@phnx-labs/agents-cli 1.22.83 → 1.22.85

package/dist/lib/secrets/audit.d.ts

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-export type SecretAuditEvent = 'secrets.get' | 'secrets.unlocked' | 'secrets.create' | 'secrets.import' | 'secrets.export' | 'secrets.view' | 'secrets.lease-denied' | 'secrets.lease-expire';
-export interface SecretAuditParams {
-    /** Which audit event this is — a read (`secrets.get`) or an unlock grant. */
-    event: SecretAuditEvent;
-    /** Bundle name (never a value). */
-    bundle?: string;
-    /** Raw keychain item/service name for `secrets get <item>` (never a value). */
-    item?: string;
-    /** Free-form operation/caller label, e.g. 'export to shell', 'unlock'. */
-    operation?: string;
-    /**
-     * Where the read/grant originated: agent | session | reveal | raw-item |
-     * remote | sync-push | broker | broker+durable.
-     */
-    source?: string;
-    status?: 'success' | 'error';
-    /** Env/key NAMES exposed — names only, never values. */
-    keys?: string[];
-    keyCount?: number;
-    /** Subset of `keys` backed by the OS keychain — names only. */
-    keychainKeys?: string[];
-    /** Count of resolved values by kind (literal / keychain / env / ...). */
-    kindCounts?: Record<string, number>;
-    /**
-     * Resolving agent/harness identity the access was scoped to (`*` = a global
-     * grant readable by every harness). Falls back to `$AGENTS_AGENT_NAME`.
-     */
-    agent?: string;
-    /** Remote host the value was pulled from, when applicable. */
-    host?: string;
-    /** Grant lifetime in ms (`secrets.unlocked` only). */
-    ttlMs?: number;
-    error?: string;
-}
-/**
- * The agent/harness identity to attribute a secret access to. Explicit callers
- * (the bundle reader knows the scope it resolved under) win; otherwise fall back
- * to the ambient `$AGENTS_AGENT_NAME` set on every agent launch.
- */
-export declare function resolveAuditAgent(explicit?: string): string | undefined;
-/**
- * Emit one value-free secret audit event to the raw/operational event stream and
- * the persisted audit log. Only ever pass metadata — the secret value must never
- * reach this function.
- */
-export declare function emitSecretAudit(p: SecretAuditParams): void;

package/dist/lib/secrets/audit.js

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Canonical audit emitter for every `agents secrets` lifecycle/access event.
- *
- * This is the ONE write path for secret events. Every path that creates,
- * imports, exports, views, reads a VALUE from, or unlocks a bundle funnels its
- * audit through here, so the operational event stream — `agents events`, backed
- * by the dated append-only `~/.agents/.history/events/` audit log — carries a uniform,
- * value-free provenance record: bundle, key NAMES, the resolving agent/harness
- * identity, operation, source, status. The ts / host / session / caller fields
- * are filled in by `emit()` itself. The secret VALUE is never part of the
- * payload; this helper only ever receives metadata, and `emit()`'s
- * `sanitizePayload` is a second redaction layer.
- *
- * The same call also mirrors the event into the per-bundle usage read-model DB
- * (`~/.agents/secrets/secrets.db`, lib/secrets/usage-db.ts) so `secrets view` /
- * `list` / `activity` can answer "how often / how recently / by whom was this
- * bundle used?" without scanning the whole event stream — a DERIVED index fed
- * off this chokepoint, not a second write path a caller has to remember.
- *
- * The event vocabulary, all audit-level and non-milestone (so they surface in
- * `agents events` and the persisted audit trail, but are NOT required in the
- * curated `agents feed` surface):
- *  - `secrets.get`      — a value was READ (exec inject, export, `view --reveal`,
- *                         raw `get <item>`, remote resolve, sync push,
- *                         `run --secrets`, and every other bundle read).
- *  - `secrets.unlocked` — a bundle was GRANTED into the secrets broker / durable
- *                         session by `agents secrets unlock`, then readable
- *                         prompt-free for the grant TTL.
- *  - `secrets.create`   — a new bundle was created.
- *  - `secrets.import`   — keys were imported into a bundle (file / ssh / 1password).
- *  - `secrets.export`   — a bundle's values were exported (file / shell / ssh /
- *                         1password). Exporting also READS the values, so the
- *                         underlying resolve emits its own `secrets.get`.
- *  - `secrets.view`     — a bundle's (masked) metadata was inspected via `view`.
- */
-import { emit } from '../feed/events.js';
-import { recordSecretUsage } from './usage-db.js';
-/**
- * Map each audit event onto the usage-DB kind it is counted as. `secrets.get` is
- * the injection/read access; the rest map 1:1 to their lifecycle kind.
- */
-const USAGE_KIND = {
-    'secrets.get': 'access',
-    'secrets.unlocked': 'unlock',
-    'secrets.create': 'create',
-    'secrets.import': 'import',
-    'secrets.export': 'export',
-    'secrets.view': 'view',
-    'secrets.lease-denied': 'access',
-    'secrets.lease-expire': 'access',
-};
-/**
- * The agent/harness identity to attribute a secret access to. Explicit callers
- * (the bundle reader knows the scope it resolved under) win; otherwise fall back
- * to the ambient `$AGENTS_AGENT_NAME` set on every agent launch.
- */
-export function resolveAuditAgent(explicit) {
-    const a = explicit || process.env.AGENTS_AGENT_NAME;
-    return a && a.length > 0 ? a : undefined;
-}
-/**
- * Emit one value-free secret audit event to the raw/operational event stream and
- * the persisted audit log. Only ever pass metadata — the secret value must never
- * reach this function.
- */
-export function emitSecretAudit(p) {
-    const agent = resolveAuditAgent(p.agent);
-    emit(p.event, {
-        module: 'secrets',
-        ...(p.bundle !== undefined ? { bundle: p.bundle } : {}),
-        ...(p.item !== undefined ? { item: p.item } : {}),
-        ...(p.operation !== undefined ? { operation: p.operation } : {}),
-        ...(p.source !== undefined ? { source: p.source } : {}),
-        ...(p.status !== undefined ? { status: p.status } : {}),
-        ...(p.keys !== undefined ? { keys: p.keys } : {}),
-        ...(p.keyCount !== undefined ? { keyCount: p.keyCount } : {}),
-        ...(p.keychainKeys !== undefined ? { keychainKeys: p.keychainKeys } : {}),
-        ...(p.kindCounts !== undefined ? { kindCounts: p.kindCounts } : {}),
-        ...(agent !== undefined ? { agent } : {}),
-        ...(p.host !== undefined ? { host: p.host } : {}),
-        ...(p.ttlMs !== undefined ? { ttlMs: p.ttlMs } : {}),
-        ...(p.error !== undefined ? { error: p.error } : {}),
-    });
-    // Mirror the event into the per-bundle usage read-model so `secrets view` /
-    // `list` / `activity` can report frequency and recency without scanning the
-    // whole event stream. Fed off THIS chokepoint alongside the events.jsonl
-    // write, never a second write path. Per-bundle only — a raw `secrets get
-    // <item>` has no bundle, so it stays in the events.jsonl audit but is not
-    // counted as bundle usage. Best-effort inside usage-db (swallows errors).
-    if (p.bundle) {
-        recordSecretUsage({
-            bundle: p.bundle,
-            event: USAGE_KIND[p.event],
-            agent,
-            host: p.host,
-            source: p.source,
-            status: p.status,
-            keyCount: p.keyCount,
-        });
-    }
-}

package/dist/lib/secrets/bundles.d.ts

@@ -1,290 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Secret bundles — named sets of environment variables backed by a secret store.
- * Metadata lives under `agents-cli.bundles.<name>`; values under
- * `agents-cli.secrets.<bundle>.<key>`. Backends: `keychain` (default),
- * `file` (headless/passphrase), and `vault` (age-encrypted, user-synced).
- */
-import { type BundleValue, type SecretRef } from './index.js';
-/** Which store carries a bundle's items. */
-export type SecretsBackend = 'keychain' | 'file' | 'vault';
-/** Disable the broker-only guard for in-memory keychain tests. */
-export declare function setKeychainAgentOnlyBypassForTest(bypass: boolean): void;
-/**
- * Discover a bundle's backend by location. File store is checked first (a plain
- * existence test, no passphrase); absent/locked vault falls back to keychain.
- */
-export declare function bundleBackend(name: string): SecretsBackend;
-/** Allowed values for a secret's `type` metadata field. */
-export declare const SECRET_TYPES: readonly ["api-key", "token", "password", "url", "database-url", "ssh-key", "certificate", "webhook", "note"];
-export type SecretType = typeof SECRET_TYPES[number];
-/** Per-secret metadata; absent fields are omitted at write time. */
-export interface VarMeta {
-    type?: SecretType;
-    /** Future-dated ISO date ('YYYY-MM-DD'). */
-    expires?: string;
-    note?: string;
-}
-/**
- * Bundle prompt policy. `hold` (default): one Touch ID per hold window (~7d),
- * then silent via the secrets-agent. `always`: prompt every read. `never`: no
- * biometry ACL — least-safe, automation-only. Configurable via `secrets.policy`;
- * persisted under the legacy `tier` key for cross-version sync.
- */
-export type SecretsPolicy = 'always' | 'hold' | 'never';
-/** A named set of environment variable definitions backed by secret stores. */
-export interface SecretsBundle {
-    name: string;
-    description?: string;
-    allow_exec?: boolean;
-    /** Absent ⇒ `keychain`. */
-    backend?: SecretsBackend;
-    /** Absent ⇒ configured default (`hold`). */
-    policy?: SecretsPolicy;
-    created_at?: string;
-    updated_at?: string;
-    last_used?: string;
-    vars: Record<string, BundleValue>;
-    meta?: Record<string, VarMeta>;
-}
-export interface LegacyBundleCandidate {
-    name: string;
-    file: string;
-    keys: string[];
-}
-export declare const BUNDLE_NAME_PATTERN: RegExp;
-export declare const ENV_KEY_PATTERN: RegExp;
-export declare const BUNDLE_KEY_PATTERN: RegExp;
-export declare const BUNDLE_META_PREFIX = "agents-cli.bundles.";
-export declare const RESERVED_ENV_NAMES: Set<string>;
-/**
- * Reserved FILE-BACKED bundle for long-lived setup tokens. Must be file-backed;
- * a keychain/vault `auth` bundle is a misconfiguration and is ignored.
- */
-export declare const AUTH_BUNDLE_NAME = "auth";
-export declare const AUTH_BUNDLE_BACKEND: SecretsBackend;
-export declare const RESERVED_BUNDLE_NAMES: Set<string>;
-export declare function isReservedBundleName(name: string): boolean;
-/** Thrown when a reserved bundle is written or resolved on the wrong backend. */
-export declare class ReservedBundleWrongBackendError extends Error {
-    readonly bundle: string;
-    readonly backend: SecretsBackend;
-    constructor(bundle: string, backend: SecretsBackend);
-}
-/** Fail loud when a reserved bundle is on the wrong backend. */
-export declare function assertReservedBundleBackend(name: string, backend: SecretsBackend): void;
-/**
- * Check the reserved `auth` bundle. `ok` is true when absent or file-backed.
- *
- * Read-only status probe (`agents doctor`, `agents fleet apply`) — unlike the
- * destructive-write guards `bundleExists()`/`hasKeychainToken()` document
- * themselves as failing loud for, a diagnostic MUST NOT crash the whole
- * command because ONE optional finding could not reach the keychain (e.g. the
- * macOS Keychain helper source is unavailable — PHNX-3385). Treat an
- * unreachable keychain the same as "bundle absent": nothing to warn about.
- */
-export declare function inspectReservedAuthBundle(): {
-    exists: boolean;
-    backend: SecretsBackend | null;
-    ok: boolean;
-};
-/**
- * After a file-backed import, verify the keys actually decrypt. Import used to
- * report success for ciphertext sealed under a forwarded passphrase this process
- * does not hold.
- */
-export declare function assertFileBundleDecryptable(name: string, keys: string[]): void;
-export declare function bundleToEnvPrefix(name: string): string;
-export declare function isReservedEnvName(key: string): boolean;
-export declare function bundleKeyToEnvKey(key: string): string;
-export declare function isLoaderOrInterpreterEnv(name: string): boolean;
-export declare function sanitizeProcessEnv(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
-/** Validate a bundle name against the allowed pattern. Throws on invalid input. */
-export declare function validateBundleName(name: string): void;
-export declare function validateEnvKey(key: string): void;
-/** Assert that `t` is one of the known SECRET_TYPES. Throws with the allowed list otherwise. */
-export declare function validateSecretType(t: string): asserts t is SecretType;
-/**
- * Validate a future `expires` date. Accepts strict 'YYYY-MM-DD'; end-of-day UTC
- * means "today" is past.
- */
-export declare function validateExpiresFutureDated(iso: string): void;
-export declare function bundleExists(name: string): boolean;
-/**
- * Thrown for file-store ciphertext that will not decrypt (lost/rotated key or
- * tampered store). Narrow: temporarily-locked bundles are recoverable and must
- * not be collapsed here.
- */
-export declare class BundleUndecryptableError extends Error {
-    constructor(message: string);
-}
-/**
- * Read a bundle, returning null only when metadata is present but permanently
- * unreadable (`BundleUndecryptableError`). Other failures — including temporary
- * lockout — rethrow so a healthy bundle is never deleted by mistake.
- */
-export declare function readBundleIfDecryptable(name: string): SecretsBundle | null;
-export declare function readBundle(name: string): SecretsBundle;
-/** Default policy for bundles without an explicit one (`secrets.policy`). */
-export declare function secretsDefaultPolicy(): SecretsPolicy;
-/** Effective prompt policy of a bundle. */
-export declare function bundlePolicy(bundle: SecretsBundle): SecretsPolicy;
-/** Options for writeBundle. */
-export interface WriteBundleOptions {
-    /**
-     * Skip evicting the broker-held copy. Only for no-op writers such as
-     * stampLastUsed; mutating writes must evict so stale values aren't served.
-     */
-    skipBrokerEviction?: boolean;
-}
-/**
- * Whether a bundle write should evict the broker-held copy. Exported for tests.
- * Skips when the writer opted out, the broker is disabled, or a test backend is
- * active (so tests don't evict the user's real unlocks).
- */
-export declare function shouldEvictAfterBundleWrite(skipRequested: boolean, noAgentEnv: string | undefined, backendOverridden: boolean): boolean;
-export declare function writeBundle(bundle: SecretsBundle, opts?: WriteBundleOptions): void;
-export declare function writeBundleWithItems(bundle: SecretsBundle, items: Map<string, string>, opts?: WriteBundleOptions): void;
-export declare function deleteBundle(name: string): boolean;
-declare function readBundleMetaIndex(): string[] | null;
-declare function writeBundleMetaIndex(services: string[]): void;
-declare function addBundleToMetaIndex(name: string): void;
-declare function removeBundleFromMetaIndex(name: string): void;
-/** Test-only accessors for the metadata-name index. Never called in production. */
-export declare const __metaIndexForTest: {
-    read: typeof readBundleMetaIndex;
-    write: typeof writeBundleMetaIndex;
-    add: typeof addBundleToMetaIndex;
-    remove: typeof removeBundleFromMetaIndex;
-};
-/**
- * Re-write keychain metadata items without the biometry ACL. The caller supplies
- * the JSON already read, so contents are preserved and no extra read is issued.
- * Exported for tests.
- */
-export declare function healKeychainBundleMetadata(metaJsonByName: Map<string, string>): number;
-/**
- * One-time driver for healKeychainBundleMetadata. macOS + real keychain only;
- * gated by a sentinel. Best-effort: a heal failure never breaks listing.
- */
-export declare function healKeychainBundleMetadataAclOnce(metaJsonByName: Map<string, string>): void;
-export declare function listBundles(): SecretsBundle[];
-export interface BundleEntryInfo {
-    key: string;
-    kind: 'literal' | 'keychain' | 'env' | 'file' | 'exec';
-    detail: string;
-}
-export declare function describeBundle(bundle: SecretsBundle): BundleEntryInfo[];
-export declare function stampLastUsed(bundle: SecretsBundle): void;
-/** Options for resolveBundleEnv. */
-export interface ResolveBundleOptions {
-    caller?: string;
-    /** Harness type whose unlock may be reused. */
-    agent?: string;
-    /** Duration shown in the Touch ID prompt. */
-    duration?: string;
-    /** Allow this call to raise an interactive biometric prompt. */
-    interactiveUnlock?: boolean;
-    /** Skip the broker fast-path and read from the keychain directly. */
-    noAgent?: boolean;
-    /** Resolve only from an already-unlocked broker snapshot; fail before prompting. */
-    agentOnly?: boolean;
-    /** Inject only these keys. Errors if any requested key is absent. */
-    keys?: string[];
-    /** Skip the per-key expiry gate. */
-    allowExpired?: boolean;
-    /** `process` projects dotted keys to shell-safe env names; `storage` preserves them. */
-    keyMode?: 'process' | 'storage';
-}
-export declare function canCacheResolvedEnv(bundle: SecretsBundle, selectedKeys: Set<string>, keyMode: ResolveBundleOptions['keyMode']): boolean;
-/**
- * Apply --keys and --allow-expired to a broker snapshot so the fast path
- * mirrors the slow path's gates. Exported for tests.
- */
-export declare function filterAgentHitBySubsetAndExpiry(hit: {
-    bundle: SecretsBundle;
-    env: Record<string, string>;
-}, opts: ResolveBundleOptions): {
-    bundle: SecretsBundle;
-    env: Record<string, string>;
-};
-/**
- * Fail loud when remote bundle resolution is asked for flags the SSH resolver
- * does not yet thread. Exported so callers share the same error text.
- */
-export declare function assertRemoteBundleFlagsUnsupported(bundleName: string, host: string, opts: {
-    keys?: string[];
-    allowExpired?: boolean;
-}, flagLabels: {
-    keysFlag: string;
-    allowExpiredFlag: string;
-}): void;
-export declare function resolveBundleEnv(bundle: SecretsBundle, _opts?: ResolveBundleOptions): Record<string, string>;
-/**
- * True when the current process is a background / non-interactive context that
- * must NEVER raise a Keychain biometry prompt on the interactive user's screen.
- * Re-exported from ./headless.js — the detector lives there so the raw-read
- * path in index.ts can share it without a bundles↔index import cycle. See that
- * module for the full contract.
- */
-export { isHeadlessSecretsContext, isAgentInvocationContext } from './headless.js';
-/**
- * Read a bundle's metadata AND resolve its env in a single Touch ID prompt.
- * `readBundle` + `resolveBundleEnv` used to issue two LAContext calls (two
- * prompts). This collapses them into one batch that includes the metadata item.
- */
-export declare function readAndResolveBundleEnv(name: string, opts?: ResolveBundleOptions): {
-    bundle: SecretsBundle;
-    env: Record<string, string>;
-};
-export declare function humanUnlockDuration(ms: number): string;
-export declare function keychainRef(key: string): string;
-/** Options for rotateBundleSecret. */
-export interface RotateOptions {
-    /** New plaintext value to write into keychain (replaces the old one). */
-    newValue: string;
-    /** When true, drop existing meta for this key. Mutually exclusive with `meta`. */
-    clearMeta?: boolean;
-    /** Patch to merge into existing meta. Undefined fields preserve current values. */
-    meta?: Partial<VarMeta>;
-}
-/**
- * Rotate a keychain-backed secret. Errors if the key is absent; preserves meta
- * unless cleared or patched.
- */
-export declare function rotateBundleSecret(bundle: SecretsBundle, key: string, opts: RotateOptions): void;
-/**
- * Reconcile keychain value items to the bundle's current policy. macOS gates
- * reads on each item's ACL, not the bundle's declared policy, so a policy change
- * alone would leave stale ACLs. hold/always → never strips ACL; never → *
- * re-attaches it. Non-keychain backends no-op.
- */
-export declare function reAclBundleItems(bundle: SecretsBundle): void;
-/** Options for renameBundle. */
-export interface RenameOptions {
-    /** Overwrite an existing destination bundle. */
-    force?: boolean;
-}
-/**
- * Rename a bundle: copy metadata + keychain values to the new name, then delete
- * the source. Steps are ordered so a copy-phase failure leaves the source intact.
- */
-export declare function renameBundle(oldName: string, newName: string, opts?: RenameOptions): void;
-/**
- * The item store (keychain or encrypted file) for a bundle's per-key secrets.
- * Pass the resolved backend (`bundle.backend ?? 'keychain'`).
- */
-export declare function bundleItemStore(backend: SecretsBackend | undefined, opts?: {
-    noAcl?: boolean;
-}): {
-    set(item: string, value: string): void;
-    delete(item: string): boolean;
-    get(item: string): string;
-    has(item: string): boolean;
-};
-export declare function keychainItemsForBundle(bundle: SecretsBundle): Array<{
-    key: string;
-    item: string;
-}>;
-export declare function parseDotenv(content: string): Record<string, string>;
-export declare function migrateLegacyBundles(confirmBundle: (candidate: LegacyBundleCandidate) => boolean | Promise<boolean>): Promise<number>;
-export type { SecretRef };