@preventive/triage 1.0.0-alpha.5 → 1.0.0-alpha.50

package/server-managed/sql.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// Each public store operation owns a transaction. SQLite serializes access to
+// its single connection across awaits; Neon can reuse a request-owned connection.
+import type { DatabaseSync, SQLInputValue } from 'node:sqlite'
+import type { ManagedDb } from './db-methods.ts'
+import { countStatement, timed } from './request-timing.ts'
+
+type MaybePromise<T> = T | Promise<T>
+export interface ManagedSql {
+  prepare(sql: string): {
+    get(...params: unknown[]): MaybePromise<unknown>
+    all(...params: unknown[]): MaybePromise<unknown[]>
+    run(...params: unknown[]): MaybePromise<{ changes: number | bigint }>
+  }
+  close(): MaybePromise<void>
+}
+export interface ManagedSqlDriver extends ManagedSql {
+  scope<T>(write: boolean, work: () => Promise<T>, options?: { lock?: boolean; statement?: boolean }): Promise<T>
+}
+
+// These operations execute exactly one SQL statement. Postgres already gives
+// that statement an atomic snapshot; an explicit BEGIN/COMMIT adds only trips.
+// Lease and cache writes coordinate through their conditional UPSERT/UPDATE alone.
+const SINGLE_STATEMENTS = new Set(['getReport', 'getBundle', 'getStorageRow', 'getStorageEncryption', 'getTeam', 'getComment',
+  'userCanReadReport', 'userCanReadRepo', 'userCanReadRepoPath', 'userCanReadBundle', 'reportPermissionsFor', 'listComments', 'listManagedIssues',
+  'listTriageHistory', 'listUsers', 'listUserOptions', 'listActivityReports', 'getRepoFullName', 'getUser', 'getSessionWithUser', 'getViewSessionWithUser',
+  'listTriageFixes', 'getRepoDependencyReviews', 'listTeamDependencyReviews', 'getNpmReviewReader',
+  'listDependencyReviewTeams', 'listDependencyReviewEnabledTeams', 'listUserNpmScopes', 'listTeamNpmScopes', 'hasTeamNpmScope',
+  'listGithubMetadata', 'listGithubRepositoryVisibility', 'setGithubMetadata', 'recordGithubMetadataAttempts', 'setGithubRepositoryVisibility',
+  'listLinkReports', 'listLegacyLinkReports', 'listReportFilenamesWithBundleHash', 'listReportsForRepo', 'listBundlesForRepo',
+  'listFindingCatalogReports', 'userCanReadBundleAdvisories',
+  'sessionWithUser', 'getTeamReportAccessSnapshot', 'getReportAccessSnapshot', 'getBundleAccessSnapshot', 'getReportView', 'getUserGithubId', 'getUserTeamFeedSnapshot', 'getAnnotations', 'getAnnotationRevision', 'getUserTokens',
+  'listReports', 'listBundles', 'listReadableBundleIds', 'listAllRepos', 'listSelectedRepos', 'listRepoScopesForUser', 'listTriage',
+  'getFeedState', 'getWorkspaceShareFeedState', 'claimMaintenanceLease', 'finishMaintenanceLease', 'cacheRepoDefaultBranch', 'releaseBundleBuildLease',
+  'getUpstreamCacheEntry', 'getUpstreamCacheEntries', 'getFirstUpstreamCacheEntries', 'setUpstreamCacheEntry', 'setUpstreamCacheEntries', 'ensureSessionUploadKey',
+  'listGithubCommits', 'listGithubCommitTags', 'setGithubCommits', 'getAvatarKey', 'listUsersByAccount'])
+// Session presence and upload keys change only their own rows.
+const UNLOCKED_WRITES = new Set(['sessionWithUser', 'viewSessionWithUser', 'ensureSessionUploadKey'])
+
+export function scopeManagedMethods(methods: ManagedDb, driver: ManagedSqlDriver): ManagedDb {
+  const entries = Object.entries(methods).map(([name, method]) => {
+    if (name === 'close') return [name, async () => { await driver.close() }]
+    const write = !/^(?:get|list|has|userCanRead|reportPermissionsFor)/u.test(name)
+    // Each operation's time told in its request's Server-Timing (request-timing.ts).
+    return [name, (...args: unknown[]) => timed('db', () => driver.scope(write, () => method(...args), {
+      // Presence writes only one user's timestamp; they need no application
+      // writer lock. Keep the session/user read and timestamp in one transaction.
+      lock: write && !UNLOCKED_WRITES.has(name), statement: SINGLE_STATEMENTS.has(name),
+    }))]
+  })
+  return Object.fromEntries(entries) as ManagedDb
+}
+
+export function createSqliteDriver(db: DatabaseSync): ManagedSqlDriver {
+  let queue = Promise.resolve()
+  let closed = false
+  function enqueue<T>(work: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+    const result = queue.then(work)
+    queue = result.then(() => undefined, () => undefined)
+    return result
+  }
+  return {
+    prepare(sql) {
+      const stmt = db.prepare(sql)
+      return {
+        get: (...args) => { countStatement(); return stmt.get(...args as SQLInputValue[]) },
+        all: (...args) => { countStatement(); return stmt.all(...args as SQLInputValue[]) },
+        run: (...args) => { countStatement(); return stmt.run(...args as SQLInputValue[]) },
+      }
+    },
+    scope(write, work) {
+      if (closed) return Promise.reject(new Error('Managed database is closed'))
+      return enqueue(async () => {
+        countStatement()
+        db.exec(write ? 'BEGIN IMMEDIATE' : 'BEGIN')
+        try {
+          const result = await work()
+          countStatement()
+          db.exec('COMMIT')
+          return result
+        } catch (err) {
+          db.exec('ROLLBACK')
+          throw err
+        }
+      })
+    },
+    async close() { closed = true; await queue; db.close() },
+  }
+}

package/server-managed/static.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+import { type StaticHandler, loadStatic } from '../server-e2e/static.ts'
+import { parseManagedRoute } from '../common/managed/routes.js'
+
+// A deep page URL must still resolve every asset at the app root. Preload
+// headers resolve against the request URL, so their hrefs must be absolute too.
+export function managedPageHtml(html: string): string {
+  return html.replaceAll(/(href|src)="\.\//gu, '$1="/')
+}
+
+export function loadManagedStatic(staticDir: string, { indexOnly = false, scanServer = null }: { indexOnly?: boolean, scanServer?: string | null } = {}): StaticHandler {
+  const serve = loadStatic(staticDir, scanServer, { transformIndex: managedPageHtml, indexOnly })
+  return (req, res) => {
+    if (!req.url?.startsWith('/') || req.url.startsWith('//')) return false
+    const url = new URL(req.url, 'http://localhost')
+    let path
+    try { path = decodeURIComponent(url.pathname) } catch { return false }
+    // No API request, including an unknown API route, may receive app HTML.
+    if (path === '/api' || path.startsWith('/api/')) return false
+    if (serve(req, res)) return true
+    if (req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') return false
+    // Finding IDs can contain dots (including URL-shaped IDs). Recognised
+    // pages still receive HTML; missing assets retain a 404.
+    if (path.split('/').at(-1)?.includes('.') && !parseManagedRoute(url)) return false
+    const original = req.url
+    req.url = '/'
+    try { return serve(req, res) } finally { req.url = original }
+  }
+}

package/server-managed/storage-command.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+import { loadManagedConfig } from './config.ts'
+import { openManagedStorageDb } from './storage.ts'
+
+// Require the deployment mode: DB_PATH belongs to e2e in combined deployments.
+// Read the database requirement without opening bytes or enabling encryption.
+export async function storageCommand(mode: string | undefined): Promise<void> {
+  if (mode !== 'managed' && mode !== 'managed-e2e' && mode !== 'e2e-managed') throw new Error('Storage status requires a deployment mode: --storage-encryption-status managed|managed-e2e|e2e-managed')
+  const db = await openManagedStorageDb(loadManagedConfig({ combined: mode !== 'managed' }))
+  try {
+    const status = await db.getStorageEncryption()
+    console.log(JSON.stringify(status ? {
+      encryption: 'chacha20-poly1305', complete: status.complete === 1, cleanupComplete: status.cleanupComplete === 1,
+      migrated: status.migrated, cursor: status.cursor,
+    } : { encryption: 'disabled' }))
+  } finally { await db.close() }
+}

package/server-managed/storage-db.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+// Keys belong to the existing upload rows. Only installation state and bounded
+// migration progress need a separate table; payload paths never move.
+import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer'
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
+import { type StorageKey, unwrapStorageValue, wrapStorageValue } from '../server-common/storage-crypto.ts'
+import type { ManagedSql } from './sql.ts'
+
+export const STORAGE_SCHEMA = `
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS managed_storage_encryption (
+  id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), test_value TEXT NOT NULL,
+  enabled_at INTEGER NOT NULL, cursor TEXT, complete INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+  migrated INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, cleanup_cursor TEXT,
+  cleanup_found INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, cleanup_complete INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
+) STRICT;
+`
+const SENTINEL = Buffer.from('deepview.storage.required.v1')
+export type StorageRowKind = 'report' | 'bundle'
+export interface StorageEncryptionState {
+  enabledAt: number; cursor: string | null; complete: number; migrated: number
+  cleanupCursor: string | null; cleanupFound: number; cleanupComplete: number
+}
+export interface StorageRow {
+  id: string; dataKey: string | null; encrypted: number; hash: string; kind: string | null
+}
+export interface StorageMigrationRow { position: string; id: string; type: StorageRowKind | 'user' }
+export interface StorageDb {
+  enableStorageEncryption(): Promise<StorageEncryptionState>
+  getStorageEncryption(): Promise<StorageEncryptionState | null>
+  getStorageRow(type: StorageRowKind, id: string): Promise<StorageRow | null>
+  ensureStorageDataKey(type: StorageRowKind, id: string): Promise<StorageRow | null>
+  markStorageEncrypted(type: StorageRowKind, id: string, dataKey: string): Promise<void>
+  listStorageMigrationRows(after: string | null, limit: number): Promise<StorageMigrationRow[]>
+  advanceStorageMigration(expected: string | null, next: string | null): Promise<void>
+  advanceStorageCleanup(expected: string | null, next: string | null, removed: number): Promise<void>
+  migrateStorageUserTokens(id: string): Promise<void>
+}
+
+function table(type: StorageRowKind): string {
+  if (type !== 'report' && type !== 'bundle') throw new Error('Invalid storage row type')
+  return `managed_${type}`
+}
+export const dataKeyIdentity = (type: StorageRowKind, id: string): string => `${table(type)}:${id}`
+export function unwrapDataKey(key: StorageKey, type: StorageRowKind, row: Pick<StorageRow, 'id' | 'dataKey'>): Buffer {
+  if (!row.dataKey) throw new Error('Missing storage data key')
+  const value = unwrapStorageValue(key, dataKeyIdentity(type, row.id), row.dataKey)
+  if (value.length !== 32) { value.fill(0); throw new Error('Invalid storage data key') }
+  return value
+}
+
+// What storageState reads of managed_storage_encryption, as `alias` names it,
+// for a statement reading it with more (storageStateOf).
+export const storageStateColumns = (alias: string) => `${alias}.test_value AS testValue, ${alias}.enabled_at AS enabledAt,
+  ${alias}.cursor AS cursor, ${alias}.complete AS complete, ${alias}.migrated AS migrated, ${alias}.cleanup_cursor AS cleanupCursor,
+  ${alias}.cleanup_found AS cleanupFound, ${alias}.cleanup_complete AS cleanupComplete`
+export async function storageState(db: ManagedSql, key: StorageKey | null): Promise<StorageEncryptionState | null> {
+  return storageStateOf(await db.prepare(`SELECT ${storageStateColumns('e')} FROM managed_storage_encryption e WHERE e.id = 1`).get() as StoredState | undefined, key)
+}
+type StoredState = StorageEncryptionState & { testValue: string }
+// The state storageStateColumns read, none where its row is missing, its
+// test value checked against `key`.
+export function storageStateOf(row: StoredState | undefined, key: StorageKey | null): StorageEncryptionState | null {
+  if (!row) return null
+  if (!key) throw new Error('Managed storage requires its configured encryption key')
+  const plain = unwrapStorageValue(key, 'managed_storage_encryption:1', row.testValue)
+  try { if (!plain.equals(SENTINEL)) throw new Error('Invalid storage encryption test value') }
+  finally { plain.fill(0) }
+  const { testValue: _testValue, ...state } = row
+  return state
+}
+
+// Called inside the insert transaction, fencing an old/plain upload that raced
+// activation. The wrapped key never enters public report/bundle DTOs.
+export async function validateStorageUpload(db: ManagedSql, key: StorageKey | null, type: StorageRowKind,
+  id: string, dataKey: string | null | undefined): Promise<void> {
+  const state = await storageState(db, key)
+  if (state) unwrapDataKey(key!, type, { id, dataKey: dataKey ?? null }).fill(0)
+  else if (dataKey) throw new Error('Storage encryption is not enabled')
+}
+
+export interface StoredTokens { access: string | null; refresh: string | null; exp: number | null; encrypted: number }
+const tokenIdentity = (id: string, field: string) => `managed_user.gh_${field}_token:${id}`
+export function encodeStorageTokens(key: StorageKey, id: string, access: string | null, refresh: string | null) {
+  const encode = (field: string, value: string | null) => value === null ? null : wrapStorageValue(key, tokenIdentity(id, field), Buffer.from(value))
+  return { access: encode('access', access), refresh: encode('refresh', refresh) }
+}
+export function decodeStorageTokens(key: StorageKey, id: string, row: StoredTokens) {
+  const decode = (field: string, value: string | null) => {
+    if (value === null) return null
+    const plain = unwrapStorageValue(key, tokenIdentity(id, field), value)
+    try { return plain.toString('utf8') } finally { plain.fill(0) }
+  }
+  return { access: decode('access', row.access), refresh: decode('refresh', row.refresh) }
+}
+
+// Fixed-width sizes make the saved position sort by type, then numeric byte
+// size, then ID in both SQLite and Postgres. Sixteen digits cover JS safe sizes.
+const PADDED_SIZE = "substr('0000000000000000', 1, 16 - length(CAST(byte_size AS TEXT))) || CAST(byte_size AS TEXT)"
+const PENDING = `SELECT '0:' || ${PADDED_SIZE} || ':' || id AS position, id, 'report' AS type FROM managed_report WHERE storage_encrypted = 0
+  UNION ALL SELECT '1:' || ${PADDED_SIZE} || ':' || id AS position, id, 'bundle' AS type FROM managed_bundle WHERE storage_encrypted = 0
+  UNION ALL SELECT '2:0000000000000000:' || id AS position, id, 'user' AS type FROM managed_user
+    WHERE gh_tokens_encrypted = 0 AND (gh_access_token IS NOT NULL OR gh_refresh_token IS NOT NULL)`
+
+// Restart the pending pass for a cursor saved under the previous ID ordering.
+// Completed rows are excluded by PENDING; the original cursor still fences CAS.
+const orderedCursor = (cursor: string | null): string => cursor && /^[012]:[0-9]{16}:/u.test(cursor) ? cursor : ''
+
+export function storageMethods(db: ManagedSql, key: StorageKey | null): StorageDb {
+  async function requireEnabled() {
+    const state = await storageState(db, key)
+    if (!state) throw new Error('Storage encryption is not enabled; configure MANAGED_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY')
+    return state
+  }
+  async function getRow(type: StorageRowKind, id: string): Promise<StorageRow | null> {
+    const row = await db.prepare(`SELECT id, data_key AS dataKey, storage_encrypted AS encrypted,
+      ${type === 'report' ? 'sha256 AS hash, NULL AS kind' : 'integrity AS hash, kind'} FROM ${table(type)} WHERE id = ?`).get(id) as StorageRow | undefined ?? null
+    if (row && row.encrypted !== 0 && row.encrypted !== 1) throw new Error('Invalid storage encryption state')
+    if (row?.encrypted && !row.dataKey) throw new Error('Encrypted storage row is missing its data key')
+    return row
+  }
+  return {
+    async enableStorageEncryption() {
+      if (!key) throw new Error('Set MANAGED_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY before enabling storage encryption')
+      // Called during startup in a writer transaction. Concurrent instances
+      // must reuse the marker and validate its key before serving requests.
+      const existing = await storageState(db, key)
+      if (existing) return existing
+      await db.prepare('INSERT INTO managed_storage_encryption (id, test_value, enabled_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)')
+        .run(wrapStorageValue(key, 'managed_storage_encryption:1', SENTINEL), Date.now())
+      return (await storageState(db, key))!
+    },
+    getStorageEncryption: () => storageState(db, key),
+    getStorageRow: getRow,
+    async ensureStorageDataKey(type, id) {
+      await requireEnabled()
+      const current = await getRow(type, id)
+      if (!current || current.dataKey) return current
+      const bytes = randomBytes(32)
+      let wrapped: string
+      try { wrapped = wrapStorageValue(key!, dataKeyIdentity(type, id), bytes) } finally { bytes.fill(0) }
+      await db.prepare(`UPDATE ${table(type)} SET data_key = ? WHERE id = ? AND data_key IS NULL`).run(wrapped, id)
+      // Return the persisted winner, never a worker's uncommitted candidate.
+      return getRow(type, id)
+    },
+    async markStorageEncrypted(type, id, wrapped) {
+      await requireEnabled()
+      const result = await db.prepare(`UPDATE ${table(type)} SET storage_encrypted = 1
+        WHERE id = ? AND data_key = ? AND storage_encrypted = 0`).run(id, wrapped)
+      if (Number(result.changes)) await db.prepare('UPDATE managed_storage_encryption SET migrated = migrated + 1 WHERE id = 1').run()
+    },
+    async listStorageMigrationRows(after, limit) {
+      await requireEnabled()
+      return await db.prepare(`SELECT position, id, type FROM (${PENDING}) AS pending
+        WHERE position > ? ORDER BY position LIMIT ?`).all(orderedCursor(after), limit) as StorageMigrationRow[]
+    },
+    async advanceStorageMigration(expected, next) {
+      await requireEnabled()
+      if (next !== null && next <= orderedCursor(expected)) return
+      // End-of-pass completion checks every pending row, including failed rows
+      // before the cursor. A failure cannot be mistaken for a finished pass.
+      await db.prepare(`UPDATE managed_storage_encryption SET cursor = ?, complete =
+        CASE WHEN ? IS NULL AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM (${PENDING}) AS pending) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END
+        WHERE id = 1 AND (cursor = ? OR (cursor IS NULL AND ? IS NULL))`).run(next, next, expected, expected)
+    },
+    async advanceStorageCleanup(expected, next, removed) {
+      const state = await requireEnabled()
+      const found = state.cleanupFound + removed
+      await db.prepare(`UPDATE managed_storage_encryption SET cleanup_cursor = ?, cleanup_found = ?, cleanup_complete = ?
+        WHERE id = 1 AND (cleanup_cursor = ? OR (cleanup_cursor IS NULL AND ? IS NULL))`).run(next, next === null ? 0 : found, next === null && found === 0 ? 1 : 0, expected, expected)
+    },
+    async migrateStorageUserTokens(id) {
+      await requireEnabled()
+      const row = await db.prepare(`SELECT gh_access_token AS access, gh_refresh_token AS refresh, gh_token_expires_at AS exp,
+        gh_tokens_encrypted AS encrypted FROM managed_user WHERE id = ?`).get(id) as StoredTokens | undefined
+      if (!row || row.encrypted || (row.access === null && row.refresh === null)) return
+      const value = encodeStorageTokens(key!, id, row.access, row.refresh)
+      // This operation holds the writer transaction; token refresh cannot be
+      // overwritten by a migration that read an earlier token value.
+      await db.prepare('UPDATE managed_user SET gh_access_token = ?, gh_refresh_token = ?, gh_tokens_encrypted = 1 WHERE id = ?')
+        .run(value.access, value.refresh, id)
+      await db.prepare('UPDATE managed_storage_encryption SET migrated = migrated + 1 WHERE id = 1').run()
+    },
+  }
+}

package/server-managed/storage-encryption.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer'
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
+import { Readable } from 'node:stream'
+import { type StorageKey, decryptStorageStream, encryptStorageStream, wrapStorageValue } from '../server-common/storage-crypto.ts'
+import { ENCRYPTED_CACHE_PREFIX, type ObjectStorage, type RawObject, type RawObjectStorage, deleteObjects, objectPath, openObjectVersion } from './object-storage.ts'
+import { type StorageDb, type StorageEncryptionState, type StorageRow, type StorageRowKind, dataKeyIdentity, unwrapDataKey } from './storage-db.ts'
+import { PUBLIC_CACHE_PREFIX, inspectStorageObject, masterKeyCache, storageOwner, storageRowPaths, verifyStoragePayload } from './storage-payload.ts'
+
+const STORAGE_WRITE_MS = 180_000
+export const STORAGE_UPLOAD_TTL_MS = 86_400_000
+export const STORAGE_DISABLED_TTL_MS = 5_000
+
+async function readBytes(stored: Awaited<ReturnType<ObjectStorage['open']>>): Promise<Buffer | null> {
+  if (!stored) return null
+  const parts: Buffer[] = []
+  try { for await (const part of stored.stream) parts.push(Buffer.from(part)); return Buffer.concat(parts) }
+  finally { stored.stream.destroy() }
+}
+function logicalKey(identity: string) {
+  objectPath(identity)
+  if (identity.startsWith(ENCRYPTED_CACHE_PREFIX)) throw new Error('Encrypted cache paths are internal')
+}
+const encryptedCachePath = (identity: string) => `${ENCRYPTED_CACHE_PREFIX}${identity.slice('cache/'.length)}`
+const deletionPaths = (identity: string) => identity.startsWith('cache/') ? [identity, encryptedCachePath(identity)] : [identity]
+// Public bytes, stored as they are whether or not storage is encrypted.
+const publicPath = (identity: string) => identity.startsWith('avatars/') || identity.startsWith(PUBLIC_CACHE_PREFIX)
+
+// A PUT can commit and still throw. Remove only this attempted plaintext,
+// comparing bytes rather than magic: arbitrary uploads can share the header.
+// A concurrent migration's ciphertext must survive this reconciliation.
+async function discardPlaintextWrite(raw: RawObjectStorage, identity: string, bytes: Buffer): Promise<void> {
+  // Leave time to report the original failure inside a serverless invocation.
+  const signal = AbortSignal.timeout(30_000)
+  const current = await raw.open(identity, signal)
+  if (!current) return
+  try {
+    let offset = 0
+    for await (const part of current.stream) {
+      const chunk = Buffer.from(part)
+      if (!chunk.equals(bytes.subarray(offset, offset + chunk.length))) return
+      offset += chunk.length
+    }
+    if (offset === bytes.length) await raw.delete(identity, current.version, signal)
+  } finally { current.stream.destroy() }
+}
+
+async function putPlaintext(raw: RawObjectStorage, identity: string, bytes: Buffer, mode: () => Promise<StorageEncryptionState | null>): Promise<null> {
+  try {
+    await raw.put(identity, bytes, AbortSignal.timeout(STORAGE_WRITE_MS))
+    if (!await mode()) return null
+    throw new Error('Storage encryption was enabled during upload; retry the upload')
+  } catch (err) {
+    try { await discardPlaintextWrite(raw, identity, bytes) }
+    catch (cleanup) { throw new AggregateError([err, cleanup], 'Storage write and plaintext cleanup failed', { cause: cleanup }) }
+    throw err
+  }
+}
+
+async function decryptOwned(stored: RawObject, key: StorageKey, type: StorageRowKind, row: StorageRow, identity: string) {
+  let dataKey: Buffer | undefined
+  try {
+    dataKey = unwrapDataKey(key, type, row)
+    return await decryptStorageStream(stored.stream, dataKey, identity)
+  } catch (err) { stored.stream.destroy(); throw err }
+  finally { dataKey?.fill(0) }
+}
+
+async function openEncrypted(raw: RawObjectStorage, db: StorageDb, key: StorageKey, identity: string, state: StorageEncryptionState): ReturnType<ObjectStorage['open']> {
+  const owner = storageOwner(identity)
+  if (!owner) {
+    // A cache no row owns: its ciphertext alone, what was kept as plaintext
+    // before activation never read.
+    if (masterKeyCache(identity)) {
+      const stored = await raw.open(encryptedCachePath(identity))
+      return stored && decryptStorageStream(stored.stream, key.bytes, identity)
+    }
+    if (!identity.startsWith('uploads/')) throw new Error('Unknown managed storage owner')
+    const stored = await raw.open(identity)
+    if (!stored) return null
+    const inspected = await inspectStorageObject(stored)
+    if (inspected.encrypted) return decryptStorageStream(inspected.stream, key.bytes, identity)
+    if (stored.modifiedAt <= state.enabledAt && Date.now() < state.enabledAt + STORAGE_UPLOAD_TTL_MS) return inspected
+    inspected.stream.destroy()
+    throw new Error('Unexpected plaintext upload part')
+  }
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt++) {
+    const row = await db.getStorageRow(owner.type, owner.id)
+    if (!row) return null
+    if (!owner.cache && !storageRowPaths(owner.type, row).includes(identity)) return null
+    if (owner.cache && !row.dataKey) return null
+    if (!owner.cache && !row.encrypted) state = (await db.getStorageEncryption())!
+    const stored = await raw.open(owner.cache ? encryptedCachePath(identity) : identity)
+    if (!stored) return null
+    // Completed uploads and all new caches are always encrypted. Only legacy
+    // pending rows need header inspection and hash-verified plaintext fallback.
+    if (row.encrypted || owner.cache || state.complete) {
+      return decryptOwned(stored, key, owner.type, row, identity)
+    }
+    let inspected = await inspectStorageObject(stored)
+    if (inspected.encrypted && !row.dataKey && (await db.getStorageRow(owner.type, owner.id))?.dataKey) {
+      inspected.stream.destroy(); continue
+    }
+    if (inspected.encrypted && row.dataKey) {
+      try { return await decryptOwned(inspected, key, owner.type, row, identity) }
+      catch {
+        // An arbitrary legacy upload can begin with our magic bytes. Only
+        // its original SQL hash can authorize that plaintext interpretation.
+        const legacy = await openObjectVersion(raw, identity, stored.version)
+        if (!legacy) continue
+        inspected = { ...legacy, encrypted: false }
+      }
+    }
+    // Only a pending row may read plaintext, and only the original upload.
+    // Verify first, then reopen that exact version before exposing bytes.
+    await verifyStoragePayload(owner.type, row, inspected.stream, undefined, identity)
+    const current = await openObjectVersion(raw, identity, stored.version)
+    if (current) return current
+  }
+  throw new Error('Storage changed repeatedly during read')
+}
+
+async function verifyReportConversion(db: StorageDb, identity: string, bytes: Buffer): Promise<string> {
+  const owner = storageOwner(identity)
+  if (owner?.type !== 'report' || owner.cache || identity !== `reports/${owner.id}.br`) throw new Error('Invalid report conversion')
+  const row = await db.getStorageRow('report', owner.id)
+  if (!row) throw new Error('Report deleted during compression')
+  // Representation changes must preserve the immutable upload hash.
+  await verifyStoragePayload('report', row, Readable.from([bytes]), undefined, identity)
+  return owner.id
+}
+
+async function finishReportConversion(raw: RawObjectStorage, db: StorageDb, id: string, encrypted: boolean): Promise<void> {
+  const row = await db.getStorageRow('report', id)
+  if (!row) { await raw.delete(`reports/${id}.br`); throw new Error('Report deleted during compression') }
+  // Conversion preserves the original row/key. Keep the original until the
+  // compressed PUT has succeeded, and mark encrypted only after removing it.
+  await raw.delete(`reports/${id}`)
+  if (encrypted) await db.markStorageEncrypted('report', id, row.dataKey!)
+}
+
+async function existingReportConversion(raw: RawObjectStorage, identity: string, row: StorageRow, key: StorageKey | null,
+  encryptedMode: boolean): Promise<{ version: string; encrypted: boolean } | null> {
+  const stored = await raw.open(identity)
+  if (!stored) return null
+  const inspected = await inspectStorageObject(stored)
+  // Activation or a concurrent key allocation can win after the SQL read.
+  // Retry with fresh policy/row state before interpreting any ciphertext.
+  if (inspected.encrypted && (!encryptedMode || !row.dataKey)) {
+    inspected.stream.destroy()
+    return { version: stored.version, encrypted: true }
+  }
+  const source = inspected.encrypted ? await decryptOwned(inspected, key!, 'report', row, identity) : inspected
+  await verifyStoragePayload('report', row, source.stream, undefined, identity)
+  return { version: stored.version, encrypted: inspected.encrypted }
+}
+
+async function publishReportConversion(raw: RawObjectStorage, identity: string, bytes: Buffer, row: StorageRow,
+  key: StorageKey | null, expected: string | null, encrypted: boolean): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!encrypted) return raw.put(identity, bytes, AbortSignal.timeout(STORAGE_WRITE_MS), expected)
+  const dataKey = unwrapDataKey(key!, 'report', row)
+  const source = encryptStorageStream(Readable.from([bytes]), dataKey, identity, bytes.length)
+  try { return await raw.put(identity, source, AbortSignal.timeout(STORAGE_WRITE_MS), expected, bytes.length) }
+  finally { source.destroy(); dataKey.fill(0) }
+}
+
+async function convertStoredReport(raw: RawObjectStorage, db: StorageDb, key: StorageKey | null, identity: string, bytes: Buffer,
+  mode: (fresh?: boolean) => Promise<StorageEncryptionState | null>): Promise<null> {
+  const id = await verifyReportConversion(db, identity, bytes)
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt++) {
+    const state = await mode(true)
+    const row = state ? await db.ensureStorageDataKey('report', id) : await db.getStorageRow('report', id)
+    if (!row) throw new Error('Report deleted during compression')
+    const current = await existingReportConversion(raw, identity, row, key, Boolean(state))
+    if (current?.encrypted && (!state || !row.dataKey)) continue
+    // A stale plaintext writer must never replace a concurrent encrypted
+    // winner. Retain the original on uncertain writes; the next open resumes.
+    if ((!current || state && !current.encrypted) &&
+      !await publishReportConversion(raw, identity, bytes, row, key, current?.version ?? null, Boolean(state))) continue
+    if (!state && await mode(true)) continue
+    await raw.sync?.(identity)
+    await finishReportConversion(raw, db, id, Boolean(state))
+    return null
+  }
+  throw new Error('Report changed repeatedly during compression')
+}
+
+// Startup enables encryption before constructing stores; validate the persisted
+// requirement even when this adapter is opened without a key.
+// `known` is the state the caller read a moment before, where it found it
+// enabled, so a cold start reads it once.
+async function storagePolicy(db: StorageDb, key: StorageKey | null, known: StorageEncryptionState | null) {
+  let enabled = known ?? await db.getStorageEncryption()
+  let checkedAt = Date.now()
+  return async (fresh = false) => {
+    // Enabled is irreversible. Keyless instances cache "off" briefly, while
+    // writes and detected ciphertext always recheck the activation fence.
+    if (!enabled && (fresh || key || Date.now() - checkedAt >= STORAGE_DISABLED_TTL_MS)) {
+      const state = await db.getStorageEncryption()
+      if (state) enabled = state // A delayed disabled read cannot undo "on".
+      checkedAt = Date.now()
+    }
+    if (enabled && !key) throw new Error('Managed storage requires its configured encryption key')
+    return enabled
+  }
+}
+
+export async function createEncryptedObjectStorage(raw: RawObjectStorage, db: StorageDb, key: StorageKey | null,
+  known: StorageEncryptionState | null = null): Promise<ObjectStorage> {
+  const mode = await storagePolicy(db, key, known)
+  async function open(identity: string): ReturnType<ObjectStorage['open']> {
+    logicalKey(identity)
+    const state = await mode()
+    if (publicPath(identity)) return raw.open(identity)
+    if (state) return openEncrypted(raw, db, key!, identity, state)
+    const stored = await raw.open(identity)
+    if (!stored) return null
+    const inspected = await inspectStorageObject(stored)
+    // Activation/migration can win after the disabled-state read. Never send
+    // that ciphertext to a caller expecting the original plaintext bytes.
+    if (inspected.encrypted) {
+      let current: StorageEncryptionState | null
+      try { current = await mode(true) } catch (err) { inspected.stream.destroy(); throw err }
+      if (current) { inspected.stream.destroy(); return openEncrypted(raw, db, key!, identity, current) }
+    }
+    return inspected
+  }
+  return {
+    open,
+    get: async identity => readBytes(await open(identity)),
+    async exists(identity) {
+      logicalKey(identity)
+      const owner = storageOwner(identity), state = await mode()
+      if (state && owner) {
+        const row = await db.getStorageRow(owner.type, owner.id)
+        if (!row || (owner.cache ? !row.dataKey : !storageRowPaths(owner.type, row).includes(identity))) return false
+      }
+      // Existence is metadata only; open() authenticates the actual bytes.
+      return await raw.head(state && (owner?.cache || masterKeyCache(identity)) ? encryptedCachePath(identity) : identity) !== null
+    },
+    async put(identity, bytes, { replaceReport = false } = {}) {
+      logicalKey(identity)
+      if (replaceReport) return convertStoredReport(raw, db, key, identity, bytes, mode)
+      const state = await mode()
+      const owner = storageOwner(identity)
+      if (publicPath(identity)) { await raw.put(identity, bytes); return null }
+      if (!state) return putPlaintext(raw, identity, bytes, () => mode(true))
+      let dataKey: Buffer, wrapped: string | null = null
+      if (owner?.cache) {
+        const row = await db.ensureStorageDataKey(owner.type, owner.id)
+        if (!row) throw new Error('Cache owner unavailable')
+        dataKey = unwrapDataKey(key!, owner.type, row)
+      } else if (owner) {
+        if (await db.getStorageRow(owner.type, owner.id)) throw new Error('Stored payloads are immutable')
+        dataKey = randomBytes(32)
+        wrapped = wrapStorageValue(key!, dataKeyIdentity(owner.type, owner.id), dataKey)
+      } else {
+        if (!identity.startsWith('uploads/') && !masterKeyCache(identity)) throw new Error('Unknown managed storage owner')
+        dataKey = Buffer.from(key!.bytes)
+      }
+      const target = owner?.cache || masterKeyCache(identity) ? encryptedCachePath(identity) : identity
+      const encrypted = encryptStorageStream(Readable.from([bytes]), dataKey, identity, bytes.length)
+      try {
+        await raw.put(target, encrypted, AbortSignal.timeout(STORAGE_WRITE_MS), undefined, bytes.length)
+        // A late cache builder must not leave a readable cache for a deleted
+        // bundle. The missing SQL key also makes failed cleanup unreadable.
+        if (owner?.cache && !await db.getStorageRow(owner.type, owner.id)) await raw.delete(target)
+        return wrapped
+      } finally { encrypted.destroy(); dataKey.fill(0) }
+    },
+    async delete(identity) {
+      logicalKey(identity)
+      await mode()
+      // Always remove both generations, including caches predating activation
+      // when migration is disabled or another instance has just enabled it.
+      for (const target of deletionPaths(identity)) await raw.delete(target)
+    },
+    async deletePrefix(prefix, keep) {
+      logicalKey(`${prefix}validate`)
+      if (!prefix.endsWith('/') || (keep !== undefined && (!keep.startsWith(prefix) || !keep.endsWith('/')))) throw new Error('Invalid storage prefix')
+      await mode()
+      const signal = AbortSignal.timeout(STORAGE_WRITE_MS)
+      // What is kept, in the same generation as each removed.
+      const kept = keep === undefined ? [] : deletionPaths(keep)
+      for (const [i, target] of deletionPaths(prefix).entries()) {
+        await deleteObjects(raw, target, signal, undefined, kept[i])
+        await raw.prune?.(target, signal)
+      }
+    },
+  }
+}