@quantakrypto/core 0.4.4 → 0.5.0

package/dist/detectors/php.js

@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 import { PHP_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
 import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
 const RE_PHP_PKEY_NEW = /\bopenssl_pkey_new\s*\(/g;
-const RE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT = /\bopenssl_(?:public_encrypt|private_decrypt)\s*\(/g;
+// public_encrypt/private_decrypt (direct RSA) plus seal/open (RSA-envelope: seal
+// encrypts a random symmetric key under each recipient's RSA public key, open
+// decrypts it with the private key) — all RSA key transport, harvest-now exposed.
+const RE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT = /\bopenssl_(?:public_encrypt|private_decrypt|seal|open)\s*\(/g;
 const RE_PHP_SIGN = /\bopenssl_(?:sign|verify)\s*\(/g;
 // phpseclib3 factory methods. The class names are generic, so require `::createKey`.
 const RE_PHP_SECLIB = /\b(RSA|EC|DSA|DH)::createKey\s*\(/g;
 // libsodium X25519 (box / kx / scalarmult) and Ed25519 (sign) key pairs.
 const RE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519 = /\bsodium_crypto_(?:box|kx)_(?:seed_)?keypair\s*\(|\bsodium_crypto_scalarmult(?:_base)?\s*\(/g;
-const RE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519 = /\bsodium_crypto_sign_(?:seed_)?keypair\s*\(/g;
+// Also the explicit-algorithm variant sodium_crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair().
+const RE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519 = /\bsodium_crypto_sign_(?:ed25519_|seed_)?keypair\s*\(/g;
 const HYBRID = "hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768) for key agreement; ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) to sign";
 const RULE_PHP_KEYGEN = {
     id: "php-openssl-keygen",
@@ -24,7 +28,7 @@ const RULE_PHP_KEYGEN = {
 const RULE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT = {
     id: "php-openssl-rsa-crypt",
     title: "PHP openssl RSA public-key encryption",
-    description: "openssl_public_encrypt / openssl_private_decrypt",
+    description: "openssl_public_encrypt / openssl_private_decrypt / openssl_seal / openssl_open",
     category: "kem",
     severity: "high",
     confidence: "high",

package/dist/detectors/php.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Source-code detector for classical asymmetric cryptography in PHP — one of the\n * most-deployed backend languages, previously uncovered. Handles the three\n * dominant crypto surfaces:\n *\n *  - **ext/openssl** — `openssl_pkey_new()` (classified by its\n *    `OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_*` config, defaulting to RSA), `openssl_public_encrypt` /\n *    `openssl_private_decrypt` (RSA), and `openssl_sign` / `openssl_verify`.\n *  - **phpseclib3** — `RSA::createKey()` / `EC::createKey()` / `DSA::createKey()`.\n *  - **libsodium** — `sodium_crypto_box`/`kx` keypairs (X25519) and\n *    `sodium_crypto_sign` keypairs (Ed25519).\n *\n * Lexical, like the other packs; the `openssl_*` / `sodium_crypto_*` prefixes and\n * `OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_*` constants are distinctive, so the false-positive rate is low.\n *\n * HNDL: RSA encryption and (EC/X)DH key agreement are harvest-now-decrypt-later\n * exposed (hndl:true); ECDSA / DSA / Ed25519 signatures are hndl:false but\n * forgeable. `openssl_pkey_new` EC and `EC::createKey` are ambiguous (feed BOTH\n * ECDSA and ECDH), classified conservatively as key-exchange-capable (hndl:true).\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { PHP_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst RE_PHP_PKEY_NEW = /\\bopenssl_pkey_new\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT = /\\bopenssl_(?:public_encrypt|private_decrypt)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_PHP_SIGN = /\\bopenssl_(?:sign|verify)\\s*\\(/g;\n// phpseclib3 factory methods. The class names are generic, so require `::createKey`.\nconst RE_PHP_SECLIB = /\\b(RSA|EC|DSA|DH)::createKey\\s*\\(/g;\n// libsodium X25519 (box / kx / scalarmult) and Ed25519 (sign) key pairs.\nconst RE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519 =\n  /\\bsodium_crypto_(?:box|kx)_(?:seed_)?keypair\\s*\\(|\\bsodium_crypto_scalarmult(?:_base)?\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519 = /\\bsodium_crypto_sign_(?:seed_)?keypair\\s*\\(/g;\n\n/** Key-type classification for `openssl_pkey_new`, keyed by its config constant. */\ninterface KeyInfo {\n  algo: Finding[\"algorithm\"];\n  cat: Finding[\"category\"];\n  sev: Finding[\"severity\"];\n  hndl: boolean;\n  label: string;\n  remediation?: string;\n}\nconst HYBRID = \"hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768) for key agreement; ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) to sign\";\n\nconst RULE_PHP_KEYGEN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-openssl-keygen\",\n  title: \"PHP openssl key generation\",\n  description: \"openssl_pkey_new (RSA/EC/DSA/DH, by OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_*)\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Generates a classical key pair via PHP openssl_pkey_new — not quantum-safe.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-openssl-rsa-crypt\",\n  title: \"PHP openssl RSA public-key encryption\",\n  description: \"openssl_public_encrypt / openssl_private_decrypt\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"RSA public-key encryption/decryption (PHP openssl) is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_SIGN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-openssl-sign\",\n  title: \"PHP openssl signature\",\n  description: \"openssl_sign / openssl_verify\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical signature via PHP openssl (RSA/ECDSA/DSA) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_SECLIB: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-phpseclib-keygen\",\n  title: \"PHP phpseclib key generation\",\n  description: \"phpseclib3 RSA/EC/DSA/DH ::createKey\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"medium\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Generates a classical key pair via phpseclib3 (createKey) — not quantum-safe.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-sodium-x25519\",\n  title: \"PHP libsodium X25519 key agreement\",\n  description: \"sodium_crypto_box/kx keypair + scalarmult\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X25519\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"libsodium crypto_box/kx (PHP) uses X25519 key agreement — modern but classical, harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-sodium-ed25519\",\n  title: \"PHP libsodium Ed25519 signature\",\n  description: \"sodium_crypto_sign keypair\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"low\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"libsodium crypto_sign (PHP) uses Ed25519 — classical and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n};\n\n/** phpseclib class name → its classification. */\nconst SECLIB_INFO: Record<string, KeyInfo> = {\n  RSA: { algo: \"RSA\", cat: \"kem\", sev: \"high\", hndl: true, label: \"RSA\" },\n  EC: {\n    algo: \"ECDH\",\n    cat: \"key-exchange\",\n    sev: \"high\",\n    hndl: true,\n    label: \"EC (ECDSA/ECDH)\",\n    remediation: HYBRID,\n  },\n  DSA: { algo: \"DSA\", cat: \"signature\", sev: \"high\", hndl: false, label: \"DSA\" },\n  DH: { algo: \"DH\", cat: \"key-exchange\", sev: \"high\", hndl: true, label: \"Diffie-Hellman\" },\n};\n\n/** Classify `openssl_pkey_new` by the `OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_*` constant in its config.\n * The window is bounded to the current statement (up to the next `;`, capped at\n * 300 chars) so it can't bleed into a following `openssl_pkey_new` call's key\n * type. Defaults to RSA — openssl_pkey_new's own default private_key_type is RSA\n * when none is given. */\nfunction classifyPkeyNew(content: string, index: number): KeyInfo {\n  const semi = content.indexOf(\";\", index);\n  const end = Math.min(index + 300, semi === -1 ? content.length : semi);\n  const w = content.slice(index, end);\n  if (/\\bOPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC\\b/.test(w)) return SECLIB_INFO.EC;\n  if (/\\bOPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA\\b/.test(w)) return SECLIB_INFO.DSA;\n  if (/\\bOPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH\\b/.test(w)) return SECLIB_INFO.DH;\n  return SECLIB_INFO.RSA;\n}\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto in PHP (openssl, phpseclib, libsodium). */\nexport const phpDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"php-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical asymmetric crypto in PHP (openssl, phpseclib3, libsodium)\",\n  scope: \"source\",\n  language: \"php\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_PHP_KEYGEN,\n    RULE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT,\n    RULE_PHP_SIGN,\n    RULE_PHP_SECLIB,\n    RULE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519,\n    RULE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, PHP_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta): void =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n\n    // openssl_pkey_new — one finding per call, classified by its key-type config.\n    eachMatch(RE_PHP_PKEY_NEW, content, (m) => {\n      const info = classifyPkeyNew(content, m.index);\n      findings.push(\n        findingFromRule(\n          RULE_PHP_KEYGEN,\n          { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length },\n          {\n            title: `PHP openssl ${info.label} key generation`,\n            category: info.cat,\n            severity: info.sev,\n            algorithm: info.algo,\n            hndl: info.hndl,\n            message: `Generates a classical ${info.label} key pair via PHP openssl_pkey_new — not quantum-safe.`,\n            ...(info.remediation ? { remediation: info.remediation } : {}),\n          },\n        ),\n      );\n    });\n\n    add(RE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT, RULE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT);\n    add(RE_PHP_SIGN, RULE_PHP_SIGN);\n\n    // phpseclib3 ::createKey — classify by the class (RSA/EC/DSA/DH).\n    eachMatch(RE_PHP_SECLIB, content, (m) => {\n      const info = SECLIB_INFO[m[1]];\n      findings.push(\n        findingFromRule(\n          RULE_PHP_SECLIB,\n          { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length },\n          {\n            title: `PHP phpseclib ${info.label} key generation`,\n            category: info.cat,\n            severity: info.sev,\n            algorithm: info.algo,\n            hndl: info.hndl,\n            message: `Generates a classical ${info.label} key pair via phpseclib3 createKey — not quantum-safe.`,\n            ...(info.remediation ? { remediation: info.remediation } : {}),\n          },\n        ),\n      );\n    });\n\n    add(RE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519, RULE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519);\n    add(RE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519, RULE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}
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* Source-code detector for classical asymmetric cryptography in PHP — one of the\n * most-deployed backend languages, previously uncovered. Handles the three\n * dominant crypto surfaces:\n *\n *  - **ext/openssl** — `openssl_pkey_new()` (classified by its\n *    `OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_*` config, defaulting to RSA), `openssl_public_encrypt` /\n *    `openssl_private_decrypt` / `openssl_seal` / `openssl_open` (RSA), and\n *    `openssl_sign` / `openssl_verify`.\n *  - **phpseclib3** — `RSA::createKey()` / `EC::createKey()` / `DSA::createKey()`.\n *  - **libsodium** — `sodium_crypto_box`/`kx` keypairs (X25519) and\n *    `sodium_crypto_sign` keypairs (Ed25519).\n *\n * Lexical, like the other packs; the `openssl_*` / `sodium_crypto_*` prefixes and\n * `OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_*` constants are distinctive, so the false-positive rate is low.\n *\n * HNDL: RSA encryption and (EC/X)DH key agreement are harvest-now-decrypt-later\n * exposed (hndl:true); ECDSA / DSA / Ed25519 signatures are hndl:false but\n * forgeable. `openssl_pkey_new` EC and `EC::createKey` are ambiguous (feed BOTH\n * ECDSA and ECDH), classified conservatively as key-exchange-capable (hndl:true).\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { PHP_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst RE_PHP_PKEY_NEW = /\\bopenssl_pkey_new\\s*\\(/g;\n// public_encrypt/private_decrypt (direct RSA) plus seal/open (RSA-envelope: seal\n// encrypts a random symmetric key under each recipient's RSA public key, open\n// decrypts it with the private key) — all RSA key transport, harvest-now exposed.\nconst RE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT = /\\bopenssl_(?:public_encrypt|private_decrypt|seal|open)\\s*\\(/g;\nconst RE_PHP_SIGN = /\\bopenssl_(?:sign|verify)\\s*\\(/g;\n// phpseclib3 factory methods. The class names are generic, so require `::createKey`.\nconst RE_PHP_SECLIB = /\\b(RSA|EC|DSA|DH)::createKey\\s*\\(/g;\n// libsodium X25519 (box / kx / scalarmult) and Ed25519 (sign) key pairs.\nconst RE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519 =\n  /\\bsodium_crypto_(?:box|kx)_(?:seed_)?keypair\\s*\\(|\\bsodium_crypto_scalarmult(?:_base)?\\s*\\(/g;\n// Also the explicit-algorithm variant sodium_crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair().\nconst RE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519 = /\\bsodium_crypto_sign_(?:ed25519_|seed_)?keypair\\s*\\(/g;\n\n/** Key-type classification for `openssl_pkey_new`, keyed by its config constant. */\ninterface KeyInfo {\n  algo: Finding[\"algorithm\"];\n  cat: Finding[\"category\"];\n  sev: Finding[\"severity\"];\n  hndl: boolean;\n  label: string;\n  remediation?: string;\n}\nconst HYBRID = \"hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768) for key agreement; ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) to sign\";\n\nconst RULE_PHP_KEYGEN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-openssl-keygen\",\n  title: \"PHP openssl key generation\",\n  description: \"openssl_pkey_new (RSA/EC/DSA/DH, by OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_*)\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Generates a classical key pair via PHP openssl_pkey_new — not quantum-safe.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-openssl-rsa-crypt\",\n  title: \"PHP openssl RSA public-key encryption\",\n  description: \"openssl_public_encrypt / openssl_private_decrypt / openssl_seal / openssl_open\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"RSA public-key encryption/decryption (PHP openssl) is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_SIGN: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-openssl-sign\",\n  title: \"PHP openssl signature\",\n  description: \"openssl_sign / openssl_verify\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Classical signature via PHP openssl (RSA/ECDSA/DSA) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_SECLIB: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-phpseclib-keygen\",\n  title: \"PHP phpseclib key generation\",\n  description: \"phpseclib3 RSA/EC/DSA/DH ::createKey\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"medium\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Generates a classical key pair via phpseclib3 (createKey) — not quantum-safe.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-sodium-x25519\",\n  title: \"PHP libsodium X25519 key agreement\",\n  description: \"sodium_crypto_box/kx keypair + scalarmult\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"X25519\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"libsodium crypto_box/kx (PHP) uses X25519 key agreement — modern but classical, harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"php-sodium-ed25519\",\n  title: \"PHP libsodium Ed25519 signature\",\n  description: \"sodium_crypto_sign keypair\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"low\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"libsodium crypto_sign (PHP) uses Ed25519 — classical and forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n};\n\n/** phpseclib class name → its classification. */\nconst SECLIB_INFO: Record<string, KeyInfo> = {\n  RSA: { algo: \"RSA\", cat: \"kem\", sev: \"high\", hndl: true, label: \"RSA\" },\n  EC: {\n    algo: \"ECDH\",\n    cat: \"key-exchange\",\n    sev: \"high\",\n    hndl: true,\n    label: \"EC (ECDSA/ECDH)\",\n    remediation: HYBRID,\n  },\n  DSA: { algo: \"DSA\", cat: \"signature\", sev: \"high\", hndl: false, label: \"DSA\" },\n  DH: { algo: \"DH\", cat: \"key-exchange\", sev: \"high\", hndl: true, label: \"Diffie-Hellman\" },\n};\n\n/** Classify `openssl_pkey_new` by the `OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_*` constant in its config.\n * The window is bounded to the current statement (up to the next `;`, capped at\n * 300 chars) so it can't bleed into a following `openssl_pkey_new` call's key\n * type. Defaults to RSA — openssl_pkey_new's own default private_key_type is RSA\n * when none is given. */\nfunction classifyPkeyNew(content: string, index: number): KeyInfo {\n  const semi = content.indexOf(\";\", index);\n  const end = Math.min(index + 300, semi === -1 ? content.length : semi);\n  const w = content.slice(index, end);\n  if (/\\bOPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC\\b/.test(w)) return SECLIB_INFO.EC;\n  if (/\\bOPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA\\b/.test(w)) return SECLIB_INFO.DSA;\n  if (/\\bOPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH\\b/.test(w)) return SECLIB_INFO.DH;\n  return SECLIB_INFO.RSA;\n}\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto in PHP (openssl, phpseclib, libsodium). */\nexport const phpDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"php-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical asymmetric crypto in PHP (openssl, phpseclib3, libsodium)\",\n  scope: \"source\",\n  language: \"php\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_PHP_KEYGEN,\n    RULE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT,\n    RULE_PHP_SIGN,\n    RULE_PHP_SECLIB,\n    RULE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519,\n    RULE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, PHP_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta): void =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n\n    // openssl_pkey_new — one finding per call, classified by its key-type config.\n    eachMatch(RE_PHP_PKEY_NEW, content, (m) => {\n      const info = classifyPkeyNew(content, m.index);\n      findings.push(\n        findingFromRule(\n          RULE_PHP_KEYGEN,\n          { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length },\n          {\n            title: `PHP openssl ${info.label} key generation`,\n            category: info.cat,\n            severity: info.sev,\n            algorithm: info.algo,\n            hndl: info.hndl,\n            message: `Generates a classical ${info.label} key pair via PHP openssl_pkey_new — not quantum-safe.`,\n            ...(info.remediation ? { remediation: info.remediation } : {}),\n          },\n        ),\n      );\n    });\n\n    add(RE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT, RULE_PHP_RSA_CRYPT);\n    add(RE_PHP_SIGN, RULE_PHP_SIGN);\n\n    // phpseclib3 ::createKey — classify by the class (RSA/EC/DSA/DH).\n    eachMatch(RE_PHP_SECLIB, content, (m) => {\n      const info = SECLIB_INFO[m[1]];\n      findings.push(\n        findingFromRule(\n          RULE_PHP_SECLIB,\n          { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length },\n          {\n            title: `PHP phpseclib ${info.label} key generation`,\n            category: info.cat,\n            severity: info.sev,\n            algorithm: info.algo,\n            hndl: info.hndl,\n            message: `Generates a classical ${info.label} key pair via phpseclib3 createKey — not quantum-safe.`,\n            ...(info.remediation ? { remediation: info.remediation } : {}),\n          },\n        ),\n      );\n    });\n\n    add(RE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519, RULE_PHP_SODIUM_X25519);\n    add(RE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519, RULE_PHP_SODIUM_ED25519);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/pkcs11.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/**
+ * Config detector: classical asymmetric keys held in / generated by a PKCS#11 HSM
+ * or token. HSMs hold an organization's longest-lived roots (CA keys, code-signing
+ * keys), so they are exactly the keys a PQC migration must find first — yet they
+ * live behind a PKCS#11 layer the source packs never see.
+ *
+ * Covered, distinctive lexical surfaces:
+ *  - `pkcs11-tool --keypairgen --key-type rsa:2048 | EC:secp256r1` — the standard
+ *    OpenSC keygen invocation recorded in ops scripts / runbooks.
+ *  - `CKM_RSA_PKCS(_KEY_PAIR_GEN|_OAEP|_PSS)` / `CKM_EC(DSA|DH)` / `CKM_DSA` — the
+ *    PKCS#11 mechanism constants (SoftHSM, SunPKCS11, pkcs11js, python-pkcs11), which
+ *    name the exact algorithm.
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/** Detects classical asymmetric keys behind a PKCS#11 HSM / token. */
+export declare const pkcs11Detector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=pkcs11.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/pkcs11.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"pkcs11.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/pkcs11.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAuE/D,sEAAsE;AACtE,eAAO,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,QA2B5B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/pkcs11.js

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+import { DOC_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
+// `pkcs11-tool --keypairgen --key-type rsa:2048` / `EC:secp256r1` (OpenSC).
+const RE_PKCS11_TOOL_RSA = /--key-type\s+rsa:\d+/gi;
+const RE_PKCS11_TOOL_EC = /--key-type\s+EC:[A-Za-z0-9]+/gi;
+// PKCS#11 mechanism constants (CKM_*), which name the algorithm exactly.
+const RE_CKM_RSA = /\bCKM_RSA_(?:PKCS(?:_KEY_PAIR_GEN|_OAEP|_PSS)?|X_509|9796)\b/g;
+const RE_CKM_EC = /\bCKM_EC(?:DSA(?:_SHA\d+)?|DH1?_DERIVE|_KEY_PAIR_GEN)\b/g;
+const RE_CKM_DSA = /\bCKM_DSA(?:_SHA\d+|_KEY_PAIR_GEN)?\b/g;
+const RE_CKM_DH = /\bCKM_DH_PKCS_(?:KEY_PAIR_GEN|DERIVE)\b/g;
+const RULE_PKCS11_RSA = {
+    id: "pkcs11-rsa",
+    title: "PKCS#11 (HSM) RSA key",
+    description: "PKCS#11 RSA key generation / mechanism (pkcs11-tool, CKM_RSA_*)",
+    category: "kem",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "RSA",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "A classical RSA key in a PKCS#11 HSM / token — likely a long-lived root (CA / code-signing), and not quantum-safe.",
+    remediation: "Inventory HSM-held RSA keys first (longest-lived); plan re-keying to PQC (ML-KEM-768 / ML-DSA-65) as HSM firmware adds support.",
+};
+const RULE_PKCS11_EC = {
+    id: "pkcs11-ec",
+    title: "PKCS#11 (HSM) EC key",
+    description: "PKCS#11 EC key generation / mechanism (CKM_EC*, --key-type EC)",
+    category: "key-exchange",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "ECDH",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "A classical EC key in a PKCS#11 HSM / token; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).",
+    remediation: "For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204). Prioritise HSM-held keys.",
+};
+const RULE_PKCS11_DSA = {
+    id: "pkcs11-dsa",
+    title: "PKCS#11 (HSM) DSA key",
+    description: "PKCS#11 DSA key generation / mechanism (CKM_DSA*)",
+    category: "signature",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "DSA",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "A classical DSA key in a PKCS#11 HSM / token — deprecated and quantum-forgeable.",
+    remediation: "Rotate off DSA; migrate to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).",
+};
+const RULE_PKCS11_DH = {
+    id: "pkcs11-dh",
+    title: "PKCS#11 (HSM) Diffie-Hellman",
+    description: "PKCS#11 finite-field DH key generation / derive (CKM_DH_PKCS_*)",
+    category: "key-exchange",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "DH",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "Finite-field Diffie-Hellman in a PKCS#11 HSM / token; classical key agreement, harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.",
+    remediation: "Migrate key agreement to hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768).",
+};
+/** Detects classical asymmetric keys behind a PKCS#11 HSM / token. */
+export const pkcs11Detector = {
+    id: "pkcs11-crypto",
+    description: "Classical asymmetric keys in a PKCS#11 HSM / token",
+    scope: "config",
+    language: "any",
+    appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),
+    rules: [RULE_PKCS11_RSA, RULE_PKCS11_EC, RULE_PKCS11_DSA, RULE_PKCS11_DH],
+    detect({ file, content }) {
+        // Fast reject: only proceed on a distinctive PKCS#11 marker.
+        if (!content.includes("CKM_") && !content.includes("--key-type")) {
+            return [];
+        }
+        const findings = [];
+        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, content, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
+        add(RE_PKCS11_TOOL_RSA, RULE_PKCS11_RSA);
+        add(RE_PKCS11_TOOL_EC, RULE_PKCS11_EC);
+        add(RE_CKM_RSA, RULE_PKCS11_RSA);
+        add(RE_CKM_EC, RULE_PKCS11_EC);
+        add(RE_CKM_DSA, RULE_PKCS11_DSA);
+        add(RE_CKM_DH, RULE_PKCS11_DH);
+        return findings;
+    },
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=pkcs11.js.map

package/dist/detectors/pkcs11.js.map

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HSMs hold an organization's longest-lived roots (CA keys, code-signing\n * keys), so they are exactly the keys a PQC migration must find first — yet they\n * live behind a PKCS#11 layer the source packs never see.\n *\n * Covered, distinctive lexical surfaces:\n *  - `pkcs11-tool --keypairgen --key-type rsa:2048 | EC:secp256r1` — the standard\n *    OpenSC keygen invocation recorded in ops scripts / runbooks.\n *  - `CKM_RSA_PKCS(_KEY_PAIR_GEN|_OAEP|_PSS)` / `CKM_EC(DSA|DH)` / `CKM_DSA` — the\n *    PKCS#11 mechanism constants (SoftHSM, SunPKCS11, pkcs11js, python-pkcs11), which\n *    name the exact algorithm.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { DOC_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\n// `pkcs11-tool --keypairgen --key-type rsa:2048` / `EC:secp256r1` (OpenSC).\nconst RE_PKCS11_TOOL_RSA = /--key-type\\s+rsa:\\d+/gi;\nconst RE_PKCS11_TOOL_EC = /--key-type\\s+EC:[A-Za-z0-9]+/gi;\n// PKCS#11 mechanism constants (CKM_*), which name the algorithm exactly.\nconst RE_CKM_RSA = /\\bCKM_RSA_(?:PKCS(?:_KEY_PAIR_GEN|_OAEP|_PSS)?|X_509|9796)\\b/g;\nconst RE_CKM_EC = /\\bCKM_EC(?:DSA(?:_SHA\\d+)?|DH1?_DERIVE|_KEY_PAIR_GEN)\\b/g;\nconst RE_CKM_DSA = /\\bCKM_DSA(?:_SHA\\d+|_KEY_PAIR_GEN)?\\b/g;\nconst RE_CKM_DH = /\\bCKM_DH_PKCS_(?:KEY_PAIR_GEN|DERIVE)\\b/g;\n\nconst RULE_PKCS11_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"pkcs11-rsa\",\n  title: \"PKCS#11 (HSM) RSA key\",\n  description: \"PKCS#11 RSA key generation / mechanism (pkcs11-tool, CKM_RSA_*)\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"A classical RSA key in a PKCS#11 HSM / token — likely a long-lived root (CA / code-signing), and not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Inventory HSM-held RSA keys first (longest-lived); plan re-keying to PQC (ML-KEM-768 / ML-DSA-65) as HSM firmware adds support.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PKCS11_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"pkcs11-ec\",\n  title: \"PKCS#11 (HSM) EC key\",\n  description: \"PKCS#11 EC key generation / mechanism (CKM_EC*, --key-type EC)\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"A classical EC key in a PKCS#11 HSM / token; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204). Prioritise HSM-held keys.\",\n};\nconst RULE_PKCS11_DSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"pkcs11-dsa\",\n  title: \"PKCS#11 (HSM) DSA key\",\n  description: \"PKCS#11 DSA key generation / mechanism (CKM_DSA*)\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"A classical DSA key in a PKCS#11 HSM / token — deprecated and quantum-forgeable.\",\n  remediation: \"Rotate off DSA; migrate to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_PKCS11_DH: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"pkcs11-dh\",\n  title: \"PKCS#11 (HSM) Diffie-Hellman\",\n  description: \"PKCS#11 finite-field DH key generation / derive (CKM_DH_PKCS_*)\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Finite-field Diffie-Hellman in a PKCS#11 HSM / token; classical key agreement, harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n  remediation: \"Migrate key agreement to hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768).\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric keys behind a PKCS#11 HSM / token. */\nexport const pkcs11Detector: Detector = {\n  id: \"pkcs11-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical asymmetric keys in a PKCS#11 HSM / token\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),\n  rules: [RULE_PKCS11_RSA, RULE_PKCS11_EC, RULE_PKCS11_DSA, RULE_PKCS11_DH],\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    // Fast reject: only proceed on a distinctive PKCS#11 marker.\n    if (!content.includes(\"CKM_\") && !content.includes(\"--key-type\")) {\n      return [];\n    }\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta): void =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    add(RE_PKCS11_TOOL_RSA, RULE_PKCS11_RSA);\n    add(RE_PKCS11_TOOL_EC, RULE_PKCS11_EC);\n    add(RE_CKM_RSA, RULE_PKCS11_RSA);\n    add(RE_CKM_EC, RULE_PKCS11_EC);\n    add(RE_CKM_DSA, RULE_PKCS11_DSA);\n    add(RE_CKM_DH, RULE_PKCS11_DH);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/proxy.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * Config detector: classical-certificate TLS termination in standalone
+ * reverse-proxy / load-balancer configuration and in-code gRPC channel
+ * credentials.
+ *
+ * A standalone Envoy, Nginx, HAProxy, Traefik, or Caddy config that terminates
+ * TLS with an RSA/ECDSA leaf certificate and negotiates an ECDHE key exchange is
+ * the canonical harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) surface: an attacker who
+ * records today's handshake + ciphertext can decrypt it retroactively once a
+ * cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) can break the ephemeral
+ * (EC)DHE secret. The Kubernetes / service-mesh detectors (`k8s.ts`, `mesh.ts`)
+ * cover the CLUSTER-managed cert + mesh-mTLS surfaces; the STANDALONE proxy
+ * config FILES and the in-code gRPC credential constructors below are seen by
+ * neither them nor the language packs, so they are covered here.
+ *
+ * Because the config token itself does not name the cert's key algorithm (the
+ * key lives in a referenced PEM file, out of band), these findings use
+ * `algorithm: "unknown"` — the evidence is "a classical-cert TLS channel is
+ * configured HERE", not a specific family. They are `category: "key-exchange"`
+ * (the ECDHE handshake is the harvestable primitive) and `hndl: true`.
+ * Confidence is `medium`: a config-level indicator of a classical TLS channel,
+ * not a matched algorithm string.
+ *
+ * PRECISION / fast-reject: several of the matched tokens (`ssl_certificate`,
+ * `private_key:`, `certificates:`) are generic enough to appear in unrelated
+ * YAML/config, so `detect()` bails unless the file carries a distinctive
+ * proxy/gRPC marker (see `hasProxyMarker`). This keeps a random YAML that merely
+ * has a `private_key:` key, or a Traefik-shaped `certificates:` list that isn't
+ * a Traefik config, from firing. Comments are masked (YAML/nginx/HCL `#`, plus
+ * `//` and C-style `/* … *\/` blocks) so a commented-out directive can't fire.
+ *
+ * Covered surfaces:
+ *  - Envoy   — `common_tls_context:` / `DownstreamTlsContext` /
+ *              `UpstreamTlsContext` with `tls_certificates:` carrying a
+ *              `certificate_chain:` + `private_key:` (and the
+ *              `envoy.transport_sockets.tls` transport socket).
+ *  - Nginx   — `ssl_certificate` + `ssl_certificate_key` directives.
+ *  - HAProxy — `bind … ssl crt …` lines and `crt-store` sections.
+ *  - Traefik — a `tls:` block's `certificates:` with `certFile:` + `keyFile:`
+ *              (dynamic config) or a `certResolver` (ACME) reference.
+ *  - gRPC    — in-code TLS channel credentials: `grpc.ssl_channel_credentials(`
+ *              (Python), `grpc.credentials.createSsl(` (Node),
+ *              `TlsChannelCredentials` (Java), `credentials.NewTLS(` (Go).
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/**
+ * Detects classical-cert TLS termination in standalone reverse-proxy /
+ * load-balancer config files and in-code gRPC channel credentials. See the
+ * module docstring for the covered surfaces and the fast-reject rationale.
+ */
+export declare const proxyDetector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=proxy.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/proxy.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/detectors/proxy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+import { DOC_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension, maskBlockComments, maskCommentLines, } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
+// --- Envoy: match ONLY the Envoy-DISTINCTIVE tokens (`common_tls_context:`, the
+// `*TlsContext` type names, `tls_certificates:`, the `envoy.transport_sockets.tls`
+// transport socket). The generic `certificate_chain:` / `private_key:` fields are
+// deliberately NOT matched here — they appear in unrelated YAML and would
+// cross-label a non-Envoy file as Envoy (audit L2). A distinctive token IS the
+// evidence, so no separate marker gate is needed for this rule (audit L1).
+const RE_ENVOY_TLS = /\b(?:DownstreamTlsContext|UpstreamTlsContext|common_tls_context\s*:|tls_certificates\s*:|envoy\.transport_sockets\.tls)/g;
+// --- Nginx: the classic `ssl_certificate` / `ssl_certificate_key` directive
+// pair. `ssl_certificate_key` is matched first-class; `ssl_certificate` requires
+// a following space so it doesn't also swallow `ssl_certificate_key` as a second
+// hit on the same directive (kept as a single rule regardless).
+const RE_NGINX_TLS = /\bssl_certificate(?:_key)?\s+\S/g;
+// --- HAProxy: a `bind` line that terminates TLS (`ssl crt <path>`) or a
+// `crt-store` section (HAProxy 2.8+ certificate store). `ssl` and `crt` may be
+// separated by other bind args, so match them independently on a bind context.
+const RE_HAPROXY_TLS = /\bcrt-store\b|\bbind\b[^\n]*\bssl\b[^\n]*\bcrt\b|\bbind\b[^\n]*\bcrt\b[^\n]*\bssl\b/g;
+// --- Traefik: dynamic-config TLS certificate entries (`certFile:` + `keyFile:`)
+// or an ACME `certResolver` reference. `certFile`/`keyFile` are Traefik-specific
+// enough (paired with the `certResolver`/`tls:` marker gate) to anchor on.
+const RE_TRAEFIK_TLS = /\bcertResolver\b|\b(?:certFile|keyFile)\s*:/g;
+// --- gRPC in-code TLS channel credentials across languages.
+const RE_GRPC_TLS = /grpc\.ssl_channel_credentials\s*\(|grpc\.credentials\.createSsl\s*\(|\bTlsChannelCredentials\b|\bcredentials\.NewTLS\s*\(/g;
+const MESSAGE = (proxy) => `${proxy} terminates TLS with a classical certificate + ECDHE key exchange; the recorded handshake is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed — verify the cert key algorithm and plan a PQC-hybrid (X25519MLKEM768) TLS migration.`;
+const REMEDIATION = "Enable hybrid PQC key exchange (X25519MLKEM768) once the proxy/gRPC stack supports it; re-key certificates to PQC signatures (ML-DSA) when available.";
+const RULE_ENVOY = {
+    id: "proxy-envoy-tls",
+    title: "Envoy classical TLS termination",
+    description: "Envoy TLS context terminates TLS with a classical certificate + ECDHE key exchange",
+    category: "key-exchange",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "medium",
+    algorithm: "unknown",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: MESSAGE("Envoy"),
+    remediation: REMEDIATION,
+};
+const RULE_NGINX = {
+    id: "proxy-nginx-tls",
+    title: "Nginx classical TLS termination",
+    description: "Nginx ssl_certificate/ssl_certificate_key terminates TLS with a classical cert + ECDHE",
+    category: "key-exchange",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "medium",
+    algorithm: "unknown",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: MESSAGE("Nginx"),
+    remediation: REMEDIATION,
+};
+const RULE_HAPROXY = {
+    id: "proxy-haproxy-tls",
+    title: "HAProxy classical TLS termination",
+    description: "HAProxy bind ssl crt / crt-store terminates TLS with a classical cert + ECDHE",
+    category: "key-exchange",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "medium",
+    algorithm: "unknown",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: MESSAGE("HAProxy"),
+    remediation: REMEDIATION,
+};
+const RULE_TRAEFIK = {
+    id: "proxy-traefik-tls",
+    title: "Traefik classical TLS termination",
+    description: "Traefik tls certificates (certFile/keyFile) or certResolver terminate TLS with a classical cert + ECDHE",
+    category: "key-exchange",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "medium",
+    algorithm: "unknown",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: MESSAGE("Traefik"),
+    remediation: REMEDIATION,
+};
+const RULE_GRPC = {
+    id: "grpc-tls-credentials",
+    title: "gRPC classical TLS channel credentials",
+    description: "gRPC channel established with classical TLS credentials (RSA/ECDSA cert + ECDHE)",
+    category: "key-exchange",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "medium",
+    algorithm: "unknown",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: MESSAGE("gRPC"),
+    remediation: REMEDIATION,
+};
+/**
+ * PERF fast-reject only — a superset of substrings that appear in every rule's
+ * matchable input, so it can never drop a file a rule would flag. Correctness is
+ * in the per-rule regexes (each is distinctive enough to self-gate); this list
+ * exists purely to skip the regex work on files with no proxy/gRPC token at all.
+ */
+const PROXY_FAST_REJECT = [
+    // Envoy
+    "tls_context",
+    "TlsContext",
+    "tls_certificates",
+    "transport_sockets.tls",
+    // Nginx
+    "ssl_certificate",
+    // HAProxy (`crt-store` and `bind … ssl … crt` both contain "crt")
+    "crt",
+    // Traefik
+    "certResolver",
+    "certFile",
+    "keyFile",
+    // gRPC
+    "ssl_channel_credentials",
+    "createSsl",
+    "TlsChannelCredentials",
+    "credentials.NewTLS",
+];
+const PROXY_RULES = [
+    { meta: RULE_ENVOY, re: RE_ENVOY_TLS },
+    { meta: RULE_NGINX, re: RE_NGINX_TLS },
+    { meta: RULE_HAPROXY, re: RE_HAPROXY_TLS },
+    { meta: RULE_TRAEFIK, re: RE_TRAEFIK_TLS },
+    { meta: RULE_GRPC, re: RE_GRPC_TLS },
+];
+/**
+ * Detects classical-cert TLS termination in standalone reverse-proxy /
+ * load-balancer config files and in-code gRPC channel credentials. See the
+ * module docstring for the covered surfaces and the fast-reject rationale.
+ */
+export const proxyDetector = {
+    id: "proxy-tls-crypto",
+    description: "Classical-cert TLS termination in reverse-proxy / load-balancer config (Envoy, Nginx, HAProxy, Traefik) and gRPC channel credentials",
+    scope: "config",
+    language: "any",
+    rules: PROXY_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),
+    // Config + source files are all in scope (gRPC creds live in code); only prose
+    // documentation is excluded, so a README mentioning `ssl_certificate` in a
+    // sentence can't fire (the marker gate already handles most of this).
+    appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),
+    detect({ file, content }) {
+        // Mask comments first so a directive that only appears inside a commented-out
+        // block cannot fire.
+        const scan = maskCommentLines(maskBlockComments(content), ["#", "//"]);
+        // Cheap fast-reject: skip files with none of the distinctive tokens. This is a
+        // perf gate only — each rule's regex is distinctive enough to SELF-GATE (a
+        // separate too-narrow marker list previously dropped canonical HAProxy/Traefik
+        // configs entirely — audit H1/H2), so correctness lives in the per-rule regexes.
+        if (!PROXY_FAST_REJECT.some((mk) => scan.includes(mk)))
+            return [];
+        const findings = [];
+        for (const { meta, re } of PROXY_RULES) {
+            eachMatch(re, scan, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
+        }
+        return findings;
+    },
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=proxy.js.map

package/dist/detectors/proxy.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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The Kubernetes / service-mesh detectors (`k8s.ts`, `mesh.ts`)\n * cover the CLUSTER-managed cert + mesh-mTLS surfaces; the STANDALONE proxy\n * config FILES and the in-code gRPC credential constructors below are seen by\n * neither them nor the language packs, so they are covered here.\n *\n * Because the config token itself does not name the cert's key algorithm (the\n * key lives in a referenced PEM file, out of band), these findings use\n * `algorithm: \"unknown\"` — the evidence is \"a classical-cert TLS channel is\n * configured HERE\", not a specific family. They are `category: \"key-exchange\"`\n * (the ECDHE handshake is the harvestable primitive) and `hndl: true`.\n * Confidence is `medium`: a config-level indicator of a classical TLS channel,\n * not a matched algorithm string.\n *\n * PRECISION / fast-reject: several of the matched tokens (`ssl_certificate`,\n * `private_key:`, `certificates:`) are generic enough to appear in unrelated\n * YAML/config, so `detect()` bails unless the file carries a distinctive\n * proxy/gRPC marker (see `hasProxyMarker`). This keeps a random YAML that merely\n * has a `private_key:` key, or a Traefik-shaped `certificates:` list that isn't\n * a Traefik config, from firing. Comments are masked (YAML/nginx/HCL `#`, plus\n * `//` and C-style `/* … *\\/` blocks) so a commented-out directive can't fire.\n *\n * Covered surfaces:\n *  - Envoy   — `common_tls_context:` / `DownstreamTlsContext` /\n *              `UpstreamTlsContext` with `tls_certificates:` carrying a\n *              `certificate_chain:` + `private_key:` (and the\n *              `envoy.transport_sockets.tls` transport socket).\n *  - Nginx   — `ssl_certificate` + `ssl_certificate_key` directives.\n *  - HAProxy — `bind … ssl crt …` lines and `crt-store` sections.\n *  - Traefik — a `tls:` block's `certificates:` with `certFile:` + `keyFile:`\n *              (dynamic config) or a `certResolver` (ACME) reference.\n *  - gRPC    — in-code TLS channel credentials: `grpc.ssl_channel_credentials(`\n *              (Python), `grpc.credentials.createSsl(` (Node),\n *              `TlsChannelCredentials` (Java), `credentials.NewTLS(` (Go).\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport {\n  DOC_EXTENSIONS,\n  eachMatch,\n  findingFromRule,\n  hasExtension,\n  maskBlockComments,\n  maskCommentLines,\n} from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\n// --- Envoy: match ONLY the Envoy-DISTINCTIVE tokens (`common_tls_context:`, the\n// `*TlsContext` type names, `tls_certificates:`, the `envoy.transport_sockets.tls`\n// transport socket). The generic `certificate_chain:` / `private_key:` fields are\n// deliberately NOT matched here — they appear in unrelated YAML and would\n// cross-label a non-Envoy file as Envoy (audit L2). A distinctive token IS the\n// evidence, so no separate marker gate is needed for this rule (audit L1).\nconst RE_ENVOY_TLS =\n  /\\b(?:DownstreamTlsContext|UpstreamTlsContext|common_tls_context\\s*:|tls_certificates\\s*:|envoy\\.transport_sockets\\.tls)/g;\n\n// --- Nginx: the classic `ssl_certificate` / `ssl_certificate_key` directive\n// pair. `ssl_certificate_key` is matched first-class; `ssl_certificate` requires\n// a following space so it doesn't also swallow `ssl_certificate_key` as a second\n// hit on the same directive (kept as a single rule regardless).\nconst RE_NGINX_TLS = /\\bssl_certificate(?:_key)?\\s+\\S/g;\n\n// --- HAProxy: a `bind` line that terminates TLS (`ssl crt <path>`) or a\n// `crt-store` section (HAProxy 2.8+ certificate store). `ssl` and `crt` may be\n// separated by other bind args, so match them independently on a bind context.\nconst RE_HAPROXY_TLS =\n  /\\bcrt-store\\b|\\bbind\\b[^\\n]*\\bssl\\b[^\\n]*\\bcrt\\b|\\bbind\\b[^\\n]*\\bcrt\\b[^\\n]*\\bssl\\b/g;\n\n// --- Traefik: dynamic-config TLS certificate entries (`certFile:` + `keyFile:`)\n// or an ACME `certResolver` reference. `certFile`/`keyFile` are Traefik-specific\n// enough (paired with the `certResolver`/`tls:` marker gate) to anchor on.\nconst RE_TRAEFIK_TLS = /\\bcertResolver\\b|\\b(?:certFile|keyFile)\\s*:/g;\n\n// --- gRPC in-code TLS channel credentials across languages.\nconst RE_GRPC_TLS =\n  /grpc\\.ssl_channel_credentials\\s*\\(|grpc\\.credentials\\.createSsl\\s*\\(|\\bTlsChannelCredentials\\b|\\bcredentials\\.NewTLS\\s*\\(/g;\n\nconst MESSAGE = (proxy: string): string =>\n  `${proxy} terminates TLS with a classical certificate + ECDHE key exchange; the recorded handshake is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed — verify the cert key algorithm and plan a PQC-hybrid (X25519MLKEM768) TLS migration.`;\n\nconst REMEDIATION =\n  \"Enable hybrid PQC key exchange (X25519MLKEM768) once the proxy/gRPC stack supports it; re-key certificates to PQC signatures (ML-DSA) when available.\";\n\nconst RULE_ENVOY: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"proxy-envoy-tls\",\n  title: \"Envoy classical TLS termination\",\n  description: \"Envoy TLS context terminates TLS with a classical certificate + ECDHE key exchange\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"medium\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: MESSAGE(\"Envoy\"),\n  remediation: REMEDIATION,\n};\nconst RULE_NGINX: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"proxy-nginx-tls\",\n  title: \"Nginx classical TLS termination\",\n  description:\n    \"Nginx ssl_certificate/ssl_certificate_key terminates TLS with a classical cert + ECDHE\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"medium\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: MESSAGE(\"Nginx\"),\n  remediation: REMEDIATION,\n};\nconst RULE_HAPROXY: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"proxy-haproxy-tls\",\n  title: \"HAProxy classical TLS termination\",\n  description: \"HAProxy bind ssl crt / crt-store terminates TLS with a classical cert + ECDHE\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"medium\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: MESSAGE(\"HAProxy\"),\n  remediation: REMEDIATION,\n};\nconst RULE_TRAEFIK: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"proxy-traefik-tls\",\n  title: \"Traefik classical TLS termination\",\n  description:\n    \"Traefik tls certificates (certFile/keyFile) or certResolver terminate TLS with a classical cert + ECDHE\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"medium\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: MESSAGE(\"Traefik\"),\n  remediation: REMEDIATION,\n};\nconst RULE_GRPC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"grpc-tls-credentials\",\n  title: \"gRPC classical TLS channel credentials\",\n  description: \"gRPC channel established with classical TLS credentials (RSA/ECDSA cert + ECDHE)\",\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"medium\",\n  algorithm: \"unknown\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: MESSAGE(\"gRPC\"),\n  remediation: REMEDIATION,\n};\n\n/**\n * PERF fast-reject only — a superset of substrings that appear in every rule's\n * matchable input, so it can never drop a file a rule would flag. Correctness is\n * in the per-rule regexes (each is distinctive enough to self-gate); this list\n * exists purely to skip the regex work on files with no proxy/gRPC token at all.\n */\nconst PROXY_FAST_REJECT: readonly string[] = [\n  // Envoy\n  \"tls_context\",\n  \"TlsContext\",\n  \"tls_certificates\",\n  \"transport_sockets.tls\",\n  // Nginx\n  \"ssl_certificate\",\n  // HAProxy (`crt-store` and `bind … ssl … crt` both contain \"crt\")\n  \"crt\",\n  // Traefik\n  \"certResolver\",\n  \"certFile\",\n  \"keyFile\",\n  // gRPC\n  \"ssl_channel_credentials\",\n  \"createSsl\",\n  \"TlsChannelCredentials\",\n  \"credentials.NewTLS\",\n];\n\ninterface ProxyRule {\n  meta: RuleMeta;\n  re: RegExp;\n}\n\nconst PROXY_RULES: readonly ProxyRule[] = [\n  { meta: RULE_ENVOY, re: RE_ENVOY_TLS },\n  { meta: RULE_NGINX, re: RE_NGINX_TLS },\n  { meta: RULE_HAPROXY, re: RE_HAPROXY_TLS },\n  { meta: RULE_TRAEFIK, re: RE_TRAEFIK_TLS },\n  { meta: RULE_GRPC, re: RE_GRPC_TLS },\n];\n\n/**\n * Detects classical-cert TLS termination in standalone reverse-proxy /\n * load-balancer config files and in-code gRPC channel credentials. See the\n * module docstring for the covered surfaces and the fast-reject rationale.\n */\nexport const proxyDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"proxy-tls-crypto\",\n  description:\n    \"Classical-cert TLS termination in reverse-proxy / load-balancer config (Envoy, Nginx, HAProxy, Traefik) and gRPC channel credentials\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: PROXY_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),\n  // Config + source files are all in scope (gRPC creds live in code); only prose\n  // documentation is excluded, so a README mentioning `ssl_certificate` in a\n  // sentence can't fire (the marker gate already handles most of this).\n  appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    // Mask comments first so a directive that only appears inside a commented-out\n    // block cannot fire.\n    const scan = maskCommentLines(maskBlockComments(content), [\"#\", \"//\"]);\n    // Cheap fast-reject: skip files with none of the distinctive tokens. This is a\n    // perf gate only — each rule's regex is distinctive enough to SELF-GATE (a\n    // separate too-narrow marker list previously dropped canonical HAProxy/Traefik\n    // configs entirely — audit H1/H2), so correctness lives in the per-rule regexes.\n    if (!PROXY_FAST_REJECT.some((mk) => scan.includes(mk))) return [];\n\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    for (const { meta, re } of PROXY_RULES) {\n      eachMatch(re, scan, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/pulumi.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/**
+ * IaC detector: classical asymmetric keys provisioned by Pulumi's `tls` provider
+ * (`@pulumi/tls` / `pulumi_tls` / `pulumi-tls`), across the languages Pulumi programs
+ * are written in (TS/JS, Python, Go). A `tls.PrivateKey` resource mints real key
+ * material at deploy time — the IaC surface, like Terraform's `tls_private_key`, but
+ * expressed as SDK calls in a general-purpose source file rather than HCL.
+ *
+ * Detection is gated to files that actually use the pulumi-tls provider (a
+ * `@pulumi/tls` / `pulumi_tls` / `pulumi-tls` import or a `tls.PrivateKey` /
+ * `tls.NewPrivateKey` construction), then classifies each `algorithm` value:
+ *  - `"RSA"`     → RSA key (kem, HNDL)
+ *  - `"ECDSA"`   → EC signing key (signature)
+ *  - `"ED25519"` → Ed25519 signing key (signature)
+ * Comment/string suppression is handled centrally for the host languages.
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/** Detects classical asymmetric keys provisioned by Pulumi's tls provider. */
+export declare const pulumiDetector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=pulumi.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/pulumi.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"pulumi.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/pulumi.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAsE/D,8EAA8E;AAC9E,eAAO,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,QAmB5B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/pulumi.js

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
+const PULUMI_EXTENSIONS = [".ts", ".js", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".py", ".go"];
+// The `algorithm` value of a pulumi-tls PrivateKey, in the TS/Python (`algorithm:
+// "RSA"` / `algorithm="RSA"`) and Go (`Algorithm: pulumi.String("RSA")`) spellings.
+const RE_PULUMI_TLS_ALG = /\b[Aa]lgorithm\s*[:=]\s*(?:pulumi\.String\(\s*)?["'](RSA|ECDSA|ED25519)["']/g;
+/** True when the file actually uses the pulumi-tls provider (gate against FPs). */
+function usesPulumiTls(content) {
+    return (content.includes("@pulumi/tls") ||
+        content.includes("pulumi_tls") ||
+        content.includes("pulumi-tls") ||
+        content.includes("tls.PrivateKey") ||
+        content.includes("tls.NewPrivateKey"));
+}
+const RULE_PULUMI_RSA = {
+    id: "pulumi-tls-rsa",
+    title: "Pulumi tls.PrivateKey RSA key",
+    description: 'Pulumi tls.PrivateKey with algorithm "RSA"',
+    category: "kem",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "RSA",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "Pulumi provisions a classical RSA key (tls.PrivateKey), which is not quantum-safe.",
+    remediation: "Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).",
+};
+const RULE_PULUMI_ECDSA = {
+    id: "pulumi-tls-ecdsa",
+    title: "Pulumi tls.PrivateKey ECDSA key",
+    description: 'Pulumi tls.PrivateKey with algorithm "ECDSA"',
+    category: "signature",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "ECDSA",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "Pulumi provisions a classical ECDSA key (tls.PrivateKey), forgeable by a quantum attacker.",
+    remediation: "ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).",
+};
+const RULE_PULUMI_ED25519 = {
+    id: "pulumi-tls-ed25519",
+    title: "Pulumi tls.PrivateKey Ed25519 key",
+    description: 'Pulumi tls.PrivateKey with algorithm "ED25519"',
+    category: "signature",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "EdDSA",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "Pulumi provisions a classical Ed25519 key (tls.PrivateKey), forgeable by a quantum attacker.",
+    remediation: "ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).",
+};
+const RULE_BY_ALG = {
+    RSA: RULE_PULUMI_RSA,
+    ECDSA: RULE_PULUMI_ECDSA,
+    ED25519: RULE_PULUMI_ED25519,
+};
+/** Detects classical asymmetric keys provisioned by Pulumi's tls provider. */
+export const pulumiDetector = {
+    id: "pulumi-crypto",
+    description: "Classical asymmetric keys provisioned by Pulumi's tls provider (IaC)",
+    scope: "config",
+    language: "any",
+    rules: [RULE_PULUMI_RSA, RULE_PULUMI_ECDSA, RULE_PULUMI_ED25519],
+    appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, PULUMI_EXTENSIONS),
+    detect({ file, content }) {
+        if (!usesPulumiTls(content))
+            return [];
+        const findings = [];
+        eachMatch(RE_PULUMI_TLS_ALG, content, (m) => {
+            const rule = RULE_BY_ALG[m[1]];
+            if (!rule)
+                return;
+            findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }));
+        });
+        return findings;
+    },
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=pulumi.js.map

package/dist/detectors/pulumi.js.map

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A `tls.PrivateKey` resource mints real key\n * material at deploy time — the IaC surface, like Terraform's `tls_private_key`, but\n * expressed as SDK calls in a general-purpose source file rather than HCL.\n *\n * Detection is gated to files that actually use the pulumi-tls provider (a\n * `@pulumi/tls` / `pulumi_tls` / `pulumi-tls` import or a `tls.PrivateKey` /\n * `tls.NewPrivateKey` construction), then classifies each `algorithm` value:\n *  - `\"RSA\"`     → RSA key (kem, HNDL)\n *  - `\"ECDSA\"`   → EC signing key (signature)\n *  - `\"ED25519\"` → Ed25519 signing key (signature)\n * Comment/string suppression is handled centrally for the host languages.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst PULUMI_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".ts\", \".js\", \".mjs\", \".cjs\", \".py\", \".go\"];\n\n// The `algorithm` value of a pulumi-tls PrivateKey, in the TS/Python (`algorithm:\n// \"RSA\"` / `algorithm=\"RSA\"`) and Go (`Algorithm: pulumi.String(\"RSA\")`) spellings.\nconst RE_PULUMI_TLS_ALG =\n  /\\b[Aa]lgorithm\\s*[:=]\\s*(?:pulumi\\.String\\(\\s*)?[\"'](RSA|ECDSA|ED25519)[\"']/g;\n\n/** True when the file actually uses the pulumi-tls provider (gate against FPs). */\nfunction usesPulumiTls(content: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    content.includes(\"@pulumi/tls\") ||\n    content.includes(\"pulumi_tls\") ||\n    content.includes(\"pulumi-tls\") ||\n    content.includes(\"tls.PrivateKey\") ||\n    content.includes(\"tls.NewPrivateKey\")\n  );\n}\n\nconst RULE_PULUMI_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"pulumi-tls-rsa\",\n  title: \"Pulumi tls.PrivateKey RSA key\",\n  description: 'Pulumi tls.PrivateKey with algorithm \"RSA\"',\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message: \"Pulumi provisions a classical RSA key (tls.PrivateKey), which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).\",\n};\nconst RULE_PULUMI_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"pulumi-tls-ecdsa\",\n  title: \"Pulumi tls.PrivateKey ECDSA key\",\n  description: 'Pulumi tls.PrivateKey with algorithm \"ECDSA\"',\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Pulumi provisions a classical ECDSA key (tls.PrivateKey), forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\",\n};\nconst RULE_PULUMI_ED25519: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"pulumi-tls-ed25519\",\n  title: \"Pulumi tls.PrivateKey Ed25519 key\",\n  description: 'Pulumi tls.PrivateKey with algorithm \"ED25519\"',\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Pulumi provisions a classical Ed25519 key (tls.PrivateKey), forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\",\n};\n\nconst RULE_BY_ALG: Record<string, RuleMeta> = {\n  RSA: RULE_PULUMI_RSA,\n  ECDSA: RULE_PULUMI_ECDSA,\n  ED25519: RULE_PULUMI_ED25519,\n};\n\n/** Detects classical asymmetric keys provisioned by Pulumi's tls provider. */\nexport const pulumiDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"pulumi-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical asymmetric keys provisioned by Pulumi's tls provider (IaC)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [RULE_PULUMI_RSA, RULE_PULUMI_ECDSA, RULE_PULUMI_ED25519],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, PULUMI_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    if (!usesPulumiTls(content)) return [];\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    eachMatch(RE_PULUMI_TLS_ALG, content, (m) => {\n      const rule = RULE_BY_ALG[m[1]];\n      if (!rule) return;\n      findings.push(\n        findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n      );\n    });\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

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