@quantakrypto/core 0.4.4 → 0.5.0

package/dist/detectors/jwk.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-import { eachMatch, findingFromRule } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { DOC_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, enclosingObject, findingFromRule, hasExtension, } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { isCloudTemplateFile } from "./cloudformation.js";
 import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
 const JWK_RULES = [
     {
@@ -66,6 +67,19 @@ const JWK_RULES = [
         },
     },
 ];
+/**
+ * True when THIS key's own object marks it as a signing key via `use`/`alg`. The
+ * caller passes the enclosing `{…}` object so a neighbouring key in a JWKS array
+ * can't contaminate the result, and an explicit `"use":"enc"` on the key always
+ * wins (never classify an encryption key as a signature).
+ */
+function isSigningUse(objectText, sigAlg) {
+    if (/"use"\s*:\s*"enc"/.test(objectText))
+        return false;
+    return /"use"\s*:\s*"sig"/.test(objectText) || sigAlg.test(objectText);
+}
+const RSA_SIG_ALG = /"alg"\s*:\s*"(?:RS|PS)(?:256|384|512)"/;
+const EC_SIG_ALG = /"alg"\s*:\s*"ES(?:256K?|384|512)"/;
 /** Detects classical JSON Web Key (JWK/JWKS) material in any JSON/text file. */
 export const jwkDetector = {
     id: "jwk-material",
@@ -73,20 +87,42 @@ export const jwkDetector = {
     scope: "config",
     language: "any",
     rules: JWK_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),
-    appliesTo: () => true,
+    appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),
     detect({ file, content }) {
         // Fast reject: a JWK always has one of these two members.
         if (!content.includes('"kty"') && !content.includes('"crv"'))
             return [];
+        // The ONLY overlap with the cloudformation detector is the ARM Key Vault key
+        // `kty:"RSA"` (cfn-arm-keyvault-rsa), which only fires when Microsoft.KeyVault is
+        // present. Defer just the RSA rule in that case — everything else (crv keys, and
+        // JWKs embedded in AWS CloudFormation, which cfn does not own) is still reported.
+        const isArm = isCloudTemplateFile(file, content) && content.includes("Microsoft.KeyVault");
         const findings = [];
         for (const rule of JWK_RULES) {
             eachMatch(rule.re, content, (m) => {
-                findings.push(findingFromRule(rule.meta, {
-                    file,
-                    content,
-                    index: m.index,
-                    matchLength: m[0].length,
-                }));
+                if (rule.meta.id === "jwk-rsa" && isArm)
+                    return; // cfn-arm-keyvault-rsa owns it
+                const at = { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length };
+                // Analyse the key's OWN enclosing object so a neighbouring key in a JWKS
+                // array can't flip this key's sig/enc classification.
+                const obj = enclosingObject(content, m.index);
+                let overrides;
+                if (rule.meta.id === "jwk-rsa" && isSigningUse(obj, RSA_SIG_ALG)) {
+                    overrides = {
+                        category: "signature",
+                        hndl: false,
+                        message: "RSA JSON Web Key (JWK) used for signing (RS*/PS*); forgeable by a quantum attacker.",
+                    };
+                }
+                else if (rule.meta.id === "jwk-ec" && isSigningUse(obj, EC_SIG_ALG)) {
+                    overrides = {
+                        category: "signature",
+                        algorithm: "ECDSA",
+                        hndl: false,
+                        message: "Elliptic-curve JSON Web Key (JWK) used for ECDSA signing; forgeable by a quantum attacker.",
+                    };
+                }
+                findings.push(findingFromRule(rule.meta, at, overrides));
             });
         }
         return findings;

package/dist/detectors/jwk.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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JWKs appear in `.json` / `.jwks` files, OIDC discovery documents, and\n * config — a real key-material surface the source packs (which look at *code*)\n * and the PEM detector (which looks at PEM markers) both miss.\n *\n * Detection keys off the JWK's distinctive JSON fields:\n *  - `\"kty\":\"RSA\"`                          → classical RSA key.\n *  - `\"crv\":\"P-256\"|\"P-384\"|\"P-521\"|…`      → classical EC key (ECDSA + ECDH).\n *  - `\"crv\":\"Ed25519\"|\"Ed448\"`              → EdDSA signing key.\n *  - `\"crv\":\"X25519\"|\"X448\"`                → classical Montgomery-curve key agreement.\n *\n * Keying EC/OKP off `crv` (present in every EC/OKP JWK) rather than `kty` avoids\n * double-counting a single key, and `\"kty\"`/`\"crv\"` are specific enough to RFC\n * 7517 that the false-positive risk on ordinary JSON is low.\n *\n * HNDL: RSA and (EC)DH / X25519 / X448 key agreement are harvest-now-decrypt-later\n * exposed (hndl:true); EdDSA signing keys are hndl:false but forgeable. A JWKS is\n * usually PUBLIC keys, so severity is medium — the exposure is a classical key\n * pair, not necessarily an embedded secret.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\ninterface JwkRule {\n  re: RegExp;\n  meta: RuleMeta;\n}\n\nconst JWK_RULES: JwkRule[] = [\n  {\n    re: /\"kty\"\\s*:\\s*\"RSA\"/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"jwk-rsa\",\n      title: \"RSA JSON Web Key (JWK)\",\n      description: 'JWK with \"kty\":\"RSA\" (RFC 7518)',\n      category: \"certificate\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: true,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message: \"RSA JSON Web Key (JWK); classical RSA, not quantum-safe.\",\n      remediation: \"Re-issue with PQC keys (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\"crv\"\\s*:\\s*\"(?:P-256K?|P-384|P-521|secp256k1)\"/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"jwk-ec\",\n      title: \"EC JSON Web Key (JWK)\",\n      description: 'JWK with an \"crv\" naming a NIST/secp curve (RFC 7518)',\n      category: \"key-exchange\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n      hndl: true,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"Elliptic-curve JSON Web Key (JWK); a classical EC key feeds BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement — the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n      remediation:\n        \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\"crv\"\\s*:\\s*\"Ed(?:25519|448)\"/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"jwk-eddsa\",\n      title: \"EdDSA JSON Web Key (JWK)\",\n      description: 'JWK OKP key with \"crv\":\"Ed25519\"/\"Ed448\" (RFC 8037)',\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"low\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448) JSON Web Key (JWK); classical and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n      remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\"crv\"\\s*:\\s*\"X(?:25519|448)\"/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"jwk-xdh\",\n      title: \"X25519/X448 JSON Web Key (JWK)\",\n      description: 'JWK OKP key with \"crv\":\"X25519\"/\"X448\" (RFC 8037)',\n      category: \"key-exchange\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"X25519\",\n      hndl: true,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"X25519/X448 JSON Web Key (JWK); modern but classical key agreement, and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n      remediation: \"Migrate key agreement to hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768).\",\n    },\n  },\n];\n\n/** Detects classical JSON Web Key (JWK/JWKS) material in any JSON/text file. */\nexport const jwkDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"jwk-material\",\n  description: \"Classical key material in JSON Web Keys (JWK / JWKS)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: JWK_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),\n  appliesTo: () => true,\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    // Fast reject: a JWK always has one of these two members.\n    if (!content.includes('\"kty\"') && !content.includes('\"crv\"')) return [];\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    for (const rule of JWK_RULES) {\n      eachMatch(rule.re, content, (m) => {\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule.meta, {\n            file,\n            content,\n            index: m.index,\n            matchLength: m[0].length,\n          }),\n        );\n      });\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}
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JWKs appear in `.json` / `.jwks` files, OIDC discovery documents, and\n * config — a real key-material surface the source packs (which look at *code*)\n * and the PEM detector (which looks at PEM markers) both miss.\n *\n * Detection keys off the JWK's distinctive JSON fields:\n *  - `\"kty\":\"RSA\"`                          → classical RSA key.\n *  - `\"crv\":\"P-256\"|\"P-384\"|\"P-521\"|…`      → classical EC key (ECDSA + ECDH).\n *  - `\"crv\":\"Ed25519\"|\"Ed448\"`              → EdDSA signing key.\n *  - `\"crv\":\"X25519\"|\"X448\"`                → classical Montgomery-curve key agreement.\n *\n * Usage-aware classification: when a key's surrounding `\"use\"` / `\"alg\"` marks it\n * as a SIGNING key (`use:\"sig\"`, or an `RS`/`PS`/`ES` signature alg), the finding\n * is a `signature` (`hndl:false`) — a signing key is forgeable at a CRQC but not\n * harvest-now exposed. An encryption/unspecified key stays `hndl:true`.\n *\n * Deferrals to avoid double-counting: skipped on doc extensions (a README JWK\n * example is not live) and inside CloudFormation/ARM templates, where the\n * cloudformation detector owns the `kty` of a `Microsoft.KeyVault` key resource.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport {\n  DOC_EXTENSIONS,\n  eachMatch,\n  enclosingObject,\n  findingFromRule,\n  hasExtension,\n} from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { isCloudTemplateFile } from \"./cloudformation.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\ninterface JwkRule {\n  re: RegExp;\n  meta: RuleMeta;\n}\n\nconst JWK_RULES: JwkRule[] = [\n  {\n    re: /\"kty\"\\s*:\\s*\"RSA\"/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"jwk-rsa\",\n      title: \"RSA JSON Web Key (JWK)\",\n      description: 'JWK with \"kty\":\"RSA\" (RFC 7518)',\n      category: \"certificate\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"RSA\",\n      hndl: true,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message: \"RSA JSON Web Key (JWK); classical RSA, not quantum-safe.\",\n      remediation: \"Re-issue with PQC keys (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\"crv\"\\s*:\\s*\"(?:P-256K?|P-384|P-521|secp256k1)\"/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"jwk-ec\",\n      title: \"EC JSON Web Key (JWK)\",\n      description: 'JWK with an \"crv\" naming a NIST/secp curve (RFC 7518)',\n      category: \"key-exchange\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n      hndl: true,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"Elliptic-curve JSON Web Key (JWK); a classical EC key feeds BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement — the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n      remediation:\n        \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\"crv\"\\s*:\\s*\"Ed(?:25519|448)\"/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"jwk-eddsa\",\n      title: \"EdDSA JSON Web Key (JWK)\",\n      description: 'JWK OKP key with \"crv\":\"Ed25519\"/\"Ed448\" (RFC 8037)',\n      category: \"signature\",\n      severity: \"low\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n      hndl: false,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448) JSON Web Key (JWK); classical and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n      remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\",\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    re: /\"crv\"\\s*:\\s*\"X(?:25519|448)\"/g,\n    meta: {\n      id: \"jwk-xdh\",\n      title: \"X25519/X448 JSON Web Key (JWK)\",\n      description: 'JWK OKP key with \"crv\":\"X25519\"/\"X448\" (RFC 8037)',\n      category: \"key-exchange\",\n      severity: \"medium\",\n      confidence: \"high\",\n      algorithm: \"X25519\",\n      hndl: true,\n      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n      message:\n        \"X25519/X448 JSON Web Key (JWK); modern but classical key agreement, and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n      remediation: \"Migrate key agreement to hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768).\",\n    },\n  },\n];\n\n/**\n * True when THIS key's own object marks it as a signing key via `use`/`alg`. The\n * caller passes the enclosing `{…}` object so a neighbouring key in a JWKS array\n * can't contaminate the result, and an explicit `\"use\":\"enc\"` on the key always\n * wins (never classify an encryption key as a signature).\n */\nfunction isSigningUse(objectText: string, sigAlg: RegExp): boolean {\n  if (/\"use\"\\s*:\\s*\"enc\"/.test(objectText)) return false;\n  return /\"use\"\\s*:\\s*\"sig\"/.test(objectText) || sigAlg.test(objectText);\n}\n\nconst RSA_SIG_ALG = /\"alg\"\\s*:\\s*\"(?:RS|PS)(?:256|384|512)\"/;\nconst EC_SIG_ALG = /\"alg\"\\s*:\\s*\"ES(?:256K?|384|512)\"/;\n\n/** Detects classical JSON Web Key (JWK/JWKS) material in any JSON/text file. */\nexport const jwkDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"jwk-material\",\n  description: \"Classical key material in JSON Web Keys (JWK / JWKS)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: JWK_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),\n  appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    // Fast reject: a JWK always has one of these two members.\n    if (!content.includes('\"kty\"') && !content.includes('\"crv\"')) return [];\n    // The ONLY overlap with the cloudformation detector is the ARM Key Vault key\n    // `kty:\"RSA\"` (cfn-arm-keyvault-rsa), which only fires when Microsoft.KeyVault is\n    // present. Defer just the RSA rule in that case — everything else (crv keys, and\n    // JWKs embedded in AWS CloudFormation, which cfn does not own) is still reported.\n    const isArm = isCloudTemplateFile(file, content) && content.includes(\"Microsoft.KeyVault\");\n\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    for (const rule of JWK_RULES) {\n      eachMatch(rule.re, content, (m) => {\n        if (rule.meta.id === \"jwk-rsa\" && isArm) return; // cfn-arm-keyvault-rsa owns it\n        const at = { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length };\n        // Analyse the key's OWN enclosing object so a neighbouring key in a JWKS\n        // array can't flip this key's sig/enc classification.\n        const obj = enclosingObject(content, m.index);\n        let overrides;\n        if (rule.meta.id === \"jwk-rsa\" && isSigningUse(obj, RSA_SIG_ALG)) {\n          overrides = {\n            category: \"signature\" as const,\n            hndl: false,\n            message:\n              \"RSA JSON Web Key (JWK) used for signing (RS*/PS*); forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n          };\n        } else if (rule.meta.id === \"jwk-ec\" && isSigningUse(obj, EC_SIG_ALG)) {\n          overrides = {\n            category: \"signature\" as const,\n            algorithm: \"ECDSA\" as const,\n            hndl: false,\n            message:\n              \"Elliptic-curve JSON Web Key (JWK) used for ECDSA signing; forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n          };\n        }\n        findings.push(findingFromRule(rule.meta, at, overrides));\n      });\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/k8s.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"k8s.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/k8s.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAoE/D,mFAAmF;AACnF,eAAO,MAAM,WAAW,EAAE,QA6BzB,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"k8s.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/k8s.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAoE/D,mFAAmF;AACnF,eAAO,MAAM,WAAW,EAAE,QAgCzB,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/k8s.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskCommentLines } from "../detect-utils.js";
 import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE } from "../cwe.js";
 const K8S_EXTENSIONS = [".yaml", ".yml", ".json"];
 const RE_CM_RSA = /(?:algorithm|keyAlgorithm):\s*["']?RSA\b/g;
@@ -70,8 +70,11 @@ export const k8sDetector = {
         const isIstio = content.includes("minProtocolVersion");
         if (!isCertManager && !isIstio)
             return [];
+        // A `# algorithm: RSA` YAML comment is not an active setting; match over
+        // comment-masked content (offsets preserved).
+        const scan = maskCommentLines(content, ["#"]);
         const findings = [];
-        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, content, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
+        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, scan, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
         if (isCertManager) {
             add(RE_CM_RSA, RULE_CM_RSA);
             add(RE_CM_ECDSA, RULE_CM_ECDSA);

package/dist/detectors/k8s.js.map

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These mint the certificates\n * and secure the pod-to-pod traffic of a cluster, a surface neither the language\n * packs nor the Terraform detector see.\n *\n * Covered (gated by a cert-manager / Istio marker in the document to keep the\n * generic `algorithm:` / `minProtocolVersion:` keys from firing on unrelated YAML):\n *  - cert-manager `Certificate`/`Issuer` `privateKey.algorithm` (or legacy\n *    `keyAlgorithm`): `RSA` | `ECDSA` | `Ed25519`.\n *  - Istio `minProtocolVersion: TLSV1_0 | TLSV1_1` — a legacy TLS floor on mesh\n *    traffic, whose (EC)DHE key exchange is classical and harvestable.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst K8S_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".yaml\", \".yml\", \".json\"];\n\nconst RE_CM_RSA = /(?:algorithm|keyAlgorithm):\\s*[\"']?RSA\\b/g;\nconst RE_CM_ECDSA = /(?:algorithm|keyAlgorithm):\\s*[\"']?ECDSA\\b/g;\nconst RE_CM_ED25519 = /(?:algorithm|keyAlgorithm):\\s*[\"']?Ed25519\\b/g;\nconst RE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS = /minProtocolVersion:\\s*[\"']?TLSV1_[01]\\b/g;\n\nconst RULE_CM_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"k8s-certmanager-rsa\",\n  title: \"cert-manager RSA key\",\n  description: \"cert-manager Certificate/Issuer privateKey.algorithm = RSA\",\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"cert-manager mints certificates with a classical RSA key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Plan migration to PQC certificate keys (ML-DSA-65) as the CA/issuer chain adds support.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CM_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"k8s-certmanager-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"cert-manager ECDSA key\",\n  description: \"cert-manager Certificate/Issuer privateKey.algorithm = ECDSA\",\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"cert-manager mints certificates with a classical ECDSA key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) certificate keys.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CM_ED25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"k8s-certmanager-ed25519\",\n  title: \"cert-manager Ed25519 key\",\n  description: \"cert-manager Certificate/Issuer privateKey.algorithm = Ed25519\",\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"low\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"cert-manager mints certificates with a classical Ed25519 key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) certificate keys.\",\n};\nconst RULE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"k8s-istio-legacy-tls\",\n  title: \"Istio legacy TLS floor\",\n  description: \"Istio minProtocolVersion allows TLS 1.0 / 1.1 on mesh traffic\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE,\n  message:\n    \"Istio mesh TLS floor allows TLS 1.0/1.1; its classical (EC)DHE key exchange is weak and harvestable.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Raise minProtocolVersion to TLSV1_3 and track PQC-hybrid mesh KEX (X25519MLKEM768).\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical cert-manager keys and legacy Istio TLS floors in K8s YAML. */\nexport const k8sDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"k8s-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical crypto in Kubernetes manifests (cert-manager keys, Istio TLS floors)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [RULE_CM_RSA, RULE_CM_ECDSA, RULE_CM_ED25519, RULE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, K8S_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const isCertManager =\n      content.includes(\"cert-manager.io\") ||\n      /kind:\\s*[\"']?(?:Certificate|Issuer|ClusterIssuer)\\b/.test(content);\n    const isIstio = content.includes(\"minProtocolVersion\");\n    if (!isCertManager && !isIstio) return [];\n\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    if (isCertManager) {\n      add(RE_CM_RSA, RULE_CM_RSA);\n      add(RE_CM_ECDSA, RULE_CM_ECDSA);\n      add(RE_CM_ED25519, RULE_CM_ED25519);\n    }\n    if (isIstio) add(RE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS, RULE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}
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These mint the certificates\n * and secure the pod-to-pod traffic of a cluster, a surface neither the language\n * packs nor the Terraform detector see.\n *\n * Covered (gated by a cert-manager / Istio marker in the document to keep the\n * generic `algorithm:` / `minProtocolVersion:` keys from firing on unrelated YAML):\n *  - cert-manager `Certificate`/`Issuer` `privateKey.algorithm` (or legacy\n *    `keyAlgorithm`): `RSA` | `ECDSA` | `Ed25519`.\n *  - Istio `minProtocolVersion: TLSV1_0 | TLSV1_1` — a legacy TLS floor on mesh\n *    traffic, whose (EC)DHE key exchange is classical and harvestable.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskCommentLines } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst K8S_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".yaml\", \".yml\", \".json\"];\n\nconst RE_CM_RSA = /(?:algorithm|keyAlgorithm):\\s*[\"']?RSA\\b/g;\nconst RE_CM_ECDSA = /(?:algorithm|keyAlgorithm):\\s*[\"']?ECDSA\\b/g;\nconst RE_CM_ED25519 = /(?:algorithm|keyAlgorithm):\\s*[\"']?Ed25519\\b/g;\nconst RE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS = /minProtocolVersion:\\s*[\"']?TLSV1_[01]\\b/g;\n\nconst RULE_CM_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"k8s-certmanager-rsa\",\n  title: \"cert-manager RSA key\",\n  description: \"cert-manager Certificate/Issuer privateKey.algorithm = RSA\",\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"cert-manager mints certificates with a classical RSA key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Plan migration to PQC certificate keys (ML-DSA-65) as the CA/issuer chain adds support.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CM_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"k8s-certmanager-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"cert-manager ECDSA key\",\n  description: \"cert-manager Certificate/Issuer privateKey.algorithm = ECDSA\",\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"cert-manager mints certificates with a classical ECDSA key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) certificate keys.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CM_ED25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"k8s-certmanager-ed25519\",\n  title: \"cert-manager Ed25519 key\",\n  description: \"cert-manager Certificate/Issuer privateKey.algorithm = Ed25519\",\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"low\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"cert-manager mints certificates with a classical Ed25519 key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) certificate keys.\",\n};\nconst RULE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"k8s-istio-legacy-tls\",\n  title: \"Istio legacy TLS floor\",\n  description: \"Istio minProtocolVersion allows TLS 1.0 / 1.1 on mesh traffic\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE,\n  message:\n    \"Istio mesh TLS floor allows TLS 1.0/1.1; its classical (EC)DHE key exchange is weak and harvestable.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Raise minProtocolVersion to TLSV1_3 and track PQC-hybrid mesh KEX (X25519MLKEM768).\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical cert-manager keys and legacy Istio TLS floors in K8s YAML. */\nexport const k8sDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"k8s-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical crypto in Kubernetes manifests (cert-manager keys, Istio TLS floors)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [RULE_CM_RSA, RULE_CM_ECDSA, RULE_CM_ED25519, RULE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, K8S_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const isCertManager =\n      content.includes(\"cert-manager.io\") ||\n      /kind:\\s*[\"']?(?:Certificate|Issuer|ClusterIssuer)\\b/.test(content);\n    const isIstio = content.includes(\"minProtocolVersion\");\n    if (!isCertManager && !isIstio) return [];\n\n    // A `# algorithm: RSA` YAML comment is not an active setting; match over\n    // comment-masked content (offsets preserved).\n    const scan = maskCommentLines(content, [\"#\"]);\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, scan, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    if (isCertManager) {\n      add(RE_CM_RSA, RULE_CM_RSA);\n      add(RE_CM_ECDSA, RULE_CM_ECDSA);\n      add(RE_CM_ED25519, RULE_CM_ED25519);\n    }\n    if (isIstio) add(RE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS, RULE_ISTIO_LEGACY_TLS);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/keystore.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/**
+ * Config detector: classical cryptographic KEYSTORES committed to a repository —
+ * Java KeyStore (JKS), JCEKS, PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx), and BouncyCastle (.bks). These
+ * binary containers hold private keys and certificate chains, essentially always
+ * classical (RSA / EC / DSA). A keystore in version control is committed key
+ * material: harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed and retroactively un-fixable.
+ *
+ * The scan pipeline reads these extensions byte-preserving (latin1; see
+ * {@link ../walk.ts isKeystorePath} and scan.ts), so `content.charCodeAt(i)` is the
+ * i-th file byte and we can identify the container by its magic number. We do NOT
+ * parse the enclosed key algorithm (that needs full ASN.1 / proprietary parsing);
+ * flagging the presence of a classical keystore is the actionable signal.
+ *
+ * The match is sensitive key material, so reporters drop the (binary) snippet.
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/** Detects committed classical keystores by magic number / extension. */
+export declare const keystoreDetector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=keystore.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/keystore.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"keystore.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/keystore.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AA4D/D,yEAAyE;AACzE,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,QAgC9B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/keystore.js

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import { findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_HARDCODED_KEY } from "../cwe.js";
+const KEYSTORE_EXTENSIONS = [
+    ".jks",
+    ".keystore",
+    ".jceks",
+    ".bks",
+    ".p12",
+    ".pfx",
+];
+function baseRule(id, title, message) {
+    return {
+        id,
+        title,
+        description: message,
+        category: "certificate",
+        severity: "high",
+        confidence: "high",
+        hndl: true,
+        cwe: CWE_HARDCODED_KEY,
+        sensitive: true,
+        message,
+        remediation: "Remove key material from version control and rotate it; store keys in a secret manager / HSM. Plan re-issuance with PQC keys (ML-DSA-65 / ML-KEM-768) as tooling supports it.",
+    };
+}
+const RULE_JKS = baseRule("keystore-jks", "Java KeyStore (JKS)", "A Java KeyStore (JKS) holds classical private keys / certificates (RSA/EC/DSA); a keystore in version control is committed, harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed key material.");
+const RULE_JCEKS = baseRule("keystore-jceks", "Java JCEKS keystore", "A JCEKS keystore holds classical key material (RSA/EC/DSA); committed to version control it is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.");
+const RULE_PKCS12 = baseRule("keystore-pkcs12", "PKCS#12 keystore", "A PKCS#12 container (a `.p12`/`.pfx`, or a modern `.jks`/`.keystore` — keytool writes PKCS#12 by default since Java 9) holds classical private keys / certificate chains (RSA/EC); committed to version control it is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.");
+const RULE_BKS = baseRule("keystore-bks", "BouncyCastle keystore (.bks)", "A BouncyCastle (.bks) keystore holds classical key material; committed to version control it is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.");
+/** Bytes-equal check against `content` read as latin1 (charCodeAt == file byte). */
+function magic(content, ...bytes) {
+    if (content.length < bytes.length)
+        return false;
+    for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {
+        if (content.charCodeAt(i) !== bytes[i])
+            return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+/** Detects committed classical keystores by magic number / extension. */
+export const keystoreDetector = {
+    id: "keystore-material",
+    description: "Committed classical cryptographic keystores (JKS, JCEKS, PKCS#12, BKS)",
+    scope: "config",
+    language: "any",
+    rules: [RULE_JKS, RULE_JCEKS, RULE_PKCS12, RULE_BKS],
+    appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, KEYSTORE_EXTENSIONS),
+    detect({ file, content }) {
+        const at = { file, content, index: 0, matchLength: 4 };
+        // JKS: 0xFEEDFEED. JCEKS: 0xCECECECE.
+        if (magic(content, 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfe, 0xed))
+            return [findingFromRule(RULE_JKS, at)];
+        if (magic(content, 0xce, 0xce, 0xce, 0xce))
+            return [findingFromRule(RULE_JCEKS, at)];
+        // PKCS#12 is a DER SEQUENCE. Since Java 9, `keytool` writes PKCS#12 BY DEFAULT
+        // even for files named `.jks`/`.keystore` (and Android release keystores are
+        // PKCS#12), so this runs for ANY keystore extension once the JKS/JCEKS magics
+        // fail. Accept the long-form length octets 0x81/0x82/0x83 (real PKCS#12 is
+        // always >127 bytes, so short-form would be a false positive).
+        if (content.length >= 2 && content.charCodeAt(0) === 0x30) {
+            const lenOctet = content.charCodeAt(1);
+            // Long-form DER length (0x81/0x82/0x83) or BER indefinite length (0x80, emitted
+            // by NSS/Firefox .p12 exports). Short-form is excluded (real PKCS#12 is >127 B).
+            if (lenOctet === 0x80 || lenOctet === 0x81 || lenOctet === 0x82 || lenOctet === 0x83) {
+                return [findingFromRule(RULE_PKCS12, { ...at, matchLength: 2 })];
+            }
+        }
+        // BouncyCastle keystores have no stable magic; key off the extension, but
+        // require some content so an empty `.bks` placeholder does not fire.
+        if (file.toLowerCase().endsWith(".bks") && content.length > 0) {
+            return [findingFromRule(RULE_BKS, { ...at, matchLength: 1 })];
+        }
+        return [];
+    },
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=keystore.js.map

package/dist/detectors/keystore.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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These\n * binary containers hold private keys and certificate chains, essentially always\n * classical (RSA / EC / DSA). A keystore in version control is committed key\n * material: harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed and retroactively un-fixable.\n *\n * The scan pipeline reads these extensions byte-preserving (latin1; see\n * {@link ../walk.ts isKeystorePath} and scan.ts), so `content.charCodeAt(i)` is the\n * i-th file byte and we can identify the container by its magic number. We do NOT\n * parse the enclosed key algorithm (that needs full ASN.1 / proprietary parsing);\n * flagging the presence of a classical keystore is the actionable signal.\n *\n * The match is sensitive key material, so reporters drop the (binary) snippet.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_HARDCODED_KEY } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst KEYSTORE_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\n  \".jks\",\n  \".keystore\",\n  \".jceks\",\n  \".bks\",\n  \".p12\",\n  \".pfx\",\n];\n\nfunction baseRule(id: string, title: string, message: string): RuleMeta {\n  return {\n    id,\n    title,\n    description: message,\n    category: \"certificate\",\n    severity: \"high\",\n    confidence: \"high\",\n    hndl: true,\n    cwe: CWE_HARDCODED_KEY,\n    sensitive: true,\n    message,\n    remediation:\n      \"Remove key material from version control and rotate it; store keys in a secret manager / HSM. Plan re-issuance with PQC keys (ML-DSA-65 / ML-KEM-768) as tooling supports it.\",\n  };\n}\n\nconst RULE_JKS = baseRule(\n  \"keystore-jks\",\n  \"Java KeyStore (JKS)\",\n  \"A Java KeyStore (JKS) holds classical private keys / certificates (RSA/EC/DSA); a keystore in version control is committed, harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed key material.\",\n);\nconst RULE_JCEKS = baseRule(\n  \"keystore-jceks\",\n  \"Java JCEKS keystore\",\n  \"A JCEKS keystore holds classical key material (RSA/EC/DSA); committed to version control it is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n);\nconst RULE_PKCS12 = baseRule(\n  \"keystore-pkcs12\",\n  \"PKCS#12 keystore\",\n  \"A PKCS#12 container (a `.p12`/`.pfx`, or a modern `.jks`/`.keystore` — keytool writes PKCS#12 by default since Java 9) holds classical private keys / certificate chains (RSA/EC); committed to version control it is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n);\nconst RULE_BKS = baseRule(\n  \"keystore-bks\",\n  \"BouncyCastle keystore (.bks)\",\n  \"A BouncyCastle (.bks) keystore holds classical key material; committed to version control it is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n);\n\n/** Bytes-equal check against `content` read as latin1 (charCodeAt == file byte). */\nfunction magic(content: string, ...bytes: number[]): boolean {\n  if (content.length < bytes.length) return false;\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {\n    if (content.charCodeAt(i) !== bytes[i]) return false;\n  }\n  return true;\n}\n\n/** Detects committed classical keystores by magic number / extension. */\nexport const keystoreDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"keystore-material\",\n  description: \"Committed classical cryptographic keystores (JKS, JCEKS, PKCS#12, BKS)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [RULE_JKS, RULE_JCEKS, RULE_PKCS12, RULE_BKS],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, KEYSTORE_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const at = { file, content, index: 0, matchLength: 4 };\n    // JKS: 0xFEEDFEED. JCEKS: 0xCECECECE.\n    if (magic(content, 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfe, 0xed)) return [findingFromRule(RULE_JKS, at)];\n    if (magic(content, 0xce, 0xce, 0xce, 0xce)) return [findingFromRule(RULE_JCEKS, at)];\n    // PKCS#12 is a DER SEQUENCE. Since Java 9, `keytool` writes PKCS#12 BY DEFAULT\n    // even for files named `.jks`/`.keystore` (and Android release keystores are\n    // PKCS#12), so this runs for ANY keystore extension once the JKS/JCEKS magics\n    // fail. Accept the long-form length octets 0x81/0x82/0x83 (real PKCS#12 is\n    // always >127 bytes, so short-form would be a false positive).\n    if (content.length >= 2 && content.charCodeAt(0) === 0x30) {\n      const lenOctet = content.charCodeAt(1);\n      // Long-form DER length (0x81/0x82/0x83) or BER indefinite length (0x80, emitted\n      // by NSS/Firefox .p12 exports). Short-form is excluded (real PKCS#12 is >127 B).\n      if (lenOctet === 0x80 || lenOctet === 0x81 || lenOctet === 0x82 || lenOctet === 0x83) {\n        return [findingFromRule(RULE_PKCS12, { ...at, matchLength: 2 })];\n      }\n    }\n    // BouncyCastle keystores have no stable magic; key off the extension, but\n    // require some content so an empty `.bks` placeholder does not fire.\n    if (file.toLowerCase().endsWith(\".bks\") && content.length > 0) {\n      return [findingFromRule(RULE_BKS, { ...at, matchLength: 1 })];\n    }\n    return [];\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/mesh.d.ts

@@ -18,18 +18,17 @@
  *  - HashiCorp Consul Connect: the `connect { ca_config { private_key_type =
  *    "ec" | "rsa" } } }` mesh CA provider setting (also `ca_provider`). Flagged
  *    as a classical mesh CA (certificate; ECDSA for "ec", RSA for "rsa").
- *  - Istio `DestinationRule` / `Gateway` `tls.cipherSuites:` listing a classical
- *    `ECDHE-RSA-*` / `ECDHE-ECDSA-*` suite — the (EC)DHE key exchange in these
- *    suites is classical and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed (tls, ECDH,
- *    hndl:true). This complements, and does not duplicate, `k8s.ts`'s
- *    `minProtocolVersion` legacy-TLS-floor rule.
+ * Istio `tls.cipherSuites:` `ECDHE-RSA-*` / `ECDHE-ECDSA-*` suites are NOT handled
+ * here — the language-agnostic `tls-classical-kex` token rule in `source.ts`
+ * already flags those cipher strings in any config file, so a rule here would
+ * double-count.
  */
 import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
 /**
  * Detects classical asymmetric crypto in service-mesh configuration: Linkerd's
- * default ECDSA identity issuer, Consul Connect's mesh CA private key type,
- * and classical ECDHE cipher suites in Istio DestinationRule/Gateway TLS
- * policy.
+ * default ECDSA identity issuer and Consul Connect's mesh CA private key type.
+ * (Istio ECDHE cipher-suite strings are covered by `source.ts`'s
+ * `tls-classical-kex` token rule, so they are not duplicated here.)
  */
 export declare const meshDetector: Detector;
 //# sourceMappingURL=mesh.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/mesh.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"mesh.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/mesh.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAyBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAuF/D;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,QAkC1B,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"mesh.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/mesh.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAoE/D;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,QA8B1B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/mesh.js

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
-import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
-import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE } from "../cwe.js";
-const MESH_EXTENSIONS = [".yaml", ".yml", ".hcl"];
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskCommentLines } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
+// `.json` is included because Consul agent config is commonly JSON (the
+// `private_key_type` rules already support the JSON `:` form); the content gates
+// keep unrelated generic JSON/YAML out.
+const MESH_EXTENSIONS = [".yaml", ".yml", ".hcl", ".json"];
 // Linkerd's default self-managed identity scheme (`linkerd.io/tls`, as opposed
 // to a `kubernetes.io/tls` bring-your-own-cert secret) mints its trust anchor
 // and issuer credentials as ECDSA P-256 by default. Matched in both nested
@@ -13,10 +16,6 @@ const RE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA = /identityTrustAnchorsPEM\b|(?:identity\.issuer\.sc
 // mirroring the terraform.ts attribute-matching convention.
 const RE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA = /(?<![\w"-])"?private_key_type"?\s*[:=]\s*"rsa"/gi;
 const RE_MESH_CONSUL_EC = /(?<![\w"-])"?private_key_type"?\s*[:=]\s*"ec"/gi;
-// Istio mesh TLS cipher suites: OpenSSL-style suite names naming classical
-// ECDHE key exchange combined with an RSA or ECDSA certificate. These are
-// distinctive tokens (no generic-config collision risk).
-const RE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER = /\bECDHE-(?:RSA|ECDSA)-[A-Z0-9_-]+\b/g;
 const RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA = {
     id: "mesh-linkerd-identity-ecdsa",
     title: "Linkerd ECDSA identity issuer",
@@ -56,53 +55,36 @@ const RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC = {
     message: "Consul Connect's mesh CA issues leaf certificates from a classical EC private key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.",
     remediation: "Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) as the Connect CA provider adds support.",
 };
-const RULE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER = {
-    id: "mesh-istio-classical-cipher",
-    title: "Istio classical ECDHE cipher suite",
-    description: "Istio DestinationRule/Gateway tls.cipherSuites lists a classical ECDHE-RSA/ECDHE-ECDSA suite",
-    category: "tls",
-    severity: "medium",
-    confidence: "high",
-    algorithm: "ECDH",
-    hndl: true,
-    cwe: CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE,
-    message: "Istio mesh TLS cipher suite allows classical ECDHE key exchange, which is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.",
-    remediation: "Prefer TLS 1.3 AEAD suites and track PQC-hybrid mesh key exchange (X25519MLKEM768) as Envoy/BoringSSL adds support.",
-};
 /**
  * Detects classical asymmetric crypto in service-mesh configuration: Linkerd's
- * default ECDSA identity issuer, Consul Connect's mesh CA private key type,
- * and classical ECDHE cipher suites in Istio DestinationRule/Gateway TLS
- * policy.
+ * default ECDSA identity issuer and Consul Connect's mesh CA private key type.
+ * (Istio ECDHE cipher-suite strings are covered by `source.ts`'s
+ * `tls-classical-kex` token rule, so they are not duplicated here.)
  */
 export const meshDetector = {
     id: "service-mesh-crypto",
-    description: "Classical crypto in service-mesh config (Linkerd identity, Consul Connect CA, Istio cipher suites)",
+    description: "Classical crypto in service-mesh config (Linkerd identity, Consul Connect CA)",
     scope: "config",
     language: "any",
-    rules: [
-        RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA,
-        RULE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA,
-        RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC,
-        RULE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER,
-    ],
+    rules: [RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC],
     appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, MESH_EXTENSIONS),
     detect({ file, content }) {
         const isLinkerd = content.includes("linkerd") || content.includes("identityTrustAnchors");
         const isConsulConnect = content.includes("consul") && content.includes("connect");
-        const isIstioCipher = content.includes("DestinationRule") || content.includes("cipherSuites");
-        if (!isLinkerd && !isConsulConnect && !isIstioCipher)
+        if (!isLinkerd && !isConsulConnect)
             return [];
+        // Mask whole comment lines (YAML/HCL `#`, HCL/JSON5 `//`) so a commented-out
+        // directive can't fire — `.yaml`/`.hcl`/`.json` are not centrally stripped.
+        // Offsets are preserved, so the finding location stays exact.
+        const scan = maskCommentLines(content, ["#", "//"]);
         const findings = [];
-        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, content, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
+        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, scan, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
         if (isLinkerd)
             add(RE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA, RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA);
         if (isConsulConnect) {
             add(RE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA);
             add(RE_MESH_CONSUL_EC, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC);
         }
-        if (isIstioCipher)
-            add(RE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER, RULE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER);
         return findings;
     },
 };

package/dist/detectors/mesh.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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These mint the mTLS identity\n * certificates that secure sidecar-to-sidecar traffic and are configured in\n * their own Helm values / HCL / CRD surfaces, distinct from what `k8s.ts`\n * already covers (cert-manager `Certificate`/`Issuer` keys and Istio's\n * `minProtocolVersion` TLS floor — NOT duplicated here).\n *\n * Covered (gated by a mesh marker in the document to keep generic keys like\n * `scheme:` / `private_key_type` from firing on unrelated YAML/HCL):\n *  - Linkerd control-plane identity issuer: Helm values `identityTrustAnchorsPEM`\n *    and `identity.issuer.scheme` / nested `issuer.scheme: linkerd.io/tls` — the\n *    default self-managed Linkerd identity scheme, which mints workload\n *    certificates from an ECDSA P-256 trust anchor. Flagged as a classical mesh\n *    CA (certificate, ECDSA, hndl:false) since Linkerd's identity issuer signs\n *    forgeable-by-quantum leaf certs, not a confidentiality key.\n *  - HashiCorp Consul Connect: the `connect { ca_config { private_key_type =\n *    \"ec\" | \"rsa\" } } }` mesh CA provider setting (also `ca_provider`). Flagged\n *    as a classical mesh CA (certificate; ECDSA for \"ec\", RSA for \"rsa\").\n *  - Istio `DestinationRule` / `Gateway` `tls.cipherSuites:` listing a classical\n *    `ECDHE-RSA-*` / `ECDHE-ECDSA-*` suite — the (EC)DHE key exchange in these\n *    suites is classical and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed (tls, ECDH,\n *    hndl:true). This complements, and does not duplicate, `k8s.ts`'s\n *    `minProtocolVersion` legacy-TLS-floor rule.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst MESH_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".yaml\", \".yml\", \".hcl\"];\n\n// Linkerd's default self-managed identity scheme (`linkerd.io/tls`, as opposed\n// to a `kubernetes.io/tls` bring-your-own-cert secret) mints its trust anchor\n// and issuer credentials as ECDSA P-256 by default. Matched in both nested\n// YAML form (`scheme: linkerd.io/tls`) and the flattened Helm `--set`/values\n// key form (`identity.issuer.scheme: linkerd.io/tls`), plus the distinctive\n// `identityTrustAnchorsPEM` values key which only exists in Linkerd charts.\nconst RE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA =\n  /identityTrustAnchorsPEM\\b|(?:identity\\.issuer\\.scheme|scheme)\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"']?linkerd\\.io\\/tls\\b/g;\n\n// Consul Connect's CA provider config: `private_key_type = \"ec\" | \"rsa\"`\n// inside a `ca_config` block. Matched in both HCL (`=`) and JSON (`:`) forms,\n// mirroring the terraform.ts attribute-matching convention.\nconst RE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?private_key_type\"?\\s*[:=]\\s*\"rsa\"/gi;\nconst RE_MESH_CONSUL_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?private_key_type\"?\\s*[:=]\\s*\"ec\"/gi;\n\n// Istio mesh TLS cipher suites: OpenSSL-style suite names naming classical\n// ECDHE key exchange combined with an RSA or ECDSA certificate. These are\n// distinctive tokens (no generic-config collision risk).\nconst RE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER = /\\bECDHE-(?:RSA|ECDSA)-[A-Z0-9_-]+\\b/g;\n\nconst RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"mesh-linkerd-identity-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"Linkerd ECDSA identity issuer\",\n  description: \"Linkerd control-plane identity issuer (default ECDSA P-256 mesh CA)\",\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Linkerd's control-plane identity issuer mints workload certificates from a classical ECDSA P-256 trust anchor by default, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) once Linkerd's identity issuer supports PQC signing.\",\n};\nconst RULE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"mesh-consul-connect-rsa\",\n  title: \"Consul Connect RSA mesh CA\",\n  description: 'Consul Connect ca_config private_key_type = \"rsa\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Consul Connect's mesh CA issues leaf certificates from a classical RSA private key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Plan migration to PQC certificate keys (ML-DSA-65) as the Connect CA provider adds support.\",\n};\nconst RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"mesh-consul-connect-ec\",\n  title: \"Consul Connect EC mesh CA\",\n  description: 'Consul Connect ca_config private_key_type = \"ec\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Consul Connect's mesh CA issues leaf certificates from a classical EC private key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) as the Connect CA provider adds support.\",\n};\nconst RULE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"mesh-istio-classical-cipher\",\n  title: \"Istio classical ECDHE cipher suite\",\n  description:\n    \"Istio DestinationRule/Gateway tls.cipherSuites lists a classical ECDHE-RSA/ECDHE-ECDSA suite\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE,\n  message:\n    \"Istio mesh TLS cipher suite allows classical ECDHE key exchange, which is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Prefer TLS 1.3 AEAD suites and track PQC-hybrid mesh key exchange (X25519MLKEM768) as Envoy/BoringSSL adds support.\",\n};\n\n/**\n * Detects classical asymmetric crypto in service-mesh configuration: Linkerd's\n * default ECDSA identity issuer, Consul Connect's mesh CA private key type,\n * and classical ECDHE cipher suites in Istio DestinationRule/Gateway TLS\n * policy.\n */\nexport const meshDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"service-mesh-crypto\",\n  description:\n    \"Classical crypto in service-mesh config (Linkerd identity, Consul Connect CA, Istio cipher suites)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA,\n    RULE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA,\n    RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC,\n    RULE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, MESH_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const isLinkerd = content.includes(\"linkerd\") || content.includes(\"identityTrustAnchors\");\n    const isConsulConnect = content.includes(\"consul\") && content.includes(\"connect\");\n    const isIstioCipher = content.includes(\"DestinationRule\") || content.includes(\"cipherSuites\");\n    if (!isLinkerd && !isConsulConnect && !isIstioCipher) return [];\n\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    if (isLinkerd) add(RE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA, RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA);\n    if (isConsulConnect) {\n      add(RE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA);\n      add(RE_MESH_CONSUL_EC, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC);\n    }\n    if (isIstioCipher) add(RE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER, RULE_MESH_ISTIO_CLASSICAL_CIPHER);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}
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These mint the mTLS identity\n * certificates that secure sidecar-to-sidecar traffic and are configured in\n * their own Helm values / HCL / CRD surfaces, distinct from what `k8s.ts`\n * already covers (cert-manager `Certificate`/`Issuer` keys and Istio's\n * `minProtocolVersion` TLS floor — NOT duplicated here).\n *\n * Covered (gated by a mesh marker in the document to keep generic keys like\n * `scheme:` / `private_key_type` from firing on unrelated YAML/HCL):\n *  - Linkerd control-plane identity issuer: Helm values `identityTrustAnchorsPEM`\n *    and `identity.issuer.scheme` / nested `issuer.scheme: linkerd.io/tls` — the\n *    default self-managed Linkerd identity scheme, which mints workload\n *    certificates from an ECDSA P-256 trust anchor. Flagged as a classical mesh\n *    CA (certificate, ECDSA, hndl:false) since Linkerd's identity issuer signs\n *    forgeable-by-quantum leaf certs, not a confidentiality key.\n *  - HashiCorp Consul Connect: the `connect { ca_config { private_key_type =\n *    \"ec\" | \"rsa\" } } }` mesh CA provider setting (also `ca_provider`). Flagged\n *    as a classical mesh CA (certificate; ECDSA for \"ec\", RSA for \"rsa\").\n * Istio `tls.cipherSuites:` `ECDHE-RSA-*` / `ECDHE-ECDSA-*` suites are NOT handled\n * here — the language-agnostic `tls-classical-kex` token rule in `source.ts`\n * already flags those cipher strings in any config file, so a rule here would\n * double-count.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskCommentLines } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\n// `.json` is included because Consul agent config is commonly JSON (the\n// `private_key_type` rules already support the JSON `:` form); the content gates\n// keep unrelated generic JSON/YAML out.\nconst MESH_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".yaml\", \".yml\", \".hcl\", \".json\"];\n\n// Linkerd's default self-managed identity scheme (`linkerd.io/tls`, as opposed\n// to a `kubernetes.io/tls` bring-your-own-cert secret) mints its trust anchor\n// and issuer credentials as ECDSA P-256 by default. Matched in both nested\n// YAML form (`scheme: linkerd.io/tls`) and the flattened Helm `--set`/values\n// key form (`identity.issuer.scheme: linkerd.io/tls`), plus the distinctive\n// `identityTrustAnchorsPEM` values key which only exists in Linkerd charts.\nconst RE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA =\n  /identityTrustAnchorsPEM\\b|(?:identity\\.issuer\\.scheme|scheme)\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"']?linkerd\\.io\\/tls\\b/g;\n\n// Consul Connect's CA provider config: `private_key_type = \"ec\" | \"rsa\"`\n// inside a `ca_config` block. Matched in both HCL (`=`) and JSON (`:`) forms,\n// mirroring the terraform.ts attribute-matching convention.\nconst RE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?private_key_type\"?\\s*[:=]\\s*\"rsa\"/gi;\nconst RE_MESH_CONSUL_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?private_key_type\"?\\s*[:=]\\s*\"ec\"/gi;\n\nconst RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"mesh-linkerd-identity-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"Linkerd ECDSA identity issuer\",\n  description: \"Linkerd control-plane identity issuer (default ECDSA P-256 mesh CA)\",\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Linkerd's control-plane identity issuer mints workload certificates from a classical ECDSA P-256 trust anchor by default, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) once Linkerd's identity issuer supports PQC signing.\",\n};\nconst RULE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"mesh-consul-connect-rsa\",\n  title: \"Consul Connect RSA mesh CA\",\n  description: 'Consul Connect ca_config private_key_type = \"rsa\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Consul Connect's mesh CA issues leaf certificates from a classical RSA private key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Plan migration to PQC certificate keys (ML-DSA-65) as the Connect CA provider adds support.\",\n};\nconst RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"mesh-consul-connect-ec\",\n  title: \"Consul Connect EC mesh CA\",\n  description: 'Consul Connect ca_config private_key_type = \"ec\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Consul Connect's mesh CA issues leaf certificates from a classical EC private key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) as the Connect CA provider adds support.\",\n};\n/**\n * Detects classical asymmetric crypto in service-mesh configuration: Linkerd's\n * default ECDSA identity issuer and Consul Connect's mesh CA private key type.\n * (Istio ECDHE cipher-suite strings are covered by `source.ts`'s\n * `tls-classical-kex` token rule, so they are not duplicated here.)\n */\nexport const meshDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"service-mesh-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical crypto in service-mesh config (Linkerd identity, Consul Connect CA)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, MESH_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const isLinkerd = content.includes(\"linkerd\") || content.includes(\"identityTrustAnchors\");\n    const isConsulConnect = content.includes(\"consul\") && content.includes(\"connect\");\n    if (!isLinkerd && !isConsulConnect) return [];\n\n    // Mask whole comment lines (YAML/HCL `#`, HCL/JSON5 `//`) so a commented-out\n    // directive can't fire — `.yaml`/`.hcl`/`.json` are not centrally stripped.\n    // Offsets are preserved, so the finding location stays exact.\n    const scan = maskCommentLines(content, [\"#\", \"//\"]);\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, scan, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    if (isLinkerd) add(RE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA, RULE_MESH_LINKERD_ECDSA);\n    if (isConsulConnect) {\n      add(RE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_RSA);\n      add(RE_MESH_CONSUL_EC, RULE_MESH_CONSUL_EC);\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/messaging.d.ts

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
  * Covered in broker config files (`.properties`, `.conf`, `.cfg`, `.ini`):
  *  - Kafka `ssl.protocol` / `ssl.enabled.protocols = TLSv1 | TLSv1.1` (legacy).
  *  - MQTT/Mosquitto `tls_version tlsv1 | tlsv1.1` (legacy).
- *  - Kafka `ssl.cipher.suites` naming a classical `ECDHE_RSA` / `ECDHE_ECDSA` /
- *    `TLS_RSA` suite — the harvestable key-exchange path.
+ *  - Kafka `ssl.cipher.suites` naming a static-RSA `TLS_RSA_WITH_*` key-transport
+ *    suite (the ECDHE/DHE suites are owned by source.ts's `tls-classical-kex`).
  */
 import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
 /** Detects classical transport crypto in message-broker / event-stream config. */

package/dist/detectors/messaging.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"messaging.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/messaging.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAkE/D,kFAAkF;AAClF,eAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,QAkB/B,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"messaging.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/messaging.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAsE/D,kFAAkF;AAClF,eAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,QAsB/B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/messaging.js

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskCommentLines } from "../detect-utils.js";
 import { CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE, CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
 const MQ_EXTENSIONS = [".properties", ".conf", ".cfg", ".ini"];
 const MQ_RULES = [
     {
         // Match TLSv1 (=1.0) and TLSv1.1 but never TLSv1.2 / TLSv1.3: the negative
         // lookahead stops "TLSv1" from matching the "TLSv1" inside "TLSv1.3".
-        re: /\bssl\.(?:enabled\.)?protocols?\s*=\s*[^\n]*\bTLSv1(?:\.1)?(?![.\d])/gi,
+        re: /\bssl\.(?:enabled\.)?protocols?\s*=\s*[^\n]{0,80}?\bTLSv1(?:\.1)?(?![.\d])/gi,
         meta: {
             id: "mq-kafka-legacy-tls",
             title: "Kafka legacy TLS protocol",
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const MQ_RULES = [
             confidence: "high",
             hndl: false,
             cwe: CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE,
-            message: "Kafka broker permits legacy TLS 1.0/1.1; its classical key exchange is weak and harvestable.",
+            message: "Kafka broker permits legacy TLS 1.0/1.1, an obsolete protocol; require TLS 1.3 (the harvestable classical key exchange is reported separately by the cipher-suite rule).",
             remediation: "Require TLS 1.3 and track PQC-hybrid KEX (X25519MLKEM768).",
         },
     },
@@ -30,23 +30,26 @@ const MQ_RULES = [
             confidence: "high",
             hndl: false,
             cwe: CWE_RISKY_PRIMITIVE,
-            message: "MQTT broker permits legacy TLS 1.0/1.1; its classical key exchange is weak and harvestable.",
+            message: "MQTT broker permits legacy TLS 1.0/1.1, an obsolete protocol; require TLS 1.3 (the harvestable classical key exchange is reported separately).",
             remediation: "Require TLS 1.3 and track PQC-hybrid KEX for device fleets.",
         },
     },
     {
-        re: /\bssl\.cipher\.suites\s*=\s*[^\n]*(?:ECDHE_RSA|ECDHE_ECDSA|TLS_RSA|_DHE_RSA)/g,
+        // Only static-RSA key transport (`TLS_RSA_WITH_…`) is flagged here: the ECDHE /
+        // DHE suites are owned by source.ts's language-agnostic `tls-classical-kex` token
+        // rule (which fires on `.properties` too), so flagging them here would double-count.
+        re: /\bssl\.cipher\.suites\s*=\s*[^\n]{0,200}?\bTLS_RSA_WITH_/g,
         meta: {
-            id: "mq-classical-cipher",
-            title: "Broker classical (EC)DHE cipher suite",
-            description: "Kafka ssl.cipher.suites names a classical ECDHE/DHE/RSA suite",
-            category: "tls",
+            id: "mq-rsa-key-transport",
+            title: "Broker static-RSA key transport cipher",
+            description: "Kafka ssl.cipher.suites names a static-RSA (TLS_RSA_WITH_*) key-transport suite",
+            category: "kem",
+            algorithm: "RSA",
             severity: "medium",
             confidence: "high",
-            algorithm: "ECDH",
             hndl: true,
             cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
-            message: "Broker TLS is pinned to a classical (EC)DHE/RSA cipher suite; the key exchange is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.",
+            message: "Broker TLS is pinned to a static-RSA (TLS_RSA_WITH_*) key-transport suite; the wrapped session key is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed (and it has no forward secrecy).",
             remediation: "Move to TLS 1.3 with a PQC-hybrid group (X25519MLKEM768) once the broker/runtime supports it.",
         },
     },
@@ -61,8 +64,12 @@ export const messagingDetector = {
     appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, MQ_EXTENSIONS),
     detect({ file, content }) {
         const findings = [];
+        // Broker config files ship large commented-out example blocks; a commented
+        // directive is not active. Match over comment-masked content (offsets preserved,
+        // so the snippet from the original `content` is still correct).
+        const scan = maskCommentLines(content, ["#", "!", ";"]);
         for (const rule of MQ_RULES) {
-            eachMatch(rule.re, content, (m) => {
+            eachMatch(rule.re, scan, (m) => {
                 findings.push(findingFromRule(rule.meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }));
             });
         }