@phnx-labs/agents-cli 1.22.83 → 1.22.85

package/dist/lib/secrets-client.js

@@ -0,0 +1,710 @@
+/**
+ * secrets-client.ts — the ONE process client through which agents-cli talks to
+ * the standalone `secrets` CLI (PHNX-3989).
+ *
+ * This is the agents-owned half of the secrets extraction: a bounded
+ * request/response client over the standalone executable's private consumer
+ * pipe. It carries NO storage, provider, or broker implementation — every
+ * operation is resolved by spawning `secrets __serve` and exchanging one JSON
+ * message over inherited pipes (delta-spec RPC-1). The engine lives entirely in
+ * the standalone package; agents-cli never rebundles it (DIST-1), so there is
+ * deliberately NO fallback to the in-repo `cli/src/lib/secrets/` engine — a
+ * missing executable fails loud with install guidance.
+ *
+ * Transport (matches secrets-cli/src/protocol-server.ts `runProtocolServer`):
+ *   - the child reads the request JSON from fd 3 (to EOF) and writes the
+ *     response JSON to fd 4; nothing is ever written to the child's stdout.
+ *   - async: `spawn` with stdio ['ignore','ignore','inherit','pipe','pipe'];
+ *     write+end child.stdio[3], read child.stdio[4] to EOF.
+ *   - sync: `spawnSync` only wires stdio 0-2 portably (Bun drops numbered fds
+ *     3+), so the fd 3/4 wiring is done in a POSIX shell: the request rides a
+ *     named FIFO fed by a backgrounded `cat` (fd 3), and fd 4 is redirected onto
+ *     the child's stdout (`4>&1`), which `spawnSync` captures natively on every
+ *     runtime. Bounded to `SYNC_SERVE_TIMEOUT_MS` so a broken standalone fails
+ *     fast, never for the server's 60s deadline. POSIX only; Windows has no
+ *     `mkfifo` and fails loud pointing at the async path.
+ *
+ * State root (MIG-1): the standalone selects its state root from `SECRETS_HOME`.
+ * agents-cli points it at the user agents dir (`~/.agents`) by default so the
+ * user's existing stores are adopted in place — no copy, no re-encryption. An
+ * explicit `SECRETS_HOME` in the environment wins (test isolation, power users),
+ * matching the standalone's own `state.ts` precedence.
+ *
+ * Policy (CTX-1): agents-cli passes its harness name as the opaque `scope` and,
+ * when a request must be bounded, a resource-profile-filtered `allowedBundles`
+ * set. Computing that policy stays in agents-cli (the caller supplies `context`);
+ * this client only forwards it.
+ *
+ * The typed shapes are imported `type`-only from `./secrets-types.js`, a pure
+ * re-declaration of the standalone's wire types (no runtime code, nothing in
+ * the npm tarball beyond the erased type import) — this repo's own in-process
+ * engine (`cli/src/lib/secrets/**`) is gone (PHNX-3989 Track D); the standalone
+ * `@phnx-labs/secrets-cli` package is the only implementation.
+ */
+import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { findExecutable } from './platform/exec.js';
+import { getUserAgentsDir } from './state.js';
+/**
+ * Wire contract, mirrored from `secrets-cli/src/protocol.ts`. Both sides MUST
+ * agree byte-for-byte; this is the shared schema of the seam, the one thing an
+ * independent client legitimately re-declares rather than imports.
+ */
+export const PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1;
+const MAX_PROTOCOL_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
+/** Just over the server's own 60s deadline, so the server times out first. */
+const SERVE_TIMEOUT_MS = 65_000;
+/**
+ * The synchronous path only serves read-only STATUS surfaces — `agents view`,
+ * the account-catalog rows, and run-config / account-rotation resolution on the
+ * `agents run` hot path. Those must never hang the whole render or launch on a
+ * missing or unreachable standalone, so the sync serve carries a short, hard
+ * bound instead of the async path's 65s: a broken `secrets` fails loud in a few
+ * seconds and the caller renders the rest of its output (or launches on the
+ * native login) with one clear line, rather than sitting for the standalone's
+ * own 60s deadline (the exact 60s hang PHNX-3989 hit when the child ran under
+ * Bun). A real sync op (a handshake, a bundle list, one item read) completes in
+ * tens of milliseconds, so this is ~100x headroom. It is NOT a fallback to the
+ * embedded engine (DIST-1); the standalone stays the only implementation, it
+ * just fails fast.
+ */
+const SYNC_SERVE_TIMEOUT_MS = 3_000;
+/** Serialize `Map`s the way the server's `decodeWire` expects to receive them. */
+export function encodeWire(value) {
+    if (value instanceof Map) {
+        return { $map: [...value.entries()].map(([key, item]) => [key, encodeWire(item)]) };
+    }
+    if (Array.isArray(value))
+        return value.map(encodeWire);
+    if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {
+        return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(value).map(([key, item]) => [key, encodeWire(item)]));
+    }
+    return value === undefined ? null : value;
+}
+/** Reconstruct `Map`s from the server's `encodeWire`'d reply. */
+export function decodeWire(value) {
+    if (Array.isArray(value))
+        return value.map(decodeWire);
+    if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {
+        const object = value;
+        if (Object.keys(object).length === 1 && Array.isArray(object.$map)) {
+            if (object.$map.some((entry) => !Array.isArray(entry) || entry.length !== 2 || typeof entry[0] !== 'string')) {
+                throw new SecretsClientError('INVALID_RESPONSE', 'Invalid map encoding in secrets response');
+            }
+            return new Map(object.$map.map(([key, item]) => [key, decodeWire(item)]));
+        }
+        return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(object).map(([key, item]) => [key, decodeWire(item)]));
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+/** Carries the server's `{code, message}`, or a client-side transport code. */
+export class SecretsClientError extends Error {
+    code;
+    constructor(code, message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.code = code;
+        this.name = 'SecretsClientError';
+    }
+    /**
+     * Serialize to a plain `{code, message}`. A consumer that folds a failure into
+     * a structure it later `JSON.stringify`s (a teammate's meta.json, a failure
+     * record, a spawn env) must never make the serializer chase this Error's
+     * internal references and throw `Converting circular structure to JSON`
+     * mid-launch — the value here is the two fields a caller actually needs.
+     */
+    toJSON() {
+        return { code: this.code, message: this.message };
+    }
+}
+/** True when `error` is a {@link SecretsClientError}, optionally with the given code. */
+export function isSecretsClientError(error, code) {
+    return error instanceof SecretsClientError && (code === undefined || error.code === code);
+}
+/**
+ * Client-side TRANSPORT codes — the standalone could not be reached or spoke a
+ * broken protocol. These are the ONLY errors a "degrade when the standalone is
+ * unavailable" consumer may swallow: a code from the standalone's own reply
+ * (`NOT_FOUND`, `LOCKED`, `WRONG_BACKEND`, `OPERATION_FAILED`, `ACCESS_DENIED`, …)
+ * is a real answer and must surface, never be hidden as "unavailable".
+ */
+const SECRETS_TRANSPORT_CODES = new Set([
+    'SECRETS_BIN_MISSING',
+    'TIMEOUT',
+    'SPAWN_FAILED',
+    'SYNC_UNSUPPORTED',
+    'PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED',
+    'INVALID_RESPONSE',
+    'RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE',
+    'IO_ERROR',
+]);
+/** True when `error` is a {@link SecretsClientError} from the transport itself (the
+ * standalone was unreachable/unusable), not a data error it answered with. */
+export function isSecretsTransportError(error) {
+    return error instanceof SecretsClientError && SECRETS_TRANSPORT_CODES.has(error.code);
+}
+// --- item naming (the shared identifier scheme of the seam) ---------------
+//
+// Raw item identifiers are part of the wire contract, mapped 1:1 across the
+// cutover (delta-spec MIG-1): the standalone stores a bundle's per-key value at
+// `agents-cli.secrets.<bundle>.<KEY>` and a profile provider token at
+// `agents-cli.<provider>.token`, and a bundle var that reads `keychain:<KEY>`
+// refers to the former. agents-cli derives these names whenever it seeds or
+// reads a raw item (account bundles, profile tokens, the reserved `auth`
+// bundle), so they are declared once here beside the protocol schema rather
+// than re-derived per consumer.
+const SERVICE_PREFIX = 'agents-cli';
+export const SECRETS_ITEM_PREFIX = `${SERVICE_PREFIX}.secrets.`;
+/** The raw item holding one bundle key's value. */
+export function secretsKeychainItem(bundle, key) {
+    return `${SECRETS_ITEM_PREFIX}${bundle}.${key}`;
+}
+/** The raw item holding a profile provider's token (`agents-cli.<provider>.token`). */
+export function profileKeychainItem(provider) {
+    return `${SERVICE_PREFIX}.${provider}.token`;
+}
+/** The bundle-var form that points a key at its own raw item. */
+export function keychainRef(key) {
+    return `keychain:${key}`;
+}
+const REF_PATTERN = /^(keychain|env|file|exec):(.+)$/s;
+/**
+ * Parse a bundle value into either a literal string or a typed secret ref. A
+ * `{ value }` object is an escaped literal (a URL that happens to start with a
+ * ref prefix is never misread as a reference).
+ */
+export function parseBundleValue(raw) {
+    if (typeof raw === 'object' && raw !== null && typeof raw.value === 'string') {
+        return { literal: raw.value };
+    }
+    if (typeof raw !== 'string') {
+        throw new Error(`Invalid bundle value (expected string or {value: string}): ${JSON.stringify(raw)}`);
+    }
+    const match = REF_PATTERN.exec(raw);
+    if (!match)
+        return { literal: raw };
+    return { ref: { provider: match[1], value: match[2] } };
+}
+// --- executable resolution -------------------------------------------------
+let cachedBin;
+/**
+ * Resolve the standalone `secrets` executable: `$SECRETS_BIN` if set, else the
+ * `secrets` command on PATH. Cached for the process. A miss throws with install
+ * guidance — there is NO fallback to the embedded engine (DIST-1).
+ */
+export function resolveSecretsBin() {
+    if (cachedBin)
+        return cachedBin;
+    const explicit = process.env.SECRETS_BIN?.trim();
+    const resolved = explicit && explicit.length > 0 ? explicit : findExecutable('secrets');
+    if (!resolved) {
+        throw new SecretsClientError('SECRETS_BIN_MISSING', 'The standalone `secrets` CLI was not found. Install it with:\n' +
+            '  npm i -g @phnx-labs/secrets-cli\n' +
+            'or point $SECRETS_BIN at its executable.');
+    }
+    cachedBin = resolved;
+    return resolved;
+}
+/**
+ * How to invoke the resolved binary. A `.js`/`.mjs`/`.cjs` entrypoint (a dev
+ * build, or `$SECRETS_BIN` pointing at `dist/index.js`) is run through this
+ * process's Node so it works without an executable bit and on Windows; an
+ * installed `secrets` shim/binary is spawned directly. Exported so a caller
+ * that needs to run an interactive standalone verb directly (e.g. `secrets
+ * migrate`, which isn't in this client's op table) can build the same argv.
+ */
+export function invocation(bin) {
+    if (/\.[mc]?js$/.test(bin))
+        return { command: process.execPath, prefix: [bin] };
+    return { command: bin, prefix: [] };
+}
+/**
+ * Spawn env for the child, applied to a base env (defaults to `process.env`):
+ *
+ *  - `SECRETS_HOME` defaults to the user agents dir so the standalone adopts the
+ *    existing stores in place (MIG-1); an explicit value in the base env wins.
+ *  - The standalone renamed every `AGENTS_SECRETS_*` knob to `SECRETS_*`, so a
+ *    caller env still carrying the old `AGENTS_SECRETS_PASSPHRASE` (the name
+ *    agents-cli's own engine reads — filestore/linux/windows) would be invisible
+ *    to `secrets`, which reads only `SECRETS_PASSPHRASE`. Forward it so the child
+ *    can decrypt the very file store agents-cli wrote, rather than silently
+ *    provisioning a fresh machine-local key. An explicit `SECRETS_PASSPHRASE`
+ *    wins — this only bridges the rename, it never overrides.
+ *
+ * Exported for the seam test (a pure env mapping, no spawn).
+ */
+export function buildServeEnv(base = process.env) {
+    const env = {
+        ...base,
+        SECRETS_HOME: base.SECRETS_HOME ?? getUserAgentsDir(),
+    };
+    if (!env.SECRETS_PASSPHRASE && base.AGENTS_SECRETS_PASSPHRASE) {
+        env.SECRETS_PASSPHRASE = base.AGENTS_SECRETS_PASSPHRASE;
+    }
+    return env;
+}
+let requestCounter = 0;
+function buildRequest(op, args, context) {
+    requestCounter += 1;
+    const request = {
+        v: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+        id: `${process.pid}-${requestCounter}`,
+        op,
+        args: encodeWire(args),
+    };
+    if (context)
+        request.context = context;
+    return request;
+}
+/**
+ * Describe what the child actually wrote on fd 4 when it did not parse as JSON,
+ * so a wrong `secrets` on PATH (a shim printing usage, an unrelated binary), a
+ * child that ran under the wrong runtime and never answered, or a silent write
+ * failure is diagnosable from the error alone rather than a bare "non-JSON
+ * response". Bounded to 200 bytes; control bytes are stripped so the message
+ * stays one readable line.
+ */
+function describeNonJson(text) {
+    const trimmed = text.trim();
+    if (!trimmed)
+        return ' (the standalone wrote nothing to fd 4)';
+    const preview = trimmed.slice(0, 200).replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/g, '?');
+    return ` (first 200 bytes on fd 4: ${JSON.stringify(preview)})`;
+}
+function parseResponse(raw) {
+    const text = raw.toString('utf8');
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = JSON.parse(text);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new SecretsClientError('INVALID_RESPONSE', `secrets returned a non-JSON response${describeNonJson(text)}`);
+    }
+    if (!parsed || parsed.v !== PROTOCOL_VERSION || typeof parsed.id !== 'string') {
+        throw new SecretsClientError('INVALID_RESPONSE', 'secrets returned a malformed response envelope');
+    }
+    if (parsed.ok)
+        return decodeWire(parsed.result);
+    throw new SecretsClientError(parsed.error.code, parsed.error.message);
+}
+// --- raw transport (one spawn per request) ---------------------------------
+function serveOnce(op, args, context) {
+    const { command, prefix } = invocation(resolveSecretsBin());
+    const request = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(buildRequest(op, args, context)));
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const child = spawn(command, [...prefix, '__serve'], {
+            stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'inherit', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+            env: buildServeEnv(),
+        });
+        let settled = false;
+        const fail = (error) => {
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+            child.kill('SIGKILL');
+            reject(error);
+        };
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => fail(new SecretsClientError('TIMEOUT', 'secrets request timed out')), SERVE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        child.on('error', (error) => fail(new SecretsClientError('SPAWN_FAILED', `Failed to spawn secrets: ${error.message}`)));
+        // A child that dies before reading gives EPIPE here; the outcome surfaces on
+        // fd 4 / 'error' instead, so this handler just keeps it from throwing.
+        const input = child.stdio[3];
+        input.on('error', () => { });
+        input.end(request);
+        // Settle only when BOTH the response has been read to EOF AND the child has
+        // fully exited. The standalone writes its response to fd 4 and closes it
+        // *before* it finishes: on the way out it still releases its proper-lockfile
+        // lock dir and flushes its meta/events log under the store's `.cache`.
+        // Resolving on fd-4 EOF alone let the caller (e.g. a test tearing down its
+        // throwaway SECRETS_HOME) race those trailing writes — an ENOTEMPTY rmdir.
+        // Awaiting child exit makes the store quiescent the instant secretsRequest
+        // resolves, so no consumer needs a cleanup retry.
+        const out = child.stdio[4];
+        const chunks = [];
+        let size = 0;
+        let response = null;
+        let exited = false;
+        const settleWhenReady = () => {
+            if (settled || response === null || !exited)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+            try {
+                resolve(parseResponse(response));
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                reject(error);
+            }
+        };
+        out.on('data', (chunk) => {
+            size += chunk.length;
+            if (size > MAX_PROTOCOL_BYTES) {
+                fail(new SecretsClientError('RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE', 'secrets response exceeds the protocol limit'));
+                return;
+            }
+            chunks.push(chunk);
+        });
+        out.on('error', (error) => fail(new SecretsClientError('IO_ERROR', error.message)));
+        out.on('end', () => {
+            response = Buffer.concat(chunks);
+            settleWhenReady();
+        });
+        child.on('exit', () => {
+            exited = true;
+            settleWhenReady();
+        });
+    });
+}
+/** POSIX single-quote a token so the shell passes it to the child verbatim. */
+function shQuote(token) {
+    return `'${token.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'`;
+}
+function serveOnceSync(op, args, context) {
+    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+        throw new SecretsClientError('SYNC_UNSUPPORTED', 'The synchronous secrets path needs a POSIX shell and FIFO; use secretsRequest (async) on Windows.');
+    }
+    const { command, prefix } = invocation(resolveSecretsBin());
+    const request = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(buildRequest(op, args, context)));
+    // The standalone's private protocol reads the request from fd 3 and writes the
+    // response to fd 4, and it REFUSES a plain file or tty for either (it fails with
+    // `PRIVATE_PIPE_REQUIRED` so no secret is ever staged to disk). But `spawnSync`
+    // only wires stdio 0-2 portably — the Bun runtime (this repo runs its whole CLI
+    // suite as `bun src/index.ts`, so the 71 CLI-integration tests spawn agents-cli
+    // under Bun) silently DROPS numbered fds 3+, so the old direct-fd wiring left the
+    // child blocked on an empty fd 3 for the full timeout. Do the numbered-fd wiring
+    // in a POSIX shell against PIPES instead: the request rides a FIFO fed by a
+    // backgrounded `cat` (fd 3), and fd 4 is dup'd from the captured stdout pipe
+    // (`4>&1`), which `spawnSync` captures natively as an anonymous pipe on every
+    // runtime. The child's own fd 1 is then redirected to /dev/null (`1>/dev/null`,
+    // applied AFTER `4>&1` so fd 4 keeps the pipe): the response channel (fd 4) is
+    // structurally the ONLY writer to the captured stream, so even a stray write to
+    // the standalone's own stdout can never corrupt the fd-4 bytes. Both fd 3/4 are
+    // S_ISFIFO, satisfying the standalone; the response never touches disk.
+    // Identical on Node and Bun.
+    const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'agents-secrets-'));
+    const reqFile = join(dir, 'req');
+    const reqFifo = join(dir, 'reqfifo');
+    try {
+        writeFileSync(reqFile, request);
+        const mk = spawnSync('mkfifo', [reqFifo]);
+        if (mk.status !== 0) {
+            throw new SecretsClientError('SYNC_UNSUPPORTED', 'mkfifo is unavailable for the synchronous secrets path');
+        }
+        const serve = [command, ...prefix, '__serve'].map(shQuote).join(' ');
+        // `exec` so the wrapper `sh` BECOMES the standalone (same PID). Two things ride
+        // on that: `spawnSync` waits on the real process, so on return the store is
+        // fully flushed and its proper-lockfile lock dir released (the sync path never
+        // had the async path's resolve-before-exit race — spawnSync is a hard barrier);
+        // and `spawnSync`'s timeout SIGTERM lands on the standalone itself rather than
+        // orphaning a wedged child behind a dead wrapper. The backgrounded `cat` only
+        // feeds the tiny request into the FIFO and exits the instant the reader (fd 3)
+        // opens — long before the standalone finishes — so it is reaped by its own exit
+        // and never outlives the call. fd wiring is order-sensitive: `4>&1` dups the
+        // response channel from the captured stdout pipe, THEN `1>/dev/null` sends the
+        // child's own stdout to the bit bucket, so fd 4 stays the sole writer to the
+        // captured stream.
+        const script = `cat ${shQuote(reqFile)} > ${shQuote(reqFifo)} & exec ${serve} 3<${shQuote(reqFifo)} 4>&1 1>/dev/null`;
+        const result = spawnSync('sh', ['-c', script], {
+            stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'inherit'],
+            env: buildServeEnv(),
+            timeout: SYNC_SERVE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+            maxBuffer: MAX_PROTOCOL_BYTES + 4096,
+        });
+        if (result.error) {
+            const err = result.error;
+            const code = err.code === 'ETIMEDOUT' ? 'TIMEOUT' : 'SPAWN_FAILED';
+            throw new SecretsClientError(code, `secrets request failed: ${err.message}`);
+        }
+        const raw = result.stdout ?? Buffer.alloc(0);
+        if (raw.length > MAX_PROTOCOL_BYTES) {
+            throw new SecretsClientError('RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE', 'secrets response exceeds the protocol limit');
+        }
+        return parseResponse(raw);
+    }
+    finally {
+        rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+}
+// --- handshake (once per process) ------------------------------------------
+let handshakeReady = false;
+let handshakePromise = null;
+function checkHandshake(result) {
+    const protocol = result?.protocol;
+    if (protocol !== PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
+        throw new SecretsClientError('PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED', `secrets speaks protocol ${String(protocol)}; this agents-cli needs ${PROTOCOL_VERSION}. ` +
+            'Update the standalone CLI (npm i -g @phnx-labs/secrets-cli).');
+    }
+}
+async function ensureHandshake() {
+    if (handshakeReady)
+        return;
+    if (!handshakePromise) {
+        handshakePromise = (async () => {
+            checkHandshake(await serveOnce('handshake', []));
+            handshakeReady = true;
+        })().catch((error) => {
+            handshakePromise = null;
+            throw error;
+        });
+    }
+    await handshakePromise;
+}
+function ensureHandshakeSync() {
+    if (handshakeReady)
+        return;
+    checkHandshake(serveOnceSync('handshake', []));
+    handshakeReady = true;
+}
+// --- primitives ------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Send one operation to the standalone secrets CLI and await its typed result.
+ * Verifies the executable speaks protocol v1 once per process (cached), then
+ * spawns `secrets __serve` for the operation. Throws a {@link SecretsClientError}
+ * carrying the server's `{code, message}` on failure.
+ */
+export async function secretsRequest(op, args = [], context) {
+    await ensureHandshake();
+    return (await serveOnce(op, args, context));
+}
+/**
+ * Synchronous sibling of {@link secretsRequest} for the consumers that resolve
+ * secrets on a synchronous path (e.g. building a child env before spawn).
+ * Bounded by a spawn timeout. POSIX only.
+ */
+export function secretsRequestSync(op, args = [], context) {
+    ensureHandshakeSync();
+    return serveOnceSync(op, args, context);
+}
+/** Test hook: forget the cached binary + handshake so a new env is re-resolved. */
+export function _resetSecretsClientForTest() {
+    cachedBin = undefined;
+    handshakeReady = false;
+    handshakePromise = null;
+    requestCounter = 0;
+}
+// --- typed wrappers -------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// The resolve/read/write/raw-CRUD ops today's consumers hit — one thin, typed
+// forward each onto the two primitives above; the standalone remains the single
+// implementation. Async by default; the read-hot operations agents-cli resolves
+// synchronously carry a `*Sync` sibling.
+//
+// This is deliberately NOT the standalone's full op table. The remaining
+// bundle-metadata ops it also exposes — `bundlePolicy`,
+// `readBundleIfDecryptable`, `keychainItemsForBundle`, `migrateLegacyBundles`
+// — get their wrapper as the consumer-conversion wave (tasks.md item 6) lands
+// each caller that needs it, so a wrapper always ships with a real call site
+// and a test rather than as speculative unused surface. (`describeBundle`,
+// `bundleBackend`, `renameBundle`, `rotateBundleSecret`, and the `sync.*` /
+// `rc-hygiene.*` groups have landed with the consumers that needed them.)
+// bundles.*
+export function readAndResolveBundleEnv(name, opts, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.readAndResolveBundleEnv', [name, opts ?? {}], context);
+}
+export function readAndResolveBundleEnvSync(name, opts, context) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('bundles.readAndResolveBundleEnv', [name, opts ?? {}], context);
+}
+export function listBundles(context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.listBundles', [], context);
+}
+export function listBundlesSync(context) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('bundles.listBundles', [], context);
+}
+/**
+ * Per-key kind breakdown (`literal`/`file`/`onepassword`/…) of an already-resolved
+ * bundle — the cosmetic `[secrets] Resolved <name>: N keys (…)` summary line. Pure
+ * over the bundle document server-side; the wrapper forwards the object the caller
+ * already holds from {@link readAndResolveBundleEnv} so the same shape is described.
+ */
+export function describeBundle(bundle, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.describeBundle', [bundle], context);
+}
+export function readBundle(name, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.readBundle', [name], context);
+}
+export function readBundleSync(name, context) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('bundles.readBundle', [name], context);
+}
+export function bundleExists(name, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.bundleExists', [name], context);
+}
+export function bundleExistsSync(name, context) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('bundles.bundleExists', [name], context);
+}
+export function bundleBackend(name, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.bundleBackend', [name], context);
+}
+export function bundleBackendSync(name, context) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('bundles.bundleBackend', [name], context);
+}
+export function writeBundle(bundle, opts, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.writeBundle', [bundle, opts ?? {}], context);
+}
+export function writeBundleWithItems(bundle, items, opts, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.writeBundleWithItems', [bundle, items, opts ?? {}], context);
+}
+export function writeBundleWithItemsSync(bundle, items, opts, context) {
+    secretsRequestSync('bundles.writeBundleWithItems', [bundle, items, opts ?? {}], context);
+}
+export function deleteBundle(name, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.deleteBundle', [name], context);
+}
+export function deleteBundleSync(name, context) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('bundles.deleteBundle', [name], context);
+}
+/** Rename a bundle: metadata and raw items move together; the source is deleted last. */
+export function renameBundle(oldName, newName, opts, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.renameBundle', [oldName, newName, opts ?? {}], context);
+}
+export function renameBundleSync(oldName, newName, opts, context) {
+    secretsRequestSync('bundles.renameBundle', [oldName, newName, opts ?? {}], context);
+}
+/** Rotate one keychain-backed key's value in place, preserving or patching its meta. */
+export function rotateBundleSecret(bundle, key, opts, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('bundles.rotateBundleSecret', [bundle, key, opts], context);
+}
+export function rotateBundleSecretSync(bundle, key, opts, context) {
+    secretsRequestSync('bundles.rotateBundleSecret', [bundle, key, opts], context);
+}
+// agent.*
+export function agentPing() {
+    return secretsRequest('agent.agentPing', []);
+}
+export function agentPingSync() {
+    return secretsRequestSync('agent.agentPing', []);
+}
+export function agentStatus() {
+    return secretsRequest('agent.agentStatus', []);
+}
+export function agentLock(name) {
+    return secretsRequest('agent.agentLock', name === undefined ? [] : [name]);
+}
+export function ensureAgentRunning(timeoutMs) {
+    return secretsRequest('agent.ensureAgentRunning', timeoutMs === undefined ? [] : [timeoutMs]);
+}
+// index.* (keychain items)
+export function getKeychainToken(item, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('index.getKeychainToken', [item, context ?? {}]);
+}
+export function getKeychainTokenSync(item, context) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('index.getKeychainToken', [item, context ?? {}]);
+}
+export function setKeychainToken(item, value, opts) {
+    return secretsRequest('index.setKeychainToken', opts === undefined ? [item, value] : [item, value, opts]);
+}
+export function setKeychainTokenSync(item, value, opts) {
+    secretsRequestSync('index.setKeychainToken', opts === undefined ? [item, value] : [item, value, opts]);
+}
+export function hasKeychainToken(item) {
+    return secretsRequest('index.hasKeychainToken', [item]);
+}
+export function hasKeychainTokenSync(item) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('index.hasKeychainToken', [item]);
+}
+export function deleteKeychainToken(item) {
+    return secretsRequest('index.deleteKeychainToken', [item]);
+}
+export function deleteKeychainTokenSync(item) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('index.deleteKeychainToken', [item]);
+}
+export function listKeychainItems(prefix) {
+    return secretsRequest('index.listKeychainItems', [prefix]);
+}
+/**
+ * True when `keychain`-backend items are being routed to the standalone's
+ * encrypted file store (headless Linux/Windows with no reachable keyring):
+ * on such a host no test or probe can reach a real OS keychain.
+ */
+export function keychainUsesFileFallback() {
+    return secretsRequest('index.keychainUsesFileFallback', []);
+}
+// store.* (explicit-backend raw item CRUD)
+export function storeGet(backend, item) {
+    return secretsRequest('store.get', [backend, item]);
+}
+export function storeGetSync(backend, item) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('store.get', [backend, item]);
+}
+export function storeHas(backend, item) {
+    return secretsRequest('store.has', [backend, item]);
+}
+export function storeHasSync(backend, item) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('store.has', [backend, item]);
+}
+export function storeSet(backend, item, value) {
+    return secretsRequest('store.set', [backend, item, value]);
+}
+export function storeSetSync(backend, item, value) {
+    secretsRequestSync('store.set', [backend, item, value]);
+}
+export function storeDelete(backend, item) {
+    return secretsRequest('store.delete', [backend, item]);
+}
+// remote.* / push.*
+export function remoteResolveEnv(target, bundle, opts) {
+    return secretsRequest('remote.remoteResolveEnv', [target, bundle, opts ?? {}]);
+}
+export function pushBundleToHost(bundle, host, opts) {
+    return secretsRequest('push.pushBundleToHost', [bundle, host, opts]);
+}
+export function pushBundleToHostAsync(bundle, host, opts) {
+    return secretsRequest('push.pushBundleToHostAsync', [bundle, host, opts]);
+}
+// sync.* (transport pull, used by the `agents sync --secrets` umbrella stage)
+export function listRemoteBundles(context) {
+    return secretsRequest('sync.listRemoteBundles', [], context);
+}
+export function pullBundle(name, opts, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('sync.pullBundle', [name, opts], context);
+}
+// rc-hygiene.* (shell-rc credential-export advisory, `agents doctor`)
+export function scanUserRcFiles(homeDir, context) {
+    return secretsRequest('rc-hygiene.scanUserRcFiles', homeDir === undefined ? [] : [homeDir], context);
+}
+export function scanUserRcFilesSync(homeDir, context) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('rc-hygiene.scanUserRcFiles', homeDir === undefined ? [] : [homeDir], context);
+}
+export function masterPassphraseInEnv(context) {
+    return secretsRequest('rc-hygiene.masterPassphraseInEnv', [], context);
+}
+export function masterPassphraseInEnvSync(context) {
+    return secretsRequestSync('rc-hygiene.masterPassphraseInEnv', [], context);
+}
+// --- env sanitization (EXEC-1: deny loader/interpreter overrides) ----------
+//
+// Pure, engine-free — every spawn boundary strips these before either an
+// injected secrets env or the bare process env reaches a child, so a bundle
+// (or an inherited shell) can never smuggle a loader/interpreter override into
+// an agent's process.
+/** True for a dynamic-loader or language-interpreter override env var. */
+export function isLoaderOrInterpreterEnv(name) {
+    const upper = name.toUpperCase();
+    return (upper.startsWith('LD_') ||
+        upper.startsWith('DYLD_') ||
+        [
+            'NODE_OPTIONS',
+            'PYTHONPATH',
+            'PYTHONSTARTUP',
+            'BASH_ENV',
+            'ENV',
+            'PERL5OPT',
+            'RUBYOPT',
+            'PROMPT_COMMAND',
+            'IFS',
+            'CDPATH',
+        ].includes(upper));
+}
+/** Strip loader/interpreter overrides from an env before it reaches a spawned child. */
+export function sanitizeProcessEnv(env = process.env) {
+    const out = {};
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(env)) {
+        if (v === undefined)
+            continue;
+        if (isLoaderOrInterpreterEnv(k))
+            continue;
+        out[k] = v;
+    }
+    return out;
+}