@preventive/triage 1.0.0-alpha.2 → 1.0.0-alpha.20

package/{server → server-e2e}/config.ts

@@ -2,15 +2,16 @@
 // vars, the optional config.json) into one immutable `Config`, failing
 // loud on malformed values so a typo surfaces at startup rather than
 // deep in `node:net` / at the first token verification. Pure parsing —
-// no backends opened, no crypto keys derived, no side effects beyond
-// `--help` / fail-fast `process.exit`. index.ts destructures the
-// result and does the wiring (backend selection, password HMAC, …).
+// no backends opened or process termination. Invalid configuration throws so
+// embedding hosts can recover; app.ts handles backend selection and wiring.
 
 import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer'
 import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
-import { argv, env } from 'node:process'
+import { env } from 'node:process'
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
 import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
+import { configuredScanServer } from '../server-common/scan-config.ts'
+import { databaseUrls } from '../server-common/database-config.ts'
 
 export type Config = {
   port: number
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ export type Config = {
   dbPath: string
   objstoreDir: string
   reapIntervalMs: number
+  reapDisabled: boolean
   maxInflightPerSocket: number
   debug: boolean
   neonUrl: string | null
@@ -25,9 +27,10 @@ export type Config = {
   tokenSecret: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> | null
   password: string | null
   trustProxyEnv: string | undefined
+  deepviewScanServer: string | null
 }
 
-// Parse + range-validate an integer env var, exiting with a clear
+// Parse + range-validate an integer env var, throwing a clear
 // up-front message on a malformed value — a NaN from `Number("abc")`
 // otherwise surfaces as a confusing crash deep inside `node:net`
 // (`WebSocketServer({ port: NaN })`) or a 0-ms `setInterval` loop. An
@@ -38,20 +41,28 @@ function intEnv(name: string, def: number, min: number, max: number, hint = ''):
   const raw = env[name]
   const n = raw == null ? def : Number(raw)
   if (!Number.isSafeInteger(n) || n < min || n > max) {
-    console.error(`Invalid ${name}: ${raw} — must be an integer in [${min}, ${max}].${hint ? ` ${hint}` : ''}`)
-    process.exit(1)
+    throw new Error(`Invalid ${name}: ${raw} — must be an integer in [${min}, ${max}].${hint ? ` ${hint}` : ''}`)
   }
   return n
 }
 
-const HELP = `Usage: node server/index.ts
+export const HELP = `Usage: node server-e2e/index.ts
 Environment:
   PORT                       listen port (default 8765)
   HOST                       bind host (default 127.0.0.1)
-  DB_PATH                    sqlite file (default: server/data/data.db);
-                             ignored when DATABASE_URL is set
-  DATABASE_URL               Neon Postgres connection string; if set,
-                             selects the Neon backend instead of
+  DEEPVIEW_SCAN_SERVER       optional HTTP(S) scan-service URL; advertised
+                             in /api/config and allowed by the UI CSP.
+                             Unset by default (no external scan service).
+  DB_PATH                    sqlite file (default: server-e2e/data/data.db);
+                             ignored when an e2e database URL is set
+  DATABASE_URL               shared Neon Postgres URL for enabled modes.
+                             Cannot be combined with E2E_DATABASE_URL
+                             or MANAGED_DATABASE_URL.
+  E2E_DATABASE_URL           e2e-only Neon URL, used without DATABASE_URL.
+                             Combined mode also requires
+                             MANAGED_DATABASE_URL; mixing Neon and
+                             SQLite backends is rejected.
+                             Either e2e URL selects Neon instead of
                              SQLite. Requires the optional peer dep
                              @neondatabase/serverless. The Neon
                              pairing additionally requires
@@ -60,12 +71,12 @@ Environment:
                              local-FS bytes cannot back a multi-
                              replica DB plane.
   BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN      Vercel Blob R/W token (private store).
-                             Required when DATABASE_URL is set;
+                             Required when an e2e database URL is set;
                              ignored otherwise. Requires the optional
                              peer dep @vercel/blob.
   OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET      Base64 (32 bytes) HMAC secret for REST
-                             bearer tokens. REQUIRED when DATABASE_URL
-                             is set (multi-replica deployments: a
+                             bearer tokens. REQUIRED in Neon mode
+                             (multi-replica deployments: a
                              token minted on one replica's WS plane
                              must validate on another replica's REST
                              plane). Optional under SQLite (a fresh
@@ -75,9 +86,15 @@ Environment:
   OBJSTORE_DIR               object store root (default: ./objstore
                              next to DB_PATH). Used by the local-FS
                              byte plane only; ignored when
-                             DATABASE_URL + BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN
-                             are set (bytes live in Vercel Blob).
+                             an e2e database URL selects Neon
+                             (bytes live in Vercel Blob).
   OBJSTORE_REAP_INTERVAL_MS  orphan reaper period (default 600000)
+  OBJSTORE_REAP_DISABLED     set '1' / 'true' to disable automatic orphan
+                             sweeps (boot and periodic). Explicit /api/reap
+                             remains available. Schedule cleanup externally
+                             to avoid accumulating orphaned bytes.
+  CRON_SECRET               bearer secret for GET /api/reap (fails closed
+                             when unset). Runs cleanup for enabled modes.
   TRUST_PROXY                set '1' / 'true' to honour X-Forwarded-
                              Host / X-Forwarded-Proto when computing
                              the same-origin gate's expected origin.
@@ -95,7 +112,7 @@ Environment:
                              that need to deterministically
                              exercise the cap.
   CONFIG_PATH                operator config JSON path (default:
-                             server/config.json). Currently the
+                             server-e2e/config.json). Currently the
                              only field is { "password": "..." }
                              which gates first-action creation of
                              a new workspace on the
@@ -113,11 +130,11 @@ function readServerConfigFile(path: string): ServerConfigFile {
   let raw: string
   try { raw = readFileSync(path, 'utf8') } catch (err) {
     if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException)?.code === 'ENOENT') return {}
-    console.error(`Failed to read ${path}:`, (err as Error)?.message ?? err); process.exit(1)
+    throw new Error(`Failed to read ${path}: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? err}`, { cause: err })
   }
   try { return JSON.parse(raw) as ServerConfigFile }
   catch (err) {
-    console.error(`Failed to parse ${path} as JSON:`, (err as Error)?.message ?? err); process.exit(1)
+    throw new Error(`Failed to parse ${path} as JSON: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? err}`, { cause: err })
   }
 }
 
@@ -132,20 +149,17 @@ function decodeTokenSecret(raw: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {
   // typo-detector below would fail with a misleading message.
   const trimmed = raw.trim()
   if (trimmed.length === 0) {
-    console.error('OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET is empty after trimming whitespace')
-    process.exit(1)
+    throw new Error('OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET is empty after trimming whitespace')
   }
   const decoded = Buffer.from(trimmed, 'base64')
   const reencoded = decoded.toString('base64')
   const norm = (s: string): string => s.replace(/=+$/u, '')
   if (norm(reencoded) !== norm(trimmed)) {
-    console.error('OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET contains non-base64 characters (likely a typo, e.g. base64url chars in a base64 secret).')
-    console.error('Regenerate with: node -e \'console.log(require("crypto").randomBytes(32).toString("base64"))\'')
-    process.exit(1)
+    throw new Error('OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET contains non-base64 characters (likely a typo, e.g. base64url chars in a base64 secret).\n' +
+      'Regenerate with: node -e \'console.log(require("crypto").randomBytes(32).toString("base64"))\'')
   }
   if (decoded.byteLength !== 32) {
-    console.error(`OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET must decode to 32 bytes (got ${decoded.byteLength})`)
-    process.exit(1)
+    throw new Error(`OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET must decode to 32 bytes (got ${decoded.byteLength})`)
   }
   // Copy into a fresh ArrayBuffer so the type matches
   // `Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>` (Buffer may be SharedArrayBuffer-backed).
@@ -156,41 +170,42 @@ export function loadConfig(): Config {
   // 0 = OS-assigned ephemeral port (the test harness boots with PORT=0).
   const port = intEnv('PORT', 8765, 0, 65535)
   const host = env['HOST'] ?? '127.0.0.1'
-  // `fileURLToPath` decodes percent-escapes / non-ASCII path segments
-  // correctly (the older `new URL(...).pathname` left `%20` raw).
+  // `fileURLToPath` decodes percent-escapes / non-ASCII path segments;
+  // `new URL(...).pathname` would leave `%20` raw.
   const dbPath = env['DB_PATH'] ?? fileURLToPath(new URL('./data/data.db', import.meta.url))
   // `path.join` so a Windows DB_PATH doesn't get a mixed-separator child.
   const objstoreDir = env['OBJSTORE_DIR'] ?? join(dirname(dbPath), 'objstore')
   // No practical upper bound beyond the safe-integer range.
   const reapIntervalMs = intEnv('OBJSTORE_REAP_INTERVAL_MS', 10 * 60 * 1000, 1, Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)
+  // Off-switch for automatic orphan reaping (both the boot sweep AND the
+  // periodic timer). '1' / 'true' (case-insensitive) → disabled; anything
+  // else, including unset, leaves it ON. Same boolean shape as TRUST_PROXY.
+  const reapDisabledEnv = env['OBJSTORE_REAP_DISABLED']
+  const reapDisabled = reapDisabledEnv === '1' || reapDisabledEnv?.toLowerCase() === 'true'
   const debug = env['DEBUG'] === '1'
 
   const configPath = env['CONFIG_PATH'] ?? fileURLToPath(new URL('./config.json', import.meta.url))
   const serverConfig = readServerConfigFile(configPath)
   const rawPassword = serverConfig.password
   if (rawPassword != null && typeof rawPassword !== 'string') {
-    console.error(`Invalid ${configPath}: "password" must be a string or null`); process.exit(1)
+    throw new Error(`Invalid ${configPath}: "password" must be a string or null`)
   }
   const password = rawPassword ?? null
   // Upper bound 65_536 — bounds memory under hostile load; a deployer
   // passing MAX_SAFE_INTEGER would silently defeat the cap. Validated
-  // here (after the config.json / password parse) to preserve the
-  // pre-split error-precedence order.
+  // here, after the config.json / password parse, to keep the
+  // error-precedence order.
   const maxInflightPerSocket = intEnv('MAX_INFLIGHT_PER_SOCKET', 64, 1, 65_536)
 
-  if (argv.includes('--help') || argv.includes('-h')) {
-    console.log(HELP)
-    process.exit(0)
-  }
-
-  const neonUrl = env['DATABASE_URL'] ?? null
+  const neonUrl = databaseUrls().e2e
   const blobToken = env['BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN'] ?? null
   const tokenSecretB64 = env['OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET'] ?? null
   const tokenSecret = tokenSecretB64 ? decodeTokenSecret(tokenSecretB64) : null
 
   return {
-    port, host, dbPath, objstoreDir, reapIntervalMs, maxInflightPerSocket,
+    port, host, dbPath, objstoreDir, reapIntervalMs, reapDisabled, maxInflightPerSocket,
     debug, neonUrl, blobToken, tokenSecret, password,
     trustProxyEnv: env['TRUST_PROXY'],
+    deepviewScanServer: configuredScanServer(env['DEEPVIEW_SCAN_SERVER']),
   }
 }

package/{server → server-e2e}/db-neon.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 // dialect on the wire.
 //
 // `@neondatabase/serverless` is an OPTIONAL peer dep — selected by
-// the `DATABASE_URL` branch in `server/index.ts`. The peer dep
+// the configured database URL branch in `server-e2e/index.ts`. The peer dep
 // itself is loaded lazily via the dynamic `import()` inside
 // `openNeonDb` below, so a SQLite-only deployment never installs it
 // (`autoInstallPeers: false` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`) and never
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ export async function openNeonDb(connectionString: string): Promise<Handle> {
   // in-process Postgres (PGlite) via `mock.module`: that hook can only
   // intercept a specifier it can RESOLVE, and the optional peer dep
   // isn't installed in a SQLite-only checkout. The wrapper path always
-  // resolves — see `server/neon-driver.ts`. Cast through `unknown`
+  // resolves — see `server-e2e/neon-driver.ts`. Cast through `unknown`
   // because the wrapper's `export *` re-exports a `@ts-ignore`'d
   // (possibly-absent) module, so tsc can't see `neon`'s type here.
   const mod = (await import('./neon-driver.ts')) as unknown as { neon: (url: string) => NeonSql }

package/{server → server-e2e}/db-revision-sql.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
 // Shared SQL + row-mapping for the `workspace_revision` chain, used by
 // BOTH backends — `./db.ts` (SQLite) and `./db-neon.ts` (Neon/Postgres).
-// The two backends previously carried byte-for-byte-equal query strings
-// (modulo `?`↔`$N` placeholders) and a copy of the same row mapper; that
-// duplication is collapsed here so a query edit can't silently drift
-// between backends.
+// Single source of truth (modulo `?`↔`$N` placeholders) so a query edit
+// can't silently drift between backends.
 //
 // Single source of truth, in `$N` (Postgres) form:
 //   • the read queries (`headFor`, `seqOfId`, `lastKeyframeSeq`, the
@@ -60,11 +58,10 @@ export function numOrNull(v: unknown): number | null {
 // `Record<string, unknown>` rows whose `keyframe` may be a number OR (on
 // a future driver change) a string; `node:sqlite` hands back native
 // numbers. The `num`/`numOrNull` coercion is safe over both — a native
-// `0`/`1` integer passes through unchanged, so SQLite rows round-trip
-// identically to the bespoke pass-through they had before, while Neon
-// rows keep their defensive string→number coercion. `base` is the only
-// nullable column (first revision); `keyframe` collapses to a strict
-// 0 / 1 via the `=== 1` check the chain-broadcast contract relies on.
+// `0`/`1` integer passes through unchanged, while Neon rows keep their
+// defensive string→number coercion. `base` is the only nullable column
+// (first revision); `keyframe` collapses to a strict 0 / 1 via the
+// `=== 1` check the chain-broadcast contract relies on.
 export function mapRevisionRow(r: Record<string, unknown>): RevisionRow {
   return {
     base: (r['base'] as string | null) ?? null,
@@ -109,7 +106,7 @@ export const CHAIN_FROM_SQL =
 export const REVISION_EXISTS_SQL =
   `SELECT 1 AS one FROM workspace_revision WHERE workspace_tag = $1 AND id = $2`
 // Fetch a single revision row by content-addressed id. The cross-instance
-// pubsub (server/pubsub.ts) NOTIFY payload carries only `(tag, revisionId)`
+// pubsub (server-e2e/pubsub.ts) NOTIFY payload carries only `(tag, revisionId)`
 // because the full `workspace-state` broadcast envelope is bounded by
 // `MAX_CIPHERTEXT_LEN` (2 MiB) and Postgres NOTIFY caps payloads at ~8 KB.
 // The receiver re-fetches the row from this shared table to construct the

package/{server → server-e2e}/db-stmt.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-// Shared async-statement primitives. Both `server/db.ts` (workspace_revision
-// chain) and `server/objstore/store.ts` (objstore tables) expose Handles
+// Shared async-statement primitives. Both `server-e2e/db.ts` (workspace_revision
+// chain) and `server-e2e/objstore/store.ts` (objstore tables) expose Handles
 // whose statements look like `{ get(...) → Promise<…>, all(...) → Promise<[…]>,
 // run(...) → Promise<void> }`. The underlying `node:sqlite` driver is
 // synchronous; the wrappers below catch sync errors and route them through

package/{server → server-e2e}/db.ts

@@ -10,49 +10,30 @@
 // `base` points at the previous revision's `id` (or null for the
 // first revision in a workspace).
 //
-// `keyframe` is `1` for a revision the client emits with the full
-// state baked in (rather than just a delta). The wire-level flag
-// is also covered by the signature, so the column value MUST match
-// what the signed canonical bytes claim — `canonicalSave` in
-// `server/sign.ts` (called from `handleSave` in `server/index.ts`)
-// encodes `keyframe ? '1' : ''` into the bytes that `verifyEd25519`
-// then checks against the wire-supplied signature, so a wire flag
-// that doesn't match what the signer hashed fails verify and never
-// reaches this column. Client-driven: the server only stores what
-// the client sent and treats keyframes as catch-up roots when a
-// from=null subscriber arrives.
+// `keyframe` is `1` for a revision the client emits with full state
+// baked in (rather than a delta). The wire flag is covered by the
+// signature, so the column value MUST match the signed canonical
+// bytes: `canonicalSave` (server-e2e/sign.ts, via `handleSave`) encodes
+// `keyframe ? '1' : ''` into the bytes `verifyEd25519` checks, so a
+// mismatched wire flag fails verify and never reaches this column.
+// Client-driven: the server stores what the client sent and treats
+// keyframes as catch-up roots when a from=null subscriber arrives.
 //
 // `node:sqlite` is the built-in driver (Node ≥ 22 experimental,
-// stable in 24+). The driver is synchronous under the hood; the
-// Handle wraps each prepared statement so call sites `await`
-// uniformly. This is async-ready surface for a future async DB
-// backend — every operation today resolves in the current microtask
-// off a sync `node:sqlite` call.
+// stable in 24+), synchronous under the hood; the Handle wraps each
+// prepared statement so call sites `await` uniformly — async-ready
+// surface for a future async DB backend (every op resolves in the
+// current microtask off a sync call).
 //
-// Because operations are now async, two handlers can interleave
-// across an `await`. `commitRevision` (below) does NOT take an
-// in-process lock — it folds the dup recheck, base-equality check,
-// MAX(seq) and INSERT into ONE gated INSERT statement
-// (`commitRevisionSqlite` below):
-//   INSERT … SELECT COALESCE(MAX(seq),0)+1 … WHERE NOT EXISTS(dup)
-//     AND head IS base RETURNING seq
-// `node:sqlite` is synchronous, so that single statement runs to
-// completion without yielding the event loop — no concurrent commit
-// can interleave mid-statement, and the head-check + MAX(seq) read
-// from ONE consistent snapshot. That single-snapshot property is
-// what makes a per-tag lock redundant: the lock formerly existed
-// only to stop a chain fork where a racer read `head` from one
-// snapshot but `MAX(seq)` from a LATER one (after a sibling
-// committed) and inserted (seq=N+2, base=X) alongside the winner's
-// (seq=N+1, base=X) — same base, different seq, no PK conflict. With
-// both reads inside one statement that interleaving is impossible:
-// a racer's snapshot is either before the winner's commit (→ same
-// seq=N+1 → the UNIQUE(workspace_tag, seq) PK rejects the second →
-// recovery → stale-base) or after it (→ head ≠ base → no insert →
-// stale-base). Exactly one commits; the loser gets stale-base.
-// SQLite also serialises writers internally, and the PK backstops
-// the unsupported multi-connection case. See `commitRevisionSqlite`
-// for the full fork-safety argument.
+// Operations being async, two handlers can interleave across an
+// `await`. `commitRevision` (below) takes NO in-process lock — it
+// folds the dup recheck, base-equality check, MAX(seq) and INSERT
+// into ONE gated INSERT (`commitRevisionSqlite`). `node:sqlite` runs
+// that statement to completion without yielding, so its head-check +
+// MAX(seq) read ONE snapshot, which is what makes a per-tag lock
+// redundant. SQLite also serialises writers internally, and the PK
+// backstops the unsupported multi-connection case. See
+// `commitRevisionSqlite` for the full fork-safety argument.
 
 import { DatabaseSync } from 'node:sqlite'
 import { mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'
@@ -64,24 +45,20 @@ import {
   mapRevisionRow, toSqlitePlaceholders,
 } from './db-revision-sql.ts'
 
-// `CHECK (keyframe IN (0, 1))` is the value-domain guard on the
-// keyframe column. STRICT (the table marker) enforces the column's
-// TYPE — an INTEGER stays an INTEGER — but NOT its value range:
-// `keyframe = 2` is a perfectly valid integer that STRICT accepts,
-// which `mapRevisionRow`'s `=== 1` check then silently coerces back to
-// 0. That divergence between the stored row and the signed canonical
-// (which only ever encodes 0 / 1) poisons chain-replay verifies for
-// any peer who recomputes — the same operator-with-direct-DB-write
-// attack vector the STRICT guard in `openDbInner` catches for the
-// column TYPE. The CHECK closes the value-domain half, giving SQLite
-// the protection the Neon schema's identical `CHECK (keyframe IN
-// (0, 1))` carries (see `db-neon.ts`).
+// `CHECK (keyframe IN (0, 1))` is the value-domain guard. STRICT
+// (the table marker) enforces the column TYPE (an INTEGER stays an
+// INTEGER) but NOT its value range: `keyframe = 2` is a valid integer
+// STRICT accepts, which `mapRevisionRow`'s `=== 1` check then coerces
+// back to 0. That divergence from the signed canonical (only ever
+// 0 / 1) poisons chain-replay verifies for any recomputing peer — the
+// same operator-with-direct-DB-write vector the STRICT guard in
+// `openDbInner` catches for TYPE. The CHECK closes the value-domain
+// half, matching the Neon schema's identical CHECK (see `db-neon.ts`).
 //
-// `WORKSPACE_REVISION_DEF` is the parenthesised column + constraint
-// body (plus the STRICT marker), shared by the initial `CREATE TABLE`
-// and the `migrateAddKeyframeCheck` rebuild below — so a table the
-// rebuild produces is byte-identical in shape to a freshly-created
-// one, and a future column edit can't drift the two apart.
+// Parenthesised column + constraint body (plus STRICT marker), shared
+// by the initial `CREATE TABLE` and the `migrateAddKeyframeCheck`
+// rebuild below — so a rebuilt table is byte-identical in shape to a
+// fresh one and a future column edit can't drift the two apart.
 const WORKSPACE_REVISION_DEF = `(
     workspace_tag TEXT NOT NULL,
     seq INTEGER NOT NULL,
@@ -105,10 +82,10 @@ const SCHEMA = `
   ${WORKSPACE_REVISION_TAG_ID_INDEX};
 `
 
-// Row shape returned by the chain queries. SQLite stores `keyframe`
-// as INTEGER (0 / 1); `chainForWire` in server/index.ts normalises
-// to a strict boolean before broadcasting, but the raw row carries
-// the integer. `base` is nullable on the very first revision.
+// Row shape from the chain queries. `keyframe` is stored as INTEGER
+// (0 / 1); the raw row carries the integer — `chainForWire` in
+// server-e2e/index.ts normalises to a strict boolean before broadcasting.
+// `base` is nullable on the very first revision.
 export type RevisionRow = {
   base: string | null
   id: string
@@ -119,9 +96,8 @@ export type RevisionRow = {
 }
 
 // Input to `commitRevision`. `keyframe` is a strict boolean here —
-// the canonical-payload contract uses `=== true`, and the storage
-// path coerces to 0 / 1 via `keyframe ? 1 : 0` before hitting the
-// STRICT INTEGER column.
+// the canonical-payload contract uses `=== true`; the storage path
+// coerces to 0 / 1 before hitting the STRICT INTEGER column.
 export type RevisionInsert = {
   tag: string
   id: string
@@ -142,37 +118,31 @@ export type CommitResult =
   | { kind: 'duplicate' }
   | { kind: 'stale-base'; head: string | null }
 
-// Bag of pre-prepared statements + the underlying connection.
-// Held for the process lifetime; `close()` runs from `shutdown()`.
+// Pre-prepared statements + the underlying connection, held for the
+// process lifetime; `close()` runs from `shutdown()`.
 //
-// `db` is the raw `DatabaseSync` and is SQLite-only. The Neon
-// backend (`./db-neon.ts`) constructs a Handle with `db` unset.
-// Callers that reach into `db` directly (e.g. `openObjstore`,
-// test-only fixture SQL) are SQLite-coupled by construction —
-// passing them a Neon-backed Handle is the operator's mistake to
-// catch at the `if (DATABASE_URL)` switch in `server/index.ts`.
+// `db` is the raw `DatabaseSync`, SQLite-only — the Neon backend
+// (`./db-neon.ts`) constructs a Handle with `db` unset. Callers that
+// reach into `db` directly (e.g. `openObjstore`, test-only fixture
+// SQL) are SQLite-coupled by construction; passing them a Neon-backed
+// Handle is the operator's mistake to catch at the database URL
+// switch in `server-e2e/index.ts`.
 //
-// `tryCommit` is the backend-specific atomic-commit primitive that
+// `tryCommit` is the backend-specific atomic-commit primitive
 // `commitRevision` dispatches through. SQLite runs one synchronous
-// gated INSERT (no in-process lock — `node:sqlite` doesn't yield
-// mid-statement, so the head-check + MAX(seq) read one snapshot;
-// see `commitRevisionSqlite`). Neon wraps the dup-check + head-check
-// + gated INSERT in a pipelined transaction; it relies on Postgres'
-// READ-COMMITTED single-statement snapshot (the gated INSERT's
-// head-check and MAX(seq) read one snapshot) plus the
-// `UNIQUE(workspace_tag, seq)` PK to keep cross-replica racers from
-// forking the chain — see `db-neon.ts`'s `tryCommitNeon`.
+// gated INSERT (see `commitRevisionSqlite`); Neon wraps it in a
+// pipelined transaction (see `db-neon.ts`'s `tryCommitNeon`). Both
+// rely on a single-statement snapshot + the `UNIQUE(workspace_tag,
+// seq)` PK for fork-safety; see those functions for the argument.
 //
 // `gatedInsert` is SQLite-only (like `db`): it backs
-// `commitRevisionSqlite`'s single gated INSERT (the dup-gate +
-// head-equals-base-gate + server-assigned seq folded into one
-// statement, mirroring the Neon path's gated INSERT). The Neon
-// backend leaves it unset — its gated INSERT lives inside the
-// pipelined `sql.transaction([...])`, not a standalone statement
-// object. Kept on the Handle (rather than a module-private closure)
-// so the SQLite white-box tests can wrap `.get` to inject a
-// unique-violation / non-unique failure into the commit, the same
-// recovery paths the Neon suite stages via `failNextCommit`.
+// `commitRevisionSqlite`'s single gated INSERT. The Neon backend
+// leaves it unset — its gated INSERT lives inside the pipelined
+// `sql.transaction([...])`, not a standalone statement object. Kept
+// on the Handle (not a module-private closure) so SQLite white-box
+// tests can wrap `.get` to inject a unique-violation / non-unique
+// failure into the commit, exercising the same recovery paths the
+// Neon suite stages via `failNextCommit`.
 export type Handle = {
   db?: DatabaseSync
   headFor: GetStmt<[string], { id: string }>
@@ -184,7 +154,7 @@ export type Handle = {
   revisionExists: GetStmt<[string, string], unknown>
   // Single-revision fetch by content-addressed id. The cross-instance
   // pubsub receiver uses this to assemble a `workspace-state` from a
-  // NOTIFY hint (see `server/pubsub.ts`).
+  // NOTIFY hint (see `server-e2e/pubsub.ts`).
   revisionById: GetStmt<[string, string], RevisionRow>
   gatedInsert?: GetStmt<[string, string, string | null, number, string, string, string, number], { seq: number }>
   tryCommit: (input: RevisionInsert) => Promise<CommitResult>
@@ -192,23 +162,22 @@ export type Handle = {
 }
 
 // Narrowing alias for the SQLite-backed Handle: `db` is guaranteed
-// to be set. `openDb` returns this so call sites that need direct
+// set. `openDb` returns this so call sites needing direct
 // `DatabaseSync` access (e.g. `openObjstore(handle.db, …)` in
-// `server/index.ts`'s SQLite branch) can reach `handle.db` without
-// an optional-chain or non-null assertion. A Neon-backed Handle
-// (`openNeonDb`) keeps the wider `db?: DatabaseSync` shape; routing
-// a Neon Handle into a SQLite-coupled call site is a compile-time
-// error. Mirrors the same pattern in `server/objstore/store.ts`.
+// `server-e2e/index.ts`'s SQLite branch) reach `handle.db` without an
+// optional-chain or non-null assertion. A Neon-backed Handle
+// (`openNeonDb`) keeps the wider `db?: DatabaseSync` shape, so routing
+// one into a SQLite-coupled call site is a compile-time error. Mirrors
+// `server-e2e/objstore/store.ts`.
 export type SqliteHandle = Handle & { db: DatabaseSync }
 
 export function openDb(path: string): SqliteHandle {
   mkdirSync(dirname(path), { recursive: true })
   const db = new DatabaseSync(path)
-  // Any throw between the DatabaseSync constructor and the return
-  // would otherwise leak the underlying file / WAL / shm locks until
-  // process exit — close before re-raising so the operator can fix
-  // the underlying issue (failed STRICT check, ALTER TABLE error,
-  // …) and re-run without a stale lock pinning the file.
+  // A throw between the DatabaseSync constructor and the return would
+  // leak the file / WAL / shm locks until process exit — close before
+  // re-raising so the operator can fix the cause (failed STRICT check,
+  // ALTER TABLE error, …) and re-run without a stale lock on the file.
   try {
     return openDbInner(db)
   } catch (err) {
@@ -218,35 +187,30 @@ export function openDb(path: string): SqliteHandle {
 }
 
 function openDbInner(db: DatabaseSync): SqliteHandle {
-  // WAL gives concurrent readers + faster writes and survives
-  // crashes between commits without corrupting the file. Foreign
-  // keys aren't strictly needed here (single-table schema) but
-  // turning them on preserves the option to add referential
-  // tables later without revisiting init.
+  // WAL gives concurrent readers + faster writes and survives crashes
+  // between commits without corrupting the file. Foreign keys aren't
+  // needed here (single-table schema) but turning them on keeps the
+  // option to add referential tables later without revisiting init.
   db.exec('PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;')
   // FULL (not NORMAL): the server emits `workspace-save-ack` BEFORE
-  // returning to the event loop after `commitRevision`. With NORMAL,
-  // SQLite only fsyncs at WAL checkpoint, so a power loss between
-  // ack and the next checkpoint loses the row even though the
-  // originator and broadcast peers were told the revision committed.
-  // FULL fsyncs per commit; durability matches the contract the
-  // ack implies. Trade-off is per-commit fsync latency, acceptable
-  // for the protocol's edit-driven write pattern (triage edits, not
-  // streaming throughput). Audit round-9 M1.
+  // returning to the event loop after `commitRevision`. NORMAL only
+  // fsyncs at WAL checkpoint, so a power loss between ack and the next
+  // checkpoint loses a row the originator + peers were told committed.
+  // FULL fsyncs per commit, matching the durability the ack implies.
+  // Trade-off is per-commit fsync latency, acceptable for the edit-
+  // driven write pattern (triage edits, not streaming). Audit round-9 M1.
   db.exec('PRAGMA synchronous = FULL;')
   db.exec('PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;')
   db.exec(SCHEMA)
   // Fail-loud on a pre-existing non-STRICT table — `CREATE TABLE IF
-  // NOT EXISTS … STRICT` is a no-op when the table already exists,
-  // so a deployment that predates the STRICT marker would silently
-  // keep its non-STRICT shape. Without STRICT, an operator with
-  // direct DB write access could insert mis-typed rows (e.g. a
-  // `keyframe = "1\nfoo"` text value in the INTEGER column) and
-  // poison the chain — the signed canonical the client originally
-  // hashed says `keyframe = 1`, but the stored `keyframe = "1\nfoo"`
-  // round-trips back into the canonical as a different string,
-  // making every subsequent verify fail. Operator must migrate
-  // before this server boots.
+  // NOT EXISTS … STRICT` is a no-op when the table exists, so a
+  // deployment predating the STRICT marker keeps its non-STRICT shape.
+  // Without STRICT, an operator with direct DB write access could
+  // insert mis-typed rows (e.g. `keyframe = "1\nfoo"` text in the
+  // INTEGER column) and poison the chain: the signed canonical says
+  // `keyframe = 1`, but the stored text round-trips into the canonical
+  // as a different string, failing every subsequent verify. Operator
+  // must migrate before this server boots.
   const meta = db.prepare(
     `SELECT strict FROM pragma_table_list WHERE schema = 'main' AND name = 'workspace_revision'`,
   ).get() as { strict: number } | undefined
@@ -254,13 +218,11 @@ function openDbInner(db: DatabaseSync): SqliteHandle {
     throw new Error('workspace_revision is non-STRICT — migrate via rename+create+copy before booting')
   }
   // Idempotent migration for DBs created before the keyframe column
-  // existed. Inspect the column list rather than catching every
-  // ALTER error — the previous shape swallowed `try { ALTER } catch
-  // {}` for ANY failure (lock contention, disk full, corrupt page),
-  // masking real problems as "column already exists". Now we only
-  // ALTER when the column is genuinely missing, and any failure of
-  // the ALTER itself bubbles up as an open-time crash where the
-  // operator can act on it.
+  // existed. Inspect the column list rather than `try { ALTER } catch
+  // {}`: a blanket catch swallows ANY failure (lock contention, disk
+  // full, corrupt page) as "column already exists". ALTER only when
+  // the column is genuinely missing, so an ALTER failure bubbles up as
+  // an open-time crash the operator can act on.
   const columns = db.prepare(`PRAGMA table_info(workspace_revision)`).all() as Array<{ name: string }>
   if (!columns.some((c) => c.name === 'keyframe')) {
     // ADD COLUMN carries the CHECK so a legacy DB migrating up lands
@@ -507,9 +469,8 @@ export function commitRevision(handle: Handle, input: RevisionInsert): Promise<C
 //     base gate fails → `stale-base`.
 //   • Two retransmits with the same id: the second's dup gate fails →
 //     `duplicate`.
-// These are PROVEN green, unchanged, by the no-fork concurrency tests
-// in `tests/server-db.test.js` (two/N concurrent same-base, mixed,
-// chainFrom-during-commits) which now pass with no lock present.
+// Covered by the no-fork concurrency tests in `tests/server-db.test.js`
+// (two/N concurrent same-base, mixed, chainFrom-during-commits).
 //
 // SQLite serialises writers internally even ACROSS connections, but a
 // multi-connection deployment is unsupported regardless. The