@payez/next-mvp 4.8.1 → 4.8.3

package/src/server/auth-guard.ts

@@ -1,203 +1,203 @@
-/**
- * Server-Side Auth Guard for Layouts
- *
- * Replaces middleware's self-fetch auth checks with direct Redis/function calls.
- * Call from server-component layouts to protect routes.
- *
- * Zero HTTP self-fetches. ~8ms total (Redis + in-memory checks).
- */
-
-import 'server-only';
-import { redirect } from 'next/navigation';
-import { headers } from 'next/headers';
-import { decodeSession } from './decode-session';
-import { getIDPClientConfig } from '../lib/idp-client-config';
-import { getSessionCookieName, getSecureSessionCookieName } from '../lib/app-slug';
-import type { SessionData } from '../lib/session-store';
-
-// =============================================================================
-// TYPES
-// =============================================================================
-
-export interface AuthGuardOptions {
-  /** Custom checks to run after standard auth validation */
-  checks?: AuthCheck[];
-  /** Override login redirect URL (default: /account-auth/login) */
-  loginUrl?: string;
-  /** Override 2FA redirect URL (default: /account-auth/verify-code) */
-  verifyCodeUrl?: string;
-  /** Override service unavailable URL (default: /service-unavailable) */
-  serviceUnavailableUrl?: string;
-}
-
-export interface AuthCheck {
-  /** Name for logging */
-  name: string;
-  /** Returns redirect URL if check fails, null if passes */
-  check: (session: SessionData, pathname: string) => Promise<string | null>;
-}
-
-export interface AuthGuardResult {
-  userId: string;
-  email: string;
-  roles: string[];
-  sessionData: SessionData;
-  accessToken?: string;
-}
-
-// =============================================================================
-// CONSTANTS
-// =============================================================================
-
-const LOGIN_PAGE = '/account-auth/login';
-const VERIFY_CODE_PAGE = '/account-auth/verify-code';
-const SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_PAGE = '/service-unavailable';
-
-// =============================================================================
-// MAIN
-// =============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Server-side auth guard. Call from async server layouts.
- *
- * Redirects (via next/navigation redirect()) if:
- * - No session cookie / invalid JWT
- * - Session not in Redis (stale)
- * - Session force-invalidated
- * - 2FA required but not completed / expired
- * - Any custom check fails
- *
- * Returns the authenticated user's session data on success.
- */
-export async function authGuard(options?: AuthGuardOptions): Promise<AuthGuardResult> {
-  const loginUrl = options?.loginUrl || LOGIN_PAGE;
-  const verifyCodeUrl = options?.verifyCodeUrl || VERIFY_CODE_PAGE;
-  const serviceUnavailableUrl = options?.serviceUnavailableUrl || SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_PAGE;
-
-  // Get current pathname from headers (set by Next.js)
-  const headerStore = await headers();
-  const pathname = headerStore.get('x-next-pathname') ||
-                   headerStore.get('x-invoke-path') ||
-                   headerStore.get('x-matched-path') ||
-                   '/';
-
-  const callbackUrl = encodeURIComponent(pathname);
-
-  // --- Decode session (cookie → JWT → Redis) ---
-  let decoded: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof decodeSession>>;
-  try {
-    decoded = await decodeSession();
-  } catch (error) {
-    // Redis unreachable or startup failure → fail closed
-    console.error('[AUTH-GUARD] Session decode failed (service error):', error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error));
-    redirect(serviceUnavailableUrl);
-  }
-
-  // No session at all → redirect to login
-  if (!decoded) {
-    redirect(`${loginUrl}?callbackUrl=${callbackUrl}`);
-  }
-
-  const { sessionData } = decoded;
-
-  // --- Force-invalidated session (admin action, password change) ---
-  if (sessionData.forceInvalidated) {
-    console.warn('[AUTH-GUARD] Session force-invalidated', {
-      userId: sessionData.userId,
-      pathname,
-    });
-    redirect(`${loginUrl}?callbackUrl=${callbackUrl}&reason=invalidated`);
-  }
-
-  // --- 2FA check ---
-  // This try wraps ONLY the config fetch, because that is the only thing here
-  // that can genuinely fail. Do NOT widen it to cover the redirect below:
-  // next/navigation's redirect() signals by THROWING a NEXT_REDIRECT digest, so
-  // a redirect inside this try is caught by the catch and rewritten into a
-  // service-unavailable page - denying a 2FA user the one page that would let
-  // them satisfy the challenge, and reporting it as an outage. See card 312242.
-  let requires2FA: boolean;
-  try {
-    const config = await getIDPClientConfig();
-    requires2FA = config.authSettings?.require2FA ?? true;
-  } catch (error) {
-    // If we can't check 2FA config, fail closed
-    console.error('[AUTH-GUARD] 2FA config check failed:', error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error));
-    redirect(serviceUnavailableUrl);
-  }
-
-  if (requires2FA) {
-    // 369858: the legacy `?? (sessionData as any).twoFactorComplete` carry is REMOVED.
-    // This is THE access gate - the only one of the 8 carry sites that grants access
-    // rather than reporting status - so it reads exactly one source of truth.
-    //
-    // Removing it is fail-closed. No current writer emits the legacy field alone:
-    // session-store.ts:444-445 writes both as a pair from a server-derived stepped-up
-    // token, auth/refresh.ts:376 writes it as a MIRROR of mfaVerified, and
-    // routes/auth/session.ts:149-157 refuses both on PRESENCE, so a caller cannot
-    // assert either. The carry therefore only ever served sessions minted before
-    // `mfaVerified` existed, and for those the correct behaviour is re-verify, not
-    // grandfather. Cost is one forced re-challenge for a stale legacy session.
-    //
-    // Severity note, so nobody re-inflates this later: the operator was `??`
-    // (nullish), NOT `||`. `false ?? x` is `false`, so an explicitly DENIED session
-    // could never be upgraded by a stale flag. This was legacy grandfathering, not a
-    // live 2FA bypass. Had it been `||`, it would have been the bypass.
-    const mfaVerified = sessionData.mfaVerified ?? false;
-
-    // 339563 / 369858 §3: THIS IS STILL A FAIL-OPEN AND IS DELIBERATELY LEFT VISIBLE.
-    // An absent mfaExpiresAt collapses to 0, so `mfaExpired` is false and the MFA
-    // verdict NEVER EXPIRES. That needs no legacy-session hypothesis: it fires on a
-    // current `mfaVerified: true` session whose token carried no `mfa_expires` claim -
-    // the passwordless/primary-credential lane, named on the write path in the
-    // source's own voice at session-store.ts:464-467 ("it IS the case the consumers
-    // currently fail OPEN on"). Removing the carry above does NOT touch this.
-    // Tracked separately by BAPert; not fixed here because failing closed on absent
-    // expiry would deny the passwordless lane outright and that is a product call.
-    const mfaExpiresAt = sessionData.mfaExpiresAt || 0;
-    const mfaExpired = mfaExpiresAt > 0 && mfaExpiresAt < Date.now();
-
-    if (!mfaVerified || mfaExpired) {
-      console.log('[AUTH-GUARD] 2FA required', {
-        mfaVerified,
-        mfaExpired,
-        userId: sessionData.userId,
-        pathname,
-      });
-      redirect(`${verifyCodeUrl}?callbackUrl=${callbackUrl}`);
-    }
-  }
-
-  // --- Custom checks (beta, admin, etc.) ---
-  if (options?.checks) {
-    for (const check of options.checks) {
-      try {
-        const redirectUrl = await check.check(sessionData, pathname);
-        if (redirectUrl) {
-          console.log(`[AUTH-GUARD] Custom check "${check.name}" failed`, {
-            userId: sessionData.userId,
-            pathname,
-            redirectUrl,
-          });
-          redirect(redirectUrl);
-        }
-      } catch (error) {
-        // If the error is a redirect (from next/navigation), re-throw it
-        if (error && typeof error === 'object' && 'digest' in error) {
-          throw error;
-        }
-        console.error(`[AUTH-GUARD] Custom check "${check.name}" error:`, error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error));
-        redirect(serviceUnavailableUrl);
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // --- All checks passed ---
-  return {
-    userId: sessionData.userId,
-    email: sessionData.email,
-    roles: sessionData.roles || [],
-    sessionData,
-    accessToken: sessionData.idpAccessToken,
-  };
-}
+/**
+ * Server-Side Auth Guard for Layouts
+ *
+ * Replaces middleware's self-fetch auth checks with direct Redis/function calls.
+ * Call from server-component layouts to protect routes.
+ *
+ * Zero HTTP self-fetches. ~8ms total (Redis + in-memory checks).
+ */
+
+import 'server-only';
+import { redirect } from 'next/navigation';
+import { headers } from 'next/headers';
+import { decodeSession } from './decode-session';
+import { getIDPClientConfig } from '../lib/idp-client-config';
+import { getSessionCookieName, getSecureSessionCookieName } from '../lib/app-slug';
+import type { SessionData } from '../lib/session-store';
+
+// =============================================================================
+// TYPES
+// =============================================================================
+
+export interface AuthGuardOptions {
+  /** Custom checks to run after standard auth validation */
+  checks?: AuthCheck[];
+  /** Override login redirect URL (default: /account-auth/login) */
+  loginUrl?: string;
+  /** Override 2FA redirect URL (default: /account-auth/verify-code) */
+  verifyCodeUrl?: string;
+  /** Override service unavailable URL (default: /service-unavailable) */
+  serviceUnavailableUrl?: string;
+}
+
+export interface AuthCheck {
+  /** Name for logging */
+  name: string;
+  /** Returns redirect URL if check fails, null if passes */
+  check: (session: SessionData, pathname: string) => Promise<string | null>;
+}
+
+export interface AuthGuardResult {
+  userId: string;
+  email: string;
+  roles: string[];
+  sessionData: SessionData;
+  accessToken?: string;
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// CONSTANTS
+// =============================================================================
+
+const LOGIN_PAGE = '/account-auth/login';
+const VERIFY_CODE_PAGE = '/account-auth/verify-code';
+const SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_PAGE = '/service-unavailable';
+
+// =============================================================================
+// MAIN
+// =============================================================================
+
+/**
+ * Server-side auth guard. Call from async server layouts.
+ *
+ * Redirects (via next/navigation redirect()) if:
+ * - No session cookie / invalid JWT
+ * - Session not in Redis (stale)
+ * - Session force-invalidated
+ * - 2FA required but not completed / expired
+ * - Any custom check fails
+ *
+ * Returns the authenticated user's session data on success.
+ */
+export async function authGuard(options?: AuthGuardOptions): Promise<AuthGuardResult> {
+  const loginUrl = options?.loginUrl || LOGIN_PAGE;
+  const verifyCodeUrl = options?.verifyCodeUrl || VERIFY_CODE_PAGE;
+  const serviceUnavailableUrl = options?.serviceUnavailableUrl || SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_PAGE;
+
+  // Get current pathname from headers (set by Next.js)
+  const headerStore = await headers();
+  const pathname = headerStore.get('x-next-pathname') ||
+                   headerStore.get('x-invoke-path') ||
+                   headerStore.get('x-matched-path') ||
+                   '/';
+
+  const callbackUrl = encodeURIComponent(pathname);
+
+  // --- Decode session (cookie → JWT → Redis) ---
+  let decoded: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof decodeSession>>;
+  try {
+    decoded = await decodeSession();
+  } catch (error) {
+    // Redis unreachable or startup failure → fail closed
+    console.error('[AUTH-GUARD] Session decode failed (service error):', error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error));
+    redirect(serviceUnavailableUrl);
+  }
+
+  // No session at all → redirect to login
+  if (!decoded) {
+    redirect(`${loginUrl}?callbackUrl=${callbackUrl}`);
+  }
+
+  const { sessionData } = decoded;
+
+  // --- Force-invalidated session (admin action, password change) ---
+  if (sessionData.forceInvalidated) {
+    console.warn('[AUTH-GUARD] Session force-invalidated', {
+      userId: sessionData.userId,
+      pathname,
+    });
+    redirect(`${loginUrl}?callbackUrl=${callbackUrl}&reason=invalidated`);
+  }
+
+  // --- 2FA check ---
+  // This try wraps ONLY the config fetch, because that is the only thing here
+  // that can genuinely fail. Do NOT widen it to cover the redirect below:
+  // next/navigation's redirect() signals by THROWING a NEXT_REDIRECT digest, so
+  // a redirect inside this try is caught by the catch and rewritten into a
+  // service-unavailable page - denying a 2FA user the one page that would let
+  // them satisfy the challenge, and reporting it as an outage. See card 312242.
+  let requires2FA: boolean;
+  try {
+    const config = await getIDPClientConfig();
+    requires2FA = config.authSettings?.require2FA ?? true;
+  } catch (error) {
+    // If we can't check 2FA config, fail closed
+    console.error('[AUTH-GUARD] 2FA config check failed:', error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error));
+    redirect(serviceUnavailableUrl);
+  }
+
+  if (requires2FA) {
+    // 369858: the legacy `?? (sessionData as any).twoFactorComplete` carry is REMOVED.
+    // This is THE access gate - the only one of the 8 carry sites that grants access
+    // rather than reporting status - so it reads exactly one source of truth.
+    //
+    // Removing it is fail-closed. No current writer emits the legacy field alone:
+    // session-store.ts:444-445 writes both as a pair from a server-derived stepped-up
+    // token, auth/refresh.ts:376 writes it as a MIRROR of mfaVerified, and
+    // routes/auth/session.ts:149-157 refuses both on PRESENCE, so a caller cannot
+    // assert either. The carry therefore only ever served sessions minted before
+    // `mfaVerified` existed, and for those the correct behaviour is re-verify, not
+    // grandfather. Cost is one forced re-challenge for a stale legacy session.
+    //
+    // Severity note, so nobody re-inflates this later: the operator was `??`
+    // (nullish), NOT `||`. `false ?? x` is `false`, so an explicitly DENIED session
+    // could never be upgraded by a stale flag. This was legacy grandfathering, not a
+    // live 2FA bypass. Had it been `||`, it would have been the bypass.
+    const mfaVerified = sessionData.mfaVerified ?? false;
+
+    // 339563 / 369858 §3: THIS IS STILL A FAIL-OPEN AND IS DELIBERATELY LEFT VISIBLE.
+    // An absent mfaExpiresAt collapses to 0, so `mfaExpired` is false and the MFA
+    // verdict NEVER EXPIRES. That needs no legacy-session hypothesis: it fires on a
+    // current `mfaVerified: true` session whose token carried no `mfa_expires` claim -
+    // the passwordless/primary-credential lane, named on the write path in the
+    // source's own voice at session-store.ts:464-467 ("it IS the case the consumers
+    // currently fail OPEN on"). Removing the carry above does NOT touch this.
+    // Tracked separately by BAPert; not fixed here because failing closed on absent
+    // expiry would deny the passwordless lane outright and that is a product call.
+    const mfaExpiresAt = sessionData.mfaExpiresAt || 0;
+    const mfaExpired = mfaExpiresAt > 0 && mfaExpiresAt < Date.now();
+
+    if (!mfaVerified || mfaExpired) {
+      console.log('[AUTH-GUARD] 2FA required', {
+        mfaVerified,
+        mfaExpired,
+        userId: sessionData.userId,
+        pathname,
+      });
+      redirect(`${verifyCodeUrl}?callbackUrl=${callbackUrl}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // --- Custom checks (beta, admin, etc.) ---
+  if (options?.checks) {
+    for (const check of options.checks) {
+      try {
+        const redirectUrl = await check.check(sessionData, pathname);
+        if (redirectUrl) {
+          console.log(`[AUTH-GUARD] Custom check "${check.name}" failed`, {
+            userId: sessionData.userId,
+            pathname,
+            redirectUrl,
+          });
+          redirect(redirectUrl);
+        }
+      } catch (error) {
+        // If the error is a redirect (from next/navigation), re-throw it
+        if (error && typeof error === 'object' && 'digest' in error) {
+          throw error;
+        }
+        console.error(`[AUTH-GUARD] Custom check "${check.name}" error:`, error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error));
+        redirect(serviceUnavailableUrl);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // --- All checks passed ---
+  return {
+    userId: sessionData.userId,
+    email: sessionData.email,
+    roles: sessionData.roles || [],
+    sessionData,
+    accessToken: sessionData.idpAccessToken,
+  };
+}