidence-variable convention
+
+Variables such as $APPROVED_AZURE_SCOPE, $ASSIGNEE_LOOKUP_VALUE, $ROLE_DEFINITION_NAME, $KEY_VAULT_NAME, and $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME are local operator placeholders. Do not commit real values, and redact them from shared evidence unless the change record explicitly allows disclosure.
+
 ## Restore a key from backup
 
 ```bash
 # Restore the key backup created during preflight
-az keyvault key restore --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> -f <KEY_NAME>-backup.json
+az keyvault key restore --vault-name $KEY_VAULT_NAME -f $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME-backup.json
 ```
 
 Note: key backup/restore only works within the same geography and subscription security boundary.
@@ -12,7 +16,7 @@ Note: key backup/restore only works within the same geography and subscription s
 ## Re-enable a disabled key version
 
 ```bash
-az keyvault key set-attributes --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> -n <KEY_NAME> \
+az keyvault key set-attributes --vault-name $KEY_VAULT_NAME -n $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME \
   --version <VERSION_ID> --enabled true
 ```
 
@@ -20,10 +24,10 @@ az keyvault key set-attributes --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> -n <KEY_NAME> \
 
 ```bash
 # List soft-deleted keys
-az keyvault key list-deleted --vault-name <VAULT_NAME>
+az keyvault key list-deleted --vault-name $KEY_VAULT_NAME
 
 # Recover
-az keyvault key recover --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> -n <KEY_NAME>
+az keyvault key recover --vault-name $KEY_VAULT_NAME -n $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME
 ```
 
 ## Revert rotation policy to previous settings
@@ -31,8 +35,8 @@ az keyvault key recover --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> -n <KEY_NAME>
 ```bash
 # Update rotation policy with restored values
 az keyvault key rotation-policy update \
-  --vault-name <VAULT_NAME> \
-  -n <KEY_NAME> \
+  --vault-name $KEY_VAULT_NAME \
+  -n $KEY_VAULT_KEY_NAME \
   --value @previous-rotation-policy.json
 ```
 

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/references/safety-checklist.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Safety Checklist
+
+## Evidence labels
+
+- `documentation-based`: grounded in Microsoft Learn or listed official documentation.
+- `sampled-current-state`: grounded in read-only Azure or Kubernetes observations from the user's configured tools.
+- `user-provided`: grounded in sanitized snippets supplied by the user.
+- `inference`: reasoned from evidence but not directly proven.
+
+## Mutation boundary
+
+- Default to read-only review.
+- Do not perform create, update, delete, rotate, purge, recover, apply, swap, reset, complete, deploy, assign, revoke, deallocate, quota, budget, or policy changes unless the user explicitly asks and approval is clear.
+- Prefer preview, what-if, dry-run, status, describe, list, show, diff, activity-log, and policy evaluation evidence before any mutation.
+
+## Credential and data boundary
+
+- Never ask users to paste credentials, tokens, tenant IDs, subscription IDs, customer data, private keys, kubeconfig contents, CA requester credentials, secret values, connection strings, or raw environment dumps.
+- Summarize sensitive evidence by field presence, control state, and risk; do not reproduce secret material.
+
+## Risk gates
+
+- Stop on ambiguous target, ambiguous principal, missing approval, missing rollback, missing financial owner, or missing asset owner for high-impact assets.
+- Treat broad permissions, permanent privileged access, public exposure, purge authority, destructive deployment behavior, quota increases, budget automation, and production slot swaps as high-risk.
+- Separate documented product behavior from sampled configured-environment evidence.
+
+## Asset-specific hard line
+
+Purge protection enablement is irreversible, purge is permanent when allowed, and key/secret rotation can break dependent workloads. Never grant purge rights to routine rotation operators or mutate production vault lifecycle controls without owner approval and dependency evidence.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard/references/workflow-and-output.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Workflow and Output Contract
+
+## Execution flow
+
+1. Scope the exact target, environment boundary, owner, requested operation, approval state, and rollback owner.
+2. Load `official-sources.md`, then the component operations guide for service behavior and risk gates.
+3. Gather sampled read-only evidence only when available and safe.
+4. Compare observed posture against documented behavior, least-privilege expectations, and live-operation safety rules.
+5. Refuse or defer mutation if target, approval, rollback, or evidence is incomplete.
+6. Return a verdict with evidence level, blockers, safe next actions, and open questions.
+
+## Required output
+
+- `verdict`: pass, warn, fail, or blocked.
+- `evidence_level`: documentation-based, sampled-current-state, user-provided, inference, or mixed.
+- `scope`: what was reviewed and what was not reviewed.
+- `approval_status`: explicit approval, missing approval, or not applicable for read-only review.
+- `blockers`: issues that prevent a safe or production-ready conclusion.
+- `findings`: severity-labeled risks with source labels.
+- `rollback_posture`: exact rollback path or explicit non-reversibility caveat.
+- `safe_next_actions`: reversible actions first; mutation only with explicit approval.
+- `open_questions`: missing facts that would change the verdict.
+
+## Stress checks
+
+- What assumption would make this recommendation unsafe?
+- Which role, policy, budget, quota, deployment, swap, or purge action has the largest blast radius?
+- What evidence would disprove the claimed readiness?
+- Is the answer accidentally treating documentation as environment-specific proof?
+
+## Response discipline
+
+Use Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP for documented Azure behavior. Use sampled read-only Azure evidence only for current configured-environment observations and label it as sampled evidence.

package/skills/azure/azure-live-pim-jit-activation-guard/SKILL.md

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ description: Gate Entra ID PIM eligible role activations with justification, MFA
 allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob WebFetch
 metadata:
   author: "github: Raishin"
-  version: "0.1.0"
-  updated: "2026-05-05"
+  version: 0.1.6
+  updated: "2026-06-05"
   category: security
 ---
 
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Use this skill when:
 
 ## Lean operating rules
 
-- Prefer Azure CLI (`az`) official documentation when available; fall back to Microsoft Learn docs and sanitized user evidence.
+- Prefer Microsoft Learn documentation through the user's configured documentation MCP, then sampled read-only Azure evidence when available, then sanitized user evidence.
 - Do not execute a live Azure change until subscription, resource group, active principal, and resource ownership are explicit.
 - Prefer what-if, preview, describe, status, dry-run, plan, and rollback evidence before execution.
 - If the request skips preview or rollback design, push back.
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ Use this skill when:
 
 Load these only when needed:
 
+- [Azure PIM JIT Activation Operations](references/pim-jit-activation-operations.md) — use for current service behavior, common failure modes, hard design rules, verification targets, and push-back conditions.
+- [Safety checklist](references/safety-checklist.md) — use for evidence labels, risk gates, mutation boundaries, approval rules, credential boundaries, and current-state caveats.
 - [Preflight commands](references/preflight-commands.md) — CLI commands to run before any mutation.
 - [Rollback playbook](references/rollback-playbook.md) — concrete rollback steps for this service.
 - [Permission model](references/permission-model.md) — RBAC role definitions and PIM guidance.