@payez/next-mvp 4.4.8 → 4.4.9

package/src/components/auth/FederatedAuthSection.tsx

@@ -9,12 +9,44 @@ interface Props {
   isLoading?: boolean;
 }
 
-const providerIcons: Record<FederatedProvider, { label: string; svg: React.ReactNode; color: string }> = {
+/**
+ * PAY-2104 — PER-PROVIDER BRAND TREATMENT, NOT ONE GENERIC BUTTON.
+ *
+ * Apple and Facebook both publish binding rules for their sign-in buttons and
+ * neither is satisfied by the generic "Continue with X" control this section
+ * used to render for every provider:
+ *   - APPLE (App Store Review Guidelines 4.8 / "Sign in with Apple" HIG): the
+ *     button MUST carry the Apple logo and one of Apple's own wordings. The
+ *     approved primary wording is "Sign in with Apple" ("Continue with Apple"
+ *     is the permitted alternative). "Continue with Apple" with no logo, which
+ *     is what the generic path produced, is non-compliant and is what App Store
+ *     review rejects. Black or white only.
+ *   - FACEBOOK (Meta Platform Terms / brand guidelines): "Continue with
+ *     Facebook", the Facebook "f" mark, and the brand blue (#1877F2) or white
+ *     are the sanctioned treatments.
+ * Google/Microsoft/GitHub keep the neutral control — they impose no such rule,
+ * and inventing brand colours for them would be a change nobody asked for.
+ *
+ * The mark inherits `currentColor` so it is legible on both the white neutral
+ * buttons and the black/blue branded ones without a second SVG per provider.
+ */
+const PROVIDER_BRAND: Record<
+  FederatedProvider,
+  { label: string; background: string; color: string; border: string }
+> = {
+  google: { label: 'Continue with Google', background: 'var(--bg-default, #ffffff)', color: 'var(--text-primary, #111827)', border: 'var(--border-default, #e5e7eb)' },
+  microsoft: { label: 'Continue with Microsoft', background: 'var(--bg-default, #ffffff)', color: 'var(--text-primary, #111827)', border: 'var(--border-default, #e5e7eb)' },
+  github: { label: 'Continue with GitHub', background: 'var(--bg-default, #ffffff)', color: 'var(--text-primary, #111827)', border: 'var(--border-default, #e5e7eb)' },
+  // Meta brand blue; white mark on blue, per the brand guidelines.
+  facebook: { label: 'Continue with Facebook', background: '#1877F2', color: '#ffffff', border: '#1877F2' },
+  // Apple HIG: black (or white) field, "Sign in with Apple", Apple logo.
+  apple: { label: 'Sign in with Apple', background: '#000000', color: '#ffffff', border: '#000000' },
+};
+
+const providerIcons: Record<FederatedProvider, { svg: React.ReactNode }> = {
   google: {
-    label: 'Google',
-    color: '#4285F4',
     svg: (
-      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="currentColor">
+      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true">
         <path d="M22.56 12.25c0-.78-.07-1.53-.2-2.25H12v4.26h5.92c-.26 1.37-1.04 2.53-2.21 3.31v2.77h3.57c2.08-1.92 3.28-4.74 3.28-8.09z" fill="#4285F4"/>
         <path d="M12 23c2.97 0 5.46-.98 7.28-2.66l-3.57-2.77c-.98.66-2.23 1.06-3.71 1.06-2.86 0-5.29-1.93-6.16-4.53H2.18v2.84C3.99 20.53 7.7 23 12 23z" fill="#34A853"/>
         <path d="M5.84 14.09c-.22-.66-.35-1.36-.35-2.09s.13-1.43.35-2.09V7.07H2.18C1.43 8.55 1 10.22 1 12s.43 3.45 1.18 4.93l2.85-2.22.81-.62z" fill="#FBBC05"/>
@@ -23,10 +55,8 @@ const providerIcons: Record<FederatedProvider, { label: string; svg: React.React
     ),
   },
   microsoft: {
-    label: 'Microsoft',
-    color: '#0078D4',
     svg: (
-      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="currentColor">
+      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true">
         <rect x="1" y="1" width="9" height="9" fill="#F25022"/>
         <rect x="12" y="1" width="9" height="9" fill="#7FBA00"/>
         <rect x="1" y="12" width="9" height="9" fill="#00A4EF"/>
@@ -35,28 +65,25 @@ const providerIcons: Record<FederatedProvider, { label: string; svg: React.React
     ),
   },
   facebook: {
-    label: 'Facebook',
-    color: '#1877F2',
+    // currentColor: white on the Meta-blue button. A hardcoded #1877F2 fill on a
+    // #1877F2 field is an invisible mark — the exact way a branded button ships
+    // looking like a blank one.
     svg: (
-      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="#1877F2">
+      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true">
         <path d="M24 12.073c0-6.627-5.373-12-12-12s-12 5.373-12 12c0 5.99 4.388 10.954 10.125 11.854v-8.385H7.078v-3.47h3.047V9.43c0-3.007 1.792-4.669 4.533-4.669 1.312 0 2.686.235 2.686.235v2.953H15.83c-1.491 0-1.956.925-1.956 1.874v2.25h3.328l-.532 3.47h-2.796v8.385C19.612 23.027 24 18.062 24 12.073z"/>
       </svg>
     ),
   },
   github: {
-    label: 'GitHub',
-    color: '#000000',
     svg: (
-      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="currentColor">
+      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true">
         <path d="M12 0c-6.626 0-12 5.373-12 12 0 5.302 3.438 9.8 8.207 11.387.599.111.793-.261.793-.577v-2.234c-3.338.726-4.033-1.416-4.033-1.416-.546-1.387-1.333-1.756-1.333-1.756-1.089-.745.083-.729.083-.729 1.205.084 1.839 1.237 1.839 1.237 1.07 1.834 2.807 1.304 3.492.997.107-.775.418-1.305.762-1.604-2.665-.305-5.467-1.334-5.467-5.931 0-1.311.469-2.381 1.236-3.221-.124-.303-.535-1.524.117-3.176 0 0 1.008-.322 3.301 1.23.957-.266 1.983-.399 3.003-.404 1.02.005 2.047.138 3.006.404 2.291-1.552 3.297-1.23 3.297-1.23.653 1.653.242 2.874.118 3.176.77.84 1.235 1.911 1.235 3.221 0 4.609-2.807 5.624-5.479 5.921.43.372.823 1.102.823 2.222v3.293c0 .319.192.694.801.576 4.765-1.589 8.199-6.086 8.199-11.386 0-6.627-5.373-12-12-12z"/>
       </svg>
     ),
   },
   apple: {
-    label: 'Apple',
-    color: '#000000',
     svg: (
-      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="currentColor">
+      <svg className="w-5 h-5" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true">
         <path d="M17.05 20.28c-.98.95-2.05.8-3.08.35-1.09-.46-2.09-.48-3.24 0-1.44.62-2.2.44-3.06-.35C2.79 15.25 3.51 7.59 9.05 7.31c1.35.07 2.29.74 3.08.8 1.18-.24 2.31-.93 3.57-.84 1.51.12 2.65.72 3.4 1.8-3.12 1.87-2.38 5.98.48 7.13-.57 1.5-1.31 2.99-2.54 4.09l.01-.01zM12.03 7.25c-.15-2.23 1.66-4.07 3.74-4.25.29 2.58-2.34 4.5-3.74 4.25z"/>
       </svg>
     ),
@@ -71,22 +98,29 @@ export function FederatedAuthSection({ providers, onProviderClick, isLoading }:
   return (
     <div className="space-y-3">
       {providers.map((provider) => {
-        const config = providerIcons[provider];
+        const icon = providerIcons[provider];
+        const brand = PROVIDER_BRAND[provider] ?? {
+          label: `Continue with ${provider}`,
+          background: 'var(--bg-default, #ffffff)',
+          color: 'var(--text-primary, #111827)',
+          border: 'var(--border-default, #e5e7eb)',
+        };
         return (
           <button
             key={provider}
             type="button"
             onClick={() => onProviderClick(provider)}
             disabled={isLoading}
+            data-provider={provider}
             className={`w-full px-4 py-3 rounded-lg border-2 font-semibold transition-colors flex items-center justify-center gap-2 disabled:opacity-50 disabled:cursor-not-allowed`}
             style={{
-              border: '1px solid var(--border-default)',
-              color: 'var(--text-primary)',
-              background: 'var(--bg-default)',
+              border: `1px solid ${brand.border}`,
+              color: brand.color,
+              background: brand.background,
             }}
           >
-            {config.svg}
-            Continue with {config.label}
+            {icon.svg}
+            {brand.label}
           </button>
         );
       })}

package/src/hooks/useAvailableProviders.ts

@@ -62,35 +62,58 @@ export function useAvailableProviders(): UseAvailableProvidersResult {
 
         async function fetchProviders() {
             try {
-                // Fetch available providers from Better Auth
-                // Better Auth doesn't have a getProviders equivalent, so we use a static list
-                // based on configured social providers
-                const result: Record<string, { id: string; name: string }> = {
-                    google: { id: 'google', name: 'Google' },
-                };
+                // PAY-2104: THIS USED TO BE A HARDCODED GOOGLE LITERAL.
+                //
+                //   const result = { google: { id: 'google', name: 'Google' } };
+                //
+                // under a comment claiming providers were "loaded dynamically". It
+                // returned Google for EVERY client whatever the tenant had enabled -
+                // a config-shaped constant, so Apple/Facebook (PAY-2104) could never
+                // appear and a client that had DISABLED Google would still see its
+                // button. The real answer is served by /api/auth/settings (the same
+                // route routes/auth/settings.ts builds from the IDP's oauthProviders).
+                const response = await fetch('/api/auth/settings', { cache: 'no-store' });
 
                 if (!mounted) return;
 
-                setRawProviders(result);
-
-                if (result) {
-                    // Filter to OAuth providers only (exclude credentials)
-                    // Map to our FederatedProvider type
-                    const oauthProviders = Object.keys(result)
-                        .filter(id => OAUTH_PROVIDERS.includes(id))
-                        .map(id => PROVIDER_MAP[id])
-                        .filter((p): p is FederatedProvider => p !== undefined);
+                if (!response.ok) {
+                    // FAIL CLOSED. An unreadable policy is not an empty provider list
+                    // that we may then pad with a guess - it is "we do not know". See
+                    // the PAY-1243 rule: never fabricate a provider list.
+                    throw new Error(`Failed to fetch auth settings: ${response.status}`);
+                }
 
-                    setProviders(oauthProviders);
-                } else {
-                    setProviders([]);
+                const body = await response.json().catch(() => null);
+                const settings = body?.data ?? body;
+                if (body?.success === false || !settings) {
+                    throw new Error(body?.error?.code ?? 'POLICY_UNAVAILABLE');
                 }
 
+                // Keep the raw provider rows (id -> the settings row) for callers that
+                // want more than the mapped union type, exactly as before.
+                const enabledIds: string[] = Array.isArray(settings.enabledProviders)
+                    ? settings.enabledProviders.filter((p: unknown): p is string => typeof p === 'string')
+                    : [];
+                const raw: Record<string, { id: string; name: string }> = {};
+                for (const id of enabledIds) raw[id] = { id, name: id };
+
+                if (!mounted) return;
+                setRawProviders(raw);
+
+                // Filter to OAuth providers only (exclude credentials) and map to our
+                // FederatedProvider union, in the IDP's order.
+                const oauthProviders = enabledIds
+                    .filter(id => OAUTH_PROVIDERS.includes(id))
+                    .map(id => PROVIDER_MAP[id])
+                    .filter((p): p is FederatedProvider => p !== undefined);
+
+                setProviders(oauthProviders);
                 setError(null);
             } catch (err) {
                 if (!mounted) return;
                 setError(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
                 setProviders([]);
+                setRawProviders(null);   // never leave a stale list behind a failure
             } finally {
                 if (mounted) {
                     setIsLoading(false);

package/src/lib/safe-error-response.ts

@@ -124,3 +124,26 @@ export function projectPasswordPolicyRules(json: unknown): string[] | undefined
   if (!details || details.code !== 'password_policy') return undefined;
   return knownPasswordRules(details.rules);
 }
+
+/**
+ * PAY-2103 (AUTH-009 breached-password check): the IdP refuses a password found in a breach corpus with
+ * the typed code `password_breached` in its 400 validation envelope (error.code, or error.details.code,
+ * or a value[] entry while it settles). The reset-password route is ANONYMOUS, so only a BOOLEAN crosses
+ * (`password_breached: true`), never the code text: the page maps the boolean to its own sentence. Reads
+ * only the code, never IdP text.
+ */
+export function projectPasswordBreached(json: unknown): boolean {
+  if (!json || typeof json !== 'object') return false;
+  const top = json as Record<string, unknown>;
+  const err = top.error && typeof top.error === 'object' ? (top.error as Record<string, unknown>) : {};
+  const direct = str(err.code) ?? str(top.code) ?? str(top.error_code);
+  if (direct?.toLowerCase() === 'password_breached') return true;
+  const details = (err.details && typeof err.details === 'object' ? err.details : top.details && typeof top.details === 'object' ? top.details : null) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+  if (str(details?.code)?.toLowerCase() === 'password_breached') return true;
+  // THE SHAPE THE IdP ACTUALLY SENDS (DotNetPert-Scout, PAY-2103 PR 850caa07a): error.details =
+  // { field:'new_password', code:'password_policy', rules:['password_breached'], requirements:[...] }.
+  // The breach is a member of rules[], not a code - the house envelope carries every password rule
+  // that way. Reading only a code would MISS the real refusal.
+  if (Array.isArray(details?.rules) && (details!.rules as unknown[]).some((r) => typeof r === 'string' && r.toLowerCase() === 'password_breached')) return true;
+  return Array.isArray(details?.value) && (details!.value as unknown[]).some((v) => !!v && typeof v === 'object' && str((v as Record<string, unknown>).code)?.toLowerCase() === 'password_breached');
+}

package/src/middleware/create-middleware.ts

@@ -113,6 +113,30 @@ export interface MvpMiddlewareOptions {
   bypassPaths?: string[];
   /** Paths exempt from RBAC checks (auth still enforced, just no page-permission check) */
   rbacExemptPaths?: string[];
+  /**
+   * PAY-1882 step 4 - how this app treats a producer that reports the session's
+   * revocation status as `'unknown'` (a Vibe read that FAILED: non-OK, timeout,
+   * throw - the status could not be determined).
+   *
+   *   'closed' (DEFAULT) - an unknown revocation status is NOT viable; the
+   *                        session is force-invalidated and the user re-auths.
+   *                        This is Jon's PAY-1880 ruling (option A, fail closed),
+   *                        2026-09-27, and BAPert 66316/66320 restates it for
+   *                        step 4. Consequence, accepted explicitly: a Vibe
+   *                        outage signs this app's users out. 'not_configured'
+   *                        also fails closed here - both live consumers ARE
+   *                        configured (BAPert 66356), so for them it means a
+   *                        misconfiguration, not "no revocation source".
+   *   'open'             - an unknown OR not-configured status stays viable
+   *                        (availability over fail-closed). Per-app opt-out for a
+   *                        deployment with no revocation source, or the two live
+   *                        consumers while Jon decides.
+   *
+   * Neither mode changes `'revoked'` (always force-invalid) or an ABSENT
+   * `revocationStatus` (an older producer - unchanged behaviour, so no consumer
+   * is signed out for not implementing the check).
+   */
+  revocationFailMode?: 'closed' | 'open';
 }
 
 // =============================================================================
@@ -436,6 +460,8 @@ export function createMvpMiddleware(options: MvpMiddlewareOptions = {}) {
   const refreshEndpoint = options.refreshEndpoint || '/api/auth/refresh';
   const bypassPaths = options.bypassPaths || [];
   const rbacExemptPaths = options.rbacExemptPaths || [];
+  // PAY-1882 step 4: default 'closed' (Jon's option A / BAPert 66316).
+  const revocationFailMode = options.revocationFailMode || 'closed';
 
   return async function middleware(request: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
     const { pathname, searchParams } = request.nextUrl;
@@ -472,7 +498,12 @@ export function createMvpMiddleware(options: MvpMiddlewareOptions = {}) {
     }
 
     // --- Fetch session viability from internal API ---
-    const { sessionStatus, sessionPointer } = await checkViability(request, viabilityEndpoint, log);
+    const { sessionStatus, sessionPointer } = await checkViability(
+      request,
+      viabilityEndpoint,
+      log,
+      revocationFailMode
+    );
 
     // --- Stale session (cookie exists but session doesn't): OBSERVE ONLY, DO NOT DECIDE ---
     //
@@ -538,11 +569,43 @@ export function createMvpMiddleware(options: MvpMiddlewareOptions = {}) {
   };
 }
 
+/**
+ * The revocation decision, as a pure function (PAY-1882 step 4, NightHawk 66392).
+ *
+ * Separate + exported so the B1 defect is testable with a REAL mutant: the bug was
+ * that `data.forceInvalid === true` was read BEFORE revocationFailMode, so a
+ * producer that folds 'unknown' into forceInvalid made the 'open' lever dead.
+ *
+ * RULE: when the producer supplies `revocationStatus`, it is AUTHORITATIVE - the
+ * decision is made from it plus failMode, and the folded booleans are ignored for
+ * 'unknown'/'not_configured'. The booleans are read ONLY when revocationStatus is
+ * absent (idealresume.online's older boolean-only route).
+ */
+export function decideForceInvalid(
+  data: { revocationStatus?: unknown; forceInvalid?: unknown; revoked?: unknown },
+  revocationFailMode: 'closed' | 'open',
+): boolean {
+  const status = data.revocationStatus;
+  if (typeof status === 'string') {
+    if (status === 'revoked') return true;
+    if (status === 'active') return false;
+    // S1 (NightHawk 66409): ANY other string - 'unknown', 'not_configured', a
+    // typo like 'Revoked', 'error', or '' - is treated as 'unknown' (fail mode
+    // applies), NEVER as 'active'. Returning false here would let the first
+    // producer that emits an unexpected state silently switch revocation OFF -
+    // the exact PAY-1880 fail-open class. Only an explicit 'active' is viable.
+    return revocationFailMode === 'closed';
+  }
+  // No revocationStatus: an older boolean producer. Absence of both stays false.
+  return data.forceInvalid === true || data.revoked === true;
+}
+
 /** Check session viability via internal API */
 async function checkViability(
   request: NextRequest,
   endpoint: string,
-  log: MiddlewareLogger
+  log: MiddlewareLogger,
+  revocationFailMode: 'closed' | 'open'
 ): Promise<{
   sessionStatus: SessionStatus;
   sessionPointer: SessionPointer;
@@ -581,6 +644,46 @@ async function checkViability(
       sessionStatus.exists = data.authenticated ?? (!!data.sessionTokenId && data.reason !== 'session_not_found');
       sessionStatus.requires2FA = data.requires2FA || false;
       sessionStatus.twoFactorComplete = data.twoFactorComplete || false;
+      // --- Session revocation (PAY-1882 Step 4) ---
+      // Two producer spellings are honoured, because both exist on the wire:
+      //   - boolean `forceInvalid` / `revoked` (idealresume.online's route today)
+      //   - the three-state `revocationStatus` the package's own viability
+      //     handlers now emit (PAY-1882 step 4).
+      //
+      // RULING (Jon, via BAPert 66316): 'revoked' ALWAYS fails closed. 'unknown'
+      // (a FAILED Vibe read) fails closed by default and is the ONLY state that
+      // the per-app `revocationFailMode` option can relax to viable.
+      //
+      // Four producer states (BAPert 66320), with the fail-closed ruling for
+      // 'not_configured' added by BAPert 66356:
+      //   'active'         - Vibe read OK, not revoked  -> viable
+      //   'revoked'        - Vibe says revoked          -> force-invalid, ALWAYS
+      //   'unknown'        - read FAILED                -> force-invalid if 'closed'
+      //   'not_configured' - no revocation source       -> force-invalid if 'closed'
+      //
+      // WHY 'not_configured' FAILS CLOSED WHEN 'closed': both live consumers of
+      // this middleware (portal.keelauth.com / keelauth-portal, idealvibe.online)
+      // DO set IDP_URL + VIBE_CLIENT_ID + VIBE_HMAC_KEY (BAPert 66356, measured in
+      // their committed manifests + the graft pipeline's own secret check), so for
+      // them 'not_configured' can only mean a MISCONFIGURATION - revocation
+      // silently switched off is exactly the PAY-1880 fail-open bug. An app with
+      // no revocation source that genuinely wants availability sets
+      // revocationFailMode 'open'.
+      //
+      // A MISSING revocationStatus (an older producer) keeps today's behaviour,
+      // i.e. NOT force-invalid: absence must never sign out a population that
+      // never opted into the check.
+      //
+      // *** revocationStatus IS AUTHORITATIVE WHEN PRESENT (NightHawk 66392). ***
+      // The package's own producers emit `forceInvalid: revocationStatus ===
+      // 'revoked' || revocationStatus === 'unknown'`. If the boolean were read
+      // FIRST, `forceInvalid: true` would short-circuit before revocationFailMode
+      // was consulted, so `'open'` could never keep an 'unknown' session viable -
+      // the opt-out lever would be DEAD. So: when a producer supplies a
+      // revocations status, decide from it + failMode and ignore the folded
+      // booleans for unknown/not_configured. The booleans are read ONLY when
+      // revocationStatus is ABSENT (idealresume.online's older boolean route).
+      sessionStatus.forceInvalid = decideForceInvalid(data, revocationFailMode);
       sessionPointer.exists = sessionStatus.exists ?? false;
       sessionPointer.sessionTokenId = data.sessionTokenId ?? null;
       sessionPointer.expired = data.accessTokenExpired || false;
@@ -792,3 +895,4 @@ async function handleRefresh(
     );
   }
 }
+

package/src/routes/auth/viability.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import {
 import { getIDPClientConfig } from '../../lib/idp-client-config';
 import { logExceptionWithCorrelation } from '../../lib/safe-error-response';
 import { tokenLogId } from '../../lib/token-log-id';
+import { getRevocationStatus, warnNonNumericUserId, resolveNumericIdpUserId, type RevocationStatus } from '../../vibe/sessions';
 
 /**
  * Get tenant-wide 2FA requirement from cached client config (from broker handshake)
@@ -262,6 +263,40 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
       session?.mfaVerified === false &&
       !(session.idpRefreshToken || (session as any)?.refreshToken);
 
+    // --- Session revocation status (PAY-1882 step 4 producer half) ---
+    /*
+     * Resolve the four-state revocation status for this user (BAPert 66320).
+     * Read it HERE, above every authenticated return, so all three responses
+     * carry the SAME value - the same discipline as nextStep above.
+     *
+     * The middleware fails CLOSED by default on 'unknown' (a failed Vibe read)
+     * and always on 'revoked'; 'active' and 'not_configured' stay viable. A
+     * consumer that does NOT read revocationStatus is unaffected - absent is not
+     * revoked - so shipping this changes nothing for them until they opt in.
+     */
+    let revocationStatus: RevocationStatus = 'not_configured';
+    if (session) {
+      // BAPert 66480 condition 2 / ruling (ii) 66700: the numeric IdP id comes from
+      // the token's own `sub` claim FIRST (session.userId can be an email).
+      const revocationUserId = resolveNumericIdpUserId(session, (session as any).idpAccessToken);
+      if (revocationUserId > 0) {
+        try {
+          revocationStatus = await getRevocationStatus(revocationUserId, sessionToken);
+        } catch {
+          // getRevocationStatus does not throw by contract, but never let a
+          // revocation probe take down the viability answer: fail closed.
+          revocationStatus = 'unknown';
+        }
+      } else {
+        // N1 (NightHawk 66392): a session exists but carries no usable numeric
+        // IdP id, so the check could not run -> 'unknown' (could not determine),
+        // NOT 'not_configured' (no revocation source).
+        // BAPert 66480 condition 1: emit ONE WARN (shape only) so a non-numeric
+        // id surfaces as a log line, not an unexplained sign-out.
+        revocationStatus = warnNonNumericUserId(sessionToken, session.userId);
+      }
+    }
+
     // Check access token expiry
     const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
     // 240654 addendum 2: fall back to the Redis session's own expiry.
@@ -312,6 +347,11 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
         needsRefresh: true,
         authenticated: true,
         sessionTokenId: sessionToken ? tokenLogId(sessionToken) : null,
+        // Session revocation (PAY-1882 step 4): the four-state status, plus the
+        // boolean the middleware's existing force-invalid branch already reads.
+        revocationStatus,
+        forceInvalid: revocationStatus === 'revoked' || revocationStatus === 'unknown',
+        revoked: revocationStatus === 'revoked',
         // Clear names for middleware decision-making
         tenantRequiresTwoFactor,
         userHasCompletedTenantTwoFactorRequirements,
@@ -393,6 +433,10 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
         twoFactorComplete: userHasCompletedTenantTwoFactorRequirements,
         accessTokenExpired: true,
         reason: 'Token expired',
+        // Session revocation (PAY-1882 step 4) - same value on every return.
+        revocationStatus,
+        forceInvalid: revocationStatus === 'revoked' || revocationStatus === 'unknown',
+        revoked: revocationStatus === 'revoked',
         // RBAC fields
         roles: session?.roles || [],
         clientId: resolveClientId(session?.idpClientId),
@@ -406,6 +450,10 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
       hasRefreshToken,
       authenticated: true,
       sessionTokenId: sessionToken ? tokenLogId(sessionToken) : null,
+      // Session revocation (PAY-1882 step 4) - same value on every return.
+      revocationStatus,
+      forceInvalid: revocationStatus === 'revoked' || revocationStatus === 'unknown',
+      revoked: revocationStatus === 'revoked',
       // Clear names
       tenantRequiresTwoFactor,
       userHasCompletedTenantTwoFactorRequirements,
@@ -428,6 +476,10 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
       viable: false,
       needsRefresh: false,
       authenticated: false,
+      // PAY-1882 step 4: an exception here means the status could not be read.
+      // Report 'unknown' (not a bare 500 with no revocation signal) so the
+      // middleware's fail-closed default applies rather than reading it as viable.
+      revocationStatus: 'unknown' as RevocationStatus,
       error: 'Failed to check session',
       code: 'INTERNAL_ERROR',
       correlationId

package/src/utils/api.ts

@@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ export const RECOVERY_EXPIRED_TEXT = 'This reset link has expired or was already
 
 export const RESET_NEUTRAL_TEXT = "We couldn't set that password. Check it meets the requirements shown and try again.";
 
+/**
+ * PAY-2103 (AUTH-009): the IdP refuses a password found in a breach corpus; the route projects a
+ * `password_breached: true` boolean, and the user reads this. Distinct from the policy sentence,
+ * which would wrongly tell them to re-read the requirements.
+ */
+export const RESET_BREACHED_TEXT = 'This password appears in a known data breach. Choose a different one.';
+
 /**
  * Three tiers for a 400/422 from reset (rigpert 60822, QAPert 60820), decided ONLY on codes the IdP actually sends:
  *   policy        details.code password_policy (projected by the handler as password_policy) -> the rule sentences
@@ -233,7 +240,9 @@ export class AccountApi {
             const policy = !!body?.password_policy;
             const rules = knownPasswordRules(body?.password_policy?.rules);
             const tokenInvalid = body?.reset_token_invalid === true;
-            const err = new Error(resetFailureText(res.status, rules, policy, tokenInvalid)) as Error & { rules?: string[]; code?: string };
+            // PAY-2103: a breached password is its own outcome, not a policy refusal.
+            const breached = body?.password_breached === true;
+            const err = new Error(breached ? RESET_BREACHED_TEXT : resetFailureText(res.status, rules, policy, tokenInvalid)) as Error & { rules?: string[]; code?: string };
             if (rules.length) err.rules = rules;
             if ((res.status === 400 || res.status === 422) && tokenInvalid && !policy) err.code = 'RECOVERY_EXPIRED';
             throw err;