@quantakrypto/core 0.4.4 → 0.6.0

package/dist/detectors/cloudformation.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskCommentLines } from "../detect-utils.js";
 import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from "../cwe.js";
 const CFN_EXTENSIONS = [".json", ".yaml", ".yml"];
 // Fast-reject markers: at least one must appear before any rule regex runs, so
@@ -10,22 +10,44 @@ const CFN_MARKERS = [
     "AWSTemplateFormatVersion",
     "MinimumProtocolVersion",
     "Microsoft.KeyVault",
-    '"SslPolicy"',
+    "SslPolicy", // unquoted so a YAML `SslPolicy:` key also gates the file in, not just JSON
 ];
+/**
+ * True when the content looks like a CloudFormation / ARM deployment template (one
+ * of the {@link CFN_MARKERS} is present).
+ */
+function isCloudTemplate(content) {
+    return CFN_MARKERS.some((marker) => content.includes(marker));
+}
+/**
+ * True when a file is one THIS detector actually scans (a `.json`/`.yaml`/`.yml`
+ * template). The `cloud-kms` and `jwk` detectors defer to this detector ONLY on
+ * such files — deferring on any extension that merely contains a marker string
+ * (e.g. a `.ts` with an `AWS::KMS` comment) would drop a real finding, since this
+ * detector never runs there.
+ */
+export function isCloudTemplateFile(file, content) {
+    return hasExtension(file, CFN_EXTENSIONS) && isCloudTemplate(content);
+}
 // Each attribute is matched with an optional quote around the key and `:` as
 // the separator (both plain-JSON and YAML-block-scalar forms use `:`). The
 // `(?<![\w"-])` lookbehind stops a longer/prefixed attribute name from
 // matching on its suffix.
-const RE_CFN_KMS_RSA = /(?<![\w"-])"?KeySpec"?\s*:\s*"?RSA_\d+"?/g;
-const RE_CFN_KMS_EC = /(?<![\w"-])"?KeySpec"?\s*:\s*"?ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+"?/g;
+// Match all three AWS KMS spec-key spellings so this detector fully owns KMS keys
+// inside a template (KeySpec, the KeyPair variant, and the legacy CustomerMasterKeySpec).
+const RE_CFN_KMS_RSA = /(?<![\w"-])"?(?:KeySpec|KeyPairSpec|CustomerMasterKeySpec)"?\s*:\s*"?RSA_\d+"?/g;
+const RE_CFN_KMS_EC = /(?<![\w"-])"?(?:KeySpec|KeyPairSpec|CustomerMasterKeySpec)"?\s*:\s*"?ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+"?/g;
 const RE_CFN_ACM_RSA = /(?<![\w"-])"?KeyAlgorithm"?\s*:\s*"?RSA_\d+"?/g;
 const RE_CFN_ACM_EC = /(?<![\w"-])"?KeyAlgorithm"?\s*:\s*"?EC_[A-Za-z0-9]+"?/g;
 // CloudFront: only the pre-2018 "TLSv1" / "TLSv1_2016" / "TLSv1.1_2016"
 // values are legacy; the lookahead delimiter stops this from matching a
 // "TLSv1.2_2018"-style value that merely starts with the same prefix.
-const RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS = /(?<![\w"-])"?MinimumProtocolVersion"?\s*:\s*"?(?:TLSv1(?:\.1)?_2016|TLSv1)(?=["'\s,}]|$)/gm;
-// ELB/ALB legacy SSL negotiation policies (named, dated policy strings).
-const RE_CFN_ELB_TLS = /(?<![\w"-])"?SslPolicy"?\s*:\s*"ELBSecurityPolicy-(?:2016-08|TLS-1-0-\d{4}-\d{2}|TLS-1-1-\d{4}-\d{2})"/g;
+const RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS = /(?<![\w"-])"?MinimumProtocolVersion"?\s*:\s*"?(?:TLSv1(?:\.1)?_2016|TLSv1|SSLv3)(?=["'\s,}]|$)/gm;
+// ELB/ALB legacy SSL negotiation policies (named, dated policy strings). The value
+// quote is optional (`"?`) so YAML block scalars (`SslPolicy: ELBSecurityPolicy-...`)
+// match too, with a delimiter lookahead so a longer/newer policy name that merely
+// shares the prefix is not matched.
+const RE_CFN_ELB_TLS = /(?<![\w"-])"?SslPolicy"?\s*:\s*"?ELBSecurityPolicy-(?:2016-08|TLS-1-0-\d{4}-\d{2}|TLS-1-1-\d{4}-\d{2})(?=["'\s,}]|$)/g;
 // Azure ARM Microsoft.KeyVault key resource `properties.kty`.
 const RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA = /(?<![\w"-])"?kty"?\s*:\s*"?RSA"?(?!\w)/g;
 const RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC = /(?<![\w"-])"?kty"?\s*:\s*"?EC"?(?!\w)/g;
@@ -154,16 +176,25 @@ export const cloudformationDetector = {
     detect({ file, content }) {
         if (!CFN_MARKERS.some((marker) => content.includes(marker)))
             return [];
+        // Mask whole `#` comment lines (YAML CFN/ARM templates ship large commented-out
+        // blocks); harmless for JSON, which has no comments. Offsets preserved so finding
+        // locations stay exact. `.yaml`/`.json` are not centrally comment-stripped.
+        const scan = maskCommentLines(content, ["#"]);
         const findings = [];
-        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, content, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
+        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, scan, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
         add(RE_CFN_KMS_RSA, RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA);
         add(RE_CFN_KMS_EC, RULE_CFN_KMS_EC);
         add(RE_CFN_ACM_RSA, RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA);
         add(RE_CFN_ACM_EC, RULE_CFN_ACM_EC);
         add(RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS, RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS);
         add(RE_CFN_ELB_TLS, RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS);
-        add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA);
-        add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC);
+        // The bare `kty` attribute is generic (every JWK has it), so only treat it as
+        // an ARM Key Vault key when the ARM resource type is actually present — otherwise
+        // a JWK in a file gated in by another marker (e.g. SslPolicy) would misfire here.
+        if (content.includes("Microsoft.KeyVault")) {
+            add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA);
+            add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC);
+        }
         return findings;
     },
 };

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Bicep-compiled JSON)\n * templates — plus CDK `cdk synth` output, which is plain CloudFormation\n * JSON. This is a distinct surface from `terraform.ts`: CloudFormation/ARM\n * use PascalCase JSON/YAML property names, never Terraform's snake_case HCL\n * attributes, so the two detectors never collide on the same file.\n *\n * Covered:\n *  - AWS::KMS::Key `KeySpec`:                    `\"RSA_…\"` (kem) / `\"ECC_…\"` (key-exchange)\n *  - AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate\n *    `KeyAlgorithm`:                             `\"RSA_…\"` / `\"EC_…\"` (certificate)\n *  - CloudFront distribution `MinimumProtocolVersion`: legacy `TLSv1` / `TLSv1.1` (tls)\n *  - ELB/ALB listener `SslPolicy`:                legacy `ELBSecurityPolicy-2016-08` /\n *                                                 `-TLS-1-0-…` / `-TLS-1-1-…` (tls)\n *  - Azure ARM `Microsoft.KeyVault` key `kty`:    `\"RSA\"` (kem) / `\"EC\"` (key-exchange)\n *\n * `KeySpec` is PascalCase and case-sensitive, so it never matches Terraform's\n * snake_case `customer_master_key_spec` (same underlying AWS API, different\n * authoring surface). A fast-reject on a CFN/ARM marker keeps this detector\n * from ever firing on arbitrary JSON/YAML that happens to contain one of\n * these property names in an unrelated context.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst CFN_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".json\", \".yaml\", \".yml\"];\n\n// Fast-reject markers: at least one must appear before any rule regex runs, so\n// this detector never scans arbitrary JSON/YAML that merely happens to share\n// an attribute name (`KeySpec`, `kty`, …) with an unrelated schema.\nconst CFN_MARKERS: readonly string[] = [\n  \"AWS::KMS\",\n  \"AWS::CertificateManager\",\n  \"AWSTemplateFormatVersion\",\n  \"MinimumProtocolVersion\",\n  \"Microsoft.KeyVault\",\n  '\"SslPolicy\"',\n];\n\n// Each attribute is matched with an optional quote around the key and `:` as\n// the separator (both plain-JSON and YAML-block-scalar forms use `:`). The\n// `(?<![\\w\"-])` lookbehind stops a longer/prefixed attribute name from\n// matching on its suffix.\nconst RE_CFN_KMS_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeySpec\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?RSA_\\d+\"?/g;\nconst RE_CFN_KMS_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeySpec\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+\"?/g;\nconst RE_CFN_ACM_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeyAlgorithm\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?RSA_\\d+\"?/g;\nconst RE_CFN_ACM_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeyAlgorithm\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?EC_[A-Za-z0-9]+\"?/g;\n// CloudFront: only the pre-2018 \"TLSv1\" / \"TLSv1_2016\" / \"TLSv1.1_2016\"\n// values are legacy; the lookahead delimiter stops this from matching a\n// \"TLSv1.2_2018\"-style value that merely starts with the same prefix.\nconst RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS =\n  /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?MinimumProtocolVersion\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?(?:TLSv1(?:\\.1)?_2016|TLSv1)(?=[\"'\\s,}]|$)/gm;\n// ELB/ALB legacy SSL negotiation policies (named, dated policy strings).\nconst RE_CFN_ELB_TLS =\n  /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?SslPolicy\"?\\s*:\\s*\"ELBSecurityPolicy-(?:2016-08|TLS-1-0-\\d{4}-\\d{2}|TLS-1-1-\\d{4}-\\d{2})\"/g;\n// Azure ARM Microsoft.KeyVault key resource `properties.kty`.\nconst RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?kty\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?RSA\"?(?!\\w)/g;\nconst RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?kty\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?EC\"?(?!\\w)/g;\n\nconst RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-kms-rsa\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation KMS RSA key\",\n  description: 'AWS::KMS::Key KeySpec = \"RSA_*\"',\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions a classical RSA KMS key (harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed for encryption CMKs).\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC as cloud KMS adds ML-KEM / ML-DSA key specs.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_KMS_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-kms-ec\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation KMS EC key\",\n  description: 'AWS::KMS::Key KeySpec = \"ECC_*\"',\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions a classical EC KMS key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-acm-rsa\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation ACM RSA certificate\",\n  description: 'AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate KeyAlgorithm = \"RSA_*\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions an ACM certificate with a classical RSA key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ACM_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-acm-ec\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation ACM EC certificate\",\n  description: 'AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate KeyAlgorithm = \"EC_*\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions an ACM certificate with a classical EC key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-cloudfront-legacy-tls\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation CloudFront legacy TLS\",\n  description: 'CloudFront Distribution MinimumProtocolVersion = \"TLSv1\" / \"TLSv1.1\"',\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message: \"CloudFront distribution permits TLS 1.0/1.1, which are deprecated and insecure.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Set MinimumProtocolVersion to TLSv1.2_2021 (or later) and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-elb-legacy-tls\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation ELB/ALB legacy TLS policy\",\n  description: \"Elastic Load Balancer SslPolicy naming a pre-2017 legacy policy\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message: \"Load balancer listener uses a legacy SSL negotiation policy permitting TLS 1.0/1.1.\",\n  remediation: \"Use ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06 (or the latest FS+TLS1.2/1.3 policy).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-arm-keyvault-rsa\",\n  title: \"ARM template Key Vault RSA key\",\n  description: 'Microsoft.KeyVault key resource kty = \"RSA\"',\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"ARM template provisions a classical RSA Azure Key Vault key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 / ML-DSA-65).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-arm-keyvault-ec\",\n  title: \"ARM template Key Vault EC key\",\n  description: 'Microsoft.KeyVault key resource kty = \"EC\"',\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"ARM template provisions a classical EC Azure Key Vault key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\n\n/**\n * Detects classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in\n * AWS CloudFormation / Azure ARM (incl. Bicep-compiled JSON) templates.\n */\nexport const cloudformationDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"cloudformation-crypto\",\n  description:\n    \"Classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in CloudFormation / ARM templates (IaC)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA,\n    RULE_CFN_KMS_EC,\n    RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA,\n    RULE_CFN_ACM_EC,\n    RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS,\n    RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS,\n    RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA,\n    RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, CFN_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    if (!CFN_MARKERS.some((marker) => content.includes(marker))) return [];\n\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    add(RE_CFN_KMS_RSA, RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA);\n    add(RE_CFN_KMS_EC, RULE_CFN_KMS_EC);\n    add(RE_CFN_ACM_RSA, RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA);\n    add(RE_CFN_ACM_EC, RULE_CFN_ACM_EC);\n    add(RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS, RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS);\n    add(RE_CFN_ELB_TLS, RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS);\n    add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA);\n    add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}
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Bicep-compiled JSON)\n * templates — plus CDK `cdk synth` output, which is plain CloudFormation\n * JSON. This is a distinct surface from `terraform.ts`: CloudFormation/ARM\n * use PascalCase JSON/YAML property names, never Terraform's snake_case HCL\n * attributes, so the two detectors never collide on the same file.\n *\n * Covered:\n *  - AWS::KMS::Key `KeySpec`:                    `\"RSA_…\"` (kem) / `\"ECC_…\"` (key-exchange)\n *  - AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate\n *    `KeyAlgorithm`:                             `\"RSA_…\"` / `\"EC_…\"` (certificate)\n *  - CloudFront distribution `MinimumProtocolVersion`: legacy `TLSv1` / `TLSv1.1` (tls)\n *  - ELB/ALB listener `SslPolicy`:                legacy `ELBSecurityPolicy-2016-08` /\n *                                                 `-TLS-1-0-…` / `-TLS-1-1-…` (tls)\n *  - Azure ARM `Microsoft.KeyVault` key `kty`:    `\"RSA\"` (kem) / `\"EC\"` (key-exchange)\n *\n * `KeySpec` is PascalCase and case-sensitive, so it never matches Terraform's\n * snake_case `customer_master_key_spec` (same underlying AWS API, different\n * authoring surface). A fast-reject on a CFN/ARM marker keeps this detector\n * from ever firing on arbitrary JSON/YAML that happens to contain one of\n * these property names in an unrelated context.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskCommentLines } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst CFN_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".json\", \".yaml\", \".yml\"];\n\n// Fast-reject markers: at least one must appear before any rule regex runs, so\n// this detector never scans arbitrary JSON/YAML that merely happens to share\n// an attribute name (`KeySpec`, `kty`, …) with an unrelated schema.\nconst CFN_MARKERS: readonly string[] = [\n  \"AWS::KMS\",\n  \"AWS::CertificateManager\",\n  \"AWSTemplateFormatVersion\",\n  \"MinimumProtocolVersion\",\n  \"Microsoft.KeyVault\",\n  \"SslPolicy\", // unquoted so a YAML `SslPolicy:` key also gates the file in, not just JSON\n];\n\n/**\n * True when the content looks like a CloudFormation / ARM deployment template (one\n * of the {@link CFN_MARKERS} is present).\n */\nfunction isCloudTemplate(content: string): boolean {\n  return CFN_MARKERS.some((marker) => content.includes(marker));\n}\n\n/**\n * True when a file is one THIS detector actually scans (a `.json`/`.yaml`/`.yml`\n * template). The `cloud-kms` and `jwk` detectors defer to this detector ONLY on\n * such files — deferring on any extension that merely contains a marker string\n * (e.g. a `.ts` with an `AWS::KMS` comment) would drop a real finding, since this\n * detector never runs there.\n */\nexport function isCloudTemplateFile(file: string, content: string): boolean {\n  return hasExtension(file, CFN_EXTENSIONS) && isCloudTemplate(content);\n}\n\n// Each attribute is matched with an optional quote around the key and `:` as\n// the separator (both plain-JSON and YAML-block-scalar forms use `:`). The\n// `(?<![\\w\"-])` lookbehind stops a longer/prefixed attribute name from\n// matching on its suffix.\n// Match all three AWS KMS spec-key spellings so this detector fully owns KMS keys\n// inside a template (KeySpec, the KeyPair variant, and the legacy CustomerMasterKeySpec).\nconst RE_CFN_KMS_RSA =\n  /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?(?:KeySpec|KeyPairSpec|CustomerMasterKeySpec)\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?RSA_\\d+\"?/g;\nconst RE_CFN_KMS_EC =\n  /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?(?:KeySpec|KeyPairSpec|CustomerMasterKeySpec)\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+\"?/g;\nconst RE_CFN_ACM_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeyAlgorithm\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?RSA_\\d+\"?/g;\nconst RE_CFN_ACM_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeyAlgorithm\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?EC_[A-Za-z0-9]+\"?/g;\n// CloudFront: only the pre-2018 \"TLSv1\" / \"TLSv1_2016\" / \"TLSv1.1_2016\"\n// values are legacy; the lookahead delimiter stops this from matching a\n// \"TLSv1.2_2018\"-style value that merely starts with the same prefix.\nconst RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS =\n  /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?MinimumProtocolVersion\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?(?:TLSv1(?:\\.1)?_2016|TLSv1|SSLv3)(?=[\"'\\s,}]|$)/gm;\n// ELB/ALB legacy SSL negotiation policies (named, dated policy strings). The value\n// quote is optional (`\"?`) so YAML block scalars (`SslPolicy: ELBSecurityPolicy-...`)\n// match too, with a delimiter lookahead so a longer/newer policy name that merely\n// shares the prefix is not matched.\nconst RE_CFN_ELB_TLS =\n  /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?SslPolicy\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?ELBSecurityPolicy-(?:2016-08|TLS-1-0-\\d{4}-\\d{2}|TLS-1-1-\\d{4}-\\d{2})(?=[\"'\\s,}]|$)/g;\n// Azure ARM Microsoft.KeyVault key resource `properties.kty`.\nconst RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?kty\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?RSA\"?(?!\\w)/g;\nconst RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?kty\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?EC\"?(?!\\w)/g;\n\nconst RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-kms-rsa\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation KMS RSA key\",\n  description: 'AWS::KMS::Key KeySpec = \"RSA_*\"',\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions a classical RSA KMS key (harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed for encryption CMKs).\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC as cloud KMS adds ML-KEM / ML-DSA key specs.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_KMS_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-kms-ec\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation KMS EC key\",\n  description: 'AWS::KMS::Key KeySpec = \"ECC_*\"',\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions a classical EC KMS key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-acm-rsa\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation ACM RSA certificate\",\n  description: 'AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate KeyAlgorithm = \"RSA_*\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions an ACM certificate with a classical RSA key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ACM_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-acm-ec\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation ACM EC certificate\",\n  description: 'AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate KeyAlgorithm = \"EC_*\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions an ACM certificate with a classical EC key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-cloudfront-legacy-tls\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation CloudFront legacy TLS\",\n  description: 'CloudFront Distribution MinimumProtocolVersion = \"TLSv1\" / \"TLSv1.1\"',\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message: \"CloudFront distribution permits TLS 1.0/1.1, which are deprecated and insecure.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Set MinimumProtocolVersion to TLSv1.2_2021 (or later) and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-elb-legacy-tls\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation ELB/ALB legacy TLS policy\",\n  description: \"Elastic Load Balancer SslPolicy naming a pre-2017 legacy policy\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message: \"Load balancer listener uses a legacy SSL negotiation policy permitting TLS 1.0/1.1.\",\n  remediation: \"Use ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06 (or the latest FS+TLS1.2/1.3 policy).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-arm-keyvault-rsa\",\n  title: \"ARM template Key Vault RSA key\",\n  description: 'Microsoft.KeyVault key resource kty = \"RSA\"',\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"ARM template provisions a classical RSA Azure Key Vault key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 / ML-DSA-65).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-arm-keyvault-ec\",\n  title: \"ARM template Key Vault EC key\",\n  description: 'Microsoft.KeyVault key resource kty = \"EC\"',\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"ARM template provisions a classical EC Azure Key Vault key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\n\n/**\n * Detects classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in\n * AWS CloudFormation / Azure ARM (incl. Bicep-compiled JSON) templates.\n */\nexport const cloudformationDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"cloudformation-crypto\",\n  description:\n    \"Classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in CloudFormation / ARM templates (IaC)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA,\n    RULE_CFN_KMS_EC,\n    RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA,\n    RULE_CFN_ACM_EC,\n    RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS,\n    RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS,\n    RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA,\n    RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, CFN_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    if (!CFN_MARKERS.some((marker) => content.includes(marker))) return [];\n\n    // Mask whole `#` comment lines (YAML CFN/ARM templates ship large commented-out\n    // blocks); harmless for JSON, which has no comments. Offsets preserved so finding\n    // locations stay exact. `.yaml`/`.json` are not centrally comment-stripped.\n    const scan = maskCommentLines(content, [\"#\"]);\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, scan, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    add(RE_CFN_KMS_RSA, RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA);\n    add(RE_CFN_KMS_EC, RULE_CFN_KMS_EC);\n    add(RE_CFN_ACM_RSA, RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA);\n    add(RE_CFN_ACM_EC, RULE_CFN_ACM_EC);\n    add(RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS, RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS);\n    add(RE_CFN_ELB_TLS, RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS);\n    // The bare `kty` attribute is generic (every JWK has it), so only treat it as\n    // an ARM Key Vault key when the ARM resource type is actually present — otherwise\n    // a JWK in a file gated in by another marker (e.g. SslPolicy) would misfire here.\n    if (content.includes(\"Microsoft.KeyVault\")) {\n      add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA);\n      add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC);\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/codesign.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**
+ * Config detector: classical **code-signing CLI** invocations in build scripts —
+ * the tools that sign long-lived, distributable artifacts (Windows installers,
+ * Android APKs, RPM/deb packages, NuGet packages, macOS apps) with a classical
+ * RSA/ECDSA signing identity.
+ *
+ * Why this is quantum-migration debt: a code signature produced today keeps
+ * verifying against its classical public key for the life of the artifact
+ * (installers and packages linger on mirrors and machines for years). Once a
+ * cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) can recover the signing
+ * key from that public key, every such signature becomes *forgeable* — an
+ * attacker can mint a validly-signed trojaned installer. This is the
+ * signature-side analogue of harvest-now-decrypt-later: there is no
+ * confidentiality to harvest, so findings are `category:"signature"`,
+ * `hndl:false`, but they are real debt to inventory now.
+ *
+ * How this differs from the two neighbouring signing detectors — kept
+ * deliberately non-overlapping:
+ *
+ *  - `cicd.ts` (cicdDetector) is gated to CI *pipeline* files
+ *    (`.github/workflows/*.yml`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`, Jenkinsfile, azure-pipelines,
+ *    CircleCI) and matches the release-automation signers there
+ *    (cosign / gpg / jarsigner / codesign / minisign). It intentionally does
+ *    NOT fire on a plain `build.sh`, `build.ps1`, `build.gradle`, or Makefile.
+ *  - `supply-chain.ts` (supplyChainDetector) covers container/artifact signing
+ *    (Docker Content Trust, CNCF Notation, in-toto) in CI files, Dockerfiles,
+ *    and shell scripts.
+ *
+ * This detector fills the gap: the *native platform* code-signing CLIs
+ * (`signtool`, `osslsigncode`, `Set-AuthenticodeSignature`, `apksigner`, Gradle
+ * `signingConfigs`, `rpmsign`/`dpkg-sig`, `nuget sign`, `notarytool`) as they
+ * appear in a build script of ANY extension — because that is where developers
+ * actually run them. It applies everywhere except documentation
+ * (a README showing `signtool sign` is prose, not a build step). One token
+ * (`codesign`) can also be matched by `cicd.ts` when it appears inside a CI
+ * file; a duplicate finding across the two detectors is acceptable, and keeping
+ * `codesign` here means a `codesign --sign` in a hand-written `build.sh` — which
+ * `cicd.ts`'s CI-file gate deliberately skips — is still caught.
+ *
+ * Precision comes from two gates, mirroring `dnssec.ts`: a cheap file-level
+ * fast-reject (bail unless some signing-command marker is present) and
+ * comment-line masking (`#` for shell/PowerShell/Makefile/Gradle, `//` for
+ * Gradle/Groovy) so a commented-out signing step never fires. The rule regexes
+ * themselves key on distinctive `<tool> sign` command shapes, so the residual
+ * false-positive risk is low and confidence is `high`.
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/** Detects classical code-signing CLI invocations in build scripts. */
+export declare const codesignDetector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=codesign.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/codesign.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"codesign.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/codesign.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6CG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAwI/D,uEAAuE;AACvE,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,QA8B9B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/codesign.js

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskCommentLines, DOC_EXTENSIONS, } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
+/** Shared one-line explanation, parameterised by the signing tool named in the finding. */
+function signMessage(tool) {
+    return (`${tool} signs an artifact with a classical RSA/ECDSA key; the signature is ` +
+        `forgeable once a CRQC can recover the signing key — inventory the signing ` +
+        `identity and plan PQC migration.`);
+}
+/** Shared remediation: no PQC code-signing format is broadly standardized yet. */
+const REMEDIATION = "No PQC code-signing format is broadly standardized yet; track platform roadmaps " +
+    "(e.g. Sigstore/PQC, Authenticode); keep signing-key rotation ready.";
+/**
+ * Distinctive markers for the file-level fast-reject. Kept as a SUPERSET of the
+ * rule tokens below so the cheap gate can never exclude a file one of the rules
+ * would match: it includes every rule's trigger token (`--addsign`, `%_gpg_name`,
+ * `codesign`, `nuget`, …), not only the headline command names.
+ */
+const MARKER_RE = /signtool|osslsigncode|AuthenticodeSignature|apksigner|signingConfigs|rpmsign|--addsign|%_gpg_name|dpkg-sig|nuget|notarytool|codesign/;
+const CS_RULES = [
+    {
+        // Windows Authenticode: `signtool sign …` (optionally `signtool.exe`),
+        // `osslsigncode sign …`, or the PowerShell `Set-AuthenticodeSignature` cmdlet.
+        re: /\bsigntool(?:\.exe)?\s+sign\b|\bosslsigncode\s+sign\b|\bSet-AuthenticodeSignature\b/g,
+        meta: {
+            id: "codesign-authenticode",
+            title: "Windows Authenticode code signing (RSA)",
+            description: "signtool / osslsigncode / Set-AuthenticodeSignature Authenticode signing",
+            category: "signature",
+            severity: "medium",
+            confidence: "high",
+            algorithm: "RSA",
+            hndl: false,
+            cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+            message: signMessage("Windows Authenticode (signtool/osslsigncode/Set-AuthenticodeSignature)"),
+            remediation: REMEDIATION,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        // Android: `apksigner sign …` (covers `--ks` / `--ks-key-alias` forms), or a
+        // Gradle `signingConfigs { … }` block (which carries `storeFile`/`keyAlias`).
+        re: /\bapksigner\s+sign\b|\bsigningConfigs\s*\{/g,
+        meta: {
+            id: "codesign-apk",
+            title: "Android APK signing (RSA)",
+            description: "apksigner / Gradle signingConfigs APK signing",
+            category: "signature",
+            severity: "medium",
+            confidence: "high",
+            algorithm: "RSA",
+            hndl: false,
+            cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+            message: signMessage("Android APK signing (apksigner/Gradle signingConfigs)"),
+            remediation: REMEDIATION,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        // RPM/deb: `rpmsign --addsign`, `rpm --addsign`, the `%_gpg_name` rpmmacro, or
+        // `dpkg-sig --sign`. All ultimately GPG (classically RSA) signatures.
+        re: /\brpmsign\s+--addsign\b|\brpm\s+--addsign\b|%_gpg_name\b|\bdpkg-sig\s+--sign\b/g,
+        meta: {
+            id: "codesign-rpm",
+            title: "RPM/deb package signing (RSA)",
+            description: "rpmsign / rpm --addsign / %_gpg_name / dpkg-sig package signing",
+            category: "signature",
+            severity: "medium",
+            confidence: "high",
+            algorithm: "RSA",
+            hndl: false,
+            cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+            message: signMessage("RPM/deb package signing (rpmsign/rpm --addsign/dpkg-sig, GPG)"),
+            remediation: REMEDIATION,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        // NuGet: `nuget sign …` — also matches `dotnet nuget sign …` (the `nuget sign`
+        // token is a substring of it), typically paired with `--certificate-*` flags.
+        re: /\bnuget\s+sign\b/g,
+        meta: {
+            id: "codesign-nuget",
+            title: "NuGet package signing (RSA)",
+            description: "nuget sign / dotnet nuget sign package signing",
+            category: "signature",
+            severity: "medium",
+            confidence: "high",
+            algorithm: "RSA",
+            hndl: false,
+            cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+            message: signMessage("NuGet package signing (nuget sign/dotnet nuget sign)"),
+            remediation: REMEDIATION,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        // Apple: `xcrun notarytool submit …`, or `codesign --sign` / `codesign -s`.
+        // Allow intervening flags before `--sign`/`-s`, bounded to the codesign
+        // invocation so it can't latch onto a later command's flag across `&&`/`|`/`;`
+        // (same shape as cicd.ts's codesign rule). Algorithm is "unknown": an Apple
+        // signing identity may be RSA or ECDSA.
+        re: /\bnotarytool\s+submit\b|\bcodesign\b[^\n&|;]{0,120}?\s(?:-s\b|--sign\b)/g,
+        meta: {
+            id: "codesign-apple",
+            title: "Apple code signing / notarization",
+            description: "codesign --sign / xcrun notarytool submit macOS signing",
+            category: "signature",
+            severity: "medium",
+            confidence: "high",
+            algorithm: "unknown",
+            hndl: false,
+            cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+            message: signMessage("Apple code signing (codesign/notarytool)"),
+            remediation: REMEDIATION,
+        },
+    },
+];
+/** Detects classical code-signing CLI invocations in build scripts. */
+export const codesignDetector = {
+    id: "codesign-signing",
+    description: "Classical code-signing CLIs in build scripts (Authenticode, APK, RPM, NuGet, Apple)",
+    scope: "config",
+    language: "any",
+    rules: CS_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),
+    // Applies to build scripts of any extension EXCEPT documentation: a README that
+    // shows `signtool sign` in an example is prose, not a build step.
+    appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),
+    detect({ file, content }) {
+        // Cheap fast-reject: bail unless some signing-command marker is present, so
+        // the per-rule regexes never run on the overwhelming majority of files.
+        if (!MARKER_RE.test(content))
+            return [];
+        // Mask whole comment lines so a commented-out signing step can't fire.
+        // `#` covers shell / PowerShell / Makefile / Gradle(Groovy & Kotlin DSL);
+        // `//` covers Gradle/Groovy. Offsets are preserved so finding locations stay
+        // exact (see maskCommentLines).
+        const scan = maskCommentLines(content, ["#", "//"]);
+        const findings = [];
+        for (const rule of CS_RULES) {
+            eachMatch(rule.re, scan, (m) => {
+                findings.push(findingFromRule(rule.meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }));
+            });
+        }
+        return findings;
+    },
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=codesign.js.map

package/dist/detectors/codesign.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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Once a\n * cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) can recover the signing\n * key from that public key, every such signature becomes *forgeable* — an\n * attacker can mint a validly-signed trojaned installer. This is the\n * signature-side analogue of harvest-now-decrypt-later: there is no\n * confidentiality to harvest, so findings are `category:\"signature\"`,\n * `hndl:false`, but they are real debt to inventory now.\n *\n * How this differs from the two neighbouring signing detectors — kept\n * deliberately non-overlapping:\n *\n *  - `cicd.ts` (cicdDetector) is gated to CI *pipeline* files\n *    (`.github/workflows/*.yml`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`, Jenkinsfile, azure-pipelines,\n *    CircleCI) and matches the release-automation signers there\n *    (cosign / gpg / jarsigner / codesign / minisign). It intentionally does\n *    NOT fire on a plain `build.sh`, `build.ps1`, `build.gradle`, or Makefile.\n *  - `supply-chain.ts` (supplyChainDetector) covers container/artifact signing\n *    (Docker Content Trust, CNCF Notation, in-toto) in CI files, Dockerfiles,\n *    and shell scripts.\n *\n * This detector fills the gap: the *native platform* code-signing CLIs\n * (`signtool`, `osslsigncode`, `Set-AuthenticodeSignature`, `apksigner`, Gradle\n * `signingConfigs`, `rpmsign`/`dpkg-sig`, `nuget sign`, `notarytool`) as they\n * appear in a build script of ANY extension — because that is where developers\n * actually run them. It applies everywhere except documentation\n * (a README showing `signtool sign` is prose, not a build step). One token\n * (`codesign`) can also be matched by `cicd.ts` when it appears inside a CI\n * file; a duplicate finding across the two detectors is acceptable, and keeping\n * `codesign` here means a `codesign --sign` in a hand-written `build.sh` — which\n * `cicd.ts`'s CI-file gate deliberately skips — is still caught.\n *\n * Precision comes from two gates, mirroring `dnssec.ts`: a cheap file-level\n * fast-reject (bail unless some signing-command marker is present) and\n * comment-line masking (`#` for shell/PowerShell/Makefile/Gradle, `//` for\n * Gradle/Groovy) so a commented-out signing step never fires. The rule regexes\n * themselves key on distinctive `<tool> sign` command shapes, so the residual\n * false-positive risk is low and confidence is `high`.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport {\n  eachMatch,\n  findingFromRule,\n  hasExtension,\n  maskCommentLines,\n  DOC_EXTENSIONS,\n} from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\n/** Shared one-line explanation, parameterised by the signing tool named in the finding. */\nfunction signMessage(tool: string): string {\n  return (\n    `${tool} signs an artifact with a classical RSA/ECDSA key; the signature is ` +\n    `forgeable once a CRQC can recover the signing key — inventory the signing ` +\n    `identity and plan PQC migration.`\n  );\n}\n\n/** Shared remediation: no PQC code-signing format is broadly standardized yet. */\nconst REMEDIATION =\n  \"No PQC code-signing format is broadly standardized yet; track platform roadmaps \" +\n  \"(e.g. Sigstore/PQC, Authenticode); keep signing-key rotation ready.\";\n\n/**\n * Distinctive markers for the file-level fast-reject. Kept as a SUPERSET of the\n * rule tokens below so the cheap gate can never exclude a file one of the rules\n * would match: it includes every rule's trigger token (`--addsign`, `%_gpg_name`,\n * `codesign`, `nuget`, …), not only the headline command names.\n */\nconst MARKER_RE =\n  /signtool|osslsigncode|AuthenticodeSignature|apksigner|signingConfigs|rpmsign|--addsign|%_gpg_name|dpkg-sig|nuget|notarytool|codesign/;\n\ninterface CsRule {\n  re: RegExp;\n  meta: RuleMeta;\n}\n\nconst CS_RULES: CsRule[] = [\n  {\n    // Windows Authenticode: `signtool sign …` (optionally `signtool.exe`),\n    // `osslsigncode sign …`, or the PowerShell `Set-AuthenticodeSignature` cmdlet.\n    re: /\\bsigntool(?:\\.exe)?\\s+sign\\b|\\bosslsigncode\\s+sign\\b|\\bSet-AuthenticodeSignature\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"codesign-authenticode\",\n      title: \"Windows Authenticode code signing (RSA)\",\n      description: \"signtool / osslsigncode / Set-AuthenticodeSignature Authenticode signing\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message: signMessage(\n        \"Windows Authenticode (signtool/osslsigncode/Set-AuthenticodeSignature)\",\n      ),\n      remediation: REMEDIATION,\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    // Android: `apksigner sign …` (covers `--ks` / `--ks-key-alias` forms), or a\n    // Gradle `signingConfigs { … }` block (which carries `storeFile`/`keyAlias`).\n    re: /\\bapksigner\\s+sign\\b|\\bsigningConfigs\\s*\\{/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"codesign-apk\",\n      title: \"Android APK signing (RSA)\",\n      description: \"apksigner / Gradle signingConfigs APK signing\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message: signMessage(\"Android APK signing (apksigner/Gradle signingConfigs)\"),\n      remediation: REMEDIATION,\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    // RPM/deb: `rpmsign --addsign`, `rpm --addsign`, the `%_gpg_name` rpmmacro, or\n    // `dpkg-sig --sign`. All ultimately GPG (classically RSA) signatures.\n    re: /\\brpmsign\\s+--addsign\\b|\\brpm\\s+--addsign\\b|%_gpg_name\\b|\\bdpkg-sig\\s+--sign\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"codesign-rpm\",\n      title: \"RPM/deb package signing (RSA)\",\n      description: \"rpmsign / rpm --addsign / %_gpg_name / dpkg-sig package signing\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message: signMessage(\"RPM/deb package signing (rpmsign/rpm --addsign/dpkg-sig, GPG)\"),\n      remediation: REMEDIATION,\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    // NuGet: `nuget sign …` — also matches `dotnet nuget sign …` (the `nuget sign`\n    // token is a substring of it), typically paired with `--certificate-*` flags.\n    re: /\\bnuget\\s+sign\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"codesign-nuget\",\n      title: \"NuGet package signing (RSA)\",\n      description: \"nuget sign / dotnet nuget sign package signing\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message: signMessage(\"NuGet package signing (nuget sign/dotnet nuget sign)\"),\n      remediation: REMEDIATION,\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    // Apple: `xcrun notarytool submit …`, or `codesign --sign` / `codesign -s`.\n    // Allow intervening flags before `--sign`/`-s`, bounded to the codesign\n    // invocation so it can't latch onto a later command's flag across `&&`/`|`/`;`\n    // (same shape as cicd.ts's codesign rule). Algorithm is \"unknown\": an Apple\n    // signing identity may be RSA or ECDSA.\n    re: /\\bnotarytool\\s+submit\\b|\\bcodesign\\b[^\\n&|;]{0,120}?\\s(?:-s\\b|--sign\\b)/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"codesign-apple\",\n      title: \"Apple code signing / notarization\",\n      description: \"codesign --sign / xcrun notarytool submit macOS signing\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"unknown\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message: signMessage(\"Apple code signing (codesign/notarytool)\"),\n      remediation: REMEDIATION,\n    },\n  },\n];\n\n/** Detects classical code-signing CLI invocations in build scripts. */\nexport const codesignDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"codesign-signing\",\n  description:\n    \"Classical code-signing CLIs in build scripts (Authenticode, APK, RPM, NuGet, Apple)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: CS_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),\n  // Applies to build scripts of any extension EXCEPT documentation: a README that\n  // shows `signtool sign` in an example is prose, not a build step.\n  appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    // Cheap fast-reject: bail unless some signing-command marker is present, so\n    // the per-rule regexes never run on the overwhelming majority of files.\n    if (!MARKER_RE.test(content)) return [];\n\n    // Mask whole comment lines so a commented-out signing step can't fire.\n    // `#` covers shell / PowerShell / Makefile / Gradle(Groovy & Kotlin DSL);\n    // `//` covers Gradle/Groovy. Offsets are preserved so finding locations stay\n    // exact (see maskCommentLines).\n    const scan = maskCommentLines(content, [\"#\", \"//\"]);\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    for (const rule of CS_RULES) {\n      eachMatch(rule.re, scan, (m) => {\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule.meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        );\n      });\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/csharp.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"csharp.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/csharp.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAwM/D,gFAAgF;AAChF,eAAO,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,QA8C5B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/csharp.js

@@ -12,13 +12,23 @@ const RE_CS_DSA = /\bDSA\.Create\s*\(|\bnew\s+DSACryptoServiceProvider\s*\(|\bne
 //   - SslProtocols.Ssl3 / .Tls / .Tls11 → deprecated SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0 / 1.1.
 // `SslProtocols.Tls` (no suffix) is the legacy TLS 1.0 constant; `Tls12`/`Tls13`
 // are excluded by the trailing \b (the following digit is a word char).
-const RE_CS_TLS_CERT_VALIDATION = /\bDangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator\b|ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback\s*=/g;
+// Only the genuinely-permissive forms: the built-in accept-any validator, or a
+// callback assigned an always-`true` lambda. A callback assigned a NAMED validator
+// method is typically certificate PINNING (stricter than default) and must NOT fire.
+// An accept-any server-certificate callback: the BouncyCastle helper, or a
+// ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback that unconditionally yields `true` — as an
+// expression lambda (`=> true`), a block-body lambda (`=> { return true; }`), or a
+// `delegate { return true; }`. Requiring a literal `true` (not just any `=>`) keeps
+// certificate PINNING — which returns a comparison, `=> cert.Thumbprint == pinned` —
+// from being flagged as a disabled validator.
+const RE_CS_TLS_CERT_VALIDATION = /\bDangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator\b|ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback\s*=\s*(?:[^;\n]{0,80}=>\s*(?:true\b|\{\s*return\s+true\b)|delegate\s*(?:\([^)]{0,80}\))?\s*\{\s*return\s+true\b)/g;
 const RE_CS_TLS_LEGACY_VERSION = /\bSslProtocols\.(?:Tls|Tls11|Ssl3)\b/g;
 // Identifier-form JWT/JOSE signature algorithms (audit F7). The quoted-string
 // alg token ("RS256") is caught by the language-agnostic jwt-jose detector, but
 // Microsoft.IdentityModel passes the alg as an IDENTIFIER, not a string literal:
-// SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256 / SecurityAlgorithms.EcdsaSha256.
-const RE_CS_JWT_ALG = /\bSecurityAlgorithms\.(?:Rsa|Ecdsa)Sha(?:256|384|512)\b/g;
+// SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256 / SecurityAlgorithms.EcdsaSha256, and the
+// `…Signature`-suffixed constants used in SigningCredentials (RsaSha256Signature).
+const RE_CS_JWT_ALG = /\bSecurityAlgorithms\.(?:Rsa|Ecdsa)Sha(?:256|384|512)(?:Signature)?\b/g;
 // BouncyCastle (Org.BouncyCastle) modern-curve and finite-field DH primitives,
 // which System.Security.Cryptography does not expose directly. Each regex is
 // anchored to the distinctive BouncyCastle class names for one family so it

package/dist/detectors/csharp.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Source-code detector for classical asymmetric cryptography in C# / .NET\n * (`System.Security.Cryptography`). Same lexical strategy as the other packs.\n * .NET exposes each algorithm through a factory (`RSA.Create()`,\n * `ECDsa.Create()`, `ECDiffieHellman.Create()`) or a concrete CSP/CNG class\n * (`RSACryptoServiceProvider`, `ECDsaCng`, …), all of which are precise signals.\n *\n * HNDL: RSA (keygen/encryption) and (EC)DH key agreement are harvest-now-\n * decrypt-later exposed (hndl:true); ECDSA/DSA signatures are hndl:false but\n * forgeable by a quantum attacker.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { CSHARP_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_CERT_VALIDATION, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst RE_CS_RSA =\n  /\\bRSA\\.Create\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+RSACryptoServiceProvider\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+RSACng\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+RSAOpenSsl\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_CS_ECDSA = /\\bECDsa\\.Create\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+ECDsaCng\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+ECDsaOpenSsl\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_CS_ECDH =\n  /\\bECDiffieHellman\\.Create\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+ECDiffieHellmanCng\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+ECDiffieHellmanOpenSsl\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_CS_DSA = /\\bDSA\\.Create\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+DSACryptoServiceProvider\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+DSACng\\s*\\(/g;\n// Insecure TLS configuration (.NET). Mirrors source.ts's tlsDetector split of a\n// cert-verification-disabled rule (tls-reject-unauthorized) and a legacy-version\n// rule (tls-legacy-version) for the equivalent C# idioms:\n//   - DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator / a custom\n//     ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback → accepts any cert (MITM).\n//   - SslProtocols.Ssl3 / .Tls / .Tls11 → deprecated SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0 / 1.1.\n// `SslProtocols.Tls` (no suffix) is the legacy TLS 1.0 constant; `Tls12`/`Tls13`\n// are excluded by the trailing \\b (the following digit is a word char).\nconst RE_CS_TLS_CERT_VALIDATION =\n  /\\bDangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator\\b|ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback\\s*=/g;\nconst RE_CS_TLS_LEGACY_VERSION = /\\bSslProtocols\\.(?:Tls|Tls11|Ssl3)\\b/g;\n// Identifier-form JWT/JOSE signature algorithms (audit F7). The quoted-string\n// alg token (\"RS256\") is caught by the language-agnostic jwt-jose detector, but\n// Microsoft.IdentityModel passes the alg as an IDENTIFIER, not a string literal:\n// SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256 / SecurityAlgorithms.EcdsaSha256.\nconst RE_CS_JWT_ALG = /\\bSecurityAlgorithms\\.(?:Rsa|Ecdsa)Sha(?:256|384|512)\\b/g;\n// BouncyCastle (Org.BouncyCastle) modern-curve and finite-field DH primitives,\n// which System.Security.Cryptography does not expose directly. Each regex is\n// anchored to the distinctive BouncyCastle class names for one family so it\n// can't misfire on unrelated identifiers:\n//   - Ed25519KeyPairGenerator / Ed25519Signer / Ed25519PrivateKeyParameters → EdDSA\n//   - X25519KeyPairGenerator / X25519Agreement / X25519PrivateKeyParameters → X25519\n//   - X448KeyPairGenerator / X448Agreement / X448PrivateKeyParameters → X448\n//   - DHParametersGenerator / DHBasicAgreement / DH(Basic)KeyPairGenerator / DHParameters → DH\n// The trailing \\b keeps each token whole (e.g. Ed25519KeyGenerationParameters,\n// X25519PublicKeyParameters and DHKeyGenerationParameters are NOT matched).\nconst RE_CS_BC_EDDSA = /\\bEd25519(?:KeyPairGenerator|Signer|PrivateKeyParameters)\\b/g;\nconst RE_CS_BC_X25519 = /\\bX25519(?:KeyPairGenerator|Agreement|PrivateKeyParameters)\\b/g;\nconst RE_CS_BC_X448 = /\\bX448(?:KeyPairGenerator|Agreement|PrivateKeyParameters)\\b/g;\nconst RE_CS_BC_DH =\n  /\\bDH(?:ParametersGenerator|BasicAgreement|BasicKeyPairGenerator|KeyPairGenerator|Parameters)\\b/g;\n\nconst RULE_CS_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-rsa\",\n  title: \"C# RSA key/usage\",\n  description: \"System.Security.Cryptography RSA.Create / RSACryptoServiceProvider / RSACng\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical RSA (.NET) is not quantum-safe and RSA encryption is HNDL-exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"C# ECDSA signature\",\n  description: \"System.Security.Cryptography ECDsa.Create / ECDsaCng\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical ECDSA signing (.NET) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_ECDH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-ecdh\",\n  title: \"C# ECDH key agreement\",\n  description: \"System.Security.Cryptography ECDiffieHellman.Create / ECDiffieHellmanCng\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (.NET) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_DSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-dsa\",\n  title: \"C# DSA key/signature\",\n  description: \"System.Security.Cryptography DSA.Create / DSACryptoServiceProvider\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical DSA (.NET) is deprecated and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Rotate off DSA and migrate to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_TLS_CERT: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-tls-cert-validation\",\n  title: \"C# TLS certificate verification disabled\",\n  description:\n    \"DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator / ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback override\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_CERT_VALIDATION,\n  message: \"Accepting any server certificate disables TLS certificate verification (MITM risk).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Remove the custom validator and verify certificates properly; prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_TLS_LEGACY: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-tls-legacy-version\",\n  title: \"C# legacy TLS/SSL version pinned\",\n  description: \"SslProtocols pinned to Ssl3 / TLS 1.0 / TLS 1.1\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message:\n    \"SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0 / TLS 1.1 are deprecated and insecure; require TLS 1.2+ (prefer 1.3).\",\n  remediation: \"Use SslProtocols.Tls13 (or Tls12) and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_JWT_ALG: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-jwt-alg\",\n  title: \"C# identifier-form JWT/JOSE algorithm\",\n  description: \"Microsoft.IdentityModel SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha* / EcdsaSha*\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"A classical JWT/JOSE signature algorithm (.NET, identifier form) is used, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204); track IETF PQC JOSE/COSE algorithms\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_BC_EDDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-bouncycastle-eddsa\",\n  title: \"C# Ed25519 signature (BouncyCastle)\",\n  description:\n    \"Org.BouncyCastle Ed25519KeyPairGenerator / Ed25519Signer / Ed25519PrivateKeyParameters\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical Ed25519 signing (BouncyCastle) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_BC_X25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-bouncycastle-x25519\",\n  title: \"C# X25519 key agreement (BouncyCastle)\",\n  description:\n    \"Org.BouncyCastle X25519KeyPairGenerator / X25519Agreement / X25519PrivateKeyParameters\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X25519\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"X25519 Diffie-Hellman key agreement (BouncyCastle) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_BC_X448: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-bouncycastle-x448\",\n  title: \"C# X448 key agreement (BouncyCastle)\",\n  description: \"Org.BouncyCastle X448KeyPairGenerator / X448Agreement / X448PrivateKeyParameters\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X448\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"X448 Diffie-Hellman key agreement (BouncyCastle) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_BC_DH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-bouncycastle-dh\",\n  title: \"C# finite-field Diffie-Hellman (BouncyCastle)\",\n  description:\n    \"Org.BouncyCastle DHParametersGenerator / DHBasicAgreement / DHKeyPairGenerator / DHParameters\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (BouncyCastle) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto in C# (System.Security.Cryptography). */\nexport const csharpDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"csharp-crypto\",\n  description:\n    \"Classical asymmetric crypto (System.Security.Cryptography) and insecure TLS config in C#/.NET\",\n  scope: \"source\",\n  language: \"csharp\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_CS_RSA,\n    RULE_CS_ECDSA,\n    RULE_CS_ECDH,\n    RULE_CS_DSA,\n    RULE_CS_TLS_CERT,\n    RULE_CS_TLS_LEGACY,\n    RULE_CS_JWT_ALG,\n    RULE_CS_BC_EDDSA,\n    RULE_CS_BC_X25519,\n    RULE_CS_BC_X448,\n    RULE_CS_BC_DH,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, CSHARP_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    // ECDSA / ECDH before RSA/DSA so the specific EC factories win.\n    add(RE_CS_ECDSA, RULE_CS_ECDSA);\n    add(RE_CS_ECDH, RULE_CS_ECDH);\n    add(RE_CS_RSA, RULE_CS_RSA);\n    add(RE_CS_DSA, RULE_CS_DSA);\n    // Insecure TLS configuration (disjoint from the crypto factories above).\n    add(RE_CS_TLS_CERT_VALIDATION, RULE_CS_TLS_CERT);\n    add(RE_CS_TLS_LEGACY_VERSION, RULE_CS_TLS_LEGACY);\n    // Identifier-form JWT/JOSE signature algorithms (Microsoft.IdentityModel).\n    add(RE_CS_JWT_ALG, RULE_CS_JWT_ALG);\n    // BouncyCastle (Org.BouncyCastle) curve / finite-field DH primitives that\n    // System.Security.Cryptography does not expose directly.\n    add(RE_CS_BC_EDDSA, RULE_CS_BC_EDDSA);\n    add(RE_CS_BC_X25519, RULE_CS_BC_X25519);\n    add(RE_CS_BC_X448, RULE_CS_BC_X448);\n    add(RE_CS_BC_DH, RULE_CS_BC_DH);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}
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* Source-code detector for classical asymmetric cryptography in C# / .NET\n * (`System.Security.Cryptography`). Same lexical strategy as the other packs.\n * .NET exposes each algorithm through a factory (`RSA.Create()`,\n * `ECDsa.Create()`, `ECDiffieHellman.Create()`) or a concrete CSP/CNG class\n * (`RSACryptoServiceProvider`, `ECDsaCng`, …), all of which are precise signals.\n *\n * HNDL: RSA (keygen/encryption) and (EC)DH key agreement are harvest-now-\n * decrypt-later exposed (hndl:true); ECDSA/DSA signatures are hndl:false but\n * forgeable by a quantum attacker.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { CSHARP_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_CERT_VALIDATION, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst RE_CS_RSA =\n  /\\bRSA\\.Create\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+RSACryptoServiceProvider\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+RSACng\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+RSAOpenSsl\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_CS_ECDSA = /\\bECDsa\\.Create\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+ECDsaCng\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+ECDsaOpenSsl\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_CS_ECDH =\n  /\\bECDiffieHellman\\.Create\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+ECDiffieHellmanCng\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+ECDiffieHellmanOpenSsl\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_CS_DSA = /\\bDSA\\.Create\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+DSACryptoServiceProvider\\s*\\(|\\bnew\\s+DSACng\\s*\\(/g;\n// Insecure TLS configuration (.NET). 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Requiring a literal `true` (not just any `=>`) keeps\n// certificate PINNING — which returns a comparison, `=> cert.Thumbprint == pinned` —\n// from being flagged as a disabled validator.\nconst RE_CS_TLS_CERT_VALIDATION =\n  /\\bDangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator\\b|ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback\\s*=\\s*(?:[^;\\n]{0,80}=>\\s*(?:true\\b|\\{\\s*return\\s+true\\b)|delegate\\s*(?:\\([^)]{0,80}\\))?\\s*\\{\\s*return\\s+true\\b)/g;\nconst RE_CS_TLS_LEGACY_VERSION = /\\bSslProtocols\\.(?:Tls|Tls11|Ssl3)\\b/g;\n// Identifier-form JWT/JOSE signature algorithms (audit F7). The quoted-string\n// alg token (\"RS256\") is caught by the language-agnostic jwt-jose detector, but\n// Microsoft.IdentityModel passes the alg as an IDENTIFIER, not a string literal:\n// SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256 / SecurityAlgorithms.EcdsaSha256, and the\n// `…Signature`-suffixed constants used in SigningCredentials (RsaSha256Signature).\nconst RE_CS_JWT_ALG = /\\bSecurityAlgorithms\\.(?:Rsa|Ecdsa)Sha(?:256|384|512)(?:Signature)?\\b/g;\n// BouncyCastle (Org.BouncyCastle) modern-curve and finite-field DH primitives,\n// which System.Security.Cryptography does not expose directly. Each regex is\n// anchored to the distinctive BouncyCastle class names for one family so it\n// can't misfire on unrelated identifiers:\n//   - Ed25519KeyPairGenerator / Ed25519Signer / Ed25519PrivateKeyParameters → EdDSA\n//   - X25519KeyPairGenerator / X25519Agreement / X25519PrivateKeyParameters → X25519\n//   - X448KeyPairGenerator / X448Agreement / X448PrivateKeyParameters → X448\n//   - DHParametersGenerator / DHBasicAgreement / DH(Basic)KeyPairGenerator / DHParameters → DH\n// The trailing \\b keeps each token whole (e.g. Ed25519KeyGenerationParameters,\n// X25519PublicKeyParameters and DHKeyGenerationParameters are NOT matched).\nconst RE_CS_BC_EDDSA = /\\bEd25519(?:KeyPairGenerator|Signer|PrivateKeyParameters)\\b/g;\nconst RE_CS_BC_X25519 = /\\bX25519(?:KeyPairGenerator|Agreement|PrivateKeyParameters)\\b/g;\nconst RE_CS_BC_X448 = /\\bX448(?:KeyPairGenerator|Agreement|PrivateKeyParameters)\\b/g;\nconst RE_CS_BC_DH =\n  /\\bDH(?:ParametersGenerator|BasicAgreement|BasicKeyPairGenerator|KeyPairGenerator|Parameters)\\b/g;\n\nconst RULE_CS_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-rsa\",\n  title: \"C# RSA key/usage\",\n  description: \"System.Security.Cryptography RSA.Create / RSACryptoServiceProvider / RSACng\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical RSA (.NET) is not quantum-safe and RSA encryption is HNDL-exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"C# ECDSA signature\",\n  description: \"System.Security.Cryptography ECDsa.Create / ECDsaCng\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical ECDSA signing (.NET) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_ECDH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-ecdh\",\n  title: \"C# ECDH key agreement\",\n  description: \"System.Security.Cryptography ECDiffieHellman.Create / ECDiffieHellmanCng\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (.NET) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_DSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-dsa\",\n  title: \"C# DSA key/signature\",\n  description: \"System.Security.Cryptography DSA.Create / DSACryptoServiceProvider\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical DSA (.NET) is deprecated and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Rotate off DSA and migrate to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_TLS_CERT: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-tls-cert-validation\",\n  title: \"C# TLS certificate verification disabled\",\n  description:\n    \"DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator / ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback override\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_CERT_VALIDATION,\n  message: \"Accepting any server certificate disables TLS certificate verification (MITM risk).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Remove the custom validator and verify certificates properly; prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_TLS_LEGACY: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-tls-legacy-version\",\n  title: \"C# legacy TLS/SSL version pinned\",\n  description: \"SslProtocols pinned to Ssl3 / TLS 1.0 / TLS 1.1\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message:\n    \"SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0 / TLS 1.1 are deprecated and insecure; require TLS 1.2+ (prefer 1.3).\",\n  remediation: \"Use SslProtocols.Tls13 (or Tls12) and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_JWT_ALG: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-jwt-alg\",\n  title: \"C# identifier-form JWT/JOSE algorithm\",\n  description: \"Microsoft.IdentityModel SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha* / EcdsaSha*\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"A classical JWT/JOSE signature algorithm (.NET, identifier form) is used, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204); track IETF PQC JOSE/COSE algorithms\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_BC_EDDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-bouncycastle-eddsa\",\n  title: \"C# Ed25519 signature (BouncyCastle)\",\n  description:\n    \"Org.BouncyCastle Ed25519KeyPairGenerator / Ed25519Signer / Ed25519PrivateKeyParameters\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical Ed25519 signing (BouncyCastle) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_BC_X25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-bouncycastle-x25519\",\n  title: \"C# X25519 key agreement (BouncyCastle)\",\n  description:\n    \"Org.BouncyCastle X25519KeyPairGenerator / X25519Agreement / X25519PrivateKeyParameters\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X25519\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"X25519 Diffie-Hellman key agreement (BouncyCastle) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_BC_X448: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-bouncycastle-x448\",\n  title: \"C# X448 key agreement (BouncyCastle)\",\n  description: \"Org.BouncyCastle X448KeyPairGenerator / X448Agreement / X448PrivateKeyParameters\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X448\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"X448 Diffie-Hellman key agreement (BouncyCastle) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CS_BC_DH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"csharp-bouncycastle-dh\",\n  title: \"C# finite-field Diffie-Hellman (BouncyCastle)\",\n  description:\n    \"Org.BouncyCastle DHParametersGenerator / DHBasicAgreement / DHKeyPairGenerator / DHParameters\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (BouncyCastle) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto in C# (System.Security.Cryptography). */\nexport const csharpDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"csharp-crypto\",\n  description:\n    \"Classical asymmetric crypto (System.Security.Cryptography) and insecure TLS config in C#/.NET\",\n  scope: \"source\",\n  language: \"csharp\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_CS_RSA,\n    RULE_CS_ECDSA,\n    RULE_CS_ECDH,\n    RULE_CS_DSA,\n    RULE_CS_TLS_CERT,\n    RULE_CS_TLS_LEGACY,\n    RULE_CS_JWT_ALG,\n    RULE_CS_BC_EDDSA,\n    RULE_CS_BC_X25519,\n    RULE_CS_BC_X448,\n    RULE_CS_BC_DH,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, CSHARP_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    // ECDSA / ECDH before RSA/DSA so the specific EC factories win.\n    add(RE_CS_ECDSA, RULE_CS_ECDSA);\n    add(RE_CS_ECDH, RULE_CS_ECDH);\n    add(RE_CS_RSA, RULE_CS_RSA);\n    add(RE_CS_DSA, RULE_CS_DSA);\n    // Insecure TLS configuration (disjoint from the crypto factories above).\n    add(RE_CS_TLS_CERT_VALIDATION, RULE_CS_TLS_CERT);\n    add(RE_CS_TLS_LEGACY_VERSION, RULE_CS_TLS_LEGACY);\n    // Identifier-form JWT/JOSE signature algorithms (Microsoft.IdentityModel).\n    add(RE_CS_JWT_ALG, RULE_CS_JWT_ALG);\n    // BouncyCastle (Org.BouncyCastle) curve / finite-field DH primitives that\n    // System.Security.Cryptography does not expose directly.\n    add(RE_CS_BC_EDDSA, RULE_CS_BC_EDDSA);\n    add(RE_CS_BC_X25519, RULE_CS_BC_X25519);\n    add(RE_CS_BC_X448, RULE_CS_BC_X448);\n    add(RE_CS_BC_DH, RULE_CS_BC_DH);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/dart.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * Source detector for classical asymmetric cryptography in Dart / Flutter.
+ *
+ * Dart has no asymmetric crypto in its standard library, so real-world code
+ * reaches for one of the two dominant pub.dev packages, and both expose their
+ * primitives through distinctive class names — which makes a lexical scan (the
+ * same zero-dependency strategy as every other language pack here) precise:
+ *
+ *  - package:pointycastle (a Bouncy Castle port). RSA via `RSAKeyGenerator`,
+ *    `RSAEngine`, `RSASigner`, `PSSSigner`; EC via `ECKeyGenerator`,
+ *    `ECDSASigner`, `ECDHBasicAgreement`; Edwards via `Ed25519`.
+ *  - package:cryptography (Dart-native). RSA via `RsaPss`, `RsaSsaPkcs1v15`;
+ *    EC via `Ecdsa`, `Ecdh`; modern curves via `Ed25519`, `X25519`.
+ *
+ * HNDL (harvest-now-decrypt-later) reasoning — the field that drives urgency:
+ *  - RSA encryption (`RSAEngine`) and RSA key generation (`RSAKeyGenerator`,
+ *    which yields keys that can decrypt) are confidentiality surfaces → hndl:true.
+ *  - (EC)DH key agreement (`ECDHBasicAgreement`, `Ecdh`, `X25519`) is the classic
+ *    HNDL target — recorded ciphertext is decryptable once the curve falls → hndl:true.
+ *  - Signatures (`RSASigner`/`PSSSigner`/`RsaPss`/`RsaSsaPkcs1v15`, `ECDSASigner`/
+ *    `Ecdsa`, `Ed25519`) are forgeable by a quantum attacker but not retroactively
+ *    breakable → hndl:false.
+ *  - `ECKeyGenerator` is ambiguous (an EC key can feed either ECDSA or ECDH); it is
+ *    classified conservatively as an ECDSA signing key (hndl:false), the Dart default.
+ *
+ * Comment suppression is C-style (`//` line + `/* … *\/` block), matching Dart's
+ * lexer, so commented-out crypto is not reported. The regexes are `\b`-anchored on
+ * the library-specific identifiers above; none matches a bare `RSA`/`EC` substring,
+ * keeping false positives low. A cheap substring fast-reject skips the regex work on
+ * the overwhelming majority of `.dart` files that touch no asymmetric crypto.
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto in Dart / Flutter (pointycastle, cryptography). */
+export declare const dartDetector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=dart.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/dart.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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