@quantakrypto/core 0.4.4 → 0.6.0

package/dist/detectors/bicep.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"bicep.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/bicep.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAiBA,OAAO,EACL,SAAS,EACT,eAAe,EACf,YAAY,EACZ,iBAAiB,EACjB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAC5B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAEjE,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAsB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAEvD,8EAA8E;AAC9E,qFAAqF;AACrF,uFAAuF;AACvF,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAC/D,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,oCAAoC,CAAC;AAC7D,sFAAsF;AACtF,uDAAuD;AACvD,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,+CAA+C,CAAC;AAEzE,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAa;IACnC,EAAE,EAAE,oBAAoB;IACxB,KAAK,EAAE,+BAA+B;IACtC,WAAW,EAAE,oDAAoD;IACjE,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM;IAChB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM;IAClB,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK;IAChB,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI;IACV,GAAG,EAAE,iBAAiB;IACtB,OAAO,EAAE,kFAAkF;IAC3F,WAAW,EAAE,8EAA8E;CAC5F,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAa;IAClC,EAAE,EAAE,mBAAmB;IACvB,KAAK,EAAE,8BAA8B;IACrC,WAAW,EAAE,mDAAmD;IAChE,QAAQ,EAAE,cAAc;IACxB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM;IAChB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM;IAClB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM;IACjB,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI;IACV,GAAG,EAAE,iBAAiB;IACtB,OAAO,EACL,iKAAiK;IACnK,WAAW,EACT,8FAA8F;CACjG,CAAC;AACF,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAa;IACnC,EAAE,EAAE,sBAAsB;IAC1B,KAAK,EAAE,kCAAkC;IACzC,WAAW,EAAE,4DAA4D;IACzE,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ;IAClB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM;IAClB,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK;IACX,GAAG,EAAE,iBAAiB;IACtB,OAAO,EAAE,mFAAmF;IAC5F,WAAW,EAAE,iFAAiF;CAC/F,CAAC;AAEF,kFAAkF;AAClF,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,aAAa,GAAa;IACrC,EAAE,EAAE,cAAc;IAClB,WAAW,EAAE,0EAA0E;IACvF,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ;IACf,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAClE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC;IACnD,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE;QACtB,+EAA+E;QAC/E,sFAAsF;QACtF,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAClE,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAc,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/B,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,EAAU,EAAE,IAAc,EAAE,EAAE,CACzC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CACxB,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CACX,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CACnF,CACF,CAAC;QACJ,6EAA6E;QAC7E,4EAA4E;QAC5E,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3C,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC;YAC1C,GAAG,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,CAAC;QACD,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;IAClB,CAAC;CACF,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * IaC detector: classical asymmetric cryptography and legacy TLS declared in Azure\n * Bicep (`.bicep`) — Azure's native IaC DSL, distinct from the ARM/CloudFormation\n * JSON the cloudformation detector already covers (Bicep is the *source*; ARM JSON is\n * its compiled output). Bicep provisions the same Key Vault keys and TLS floors, but\n * in its own single-quoted-string syntax that the JSON detector never sees.\n *\n * Covered (gated to `.bicep` files):\n *  - `Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/keys` `kty: 'RSA' | 'RSA-HSM' | 'EC' | 'EC-HSM'` — a\n *    classical Key Vault key. RSA is KEM (HNDL); EC feeds ECDSA + ECDH (the ECDH path\n *    is HNDL). Gated to a `Microsoft.KeyVault` marker so a stray `kty` elsewhere in a\n *    template does not fire.\n *  - `minimumTlsVersion: 'TLS1_0' | 'TLS1_1'` — a deprecated TLS floor on storage /\n *    app-service / other resources (RFC 8996). Not HNDL (a config weakness), category\n *    \"tls\".\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport {\n  eachMatch,\n  findingFromRule,\n  hasExtension,\n  maskBlockComments,\n  maskCommentLines,\n} from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst BICEP_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".bicep\"];\n\n// Bicep string values are single-quoted. `kty: 'RSA'` / `'RSA-HSM'` (KEM) and\n// `kty: 'EC'` / `'EC-HSM'` (EC). The `(?<![\\w-])` lookbehind stops a longer key name\n// from matching on a `kty` suffix; the value bound keeps `'EC'` from matching `'ECX'`.\nconst RE_BICEP_KTY_RSA = /(?<![\\w-])kty\\s*:\\s*'RSA(?:-HSM)?'/g;\nconst RE_BICEP_KTY_EC = /(?<![\\w-])kty\\s*:\\s*'EC(?:-HSM)?'/g;\n// Legacy TLS floor. `TLS1_0` / `TLS1_1` are deprecated; `TLS1_2` / `TLS1_3` are fine,\n// and the closing quote keeps this from matching them.\nconst RE_BICEP_MIN_TLS = /(?<![\\w])minimumTlsVersion\\s*:\\s*'TLS1_[01]'/g;\n\nconst RULE_BICEP_KTY_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"bicep-keyvault-rsa\",\n  title: \"Bicep Azure Key Vault RSA key\",\n  description: \"Azure Bicep Microsoft.KeyVault key with kty: 'RSA'\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Bicep provisions a classical RSA Azure Key Vault key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).\",\n};\nconst RULE_BICEP_KTY_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"bicep-keyvault-ec\",\n  title: \"Bicep Azure Key Vault EC key\",\n  description: \"Azure Bicep Microsoft.KeyVault key with kty: 'EC'\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Bicep provisions a classical EC Azure Key Vault key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_BICEP_MIN_TLS: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"bicep-min-tls-legacy\",\n  title: \"Bicep legacy minimum TLS version\",\n  description: \"Azure Bicep resource pins minimumTlsVersion to TLS 1.0/1.1\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message: \"Bicep resource pins a deprecated TLS floor (TLS 1.0/1.1); require TLS 1.2+ (1.3).\",\n  remediation: \"Set minimumTlsVersion: 'TLS1_2' and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange as it lands.\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS declared in Azure Bicep. */\nexport const bicepDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"bicep-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS declared in Azure Bicep (IaC)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [RULE_BICEP_KTY_RSA, RULE_BICEP_KTY_EC, RULE_BICEP_MIN_TLS],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, BICEP_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    // Bicep comments are `//` and `/* … */`; mask block comments (multi-line) then\n    // whole `//` comment lines so a commented-out resource can't fire. Offsets preserved.\n    const scan = maskCommentLines(maskBlockComments(content), [\"//\"]);\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, scan, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    // The bare `kty` field is generic; only treat it as a Key Vault key when the\n    // resource type is actually present, mirroring the cloudformation ARM gate.\n    if (content.includes(\"Microsoft.KeyVault\")) {\n      add(RE_BICEP_KTY_RSA, RULE_BICEP_KTY_RSA);\n      add(RE_BICEP_KTY_EC, RULE_BICEP_KTY_EC);\n    }\n    add(RE_BICEP_MIN_TLS, RULE_BICEP_MIN_TLS);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/c.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"c.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/c.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AA0b/D,8DAA8D;AAC9D,eAAO,MAAM,SAAS,EAAE,QA4EvB,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"c.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/c.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AA4b/D,8DAA8D;AAC9D,eAAO,MAAM,SAAS,EAAE,QAsGvB,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/c.js

@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ const RE_C_RSA_VERIFY = /\bRSA_verify\s*\(/g;
 const RE_C_RSA_CRYPT = /\bRSA_public_encrypt\s*\(|\bRSA_private_decrypt\s*\(/g;
 // C/OpenSSL legacy TLS configuration (mirrors source.ts tlsDetector): forcing a
 // deprecated protocol version or disabling certificate verification.
-const RE_C_TLS_VERSION = /\bTLSv1_method\b|\bSSLv3_method\b/g;
+// TLSv1_method / TLSv1_1_method (+ the client/server-specific variants) and the
+// SSLv2/SSLv3 method constructors — all pin a deprecated protocol (RFC 8996).
+const RE_C_TLS_VERSION = /\b(?:TLSv1(?:_1)?|SSLv2|SSLv3)(?:_client|_server)?_method\b/g;
 const RE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE = /\bSSL_VERIFY_NONE\b/g;
 // Embedded C crypto libraries (the "embedded" niche): Mbed TLS and wolfSSL /
 // wolfCrypt. Both use highly-distinctive `mbedtls_*` / `wc_*` prefixes, so the
@@ -455,9 +457,34 @@ export const cDetector = {
         add(RE_C_DSA, RULE_C_DSA);
         add(RE_C_DH, RULE_C_DH);
         add(RE_C_EVP_KEYGEN, RULE_C_EVP_KEYGEN);
-        add(RE_C_EVP_DERIVE, RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE);
+        // `EVP_PKEY_derive` is OpenSSL's entry point for BOTH (EC)DH key agreement and the
+        // symmetric KDFs (HKDF/scrypt/TLS1-PRF). Real (EC)DH always sets a peer key via
+        // `EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer`; a KDF never does. So only treat it as classical key
+        // agreement when a peer is set, or when no KDF context marker is present.
+        const hasKdfCtx = /\bEVP_PKEY_(?:HKDF|SCRYPT|TLS1_PRF)\b/.test(content);
+        if (content.includes("EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer") || !hasKdfCtx) {
+            add(RE_C_EVP_DERIVE, RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE);
+        }
         add(RE_C_EVP_CRYPT, RULE_C_EVP_CRYPT);
-        add(RE_C_EVP_SIGN, RULE_C_EVP_SIGN);
+        // `EVP_DigestSign*` also drives HMAC/CMAC (a symmetric MAC keyed by
+        // `EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC/CMAC, …)`), which is NOT a classical
+        // asymmetric signature. Suppress a `DigestSign*` match ONLY when a MAC key setup
+        // sits just before it — per-match, so a real RSA/ECDSA sign elsewhere in the same
+        // file is still reported. `DigestVerify*` (no MAC form here) is never suppressed.
+        eachMatch(RE_C_EVP_SIGN, content, (m) => {
+            const isSign = m[0].includes("DigestSign");
+            if (isSign) {
+                const back = content.slice(Math.max(0, m.index - 300), m.index);
+                if (/EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key|EVP_PKEY_(?:HMAC|CMAC)\b/.test(back))
+                    return;
+            }
+            findings.push(findingFromRule(RULE_C_EVP_SIGN, {
+                file,
+                content,
+                index: m.index,
+                matchLength: m[0].length,
+            }));
+        });
         add(RE_C_SODIUM_BOX, RULE_C_SODIUM_BOX);
         add(RE_C_SODIUM_SIGN, RULE_C_SODIUM_SIGN);
         add(RE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY, RULE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY);

package/dist/detectors/c.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Source-code detector for classical asymmetric cryptography in C / C++ using\n * OpenSSL (the dominant crypto library for the ecosystem), libsodium, and — for\n * the embedded / firmware / IoT niche — Mbed TLS (`mbedtls_*`) and wolfSSL /\n * wolfCrypt (`wc_*`). Lexical, same strategy as the other packs; every library's\n * function names are distinctive enough to keep the false-positive risk low.\n *\n * NOTE: scanning OpenSSL's OWN source/headers will naturally light up (the\n * library declares these symbols) — that is inherent to lexical scanning of a\n * crypto library, not a false positive in application code. Matches the classic\n * `*_generate_key` / `ECDSA_sign` / `ECDH_compute_key` call forms plus the\n * `EVP_RSA_gen` helper.\n *\n * HNDL: RSA encryption and (EC)DH key agreement are harvest-now-decrypt-later\n * exposed (hndl:true); ECDSA / DSA signatures are hndl:false but forgeable.\n * `EC_KEY_generate_key` is ambiguous (feeds ECDSA + ECDH), classified\n * conservatively as key-exchange-capable (hndl:true).\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { C_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_CERT_VALIDATION, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst RE_C_RSA = /\\bRSA_generate_key(?:_ex)?\\s*\\(|\\bEVP_RSA_gen\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_EC = /\\bEC_KEY_generate_key\\s*\\(|\\bEC_KEY_new_by_curve_name\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_ECDSA = /\\bECDSA_do_sign\\s*\\(|\\bECDSA_sign\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_ECDH = /\\bECDH_compute_key\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_DSA = /\\bDSA_generate_key\\s*\\(|\\bDSA_generate_parameters(?:_ex)?\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_DH = /\\bDH_generate_key\\s*\\(|\\bDH_generate_parameters(?:_ex)?\\s*\\(/g;\n// Modern OpenSSL 3.x EVP API (the legacy *_generate_key forms above are\n// deprecated) + libsodium — the biggest C false-negative surface (audit F1).\nconst RE_C_EVP_KEYGEN = /\\bEVP_PKEY_(?:Q_)?keygen\\s*\\(|\\bEVP_PKEY_paramgen\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_EVP_DERIVE = /\\bEVP_PKEY_derive\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_EVP_CRYPT = /\\bEVP_PKEY_(?:encrypt|decrypt)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_EVP_SIGN = /\\bEVP_DigestSign(?:Init)?\\s*\\(|\\bEVP_DigestVerify(?:Init)?\\s*\\(/g;\n// X25519: crypto_box / crypto_kx key pairs (incl. the fully-qualified\n// curve25519xsalsa20poly1305 form) plus the low-level crypto_scalarmult\n// primitive — all classical Curve25519 key agreement (audit recall gap).\nconst RE_C_SODIUM_BOX =\n  /\\bcrypto_box_(?:curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_)?(?:seed_)?keypair\\s*\\(|\\bcrypto_kx_keypair\\s*\\(|\\bcrypto_scalarmult_(?:curve25519|base)\\s*\\(/g;\n// EdDSA: crypto_sign key pairs, including the explicit _ed25519 forms and the\n// deterministic seed_keypair variants (audit recall gap: _ed25519_keypair).\nconst RE_C_SODIUM_SIGN = /\\bcrypto_sign_(?:ed25519_)?(?:seed_)?keypair\\s*\\(/g;\n// Legacy verify / decrypt counterparts to the *_sign / *_encrypt rules above\n// (audit F4-c): the classic OpenSSL RSA/ECDSA verification and RSA raw\n// decryption call forms that the modern EVP + legacy keygen rules don't cover.\nconst RE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY = /\\bECDSA_verify\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_RSA_VERIFY = /\\bRSA_verify\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_RSA_CRYPT = /\\bRSA_public_encrypt\\s*\\(|\\bRSA_private_decrypt\\s*\\(/g;\n// C/OpenSSL legacy TLS configuration (mirrors source.ts tlsDetector): forcing a\n// deprecated protocol version or disabling certificate verification.\nconst RE_C_TLS_VERSION = /\\bTLSv1_method\\b|\\bSSLv3_method\\b/g;\nconst RE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE = /\\bSSL_VERIFY_NONE\\b/g;\n// Embedded C crypto libraries (the \"embedded\" niche): Mbed TLS and wolfSSL /\n// wolfCrypt. Both use highly-distinctive `mbedtls_*` / `wc_*` prefixes, so the\n// false-positive risk is low. These dominate firmware / IoT / RTOS builds where\n// OpenSSL is too heavy — a codebase surface qScan previously missed entirely.\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA = /\\bmbedtls_rsa_gen_key\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_EC = /\\bmbedtls_ecp_gen_key(?:pair)?\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA =\n  /\\bmbedtls_ecdsa_(?:sign|write_signature|read_signature|verify)\\w*\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH = /\\bmbedtls_ecdh_(?:compute_shared|calc_secret)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_DH = /\\bmbedtls_dhm_(?:make_public|make_params|calc_secret)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_RSA =\n  /\\bwc_MakeRsaKey\\s*\\(|\\bwc_RsaPublicEncrypt\\s*\\(|\\bwc_RsaPrivateDecrypt\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_ECC = /\\bwc_ecc_make_key(?:_ex)?\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_ECDSA = /\\bwc_ecc_sign_hash\\s*\\(|\\bwc_ecc_verify_hash\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_ECDH = /\\bwc_ecc_shared_secret\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_DH = /\\bwc_DhGenerateKeyPair\\s*\\(|\\bwc_DhAgree\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519 = /\\bwc_curve25519_(?:make_key|shared_secret)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_ED25519 = /\\bwc_ed25519_(?:make_key|sign_msg|verify_msg)\\s*\\(/g;\n\nconst RULE_C_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-rsa-keygen\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL RSA key generation\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL RSA_generate_key(_ex) / EVP_RSA_gen\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Generates a classical RSA key pair (C/OpenSSL), which is not quantum-safe.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-ec-keygen\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EC key generation\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL EC_KEY_generate_key / EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Generates a classical EC key pair (C/OpenSSL). EC keys feed BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement; the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL ECDSA signature\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL ECDSA_sign / ECDSA_do_sign\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical ECDSA signing (C/OpenSSL) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_ECDH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-ecdh\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL ECDH key agreement\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL ECDH_compute_key\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (C/OpenSSL) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_DSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-dsa\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL DSA key/usage\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL DSA_generate_key / DSA_generate_parameters\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical DSA (C/OpenSSL) is deprecated and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Rotate off DSA and migrate to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_DH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-dh\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL Diffie-Hellman key exchange\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL DH_generate_key / DH_generate_parameters\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (C/OpenSSL) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EVP_KEYGEN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-evp-keygen\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EVP key generation\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL 3.x EVP_PKEY_keygen / EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen / paramgen\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Generates an asymmetric key via the OpenSSL 3.x EVP API (the key type — RSA/EC/DH/X25519 — is set on the CTX). Treated conservatively as key-exchange-capable (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-evp-derive\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EVP key agreement\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL 3.x EVP_PKEY_derive (ECDH / DH shared secret)\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Derives an (EC)DH shared secret via the OpenSSL EVP API — broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EVP_CRYPT: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-evp-pkey-crypt\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EVP public-key encryption\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL 3.x EVP_PKEY_encrypt / EVP_PKEY_decrypt (RSA)\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"RSA public-key encryption/decryption via the OpenSSL EVP API is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EVP_SIGN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-evp-sign\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EVP signing\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL 3.x EVP_DigestSign* / EVP_DigestVerify*\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical signature via the OpenSSL EVP API (RSA/ECDSA/EdDSA) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_SODIUM_BOX: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-libsodium-box\",\n  title: \"libsodium X25519 key pair\",\n  description:\n    \"libsodium crypto_box / crypto_kx keypair + crypto_scalarmult (X25519 key agreement)\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X25519\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"libsodium crypto_box uses X25519 key agreement — modern but classical, and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_SODIUM_SIGN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-libsodium-sign\",\n  title: \"libsodium Ed25519 key pair\",\n  description: \"libsodium crypto_sign(_ed25519)(_seed)_keypair (Ed25519 signatures)\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"low\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"libsodium crypto_sign uses Ed25519 signatures — classical and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-ecdsa-verify\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL ECDSA signature verification\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL ECDSA_verify\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical ECDSA verification (C/OpenSSL) trusts signatures forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_RSA_VERIFY: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-rsa-verify\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL RSA signature verification\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL RSA_verify\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical RSA signature verification (C/OpenSSL) trusts signatures forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_RSA_CRYPT: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-rsa-crypt\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL RSA public-key encryption\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL RSA_public_encrypt / RSA_private_decrypt\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Legacy RSA public-key encryption/decryption (C/OpenSSL) is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_TLS_VERSION: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-tls-legacy-version\",\n  title: \"Legacy TLS/SSL version pinned (C/OpenSSL)\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL TLSv1_method / SSLv3_method\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message: \"TLS 1.0 / SSLv3 are deprecated and insecure; require TLS 1.3.\",\n  remediation: \"Use TLS_method() with a minimum of TLS 1.3 and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-tls-verify-none\",\n  title: \"TLS certificate verification disabled (C/OpenSSL)\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL SSL_VERIFY_NONE\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_CERT_VALIDATION,\n  message: \"SSL_VERIFY_NONE disables TLS certificate verification (MITM risk).\",\n  remediation: \"Use SSL_VERIFY_PEER and verify certificates properly.\",\n};\n// --- Mbed TLS (embedded) ---\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-rsa-keygen\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS RSA key generation\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_rsa_gen_key\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Generates a classical RSA key pair (Mbed TLS, embedded), which is not quantum-safe.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-ec-keygen\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS EC key generation\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_ecp_gen_key / mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Generates a classical EC key pair (Mbed TLS, embedded). EC keys feed BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement; the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS ECDSA signature\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_ecdsa_sign / write_signature / read_signature / verify\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical ECDSA (Mbed TLS, embedded) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-ecdh\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS ECDH key agreement\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared / mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (Mbed TLS, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_DH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-dh\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS Diffie-Hellman key exchange\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_dhm_make_public / make_params / calc_secret\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (Mbed TLS, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\n// --- wolfSSL / wolfCrypt (embedded) ---\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-rsa\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL RSA key/usage\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_MakeRsaKey / wc_RsaPublicEncrypt / wc_RsaPrivateDecrypt\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical RSA key generation / encryption (wolfSSL, embedded) is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_ECC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-ecc-keygen\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL EC key generation\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_ecc_make_key / wc_ecc_make_key_ex\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Generates a classical EC key pair (wolfSSL, embedded). EC keys feed BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement; the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL ECDSA signature\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_ecc_sign_hash / wc_ecc_verify_hash\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical ECDSA (wolfSSL, embedded) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_ECDH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-ecdh\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL ECDH key agreement\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_ecc_shared_secret\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (wolfSSL, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_DH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-dh\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL Diffie-Hellman key exchange\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_DhGenerateKeyPair / wc_DhAgree\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (wolfSSL, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-curve25519\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL X25519 key agreement\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_curve25519_make_key / wc_curve25519_shared_secret\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X25519\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"X25519 key agreement (wolfSSL, embedded) is modern but classical, and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_ED25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-ed25519\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL Ed25519 signature\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_ed25519_make_key / wc_ed25519_sign_msg / wc_ed25519_verify_msg\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"low\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Ed25519 signatures (wolfSSL, embedded) are classical and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto in C/C++ (OpenSSL). */\nexport const cDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"c-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical asymmetric crypto in C/C++ (OpenSSL, libsodium, Mbed TLS, wolfSSL)\",\n  scope: \"source\",\n  language: \"c\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_C_RSA,\n    RULE_C_EC,\n    RULE_C_ECDSA,\n    RULE_C_ECDH,\n    RULE_C_DSA,\n    RULE_C_DH,\n    RULE_C_EVP_KEYGEN,\n    RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE,\n    RULE_C_EVP_CRYPT,\n    RULE_C_EVP_SIGN,\n    RULE_C_SODIUM_BOX,\n    RULE_C_SODIUM_SIGN,\n    RULE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY,\n    RULE_C_RSA_VERIFY,\n    RULE_C_RSA_CRYPT,\n    RULE_C_TLS_VERSION,\n    RULE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_EC,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_DH,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_RSA,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_ECC,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_ECDSA,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_ECDH,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_DH,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_ED25519,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, C_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    add(RE_C_RSA, RULE_C_RSA);\n    add(RE_C_EC, RULE_C_EC);\n    add(RE_C_ECDSA, RULE_C_ECDSA);\n    add(RE_C_ECDH, RULE_C_ECDH);\n    add(RE_C_DSA, RULE_C_DSA);\n    add(RE_C_DH, RULE_C_DH);\n    add(RE_C_EVP_KEYGEN, RULE_C_EVP_KEYGEN);\n    add(RE_C_EVP_DERIVE, RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE);\n    add(RE_C_EVP_CRYPT, RULE_C_EVP_CRYPT);\n    add(RE_C_EVP_SIGN, RULE_C_EVP_SIGN);\n    add(RE_C_SODIUM_BOX, RULE_C_SODIUM_BOX);\n    add(RE_C_SODIUM_SIGN, RULE_C_SODIUM_SIGN);\n    add(RE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY, RULE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY);\n    add(RE_C_RSA_VERIFY, RULE_C_RSA_VERIFY);\n    add(RE_C_RSA_CRYPT, RULE_C_RSA_CRYPT);\n    add(RE_C_TLS_VERSION, RULE_C_TLS_VERSION);\n    add(RE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE, RULE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_EC, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_EC);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_DH, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_DH);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_RSA, RULE_C_WOLF_RSA);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_ECC, RULE_C_WOLF_ECC);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_ECDSA, RULE_C_WOLF_ECDSA);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_ECDH, RULE_C_WOLF_ECDH);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_DH, RULE_C_WOLF_DH);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519, RULE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_ED25519, RULE_C_WOLF_ED25519);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}
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* Source-code detector for classical asymmetric cryptography in C / C++ using\n * OpenSSL (the dominant crypto library for the ecosystem), libsodium, and — for\n * the embedded / firmware / IoT niche — Mbed TLS (`mbedtls_*`) and wolfSSL /\n * wolfCrypt (`wc_*`). Lexical, same strategy as the other packs; every library's\n * function names are distinctive enough to keep the false-positive risk low.\n *\n * NOTE: scanning OpenSSL's OWN source/headers will naturally light up (the\n * library declares these symbols) — that is inherent to lexical scanning of a\n * crypto library, not a false positive in application code. Matches the classic\n * `*_generate_key` / `ECDSA_sign` / `ECDH_compute_key` call forms plus the\n * `EVP_RSA_gen` helper.\n *\n * HNDL: RSA encryption and (EC)DH key agreement are harvest-now-decrypt-later\n * exposed (hndl:true); ECDSA / DSA signatures are hndl:false but forgeable.\n * `EC_KEY_generate_key` is ambiguous (feeds ECDSA + ECDH), classified\n * conservatively as key-exchange-capable (hndl:true).\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { C_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_CERT_VALIDATION, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst RE_C_RSA = /\\bRSA_generate_key(?:_ex)?\\s*\\(|\\bEVP_RSA_gen\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_EC = /\\bEC_KEY_generate_key\\s*\\(|\\bEC_KEY_new_by_curve_name\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_ECDSA = /\\bECDSA_do_sign\\s*\\(|\\bECDSA_sign\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_ECDH = /\\bECDH_compute_key\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_DSA = /\\bDSA_generate_key\\s*\\(|\\bDSA_generate_parameters(?:_ex)?\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_DH = /\\bDH_generate_key\\s*\\(|\\bDH_generate_parameters(?:_ex)?\\s*\\(/g;\n// Modern OpenSSL 3.x EVP API (the legacy *_generate_key forms above are\n// deprecated) + libsodium — the biggest C false-negative surface (audit F1).\nconst RE_C_EVP_KEYGEN = /\\bEVP_PKEY_(?:Q_)?keygen\\s*\\(|\\bEVP_PKEY_paramgen\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_EVP_DERIVE = /\\bEVP_PKEY_derive\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_EVP_CRYPT = /\\bEVP_PKEY_(?:encrypt|decrypt)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_EVP_SIGN = /\\bEVP_DigestSign(?:Init)?\\s*\\(|\\bEVP_DigestVerify(?:Init)?\\s*\\(/g;\n// X25519: crypto_box / crypto_kx key pairs (incl. the fully-qualified\n// curve25519xsalsa20poly1305 form) plus the low-level crypto_scalarmult\n// primitive — all classical Curve25519 key agreement (audit recall gap).\nconst RE_C_SODIUM_BOX =\n  /\\bcrypto_box_(?:curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_)?(?:seed_)?keypair\\s*\\(|\\bcrypto_kx_keypair\\s*\\(|\\bcrypto_scalarmult_(?:curve25519|base)\\s*\\(/g;\n// EdDSA: crypto_sign key pairs, including the explicit _ed25519 forms and the\n// deterministic seed_keypair variants (audit recall gap: _ed25519_keypair).\nconst RE_C_SODIUM_SIGN = /\\bcrypto_sign_(?:ed25519_)?(?:seed_)?keypair\\s*\\(/g;\n// Legacy verify / decrypt counterparts to the *_sign / *_encrypt rules above\n// (audit F4-c): the classic OpenSSL RSA/ECDSA verification and RSA raw\n// decryption call forms that the modern EVP + legacy keygen rules don't cover.\nconst RE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY = /\\bECDSA_verify\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_RSA_VERIFY = /\\bRSA_verify\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_RSA_CRYPT = /\\bRSA_public_encrypt\\s*\\(|\\bRSA_private_decrypt\\s*\\(/g;\n// C/OpenSSL legacy TLS configuration (mirrors source.ts tlsDetector): forcing a\n// deprecated protocol version or disabling certificate verification.\n// TLSv1_method / TLSv1_1_method (+ the client/server-specific variants) and the\n// SSLv2/SSLv3 method constructors — all pin a deprecated protocol (RFC 8996).\nconst RE_C_TLS_VERSION = /\\b(?:TLSv1(?:_1)?|SSLv2|SSLv3)(?:_client|_server)?_method\\b/g;\nconst RE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE = /\\bSSL_VERIFY_NONE\\b/g;\n// Embedded C crypto libraries (the \"embedded\" niche): Mbed TLS and wolfSSL /\n// wolfCrypt. Both use highly-distinctive `mbedtls_*` / `wc_*` prefixes, so the\n// false-positive risk is low. These dominate firmware / IoT / RTOS builds where\n// OpenSSL is too heavy — a codebase surface qScan previously missed entirely.\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA = /\\bmbedtls_rsa_gen_key\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_EC = /\\bmbedtls_ecp_gen_key(?:pair)?\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA =\n  /\\bmbedtls_ecdsa_(?:sign|write_signature|read_signature|verify)\\w*\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH = /\\bmbedtls_ecdh_(?:compute_shared|calc_secret)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_MBEDTLS_DH = /\\bmbedtls_dhm_(?:make_public|make_params|calc_secret)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_RSA =\n  /\\bwc_MakeRsaKey\\s*\\(|\\bwc_RsaPublicEncrypt\\s*\\(|\\bwc_RsaPrivateDecrypt\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_ECC = /\\bwc_ecc_make_key(?:_ex)?\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_ECDSA = /\\bwc_ecc_sign_hash\\s*\\(|\\bwc_ecc_verify_hash\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_ECDH = /\\bwc_ecc_shared_secret\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_DH = /\\bwc_DhGenerateKeyPair\\s*\\(|\\bwc_DhAgree\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519 = /\\bwc_curve25519_(?:make_key|shared_secret)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_C_WOLF_ED25519 = /\\bwc_ed25519_(?:make_key|sign_msg|verify_msg)\\s*\\(/g;\n\nconst RULE_C_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-rsa-keygen\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL RSA key generation\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL RSA_generate_key(_ex) / EVP_RSA_gen\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Generates a classical RSA key pair (C/OpenSSL), which is not quantum-safe.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-ec-keygen\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EC key generation\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL EC_KEY_generate_key / EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Generates a classical EC key pair (C/OpenSSL). EC keys feed BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement; the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL ECDSA signature\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL ECDSA_sign / ECDSA_do_sign\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical ECDSA signing (C/OpenSSL) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_ECDH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-ecdh\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL ECDH key agreement\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL ECDH_compute_key\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (C/OpenSSL) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_DSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-dsa\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL DSA key/usage\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL DSA_generate_key / DSA_generate_parameters\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical DSA (C/OpenSSL) is deprecated and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Rotate off DSA and migrate to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_DH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-dh\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL Diffie-Hellman key exchange\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL DH_generate_key / DH_generate_parameters\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (C/OpenSSL) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EVP_KEYGEN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-evp-keygen\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EVP key generation\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL 3.x EVP_PKEY_keygen / EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen / paramgen\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Generates an asymmetric key via the OpenSSL 3.x EVP API (the key type — RSA/EC/DH/X25519 — is set on the CTX). Treated conservatively as key-exchange-capable (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-evp-derive\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EVP key agreement\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL 3.x EVP_PKEY_derive (ECDH / DH shared secret)\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Derives an (EC)DH shared secret via the OpenSSL EVP API — broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EVP_CRYPT: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-evp-pkey-crypt\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EVP public-key encryption\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL 3.x EVP_PKEY_encrypt / EVP_PKEY_decrypt (RSA)\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"RSA public-key encryption/decryption via the OpenSSL EVP API is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_EVP_SIGN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-evp-sign\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL EVP signing\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL 3.x EVP_DigestSign* / EVP_DigestVerify*\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical signature via the OpenSSL EVP API (RSA/ECDSA/EdDSA) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_SODIUM_BOX: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-libsodium-box\",\n  title: \"libsodium X25519 key pair\",\n  description:\n    \"libsodium crypto_box / crypto_kx keypair + crypto_scalarmult (X25519 key agreement)\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X25519\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"libsodium crypto_box uses X25519 key agreement — modern but classical, and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_SODIUM_SIGN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-libsodium-sign\",\n  title: \"libsodium Ed25519 key pair\",\n  description: \"libsodium crypto_sign(_ed25519)(_seed)_keypair (Ed25519 signatures)\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"low\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"libsodium crypto_sign uses Ed25519 signatures — classical and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-ecdsa-verify\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL ECDSA signature verification\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL ECDSA_verify\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical ECDSA verification (C/OpenSSL) trusts signatures forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_RSA_VERIFY: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-rsa-verify\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL RSA signature verification\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL RSA_verify\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical RSA signature verification (C/OpenSSL) trusts signatures forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_RSA_CRYPT: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-rsa-crypt\",\n  title: \"C/OpenSSL RSA public-key encryption\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL RSA_public_encrypt / RSA_private_decrypt\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Legacy RSA public-key encryption/decryption (C/OpenSSL) is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_TLS_VERSION: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-tls-legacy-version\",\n  title: \"Legacy TLS/SSL version pinned (C/OpenSSL)\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL TLSv1_method / SSLv3_method\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message: \"TLS 1.0 / SSLv3 are deprecated and insecure; require TLS 1.3.\",\n  remediation: \"Use TLS_method() with a minimum of TLS 1.3 and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-tls-verify-none\",\n  title: \"TLS certificate verification disabled (C/OpenSSL)\",\n  description: \"OpenSSL SSL_VERIFY_NONE\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_CERT_VALIDATION,\n  message: \"SSL_VERIFY_NONE disables TLS certificate verification (MITM risk).\",\n  remediation: \"Use SSL_VERIFY_PEER and verify certificates properly.\",\n};\n// --- Mbed TLS (embedded) ---\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-rsa-keygen\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS RSA key generation\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_rsa_gen_key\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Generates a classical RSA key pair (Mbed TLS, embedded), which is not quantum-safe.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-ec-keygen\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS EC key generation\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_ecp_gen_key / mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Generates a classical EC key pair (Mbed TLS, embedded). EC keys feed BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement; the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS ECDSA signature\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_ecdsa_sign / write_signature / read_signature / verify\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical ECDSA (Mbed TLS, embedded) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-ecdh\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS ECDH key agreement\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared / mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (Mbed TLS, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_MBEDTLS_DH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-mbedtls-dh\",\n  title: \"Mbed TLS Diffie-Hellman key exchange\",\n  description: \"Mbed TLS mbedtls_dhm_make_public / make_params / calc_secret\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (Mbed TLS, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\n// --- wolfSSL / wolfCrypt (embedded) ---\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-rsa\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL RSA key/usage\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_MakeRsaKey / wc_RsaPublicEncrypt / wc_RsaPrivateDecrypt\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical RSA key generation / encryption (wolfSSL, embedded) is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_ECC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-ecc-keygen\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL EC key generation\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_ecc_make_key / wc_ecc_make_key_ex\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Generates a classical EC key pair (wolfSSL, embedded). EC keys feed BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement; the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL ECDSA signature\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_ecc_sign_hash / wc_ecc_verify_hash\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Classical ECDSA (wolfSSL, embedded) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_ECDH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-ecdh\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL ECDH key agreement\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_ecc_shared_secret\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (wolfSSL, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_DH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-dh\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL Diffie-Hellman key exchange\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_DhGenerateKeyPair / wc_DhAgree\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (wolfSSL, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-curve25519\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL X25519 key agreement\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_curve25519_make_key / wc_curve25519_shared_secret\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X25519\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"X25519 key agreement (wolfSSL, embedded) is modern but classical, and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_C_WOLF_ED25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"c-wolfssl-ed25519\",\n  title: \"wolfSSL Ed25519 signature\",\n  description: \"wolfCrypt wc_ed25519_make_key / wc_ed25519_sign_msg / wc_ed25519_verify_msg\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"low\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Ed25519 signatures (wolfSSL, embedded) are classical and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto in C/C++ (OpenSSL). */\nexport const cDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"c-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical asymmetric crypto in C/C++ (OpenSSL, libsodium, Mbed TLS, wolfSSL)\",\n  scope: \"source\",\n  language: \"c\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_C_RSA,\n    RULE_C_EC,\n    RULE_C_ECDSA,\n    RULE_C_ECDH,\n    RULE_C_DSA,\n    RULE_C_DH,\n    RULE_C_EVP_KEYGEN,\n    RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE,\n    RULE_C_EVP_CRYPT,\n    RULE_C_EVP_SIGN,\n    RULE_C_SODIUM_BOX,\n    RULE_C_SODIUM_SIGN,\n    RULE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY,\n    RULE_C_RSA_VERIFY,\n    RULE_C_RSA_CRYPT,\n    RULE_C_TLS_VERSION,\n    RULE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_EC,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH,\n    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_DH,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_RSA,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_ECC,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_ECDSA,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_ECDH,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_DH,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519,\n    RULE_C_WOLF_ED25519,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, C_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    add(RE_C_RSA, RULE_C_RSA);\n    add(RE_C_EC, RULE_C_EC);\n    add(RE_C_ECDSA, RULE_C_ECDSA);\n    add(RE_C_ECDH, RULE_C_ECDH);\n    add(RE_C_DSA, RULE_C_DSA);\n    add(RE_C_DH, RULE_C_DH);\n    add(RE_C_EVP_KEYGEN, RULE_C_EVP_KEYGEN);\n    // `EVP_PKEY_derive` is OpenSSL's entry point for BOTH (EC)DH key agreement and the\n    // symmetric KDFs (HKDF/scrypt/TLS1-PRF). Real (EC)DH always sets a peer key via\n    // `EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer`; a KDF never does. So only treat it as classical key\n    // agreement when a peer is set, or when no KDF context marker is present.\n    const hasKdfCtx = /\\bEVP_PKEY_(?:HKDF|SCRYPT|TLS1_PRF)\\b/.test(content);\n    if (content.includes(\"EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer\") || !hasKdfCtx) {\n      add(RE_C_EVP_DERIVE, RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE);\n    }\n    add(RE_C_EVP_CRYPT, RULE_C_EVP_CRYPT);\n    // `EVP_DigestSign*` also drives HMAC/CMAC (a symmetric MAC keyed by\n    // `EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC/CMAC, …)`), which is NOT a classical\n    // asymmetric signature. Suppress a `DigestSign*` match ONLY when a MAC key setup\n    // sits just before it — per-match, so a real RSA/ECDSA sign elsewhere in the same\n    // file is still reported. `DigestVerify*` (no MAC form here) is never suppressed.\n    eachMatch(RE_C_EVP_SIGN, content, (m) => {\n      const isSign = m[0].includes(\"DigestSign\");\n      if (isSign) {\n        const back = content.slice(Math.max(0, m.index - 300), m.index);\n        if (/EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key|EVP_PKEY_(?:HMAC|CMAC)\\b/.test(back)) return;\n      }\n      findings.push(\n        findingFromRule(RULE_C_EVP_SIGN, {\n          file,\n          content,\n          index: m.index,\n          matchLength: m[0].length,\n        }),\n      );\n    });\n    add(RE_C_SODIUM_BOX, RULE_C_SODIUM_BOX);\n    add(RE_C_SODIUM_SIGN, RULE_C_SODIUM_SIGN);\n    add(RE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY, RULE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY);\n    add(RE_C_RSA_VERIFY, RULE_C_RSA_VERIFY);\n    add(RE_C_RSA_CRYPT, RULE_C_RSA_CRYPT);\n    add(RE_C_TLS_VERSION, RULE_C_TLS_VERSION);\n    add(RE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE, RULE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_EC, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_EC);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH);\n    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_DH, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_DH);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_RSA, RULE_C_WOLF_RSA);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_ECC, RULE_C_WOLF_ECC);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_ECDSA, RULE_C_WOLF_ECDSA);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_ECDH, RULE_C_WOLF_ECDH);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_DH, RULE_C_WOLF_DH);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519, RULE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519);\n    add(RE_C_WOLF_ED25519, RULE_C_WOLF_ED25519);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/cicd.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"cicd.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/cicd.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAmH/D,+EAA+E;AAC/E,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,QAkB1B,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"cicd.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/cicd.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AA4H/D,+EAA+E;AAC/E,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,QAsB1B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/cicd.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { eachMatch, findingFromRule } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, maskCommentLines } from "../detect-utils.js";
 import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
 /** True for the CI/CD pipeline definition files this detector inspects. */
 function isCiPipelineFile(filePath) {
@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ function isCiPipelineFile(filePath) {
 }
 const CI_RULES = [
     {
-        re: /\bcosign\s+(?:sign|attest|sign-blob|generate-key-pair)\b/g,
+        // `sign-blob` precedes `sign` so the longer subcommand wins — otherwise `sign`
+        // matches first and the trailing `\b` succeeds at the `-`, never reaching `sign-blob`.
+        re: /\bcosign\s+(?:sign-blob|sign|attest|generate-key-pair)\b/g,
         meta: {
             id: "ci-cosign-ecdsa",
             title: "cosign artifact signing (ECDSA)",
@@ -31,7 +33,11 @@ const CI_RULES = [
         },
     },
     {
-        re: /\bgpg\b[^\n]*?\s--(?:detach-sign|clearsign|sign)\b/g,
+        // Bound the span to the gpg invocation ([^\n&|;] stops it crossing `&&`/`|`/`;`
+        // into another command's flag), and `(?![\w-])` stops `--sign` matching the
+        // `--sign` prefix of an unrelated flag like `--sign-artifacts`. The short forms
+        // `-s` (sign) / `-b` (detach-sign) are safe inside the bounded gpg span.
+        re: /\bgpg\b[^\n&|;]{0,120}?\s(?:-[sb]\b|--(?:detach-sign|clearsign|sign)(?![\w-]))/g,
         meta: {
             id: "ci-gpg-sign",
             title: "GPG signing (RSA)",
@@ -63,7 +69,10 @@ const CI_RULES = [
         },
     },
     {
-        re: /\bcodesign\s+(?:-s\b|--sign\b)/g,
+        // Allow intervening flags (the common `codesign --force --options runtime --sign`
+        // form), bounded to the codesign invocation so it can't latch onto a later
+        // command's `--sign` across `&&`/`|`/`;`.
+        re: /\bcodesign\b[^\n&|;]{0,120}?\s(?:-s\b|--sign\b)/g,
         meta: {
             id: "ci-codesign",
             title: "Apple codesign (RSA)",
@@ -105,8 +114,12 @@ export const cicdDetector = {
     appliesTo: isCiPipelineFile,
     detect({ file, content }) {
         const findings = [];
+        // A commented-out CI step (`# - run: cosign sign …`, or a `//` line in a
+        // Jenkinsfile) is not an active signing step. Mask comment lines first; offsets
+        // are preserved so the snippet from the original `content` stays correct.
+        const scan = maskCommentLines(content, ["#", "//"]);
         for (const rule of CI_RULES) {
-            eachMatch(rule.re, content, (m) => {
+            eachMatch(rule.re, scan, (m) => {
                 findings.push(findingFromRule(rule.meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }));
             });
         }

package/dist/detectors/cicd.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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lower;\n  return (\n    (lower.includes(\".github/workflows/\") && (lower.endsWith(\".yml\") || lower.endsWith(\".yaml\"))) ||\n    base === \".gitlab-ci.yml\" ||\n    lower.endsWith(\".gitlab-ci.yml\") ||\n    base === \"jenkinsfile\" ||\n    lower.endsWith(\".jenkinsfile\") ||\n    base === \"azure-pipelines.yml\" ||\n    base === \"azure-pipelines.yaml\" ||\n    (lower.includes(\".circleci/\") && (lower.endsWith(\".yml\") || lower.endsWith(\".yaml\")))\n  );\n}\n\ninterface CiRule {\n  re: RegExp;\n  meta: RuleMeta;\n}\n\nconst CI_RULES: CiRule[] = [\n  {\n    re: /\\bcosign\\s+(?:sign|attest|sign-blob|generate-key-pair)\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-cosign-ecdsa\",\n      title: \"cosign artifact signing (ECDSA)\",\n      description: \"sigstore/cosign signing in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs artifacts with cosign (ECDSA P-256, key-based or keyless/Fulcio); classical signatures are forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation:\n        \"Track sigstore's post-quantum signing roadmap (ML-DSA); plan hybrid signing for long-lived release artifacts.\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\\bgpg\\b[^\\n]*?\\s--(?:detach-sign|clearsign|sign)\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-gpg-sign\",\n      title: \"GPG signing (RSA)\",\n      description: \"GnuPG detached/clear signing in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs with GPG, classically an RSA signing key; forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) signatures.\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\\bjarsigner\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-jarsigner\",\n      title: \"Java jarsigner (classical)\",\n      description: \"JDK jarsigner code signing in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs JARs with jarsigner (classical RSA/DSA/EC signing key); forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation:\n        \"Plan migration to a PQC signature scheme (ML-DSA-65 / SLH-DSA) as the JDK adds support.\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\\bcodesign\\s+(?:-s\\b|--sign\\b)/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-codesign\",\n      title: \"Apple codesign (RSA)\",\n      description: \"Apple codesign in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs with Apple codesign (classical RSA signing identity); forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation: \"Classical only today; track Apple's PQC signing support and plan migration.\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\\bminisign\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-minisign\",\n      title: \"minisign (Ed25519)\",\n      description: \"minisign signing in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"low\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs with minisign (Ed25519); modern but classical and forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\",\n    },\n  },\n];\n\n/** Detects classical artifact / code signing in CI/CD pipeline definitions. */\nexport const cicdDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"cicd-signing\",\n  description: \"Classical artifact / code signing in CI/CD pipelines\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: CI_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),\n  appliesTo: isCiPipelineFile,\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    for (const rule of CI_RULES) {\n      eachMatch(rule.re, content, (m) => {\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule.meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        );\n      });\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}
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the surface here is specifically the release pipeline.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, maskCommentLines } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\n/** True for the CI/CD pipeline definition files this detector inspects. */\nfunction isCiPipelineFile(filePath: string): boolean {\n  const lower = filePath.toLowerCase();\n  const base = lower.split(\"/\").pop() ?? lower;\n  return (\n    (lower.includes(\".github/workflows/\") && (lower.endsWith(\".yml\") || lower.endsWith(\".yaml\"))) ||\n    base === \".gitlab-ci.yml\" ||\n    lower.endsWith(\".gitlab-ci.yml\") ||\n    base === \"jenkinsfile\" ||\n    lower.endsWith(\".jenkinsfile\") ||\n    base === \"azure-pipelines.yml\" ||\n    base === \"azure-pipelines.yaml\" ||\n    (lower.includes(\".circleci/\") && (lower.endsWith(\".yml\") || lower.endsWith(\".yaml\")))\n  );\n}\n\ninterface CiRule {\n  re: RegExp;\n  meta: RuleMeta;\n}\n\nconst CI_RULES: CiRule[] = [\n  {\n    // `sign-blob` precedes `sign` so the longer subcommand wins — otherwise `sign`\n    // matches first and the trailing `\\b` succeeds at the `-`, never reaching `sign-blob`.\n    re: /\\bcosign\\s+(?:sign-blob|sign|attest|generate-key-pair)\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-cosign-ecdsa\",\n      title: \"cosign artifact signing (ECDSA)\",\n      description: \"sigstore/cosign signing in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs artifacts with cosign (ECDSA P-256, key-based or keyless/Fulcio); classical signatures are forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation:\n        \"Track sigstore's post-quantum signing roadmap (ML-DSA); plan hybrid signing for long-lived release artifacts.\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    // Bound the span to the gpg invocation ([^\\n&|;] stops it crossing `&&`/`|`/`;`\n    // into another command's flag), and `(?![\\w-])` stops `--sign` matching the\n    // `--sign` prefix of an unrelated flag like `--sign-artifacts`. The short forms\n    // `-s` (sign) / `-b` (detach-sign) are safe inside the bounded gpg span.\n    re: /\\bgpg\\b[^\\n&|;]{0,120}?\\s(?:-[sb]\\b|--(?:detach-sign|clearsign|sign)(?![\\w-]))/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-gpg-sign\",\n      title: \"GPG signing (RSA)\",\n      description: \"GnuPG detached/clear signing in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs with GPG, classically an RSA signing key; forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) signatures.\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\\bjarsigner\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-jarsigner\",\n      title: \"Java jarsigner (classical)\",\n      description: \"JDK jarsigner code signing in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs JARs with jarsigner (classical RSA/DSA/EC signing key); forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation:\n        \"Plan migration to a PQC signature scheme (ML-DSA-65 / SLH-DSA) as the JDK adds support.\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    // Allow intervening flags (the common `codesign --force --options runtime --sign`\n    // form), bounded to the codesign invocation so it can't latch onto a later\n    // command's `--sign` across `&&`/`|`/`;`.\n    re: /\\bcodesign\\b[^\\n&|;]{0,120}?\\s(?:-s\\b|--sign\\b)/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-codesign\",\n      title: \"Apple codesign (RSA)\",\n      description: \"Apple codesign in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs with Apple codesign (classical RSA signing identity); forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation: \"Classical only today; track Apple's PQC signing support and plan migration.\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\\bminisign\\b/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"ci-minisign\",\n      title: \"minisign (Ed25519)\",\n      description: \"minisign signing in a CI pipeline\",\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"low\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"CI pipeline signs with minisign (Ed25519); modern but classical and forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n      remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\",\n    },\n  },\n];\n\n/** Detects classical artifact / code signing in CI/CD pipeline definitions. */\nexport const cicdDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"cicd-signing\",\n  description: \"Classical artifact / code signing in CI/CD pipelines\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: CI_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),\n  appliesTo: isCiPipelineFile,\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    // A commented-out CI step (`# - run: cosign sign …`, or a `//` line in a\n    // Jenkinsfile) is not an active signing step. Mask comment lines first; offsets\n    // are preserved so the snippet from the original `content` stays correct.\n    const scan = maskCommentLines(content, [\"#\", \"//\"]);\n    for (const rule of CI_RULES) {\n      eachMatch(rule.re, scan, (m) => {\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule.meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        );\n      });\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/cloud-kms.d.ts

@@ -5,11 +5,14 @@
  * `GenerateDataKeyPair` select the key type with a `KeySpec` / `KeyPairSpec`
  * (legacy `CustomerMasterKeySpec`) field whose value is `RSA_*` or `ECC_*`.
  *
- * These PascalCase field names + `RSA_2048` / `ECC_NIST_P256` values are specific
- * to the AWS KMS API across every SDK language (JS/TS, Python/boto3, Java, Go,
- * the CLI, JSON policies), so a single lexical rule catches them all with a very
- * low false-positive rate. Terraform uses the snake_case `customer_master_key_spec`
- * instead, so this never double-counts with the IaC detector.
+ * These field names + `RSA_2048` / `ECC_NIST_P256` values are specific to the AWS
+ * KMS/ACM API across every SDK language (JS/TS, Python/boto3, Java, Go, the CLI, JSON
+ * policies), so a single lexical rule catches them at very low false-positive rate.
+ * Covered forms: the quoted-value SDK/JSON form (`KeySpec: "RSA_2048"`), the camelCase
+ * CDK/Pulumi prop form (`customerMasterKeySpec: "RSA_2048"`), and the AWS CDK ENUM
+ * form (`kms.KeySpec.RSA_2048`, `KeyAlgorithm.EC_prime256v1`). Terraform uses the
+ * snake_case `customer_master_key_spec`, so this never double-counts with the IaC
+ * detector.
  *
  * HNDL: an RSA KMS key (encryption/KEM) and an EC KMS key (which AWS KMS can use
  * for ECDH key agreement as well as ECDSA signing) are both harvest-now-decrypt-

package/dist/detectors/cloud-kms.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"cloud-kms.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/cloud-kms.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAoE/D,8EAA8E;AAC9E,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,QAmD9B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/cloud-kms.js

@@ -1,56 +1,98 @@
-import { eachMatch, findingFromRule } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { DOC_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskBlockComments, maskCommentLines, } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { isCloudTemplateFile } from "./cloudformation.js";
 import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
-// The AWS KMS key-spec fields (CreateKey / GenerateDataKeyPair / legacy CMK). The
-// optional `"?` after the field name accepts both the JS/HCL form (`KeySpec:`) and
-// the JSON form where the key is quoted (`"KeySpec":`).
-const SPEC_KEYS = "KeySpec|KeyPairSpec|CustomerMasterKeySpec";
-const RE_KMS_RSA = new RegExp(`\\b(?:${SPEC_KEYS})"?\\s*[:=]\\s*['"]RSA_\\d+['"]`, "g");
-const RE_KMS_EC = new RegExp(`\\b(?:${SPEC_KEYS})"?\\s*[:=]\\s*['"]ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+['"]`, "g");
+// The AWS KMS / ACM key-spec field names. Both PascalCase (SDK / boto3 / JSON) and
+// camelCase (AWS CDK / Pulumi props) leading letters are accepted. `KeyAlgorithm` is
+// the ACM certificate key spec.
+const SPEC_KEYS = "[Kk]eySpec|[Kk]eyPairSpec|[Cc]ustomerMasterKeySpec|[Kk]eyAlgorithm";
+// (a) The QUOTED-VALUE form: `KeySpec: "RSA_2048"` / `"KeySpec": "RSA_2048"` /
+//     `customerMasterKeySpec: "RSA_2048"` (SDK, boto3, JSON, Pulumi props).
+const RE_KMS_RSA = new RegExp(`\\b(?:${SPEC_KEYS})"?\\s*[:=]\\s*['"](?:RSA_\\d+)['"]`, "g");
+const RE_KMS_EC = new RegExp(`\\b(?:${SPEC_KEYS})"?\\s*[:=]\\s*['"](?:ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+|EC_[A-Za-z0-9]+)['"]`, "g");
+// (b) The ENUM-MEMBER form used by AWS CDK: `kms.KeySpec.RSA_2048`,
+//     `KeySpec.ECC_NIST_P256`, `KeyAlgorithm.RSA_2048`, `KeyAlgorithm.EC_prime256v1`
+//     — an enum reference, no quoted value, so (a) never matches it.
+const RE_KMS_RSA_ENUM = /\b(?:KeySpec|KeyAlgorithm)\.RSA_\d+\b/g;
+const RE_KMS_EC_ENUM = /\b(?:KeySpec|KeyAlgorithm)\.(?:ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+|EC_[A-Za-z0-9]+)\b/g;
+// (c) GCP Cloud KMS: the CryptoKeyVersion algorithm — `RSA_SIGN_PSS_2048_SHA256`,
+//     `RSA_DECRYPT_OAEP_*`, `EC_SIGN_P256_SHA256` (enum or quoted string). The
+//     `RSA_SIGN`/`RSA_DECRYPT`/`EC_SIGN` prefixes are GCP-KMS-specific.
+const RE_GCP_KMS_RSA = /\bRSA_(?:SIGN|DECRYPT)_[A-Z0-9_]+/g;
+const RE_GCP_KMS_EC = /\bEC_SIGN_[A-Z0-9_]+/g;
+// (d) Azure Key Vault SDK: `createRsaKey` / `createEcKey` (+ `Create*KeyOptions`) and
+//     `KeyType.Rsa` / `KeyType.Ec`.
+const RE_AZURE_KV_RSA = /\b[Cc]reateRsaKey(?:Options)?\b|\bKeyType\.Rsa\b/g;
+const RE_AZURE_KV_EC = /\b[Cc]reateEcKey(?:Options)?\b|\bKeyType\.Ec\b/g;
 const RULE_KMS_RSA = {
     id: "cloud-kms-rsa",
-    title: "AWS KMS RSA key",
-    description: "AWS KMS CreateKey / GenerateDataKeyPair with an RSA_* key spec",
+    title: "Cloud KMS RSA key",
+    description: "AWS/GCP/Azure KMS RSA key spec (KeySpec / RSA_SIGN_* / createRsaKey)",
     category: "kem",
     severity: "high",
     confidence: "high",
     algorithm: "RSA",
     hndl: true,
     cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
-    message: "Mints a classical RSA key via the AWS KMS SDK (harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed for encryption).",
+    message: "Mints a classical RSA key via a cloud KMS SDK (AWS/GCP/Azure); harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed for encryption.",
     remediation: "Plan migration to PQC as cloud KMS adds ML-KEM / ML-DSA key specs.",
 };
 const RULE_KMS_EC = {
     id: "cloud-kms-ec",
-    title: "AWS KMS EC key",
-    description: "AWS KMS CreateKey / GenerateDataKeyPair with an ECC_* key spec",
+    title: "Cloud KMS EC key",
+    description: "AWS/GCP/Azure KMS EC key spec (ECC_* / EC_SIGN_* / createEcKey)",
     category: "key-exchange",
     severity: "high",
     confidence: "high",
     algorithm: "ECDH",
     hndl: true,
     cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
-    message: "Mints a classical EC key via the AWS KMS SDK; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).",
+    message: "Mints a classical EC key via a cloud KMS SDK (AWS/GCP/Azure); EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).",
     remediation: "For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).",
 };
 /** Detects classical asymmetric keys provisioned via a cloud KMS SDK call. */
 export const cloudKmsDetector = {
     id: "cloud-kms",
-    description: "Classical asymmetric keys minted via a cloud KMS SDK (AWS KMS)",
+    description: "Classical asymmetric keys minted via a cloud KMS/ACM SDK, AWS CDK, or Pulumi",
     scope: "config",
     language: "any",
     rules: [RULE_KMS_RSA, RULE_KMS_EC],
-    appliesTo: () => true,
+    // Skip prose/docs: a README or tutorial showing `KeySpec: "RSA_2048"` to describe
+    // the KMS API is not a live key-minting call.
+    appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),
     detect({ file, content }) {
-        // Fast reject: only proceed if a KMS key-spec field name is present.
-        if (!content.includes("KeySpec") &&
-            !content.includes("KeyPairSpec") &&
-            !content.includes("CustomerMasterKeySpec")) {
+        // Fast reject: only proceed if an AWS / GCP / Azure KMS key-spec marker is present.
+        const lc = content.toLowerCase();
+        if (!lc.includes("keyspec") &&
+            !lc.includes("keypairspec") &&
+            !lc.includes("keyalgorithm") &&
+            !lc.includes("rsa_sign") &&
+            !lc.includes("rsa_decrypt") &&
+            !lc.includes("ec_sign") &&
+            !lc.includes("creatersakey") &&
+            !lc.includes("createeckey") &&
+            !lc.includes("keytype.")) {
             return [];
         }
+        // Inside a CloudFormation / ARM template FILE, the cloudformation detector owns
+        // the KMS key specs — defer so a KeySpec line is not counted twice. Gated to the
+        // template extensions it scans, so an SDK call in a `.ts` stays covered here.
+        if (isCloudTemplateFile(file, content))
+            return [];
+        // Mask comments before scanning so a commented-out `# KeySpec: "RSA_2048"` in a
+        // YAML/JSON/HCL config (which the central source-comment stripper doesn't cover)
+        // can't fire. Offsets are preserved, so the finding's snippet — built from the
+        // original `content` — stays exact.
+        const scan = maskCommentLines(maskBlockComments(content), ["#", "//"]);
         const findings = [];
-        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, content, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
+        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, scan, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
         add(RE_KMS_RSA, RULE_KMS_RSA);
         add(RE_KMS_EC, RULE_KMS_EC);
+        add(RE_KMS_RSA_ENUM, RULE_KMS_RSA);
+        add(RE_KMS_EC_ENUM, RULE_KMS_EC);
+        add(RE_GCP_KMS_RSA, RULE_KMS_RSA);
+        add(RE_GCP_KMS_EC, RULE_KMS_EC);
+        add(RE_AZURE_KV_RSA, RULE_KMS_RSA);
+        add(RE_AZURE_KV_EC, RULE_KMS_EC);
         return findings;
     },
 };

package/dist/detectors/cloud-kms.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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AWS KMS `CreateKey` /\n * `GenerateDataKeyPair` select the key type with a `KeySpec` / `KeyPairSpec`\n * (legacy `CustomerMasterKeySpec`) field whose value is `RSA_*` or `ECC_*`.\n *\n * These PascalCase field names + `RSA_2048` / `ECC_NIST_P256` values are specific\n * to the AWS KMS API across every SDK language (JS/TS, Python/boto3, Java, Go,\n * the CLI, JSON policies), so a single lexical rule catches them all with a very\n * low false-positive rate. Terraform uses the snake_case `customer_master_key_spec`\n * instead, so this never double-counts with the IaC detector.\n *\n * HNDL: an RSA KMS key (encryption/KEM) and an EC KMS key (which AWS KMS can use\n * for ECDH key agreement as well as ECDSA signing) are both harvest-now-decrypt-\n * later exposed → hndl:true.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\n// The AWS KMS key-spec fields (CreateKey / GenerateDataKeyPair / legacy CMK). The\n// optional `\"?` after the field name accepts both the JS/HCL form (`KeySpec:`) and\n// the JSON form where the key is quoted (`\"KeySpec\":`).\nconst SPEC_KEYS = \"KeySpec|KeyPairSpec|CustomerMasterKeySpec\";\nconst RE_KMS_RSA = new RegExp(`\\\\b(?:${SPEC_KEYS})\"?\\\\s*[:=]\\\\s*['\"]RSA_\\\\d+['\"]`, \"g\");\nconst RE_KMS_EC = new RegExp(`\\\\b(?:${SPEC_KEYS})\"?\\\\s*[:=]\\\\s*['\"]ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+['\"]`, \"g\");\n\nconst RULE_KMS_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cloud-kms-rsa\",\n  title: \"AWS KMS RSA key\",\n  description: \"AWS KMS CreateKey / GenerateDataKeyPair with an RSA_* key spec\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Mints a classical RSA key via the AWS KMS SDK (harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed for encryption).\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC as cloud KMS adds ML-KEM / ML-DSA key specs.\",\n};\nconst RULE_KMS_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cloud-kms-ec\",\n  title: \"AWS KMS EC key\",\n  description: \"AWS KMS CreateKey / GenerateDataKeyPair with an ECC_* key spec\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Mints a classical EC key via the AWS KMS SDK; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric keys provisioned via a cloud KMS SDK call. */\nexport const cloudKmsDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"cloud-kms\",\n  description: \"Classical asymmetric keys minted via a cloud KMS SDK (AWS KMS)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [RULE_KMS_RSA, RULE_KMS_EC],\n  appliesTo: () => true,\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    // Fast reject: only proceed if a KMS key-spec field name is present.\n    if (\n      !content.includes(\"KeySpec\") &&\n      !content.includes(\"KeyPairSpec\") &&\n      !content.includes(\"CustomerMasterKeySpec\")\n    ) {\n      return [];\n    }\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta): void =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    add(RE_KMS_RSA, RULE_KMS_RSA);\n    add(RE_KMS_EC, RULE_KMS_EC);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}
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AWS KMS `CreateKey` /\n * `GenerateDataKeyPair` select the key type with a `KeySpec` / `KeyPairSpec`\n * (legacy `CustomerMasterKeySpec`) field whose value is `RSA_*` or `ECC_*`.\n *\n * These field names + `RSA_2048` / `ECC_NIST_P256` values are specific to the AWS\n * KMS/ACM API across every SDK language (JS/TS, Python/boto3, Java, Go, the CLI, JSON\n * policies), so a single lexical rule catches them at very low false-positive rate.\n * Covered forms: the quoted-value SDK/JSON form (`KeySpec: \"RSA_2048\"`), the camelCase\n * CDK/Pulumi prop form (`customerMasterKeySpec: \"RSA_2048\"`), and the AWS CDK ENUM\n * form (`kms.KeySpec.RSA_2048`, `KeyAlgorithm.EC_prime256v1`). Terraform uses the\n * snake_case `customer_master_key_spec`, so this never double-counts with the IaC\n * detector.\n *\n * HNDL: an RSA KMS key (encryption/KEM) and an EC KMS key (which AWS KMS can use\n * for ECDH key agreement as well as ECDSA signing) are both harvest-now-decrypt-\n * later exposed → hndl:true.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport {\n  DOC_EXTENSIONS,\n  eachMatch,\n  findingFromRule,\n  hasExtension,\n  maskBlockComments,\n  maskCommentLines,\n} from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { isCloudTemplateFile } from \"./cloudformation.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\n// The AWS KMS / ACM key-spec field names. Both PascalCase (SDK / boto3 / JSON) and\n// camelCase (AWS CDK / Pulumi props) leading letters are accepted. `KeyAlgorithm` is\n// the ACM certificate key spec.\nconst SPEC_KEYS = \"[Kk]eySpec|[Kk]eyPairSpec|[Cc]ustomerMasterKeySpec|[Kk]eyAlgorithm\";\n// (a) The QUOTED-VALUE form: `KeySpec: \"RSA_2048\"` / `\"KeySpec\": \"RSA_2048\"` /\n//     `customerMasterKeySpec: \"RSA_2048\"` (SDK, boto3, JSON, Pulumi props).\nconst RE_KMS_RSA = new RegExp(`\\\\b(?:${SPEC_KEYS})\"?\\\\s*[:=]\\\\s*['\"](?:RSA_\\\\d+)['\"]`, \"g\");\nconst RE_KMS_EC = new RegExp(\n  `\\\\b(?:${SPEC_KEYS})\"?\\\\s*[:=]\\\\s*['\"](?:ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+|EC_[A-Za-z0-9]+)['\"]`,\n  \"g\",\n);\n// (b) The ENUM-MEMBER form used by AWS CDK: `kms.KeySpec.RSA_2048`,\n//     `KeySpec.ECC_NIST_P256`, `KeyAlgorithm.RSA_2048`, `KeyAlgorithm.EC_prime256v1`\n//     — an enum reference, no quoted value, so (a) never matches it.\nconst RE_KMS_RSA_ENUM = /\\b(?:KeySpec|KeyAlgorithm)\\.RSA_\\d+\\b/g;\nconst RE_KMS_EC_ENUM = /\\b(?:KeySpec|KeyAlgorithm)\\.(?:ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+|EC_[A-Za-z0-9]+)\\b/g;\n// (c) GCP Cloud KMS: the CryptoKeyVersion algorithm — `RSA_SIGN_PSS_2048_SHA256`,\n//     `RSA_DECRYPT_OAEP_*`, `EC_SIGN_P256_SHA256` (enum or quoted string). The\n//     `RSA_SIGN`/`RSA_DECRYPT`/`EC_SIGN` prefixes are GCP-KMS-specific.\nconst RE_GCP_KMS_RSA = /\\bRSA_(?:SIGN|DECRYPT)_[A-Z0-9_]+/g;\nconst RE_GCP_KMS_EC = /\\bEC_SIGN_[A-Z0-9_]+/g;\n// (d) Azure Key Vault SDK: `createRsaKey` / `createEcKey` (+ `Create*KeyOptions`) and\n//     `KeyType.Rsa` / `KeyType.Ec`.\nconst RE_AZURE_KV_RSA = /\\b[Cc]reateRsaKey(?:Options)?\\b|\\bKeyType\\.Rsa\\b/g;\nconst RE_AZURE_KV_EC = /\\b[Cc]reateEcKey(?:Options)?\\b|\\bKeyType\\.Ec\\b/g;\n\nconst RULE_KMS_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cloud-kms-rsa\",\n  title: \"Cloud KMS RSA key\",\n  description: \"AWS/GCP/Azure KMS RSA key spec (KeySpec / RSA_SIGN_* / createRsaKey)\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Mints a classical RSA key via a cloud KMS SDK (AWS/GCP/Azure); harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed for encryption.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC as cloud KMS adds ML-KEM / ML-DSA key specs.\",\n};\nconst RULE_KMS_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cloud-kms-ec\",\n  title: \"Cloud KMS EC key\",\n  description: \"AWS/GCP/Azure KMS EC key spec (ECC_* / EC_SIGN_* / createEcKey)\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Mints a classical EC key via a cloud KMS SDK (AWS/GCP/Azure); EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric keys provisioned via a cloud KMS SDK call. */\nexport const cloudKmsDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"cloud-kms\",\n  description: \"Classical asymmetric keys minted via a cloud KMS/ACM SDK, AWS CDK, or Pulumi\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [RULE_KMS_RSA, RULE_KMS_EC],\n  // Skip prose/docs: a README or tutorial showing `KeySpec: \"RSA_2048\"` to describe\n  // the KMS API is not a live key-minting call.\n  appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    // Fast reject: only proceed if an AWS / GCP / Azure KMS key-spec marker is present.\n    const lc = content.toLowerCase();\n    if (\n      !lc.includes(\"keyspec\") &&\n      !lc.includes(\"keypairspec\") &&\n      !lc.includes(\"keyalgorithm\") &&\n      !lc.includes(\"rsa_sign\") &&\n      !lc.includes(\"rsa_decrypt\") &&\n      !lc.includes(\"ec_sign\") &&\n      !lc.includes(\"creatersakey\") &&\n      !lc.includes(\"createeckey\") &&\n      !lc.includes(\"keytype.\")\n    ) {\n      return [];\n    }\n    // Inside a CloudFormation / ARM template FILE, the cloudformation detector owns\n    // the KMS key specs — defer so a KeySpec line is not counted twice. Gated to the\n    // template extensions it scans, so an SDK call in a `.ts` stays covered here.\n    if (isCloudTemplateFile(file, content)) return [];\n    // Mask comments before scanning so a commented-out `# KeySpec: \"RSA_2048\"` in a\n    // YAML/JSON/HCL config (which the central source-comment stripper doesn't cover)\n    // can't fire. Offsets are preserved, so the finding's snippet — built from the\n    // original `content` — stays exact.\n    const scan = maskCommentLines(maskBlockComments(content), [\"#\", \"//\"]);\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta): void =>\n      eachMatch(re, scan, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    add(RE_KMS_RSA, RULE_KMS_RSA);\n    add(RE_KMS_EC, RULE_KMS_EC);\n    add(RE_KMS_RSA_ENUM, RULE_KMS_RSA);\n    add(RE_KMS_EC_ENUM, RULE_KMS_EC);\n    add(RE_GCP_KMS_RSA, RULE_KMS_RSA);\n    add(RE_GCP_KMS_EC, RULE_KMS_EC);\n    add(RE_AZURE_KV_RSA, RULE_KMS_RSA);\n    add(RE_AZURE_KV_EC, RULE_KMS_EC);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/cloudformation.d.ts

@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@
  * these property names in an unrelated context.
  */
 import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/**
+ * True when a file is one THIS detector actually scans (a `.json`/`.yaml`/`.yml`
+ * template). The `cloud-kms` and `jwk` detectors defer to this detector ONLY on
+ * such files — deferring on any extension that merely contains a marker string
+ * (e.g. a `.ts` with an `AWS::KMS` comment) would drop a real finding, since this
+ * detector never runs there.
+ */
+export declare function isCloudTemplateFile(file: string, content: string): boolean;
 /**
  * Detects classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in
  * AWS CloudFormation / Azure ARM (incl. Bicep-compiled JSON) templates.

package/dist/detectors/cloudformation.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"cloudformation.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/cloudformation.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAsJ/D;;;GAGG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAqCpC,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"cloudformation.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/cloudformation.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AA0B/D;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAE1E;AA6ID;;;GAGG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,EAAE,QA8CpC,CAAC"}