@quickback-dev/cli 0.46.0 → 0.47.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/commands/compile.js +1 -1
- package/dist/docs/content.js +11 -11
- package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.js +16 -3
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +389 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +17 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +9 -4
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/diagnostics.md +88 -57
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +27 -8
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi.md +2 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/organizations.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/pages.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/durable-objects.md +9 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/live-views.md +4 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/using-realtime.md +2 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +389 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +17 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +9 -4
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/diagnostics.md +88 -57
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +27 -8
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi.md +2 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/organizations.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/pages.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/durable-objects.md +9 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/live-views.md +4 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/using-realtime.md +2 -2
- package/dist/commands/init.d.ts +0 -6
- package/dist/commands/init.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/commands/init.js +0 -405
- package/dist/commands/init.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.d.ts +0 -25
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.js +0 -179
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.d.ts +0 -2
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.js +0 -130
- package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.js.map +0 -1
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# Changelog
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## v0.47.0 — June 11, 2026
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### Breaking: zero-false-positive analyzer checks are now compile errors
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The authz/authn analyzer (v0.37) shipped warn-only. After a release cycle of
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data, the checks whose every trip is a definite misconfiguration — never a
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legitimate config — are **promoted to compile errors**. Warnings nobody is
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forced to read are documentation; the pillar guarantees are now enforced.
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**Breaking** — a config that previously compiled with one of these warnings
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now fails the compile:
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- `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` — a permission that is structurally unsatisfiable
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(`allOf(a, not(a))`: a fact AND its exact negation at the same AND-level).
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- `AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING` — a resource's firewall grants a
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`scope:<kind>:<role>` role access beyond its capability profile (or the
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role has no profile at all). This is the M0.2 pillar guarantee — it was
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authored as an error all along and is now enforced.
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- `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE`, `AUTHN_SURFACE_INVARIANT`,
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`AUTHN_SECRET_CONSISTENCY`, `AUTHN_CREDENTIAL_DELIVERY`,
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`AUTHN_CLAIM_PROVENANCE` — the structural-authn set (route auth coverage,
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bearer-only `/mcp`/agent surfaces + INTERNAL unreachability, mint↔verify
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key/issuer/audience pairing, anchored credential delivery, verifier-only
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identity claims). These still run against empty route/credential metadata
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on a real compile (no-ops until the generators emit it), but the severity
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contract is locked in now — they fail the build the moment they can fire.
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The heuristic/advisory checks are unchanged: `AUTHZ_SHADOWED_ARM`,
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`AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_ROLE`, `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_VIEW`, and
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`AUTHZ_NOT_OVER_RESOURCE` stay warnings; `AUTHZ_PUSHDOWN_COST` stays an info
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report. `QUICKBACK_AUTHZ_STRICT=true` still promotes those warnings too.
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**The override escape hatch** — every promoted finding can be explicitly
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accepted, per finding, with a required reason:
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```ts
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authz: {
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analyzer: {
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allow: [
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{
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check: 'AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING',
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target: 'sessions/scope:event:organizer', // from the rendered finding
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reason: 'organizer grant profile lands with the v2 rollout (TICKET-123)',
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},
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],
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},
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}
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```
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An override downgrades that exact `(check, target)` finding back to a warning
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that cites the reason — even under strict mode (it's an explicit, reasoned
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acceptance). Every rendered error prints its exact override recipe. Guard
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rails: `check` must be one of the promoted ids (unknown or keep-warn ids are
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rejected at config validation), `reason` is required, and an `allow` entry
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that matches no current finding is itself a compile error — no dead
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overrides accumulating after the underlying issue is fixed.
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Analyzer-internal defects are still fail-open: a bug in the analyzer itself
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downgrades to a single warning and the compile continues. Only real findings
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fail builds.
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### CLI: live views now compile through the CLI
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`defineView` files under `quickback/services/views/` were never loaded by
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the CLI — the compile payload simply omitted them, so
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[live views](/stack/realtime/live-views) (v0.35) only worked when driving
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the compiler API directly. The CLI now discovers and ships them like every
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other service definition, and the compile summary counts them
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(`Loaded services: … 1 live view(s)`). If you declared views and wondered
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why no surface ever went live: upgrade the CLI and recompile.
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### CLI: deterministic compile output across machines
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Feature and service discovery used raw `readdir` order, which differs
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between macOS and Linux — route registration order, schema re-exports,
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OpenAPI paths, and the Neon RLS document's content hash could all churn when
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the same project was recompiled on a different machine. All discovery sites
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now sort by codepoint, so the same input compiles to the same bytes
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everywhere. Expect a one-time diff on the first recompile if your previous
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output was generated in a different filesystem order.
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### Fixes
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- Read-only resources (no `crud` block) generated routes importing a
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`CRUD_ACCESS` symbol their resource file never exported — a tsc/bundle
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break. The export is now unconditional.
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- The `blog` starter template gated writes on the removed `ADMIN`
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pseudo-role, which hard-fails current compiles; it now uses the
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org-membership `admin` role.
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- `reports/operations.manifest.json` and `reports/conformance.manifest.json`
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now also cover the realtime (`/broadcast/v1`), storage (`/storage/v1`),
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and FGA (`/fga/v1`) surfaces.
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- The dead free/pro tier plumbing is gone: no Tier row in
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`quickback whoami`, no upsell copy at login. Compiling complete projects
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requires login, exactly as before — there was never a paid gate behind it.
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- The CLI is published to npm via trusted publishing (GitHub OIDC) — signed
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provenance, no long-lived npm token in the pipeline.
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## v0.46.0 — June 11, 2026
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### Breaking: "no organization context" responses unified on HTTP 403
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@@ -43,6 +141,225 @@ redeploy; switch to the documented root URL. Actions declared *under* the
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feature prefix are untouched, and a feature whose standalone actions are all
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root-mounted no longer emits an (empty) feature actions routes file.
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### Behavior change: `PUBLIC` inside `or:` arms admits anonymous callers
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[Access](/compiler/definitions/access) has always documented `PUBLIC` as
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working on every access node, but the emitted auth gate only honored it in a
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flat `roles: [...]` list. A tree like
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```ts
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access: {
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or: [
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{ roles: ["PUBLIC"] },
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{ roles: ["admin"] },
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],
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}
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```
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still answered anonymous callers with `401`. The auth gate is now tree-aware
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and matches the documented semantics: a `PUBLIC` `or:` arm admits anonymous
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callers past the authentication gate (an `and:` group admits them only when
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*every* arm does), and the access / org / firewall layers still evaluate the
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full tree. One shared predicate now drives the emitted gates, the OpenAPI
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`security` blocks, and view routes (which gate per view on the
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view-effective access).
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**Worth a loud note:** if you have a nested `PUBLIC` arm that was silently
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401-ing, that endpoint becomes anonymously reachable after recompile —
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exactly what the config declares, but verify it's what you meant. `PUBLIC`
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audit logging applies to the newly-admitted routes as usual.
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### Realtime broadcasts now enforce `requiredRoles` and masking
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A table's declared realtime gates weren't being applied to the generated
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CRUD broadcasts: `realtime: { requiredRoles: [...] }` and column masking were
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honored on the HTTP surface but not on the WebSocket fanout. The docs
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promised per-role, masked realtime delivery; the generated broadcasts now
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match it. **Recompile and redeploy** any project using realtime on
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role-gated or masked tables.
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Generated `realtime.insert / update / delete` calls now carry:
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- **`targetRoles`** — the table's `realtime.requiredRoles` (post role-
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hierarchy `+` expansion), enforced per subscriber at fanout.
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- **`maskingConfig`** — serialized from the same effective masking
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(declared + auto-detected sensitive columns) the HTTP mask functions are
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generated from. What HTTP masks is what the WebSocket wire masks.
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Live-view `view_changes` deltas honor the same table-level `requiredRoles`
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at fanout, so a role-gated table can't leak through a
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[live view](/stack/realtime/live-views) subscription either.
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Notes:
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- Recompile suffices — no config change needed.
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- If you worked around this with hand-written `realtime.*` calls passing
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`targetRoles` / `maskingConfig`, those workaround broadcasts can be
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removed.
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- `type: 'custom'` mask functions can't ride the wire — the Broadcaster
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fails closed and broadcasts `[REDACTED]` for those columns.
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- Tables without `requiredRoles` or masking are byte-identical: the open
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broadcast default is unchanged.
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### Batch operations inherit the base operation's access
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When a batch operation was declared without its own `access`, it didn't pick
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up the base operation's role requirement:
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```ts
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crud: {
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update: { access: { roles: ["admin"] } },
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batchUpdate: { maxBatchSize: 25 }, // ← no access of its own
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}
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```
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A batch config declared without `access` now inherits the base operation's
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access at compile time — fail closed, so runtime, the OpenAPI spec, and the
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generated code all agree. Explicit batch `access` still wins (including
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per-side on upserts); a base op without access still yields an
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authenticated-only batch op. The flat `update: { batch: true }` shape and
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auto-promoted batch ops were never affected. **Recompile and redeploy** if
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you use the explicit-batch shape without per-batch access.
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### Record actions, PUT upserts, and legacy firewall arms fail closed
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Three fail-closed hardening fixes, found and verified against the new
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conformance catalog (route × principal expectations derived from the
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compiler's own IR — see the
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[conformance manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest)).
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All apply on recompile + redeploy; no config change needed:
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- **Record actions evaluate the role gate before fetching the record**, so
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the denial response no longer varies with record state — a uniform
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`403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`. (Bulk actions already had this order; unsafe
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actions write their audit row on the pre-record denial.)
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- **PUT upsert treats an out-of-scope id as a firewall miss** (`403` reveal /
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`404` hide, per your firewall error mode; a standard 207 miss entry on
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`PUT /batch`) instead of routing it into the create path. Genuinely new
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ids keep the create path.
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- **Legacy (array-form) firewall arms deny cleanly when a bound context
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claim is absent at runtime** (e.g. no active org), rather than surfacing a
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database error — the same deny-when-absent behavior the explicit `all:` /
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`any:` group forms already had.
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### Root-mounted standalone actions use the standard gate stack
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Standalone actions mounted outside their feature prefix
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(`path: "/reports/orders"`) were emitted through a separate code path that
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did not apply the full access / audit / scoped-database treatment that
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in-feature standalone actions receive. They now render through the same
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generator, so the same access checks, security-audit writes, and
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tenant-scoped database wrapping apply everywhere. If you use root-mounted
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standalone actions, recompile and redeploy. (Unifying the two code paths is
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also what surfaced the two breaking changes above.)
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### Namespace routing fixes
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- An action whose declared `path` exactly equals its namespace prefix is now
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claimed by the namespace like any nested action (Hono's `/x/*` mount
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already matched the bare `/x`) — it's served through the namespace's gate
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instead of carrying a second inline copy of the resolver.
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- A namespace with zero claimed standalone actions (e.g. record-based-only)
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no longer mounts its middleware at all — a dead gate can no longer
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intercept requests under its prefix.
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### Custom org roles work with Better Auth member management
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Custom roles referenced in access trees (e.g. `roles: ["support"]`) are now
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auto-registered with the Better Auth organization plugin. They were already
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enforceable on routes but unprovisionable through Better Auth —
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`invite-member` / `update-member-role` rejected them with
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`400 ROLE_NOT_FOUND`, so there was no supported way to actually give a
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member the role. Auto-registered roles carry member-equivalent permissions
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(this is about assignability; your access trees remain the authorization
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model). If you pass your own `roles` / `ac` to the organization plugin
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options, those win and auto-registration is skipped. Built-in, pseudo, and
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`scope:` roles are excluded; projects with no custom roles emit
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byte-identical output.
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### snake_case tables: dropped record actions and broken helpers fixed
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Two fixes for tables declared with snake_case names (`event_notes`):
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- The generated `.quickback/define-action.ts` helpers imported the camelCase
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identifier while the generated alias file exports the verbatim declared
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name (`export { event_notes }`) — a TS2724 compile failure for any
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snake_case table with action files. The helpers now import the real export
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aliased to the camelCase local.
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- Record actions on a snake-declared table living in a kebab-named feature
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file (`event-notes/actions/pin.ts`) were not emitted — missing from both
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the generated routes and OpenAPI. They now emit and document consistently.
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+
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If you have snake_case tables with record actions, recompiling **adds routes
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that previously didn't exist** — review the new surface.
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### First-class MCP OAuth config: `auth.oauth`
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The OAuth 2.1 surface behind `agents.mcp.requireAuth` (v0.42.0) gains a
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first-class config block — env-resolvable issuer / login / consent URLs,
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scopes, RFC 8707 audiences, and a dynamic-client-registration toggle:
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```ts
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auth: defineAuth("better-auth", {
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oauth: {
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enabled: true,
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issuerUrl: { env: "OAUTH_ISSUER_URL", fallback: "http://localhost:8787/auth/v1" },
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+
loginPage: { env: "OAUTH_LOGIN_URL", fallback: "http://localhost:8787/account/login" },
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consentPage: { env: "OAUTH_CONSENT_URL", fallback: "http://localhost:8787/account/consent" },
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scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"],
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audiences: [{ env: "OAUTH_MCP_AUDIENCE", fallback: "http://localhost:8787/mcp" }],
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allowDynamicClientRegistration: true,
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},
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+
}),
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+
```
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+
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+
Setting it auto-enables the `oauthProvider`, `jwt`, and `bearer` plugins,
|
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emits the RFC 8414 / RFC 9728 discovery documents, and accepts the
|
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318
|
+
provider's JWKS-signed access tokens in the standard auth middleware. A new
|
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+
project hook, `quickback/hooks/resolve-oauth-context.ts`, lets you derive
|
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320
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+
tenant fields (`activeOrgId` / `activeTeamId` / roles) from the validated
|
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+
OAuth identity. On Neon, the auth schema is now owned by the Better Auth CLI
|
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+
end to end (the compiler no longer emits its placeholder `src/auth/schema.ts`
|
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+
or `src/lib/neon.ts`). See
|
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324
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+
[OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready)
|
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325
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+
and [Auth Hooks](/stack/account-ui/hooks#oauth-context-resolver).
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+
|
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327
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+
### Neon RLS covers force-enabled plugin tables
|
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328
|
+
|
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329
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+
On Neon, row-level-security policies are generated for the Better Auth
|
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+
tables. The list of tables receiving policies was derived from your declared
|
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331
|
+
auth config and didn't account for plugins the compiler force-enables
|
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|
+
automatically — so some auth-owned tables could be created without RLS
|
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|
+
policies. The list now derives from the fully resolved plugin set, so every
|
|
334
|
+
generated auth table receives appropriate policies (self-scoped where there
|
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|
+
is a clear owner, service-role-only otherwise — fail closed). The RLS
|
|
336
|
+
migration is content-addressed, so the update arrives as a new journaled
|
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|
+
entry on the next recompile + `db:migrate`. **Neon projects should recompile
|
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|
+
and run `db:migrate`.**
|
|
339
|
+
|
|
340
|
+
### New compile reports: operations + conformance manifests
|
|
341
|
+
|
|
342
|
+
Every compile now writes two machine-readable reports next to
|
|
343
|
+
`openapi.json`:
|
|
344
|
+
|
|
345
|
+
- **`reports/operations.manifest.json`** — a stable, sorted index of every
|
|
346
|
+
operation: `{ operationId, method, path, auth, feature, kind }`, covering
|
|
347
|
+
the resource, action, view, auth, realtime, storage, and FGA surfaces. An
|
|
348
|
+
extend-only public contract — the recommended integration point for
|
|
349
|
+
scripting against the generated surface.
|
|
350
|
+
- **`reports/conformance.manifest.json`** — for each route × principal
|
|
351
|
+
class, the expected outcome (allow / 401 / 403 / cross-tenant miss …),
|
|
352
|
+
derived from the same IR the emitters consume. This is the artifact the
|
|
353
|
+
conformance fixes above were found and verified against.
|
|
354
|
+
|
|
355
|
+
The OpenAPI generator itself now reads the same IR as the route emitters, so
|
|
356
|
+
the spec follows the emitted surface by construction — including four
|
|
357
|
+
accuracy fixes: `PUT /{id}` is documented only when actually enabled, the
|
|
358
|
+
batch surface documents the emitter's auto-promotion + access inheritance,
|
|
359
|
+
and views document their effective (view-level, falling back to read-level)
|
|
360
|
+
access. See
|
|
361
|
+
[Operations manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest).
|
|
362
|
+
|
|
46
363
|
## v0.45.0 — June 9, 2026
|
|
47
364
|
|
|
48
365
|
### `auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'` — sub-TTL JWT revocation
|
|
@@ -91,6 +408,78 @@ the Cloudflare KV binding; those runtimes own immediate-revoke via the
|
|
|
91
408
|
cookie/session path). Default remains `'none'`; without the flag the emitted
|
|
92
409
|
middleware is byte-identical to v0.44.0.
|
|
93
410
|
|
|
411
|
+
### Neon: `npm run db:migrate` now applies the RLS layer
|
|
412
|
+
|
|
413
|
+
The RLS SQL (helper functions, policies, triggers) used to be emitted as
|
|
414
|
+
orphaned `drizzle/migrations/0099–0102` files that no tool ever applied —
|
|
415
|
+
`db:migrate` ran the schema migrations and silently skipped the security
|
|
416
|
+
layer. The RLS document now rides the journaled drizzle set in
|
|
417
|
+
`quickback/drizzle/` as a content-addressed migration
|
|
418
|
+
(`<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>`), so one `npm run db:migrate` applies schema
|
|
419
|
+
**and** security, in dependency order. The migration is idempotent
|
|
420
|
+
(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create), so it converges over databases where
|
|
421
|
+
the old files were applied by hand; an unchanged security config appends
|
|
422
|
+
nothing (the journal stays byte-stable across recompiles), and a changed one
|
|
423
|
+
appends a new content-addressed entry — append-only, like every other
|
|
424
|
+
migration. Existing Neon projects: recompile + `db:migrate`, nothing breaks.
|
|
425
|
+
|
|
426
|
+
### Neon: `user_sessions` is real, and the SQL layer speaks TEXT ids
|
|
427
|
+
|
|
428
|
+
`get_active_org_id()` — the helper every org-scoped RLS policy reads — was
|
|
429
|
+
querying a `public.user_sessions` table that **no migration created**, and
|
|
430
|
+
the helper layer was typed `uuid` against Better Auth's TEXT ids
|
|
431
|
+
(`org_abc123`), which would throw on first contact. Now:
|
|
432
|
+
|
|
433
|
+
- `user_sessions` is compiler-owned migration state
|
|
434
|
+
(`src/db/rls-support.schema.ts`), created by the normal journaled flow
|
|
435
|
+
with a FK to the users table — outside `src/auth/schema.ts`, which the
|
|
436
|
+
Better Auth CLI rewrites.
|
|
437
|
+
- Generated Better Auth session hooks mirror the session's active
|
|
438
|
+
organization (and team, in teams mode) into it on create/update.
|
|
439
|
+
Switching to "no org" nulls it through — SQL-side access revokes, fail
|
|
440
|
+
closed.
|
|
441
|
+
- The RLS helper layer (`get_active_org_id`, `get_active_team_id`,
|
|
442
|
+
`is_owner`, the audit helpers) is TEXT-typed to match Better Auth ids.
|
|
443
|
+
- Policies for Better Auth's own tables use the plural physical names the
|
|
444
|
+
BA CLI actually generates on Neon, and BA tables no longer get Quickback
|
|
445
|
+
audit triggers for columns they don't have.
|
|
446
|
+
|
|
447
|
+
### Hard deletes wire into the audit pipeline correctly
|
|
448
|
+
|
|
449
|
+
Two codegen bugs around `delete: { mode: 'hard' }`:
|
|
450
|
+
|
|
451
|
+
- Firewall auto-detection emitted an `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate for
|
|
452
|
+
tables with no soft-delete column — every read on a hard-delete table
|
|
453
|
+
referenced a column that doesn't exist.
|
|
454
|
+
- Hard-delete routes import the `logHardDelete` audit helper, but the helper
|
|
455
|
+
file was only emitted when the project also had unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions
|
|
456
|
+
— a project with hard deletes and neither failed at deploy time. Hard
|
|
457
|
+
deletes are now a first-class trigger of the security-audit pipeline
|
|
458
|
+
(helper file, `AUDIT_DB` binding, env types, audit migration); on D1 that
|
|
459
|
+
means [`auditDatabaseId`](/compiler/config/providers) is required, and the
|
|
460
|
+
compile error says so.
|
|
461
|
+
|
|
462
|
+
### Generated output is now typechecked — with the first crop of fixes
|
|
463
|
+
|
|
464
|
+
Every compiler change now compiles a matrix of fixture projects and runs
|
|
465
|
+
`tsc` + `wrangler deploy --dry-run` against the **generated output** — the
|
|
466
|
+
class of bug where the compiler emits syntactically valid TypeScript that
|
|
467
|
+
fails downstream. The first runs caught real ones, all fixed here:
|
|
468
|
+
|
|
469
|
+
- **Neon:** `src/db/org.schema.ts` re-exported tables that don't exist after
|
|
470
|
+
the Better Auth CLI's plural rewrite; a missing `AuthDatabase` type
|
|
471
|
+
export; transaction callbacks typed bare `(tx)` failing `noImplicitAny`;
|
|
472
|
+
the auth middleware's member-table fallback hardcoded the singular name.
|
|
473
|
+
- **Embeddings:** the queue consumer's `Ai.run` result and the optional
|
|
474
|
+
`EMBEDDINGS_QUEUE` binding both failed strict checks — the route now
|
|
475
|
+
returns a structured `503` when the producer binding is missing instead
|
|
476
|
+
of crashing.
|
|
477
|
+
- **snake_case relationship tables:** relationship/arrow emitters imported
|
|
478
|
+
the camelCase identifier where the generated file exports the verbatim
|
|
479
|
+
table name (`export { event_guests }`) — TS2724 for any snake_case
|
|
480
|
+
relationship table. Imports now alias the real export
|
|
481
|
+
(`event_guests as eventGuests`).
|
|
482
|
+
|
|
94
483
|
## v0.44.0 — June 9, 2026
|
|
95
484
|
|
|
96
485
|
### Scope carry-forward is now bounded (revocation fix)
|
|
@@ -60,6 +60,22 @@ The `+` suffix expands at compile time — `"member+"` becomes `["member", "admi
|
|
|
60
60
|
- Using `+` with a role not in the hierarchy throws a compile error
|
|
61
61
|
- Using `+` without configuring `auth.roleHierarchy` throws a compile error
|
|
62
62
|
|
|
63
|
+
## Custom org roles
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
You're not limited to Better Auth's built-in `owner` / `admin` / `member` —
|
|
66
|
+
any lowercase role name you reference in an access tree (`"recruiter"`,
|
|
67
|
+
`"hiring-manager"`, `"support"`, …) is a custom org-membership role, matched
|
|
68
|
+
against `ctx.roles` like the built-ins.
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
As of v0.46, custom roles declared in access trees are **auto-registered
|
|
71
|
+
with the Better Auth organization plugin**, so members can actually be
|
|
72
|
+
provisioned into them: `invite-member` and `update-member-role` accept them
|
|
73
|
+
(previously they rejected custom roles with `400 ROLE_NOT_FOUND`).
|
|
74
|
+
Auto-registered roles carry member-equivalent Better Auth permissions —
|
|
75
|
+
registration is about assignability; your access trees remain the
|
|
76
|
+
authorization model. If you pass your own `roles` / `ac` to the organization
|
|
77
|
+
plugin options, those win and auto-registration is skipped.
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
63
79
|
## Configuration Options
|
|
64
80
|
|
|
65
81
|
```typescript
|
|
@@ -149,6 +165,7 @@ access: { roles: ["PUBLIC"] }
|
|
|
149
165
|
- `PUBLIC` skips authentication and role checks — anyone can call the endpoint
|
|
150
166
|
- **`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access.** It works on every access node — reads, top-level writes (`create`/`update`/`delete`/`upsert`), views, and actions. The compiler trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from the firewall, masking, and (for token-gated endpoints like RSVP confirm, magic-link redemption, List-Unsubscribe-Post, webhook ingest) your handler's own validation. Anonymous write endpoints typically pair `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.
|
|
151
167
|
- **Firewall still applies** — data is scoped by the firewall (organization, owner, team)
|
|
168
|
+
- **Tree semantics:** `PUBLIC` admits anonymous callers from anywhere in the access tree, not just a flat `roles` list. An `or:` arm containing `PUBLIC` admits anonymous callers past the authentication gate; an `and:` group admits them only when *every* arm does. The access, org, and firewall layers still evaluate the full tree afterwards. (Before v0.46 the emitted auth gate only honored `PUBLIC` in a flat `roles` list — a nested `PUBLIC` arm incorrectly answered `401`.)
|
|
152
169
|
- Every `PUBLIC` action invocation is **mandatory audit logged** to the security audit table (IP address, input, result, timing)
|
|
153
170
|
- The wildcard `"*"` is **not supported** — using it throws a compile-time error
|
|
154
171
|
- Tables with no isolation columns and any `PUBLIC` route do not require `firewall: [{ exception: true }]`
|
|
@@ -154,10 +154,15 @@ POST /applications/:id/schedule-interview
|
|
|
154
154
|
### Runtime Flow
|
|
155
155
|
|
|
156
156
|
1. **Authentication** - User token is validated
|
|
157
|
-
2. **
|
|
158
|
-
3. **
|
|
159
|
-
|
|
160
|
-
|
|
157
|
+
2. **Input Validation** - Request body validated against Zod schema
|
|
158
|
+
3. **Role Gate** - The access roles are checked *before* the record is
|
|
159
|
+
fetched (v0.46+), so a wrong-role caller gets a uniform
|
|
160
|
+
`403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED` whether or not the record exists — the
|
|
161
|
+
response can't be used to probe for record ids
|
|
162
|
+
4. **Record Loading** - The record is fetched by ID **through the firewall**
|
|
163
|
+
(a cross-tenant or missing id is a standard firewall miss)
|
|
164
|
+
5. **Access Check** - Record preconditions (`access.record`) and transition
|
|
165
|
+
policy are validated against the loaded record
|
|
161
166
|
6. **Execution** - Your action handler runs
|
|
162
167
|
7. **Response** - Result is returned to client
|
|
163
168
|
|