@preventive/triage 1.0.0-alpha.5 → 1.0.0-alpha.50

package/server/index.ts

@@ -1,480 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env node
-// DeepView triage-sync relay server. WebSocket front-end, SQLite
-// backing store. Implements the protocol described in
-// `client/triage-sync.js` (and `server/sign.ts` for the canonical
-// signature payloads):
-//
-//   server → client  challenge           { nonce } — emitted on every
-//                                          accept, BEFORE any client
-//                                          frame; per-socket random
-//                                          128-bit value the client
-//                                          must bind into every
-//                                          `workspace-subscribe`
-//                                          signature (round-9 H2)
-//   client → server  workspace-save      { workspaceTag, base,
-//                                          keyframe, nonce, ciphertext,
-//                                          signature } — `keyframe` is
-//                                          a boolean (`true` exactly,
-//                                          else falsy), bound into the
-//                                          signed canonical
-//   client → server  workspace-subscribe { workspaceTag, from,
-//                                          signature } — `from` is the
-//                                          last revision id the client
-//                                          claims to have applied (or
-//                                          null for fresh)
-//   client → server  ping                 — heartbeat
-//   server → client  pong                 — heartbeat reply
-//   server → client  workspace-save-ack  { workspaceTag, base, id }
-//   server → client  workspace-save-error { workspaceTag, base, reason }
-//                                          — explicit failure surface for
-//                                          the legit-signer case where
-//                                          the server rejects a signed
-//                                          save (e.g. `too-large` past
-//                                          MAX_CIPHERTEXT_LEN). Sent
-//                                          AFTER sig verify so the
-//                                          response only reaches a
-//                                          legitimate seed holder; shape
-//                                          attacks still drop silently.
-//   server → client  workspace-subscribed { workspaceTag } — explicit
-//                                          handshake-complete ack so
-//                                          the client can flip its
-//                                          status from `connecting` to
-//                                          `online` only after the
-//                                          server registered it as a
-//                                          peer (not just on socket
-//                                          open)
-//   server → client  workspace-state     { workspaceTag, revisions:
-//                                          [{ base, id, keyframe,
-//                                             nonce, ciphertext,
-//                                             signature }, ...] }
-//
-// Authentication: every signed message is checked against the
-// `workspaceTag` (= base64url Ed25519 public key) before any
-// state mutation. Unsigned / bad-sig messages are dropped silently
-// — the legitimate signer will retry, and an attacker who learns
-// the tag without holding the seed can't get past the verify.
-//
-// Content opacity: `nonce` and `ciphertext` are opaque to the
-// server. We store and forward them; we never inspect.
-//
-// Subscriber tracking: `subscribers: Map<workspaceTag, Set<socket>>`.
-// A socket joins the set ONLY via an explicit, signature-verified
-// `workspace-subscribe` (sole call site of `subscribe()` is in
-// `handleSubscribe`, gated by the per-connection challenge nonce
-// bound into the signature and a post-await `readyState` check).
-// It leaves on disconnect. Broadcasts go to every subscriber for
-// the workspaceTag except the originator.
-//
-// `workspace-save` deliberately does NOT auto-attach the sender,
-// even on a valid signature — see the audit note in `handleSave`
-// (round-9 H1): auto-subscribe-on-save let a passive observer
-// replay any captured save frame from any TCP connection to attach
-// as a silent mirror, since the duplicate-id path returns ack-only
-// and would not reject the attaching socket.
-
-import { type WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws'
-import { errMsg, errStack } from './util.ts'
-import type { PeerRegistry } from './peer.ts'
-import { LOOPBACK_HOSTS, createOriginGate } from './origin.ts'
-import { createHub } from './hub.ts'
-import { createAuth } from './auth.ts'
-import { createSyncHandlers } from './sync-handlers.ts'
-import { WS_UPGRADE_PATH, createHttpServer } from './http.ts'
-import { installWsServer } from './ws-server.ts'
-import { SSE_OPEN_PATH, installSseServer } from './sse-server.ts'
-import { createLifecycle } from './lifecycle.ts'
-import { loadConfig } from './config.ts'
-import { type Handle, openDb } from './db.ts'
-import { openNeonDb } from './db-neon.ts'
-import { initObjstore } from './objstore/init.ts'
-import { type Handle as ObjstoreHandle, listLive, objectMetaWire, openObjstore } from './objstore/store.ts'
-import { openNeonObjstore } from './objstore/store-neon.ts'
-import { openVercelBlobBackend } from './objstore/blob-vercel.ts'
-import {
-  type NeonClientCtor, type PubSub,
-  createNeonPubSub, createNoopPubSub,
-} from './pubsub.ts'
-import { createBusReceiver } from './bus-receiver.ts'
-
-// All external inputs (env vars + optional config.json) are parsed
-// and validated in ./config.ts; destructure into the uppercase names
-// the rest of this module uses.
-const config = loadConfig()
-const {
-  port: PORT, host: HOST, dbPath: DB_PATH, objstoreDir: OBJSTORE_DIR,
-  reapIntervalMs: OBJSTORE_REAP_INTERVAL_MS, reapDisabled: OBJSTORE_REAP_DISABLED,
-  maxInflightPerSocket: MAX_INFLIGHT_PER_SOCKET, debug: DEBUG,
-  neonUrl: NEON_URL, blobToken: BLOB_TOKEN, tokenSecret: TOKEN_SECRET,
-  password: CONFIG_PASSWORD, trustProxyEnv: TRUST_PROXY_ENV,
-} = config
-
-// Same-origin gate for the WS upgrade and REST data plane (see
-// ./origin.ts). `TRUST_PROXY_ENV` also feeds the boot-time
-// misconfiguration fail-fast below.
-const { trustProxy: TRUST_PROXY, isOriginAllowed } = createOriginGate(HOST, TRUST_PROXY_ENV)
-
-// Per-socket buffered-bytes cap. `socket.send` returns synchronously
-// even when the kernel/ws library can't drain to the wire fast
-// enough; the unsent payload accumulates in `bufferedAmount`. A
-// slow / blackholed peer on a high-volume workspace can hold many
-// MB of fan-out broadcasts in this buffer with no backpressure on
-// the broadcast loop. Drop the message when the buffer crosses the
-// cap; the heartbeat will eventually close a peer that never
-// drains. Transport audit `server/index.ts:225`.
-const MAX_BUFFERED_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
-// Per-socket in-flight async-handler cap (MAX_INFLIGHT_PER_SOCKET,
-// env-validated in config). Each inbound text frame spawns a
-// `track(handler)` IIFE; an authorised peer firing valid frames could
-// otherwise grow the set without bound, stretching SIGTERM drain time.
-// Saves dropped at the cap surface as a typed `busy` NACK. Transport
-// audit `server/index.ts:590`.
-
-// Per-connection state registry. One `Peer` per accepted socket holds
-// the challenge nonce, auth flag, heartbeat liveness, in-flight count,
-// and subscribed tags (see ./peer.ts). The connection handler holds
-// the Peer in a closure for the hot paths; cross-function call sites
-// resolve it via `peers.get(socket)`.
-const peers: PeerRegistry = new WeakMap()
-
-// REST PUT idle-body timeout. A slow-loris client trickling bytes
-// within the declared Content-Length holds the staging fd and an
-// inFlightSids slot until the global staging TTL reaps it. Aborting
-// the per-chunk-idle period closes that window. Transport audit
-// `server/objstore/rest.ts:218`.
-const REST_PUT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000
-
-// Server-driven WS heartbeat. Every `HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS` we walk
-// `wss.clients`, terminate anyone who didn't pong since the last
-// tick, and ping the rest. The client-initiated `{type:'ping'}` /
-// `{type:'pong'}` JSON heartbeat the protocol already had only
-// catches the case where the CLIENT notices the socket's gone — it
-// can't recover an FD when the client itself has wandered off
-// (battery-killed background tab, mid-transfer NAT timeout, a
-// hostile non-browser client that opens the socket and never
-// speaks again). The same-origin upgrade gate allows missing
-// Origin headers through (legitimate non-browser callers), so a
-// hostile CLI can stack arbitrarily many idle sockets without it.
-// Kernel TCP keepalive is hours by default; without this interval
-// each abandoned socket pins its `wss.clients` Set entry, its `Peer`
-// state, and an FD until the kernel reclaims it. Two ticks max
-// from silence to termination, so the longest a dead socket
-// survives is ~2 × HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS.
-const HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000
-
-// Backend selection. Both planes (workspace_revision DB + the
-// v1.objstore byte store) are picked from config at boot. Two
-// supported pairings:
-//   1. DATABASE_URL set → Neon (workspace_revision + objstore
-//      tables) + Vercel Blob Private Storage (bytes). Requires
-//      BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN — fail fast at boot if missing, since
-//      a local-FS byte plane can't back a multi-replica deployment
-//      (one replica's writes wouldn't be visible to another).
-//   2. DATABASE_URL absent → SQLite + local FS bytes. Single-
-//      process; the only pairing the SQLite plane supports.
-// The Neon / Vercel files import their peer deps lazily inside the
-// open functions, so static imports here are safe even on a SQLite-
-// only install where the optional peer deps aren't present. Explicit
-// branch (not a ternary) so the SQLite path keeps its `SqliteHandle`
-// narrowing — `sqliteHandle.db` is a non-optional `DatabaseSync` that
-// `openObjstore` accepts without a non-null assertion.
-let handle: Handle
-let objstoreHandle: ObjstoreHandle
-let objstoreBanner: string
-if (NEON_URL) {
-  if (!BLOB_TOKEN) {
-    console.error('DATABASE_URL is set but BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN is not.')
-    console.error('The Neon DB plane requires the Vercel Blob byte plane (local-FS bytes cannot back a multi-replica deployment).')
-    console.error('Set BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN to your Vercel Blob R/W token, or unset DATABASE_URL to fall back to SQLite + local FS.')
-    process.exit(1)
-  }
-  if (!TOKEN_SECRET) {
-    console.error('DATABASE_URL is set but OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET is not.')
-    console.error('Multi-replica deployments need a shared HMAC secret so REST bearer tokens minted on one replica validate on any other.')
-    console.error('Generate one with: node -e \'console.log(require("crypto").randomBytes(32).toString("base64"))\'')
-    process.exit(1)
-  }
-  handle = await openNeonDb(NEON_URL)
-  const blob = await openVercelBlobBackend({ token: BLOB_TOKEN })
-  objstoreHandle = await openNeonObjstore(NEON_URL, blob)
-  objstoreBanner = 'objstore: vercel-blob (private)'
-} else {
-  const sqliteHandle = openDb(DB_PATH)
-  handle = sqliteHandle
-  objstoreHandle = openObjstore(sqliteHandle.db, OBJSTORE_DIR)
-  objstoreBanner = `objstore: ${OBJSTORE_DIR}`
-}
-// Multi-replica deployments behind a load balancer / TLS terminator
-// (the typical Vercel + Neon shape) need TRUST_PROXY=1 to honour
-// X-Forwarded-Host when computing the same-origin gate's expected
-// origin. Otherwise the gate derives the origin from the internal
-// container hostname and rejects every browser request as a
-// cross-origin attempt — silently from the operator's perspective
-// until users report 403s. Fail fast (parallels the
-// BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN / OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET checks above) so
-// a misconfigured deploy doesn't ship a 100%-403 fleet. An
-// operator who genuinely terminates TLS in the container without
-// X-Forwarded-* (rare) can set `TRUST_PROXY=0` to acknowledge.
-if (NEON_URL && !TRUST_PROXY && !LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(HOST) && TRUST_PROXY_ENV !== '0' && TRUST_PROXY_ENV !== 'false') {
-  console.error(`DATABASE_URL is set and HOST=${HOST} is not loopback, but TRUST_PROXY is not enabled.`)
-  console.error('Browser requests through a load balancer / TLS terminator will be rejected by the same-origin gate (all 403).')
-  console.error('Set TRUST_PROXY=1 to honour X-Forwarded-Host / X-Forwarded-Proto from the upstream proxy.')
-  console.error('Set TRUST_PROXY=0 if you really terminate TLS in the container without X-Forwarded-* headers (no proxy).')
-  process.exit(1)
-}
-
-// "Workspace exists on the server" gate. The auth requirement only
-// kicks in for the FIRST action against a never-before-seen tag —
-// once any row lands (triage revision or objstore object), the
-// workspace is considered established and signature-gated. Checks
-// both planes so the gate stays consistent regardless of which
-// action the user picks first (workspace-save in the common case;
-// objstore-put-begin for a bundle-first flow).
-async function workspaceExists(tag: string): Promise<boolean> {
-  if (await handle.headFor.get(tag)) return true
-  const c = await objstoreHandle.countLive.get(tag)
-  return (c?.c ?? 0) > 0
-}
-
-// WS fan-out hub: subscriber registry + backpressure-aware send /
-// broadcast (see ./hub.ts).
-const hub = createHub({ peers, maxBufferedBytes: MAX_BUFFERED_BYTES, debug: DEBUG })
-const { send, broadcast, subscribe, unsubscribeAll, broadcastLocalRaw } = hub
-
-// Cross-instance pub/sub for live broadcasts (see ./pubsub.ts). SQLite
-// mode is single-process by construction so it gets a no-op; Neon mode
-// uses Postgres LISTEN/NOTIFY on a dedicated long-lived Client
-// connection (separate from the HTTP `neon()` callable the queries flow
-// over — LISTEN needs a session-bound socket, the HTTP path is
-// stateless). The bus carries lookup hints, not the full wire payload:
-// the `workspace-state` broadcast's ciphertext alone can exceed the
-// ~8 KB NOTIFY payload cap, so the receiver re-fetches from the shared
-// DB to construct the wire frame. The bus is best-effort fan-out, not a
-// durability layer — the DB itself is the source of truth, and a
-// dropped publish only means peers on other instances miss the live
-// push (they still catch up via the chain on their next subscribe).
-let pubsub: PubSub = createNoopPubSub()
-if (NEON_URL) {
-  // Dynamic import: the Client export lives in the same optional peer
-  // dep as the HTTP `neon()` callable (see ./neon-driver.ts), but the
-  // dep itself is only present on a Neon-mode deploy. The wrapper path
-  // also lets tests swap in a PGlite-backed shim (`tests/pubsub.test.js`).
-  const mod = (await import('./neon-driver.ts')) as unknown as { Client?: NeonClientCtor }
-  if (!mod.Client) {
-    console.error('DATABASE_URL is set but the @neondatabase/serverless Client export is not available.')
-    console.error('Cross-instance broadcasts require the WebSocket-based Client (the HTTP `neon()` callable cannot LISTEN).')
-    console.error('Reinstall the peer dep: pnpm add @neondatabase/serverless')
-    process.exit(1)
-  }
-  const NeonClientImpl = mod.Client
-  pubsub = createNeonPubSub({
-    newClient: () => new NeonClientImpl(NEON_URL),
-    debug: DEBUG,
-  })
-}
-
-// Password gate (see ./auth.ts) — HMAC derivation + the `authenticate`
-// handshake.
-const auth = createAuth({ peers, password: CONFIG_PASSWORD, send, debug: DEBUG })
-const { requiresAuth, passwordConfigured, handleAuthenticate, sendUnauthorized } = auth
-
-// Triage-sync protocol handlers (see ./sync-handlers.ts). `getNonce`
-// resolves a socket's challenge nonce and is shared with the objstore
-// wiring below; `sendSaveError` is reused by the dispatcher's `busy`
-// inflight-cap NACK path.
-const getNonce = (socket: WebSocket): string | undefined => peers.get(socket)?.challenge
-const publishRevision = (tag: string, revisionId: string): void => {
-  pubsub.publish({ kind: 'rev', tag, id: revisionId })
-}
-const publishObjPut = (tag: string, resourceTag: string): void => {
-  pubsub.publish({ kind: 'objput', tag, res: resourceTag })
-}
-const publishObjDeleted = (tag: string, resourceTag: string, version: number): void => {
-  pubsub.publish({ kind: 'objdel', tag, res: resourceTag, ver: version })
-}
-
-const { handleSave, handleSaveRest, handleSubscribe, sendSaveError } = createSyncHandlers({
-  handle, send, broadcast, publishRevision, subscribe, getNonce,
-  requiresAuth, passwordConfigured, sendUnauthorized, workspaceExists,
-  // Folds the objstore inventory into the `workspace-subscribed` ack.
-  // The objstore store keeps its own richer `Handle`, so we wire the
-  // query here where both handles exist rather than coupling
-  // sync-handlers to the store type.
-  objstoreResources: async (tag) => (await listLive(objstoreHandle, tag)).map(objectMetaWire),
-  debug: DEBUG,
-})
-
-const { handlers: objstore, restDeps: objstoreRestDeps, startupReap, stopReaper } = initObjstore({
-  handle: objstoreHandle, reapIntervalMs: OBJSTORE_REAP_INTERVAL_MS,
-  reapDisabled: OBJSTORE_REAP_DISABLED,
-  send, broadcast, publishObjPut, publishObjDeleted,
-  getNonce, debug: DEBUG,
-  // Auth gate for the FIRST objstore-put-begin against a workspace
-  // that doesn't yet exist on the server. Mirrors handleSave's gate
-  // below; handlers.ts calls this AFTER sig verify so the
-  // `unauthorized` frame only reaches a legitimate signer. Returns
-  // `false` to allow, `true` to deny — handlers.ts emits the
-  // `unauthorized` frame and bails on `true`.
-  authGate: async (socket, tag) => requiresAuth(socket) && !await workspaceExists(tag),
-  sendUnauthorized,
-  // Socket-less analog of `authGate` for the REST put-begin mint: a REST
-  // request can never be operator-authorized, so the gate collapses to
-  // "password configured AND workspace new". A deny routes the client to
-  // its in-band WS put-begin fallback.
-  restPutGate: async (tag) => passwordConfigured && !await workspaceExists(tag),
-  // `tokenSecret` is set only when OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET was
-  // provided in env (see TOKEN_SECRET resolution above). Omitted
-  // → initObjstore mints a fresh per-process secret (fine for
-  // single-replica).
-  ...(TOKEN_SECRET ? { tokenSecret: TOKEN_SECRET } : {}),
-})
-
-// 4 MiB cap leaves headroom above MAX_CIPHERTEXT_LEN (2 MiB) for
-// the JSON envelope + base64 overhead. `ws` defaults to 100 MiB
-// which any unauthenticated peer could spam — every connection
-// accepts and JSON.parses up to that before the signature-fail drops
-// the frame.
-const wss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true, maxPayload: 4 * 1024 * 1024 })
-
-// Process lifecycle (see ./lifecycle.ts): `track` (in-flight request
-// drain) and `isShuttingDown` (the new-work gate) are consumed by the
-// HTTP + WS planes below; the teardown is `installLifecycle`d once
-// every server object exists.
-const { track, isShuttingDown, install: installLifecycle } = createLifecycle()
-
-// Shared per-connection dispatch surface. Both the WS plane
-// (installWsServer below) and the SSE+POST fallback (installSseServer
-// below) drive `setupPeerConnection` with this; one Peer per accepted
-// connection, one message-handler tree.
-const peerConnectionDeps = {
-  peers, send, unsubscribeAll,
-  handleSave, handleSubscribe, handleAuthenticate, sendSaveError, objstore,
-  track, isShuttingDown,
-  maxInflightPerSocket: MAX_INFLIGHT_PER_SOCKET,
-  debug: DEBUG,
-}
-
-// SSE+POST fallback transport (see ./sse-server.ts). The WS upgrade is
-// the preferred path; clients fall back to SSE when `new WebSocket(…)`
-// fails to open (corporate proxies that strip the Upgrade header,
-// hostile network middleboxes, etc.). Same protocol on the wire — only
-// the byte transport differs.
-const sseServer = installSseServer({
-  peerDeps: peerConnectionDeps, isShuttingDown,
-  // Same cap shape as `wss` (no explicit per-process cap; OS FD limits
-  // are the upstream bound). 1024 leaves room above the typical web
-  // session count without being a soft DoS hammer.
-  maxSessions: 1024,
-  // Mirror the WS `maxPayload` so the SSE plane can't accept frames
-  // the WS plane would reject.
-  maxBodyBytes: 4 * 1024 * 1024,
-  debug: DEBUG,
-})
-
-// HTTP plane: REST byte-transfer routing + SSE fallback + the WS
-// upgrade gate (see ./http.ts). Built after the lifecycle state above
-// because the REST shutdown gate reads `shuttingDown` and the request
-// drain uses `track`. The WS connection handler is wired on `wss`
-// below.
-const httpServer = createHttpServer({
-  wss, restDeps: objstoreRestDeps, sseServer, isOriginAllowed,
-  isShuttingDown, track, handleSaveRest,
-  restPutIdleTimeoutMs: REST_PUT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS, debug: DEBUG,
-})
-
-// WS runtime: per-connection handler + message dispatch + heartbeat
-// sweep (see ./ws-server.ts). Returns the heartbeat timer so shutdown
-// can clear it.
-const { heartbeatTimer } = installWsServer({
-  wss, heartbeatIntervalMs: HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS,
-  ...peerConnectionDeps,
-})
-
-httpServer.on('listening', () => {
-  // Read the actual bound port from `httpServer.address()` rather
-  // than the `PORT` env constant. Operators (and the test harness)
-  // can boot with `PORT=0` to get an OS-assigned ephemeral port;
-  // the log line then carries the real bound number, not `0`.
-  // Server-side bind failure took the error path above, so
-  // `address()` is always a populated AddressInfo here.
-  const addr = httpServer.address()
-  const boundPort = typeof addr === 'object' && addr ? addr.port : PORT
-  // Differentiate the storage banner by backend so the log line
-  // doesn't claim a misleading DB_PATH under Neon, or a misleading
-  // OBJSTORE_DIR under Vercel Blob.
-  const dbBanner = NEON_URL ? 'db: neon-postgres' : `db: ${DB_PATH}`
-  console.log(`DeepView triage-sync server: ws://${HOST}:${boundPort}${WS_UPGRADE_PATH} (sse fallback http://${HOST}:${boundPort}${SSE_OPEN_PATH}) http://${HOST}:${boundPort}/api/objstore/{workspaceTag}/{resourceTag} (${dbBanner}, ${objstoreBanner})`)
-})
-
-// Cross-instance bus receiver (see ./bus-receiver.ts): a remote NOTIFY
-// lands here, we re-fetch any data the bus payload only hinted at,
-// then broadcast to local peers via `broadcastLocalRaw`. Extracted so
-// the rev / objput / objdel mapping (including the keyframe boolean
-// coercion and the `objectMetaWire` shape) is testable without the
-// full server bring-up.
-const onBusMessage = createBusReceiver({
-  handle, objstoreHandle, broadcastLocalRaw, debug: DEBUG,
-})
-
-// Kick off the LISTEN loop in the background. `pubsub.start` resolves
-// only after the FIRST successful connect, and the internal reconnect
-// loop retries indefinitely on transport / LISTEN failure — awaiting
-// it here would convert a transient Neon WS hiccup at boot into a
-// server that never binds (and a `.catch` that never runs). Instead
-// the server binds immediately and the bus comes up async; publishes
-// during the down window drop silently (best-effort semantics
-// documented in pubsub.ts). The SQLite no-op resolves immediately,
-// so the behaviour is identical in that mode.
-void pubsub.start(onBusMessage).catch((err) => {
-  console.warn('pubsub: startup error:', errStack(err))
-})
-
-// App-specific shutdown step (run after the in-flight drain), wired
-// into the lifecycle teardown below.
-const closeDb = async (): Promise<void> => {
-  // Stop the bus first so a publish from a still-draining handler
-  // can't fire into a half-closed Client. The in-flight drain runs
-  // before this (see lifecycle.ts), so by here all `broadcast` →
-  // `publish*` calls are settled.
-  try { await pubsub.stop() } catch (err) { console.warn('pubsub close error:', errMsg(err)) }
-  // objstoreHandle has no close(): SQLite shares this DatabaseSync and
-  // Neon has no persistent connection; `handle.close()` covers both.
-  try { await handle.close() } catch (err) { console.warn('DB close error:', errMsg(err)) }
-}
-// Wire graceful shutdown + the signal / error / process-catchall
-// handlers (see ./lifecycle.ts). Installed last, once httpServer, wss,
-// and the heartbeat timer all exist.
-installLifecycle({
-  httpServer, wss, heartbeatTimer, stopReaper,
-  sseSessions: sseServer.sessions,
-  sseKeepaliveTimer: sseServer.keepaliveTimer,
-  closeDb,
-})
-
-// Bind only after the startup orphan sweep finishes — otherwise a
-// fresh boot could serve traffic against tags whose on-disk state
-// still has residue from a prior crash. `startupReap` already
-// resolves on any error (the reaper's own catch logs the failure
-// unconditionally and returns void), so no outer `.catch` is
-// needed here.
-await startupReap
-
-// Bind the HTTP/WS plane on the configured PORT/HOST. Exported so a
-// launcher (server/cli.js — the triage-server bin) or any `import`er can
-// start serving. The top-level `await startupReap` above means the server
-// is fully ready — DB open, DDL bootstrapped, objstore reaper swept — by
-// the time the import resolves.
-export function start(): void {
-  httpServer.listen(PORT, HOST)
-}
-
-export { httpServer, wss }
-
-// Library mode: when this module is `import`ed (rather than run as the
-// entry script) skip the auto-start so consumers can own the bind — e.g.
-// wrap CF Access / framework-preset shims around the assembled
-// `httpServer`, or just call `start()` when ready. Direct invocation via
-// `node server/index.ts` (or the `triage-server` bin) still listens.
-if (import.meta.main) {
-  start()
-}
-