@quickback-dev/cli 0.46.0 → 0.47.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/commands/compile.js +1 -1
- package/dist/docs/content.js +11 -11
- package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.js +16 -3
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +389 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +17 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +9 -4
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/diagnostics.md +88 -57
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +27 -8
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi.md +2 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/organizations.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/pages.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/durable-objects.md +9 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/live-views.md +4 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/using-realtime.md +2 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +389 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +17 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +9 -4
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/diagnostics.md +88 -57
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +27 -8
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi.md +2 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/organizations.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/pages.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/durable-objects.md +9 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/live-views.md +4 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/using-realtime.md +2 -2
- package/dist/commands/init.d.ts +0 -6
- package/dist/commands/init.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/commands/init.js +0 -405
- package/dist/commands/init.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.d.ts +0 -25
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.js +0 -179
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.d.ts +0 -2
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.js +0 -130
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.js.map +0 -1
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@@ -19,54 +19,46 @@ a stable, greppable **code**:
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[quickback:authz] AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION: permission "event:locked" can never be satisfied — it requires organizerOf AND its negation simultaneously.
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at resource=sessions authz.permissions["event:locked"]
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hint: Remove the contradictory arm, or split into separate permissions.
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override: authz: { analyzer: { allow: [{ check: 'AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION', target: 'event:locked', reason: '<why this is acceptable>' }] } }
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```
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The first line stays greppable (`[quickback:<channel>] CODE: message`); the
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source location
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source location, fix hint, and — for promoted errors — the exact override
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recipe render on continuation lines.
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##
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## Errors vs warnings (v0.47+)
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The
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the analyzer runs on the shared compiler that serves every project, so a new
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check must never break an existing build on upgrade. In the default path
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every diagnostic — *including* the one check authored at `error` severity
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(the capability ceiling) — is rendered as a warning line and the compile
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proceeds.
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The checks split into two tiers:
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(the
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- **Promoted (compile errors).** A trip is a *definite misconfiguration* —
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never a legitimate config. These fail the build by default. Each one can be
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explicitly accepted per finding via
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[`authz.analyzer.allow`](#the-override-surface).
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- **Heuristic (warnings) and reports (info).** Advisory findings where a
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legitimate config could trip the detector. These print and the compile
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continues. Set **`QUICKBACK_AUTHZ_STRICT=true`** to promote these warnings
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to errors as well (overridden findings stay warnings even under strict —
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an override is an explicit, reasoned acceptance).
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# strict: any warn or error fails the compile
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QUICKBACK_AUTHZ_STRICT=true quickback compile
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```
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> The analyzer is compile-time only — zero runtime blast radius. A defect in
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> the analyzer itself is caught and downgraded to a single warning in the
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> default path, so an analyzer bug can never take down an otherwise-valid
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> compile. (Strict mode re-raises, because there the throw is the intended
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> hard failure.)
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The analyzer remains compile-time only — zero runtime blast radius. A defect
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in the analyzer *itself* is caught and downgraded to a single warning, so an
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analyzer bug can never take down an otherwise-valid compile. Only real
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findings fail builds.
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## Authz codes
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These read the permission graph projected from the policy IR
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which is authored as `error`.
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These read the permission graph projected from the policy IR and run on every
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compile.
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| Code |
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| Code | Tier | What it catches |
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| `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` |
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| `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` | **error** | A permission that can never be satisfied — `allOf(a, not(a))`, a fact and its exact negation at the same AND-level. The detector is conservative (exact-leaf contradictions only), so a trip is structurally unsatisfiable. |
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| `AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING` | **error** | A resource's firewall grants a `scope:<kind>:<role>` role read access **beyond its capability profile** — either the role has no profile at all, or the profile doesn't list this resource. The M0.2 pillar guarantee. |
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| `AUTHZ_SHADOWED_ARM` | warn | An `anyOf` arm subsumed by a broader arm: a leaf `X` and an `allOf(X, …)` in the same union — the narrower arm can never widen the result. |
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| `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_ROLE` | warn | A scoped role declared under `authz.scopes` with **no grant profile** — it can authorize no read, action, or channel
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| `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_VIEW` | warn | A grant's `read` names a `resource:view` whose resource has no firewall — no role can reach that view. |
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| `AUTHZ_NOT_OVER_RESOURCE` | warn | A `not` whose operand resolves to a **resource (SQL) site** — `NOT EXISTS` over a nullable join can silently pass (the null-trap). The analyzer resolves the operand's site from its leaves, so it fires even when the lowering left the site unset. |
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| `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_ROLE` | warn | A scoped role declared under `authz.scopes` with **no grant profile** — it can authorize no read, action, or channel. Dead config, deny-safe. |
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| `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_VIEW` | warn | A grant's `read` names a `resource:view` whose resource has no firewall — no role can reach that view. (A reachability proxy — heuristic by design.) |
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| `AUTHZ_NOT_OVER_RESOURCE` | warn | A `not` whose operand resolves to a **resource (SQL) site** — `NOT EXISTS` over a nullable join can silently pass (the null-trap). The site resolution is conservative, so this stays advisory. |
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| `AUTHZ_PUSHDOWN_COST` | info | Per-permission report: how many SQL subqueries the permission lowers to, plus the max recursive-CTE depth. Advisory, never fails a build. |
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A few codes are reserved in the diagnostic enum for the milestones that emit
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them and don't fire on a shipped config today: `AUTHZ_UNBOUNDED_RECURSION`
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### The capability ceiling
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grant profile the single auditable manifest of what an external principal can
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see.
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The check that backs [scope grant profiles](/compiler/definitions/scopes): a
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scoped role is deny-by-default and may touch only what its `grants` profile
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lists. The analyzer walks every resource firewall, follows each
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`{ permission }` arm into the permission graph to find the scope roles it
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references, and **fails the build** if a resource grants a scope role access
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the profile doesn't cover. This is what makes the grant profile the single
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auditable manifest of what an external principal can see.
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## Authn codes
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generated route + credential surface rather than the authz policy
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Five **structural authentication** checks — proving properties over the
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generated route + credential surface rather than the authz policy. All are
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promoted (compile errors):
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| Code | Tier | What it catches |
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| `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE` |
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| `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE` | **error** | A route that reaches data with an **unclassifiable** auth gate and isn't declared `PUBLIC` — the signup / flag-gap bug class (data delivered to an unauthenticated ctx). Fires only on a gate the compiler cannot classify; zero-FP by construction. |
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| `AUTHN_SURFACE_INVARIANT` | **error** | A surface contract breach: an `/mcp` or agent route not gated bearer-only, or an `INTERNAL`-gated route mounted on an HTTP-reachable surface. |
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| `AUTHN_SECRET_CONSISTENCY` | **error** | A credential's mint site and verify site don't share key / issuer / audience — every minted token would fail verification (the ws-ticket "401 on every upgrade" trap). |
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| `AUTHN_CREDENTIAL_DELIVERY` | **error** | A fire-and-forget credential send (the OTP-email shape) not anchored to `waitUntil` / `await` — the Worker may drop the promise and never deliver (the OTP-500 bug class). |
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| `AUTHN_CLAIM_PROVENANCE` | **error** | An identity `ctx` field written from **request input** rather than a credential verifier — client-asserted identity, which is forbidden. Unprovable provenance also fails (fail closed). |
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These check definitions are **wired and fully unit-tested**, but their inputs
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— the per-route and per-credential metadata (`RouteNode` / `MintSite` /
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`VerifySite` / `ClaimWrite`) — are not yet emitted by the route, middleware,
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and credential generators. Until those generators emit that metadata the
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analyzer runs the authn checks against **empty** route/credential graphs, so
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they are effectively no-ops on a real compile. The
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they are effectively no-ops on a real compile. The severity contract is
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locked in now: they fail builds the moment they can fire. (The emitted route
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surface is separately guarded today by the IR's unbound-route invariant — a
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hard error that predates this promotion and owns that surface; one subject,
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one error.)
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## The override surface
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Every promoted finding can be explicitly accepted — per finding, with a
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required reason:
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```ts
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authz: {
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analyzer: {
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allow: [
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{
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check: 'AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING',
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target: 'sessions/scope:event:organizer',
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reason: 'organizer grant profile lands with the v2 rollout (TICKET-123)',
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},
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],
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},
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}
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```
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that cites the reason. The rendered error prints the exact recipe — copy the
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`check` and `target` from it. Target formats:
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| Check | `target` format |
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| `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` | the permission name — `event:locked` |
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| `AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING` | `<resource>/scope:<kind>:<role>` — `sessions/scope:event:organizer` |
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| `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE`, `AUTHN_SURFACE_INVARIANT` | `<METHOD> <path>` — `GET /mcp` |
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| `AUTHN_SECRET_CONSISTENCY`, `AUTHN_CREDENTIAL_DELIVERY` | the credential kind — `ws-ticket` |
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| `AUTHN_CLAIM_PROVENANCE` | the ctx field — `ctx.userId` |
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Guard rails, all compile errors:
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- `check` must be a **promoted** id — unknown ids and keep-warn ids (there is
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nothing to override) are rejected at config validation.
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- `reason` is required and non-empty: overrides are self-documenting.
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- An `allow` entry that matches **no current finding** is a *dead override*
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and fails the compile — fix or remove the stale entry. Override lists can
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never silently outlive the problems they suppressed.
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## Reading the pushdown-cost report
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profiles the capability-ceiling check enforces.
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- [Firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) — the `{ permission }` arms the
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ceiling check follows into the permission graph.
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```
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```bash
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npm run db:migrate # applies them — schema AND the RLS layer
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The RLS layer (helper functions, policies, triggers) rides the same
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journaled migration set as your schema (v0.45+): the compiler appends a
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content-addressed `<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>` migration, so one
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`db:migrate` applies everything in order. The RLS migration is idempotent
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(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create) and only a *changed* security config
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appends a new entry — recompiles with unchanged security append nothing. No
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## Row Level Security
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Quickback emits RLS policies from your `firewall` and `access` config. The Neon target uses Neon Authorize's `auth.user_id()` JWT claim function (the Supabase target uses `auth.uid()` instead — same pattern, different function).
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All helpers are TEXT-typed to match Better Auth's prefixed ids
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(`org_abc123`). The `user_sessions` table the org helpers read is
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access — fail closed.
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RLS coverage includes Better Auth's own tables — including those the
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table families when those surfaces are on, locked to service-role only).
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## Setting up Neon Authorize
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1. Open **Project Settings → Authorize** in the Neon console
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│ └── 0102_create_indexes.sql
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├── 0000_<name>.sql # schema migrations (drizzle-kit)
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├── 0001_quickback_rls_<hash>.sql # journaled RLS layer (content-addressed)
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└── meta/_journal.json # one journal covers both
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src/
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├──
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└──
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├── db/schema.ts # Drizzle schema barrel
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├── db/rls-support.schema.ts # user_sessions + RLS support tables
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└── auth/schema.ts # Better Auth schema (owned by the BA CLI)
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```
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## When to choose Neon vs D1
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Alongside the spec, every compile writes `reports/operations.manifest.json` — a
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stable, machine-readable index of the full route surface (resource, action,
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view, and auth routes
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+
view, and auth routes; since v0.47 also the realtime, storage, and FGA
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surfaces):
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```json
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[
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Account UI provides a complete organization management interface when `VITE_ENAB
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- Change roles and remove members — actions are filtered per-target by the role hierarchy (non-owners can't manage owner-role members)
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- Leave the organization
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-
> **Note:** These three roles (`owner`, `admin`, `member`) are Better Auth's built-in organization roles and map directly to Account UI's role picker. Use the same roles in your Quickback [Access](/compiler/definitions/access) rules — with [`auth.roleHierarchy`](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) configured, you can write `roles: ["member+"]` to mean "member and above."
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+
> **Note:** These three roles (`owner`, `admin`, `member`) are Better Auth's built-in organization roles and map directly to Account UI's role picker. Use the same roles in your Quickback [Access](/compiler/definitions/access) rules — with [`auth.roleHierarchy`](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) configured, you can write `roles: ["member+"]` to mean "member and above." [Custom org roles](/compiler/definitions/access#custom-org-roles) declared in your access trees are auto-registered with the organization plugin (v0.46+), so `invite-member` / `update-member-role` accept them too.
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## Invitations
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Custom pages extend the CMS beyond standard table views. Define split-panel layo
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Pages are defined in your feature directory under a `pages/` folder:
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8
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```
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-
quickback/
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+
quickback/features/
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banking/
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bank-accounts.ts # One table per file — any filename
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bank-transactions.ts
|
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@@ -107,6 +107,15 @@ attendee — their realtime socket now opens.
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Quickback emits auto-broadcasts in **only one place**: the generated CRUD route handlers (`POST /` create, `PATCH /:id` update, `DELETE /:id` delete) for resources with `realtime.enabled` (or covered by `dbConfig.realtime: true`'s project-level default). Those handlers wrap each successful write with a `realtime.insert / update / delete` call before responding.
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+
Auto-broadcasts carry the table's declared gates (v0.46+): the
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+
`realtime.requiredRoles` list becomes the broadcast's `targetRoles` (with
|
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+
role-hierarchy `+` expanded), and the table's effective masking config —
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declared plus auto-detected sensitive columns — is applied per subscriber
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+
role at fanout, matching what the HTTP routes mask. A `type: 'custom'` mask
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+
function can't be replicated by the Broadcaster, so those columns broadcast
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as `[REDACTED]` (fail closed). Tables that declare neither broadcast openly,
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+
as before.
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+
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Everywhere else — action handlers, queue consumers, scheduled jobs, custom Hono routes — you broadcast manually. In action handlers on realtime-enabled projects, Quickback now injects a typed `realtime` helper directly into `execute(...)`; outside actions you still call `createRealtime(env)` yourself.
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| Mutation site | Auto-broadcast? | Why |
|
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@@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ are emitted as `DELETE` so the row leaves the surface.
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- Each included table's `firewall` + `masking` apply on both the initial
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materialize and the live deltas (masking is applied per subscriber role at
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fanout), so the two are consistent.
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+
- A table-level `realtime.requiredRoles` declaration is honored on view
|
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+
deltas too (v0.46+): `view_changes` for that table fan out only to
|
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+
subscribers holding one of the required roles, exactly like its row-stream
|
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+
broadcasts. Tables without `requiredRoles` are unaffected.
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- **Stricter-child guard.** When a reverse-FK child's firewall is *stricter*
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than the root's (e.g. an owner-scoped note under an org-scoped person), the
|
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raw child row is **never broadcast**. Instead the server emits a *resync
|
|
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Custom namespaces (from `defineRealtime()`) use the format `namespace:event` —
|
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|
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### Role-Based Filtering
|
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|
|
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|
-
Events are only delivered to users whose role matches the broadcast's `targetRoles`. If a table's realtime config specifies `requiredRoles: ["hiring-manager", "recruiter"]`, only users with those roles receive the events.
|
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+
Events are only delivered to users whose role matches the broadcast's `targetRoles`. If a table's realtime config specifies `requiredRoles: ["hiring-manager", "recruiter"]`, only users with those roles receive the events. This applies to generated CRUD broadcasts and to [live view](/stack/realtime/live-views) `view_changes` deltas alike, enforced at fanout (v0.46+ — recompile and redeploy to pick up the enforcement).
|
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|
|
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|
### Per-Role Masking
|
|
136
136
|
|
|
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ masking: {
|
|
|
145
145
|
- **Owner sees:** `{ ssn: "123-45-6789" }`
|
|
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|
- **Recruiter sees:** `{ ssn: "*****6789" }`
|
|
147
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|
|
|
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|
-
Masking is pre-computed per-role (O(roles), not O(subscribers)) for efficiency.
|
|
148
|
+
Masking is pre-computed per-role (O(roles), not O(subscribers)) for efficiency. A `type: 'custom'` mask function can't run inside the Broadcaster — those columns broadcast as `[REDACTED]` (fail closed).
|
|
149
149
|
|
|
150
150
|
### User-Specific Events
|
|
151
151
|
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@quickback-dev/cli",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.47.1",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "CLI for Quickback — define your backend in TypeScript, compile to a fully wired Cloudflare Worker (or Bun / Node) with auth, database, migrations, security, CMS, and Account UI.",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": "Kardoe Incorporated <paul@kardoe.com>",
|
|
6
6
|
"license": "MIT",
|